




Canadhara Mahārāja Indrabhūti Gautama



Kṣamāśramana Jinbhadra Gaṇi's

GAṆADHARAVĀDA

*Along with
Maladhārin Hemacandra Sūri's Commentary*

Edited by

Muni Ratna-prabha Vijaya

Disciple of

Śāsana Sāmrāt Ācārya Mahārāj Vijaya Nemisūrīśvaraṇī

with

Translation, Digest of Commentary
and

Introduction

by

Prof Dhirubhai P Thaker M. A
Gujarat College, Ahmedabad

*Śrī Jaina Grantha Prakāśaka Sabhā
Pāṇṇrāpole Ahmedabad.*


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HIS HOLINESS ACĀRYA MAHARAJA
SRÎ VIJAYA NEMISŪKISVARAJI

DEDICATED

INTO

THE LOTUS-LIKE HANDS

OF

MY MOST REVERED GURU

SARVA-TANTRA SVATANTRA, JAGAD-GURU

ŚĀSANA SAMRĀT, SŪRICAḲRA CAḲRAVARTI

TAPĀGACCHĀDHIPATI, TĪRTHODDHĀRAḲA

BHATTĀRAḲA

HIS HOLINESS ACĀRYA MAHĀRĀJA

ŚRÎ VIJAYA NEMISŪRÎŚVARAJI

By

His most grateful and obedient

Pupil

RATNAPRABHA VIJAYA

Introduction

The Text of Ganadhara-vāda

(a) Sources

According to the Jainas, the religious principles of the present era came into existence right from the time of *Bhagavān Rṣabhadeva Svāmî*, the first *Tīrthankara* ¹

After him, the sacred works increased in number and quality when the religion was exalted to a high rank but they subsided in times of disorder and anarchy. Generally speaking, the preachings of all the *Tīrthankaras* happened to be of the same kind and their biographies almost resembled each other in principal characteristics.

The *Bhāgavata Purāna* supports the view that *Rṣabha-deva* was the founder of the present Jain canon. There is a reference of *Rṣabha-deva*, *Ajitanātha* and *Aristanemî* in *Yajur Veda*.

Śramana Bhagavān Mahāvīra, the elder contemporary of *Buddha*, was not only the last but Supreme *Tīrthankara* in the line of all Jain *Tīrthankaras*. Like his predecessors, *Śramana Bhagavān Mahāvīra* also had got his preachings composed in books. His *Ganadharas* or principal disciples arranged his

1 It is not only the Jain tradition that ascribes the origin of the religious system to *Rṣabha-deva*, but there is historical evidence also to show that so far back as the first century B C there were people who were worshipping *Rṣabha-deva* the first *Tīrthankara*.

preachings in twelve *Angas* the twelfth *Anga* being divided into fourteen *Pūrvas*. These *Pūrvas* have been accepted by the *Śvetāmbaras* and the *Digambaras* as probably the oldest Sacred Works of the Jaina canon. The tradition of the *Śvetāmbaras* about the fourteen *Pūrvas* is this —The fourteen *Pūrvas* had been incorporated in the twelfth *Anga* (the *Dṛṣṭvāda*) which was lost before 1000 A.V. But a detailed table of its contents and consequently of the *Pūrvas* has survived in the fourth *Anga* the *Samavāyāṅga* and in the *Nandī Sūtra*.²

We are told by the tradition that *Ārya Jambu Svāmī* was the last *Kevalī*. After him, the under-mentioned six Heads of the Church viz *Prabhava Svāmī*, *Sāyyambhava Svāmī*, *Yasobhadra Svāmī*, *Sambhuti-vijaya Svāmī*, *Bhadrabāhu Svāmī* and *Śhulabhadrā* were *Sruta-Kevalīs*. Out of these *Bhadrabāhu Svāmī* was the last *Pattadhara* (Head of the Church) who had all the twelve *Angas* along with the fourteen *Pūrvas* along with their meanings and explanations of intricate subjects in his memory. *Ārya Śhulabhadrā* had a thorough knowledge of the meanings and explanations of the ten *Pūrvas* and a knowledge of the remaining four *Pūrvas* (11 12 13 14) but not their meanings and explanations. Besides he was instructed not to impart the knowledge of the four *Pūrvas* (11 12 13 14) to anyone. Thus the knowledge of the *Pūrvas* decreased gradually.

After him there was a line of ten successors who had a thorough knowledge of ten *Pūrvas*. They were known as *Dasapūrvīs*. The last *Dasapūrvī* was *Vajra Svāmī* after whom the knowledge of *Pūrvas* went on vanishing. The last who had a knowledge of one *Pūrvā* was *Devarddhī Gaṇī* *Āmāda ramāna*.

² Vide Weber Indische Studien XVI p. 341

The Śvetāmbaras accept the existence and validity of the *Siddhāntas* (Sacred Works) but the *Digambaras* believe that the real *s'āstras* or religious works have already vanished and the sacred works, which are accepted by the *Jaina* canon at present, have no validity.

At present, the Sacred Works of the Śvetāmbaras are forty-five in all. Some of them are written in prose and some in verse. There are eleven *Angas*, twelve *Upāngas*, ten *Prakîrṇas*, six *Cheda sūtras*, two *Sūtras*, and four *Mūla-sūtras* ³

As seen before, the knowledge of the original preachings of Śramana Bhagavān Mahāvîra had begun to fade gradually, and hence it was rightly felt by his successors to arrange the preachings into various books. As a result of their efforts, the religious works mentioned above were composed.

Out of these, the four *Mūla Sūtras* are considered as the Original *Sūtras* or Commandments, as they are primarily needed to guide the *Jaina* monks in their religious practices. The four *Mūla Sūtras* are.—(1) The *Āvas'yaka* (2) *Das'avakālîka* (3) *Uttarādhyana* and (4) *Pīṇḍa Nirvyukti* (or *Ogha Nirvyukti*). According to Weber, the order of composition of these *sūtras* is this —(1) *Uttarādhyayana* (2) *Āvas'yaka* (3) *Das'avakālîka* and (4) *Pīṇḍa Nirvyukti*.

Of the four *Mūla Sūtras*, the *Āvas'yaka* as its name suggests—is the most important of all. It is divided into six sections —(1) *Sāmāyîka* (*Sāmāyîya*), (2) *Caturvims'atî stava* (*caurvîsattho*), (3) *Vandanaka* (*Vandanayam*), (4) *Pratî-*

³ In addition to the above-named forty-five Sacred Works, some people enumerate twenty more *Prakîrṇas*, twelve *Nirvyuktis* and several others arriving at the total number of eighty-four. Again, in order to supplement the information supplied by these eighty-four *Āgamas* there are several other works known as *Nigamas* or *Upanisads* which, in turn, are thirty-six in all.

brahmana (*Padikkamana*), (5) *Kāyotsarga* (*Kāussagga*) and (6) *Pratyāhnyana* (*Paccakkhāna*). It should be noted that though all these *sūtras* were dedacted into books by *Ganadhara*s they were originally preached by *Sramana Bhagvān Mahāvīra Svami* 4

The *Niryukti* of the *Āvasyaka Sūtras* had already been written by *Śrīmaṇ Bhadrabahu Svami* and a number of *curnis* (detailed commentaries) were also composed by various authors as commentaries on the *Āvasyaka Sūtras*. Still however *Jinabhadra Gana kpmas ramana* felt the need of elucidating the original *niryukti*. He therefore composed a *bhāṣya* or commentary running in *gāthās* or verses on the original *niryukti* of the *Sāmdhyika Sūtras*. Since this was an additional *bhāṣya* to various other *bhāṣyas* prepared by different authors it was known as *Viśeṣāvasyaka Bhāṣya* or an *Additional Bhāṣya* to the *Āvasyaka* (*Sāmdhyika*) *Sūtras*.

The whole work runs into 3603 *Gāthās* or verses. The *Viśeṣāvasyaka Bhāṣya* could further be divided into various sub-sections such as—*Pīṭhikā Varavarūla* the *Upasargas* the *Sāmdhārt* (of ten varieties), *Ganadhara-vāda* the *Ganadhara*s the *Ninhavas* *Sesa Upodghata Niryukti* and a-*svadhyaya Niryukti*. Of these *Ganadhara-vāda* is one of the most important sub-sections as it deals with the discussion between *Sramana Bhagavan Mahāvīra Svami* and his *ganadhara*s (or principal disciples) on various philosophical topics such as the existence of *Jīva Karma, Pāpa Punya* and *Mokṣa* etc

(b) Commentaries.

Three commentaries are said to have been written on the text of *Viśeṣāvasyaka Bhāṣya*. The author himself is

4 *Vide* केय कथंति य वपहारजो जियिदेज गणहरेहि च ।

तस्सामिजा उ विच्छपनयस्स तत्तो जमोऽणण्ण ॥ ३३८२ ॥

(विशेषायहयकमाप्प)

said to have written a commentary on his own work, but unfortunately, his commentary is not available at present. The second commentary has been written by *Kotyācārya* (or *S'ī-lānkācārya*) the manuscript of which dated 1136 V S. is preserved in a tattered condition in the *Bhāndārkar* Research Institute, Poona. This commentary has not been published as yet. The only commentary that has been published and popularly accepted at present, is that of *Maladhārī Hemacandī ācārya*

Maladhārī Hemacandī ācārya is different from *Kalī-Kāla Sarvajña Hemcandrācārya*, the wellknown author of *Dvyās'raya*. Originally, he was wellknown as *Pandit Svetāmbarācārya Bhattāraka*. But his worldly name was *Pradyumna* and in the prime of his youth, it is said, he was a minister. By the advice of *S'ī Abhaya-deva Sūri* he renounced the worldly life and having left his four wives, he entered the ascetic life. *Siddharāja Jayasinha*, the great monarch of Gujarat, of the twelfth century V S, was highly impressed by his great personality and wide-spread well-versedness.

(c) *Ganadharas—their names, lineage etc*

Śramana Bhagavān Mahāvīra had eleven *ganadharas* in all. All except *Indrabhūti Gautama* and *Sudharmā Swāmī* had attained *Nirvāna* or Final Emancipation during the lifetime of their celebrated preceptor *Indrabhūti Gautama* and *Sudharmā Swāmī* had attained *mokṣa* at *Rājagriha*, after the *Nirvāna* of *Śramana Bhagavān Mahāvīra*.

All *ganadharas* belonged to the high-born families. Being directly under the guidance of *Śramana Bhagavān Mahāvīra*, they became wide-read professors and knew all the twelve *Angas* along with fourteen *Pūrvas*.

The Table attached herewith supplies all information about the eleven *ganadharas*.

Serial No	Name of the Ganadhara	Parents Name	Lineage (Gotra)	Place of Birth (Janmasthan)
1	Indrabhūti	Vasubhūti and Pṛthivī	Gautama	The Village of Gobara in Magadha
2	Agnibhūti		"	"
3	Vayubhūti		"	"
4	Vyakta	Dharmamitra and Vāruṇa	Bhāradvāja	Kollāga-Sanniveśa
5	Sudharma	Dharmilla and Bhaddita	Agnivāsiyāyana	"
6	Maṇḍika	Dhanadeva † and Vijayadevi	Vasiṣṭha	Mauryasanniveśa
7	Maurya	Maurya and Vijayadevi	Kāśyapa	"
8	Akampita	Vasu and Nanda	Hārita	Mithila
9	Aślabhrātī	Deva and Jayanti	Gautama	Kośala
10	Metārya	Datta and Varuṇadevi	Kaundīya	The Village of Tunaika in Kośambi
11	Prabhāsa	Bala and Atibhadra		Rājagṛīhanagar

† After the death of her first husband Dhanadeva Vijayadevi lived with Maurya. This shows that widow-remarriage was in vogue in those days.

Name of Constellation at the time of Birth (Naksatra)	Duration of household life (Griha-vasa)	Duration of life incognito (Chad-mastha-paryāya)	Duration of life in state of Perfect Knowledge (Kevāli Paryāya)	Total age	Remarks
Jyesthā	50 years	30 years	12 years	92 years	He was the first Pattadhara of the Jaina-Church §
Kṛitika	46 years	12 years	16 years	74 years	
Swatī	42 years	10 years	18 years	70 years	
Śravana	50 years	12 years	18 years	80 years	
Uttarāphalgunī	50 years	42 years	8 years	100 years	
Maghā	53 years	14 years	16 years	83 years	
Rohiṇī	65 years	2 years	16 years	95 years	
Mṛigaśīrṣa	46 years	12 years	14 years	72 years	
Uttarāśadhā	48 years	9 years	21 years	78 years	
Āśvinī	36 years	10 years	16 years	62 years	
Puṣya	16 years	8 years	16 years	40 years	

§ Cf गुरुपरिवाहीमूल, तिथ्ययरो वद्धमाननामेण ।
तत्पट्टोदयपट्टमो, सुदृग्मनामेण गणसामी ॥

(Tapāgacchapattāvalī, Ed-by Kalyānavijayajī).

(d) Summary of the Text.

We give below a summary of the text of *Ganadhara-vada* which is contained in *Gāthas* running from 1549 to 2024 of the *Viśvaśāyaka Bhāṣya*.

(i) *Jīva* - *Indrabhūti Gautama* the first *Ganadhara* puts forward his doubt about the existence of Soul and *S'ramana Bhagavan Mahavira* removes the doubt by means of various evidences and illustrations. Explaining the meaning of the word *Jīva* the *Bhagavan* remarks that *Jīva* 'does not signify body-*deha*-but it signifies the soul-*ātma*-which is full of cognizance. Body is only inanimate

Smṛti (remembrance), *jyāsa* (desire for knowledge) *cikṛṣa* (desire for activity) *jigamṣā* (desire for movements) and *samsaya* (doubt) etc. are the properties of Soul, which being self-evident is *pratyakṣa* or directly apprehended. Since body is corporeal and physically visible properties like cognizance etc. cannot reside into it. These properties are contained in Soul because it is *a-mūrta* or incorporeal and *a-ādṛṣṭa* or beyond the range of physical sight. This shows that Soul is absolutely different from body

In reply to the argument of the Vedantists that Soul being one and the same everywhere can never be classified *S'ramana Bhagavān Mahavira* *Swami* contends that if the Soul were one absolute entity pervading everywhere it ought to have been apprehended as one all-pervading element like *ākāśa* even in case of each and every *pinda* or body. But that is not so. The Soul varies with the shape and size of *pinda* or body. Besides if we deny the existence of Soul there would be nothing like *sukha-duḥkha* and *Bandha-Mokṣa* in this world.

The Soul is accepted as *vijñānaghana* or an assemblage of many *vijñānas* (cognitions) firstly because it is identical with *vijñāna* which is *upayoga* (attention) either of the type of *jñāna* (knowledge) or that of *darsana* (perception) and

secondly because the soul has its each and every *prades'a* (the minutest portion) formed from the assemblage of infinite modifications of *vynāna*

According to the *Nanyāyika* School, the Soul is devoid of *vynāna* and hence inanimate. The *Jaina* Preceptor refutes this theory by arguing that the soul is said to have been produced and destroyed only with regard to *upayoga* or attention but it is indestructible so far as *vynāna* is concerned on account of its *vynāna-santati* or the perpetual continuance of cognition

(u) *Karma*: Solving the doubt of *Agnibhūti*, the second *Ganadhara*, *S'ramana Bhagavān Mahāvīra Svāmī* establishes the existence and significance of *Karma* as follows —

Just as a sprout has seed as its *hetu* or cause, the pleasure and pain experienced by the people of this world must also have some sort of *hetu*. This *hetu* is nothing but deeds or *Karmas* of the living beings in their past life. Just as the body in youth has the body in childhood to precede it, the body in childhood has also some sort of body to precede it. The body formed of *Karmas* of the past life and hence known as *Kārmana Śarīra*, precedes the body in childhood

Just as each and every act performed by a living being in this world yields a fruit, as is seen in case of tilling the ground and many other acts, so also the acts of charity etc. undertaken by a living being undoubtedly yield fruit which is nothing but *Karma*.

Since a majority of living beings is found unhappy and only a few of them are found happy, we can easily infer that there are only a few who perform good actions and there are many who perform evil actions. It should be noted that *Karma* here is different from *Kṛiyā* or action, as *Karma* becomes *Kārya*, and *Kṛiyā* the *Kāraṇa*

Since pleasure and pain etc. are the properties of soul,

the soul would become their *samavayi-karana* or the intimate cause and *Karma* a *numatta* or the external cause *Karma* is corporeal

Since *Kārmāna Śarīra* is closely connected with *jīva* it is beyond the power of senses to perceive it. But there is no doubt that it is a sort of *subtle* (*subtle*) *śarīra* of an interior nature. Consequently like the variegated transformations found in clouds *vicitrata* or variegations should be accepted in case of *Kārmāna Śarīra* as well

The Soul is connected with *Karma* as intimately as a *mūrta ghata* is connected with *a-mūrta akus'a* or a *mūrta* finger is connected with the *a-mūrta* actions of expansion and contraction.

So, like seed and sprout body and *Karma* are mutually related as *hetu* and *hetumat* rendering thereby the *Karma-saṃptana anādi* or beginningless

Finally by the help of *Veda-padas* the *Bhagavān* establishes *Karma* as the intervening agent which helps the soul in the production of body. He further explains that *punya* is produced by holy deeds and *pāpa* by unholy deeds.

(iii) *Relation Between Soul and Body* According to *Vāyabkṛt* the third *Gāyadhara* soul and body are identical. But the Great Preceptor explains him the relation between soul and body in details and removes his illusion. According to him *cetana* or consciousness is not the property of each one of the five *bhūtas* or principal elements which constitute the body but *cetana* is the intrinsic quality of soul reaking into a group of *bhūtas*. For if *cetana* were the quality of all *bhūtas* taken together it ought to exist in a dead body as well. But it does not happen so

Just as *Devadatta* who recollects an object perceived through the five windows of a palace in the past, is different

from the five windows as well as the palace, so also a person recollecting an object apprehended by the five senses of a body, is different from the body and its five senses

When *Devadatta* recalls an object seen through a number of windows, even when the windows are closed, it is *ātman* or soul that recollects the object perceived through sense-organs even when the sense-organs have ceased working as in case of benumbed state of blindness, deafness etc. This shows evidently that *ātman* is different from *indriyas*. Or, say, for example, a soul who observes a person eating tamarind by means of eyes, and exhibits *vikāras* or perversion by distilling saliva etc by means of tongue is decidedly different from eyes as well as tongue. Or, *ātman* is different from *indriyas*, because having seen an object by means of eyes, *ātman* holds it by means of hands.

In reply to the *Buddhist* theory that like all objects, *jīva* is destructible, it is argued that one who remembers the incidents that happened in former time and place, is existing like *Devadatta* who is able to recollect his experience of childhood. So, the soul also can never vanish on account of its being able to recollect the past life.

Bauddhas advocate the destructibility of *jñāna* (knowledge) by means of statements such as “*Yat sat tat sarvam kṣaṇikam*” and “*Ekavijñānasantatayaḥ sattvāḥ*” etc. But if the destructibility of knowledge were accepted, there would be absolute negation of *smarana*. *Jñāna* of the *pramātā* (or the perceiver) should, therefore, be taken as indestructible. *Jñāna* being a quality could never exist without a substance. This shows distinctly that soul is distinguished from body.

Further, according to *Bauddhas*, *kṣaṇikatā* or impermanence is recognized neither by means of self-perception nor by the help of perception through sense-organs, but by means of *anumāna* or inference only. They further believe that the

earlier moments of apprehension create such a desire during the later moments of apprehension that by virtue of that desire even a *kṣāntika vyāhāra* having only one support is able to apprehend other *jāhāras* and their *visayas*. But the theory advanced by *Bauddhas* is fallacious. For *rasana* or desire mentioned above could be applied only when it is related to *varata* or *vaśantiya* and could never be applied to the knowledge that vanishes immediately after its birth.

Lastly if *atman* were taken to be *kṣāntika* a number of faults such as production of many objects at a time retention of *vyāhāra* and violation of the law of cause and effect etc. would crop up. These faults could only be avoided if soul were taken as susceptible to *utpāda* or production *vyaya* or destruction and *dhrāvya* or retention.

In addition to all these arguments the sentences of *Vedas* also lead to establish that *atman* is different from body.

(iv) *Existence of Elements* In course of discussion with the fourth *Ganadhara* named *Vyākṛta* the *Bhagavan* explains the validity of the view that elements do exist.

Since *jīva* etc. are contained in *bhūtas* or elements doubt about *bhūtas* gives rise to doubt about the existence of all leading to the idea of all-pervading negation. Consequently we will be compelled to take the whole Universe as nothing but illusion or dream. And according to this notion of all-pervading negation there will be no distinction between *sva-mata* or one's own opinion and *para-mata* or another's opinion *brāhma* or small and *dīrgha* or long and so on.

Some objects are self-accomplished like a cloud produced as a result of collision with the element as a cause without the help of any *Karta* or agent. Some objects are accomplished like *ghata* by means of an outside agent while some other objects are produced by means of their virtues as well as the outside agents as in the case of a child produced by means

of its parents as well as its own *Karmas*. Lastly, there also exist some objects which are permanently accomplished like sky.

Whatever is accepted and apprehended by us as being produced by means of *sāmagrî* or a group of materials, is nothing but a collection of atoms. This naturally leads us to believe in the existence of atoms

Out of the five main *bhūtas* or elements, the first four viz. *Prthvî* (earth), *ap* (water), *tejas* (fire) and *vāyu* are *sa-cetana* or animate because the symptoms of *cetanā* are found in all of them But the fifth element viz, *ākāśa* (sky) being *a-mūrta* or incorporeal, acts only as a support and has no life.⁵

Though distinct from the variations of clouds etc., bodies made of the first four elements are *sa-cetana* only so long as they are unstruck by any implement These bodies turn lifeless immediately if and when they are struck by some implement

At this point, the *Bhagavān* explains the important doctrine of *Ahimsā* or non-violence He dictates that according to the specific laws of morality, that which results in evil consequences is called *himsā* and that which results in good fruition is called *a-himsā*

One does not commit *himsā* in spite of his striking a *jīva* if his motive in doing so is beneficial at the end, on the other hand, a person is said to have committed *himsā* on account of his evil motive In spite of his abstention from striking a living being

All these facts lead to prove that the *bhūtas* do exist, and that out of the five main *bhūtas*, the first four are *sa-cetana*.

(v) *Identity of Existence* Sudharman, the fifth *Ganadhara*, asked a question as to whether a living being in

⁵ Vegetables being only a variety of *Prthvî* should be included under *Prthvî*

this world lived a similar life in the other world *Sramana Bhagavan Mahavira* *Sicāmi* removes his illusion by the following explanation —

Attainment of re-birth or existence in the other world depends upon the *Karmas* of an individual. The *Karma-bandhu*—which binds the soul to the body—is caused by *mithyātva* (wrong belief), *a-vrata* (non-renunciation), *pramada* (carelessness) and *yoga* (vibrations set up in the soul through mind body and speech). *Para-bhava* being dependent upon *Karma* happens to be vicarious like *Karma*. So if the life in two existences were one and the same there would be no scope for an increase or decrease in it. In such a case one who is rich in this life would become rich in the next life also and a poor man in this life would remain poor in the next life as well. Thus, there would be nothing like progress or retardation if this and the other life were to be the same or identical. And consequently there would be no justification for the practice of religious duties and pious deeds in this world.

This shows clearly that similarity or identity between the two *bhavas* or existences would never be possible and the belief is refuted by means of *Veda-padas* like “*Srugalo vaśa jayate yaj sa-purīṣo dahyate*” etc. also

(vi) *Bandha and Mokṣa*. Since body and soul are connected with each other as *hetu* and *hetumat* they must have perpetual continuance. The tendency of body is such that it becomes the cause of the future body and effect of the past *Karmas*. In case of an *anadī santāna* also that which is the cause of future body and effect of the past one, becomes decidedly a perpetual continuance of body and *Karma*. This proves the existence of *Karma-bandha*.

The mutual relation between *Jīva* and *Karma* is endless and beginningless (*anadī ananta*) like sky and at the same time beginningless but limited (*anadī santa*) like that between

gold and stone. The *anādi ananta* relation exists with regard to *a-bhavya* or mean *jîvas*, and the *anādi sânta* relation exists with regard to *bhavya* or higher souls.

Bhavya means that which is fit for the attainment of *Siddhi*. The group of such *bhavyas* is endless like *ālās'a*, and hence it could never be destroyed.

Moksa means separation or shedding off of the *karma-pudgalas* from soul. *Moksa* is neither *kṛitaka* or artificial, nor *a-nitya* or impermanent. It can be said to be *a-nitya* only to the extent that everything is *nitya* or everlasting as *dravya* (substance) and *a-nitya* or impermanent as *paryāya* or modification. Like consciousness movement is also an important property of soul.

Free souls possess movements. But these free souls cannot go beyond *Siddha-ksetra* in absence of *dharmāstikāya*. *Dharmāstikāya* and *Adharmāstikāya* are the only two factors which distinguish *loka* from *a-loka*.

Like *Kāla*, *Muktātmā* is also *anādi*. That is, just as nobody knows which was a first day or a first night, since the stream of *Kāla* flows on from times immemorial, in the same way no body knows when the first free soul came into existence. Innumerable *siddhas* or *mukta* beings could be contained in one *siddha-ksetra* by virtue of their *a-mūrtatva* or formlessness as the *Siddha-ksetra* has only limited dimensions.

Bandha and *Moksa* are, therefore, laid down as positive factors existing by virtue of *Karmas* as shown above.

(vii-viii) *Existence of Devas and Narakas*. Existence of *devas* or gods and *Narakas* or hellish denizens could be proved in various ways.

At the time of a *Tīrthankara's* birth, many gods and goddesses come to this world to pay their homages.

Like luminary gods such as Moon etc other gods are also perceptible. Here if it is said that Moon etc are not luminary gods but they are mere places of habitation there ought to exist inhabitants of these places also. And these inhabitants are none but gods.

It is impossible to find people in this world who are cent percent happy or cent percent unhappy. For in this world a happiest man is undoubtedly affected by some sort of disease or old age and an extremely miserable man will experience the happy breeze of cool wind, and the brightness of light. From this point of view human beings could never be called cent per cent happy or cent per cent unhappy. It is the *Narakas* or hellish denizens only who are destined to the cent per cent misery and it is the *devas* or divine beings who enjoy cent per cent happiness. It is true that sometimes a human being is allegorically called a god but we should not forget that unless and until the principal meaning of a word is attained the secondary meaning could never be attributed to it. All these arguments show that although gods and *narakas* are *acatkṛtā* i. e. beyond the perception of senses they do exist.

(ix) *Pāpa-Punya* There are five different theories about the existence of *papa-punya* —

(1) There exists *punya* alone which increases or decreases causing pleasure or pain. (2) There exists *pāpa* alone which increases or decreases causing pain or pleasure. (3) *Punya* and *papa* exist in a combined state like *maṇḍamāni*. (4) *Punya* and *papa* are independent of each other. (5) There is n thing like *Karma* and hence there is nothing lik *punya* and *papa* also.

Sramana Bhagavan Mahavira Swami refutes all the above-mentioned theories and establishes his own in this way:—

Just as a potter accompanied by earth stick wheel etc, happens to be the cause of *ghaṭa* there do exist *punya* and

pāpa which are but respectively good and evil forms of *Karma*, that works as the *hetu* or cause in the production of body. Though there exist visible *hetus* like father and mother in the production of body, there do exist invisible *hetus* like *punyas* and *pāpas* also, which determine the form proportionate or im-proportionate, beautiful or ugly, according as it is due to *punya* or *pāpa*. In other words, *s'ubha s'arīra* is the product of *punya karma*, and *a-s'ubha s'arīra* is the product of *pāpa karma*.

Like the *mūrta ghata* which becomes the cause of *a-mūrta jñāna*, the *mūrta karma* is also the cause of *a-mūrta sukha-duhkha* or pleasure and pain etc. The experience of exquisite happiness is caused by the abundance of *punya* and the experience of utmost misery is due to the abundance of sins.

Punya and *pāpa* which thus act as the causes of happiness and misery are independent of each other. Since there is no reason for the *Karma-bandha* of *punya* and *pāpa* taken together, they can never exist in a combined state like *mecakamanī*. As seen before, *mithyātvā*, *a-vratī*, *kasāya*, *pramāda* and *yoga* are the main causes of *Karma-bandha*. None of these causes happens to operate in case of the production of a combined state of *mecakamanī*.

Fruition of *jīva s'ubha* or *as'ubha* turns the *Karma s'ubha* or *as'ubha* at the time of apprehension.

Food of the same kind produces blood, flesh and saliva etc in the body on one hand, and results in useful refuse of faeces and urine also on the other hand. In the same way, *Karma* though apprehended in similar ways, results as *s'ubha* or *a-s'ubha* by virtue of *parināma* and *ās'raya*. Thus, according to Jainism, there do exist *punya* and *pāpa* as separate entities.

(x) *Para-bhava or the Other World*. Since *Ātman* is susceptible to production, destruction and retention as seen before, it must have an access to the next world. When *jīva* first apprehends *ghata* and then apprehends *pata*, the

apprehension of *ghata*—known as *ghaṭa-cetana*—is destroyed, that about *pata*—or *paṭa-cetana*—is produced and the *cetana* is retained in a continuous range of consciousness existing from times immemorial.

The same is the case with *jīva*s which are staying in this world or which have already passed to the other world. For since they are susceptible to *utpada vyaya* and *dhrowaya* they have a natural access to the next world.

Moreover if there were absolute negation of *para-lāṭa* the commandments of performing *agmhatra* etc. for one desirous of Salvation and the prescription of the rewards of righteous deeds such as charity etc. would be of no avail.

(xi) *Nirvāṇa or Final Emancipation* Buddhist theory of *Nirvāṇa* is this—A lamp when extinguished does never fade into any sort of earth ether or space but it only pacifies itself so also the Soul when finally liberated (from body) does never fade into earth or sky nor does it pass to any of the directions but it only attains pacification at the removal of worldly bondages of *sukha-duḥkha*

There is another theory also which asserts that *mokṣa* or *nirvāṇa* is a peculiar positive condition of the soul at the attainment of Absolute Knowledge and Perception when all sorts of miseries such as affection enmity pride avarice infatuation birth death old age and diseases etc. have been removed

Refuting both the above-stated theories *Sramana Bhagavan Mahavira* asserts that *mokṣa* means the entire separation of *Ārma* from the region of soul. Since the mundane world has its production due to *Karma* it vanishes with *Karma*. But *jīvatva* happens to exist from times immemorial and is not produced by *Karma*. So *jīvatva* naturally can never vanish with *Ārma*. It is not proper therefore to believe that at the time of *Nirvāṇa* *jīva* vanishes like a lamp.

Really speaking, the flame of lamp does not vanish entirely but it only changes its form. Just as milk changes its form into curds, the flame of lamp changes into darkness. The minute particles of the flame of a lamp transform themselves into still more minute particles of darkness which are not perceptible. But that does not mean that they have ceased to exist entirely. As a matter of fact, the light-particles of the flame which were perceptible to the eye would become perceptible to nose when turned into darkness. So, the lamp does not entirely die away, but it only changes from light into darkness which is perceptible. Like a lamp, a *jīva* is also said to have attained *Nirvāṇa* or Final Emancipation, when that *jīva* passes into a new form which is *a-mūṛta*, free from *Karma-bandhas* and which is unobstructible. This, therefore, shows that the pure, eternal, positive condition of *jīva* at the removal of obstructions like *sukha-duḥkha* is called the state of *Nirvāṇa* or Final Emancipation to the *jīva*.

Like a sage, engrossed in the highest bliss of Absolute Knowledge, a *Muktātmā* liberated from the bondages of all sorts of worldly miseries like birth, death, and old age etc. enjoys a blissful state of Perfect Knowledge.

Finally, explaining the real interpretation of the sentences of *Vedas* such as “*Na ha vaṁ sas'arîrasya priyā'priyayopahatirasti*” as well as “*As'arîram vā vasantam priyā'priye na spris'ataḥ*” etc., *S'ramana Bhagavān Mahāvîra Svāmî* convinces the *Ganadhara* of the validity of the theory of *Nirvāṇa* and removes all his doubts. (For further explanation see discussion with the last *Ganadhara*)

II The Author—His Life, Works and Dates.

(a) Life

Jinabhadra Ganî Kṣamās'ramana is the author of this splendid work. Very little is known about his life. Yet,

there is no doubt that the author was a highly-esteemed scholar of his age *

He was the first *Jaina* writer and preacher who had consistently attempted to interpret and explain the principles of the *Jaina* Canon (or the religious principles preached by the great *Jinas*) in such a manner as to appeal to the intellect of the people. That is to say he did not instruct his pupils or followers only in a traditional artificial way without caring for the inner motive or spirit of the preachings. Though he preached the same old traditional principles of the *Jaina* Canon he interpreted and explained them in a logical way so as to appeal to their intellect. He was therefore accepted by the people as an unparalleled preacher and scholar of the age and hence was awarded the title of युगप्रधान *yugapradhāna* *†

His knowledge was not confined to the religious lore but

6. Here are the tributes paid to him by several commentators—

(1) जिनमद्रगमिं स्तौमि समाधमममुत्तमम् ।

यः भुताजीवमुद्भवे शीरिः सिन्धोः सुषामिव ॥ १ ॥

—*Tilakdānya* in his *Avataryako Vṛtti*.

(ii) बाष्पैर्विशेषातिशयेर्विम्बसन्देहहारिमिः ।

जिनमुद्ं जिनमद्र किं समाधममं स्तुवं ॥

—*Mum Candra Śūri* in *Amara Candra*

(iii) जिनयजननतं विषमं माकार्यं यो विद्विष्य शिष्येभ्यः ॥

इत्यमुपादिशदमलं परोपकारीककृतयेता ॥

तं नमत बोधब्रह्मणि शुभमक्षिरमयिनपाग्मिनां श्रेष्ठम् ॥

परमधिवापगूढं जिनमद्रगमिसमाधममम् ॥

—*Malayagiri Śūri* in his *Commentary on Brihat Kātra Samāsa*.

7 *Vide* समद्वय अनुमोग-धर जगत्प्राण पञ्चाय नाजायमयं ।

सद्य-सुर-साय इत्यलं वसण-माशोषमोगामगमिदिपं ॥

—*Siddhasena Śūri* in his *Ōṛm* on *Jalakaputra*.

he was well-versed in the sciences of mathematics, etymology, prosody, and phonology also ⁸

Still, however, *Ācārya Jinabhadra Gani* was the staunch and orthodox upholder of the traditional *Jaina Canon*. Though he knew many sciences, his extensive knowledge and intelligence were taken advantage of only for establishing the authenticity and validity of the *Jaina Āgamas*. He is therefore, taken as one of the pioneer *āgama-pradhāna* or orthodox *Ācāryas* ⁹

He used to take the support of logical illustrations and inferences only partially in the sense that such illustrations or inferences were quoted only if they strengthened the viewpoint of the traditional *Jaina Āgamas*, and were rejected if they went against the traditional preachings. The example of his predecessor *Siddhasena Divākara* is well-known. *Siddhasena* was a free-minded but logical interpreter. His works are full of original thoughts and independent ideas irrespective of their being different from or similar to the traditional *Jaina Āgamas*. The theory that Absolute Knowledge and Absolute Perception do not take place simultaneously but one after the other, has been proved by him by the help of logical inferences and concrete illustrations. *Siddhasena* thus went against the traditional view of the *Jaina Āgamas* according to which the *Kevala-Jñāna* and the *Kevala-Dars'ana* took place simultaneously. *Jinabhadra Gani Kṣamās'ramana* repudiates the theory

8 *Vide* स-समय पर-समयागम-लिवि-गणिय-छन्द-सहनिम्माओ ।

दससु वि दिसासु जस्स य अणुओगो (अणुवमो) भणइ जसपडहो ॥

(Ibid)

9 *Vide* परसमयागम-निडणं सुसमिय-सुसमण-समाहिमगणमयं ।

जिणभइखमासमणं खमासमणाणं निहाणमिव एकं ॥

(Ibid)

Also vide *Jītakalpasaūtra* (Ed-by *Muni Jinavijayaji*), Editor's Preface, p 7

of *Siddhasena Divakara* in his *Visestvayaka Bhāṣya* and re-establishes the original theory of the *Jaina Āgamas* that *Kevala Darsana* and *Kevala Jñāna* take place simultaneously ¹⁰

Jinabhadra Gani is thus well-renowned as the preserver of the *Jaina* traditions

That *Jinabhadra Gani Kṣama Sramana* was an orator of established reputation is known from several sources. The commentator *Hemacandrācarya Maladhāri* refers to *Jinabhadra Gani* as *Upa Jinabhadra Kṣama Sramanah Vyākhyātārak* ¹¹. Another commentator named *Ācārya* who has written a commentary on the *Visestvayaka Bhāṣya* pays him a tribute to the same effect in the last verse of his commentary. He says ¹²

मास्य सामायिकस्य स्फुटविकटपदार्थोपगूढ बृहत्-
 क्षीमत्पूज्यैरकारि घतकस्तुपक्षिषां भूरिसंस्कारधारि ।
 तस्य व्याख्यानमात्रं किमपि विद्वत्ता यन्मया पुष्पमातृ-
 प्रेस्याह द्राग् लभेय परमपरिमितां प्रीतिमत्रैव तेन ॥

No more information is available about the life of this great *Ācārya*

(b) Works

Jinabhadra Gani Kṣama Sramana is said to have composed the following works —

(1) *Visestvayaka Bhāṣya*. This wellknown work has been ranked as one of the most important and highly esteemed works of *Jainism*. The author himself wrote a commentary on this *Bhāṣya* in *Sanskrit*. *Jinabhadra Gani* has earned

10 *Vide* *वेदवैतन्य-भाष्योपलक्षण* (मध्यमि) द्विप ।

11 *Vide* 'Short History of *Jaina Literature*' Ed. by M. D. Desai, p. 162 foot-note

the reputation as a commentator mainly from this work For, wherever he has been referred to as *Bhāsyakāra*, the references have been quoted from *Viś'esāvas'yaka Bhāṣya* But as has been suggested in the Preface to the *Jīta Kalpa Sūtra*¹² it is not improbable if *Jinabhadra Gaṇi Ksamā S'ramana* had composed other *bhāṣyas* as well. Take, for example, the following verse from the *Viś'esāvas'ayaka Bhāṣya*—

पोगल-मोदय-दन्ते फरुसगवडसालभंजने चैव ।

थीणाद्वियस्स ए ए दिट्ठेता होंति नायवा ॥ २३५ ॥

In this verse, the examples of *poggala* (flesh) *modaya* (sweet-balls) *danta* (teeth) *pharusaga* (a potter) and *vadasāla* (the branch of a tree) have not been explained in details by the commentators *Ācārya Hemacandra Maladhārī* suggestively remarks that “एतान्युदाहरणानि विशेषतो निशीथादवसेयानि” (These examples should be understood in details from *Niś'eetha*)

*Kotyācārya*¹³ also leaves the remark unexplained merely by saying “निशीथे वक्ष्यामः” (We shall explain this in *Niś'eetha*)

The question arises as to who is the author of *Niś'eetha* The tradition does not give the credit of authorship either to *Hemacandrācārya Maladhārī* or to *Kotyācārya* So, it is probable that the commentary must have been written by *Jinabhadra Gāṇi* and the sentence “निशीथे वक्ष्यामः” found in the commentary of *Kotyācārya* might have originally belonged to the commentary written by *S'ri Jinabhadra Gaṇi ksamā s'ramana* himself.¹⁴

12 *Vide Jīta Kalpa Sūtra* Preface Page 9

13 Whose commentary has not been published, but is preserved in the *Bhāṇḍārīkara* Research Institute, Poona

14. *Jinavijayan* gives another evidence for this belief In a miscellaneous collection of several stray Commentaries (which he possesses) the compiler gives three verses of *Niś'eetha Bhāṣya* and makes the following remark at the end.—

इति जिनभद्रक्षमाथमणकृतनिशीथभाष्यस्याष्टमो-द्देशकः

(Preface to *Jīta Kalpa Sūtra* pp 9-10)

of *Siddhasena Divākara* in his *Visēṣavākyaka Bhāṣya* and re-establishes the original theory of the *Jaina Āgamas* that *Kevala Darsana* and *Kevala Jhāna* take place simultaneously¹⁰

Jinabhadra Gaṇi is thus well-renowned as the preserver of the *Jaina* traditions.

That *Jinabhadra Gaṇi Kṣāma Sramana* was an orator of established reputation is known from several sources. The commentator *Hemacandra* refers to *Jinabhadra Gaṇi* as "*Upa Jinabhadra Kṣāma Sramanāḥ Vyākhyātāḥ*"¹¹. Another commentator named *Koṭyāditya* who has written a commentary on the *Visēṣavākyaka Bhāṣya* pays him a tribute to the same effect in the last verse of his commentary. He says¹²

माप्य सामायिकस्य स्फुटविस्तृतपदार्थोपगूढं वृद्ध-
 क्षीमरत्नैरकारि घटककुपचिपां मूरिसंस्कारधारि ।
 तस्य व्याख्यानमात्रं किमपि विदधता यन्मया पुण्यमाप्तं-
 प्रेत्याहं द्राग् लभेयं परमपरिमितां प्रीतिमत्रैव तेन ॥

No more information is available about the life of this great *Ācārya*.

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10. *Vide* ईशब्द-भाष्योपभोग (मगधमि) टिप्प.

11. *Vide* "Short History of Jaina Literature" Ed. by M. D. Desai p. 152 foot-note.

composition either from the portion in the beginning or one at the end.¹⁶

(v) *Viśesanavah*:—This book is a miscellaneous work comprised into nearly 400 *Prākṛit* verses and is not published as yet

In addition to the above-mentioned five works some people consider *Dhyāna-s'ataka* which has been incorporated by *Ācārya Mahārāja Haribhadra Sūri* in his commentary on the *Āvas'yaka Sūtras*, also to be the composition of *Jinabhadra Gaṇi Ksamā-s'ramana*. But there are not sufficient evidences to convince us of his authorship of *Dhyāna-Sataka*

(c) *Date* :—

There are no definite means that help us to fix the exact date of *Jinabhadra Gaṇi Ksamā-s'ramana*. Still, however, the tradition of various *Pattāvalis* throws considerable light on the problem. The tradition of the *Pattāvalis* written after the sixteenth century (V S) tells us that *Jinabhadra Gaṇi Ksamā-s'ramana* flourished 1115 years after the *Nirvana* of *S'ramana Bhagavān Mahāvīra*. This fixes the date somewhere about 645 V S

There is another theory which assigns to *Jinabhadra Gaṇi* 500 years earlier than his commentator *Maladhāri Hemacandrācārya* who is said to have flourished in 1175 V S. According to this theory also, *Jinabhadra Gaṇi Ksamā-s'ramana* must have flourished somewhere about 650-675 V. S

The author of *Tapāgaccha Pattāvali* places *Jinabhadra Gaṇi Ksamā-s'ramana* as the contemporary of *Ācārya S'rimān Haribhadra Sūri* who is said to have written a commentary

16 At the end of this *bhāṣya* the only reference is this —

सं १७२० वर्षे मार्गशीर्ष शुदि १ शुक्रवासरे अद्यहे श्रीपत्तने लि० श्री मोद
ज्ञातिना काशीदासात्मजेन अंवादत्तेन । शुभं भवतु । शिवमस्तु ।

(*Jñāna Kalpa Sūtra* Preface P. 17)

Unfortunately these commentaries are not available at present and we have to depend mostly on conjectures. The commentary of *Kaṣṭhacārya* is preserved in a tattered condition in the *Bhandarkar Research Institute Poona*. The only available commentary is that of *Srī Maladhara Hemacandrācārya*.

(ii) *Bṛihat Saṅgrahaṇī*—This work runs in almost 500 verses. *Acārya Malayagiri Śrī* has written a commentary on this work in *Sanskrit*. The work along with the Commentary has already been published.

(iii) *Bṛihat Kṣetra-Samāsa*—This is also a similar work. *Acārya Srī Malayagiri Śrī* and others have written commentaries and the work along with the commentaries is published.

(iv) *Jñāna Kalpa Sūtra*—This work lays down various religious practices to be followed by the *Jaina* monks. The work is also dealing with the ten types of remonstrations. The subject of remonstrations has already been treated in the *Oheda-sūtras* and other works. *Jinabhadra Gaṇi* seems to have composed this work with a view to treat the subject in a precise and comprehensive manner.

The latest commentary available on this work at present is the *cūṇṇī* of *Siddhasena* in *Prakṛit*. In his *Cūṇṇī* *Siddhasena* remarks at one place that there existed some other *cūṇṇī*¹⁵ also before he composed his one but that is not available at present. On this *Cūṇṇī* of *Siddhasena*, *Srī Candrar Śrī* has written explanatory notes in *Sanskrit*.

Besides the *cūṇṇī* of *Siddhasena* there is one more *cūṇṇī* available in *Prakṛit* verses. It is difficult to say whether it is the same *cūṇṇī* that he refers to or it is different from his own. Nothing is known about the author and the date of

15 महाभा विविधपुष्पिकृत-मिष्यापण्य चत्वारि वि सुतेन व गहिषा ।

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सं १७२० वर्षे मार्गशीर्ष शुदि १ शुक्रवासरे अद्यहे श्रीपत्तने लि० श्री मोढ
ज्ञातिना काशीदासात्मजेन अंबादत्तेन । शुभं भवतु । शिवमस्तु ।

(*Jñāna Kalpa Sūtra* Preface P. 17)

on *Dhyāna Śāla*. According to this view *Jinabhadra Gaṇi* had lived a long life of 104 years and though *Ācārya Haribhadra Sūri* was senior to him by 60 or 65 years both of them happened to be contemporaries on account of the long life of *Jinabhadra Gaṇi*.¹⁷ This view is not sound because *Haribhadra Sūri* did not in fact flourish in 530 V S or 580 V S but he flourished between 757 and 875 V S as *Muni Jinavijaya* has suggested. Secondly *Śrīman Haribhadra Sūri* has frequently quoted *Jinabhadra Gaṇi's sūtras* in his *Āvasyaka Vṛtti*. It is therefore clear that *Jinabhadra Gaṇi* did not in any case flourish after *Haribhadra Sūri*.

According to other *Paṭṭāvalis* all of *Jinabhadra Gaṇi*, *Haribhadra Sūri*, *Devarddhī Gaṇi*, *Leasvas ramaṇa Śīlācārya* and *Kālakācārya* happened to be contemporaries. But the history of the development of Jainism shows that the theory is wrongly based. The date of *Śrīman Haribhadra Sūri* has been fixed as the latter half of the eighth and the first half of the 9th century V S, *Jinabhadra Gaṇi* has been placed in the latter half of the 7th and the first half of the 8th century V S. *Devarddhī Gaṇi*, *Leasvas ramaṇa* and *Kālakācārya* are said to have flourished in the beginning of the 6th century V S.

Leaving others aside let us consider if *Jinabhadra Gaṇi* and *Śīlācārya* happened to flourish at the same time. The tradition says that *Śīlācārya* was the priest of *Vaṇaṇa* the king of *Anakullinpur Pātana*. If this is true the date of *Śīlācārya* falls somewhere near 800 V S since *Vaṇaṇa* established his kingdom in 802 V S. This places *Śīlācārya* undoubtedly as the contemporary of *Ācārya Śrī Haribhadra Sūri*. Now some of the *Paṭṭāvalis* refer to

17 Vide *Sri Tapagachakha Paṭṭāvali* (Edited by) *Sri Kalyana Vijaya* Vol. I, page 98.

S'īlāṅkācārya as the pupil of *Jinabhadra Gaṇi kṣamā s'ramana*. If this *S'īlāṅkācārya* is the same as the commentator *Kotyācārya* several references about *Jinabhadra Gaṇi* found in his commentary on the *Viś'eśāvas'yaka Bhāṣya* do not in any way lead us to believe that *S'īlāṅkācārya* was the pupil of *Jinabhadra Gaṇi*. Unfortunately, the first and last portions of this commentary are torn out,¹⁸ but in course of his commentary the commentator refers to *Jinabhadra Gaṇi kṣamā s'ramana* at several places *e g*

- (1) जिनभद्रगणिक्षमाश्रमणपूज्यपादैस्तु नोक्तम् ।
- (ii) अत एव पूज्यपादैः स्वटीकाया प्रायोपग्रहणं कृतम् ।
- (iii) क्षमाश्रमणटीका त्वीयम् ।
- (iv) क्षमाश्रमणटीकापीयम् ।
- (v) श्रीमत्क्षमाश्रमणपूज्यपादानामभिप्रायो लक्षणीयः ।

Although these references show how much respect the commentator had for *Jinabhadra Gaṇi kṣamā s'ramana*, they do not in any way lead us to believe that *Jinabhadra Gaṇi* was his preceptor. On the contrary, we find a reference which shows a considerable gulf of time between the dates of *Jinabhadra Gaṇi* and *S'īlāṅkācārya*. The reference is this.—

भाष्याननुयायि पाठान्तरमिदं अग्रतः,
एवमेनेनैव वृद्धिक्रमेणेत्यादेरर्वाक्,
न चेदं भूयसीषु प्रतिषु दृश्यते ॥¹⁹

This reference shows that there were various readings of *Viś'eśāvas'yaka Bhāṣya* in the time of *S'īlāṅkācārya* which means that a considerable period of time must have elapsed after the composition of the *Viś'eśāvas'yaka Bhāṣya*. This, therefore, prevents us from accepting the view that *Jinabhadra Gaṇi kṣamā s'ramana* was the preceptor and hence the contemporary of *S'īlāṅkācārya*.

18 *Vide Jītakalpa Sūtra* Preface pp 14-15

19 *Ibid* p 15

Thus there are many difficulties in accepting *Jinabhadra Gani* as the contemporary of *S'īlanācārya* or even *Haribhadra Sūryī* and others as mentioned before

It is therefore proper to believe that unless and until there is no evidence against the belief of the tradition, there is no objection in accepting the date of *Jinabhadra Lpamā-sramāṇa* as roughly about the second half of the seventh century V S

III Philosophy

(a) Ethics.

According to Jainism, the main purpose of every living being on this earth *vis nivrāṇa* or final emancipation is attained in the simultaneous observance of these three main doctrines (1) Right Belief (Faith in the teachings of *Jinas*) (2) Right knowledge (knowledge of his doctrine) that leads to Salvation and (3) Right Conduct (Perfect Conduct). According to the *Jaina* Philosophy belief in real existence of *tattvas* is right faith Knowledge of real nature without doubt or error is right knowledge An attitude of neutrality without desire or aversion towards the objects of the external world is right conduct.

Virtue consists of the five-fold conduct of one who has knowledge and faith —

- 1 Innocence—or *a-himsā* which is not mere negative abstention but positive kindness to all creation
- 2 Charity and truth-speaking
- 3 Honorable conduct—such as not stealing.
- 4 Chastity in word thought and deed
- 5 Renunciation of all worldly interests.

Jaina ethics lay stress on both faith and works. All those actions which lead to peace of mind are *punya* *Himsā* or infliction of suffering is the great sin or *pāpa*

Untruthfulness, dishonesty, unchastity, covetousness, anger, conceit etc are other sources of sin. Sin is no offence against God, but only against man according to *Jaina* ethics.

The ethical system of the *Jainas* is more rigorous than that of the *Buddhists*. It looks upon patience as the highest good and pleasure of senses as a source of sin.

The chief feature of *Jainism* is *ahimsā* (respect for all and abstention from injuring everything that has life.)

The *Jainas* repudiate the theory of the creation of the world out of nothing or as a series of accidents. According to them, there can neither be destruction of things that do exist nor can there be creation of things out of nothing. So, according to this view, there is no God necessary for creation or destruction.

Jainism looks upon God, nature, and soul, as aspects of the same. According to *Jaina* ethics there is no God except the soul in its ideal integrity.

The *Jaina* philosophy tells us that the life of God in heaven is one of the forms that a soul might assume by the accumulation of *punya* (merit). According to them, Gods are only embodied souls like men and animals different from them in degree but not in kind.

The liberated souls are above gods. They are never born again, and they have no connection with the world. Meditation or adoration of the *Jinas* sanctifies the soul.

(b) Theory of Soul Plurality of spirits

According to the *Jaina* philosophy, the universe is filled with *jīvas*. *Jīva* means whatever is living and not whatever is mechanical. So, it corresponds to the life-element of Bergson. And since it is a subject of experience it also corresponds to the monad of Leibniz.

Jainism does not seem to have made exact distinctions between *jīva* and *Ātman* *a-jīva* and matter. A *jīva* is a particular kind of existent being. The liberated *jīva* freed from matter is called the *Ātman*. *Ātman* means pure consciousness untinted by matter. It excludes all space and externality. It is the *jīva* purified and raised to the highest spiritual status which is mere formless consciousness.

On the other hand *pudgala* is not pure matter untouched by consciousness. It already bears the impress of spirit. *Ātman* is the spirit of being and matter is the negative principle of non-living. The latter corresponds to the space of Bergson, or the *materia prima* of Leibniz. The bare materiality of *pudgala* is the direct opposite of spirit. A *jīva* is the combination of the two. It is material-spiritual. A soul loaded with matter is involved in bondage. All *jīvas* in *samsāra* are associated with this negative element.

Jainism believes that *Ātman* or the pure spirit pure matter and *jīva* which is a combination of the two are existent though the first two are imperceptible to us. The *pudgala skandha* which we see has also an element of consciousness and is as much a *jīva* as others so far as the essence is concerned. The *jīva* and the *a-jīva* of the *Jainas* are not empirical abstractions of *Ātman* or consciousness and matter or non-consciousness but the products of an interaction between the two. Strictly speaking *Ātman* and *non-ātman* are the primary elements. *Jīva* possesses more of self *a-jīva* more of not-self. They represent two orders of arrangement in the whole.

Jainism believes in plurality of spirits. The *jīvas* are many but are alike eternal. Their characteristic essence is never destroyed, however much it is obscured by external causes. They are regarded as possessing size which is varying in different cases. They contract and expand according to the dimensions of the body with which they are incorporated for

the time being Truly speaking, the essence of all *jīvas* is consciousness and it is only superficial to advance the theory of plurality of *jīvas* It is only a relative conception and cannot be taken as an ultimate truth Still, however, this distinction of spirits is justified in the sense that it distinguishes good from the bad, *Brāhmanas*, *Ksatriyas*, *Vaiśyas*, and *S'ūdras*, from each other, insects, birds, snakes and so on. For, the *Jama* canon dictates that if there were but one soul common to all beings, they could not be distinguished from one another, nor could they experience different lots, there would not be *Brāhmins*, *Ksatriyas*, *Vaiśyas* and *S'ūdras*, insects, birds and snakes All would be men and gods. We make equal both those who lead a blameable life and those who, in this world, practise right conduct ²⁰

Thus unlike other systems of philosophy, *Jainism* asserts the doctrine of pluralistic realism ²¹

(c) The theory of Knowledge—

Like the theory of Soul, that of knowledge is also distinctive of *Jainism* The *Jainas* admit five kinds of knowledge viz, *Matī*, *S'ruti*, *Avadhi*, *Manahparāya*, and *Kevala*

1 *Matī* is ordinary cognition obtained by normal means of sense-perceptions We always have sense-perceptions or *darśana* prior to the rise of *matī-jñāna*

2 *S'ruti* or testimony is knowledge derived through signs, symbols, or words While *matī-jñāna* gives us knowledge by acquaintance, this gives us knowledge by description

20 Vide *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* II 7-48 and 51

21 Cf Bosanquet—"It is freely admitted that in cognition, the self is universal. It goes out into a world which is beyond its own given being and what it meets there it holds in common with other selves, and in holding, it ceases to be a self-contained and repellant unit"

(Gifford Lectures, Second Series, Chap II)

3 *Avadhi* is direct knowledge of things even at a distance of time or space. It is knowledge by clairvoyance.

4 *Mandharyāya* is direct knowledge of the thoughts of others as in telepathic knowledge of other minds.

5 *Kevala* or Perfect knowledge comprehends all substances and their various modifications. It is omniscience unlimited by time, space, or object. This knowledge which is independent of the senses which can only be felt and not described is possible only for purified souls which are perfectly free from bondage.

The first three kinds of knowledge are liable to error while the last two cannot be wrong.

Knowledge is *pratyakṣa* or direct when it is immediate and *parokṣa* or indirect when it is mediated by some other kind of knowledge. Of the five kinds of knowledge *mati* and *śruti* are *parokṣa* and the rest *pratyakṣa*.

Cetana or consciousness is the essence of *jīva* and the two manifestations of *cetana* are perception (*darsana*) and intelligence (*jñāna*). In *darsana* the details are not perceived while in *jñāna* they are. The former is simple apprehension the latter conceptual knowledge.

The relation between knowledge and its object is an external one with regard to physical objects, though it is not so with regard to self-consciousness. The consciousness of the *jīva* is ever active and this activity reveals its own nature as well as that of the object. *Jñeya* or object of knowledge includes self and non-self. Like light *jñāna* reveals itself and other objects. The *Nyaya-Vaiśeṣika* theory that knowledge reveals only external relations but not itself is rejected by the *Jainas*. In knowing any object, the self knows itself simultaneously. Knowledge is always apportioned by the self according to them and the question as to how consciousness can reveal the unconscious object is dismissed by them as absurd since it is the nature of knowledge that reveals objects.

With regard to self-consciousness, the relation between *gnāna* and *jñeya* is very intimate. *Jñānin* and *gnāna* are also inseparable though distinguishable. In self-consciousness, the subject of knowledge, the object of knowledge and knowledge itself become different aspects of a single concrete entity

There are no *jīvas* without *gnāna* since that would take away the *cetanā* or conscious character of the *jīvas* and reduce them to the level of *a-jīva dravyas* and there can be no *gnāna* without selves, for that would make *gnāna* foundationless

In its perfect condition, the soul is pure *Jñāna* and *dars'ana* (knowledge and intuition) arise simultaneously or are together. In the mundane *jīvas*, *gnāna* is preceded by *dars'ana*

Perfect knowledge is free from doubt (*sams'aya*) perversity (*vimoha*) and indefiniteness (*vibhrama*)

The *Karmas* which obscure the different varieties of *dars'ana* are *dars'anāvaranīya karmas* and those which obscure the different kinds of *gnāna* are *gnānāvaranīya karmas*

These impediments are passions and emotions All knowledge resides in the soul though it manifests itself when the disturbing media are removed

(d) Karma :

Karma is another important topic of the *Jama* philosophy *Karma*, according to the *Jānas*, is of material nature (*pudgalika*) The kind of matter fit to manifest *Karma* fills all cosmic space It has the peculiar property of developing the effects of merit and demerit The soul by its commerce with the other world becomes literally penetrated with the particles of subtle matter These become *Karma* and build up a special body called " *Kārmaṇa S'arīra* " which does not leave the soul till its Final Emancipation

Jīvas which are found on this world in infinite number, are of three kinds (1) *Nitya siddha* or the ever perfect (2) *Mukta* or the liberated and (3) the *Baddha* or the bound

The second variety of *jivas* does not become embodied. They have achieved their purity and dwell in a state of super mundane perfection unconcerned with worldly affairs. The mundane *jivas* are a prey to illusion and are condemned to the yoke of matter through an infinite succession of lines. The freed souls are absolutely pure and free from any tint of matter. They are the *nirupadhi jivas* leading a life of pure existence and infinite consciousness and possess infinite knowledge infinite perception infinite power and infinite bliss.

Thus by touching the main distinctive features of the *Jaina* philosophy we can easily remark like Sir *Radhakrishnan* that *Jainism* offers us an empirical classification of things in the universe and so argues for a plurality of spirits **

Gujarat College
Ahmedabad
10 : 12 42

D P Thaker

** *Vide* "Indian Philosophy" by Sir S. Radhakrishnan

Contents

1	Chapter I Discussion with the First Ganadhara.	1
2	Chapter II Discussion with the Second Ganadhara.	79
3	Chapter III Discussion with the Third Ganadhara	137
4	Chapter IV Discussion with the Fourth Ganadhara	190
5.	Chapter V Discussion with the Fifth Ganadhara.	279
6	Chapter VI Discussion with the Sixth Ganadhara.	309
7	Chapter VII Discussion with the Seventh Ganadhara	367
8	Chapter VIII Discussion with the Eighth Ganadhara.	389
9	Chapter IX Discussion with the Ninth Ganadhara.	408
10	Chapter X Discussion with the Tenth Ganadhara	459
11.	Chapter XI Discussion with the Eleventh Ganadhara.	480


Kṣamāśramana Jinbhadra Gani's

GAṆADHARAVĀDA

क्षमाश्रमणश्रीजिनभद्रगणिसन्द्बधः

॥ गणधरवादः ॥

श्रीमलधारिहेमचन्द्रसूरिकृतटीकासमलङ्कृतः ।



Ksamāśramana Jinabhadra Gaṇi's

GAṆADHARAVĀDA

Along with

Maladhāraṇ Hemacandra Sūri's Commentary

Chapter I



प्रथमगणधरवक्तव्यता

Discussion with the First Gaṇadhara

जीवे तुह सन्देहो पच्चक्खं जं न घिप्पइ घडो व ।

अच्चन्तापच्चक्खं च नत्थि लोए खपुप्फं व ॥ १ ॥ (१५४९)

Jīve tuha sandeho paccakkham jaṃ na ghippai ghado vva ।

Accantāpaccakkham ca natthi loe khapuppham va ॥ 1 (1549)

[जीवे तव सन्देहः प्रत्यक्ष यद् न गृह्यते घट इव ।

अत्यन्ताप्रत्यक्षं च नास्ति लोके खपुष्पमिव ॥ १ ॥ (१५४९)

Jīve tava sandehah pratyksam yad na grhyate ghaṭa iva ।

Atyantāpratyksam ca nāsti loke khapuspaṃ iva ॥ 1 (1549)]

Translation—1 (O Indrabhūti of Gautama gotra !) You have a doubt about (the existence of) *jīva* (the soul) since it is not directly perceived (by senses) as is the case with a *ghata* (a water jar) Whatever is absolutely imperceptible does not exist in the world, e g., a flower in the sky (1549)

भीमकारिणोमचन्द्राचार्यकृता टीका—

आयुष्मान् इन्द्रभूते ! तवैषः सन्देहः—किमयमात्माऽस्ति, नास्ति वा, उभयोहेतुसङ्गात् ? । तत्र नास्ति त्वहेतवोऽग्नी-नास्त्यात्मा, प्रत्यक्षेणात्यन्तमगृह्यमाणत्वात्, इह यदस्यन्ताप्रत्यक्षतल्लोके नास्त्येव, यथा स्वप्नम् । यथास्ति तत् प्रत्यक्षेण गृह्यत एव, यथा घटा, इत्यसौ न्यतिरेकदृष्टान्तः । अग्नयोऽपि सप्रत्यक्षाः किन्तु घटादिकार्यतया परिमतास्ते प्रत्यक्षमुपयान्ति; न पुनरेव मात्मा कदाचिदपि भावप्रत्यक्षमुपगच्छति, अतोऽत्रात्यन्तविश्लेषमिति ॥ १ (१५४९) ॥

Digest of the Commentary—O long lived Indrabhūti ! You entertain a doubt about the existence of the soul For, you come across reasons some of which lead you to believe that the soul exists whereas others make you surmise that the soul does not exist. The latter are as under:—

The soul does not exist for it is in no way perceptible by *pratyakṣa pramāṇa* (direct and valid proof) produced by a sense-organ as is the case with a *ghata*. Whatever is *atyanta-pratyakṣa* (absolutely imperceptible) is certainly non-existent in this world e g a flower in the sky Whatever exists is certainly perceived—realized by *pratyakṣa pramāṇa* e g a pitcher This is a *vyatireka dr̥ṣṭānta* (a negative example).

Some one may here argue that though *anus* (electrons) are not within the range of *pratyakṣa pramāṇa* they are so to say invisible yet they do exist. So what about them ? The answer is that no doubt they are imperceptible to us as *anus* but when they are transformed so as to perform the

functions of a pitcher, a cloth, etc., they no longer remain so. Such is not, however, the case with the soul. It never attains a stage when it can be directly perceived. The adjective *atyanta*, is here used on that account.

— Notes —

प्रमाणम् *Pramāṇam* प्रमीयते अनेन इति प्रमाणम्—*pramīyate anena iti pramāṇam* That by which a correct notion is arrived at, is called a *pramāṇa* अर्थोपलब्धिहेतुः प्रमाणम्—*arthopālābhihetuḥ pramāṇam* *Pramāṇa* is the means to knowledge.

Pramāṇa is the doctrine of स्याद्वाद-*syādvāda* which lays bare the whole truth, which is the synthesis of extremes and not absolute extremes or fragmentary truths.

प्रत्यक्षम् *pratyakṣam* इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षजन्यं ज्ञानं प्रत्यक्षम्—*Indriyārtha sannikarṣa-janyam jñānam pratyakṣam*—knowledge derived directly from the peripheral contact of the sense-organs with their corresponding objects.

प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणम् *pratyakṣa pramāṇam*—ज्ञानाकरणकत्वे सति ज्ञानत्वम् **प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणलक्षणम्**—*Jñānākaranakāṭve sati jñānatvam pratyakṣa-pramāṇalakṣanam* Sense-perception means direct knowledge.

न य सोऽणुमाणगम्मो जम्हा पच्चक्खपुव्वयं तं पि ।

पुव्वोवलद्धसम्बन्धसरणओ लिङ्ग-लिङ्गीणं ॥ २ ॥ (१५५०)

Na ya so'numānagammo jamhā paccakkhapuvvayam tam pi ।
Puvvovaladdhasambandhasaranāo linga-lingīṇam ॥ 2 (1550)

[न च सोऽनुमानगम्यो यस्मात् प्रत्यक्षपूर्वकं तदपि ।

पूर्वोपलब्धसम्बन्धस्मरणतो लिङ्ग-लिङ्गिनोः ॥ २ ॥ (१५५०)

Na ca so'numānagamyo yasmāt pratyakṣapūrvakam tadapi ।
Pūrvopalabdhāsambandhasmaranāto linga-lingīṇoḥ ॥ 2 (1550)]

Trans—2 It (the soul) is not an object of *anumāna* (inference), for, this (*anumāna*), too, is preceded by *pratyakṣa* and is the outcome of the recollection of the (inseparable) connection

previously observed in the case of a *linga* (a characteristic or an indicatory mark) and a *lingin* (one having such a *linga*) (1550)

टीका—न चासावात्माऽनुमानगम्यः यस्मात् तदप्यनुमानं प्रत्यक्षपूर्वकं प्रवर्तते । कृतः ? इत्याह—“ पुनोषलदे ”त्यादि लिङ्गस्ते—गम्यतेऽतीन्द्रियार्थोऽनेनेति लिङ्गम्; अथवा लीन—तिरोहितमर्थं गमयतीति लिङ्गम्, धूम-कृतकत्वादिकम्, तदस्यास्तीति लिङ्गी पक्षेऽप्यतिस्पत्वादिः, तयोर्लिङ्ग-लिङ्गिनोर्यः पूर्वं महानसादौ प्रत्यक्षादिनोपलब्धः कार्य-कारणमावादादिकः सम्बन्धस्तस्य यत् स्मरणं तस्मादिति । इदमुक्तं भवति—पूर्वं महानसादावपि धूमयोर्लिङ्ग-लिङ्गयोरन्वयमप्यतिरेक्यन्तमभिनाभावमप्यवगतौ गृहीत्वा तत् उच्यते कालं कथयितुं कान्तार-पर्यन्तनिवम्बादौ गगनावलम्बिनी धूमलेखामव लोच्य प्राग् गृहीत सम्बन्धमनुसरति, तत् यथा—‘ यत्र यत्र धूमस्तत्र तत्र प्रागाहं वह्निमग्राधम्, यथा महानसादौ, धूमश्चात्र दृश्यते, तस्मात् वह्निनापीह भवितव्यम्’, इत्येव लिङ्गग्रहण-सम्बन्धस्मरणाभ्यां तत्र प्रमाता हुतश्च भव गच्छति । न चैवमात्मना लिङ्गिना सार्धं कस्यापि लिङ्गस्य प्रत्यक्षेण सम्बन्धः सिद्धोऽस्ति, यत्तत्सम्बन्धमनुस्मरतः पुनस्तद्विज्ञानाद्विनाशे सम्प्रत्ययः स्यात् । यदि पुनर्बीज-लिङ्गयोः प्रत्यक्षतः सम्बन्धसिद्धिः स्यात् तदा जीवस्यापि प्रत्यक्षत्वापत्त्याऽनुमानवैयर्थ्यं स्यात् । तत् एव तत्सिद्धेरिति ॥ २ (१५५०) ॥

D C—The existence of the soul cannot be proved by *anumana* (inference) for after all this *anumana* is preceded by *pratyaksa pramana* as is suggested by the second hemistich of this verse

Whatever reveals an object which is imperceptible to the senses is called a *linga* or whatever throws light on a concealed object is a *linga* and one that has a *linga* is called a *lingin*. For instance smoke is the *linga* and fire the *lingin*. To give another example *kṛtalatra* (performance of an action) is the *linga* and *anityatva* (impermanence) the *lingin*.

An inseparable connection between smoke and fire in the form of effect and cause—the connection which is directly perceived in a kitchen etc. can be established in two ways viz.,

by *anvaya* (positively) and by *vyatireka* (negatively) Wherever there is smoke, there is fire, is an example of *anvaya*; and wherever there is non-existence of fire, there is non-existence of smoke, is an example of *vyatireka*

The recollection of the inseparable connection existing between smoke and fire, helps a man to infer the presence of fire, when he sees clouds of smoke rising to the sky, either in a forest or on the top of a mountain or the like For, he is then reminded of having seen fire when smoke was found coming out of the kitchen or the like Thereupon, he works up a syllogism, as under —

Wherever there was smoke, I previously saw fire there, as in the kitchen and elsewhere I see smoke here, so, here, there must be fire Thus, he rightly infers fire in view of his having previously noticed the inseparable connection between smoke the *linga*, and fire the *lingin*, and on his recollecting this connection while drawing the inference

But in the case of the soul, a *lingin*, no connection of it, whatsoever is directly perceived with any one or more of its *lingas* Such being the case, there is no room left for the recollection of an inseparable connection between the soul and its *linga* and hence there is no chance left for establishing the existence of the soul by *anumāna*

Moreover, if the inseparable connection were to be observed in the case of the soul and its *linga*, the soul would be directly perceived, and in that case, there would be no necessity to infer its existence

— Notes —

अनुमान *anumāna* (from अनु *anu*, after, and मा *mā*, to measure and hence to know) is so called because by means of this particular kind of knowledge, a thing though remote in time, space and nature, is measured out to the mind, after one has recollected the relation of invariable व्याप्ति *vyāpti*, concomitance,

between *निङ्गु linga* also known as *हेतु hetu* e. g. धूम *dhuma* smoke and *सिङ्गिङ्गु lingin* also known as *साध्व sadhya*, e. g. वह्नि *vahni* fire

It is said

न य जीवलिङ्गसम्बन्धदरिसणमभू जओ पुणो सरओ ।
तल्लिङ्गदरिसणाओ जीवे सम्पच्चओ होज्जा ॥ ३ ॥ (१५५१)

Na ya jīvaliṅgasambandhadarisaṇamabhū jaō puno saraō ।

Talliṅgadarisaṇaō jīve sampaccaō hojjā ॥ 3 ॥ (1551)

[न य जीवलिङ्गसम्बन्धदर्शनमभू यतः पुनः स्मरतः ।

तल्लिङ्गदर्शनाजीवे सम्प्रत्ययो भवेत् ॥ ३ ॥ (१५५१)

Na ca jīvaliṅgasambandhadarisaṇam abhūd yataḥ punaḥ smarataḥ ।

Talliṅgadarisaṇajīve sampratyayo bhavet ॥ 3 ॥ (1551)]

Trans—3 There has not been (previously) seen (any) connection between the soul and its *linga* the recollection of which along with the sight of its *linga* can lead (us) to a conviction about the (existence of) the soul. (1551)

टीका—गतावर्षा । न च वक्तव्य सामान्यतोदृष्टानुमानादादित्यादि गतिवर्जितः सिध्यति, यथा—गतिमानादित्यः देशान्तरप्राप्तः चेन्नवस्तवदिति, यतो हन्त ! चेन्नवस्ते दृष्टान्तवर्जिते सामान्येन देशान्तरप्राप्तिं गतिपूर्विकां प्रत्यक्षेणैव निश्चित्य, सर्वेऽपि तां तथैव प्रमाता साधयतीति युक्तम् । न चेन्नमत्र क्वचिदपि दृष्टान्ते जीवसम्बन्धाविनाशतः कोऽपि हेतुरप्यक्षेणोपसृत्यत इति । अतो न सामान्यतोदृष्टादप्यनुमानात् तद्वतिरिति ॥ ३ (१५५१) ॥

D C—It is no use arguing that the existence of the soul can be established by an *anumana* which is ordinarily met with as in the case of the motion of the Sun To put it explicitly the Sun is in motion for it reaches another region as is the case with Devadatta. As regards the Sun this inference is valid since we distinctly see that Devadatta who is here a *śranta dharmā* : e., serving as an illustration goes like the Sun to another country after he has resorted to motion But as

far as the soul is concerned, no *linga* (also known as *hetu*) which is inseparably connected with the soul, is directly perceived in any *dīstānta*, (example) whatsoever Thus, the *sāmānyatodīsta anumāna* is of no avail here

The existence of the soul cannot be proved by *āgama* (scriptural authority).

नागमगम्मो वि तओ भिज्जइ जं नागमोऽणुमाणाओ ।

न य कासइ पच्चक्खो जीवो जस्सागमो वयणं ॥४॥ (१५५२)

Nāgamgammō vi taō bhijjaī jam nāgamo'numānāō ।

Na ya kāsai paccakkho jīvo jassāgamo vayanam ॥ 4 (1552)

[नागमगम्योऽपि सको भिद्यते यद् नागमोऽनुमानात् ।

न च कस्यचित् प्रत्यक्षो जीवो यस्यागमो वचनम् ॥ ४ ॥ (१५५२)

Nāgamagamyō'pi sako bhidyate yad nāgamo'numānat ।

Na ca kasyacit pratyakso jīvo yasyāgamo vacanam ॥ 4 (1552)]

Trans —4 It (the soul) is not even within the range of *āgama* (scriptural authority), for, *āgama* is not (quite) distinct from *anumāna* Moreover, the soul is not *pratyaksa* (directly perceptible) to any one whose word is *āgama* (1552)

टीका-न चागमगम्योऽपि तर्कः-असौ जीवः यत्-यस्मादागमोऽपि नानुमानाद् भिद्यते, परमार्थतस्तस्यानुमानत्वात्; तथाहि-शाब्दं प्रमाणागम उच्यते, शब्दश्च द्विविधः-दृष्टार्थविषयः अदृष्टार्थविषयश्च । तत्र दृष्टार्थविषया शब्दाद् या प्रतीतिः, सा वस्तुतोऽनुमानसमृत्त्यैवम्, यतः क्वचित् प्रथमं पृथु-बुध्नोदरोर्ध्वकुण्ड-लोष्टायत-वृत्तग्रीवादिमति घटपदार्थे घटशब्दे प्रयुज्यमानं दृष्ट्वा तदुत्तरकालं कापि “घटमानय” इत्यादि शब्द श्रुत्वा पृथुबुध्नोदरादिमदर्थ एव घट उच्यते, तथाभूतपदार्थ एव घटशब्दप्रयोगप्रवृत्तेः, यथा पूर्वं कुम्भ-कारापणादौ, घटशब्दश्चायमिदानीमपि श्रूयते, तस्मात् तथाभूतस्यैव पृथुबुध्नो-दरादिमतः पदार्थस्य मयाऽऽनयनादिक्रिया कर्तव्या इत्यनुमानं विधाय प्रमाता घटानयनादिक्रियां करोति, इत्येवं दृष्टार्थविषयं शाब्दं प्रमाणं वस्तुतो नानु-

मानात् मिथते । न वैवमसावात्मशब्दः क्षरीरादृतेऽन्यत्र प्रयुज्यमानः कश्चिद्
 पलम्बः, यत्र स्वस्वार्मशब्दभवनात् आत्मा इति प्रत्ययो भवेदिति । यदपि
 स्वर्गनरकाद्यदृष्टार्थविषयं शब्द प्रमाण, तदपि तत्त्वतोऽनुमानं नातिवर्त्तते,
 तथाहि—“प्रमाण स्वर्ग-नरकाद्यदृष्टार्थविषय वचनम्, अविसंवादिवचनात्प्रणी
 तत्वात्, चन्द्रार्कोपरागादिवचनवत्” इत्येवमनुमानादेव तत्र प्रमाणात् । न
 वैवम्युत्तमात् कमपि पश्यामा, यस्यात्मा प्रत्यक्ष इति तद्वचनमागम इति
 ‘प्रतिपक्षेमहि’ इति श्लेषः ॥ ४ (१५५२) ॥

D C—The existence of the soul cannot be established by *agama* for after all *agama* cannot be separated from *anumanana* as really speaking *agama* is (a kind of) *anumanana*.

Agama is defined as *śabda pramāṇa* and *śabda* (word) is two-fold viz., (1) *dr̥ṣṭārtha-vyāya* (pertaining to an object which is seen) and (2) *a-dr̥ṣṭārtha-vyāya* (pertaining to an object which is not seen).

The conviction which is arrived at, by means of a *śabda* and which is associated with an object that is seen is really an outcome of *anumanana*. For instance first of all, one notices that the word *ghaṭa* is used for an object whose belly is round and extensive whose basin is raised up and hollowed out, whose neck is round and which is made up of earth. Thereafter when he hears “bring a *ghaṭa*” he begins to reflect. None else but an object whose belly is round and extensive etc., is styled as *ghaṭa*, for the word *ghaṭa* is reserved for this object only—a fact noticed in the shop of a potter. I hear the word *ghaṭa* so I should bring an object of that very kind viz. one which is round extensive etc. Having so inferred, he brings a *ghaṭa*. Hence it will be seen that the *śabda pramāṇa* which is associated with an object that is seen is not separate from *anumanana*.

To think of the soul the word soul is not used for any other object but the body. Had it been however so used one would have been convinced about the existence of the soul.

The *śabda pramāṇa* associated with unseen objects like heaven, hell etc, is also, really speaking, not separate from *anumāna*. For, the knowledge connected with unseen objects such as heaven, hell and the like is *pramāṇa*, as it comes from an *āpta*, a reliable personage whose word is true—a fact noticed when he predicted a lunar eclipse, a solar eclipse and so on. Thus, here, too, the validity or truth rests upon inference.

There is none to whom the soul is an object of direct perception. Had there been any one of that type, his word would have been looked upon as *āgama*, and on the basis of this *āgama*, the existence of the soul would have been admitted.

Besides

जं चागमा विरुद्धा परोप्परमओ वि संसओ जुत्तो ।
सवप्पमाणविसयाईओ जीवो त्ति तो बुद्धी ॥ ५ ॥ (१५५३)

Jam cāgamā viruddhā paropparamaō vi samsao jutto ।
Savappamāṇavisayāīō jīvo tti to buddhī ॥ 5 (1553)

[यच्चागमा विरुद्धाः परस्परमतोऽपि संशयो युक्तः ।
सर्वप्रमाणविषयातीतो जीवोऽस्ति ततो बुद्धिः ॥ ५ ॥ (१५५३)

Yaccāgamā viruddhāḥ parasparamato pi saṁśayo yuktah ।
Sarvaprāmāṇavisayātīto jīvo'sti tato buddhiḥ ॥ 5 (1553)]

Tvans —5 Furthermore, the *āgamas* are mutually contradictory. Consequently, on that account, too, (your) doubt is justifiable. You (therefore) believe that (the existence of) the soul cannot be established by any of the *pramāṇas* (1553)

टीका—यतश्च तीर्थिकानां सम्बन्धिनः सर्वेऽप्यागमाः परस्परविरोधिनः
खलु, अतोऽपि संशय एवात्मनो युक्तः, न तु निश्चयः, तथाहि—
केचिदागमा आत्मनो नास्तित्वमेव प्रतिपादयन्ति, यदाहुर्नास्तिकाः—

“एतावानेष लोकोऽय यावानिन्द्रियगोचरः ।

मद्र ! इकपद पश्य यद् वदन्ति बहुभुता ॥ १ ॥ ” इत्यादि ।

मद्भोऽप्याह—“ विज्ञानघन एवैतेभ्यो भूतेभ्यः समुत्थाय तान्मेवानु विनश्यति, न च प्रेत्यसञ्ज्ञाऽस्ति । ”

सुगतस्त्वाह—“ न रूप मिथुनः ! पुद्गलः ” इत्यादि ।

आत्माऽस्तित्ववचनान्यप्यागमेषु ध्रुयन्ते तथा च वेदः—“ न हि वै सशरीरस्य प्रिया अप्रिययोरपइतिरस्ति, अशरीरं वा वसन्त प्रिया अप्रिये न स्पृशतः ” इति; तथा, “ अप्रिहोत्रं शुद्धयात् स्वर्गकर्मः ” इत्यादि ।

कापिलागमे तु प्रतिपाद्यते—“ अस्ति पुरुषोऽकर्ता निर्गुणो मोक्षा चिद्रूपः ” इत्यादि ।

सस्मादागमानां परस्परविरुद्धत्वाद् नागमप्रमाणादप्यात्ममवसिद्धिः । इदं च वैशेषिकमतन प्रत्यक्षाऽनुमानाऽऽगमलक्षण प्रमाणत्रयमुपन्यस्तम् । एतच्च स्वयं द्रष्टव्यम्—उपमाप्रमाणगम्योऽपि जीवो न भवति । सत्र हि “यथा गौस्तथा गवयः । इत्यादावेव सादृश्यमसम्भिकटर्षे बुद्धिमत्त्वादयति । न चेदानीयः कश्चित् त्रिभुवनऽप्यात्ममदृष्टः पदार्थोऽस्ति, यद्वर्धनादात्मानमवगच्छामः । कालाऽऽकाश—दिगादयो जीवतुस्या विद्यन्त इति चेत् । न, तेषामपि विवादास्पदीभूतत्वेन सदहिषदत्त्वात् । अर्थापघिसाम्योऽपि जीवो न भवति । न हि दृष्टः भुतो वा कोऽप्यर्थ आत्मनमन्तरेण नोपपद्यत, यद्वत्तात् स माद्ययाम् । तस्मात् सवप्रमाणविपयातीतो जीव इति तत्र बुद्धिः, भावोपलम्भ कप्रमाणपञ्चकविपयातीतत्वात् प्रतिषेधमात्रकाऽभावास्त्वप्यष्टप्रमाणविषय एव जीव इत्यर्थः । इति पृथपक्षः ॥ ५ (१५५३) ॥

D U—The fact that the *agamas* of the various exponents of religion are opposed to one another justifies one to doubt the existence of the soul rather than to admit it. For instance some of the *agamas* propound the non existence of the soul

To cite an example the *Vaidika*—the *atheists*—*hedonists* say—

“ *Etāvān eva loko'yam yāvān indriyagocarah |*
Bhadrā ! vrkapadam paśya yad vadanti bahuśrutāḥ || ”

This means —This world is only as much as is within the range of the senses My good lady ! see the foot-prints of the wolf. Highly learned individuals also say so.

Bhatta, too, says —

“ *Vijñānaghana evatebhyo bhūtebhyah samutthāya tānye-
 vānuvmaśyati, na ca pretyasañjñā'sti.* ”

This means —This material body which is nothing else but consciousness, after having been generated from the five elements, is dissolved into them and there is no clear conception for future life

Sugata says —

“ *Na rūpam bhāksavaḥ ' pudgalah* ”

This means —O saints ! *rūpa* (form) is not a soul.

In the *āgamas*, we come across passages which admit the existence of the soul For instance, in the *Veda*, we hear :—

“ *Na hi vai sa śarīrasya priyāpriyayor. apahatnasti, a
 śarīram vā vasantam priyāpriye na spīṣataḥ.* ”

This means —There is no destruction of *priya* (attachment) and *apriya* (aversion) in connection with the embodied soul Attachment and aversion do not affect a disembodied soul

Also “ *Agnihotram juhuyāt svargakāmah* ”

This means —An individual desirous of acquiring heaven, should perform *agnihotra* (a sacrifice to the god Agni)

The *āgama* of the *Kāpilas* says —

“ *Asti puruṣo akartā nṛguno bhoktā cidrūpah* ”

This means —There exists a *puruṣa* (a personal animate

entity) which is not the doer of actions which is devoid of qualities which is the enjoyer (of pleasure and pain) and which is the embodiment of consciousness.

Thus since the various *agamas* are mutually antagonistic the existence of the soul cannot be established even by *upamana pramana* (the proof of analogy) *Yatha gau statha gavayah* means that a cow resembles a *bos gavaeus* a species of ox

Here the resemblance helps one to realize a distant object. But in the entire universe there is no object whatsoever that resembles the soul. Such being the case there is no possibility of establishing the existence of the soul on comparing it with an object resembling it.

It is no use advancing an argument that *kala* (time) *akasa* (space) *das* (direction) etc resemble the soul; for there is no uniformity regarding the exposition of their nature so far as the different systems of philosophy are concerned. And hence the same trouble

Even *arthapatti* (presumption or implication) does not help us. There does not exist any such object seen or heard whose justification depending upon the soul cannot be established.

Thus when the existence of the soul cannot be proved by any one of these five *pramanas* each of which establishes the existence of an object, it automatically follows that it comes within the range of *abhāva* (non-existence) the sixth *pramana* whose function is to prove non-existence

Thus the soul does not exist. This finishes the *purrapalen* (the view of the opponent).

Now follows the refutation of the argument —

गोयम ! पञ्चक्खु च्चिय जीवो जं संसयाइविज्जाणं ।
पञ्चक्खं च न सज्झं जह सुह-दुक्खा सदेहम्मि ॥६॥ (१५५४)

Goyama ! paccakkhu cciya jīvo jam samsayāivinnānam ।
Paccakkham ca na sajjham jaha suha-dukkhā sadehammi ॥ 6 (1954)

[गौतम ! प्रत्यक्ष एव जीवो यत् संशयादिविज्ञानम् ।
प्रत्यक्षं च न साध्यं यथा सुख-दुःखे स्वदेहे ॥ ६ ॥ (१५५४)

Gautama ! pratyaksa eva jīvo yat saṁśayadivijñānam ।
Pratyaksam ca na sādhyam yathā sukha-duhkhe svadehe ॥ 6 (1554)]

Refutation—

Trans —6 O Gautama ! the soul is indeed *pratyaksa* to you also, for, (your) knowledge about it which consists of doubts etc, is itself the soul What is *pratyaksa* should not be proved, *e g.*, weal and woe in one's body (1554)

टीका-गौतम ! भवतोऽपि प्रत्यक्ष एवास्यं जीवः, किमन्येन प्रमाणान्तरोपन्यासेन ? । कोऽयं जीवो मम प्रत्यक्षः ? इति चेत् । उच्यते-यदेतत् तवैव संशयादिविज्ञानं स्वसंवेदनसिद्धं हृदि स्फुरति स एव जीवः, संशयादिविज्ञानस्यैव तदनन्यत्वेन जीवत्वात् । यच्च प्रत्यक्षं तद् न प्रमाणान्तरेण साध्यम्, तथा स्वशरीर एवात्मसंवेदनसिद्धाः सुख-दुःखादयः । प्रत्यक्षसिद्धमपि संग्राम-नगरं विश्वं शून्यवादिनं प्रति साध्यत एवेति चेत् । नैवम्, “ निरालम्बनाः सर्वे प्रत्ययाः, प्रत्ययत्वात्, स्वप्नप्रत्ययवत् ” इत्यादेस्तदुद्धावितबाधकप्रमाणस्यैव तत्र निराकरणात्, अत्र त्वात्मग्राहके प्रत्यक्षे बाधकप्रमाणाभावादिति ॥ ६ (१५५४) ॥

D C—O Gautama ! the soul is directly cognizable even to you, so what is the use of resorting to other *pramānas* ? If you ask a question as to how the soul is *pratyaksa* (directly cognizable) to you, the answer is this —

This knowledge of yours, of which the existence is proved by your own experience of it, and which you entertain

in your heart, is the soul itself for this knowledge is identical with the soul.

What could be decided by *pratyakṣa* should not be established by any other *pramāṇa*. No proof is required to prove the existence of happiness misery etc. which one experiences in the body. It is futile to advance an argument that though the existence of the universe consisting of villages and cities is self-evident yet it is to be proved so far as a nihilist is concerned. For the argument such as "Nirālambāṇaṁ sarve pratyayaḥ pratyayatvat svapnapratyayaivat" that is to say all convictions are devoid of any substratum, since they are convictions like the conviction of a dream—an argument which can be advanced by a nihilist and which is a *bādḥaka pramāṇa* (prejudicing evidence) has already been refuted. And here there is no *bādḥaka pramāṇa* in the case of *pratyakṣa* which reveals the soul.

The existence of the soul is established by *pratyakṣa pramāṇa* for the following reason —

कयव करेमि काह वाहमह पच्चया इमाउ य ।

अप्या स प्यच्चक्खो तिकालकज्जावयसाओ ॥ ७ ॥ (१५५५)

Kayavam karemi kāham vāhamaham paccayā imāu ya ।

Appū sa ppaccakkho tikālakajjovvesāo. ॥ 7 (1555)

[कयवान् करेमि करिष्यामि वाहमहमप्रत्ययादसाव ।

आत्मा स प्रत्यक्षैकालिकार्योपदेसात् ॥ ७ ॥ (१५५५)

Kṛitavan karomi karisyānu vāhamahampratyayādnasāva ।

Atma sa pratyakṣaikaikalikakāryopadeśat ॥ 7 (1555)]

Trans — 7 Or this soul is *pratyakṣa* owing to this *aham-pratyaya* (realization as "I ") in I did I do, and I shall do —the *pratyaya* which is associated with functions pertaining to (all) the three tenses. (1555)

टीका—वेत्यथवा ‘कृतवानहम्, करोम्यहम्, करिष्याम्यहम्’; ‘उक्तवानहम्, ब्रवीम्यहम्, वक्ष्याम्यहम्’; ‘ज्ञातवानहम्, जानेऽहम्, ज्ञास्याम्यहम्’, इत्यादि प्रकारेण योऽयं त्रैकालिकः कार्यव्यपदेशः, तद्विषयप्रयुज्यमानतया तत्समुत्थो योऽयमहम्प्रत्ययः, एतस्मादपि “ प्रत्यक्ष एवाऽयमात्मा ” इति प्रपद्यस्व । अयं ह्यहम्प्रत्ययो नानुमानिकः, अलैङ्गिकत्वात् । नाप्यागमादिप्रमाण सम्भवः तदनभिज्ञानां बाल-गोपालादीनामप्यन्तर्मुखतयाऽऽत्मग्राहकत्वेन स्वसंविदितस्य तस्योत्पादात्, घटादौ चानुत्पादादिति ॥ ७ (१५५५) ॥

D C—In the expressions such as “ *kṛtavān aham* (I did), *karomyaham* (I do) and *karisyāmyaham* (I shall do) *uktavān aham* (I spoke), *bravīmyaham* (I speak) and *vaksyāmyaham* (I shall speak), *jñātavān aham* (I know), *jāne’ham* (I know) and *jñāsyāmyaham* (I shall know), etc—the expressions which are associated with acts governed by all the three tenses, viz, past, present and future, there is *aham-pratyaya* (the realization as “ I ”) This *aham-pratyaya*, too, establishes that the soul is *pratyakṣa* It should be borne in mind that this *aham-pratyaya* is not based on *anumāna*, for, it has no *linga* Moreover, it not even proved by *āgama* etc, for, even children, cowherds and others have the conviction of this *aham-pratyaya* based on self-experience, though they are not conversant with *pramānas* such as *āgama* etc, and that they have no such conviction regarding a *ghata*, a piece of cloth etc

Besides

कह पडिवण्णमहं ति यकिमत्थि नत्थि त्तिसंसओ कह णु ।
सइ संसयम्मि वायं कस्साहंपच्चओ जुत्तो ? ॥ ८ ॥ (१५५६)

Kaha padivannamaham ti ya kim atthi natthi tti samsao kaha nu ?
Sai samsayammi vāyam kassāhampaccaō jutto ? 8 (1556)

[कथं प्रतिपन्नमहमिति च किमस्मि नास्मीति संशयः कथं जु ? ।
सति संशये चायं कस्याहम्प्रत्ययो युक्तः ? ॥ ८ ॥ (१५५६)

Katham pratipannamaham iti ca kimasmā

na smiti samīśayah katham nu ?

Sata samāyo cayanī kasyaham pratyayo yuktah ? ॥ 8 (1556)

Trans—8 When there is no soul, how do you admit *aham* (the realization as I) ? How can there be a doubt as to whether it (the soul) is or not ? Or if there is a doubt in whose case is this *aham-pratyaya* justifiable ? (1556)

टीका—इन्त ! कथमसति जीवे “अहम्” इति प्रतिपन्न स्वया, विषयभावे विषयिणोऽनुत्थानप्रसङ्गात् ? । दद एवास्य प्रत्ययस्य विषय इति चेत् । न, जीवविषयक्येऽपि ददे तदुत्पत्तिप्रसङ्गात् । सति च जीवविषयेऽस्मिन् अहम्प्रत्यये ‘किमहमस्मि नास्मि’ इति भवतः सन्देहः कथं केन प्रकारेणोप जायते ? अहम्प्रत्ययप्राप्तस्य जीवस्य सङ्काशात् “अस्म्यहम्” इति निश्चय एव युज्यते इति भावः । सन्ति वाऽस्मिन्मात्मास्त्वित्वसंशये कस्यायमहम्प्रत्ययो युज्यते, निर्मूलत्वेन तदनुत्थानप्रसङ्गात् ? इति ॥ ८ (१५५६) ॥

D C—Hullo ! when the soul is non-existent how is it that you admit *aham* ? For it is a settled fact that in the absence of a *viśaya* (an object), there is no scope for a *viśayin* (one having an object). If your reply is that this *aham-pratyaya* has the body alone for *viśaya* is confined simply to the body this *aham-pratyaya* should be possible even in the case of the body which has been given up by the soul

Moreover if this *aham-pratyaya* associated with the soul arises how can you have a doubt as to *kim aham aham* (am I) or *na smi* (am I not) ? For on the contrary in such a case you ought to be in a position to decide that I am owing to the *sadbhāva* (presence) of the soul realized by the *aham pratyaya*. When there is this doubt about the existence of the soul, is there no scope for such a *pratyaya* owing to its being baseless ?

If the non-existence of the soul is admitted there is no possibility of a doubt regarding its existence

जइ नत्थि संसइ च्चिय किमत्थि नत्थि त्ति संसओ कस्स ? ।
संसइए व सरूवे गोयम ! किमसंसयं होज्जा ? ॥९॥ (१५५७)

Jaī natthi samsā cciya kim atthi natthi tti samsaō kassa ? ।
Samsaie va sarūve Goyama ! kim asamsayam hojjā ? ॥ 9 (1557)

[यदि नास्ति संशयी एव किमस्मि नास्मीति संशयः कस्य ? ।

संशयिते वा स्वरूपे गौतम ! किमसंशयं भवेत् ? ॥ ९ ॥ (१५५७)

Yadi nāsti samśayī eva kim asmi nāsmīti samśayah kasya ? ।
Samśayite vā svarūpe Gautama ! kim asamśayam bhavet ? ॥ 9 (1557)]

Trans —9 If the object about which one has doubt, is certainly non-existent, who has a doubt as to “*kum asmi nāsmi*” (whether I do exist or I do not exist) ? Or, Gautama ! when you (yourself) are doubtful (about yourself), what can be free from doubt ? (1557)

टीका—यदि संशयी जीव एवादौ नास्ति तर्हि “ अस्मिनास्मि ” इति संशयः कस्य भवतु ? । संशयो हि विज्ञानारूपो गुण एव; न च गुणिन-मन्तरेण गुणः संभवति । देहोऽत्र गुणीति चेत्, न, देहस्य मूर्तत्वाज्जडत्वाच्च, ज्ञानस्य चामूर्तत्वात् बोधरूपत्वाच्च । न चातनुरूपाणां गुणगुणिभावो युज्यते, आकाश-रूपादीनामपि तद्भावापत्त्याऽतिप्रसङ्गप्राप्तेः । “ संसइए वेत्यादि ” वेत्यथवा संशयिते स्वरूपे गौतम ! किमसंशयं शेषं भवेत् ? । इदमुक्तं भवति —‘ किमस्मि नास्म्यहम् ’ इत्येवं यः स्वरूपेऽपि संशेते—आत्मनिश्चयोऽपि यस्य नास्तीत्यर्थः तस्य शेषं कर्मबन्ध-मोक्षादिकं घट-पटादिकं च किमसंशयम्—असन्दिग्धं स्यात् ? न कश्चित्, सर्वसंशय एव तस्य स्यादित्यर्थः, आत्मास्तित्वनिश्चयमूलो हि शेषवस्तुनिश्चय इति भावः । अहमप्रत्ययग्राह्यं च प्रत्यक्षात्मानं निहुवानस्य “ अश्रावणः शब्दः ” इत्यादिवत् प्रत्यक्षविरुद्धो नाम पक्षाभासः, तथा वक्ष्यमाणात्मास्तित्वानुमानसद्भावाद् “ नित्यः शब्दः ” इत्यादिवदनुमानविरुद्धोऽपि । तथा “ अहमस्मि संशयी ” इति प्रागभ्युपगम्योरत्र “ नास्मि ” इति प्रतिजाननस्य साङ्ख्यस्याऽनित्यः कर्ता,

अचेतन आरमेत्यादिबद्धम्युपगमविरोधः। बालगोपालाङ्गनादिप्रसिद्ध चात्मानं निराकृतः “अचन्द्रः शशी” इत्यादिबल्लोकविरोधः। “अहनाह वा” इति गदसौ “माता मे धन्या” इत्यादिबल्ल स्वधनन्याइति। एव च प्रत्यक्षादिबाधितेऽस्मिन् पक्षेऽपक्षधर्मतया हेतुरप्यसिद्धः। हिमवत्पलपरिभाषादौ पिशाचादौ च प्रमाणपञ्चकामानस्य प्रवृत्तेरनैकान्तिकोऽपि, वक्ष्यमाणानुमानप्रमाणसिद्धे चात्मनि निषेध एव वृत्तेर्विरुद्धमेति ॥ ९ (१५५७) ॥

D C—If after all there is no one like a soul to entertain a doubt who can have a doubt as to whether I exist or I do not exist? Doubt is a *guna* (an attribute) known as *vyākāṇa* (knowledge) and the *guna* has no separate existence from its *gūṇa* (one having an attribute).

The body cannot become the *gūṇa* of doubt for it is *mūṛta* (corporeal) and *jada* (inanimate) whereas knowledge is *amūṛta* (incorporeal) and *bodha-rūpa* (an embodiment of consciousness).

The *guna* and its *gūṇa* cannot have an unlike nature otherwise *ākāśa* (space) will become a *gūṇa* of *rūpa* (colour etc).

Furthermore Gautama! how can he who is not sure about his own existence—who has no self-confidence—say anything definitely about the rest, such as *karma-bandha* (bondage and amalgamation of *karmans* and *mokṣa* (liberation) etc. and also about a *ghata* (a pitcher), *paṭa* (a piece of cloth) and the like? The answer is obvious that he cannot. For the decision regarding all things depends upon the decision arrived at in the case of the soul.

Moreover one who ignores the self-evident soul which can be realized by *aham-pratyaya* sails in the same boat as one who says that sound is always inaudible. He is then resorting to a *vaipulbhāsa* (a mock-assertion) which is contrary to direct evidence. His stand is further opposed to valid inference like one who may say *Nityaś śabdaḥ* (sound is eternal)—the *vaiki* inference which will be dealt with hereafter.

Further, one who comes forward to say that “ I do not exist ” after previously admitting that I am one having a doubt, is contradicting himself like a *Sāṅkhya* (a follower of the Sāṅkhya system of philosophy) who may say “ *Anityah kartā* ” (the doer is impermanent), “ *Acetanah ātmā* ” (the soul is inanimate) etc

Moreover, one, who denies the existence of the soul, which is well-known to children, cow-herds, and women, entertains a belief inconsistent with the popular one and can be compared with the one who says “ *Acandrah śaśī* ” (the moon is devoid of the moon) One, who says “ whether I am or I am not ” is contradicting oneself like one who says: “ *Mātā me vandhyā* ” (my mother is sterile)

This view being thus opposed to *pratyakṣa* etc., the *hetu* (the cause) is *a-siddha* (not established) owing to its non-existence in the *pakṣa* (subject of inference)

Besides, this *hetu* is also *anākāntika* (inconclusive), since none of the five *pramāṇas* has any scope so far as the measure of a *pala* of Mount Himavat and the existence of a *piśāca* (an evil spirit) are concerned

Moreover, since the existence of the soul can be proved by inference—a topic to be just discussed, the *hetu* is *viruddha* (contrary) too, as it is associated with the *vipakṣa* (dissimilar instance)

The existence of the soul by direct cognizance, is proved in another way —

गुणपञ्चक्वत्तणओ गुणी वि जीवो घडो व्व पञ्चक्खो ।

घडओ वि घेप्पइ गुणी गुणमेत्तग्गहणओ जम्हा ॥ १० ॥ (१५५८)

Guṇapaccakkhattanaṃ guṇī vi jīvo ghado vva paccakkho ।

Ghaḍaḍo vi gheppai guṇi guṇamettaggahanaṃ jamhā ॥ 10 (1558)

[गुणप्रत्यक्षत्वतो गुण्यपि जीवो षट इव प्रत्यक्षः ।

षटकोऽपि गृह्यते गुणी गुणमात्रग्रहणतो यस्मात् ॥ १० ॥ (१५५८)

Guṇapratyakṣatvato guṇyapi jīvo ghaṭa iva pratyakṣaḥ ।
Ghatako pi grīhyate guṇī guṇamatragrahaṇato yasmāt ॥ 10 (1551)

Trns — 10 The soul which is *guṇin* is self-evident owing to its *guṇas* being so (self-evident) as is the case with a pitcher For on realizing the *guṇas* only the *guṇin* e. g., the pitcher too is realized. (1558)

टीका—प्रत्यक्ष एव गुणी जीवः, स्मृति-जिज्ञासा-विकीर्णा जिगमिषा-संश्रित्यादिज्ञानविशेषाणां तद्वगुणानां स्वसंवेदनप्रत्यक्षसिद्धत्वात्, इह यस्य गुणाः प्रत्यक्षाः स प्रत्यक्षो दृष्टः, यथा षटः, प्रत्यक्षगुणश्च जीवः, तस्मात् प्रत्यक्षः, यथा षटोऽपि गुणी रूपादिगुणप्रत्यक्षत्वादेव प्रत्यक्षः, तद्वद् विज्ञानादिगुणप्रत्यक्षत्वादात्मापीति । आह-अनैकान्तिकोऽयम्, यस्मादाकाशगुणः शब्दः प्रत्यक्षोऽस्ति, न पुनराकाशमिति । तदयुक्तम्, यतो नाकाशगुणः शब्दः, किन्तु पुद्गलगुणः, ऐन्द्रियकत्वात्, रूपादिवदिति ॥ १० (१५५८) ॥

D C —The *guṇan* viz., the soul is certainly *pratyakṣa* because its *guṇas* such as *smṛti* (remembrance) *jyīṣā* (desire for knowledge), *cikīṛṣā* (desire for action) *jigamīṣā* (desire for movements) and doubt etc. which are kinds of knowledge are self-evident as they are experienced by oneself One whose *guṇas* are *pratyakṣa* is noticed to be *pratyakṣa* for instance a pitcher

The *guṇas* of the soul are *pratyakṣa* Therefore the soul is *pratyakṣa* Just as since *rūpa* (colour) etc., the *guṇas* of of a pitcher are *pratyakṣa* the pitcher too is *pratyakṣa*

Such is the case with the soul as its *guṇas* viz. *vijñāna* (knowledge) etc are *pratyakṣa*

Some one may say that this argument is *anāyatika* (vicious) for the *śabda* (sound) which is the *guṇa* of *ākāśa* (space) is *pratyakṣa* yet *ākāśa* is not *pratyakṣa*. But this

is not correct, for, *śabda* is not the *guna* of *ākāśa*, but *śabda* (sound) is rather the *guna* of *puṭgala* (matter) as it is *amdrīyaka* (cognizable by the sense-organs) as is the case with colour, etc.—

When the *gunas* are *pratyakṣa*, how is it that the *gunin* is also of this type ?

The answer is —

अन्नोऽणन्नो व गुणी होज्ज गुणेहिं, जइ नाम सोऽणन्नो ।
ननु गुणमेत्तग्गहणे घेप्पइ जीवो गुणी सक्खं ॥ ११ ॥ (१५५९)

Anno'nanno va guṇī hojja guṇehiṃ jaī nāma so'nanno ।
Nanu guṇamettaggahane gheppai jīvo guṇī sakkham ॥ 11 (1559)

[अन्योऽनन्यो वा गुणी भवेद् गुणैः, यदि नाम सोऽनन्यः ।

ननु गुणमात्रग्रहणे गृह्यते जीवो गुणी साक्षात् ॥ ११ ॥ (१५५९)

Anyo'nanyo vā guṇī bhaved guṇaiḥ, yadī nāma so'nanyah ।
Nanu guṇamātragrahane gr̥hyate jīvo guṇī sāksāt ॥ 11 (1559)]

अह अन्नो तो एवं गुणिनो न घडादओ वि पच्चक्खा ।
गुणमेत्तग्गहणाओ जीवम्मि कउ विचारोऽयं ? ॥ १२ ॥ (१५६०)

Aha anno to evaṃ guṇino na ghaḍādaō vi paccakkhā ।
Guṇamettaggahanāō jīvaṃmi kaū vicāro'yam ? ॥ 12 (1560)

[अथान्यस्तत एवं गुणिनो न घटादयोऽपि प्रत्यक्षाः ।

गुणमात्रग्रहणाजीवे कुतो विचारोऽयम् ? ॥ १२ ॥ (१५६०)

Athānyastata evaṃ guṇino na ghaṭādayo'pi pratyakṣāḥ ।
Guṇamātragrahanājīve kuto vicāro' yam ? ॥ 12 (1560)]

Trans — 11-12 The *gunin* may be either distinct from or identical with *gunas* If it is really identical (with the *gunas*), the *gunin*, the soul, is surely directly realized, on the realization of (its) *gunas* only If, however, it (*gunin*) is distinct, then

the *guṇins* such as a pitcher etc., are not *pratyakṣa* owing to the realization of merely *gūṇas* (Such being the case) whence is (the scope for) this thought of non-existence as regards the soul? (1559-1560)

टीका—ननु भवता गुणैर्म्यो गुणी किमर्थान्तरभूतोऽभ्युपगम्यते, अनर्थान्तरभूतो वा ? । यदि नाम सोऽनन्यस्तेर्म्योऽनर्थान्तरभूतः तर्हि ज्ञानादिगुणग्रहणमात्रादेव गुणी जीवः प्रत्यक्षेण गृह्यत इति सिद्धमेव । प्रयोगः—भो यस्मादनन्तरं स तद्वग्रहणे गृह्यते एव, यथा वाससि रामः । गुणैर्म्योऽनर्थान्तरं च गुणी तस्माद् गुणग्राहकप्रत्यक्षेण सोऽपि गृह्यत एवेति । अथ गुणैर्म्योऽनर्थान्तरभूत एव गुणी । तत एव सति घटादयोऽपि गुणिनो न प्रत्यक्षाः, तदर्थान्तरभूतस्य रूपादिगुणमात्रस्यैव ग्रहणात् । इह यद् यस्मादर्थान्तरभूत तद्वग्रहणेऽपि नेतरस्य ग्रहणम्, यथा घट गृहीते पटस्य, अर्थान्तरभूताश्च गुणिनो गुणा इष्यन्ते, अतो गुणग्रहणेऽपि न गुणिग्रहणम् । अतो घटादीनामपि समानेऽग्रहणदोषे कोऽयं नाम भवतः केवलं क्षीये विचारो नास्ति त्वविषया येनोच्यते—“ पञ्चत्वं चे न पिप्पल पटो च ” इत्यादि ? । अथ द्रव्यनिरहिताः केऽपि न सन्त्येव गुणाः, इत्यतस्तद्वग्रहणद्वारेण गृह्यन्त एव घटादयः । नन्वेतदात्मन्यपि समानमेव । किञ्च गुणिनो गुणानामर्थान्तरत्वेऽभ्युपगम्यमाने गुणी भवतु, मा भूद् वा प्रत्यक्षाः, तथापि ज्ञानादिगुणैर्म्यः पृथगात्मा गुणी स्वदभ्युपगमेनापि सिध्यत्येवेति ॥ (१५५९-१५६०) ॥

D C—The *guṇin* may be either separate or non-separate from its *gūṇas*. If it is non-separate i. e., identical then on realizing knowledge etc. which are the *gūṇas* of the soul the *guṇin* the soul is directly realized. The underlying argument is as follows —

That which is not separate from another is realized on that another being realized e. g. colour in a garment. To be explicit a garment and its colour are not separate so when the colour is realized the garment, too is realized.

The *guṇin* is non-separate from the *gūṇas*. Consequently when the *gūṇas* are directly perceived the *guṇin* too is

certainly realized If the *gunin* is really distinct from the *gunas*, then, such being the case, the *gunins* such as a pitcher and the like, are not *pratyakṣa* when only their *gunas* like colour, which are separate from the *gunin*, are realized. That which is distinct from another, is not realized even when another, which is separate from it, is realized As for example, a pitcher is distinct from a piece of cloth So, when one is realized, the other is not realized If it is desired that *gunas* are to be looked upon as separate from the *gunin*, then, even when the *gunas* are realized, the *gunin* remains unrealized Hence, when the fault of non-realization is applicable even in the case of pitchers etc, why should the question of non-existence arise only in the case of the soul, to the effect that “*paccakkham jam na ghappar ghado vva*” etc ?

There is really no existence of the *gunas* apart from the substance of which they are the *gunas*, so, when the *gunas* of a pitcher are realized, the pitcher, too, is certainly realized And the case of the soul is parallel

Furthermore, even though while assuming that the *gunas* are separate from the *gunin*, the *gunin* becomes or does not become *pratyakṣa* (when the *gunas* become *pratyakṣa*), yet the *gunin*, the soul which is distinct from its *gunas* such as knowledge, has its existence proved even by your own admission Anticipating the opinion of the disputant, the author says —

अहं मन्नसि अत्थि गुणी न य देहत्यंतरं तओ किंतु ।

देहे नाणाङ्गुणा सो च्चिय तेसिं गुणी जुत्तो ॥ १३ ॥ (१५६१)

Aha mannasi atthi gunī na ya dehatthantaram taō kintu ।

Dehe nāṇāṅgunā so cciya tesim guni jutto ॥ 13 (1561)

[अथ मन्यसेऽस्ति गुणी न च देहार्थान्तरं सकः किन्तु ।

देहे ज्ञानादिगुणाः स एव तेषां गुणी युक्तः ॥ १३ ॥ (१५६१)

Atha manyase'sti gunī na ca dehārthantaram sakah kintu ।

Dehe jñānādigunāḥ sa eva teṣāṃ guni yuktaḥ ॥ 13 (1561)]

Trans — 13 You may believe that there is the *ganun*, but that it is not distinct from a body. The *gunas* like knowledge etc., are observed in a body so that (body) alone is fit to be their *ganun*. (1561)

टीका—अथ मन्यसे-अस्त्येव ज्ञानादिगुणानां गुणी, नैव सं प्रत्याचक्ष्महे, एतत् तु नाम्युपच्छामो यत्—“ देहादर्शान्तरं तकोऽसौ ” इति, किन्तु देह एव ज्ञानादयो गुणाः समुपलभ्यन्ते, अतः स एव तेषां गुणी युक्तः, यथा रूपादीनां घटा । प्रयोगः—देहगुणा एव ज्ञानादयः, सर्वोपलभ्यमानत्वात्, गौर-कृष्ण-स्फुल्वदिषदिति ॥ १३ (१५६१) ॥

D O—It may be that you admit that there is a *ganun* for the *gunas* like knowledge etc. but you may refuse to believe that this *ganun* is something else than a body. That is to say you look upon the body itself as the *ganun* in question, since the *gunas* such as knowledge etc. are found in the body only. For example colour is seen in a pitcher and hence its *ganun* is a pitcher. The underlying argument is this —

Knowledge etc. are the *gunas* of a body because they are observed there and there only like other attributes of the body such as its whiteness oration fatness etc.

The answer is —

नाणादओ न देहस्स मुत्तिमत्ताइओ घटस्सेव ।

तम्हा नाणाइगुणा जस्स स देहाइओ जीवो ॥ १४ ॥ (१५६२)

Nāṇadao na dehassa muttimattāo ghaḍasseva ।

Tamhā nāṇaiguṇā jassa sa dehaio jīvo ॥ 14 (1562)

[ज्ञानादयो न देहस्य मूर्तिमत्तादितो घटस्येव ।

तस्मान्ज्ञानादिगुणा यस्य स देहाधिको जीवो ॥ १४ ॥ (१५६२)

Jñānadayo na debasya mūrtimattāditto ghaṭasyeva ।

Tasmajñānadiḡuṇa yasya sa dehadhiko jīvo ॥ 14 (1562)]

Trans — 14 Knowledge etc, are not the *gunas* of a body, as it is *mūtra* (corporeal) etc, like a *ghata* Therefore that (object) which has knowledge etc, as its *gunas*, is the soul which is separate from the body (1562)

टीका-प्रयोगः-देहस्य सम्बन्धिनो गुणादयो गुणा न भवन्त्येव, तस्य-मूर्त्तिमत्त्वात् चाक्षुषत्वाद् वा घटवत् । न च द्रव्यरहितो गुणः समस्ति । ततो यो ज्ञानादिगुणानामनुरूपोऽमूर्त्तः, अचाक्षुषश्च गुणी, स देहातिरिक्तो जीवो ज्ञातव्यः । आह-ज्ञानादयो न देहस्येति प्रत्यक्षवाधितमिदम्, देह एव ज्ञानादिगुणानां प्रत्यक्षेणैव ग्रहणात् । तदयुक्तम्, अनुमानवाधितत्वादस्य प्रत्यक्षस्य । तथाहि-इहेन्द्रियातिरिक्तो विज्ञाता, तदुपरमेऽपि तदुपलब्धार्थानुस्मरणात्, यो हि यदुपरमेऽपि यदुपलब्धमर्थमनुस्मरति, स तस्मादर्थान्तरं दृष्टः, यथा-पञ्चवातायनोपलब्धार्थानुस्मर्ता देवदत्त इत्यादि वायुभूतिप्रश्ने वक्ष्याम इति ॥ १४ (१५६२) ॥

D C — The *gunas* such as knowledge, cannot belong to the body, for, the body is *mūta* and *cāksusa* (visible) as is the case with a *ghata* Moreover, a *guna* cannot exist without a substance Now knowledge etc, are a *mūta gunas* Therefore their *gunin*, too, must be *amūta* etc, and hence it cannot be the body which is *mūta* Thus that very *gunin* is the soul

It may be argued that we see with our own eyes that knowledge etc, belong to the body But this is a wrong argument as it is not consistent with the following inference -

The knower is distinct from senses, for, even when the senses cease (to function), the object realized by means of them is remembered One who remembers an object realized by means of another, even when that another ceases, is distinct from it, e g, Devadatta who remembers the object realized by means of the five windows This we shall expound while answering the question of Vāyubhūti

Desirous of arriving at a conclusion, the author says —

इय तुह देसेणाय पच्चक्खो सव्वहा मह जीवो ।

अविहयनाणत्तणओ तुह विण्णाण व पडिवज्जा ॥ १५ ॥ (१५६३)

Iya tuha desenāyam paccakkho savvahā maham jīvo ।

Avihayanānattanaō tuha vimāṇam va padivajjā ॥ 15 (1563)

[इति तव देसेनाय प्रत्यक्षः सर्वथा मम जीवः ।

अविहतज्ञानत्वतस्तव विज्ञानमिव प्रतिपद्यस्व ॥ १५ ॥ (१५६३)

Iti tava desenāyam pratyakṣaḥ sarvatha mama jīvaḥ ।

Avihatajñānatvatas tava vijñānam iva pratipadyasva ॥ 15 (1563)]

Trans — 15 Thus this (soul) is partially *pratyakṣa* to you and entirely to me, as is the case with your knowledge, owing to (my) knowledge being unobstructed (infinite) (So) accept (the existence of the soul) (1563)

टीका—इत्येवम्-उक्तप्रकारेण स्वक्षरीरं तवापि देखतः प्रत्यक्षोऽयमात्मा, छद्मस्वत्वेन भवतु सर्वस्यापि वस्तुनो देखविषयत्वात्, घटवत्, तथाहि-मर्ममपि स्व-परपयायतोऽनन्तपर्याय वस्तु, छद्मस्वस्य प्रत्यक्षेण साक्षात् तदेखमिव गृह्णाति । प्रत्यक्षेण च प्रदीपादिप्रकाशेनेव देखतः प्रकाशिता अपि घटादयो व्यवहारतः प्रत्यक्षा उच्यन्ते एव । सर्वात्मना च कबलिप्रत्यक्षमेव वस्तु प्रकाशयति । अतो ममाप्रतिहतानन्तज्ञानत्वेन सर्वात्मनाऽपि प्रत्यक्षोऽय जीवः, यथाऽजीन्द्रियमपि स्वत्संक्षयविज्ञानमिति प्रतिपद्यस्वेति ॥ १५ (१५६३) ॥

D C—In this way the soul in your body is partially cognizable even to you for since you are a *chadmasika* (one under the evil influence of the *nichantya* *larman*) every object is known to you only partially Every object has an infinite number of *paryayas* (modifications) in onso it is examined from the stand-point of its own *paryayas* and that of the *paryayas* belonging to the rest. A *chadmasika* therefore directly grasps only a portion of it. It is a convention that a *ghaṭa* etc. partially revealed by light, etc. are said to be *pratyakṣa*. Only an omniscient being has a direct perception

of any and every object in toto. I am an omniscient being, for, my knowledge is neither limited by time nor by space. So I directly realize this soul in its entirety, just as I fully realize your knowledge, *viz.*, your doubt about the existence of the soul. Consequently admit that the soul exists.

Then, what about another's body ? —

एवं चिय परदेहेऽणुमाणओ गिण्ह जीवमत्थि त्ति ।

अणुवित्ति-निवित्तीओ विज्जाणमयं सरूवे व्व ॥ १६ ॥ (१५९४)

Evam ciya paradehe'numānao ginha jīvam atthi tti ।

Anuvitti-nivittiō vinnānamayam sarūve vva ॥ 16 (1564)

[एवमेव परदेहेऽनुमानतो गृहाण जीवमस्तीति ।

अनुवृत्ति-निवृत्तिभ्यां विज्ञानमयं स्वरूप इव ॥ १६ ॥ (१५६४)

Evam eva paradehe'numānato grhāṇa jīvam astīti ।

Anuvritti-nivrittibhyām vijñānamayam svarūpa iva ॥ 16 (1564)]

Trans—16 Thus do verily accept by means of inference that the soul which is an embodiment of knowledge, exists in another's body (too), owing to (his) indulgence in and cessation from activities, as is the case with one's own soul (1564)

टीका—यथा स्वदेहे एवं परदेहेऽपि गृहाण जीवमनुमानतः । कथम् ? इत्याह—अस्ति-विद्यत इति । कथंभूतं जीवम् ? इत्याह—विज्ञानमयं-विज्ञानात्मकम् । अनुमानमेव सूचयन्नाह—“ अणुवित्ति-निवित्तीओ सरूवे व्व त्ति ” इदमुक्तं भवति-परशरीरेऽप्यस्ति जीवः, इष्टाऽनिष्टयोः प्रवृत्ति-निवृत्तिदर्शनात्, यथा स्वरूपे-स्वात्मनि, इह यत्रेष्टा-ऽनिष्टयोः प्रवृत्ति निवृत्ती दृश्येते, तत्सात्मकं दृष्टम्, यथा स्वशरीरम्, तथा च प्रवृत्ति-निवृत्ती दृश्येते परशरीरे, अतस्तदपि सात्मकम्; आत्माभावे चेष्टा-ऽनिष्टप्रवृत्ति-निवृत्ती न भवतः, यथा घटे, इत्यनुमानात् परशरीरेऽपि जीवसिद्धिः ॥ १६ (१५६४) ॥

D C—The soul exists in another's body, too, for, he, too, like yourself performs desirable activities and refrains from

the undesirable ones and you who act accordingly have a soul. To put it explicitly one in whom are seen indulgence in desirable acts and non-indulgence in undesirable deeds has a soul as is the case with one's (your) body.

The body of another is seen as associated with desirable activities and dissociated from undesirable ones. Hence that body too has a soul. If the soul were non-existent there was no scope for this association and dissociation as can be seen in the case of a *ghata*. This is followed by inference that there is a soul in another's body, too.

Anticipating doubt in another's mind the author says —

ज च न लिंगेहिं सम मन्नसि लिंगी जओ पुरा गहिओ ।
सग ससेण व सम न लिंगओ सोऽणुमेओ सो ॥१७॥ (१५६५)
सोऽणेगतो जम्हा लिंगेहिं सम न दिट्ठपुब्बो वि ।
गहलिंगदरिसणाओ गहोऽणुमेओ सरीरम्मि ॥१८॥ (१५६६)

Jam ca na lingeḥim samam mannasī līngī jaō purā gahiō ।
Sangam sasena va samam na līngāō to numeō so ॥ 17 (1565)
So neganto jamhā lingeḥim samam na dīṭṭhapurvo vi ।
Gahalinga darsanāō gaho numeō sarīrammi ॥ 18 (1566)

[यच्च न लिंगैः सम मन्यसे लिंगी यतः पुरा गृहीतः ।

संग ससेन वा सम न लिंगस्ततोऽणुमेयः सः ॥ १७ ॥ (१५६५)

सोऽनेकान्तो यस्माल्लिंगैः समं न दृष्टपूर्वोऽपि ।

ग्रहलिंगदर्शनाद् ग्रहोऽणुमेयः शरीरे ॥ १८ ॥ (१५६६)

Yacca na līngaiḥ samam manyase līngī yataḥ purā grhītaḥ ।
Sṅgam śasena va samam na līngataḥ tato numeyah saḥ ॥ 17 (1565)

So nekanto yasmal līngaiḥ samam na drṣṭapūrvō pi ।

Grahalingadarśanād graho numeyah śarīre ॥ 18 (1566)]

Trans—17-18 Moreover, that you believe that since the *lingin* (viz, the soul) has not been realized formerly (up till now) along with the *lingas*, as is the case with the hare and the horn, so it (the soul) cannot be inferred by means of a *linga*, is untenable, for, a *graha*¹, that is not formerly seen along with (his) *lingas*, is inferred in a body, on perceiving his *linga* or *lingas* (1565-1566)

टीका—यच्च “ न य जीवलिंगसंबंधदरिणमभू ” इत्यादि पूर्वोक्त-पूर्वपक्षानुसारेण मन्यसे त्वम् । किम् ? इत्याह—ततो न लिङ्गतः—लिङ्गादनुमेयोऽसौ जीवः । यतः किम् ? इत्याह—यतो न खलु लिङ्गैः कैश्चिदपि मम लिङ्गी-जीवः कापि केनापि पुरा-पूर्वं गृहीतः । किंवदित्याह—शृङ्गमिव शशकेन समम् । ततो लिङ्ग-लिङ्गिनोः पूर्वं मन्वन्धाग्रहणाद् न लिङ्गाजीवोऽनुमीयते । इति यद् मन्यसे त्वं तत्र प्रतिविधीयते—मोऽनेकान्तः, यस्माल्लिङ्गैः सममदृष्ट-पूर्वोऽपि ग्रहः-देवयोनिविशेषः शरीरे हसन-गान-रोदन-कर-चरण-भ्रूविक्षेपादिविकृतग्रहलिङ्गदर्शनादनुमीयत इति बालानामपि प्रतीतमेवेति ॥ १७-१८ (१५६५-१५६६)॥

D C—Just as none has ever seen a horn on the head of a hare, so none has ever seen the *lingin*, viz, the soul as associated with one or more of its *lingas*. Such being the case, one cannot infer the existence of the soul. This belief of yours is not right For, though a *graha* is not previously seen along with his *lingas*, even children are convinced about his existence in a body, when they see that body associated with perverse acts such as, laughing, singing, weeping, movements of hands, feet and eye-brows, etc,—the acts which are the *lingas* of the *graha*

देहस्सत्थि विहाया पइनिययागारओ घडस्सेव ।

अक्खाणं च करणओ दण्डाईणं कुलालो व्व ॥ १९ ॥ (१५६७)

Dehassatthi vihāyā painiyayāgārao ghadasseva ।

Akkhānam ca karanao dandāīnam kulālo vva ॥ 19 (1567)

1 A kind of celestial being An evil-spirit

[देहस्यास्ति विधाता प्रतिनियताकारतो घटस्येव ।

अधर्मा च करणतो दण्डादीनां कुलाल इव ॥ १९ ॥ (१५६७)

Dehasyaasti vidhata pratiniyatakārato ghaṭasyeva ।

Akṣaṇaṁ ca karanato daṇḍādīnāṁ kulāla iva ॥ 19 (1567)

Trans—19 There is a creator of the body owing to its shape being definite and (its having a beginning) as is the case with a *ghāṭa* (There is an *adhīsthātṛ* of the organs of sense owing to their being a *kaṛaṇa* (a medium) as is the case with the *adhīsthātṛ* of a stick etc (1567)

टीका—देहस्यास्ति विधाता—कर्तेति प्रतिज्ञा, आदिमत्प्रतिनियताकारत्वात्, घटवत्, पुनरर्क्षकं तदादिमत्प्रतिनियताकारमपि न भवति, यथाऽप्रधिकारः, यच्च देहस्य कर्ता स जीवः । प्रतिनियताकारस्य मेवादिना मप्यस्ति, न च तेषां कस्मिंश्चिद् विधाता, इति तेनैकान्तिको हेतुः स्यात्, अतोऽनुक्तमप्यादिमत्त्वविशेषणं द्रष्टव्यमिति । तथा अधर्माभिन्द्रियाणामस्ति “अधिष्ठाता” इत्यप्याहारः करणत्वात्, यथा चक्र-वीवर-सूत-स्रग् दण्डादीनां कुलालः, यच्च निरभिष्ठातृकं तत् करणमपि न भवति, यथाऽऽकाशश्च, यथेन्द्रियाणामधिष्ठाता स जीव इति ॥ १९ (१५६७) ॥

D O—That there is a creator of the body is the *pratyakṣa* (premise) for it (body) has a beginning and has a definite shape as well as is the case with a *ghāṭa* Whatever has no creator whatsoever has neither a beginning nor a definite shape The transformation of clouds may be pointed out as a pertinent example Meru etc. have a fixed form and even then they have no creator So to avoid such a case wherein the *hetu* (cause) becomes *anānantarā* the adjective *adimat* (having a beginning) though not expressed is to be taken as understood

The word *adhīsthātṛ* is also understood Since the organs of sense are *kaṛaṇa* there must be an *adhīsthātṛ* for them

A parallel example is furnished by a potter, who is an *adhīsthātṛ* of a wheel, a piece of cloth, clay, thread, a stick, etc., which are *karana*s. Whatever has no *adhīsthātṛ*, has no *karana*, e. g., *ākāśa*. Hence it follows that the *adhīsthātṛ* of the organs of sense is the soul.

Moreover,

अतिथिदिय—विसयाणं आयाणादेयभावओऽवस्सं ।

कम्मर इवादाया लोए सण्डास—लोहाणं ॥ २० ॥ (१५६८)

Atthindiya-vīsayāṇam āyānādeyabhavao'vassam ।

Kammāra ivādāyā loe sandāsa-lohāṇam ॥ 20 (1568)

[अस्तीन्द्रिय—विषयाणामादानादेयभावतोऽवश्यम् ।

कर्मार इवादाता लोके सन्दंशक—लोहानाम् ॥ २० ॥ (१५६८)

Astindriya-vīsayāṇām ādānādeyabhāvato'vaśyam ।

Karmāra ivādātā loke sandamśaka-lohāṇam ॥ 20 (1568)]

Trans —20 Just as in this world a blacksmith is the *ādātṛ* (grasper) in the case of a pair of tongs and iron, so there is certainly an *ādātṛ* (viz, the soul) in the case of organs of sense and their objects, since they are related as *ādāna* (means of grasping) and *ādeya* (graspables) (1568)

टीका—इह यत्रादानादेयभावस्तत्रावश्यमादाता समस्ति, यथा लोके सन्दंशक—लोहानां कर्मरिोऽयस्काः, विद्यते चेन्द्रियविषयाणामादानादेयभावः, अतस्तेषामप्यस्त्यादाता, स च जीवः, यत्र त्वादाता नास्ति, तत्रादानदेयभावोऽपि न विद्यते, यथाऽऽकाश इति ॥ २० (१५६८) ॥

D C—If there is a relation of the type of *ādāna* and *ādeya*, then there needs be an *ādātṛ*. A blacksmith is found as the *ādātṛ*, for, we come across a pair of tongs and iron which respectively stand for *ādāna* and *ādeya*. There is a relation of the kind of *ādāna* and *ādeya*, in the case of the organs of sense and sense-objects. Therefore, there must be their

[देहस्यास्ति विधाता प्रतिनियताकारतो घटस्येव ।

अद्यानां च करवतो दण्डादीनां कुलाल इव ॥ १९ ॥ (१५६७)

Dehasyaasti vidhata pratiniyatakarakato ghatasyeva ।

Aksaṇṣu ca karaṇato daṇḍādīnaṁ kulala iva ॥ 19 (1567)]

Trans — 19 There is a creator of the body owing to its shape being definite and (its having a beginning) as is the case with a *ghāṭa*. (There is an *adhīsthātṛ* of the organs of sense owing to their being a *karaṇa* (a medium) as is the case with the *adhīsthātṛ* of a stick etc. (1567)

टीका—देहस्यास्ति विधाता—कर्तेति प्रतिज्ञा, आदिमत्प्रतिनियताकारत्वात्, घटवत्, पुनरकर्तृकं तदादिमत्प्रतिनियताकारमपि न भवति, यथाऽप्रधिकारा, यथा देहस्य कर्ता स जीवः । प्रतिनियताकारत्वं मेवादिना मप्यस्ति, न च तेषां कश्चिद् विधाता, इति तेनैकान्तिको हेतुः स्यात्, अतोऽनुक्तमप्यादिमत्त्वविशेषण इष्टमिति । तथा अद्यानामिन्द्रियाणामस्ति “अधिष्ठाता” इत्यप्याहारः करवत्त्वात्, यथा चक्र-चीवर-मृत्-स्रग् दण्डादीनां कुलालः, यथा निरधिष्ठातृकं तत् करमपि न भवति, यथाऽऽकाशम्, यथेन्द्रियाणामधिष्ठाता स जीव इति ॥ १९ (१५६७) ॥

D O—That there is a creator of the body is the *pratyjñā* (premise) for it (body) has a beginning and has a definite shape as well as is the case with a *ghata*. Whatever has no creator whatsoever has neither a beginning nor a definite shape. The transformation of clouds may be pointed out as a pertinent example. Meru etc. have a fixed form and even then they have no creator. So to avoid such a case wherein the *hetu* (cause) becomes *anānantika* the adjective *ademat* (having a beginning) though not expressed is to be taken as understood.

The word *adhīsthātṛ* is also understood. Since the organs of sense are *karaṇa* there must be an *adhīsthātṛ* for them.

A parallel example is furnished by a potter, who is an *adhīsthātṛ* of a wheel, a piece of cloth, clay, thread, a stick, etc., which are *karana*s. Whatever has no *adhīsthātṛ*, has no *karana*, e. g., *ākāśa*. Hence it follows that the *adhīsthātṛ* of the organs of sense is the soul.

Moreover,

अतिन्दिद्य-विसयाण आयाणादेयभावोऽवस्सं ।

कम्मर इवादाया लोए सण्डास-लोहाणं ॥ २० ॥ (१५६८)

Atthindiya-vīsayānam āyānādeyabhavao'vassam ।

Kammāra ivādāyā loe sandāsa-lohānam ॥ 20 (1568)

[अस्तीन्द्रिय-विषयाणामादानादेयभावतोऽवश्यम् ।

कर्मार इवादाता लोके सन्दंशक-लोहानाम् ॥ २० ॥ (१५६८)

Astindriya-vīsayānām ādānādeyabhāvato'vaśyam ।

Karmāra ivādātā loke sandaṁśaka-lohānām ॥ 20 (1568)]

Trans — 20 Just as in this world a blacksmith is the *ādātṛ* (grasper) in the case of a pair of tongs and iron, so there is certainly an *ādātṛ* (viz., the soul) in the case of organs of sense and their objects, since they are related as *ādāna* (means of grasping) and *ādeya* (graspables) (1568)

टीका—इह यत्रादानादेयभावस्तत्रावश्यमादाता समस्ति, यथा लोके सन्दंशक-लोहानां कर्मरिणोऽयस्कारः, विद्यते चेन्द्रियविषयाणामादानादेयभावः, अतस्तेषामप्यस्त्यादाता, स च जीवः, यत्र त्वादाता नास्ति, तत्रादानादेयभावोऽपि न विद्यते, यथाऽऽकाश इति ॥ २० (१५६८) ॥

D C—If there is a relation of the type of *ādāna* and *ādeya*, then there needs be an *ādātṛ*. A blacksmith is found as the *ādātṛ*, for, we come across a pair of tongs and iron which respectively stand for *ādāna* and *ādeya*. There is a relation of the kind of *ādāna* and *ādeya*, in the case of the organs of sense and sense-objects. Therefore, there must be their

ātāt He is none else but the soul. It may be added that there is no scope for the relation of the sort of *ādāna* and *ādēya* in case the *ādāt* is non-existent e.g. *ākāśa*.

Also

भोक्ता देहादौ भोज्यत्तणो नरो व भक्तस्त्व ।

सङ्घायाइत्तणो अत्थि य अत्थी घरस्सेव ॥ २१ ॥ (१५६९)

Bhoktā dehādānam bhōjyattanō naro vva bhaktasva ।

Sanghāyāttanaō atthi ya atthi gharasseva ॥ 21 (1569)

[भोक्ता देहादीनां भोग्यत्वतो नर इव भक्तस्त्व ।

सङ्घातादित्वतोऽस्ति चार्थी गृहस्येव ॥ २१ ॥ (१५६९)]

Bhoktā dehādīnām bhogyatvato nara iva bhaktasya ।

Sanghataditvato stu cārthi grhasyeva ॥ 21 (1569)]

Trans.—21 Just as a man is an enjoyer of *bhakta* (food) so there is an enjoyer of body etc. owing to their being objects of enjoyment. Just as there is an owner of a house, owing to its being a *sanghāta* (collection) etc., so there is an owner of body etc., on account of its being a *sanghāta*. (1569)

टीका—इह देहादीनां भोक्ता समस्ति, भोग्यत्वात्, यथा आसयादिभक्त
वस्त्रादीनां नरः, यस्य च भोक्ता नास्ति तद् भोग्यमपि न भवति, यथा
सरविषाणम्, भोग्य च क्षीरादिकम्, ततो विद्यमानभोक्तृत्वमिति । तथा
अर्थी—स्वामी । तत्र च देहादीनां विद्यते स्वामी, सङ्घातरूपत्वात्, आदिशब्दाद्
मूर्तिमत्त्वात्, ऐन्द्रियकत्वात्, बाह्यपत्वादित्यादयोऽप्यनैकान्तिकस्वपरिहाराय
सम्भवद्विहितविशेषणा हेतवो योजनीयाः, यथा गृहादीनां पुत्रधारादय इति
दृष्टान्तः । यत् पुनरस्वामिक तत् सङ्घातादिरूपमपि न भवति; यथा
गमनकृत्यम्, सङ्घातादिरूप च देहादिकम्, तस्माद् विद्यमानस्वामिक
मिति ॥ २१ (१५६९) ॥

D O—Just as we find that there is a person to enjoy food etc. so there is an enjoyer of body etc. The underlying reasoning is as follows —

An object of enjoyment for which there is no enjoyer, does not exist, e g a horn of an ass Body etc, exist as objects of enjoyment So it follows that there is their enjoyer

Just as a carpenter and others are *svāmīns* of a house, etc, so there is a *svāmin* of body etc, since this body and the like are in the form of a collection, have a beginning, are *mūrta*, are objects of sense and are visible etc, A number of similar *hetus* as may be helpful in making this syllogism perfectly logical, may be mentioned —

One that has no *svāmin*, is not in the form of a collection etc. For instance, a flower in the sky which has no *svāmin* is not in the form of a collection etc A body etc, are, on the contrary, in the form of a collection etc So they have a *svāmin viz.*, the soul

Really, by saying that the body has a creator, one proves that there is a creator etc, for the body But that is not the soul.

जो कत्ताइ स जीवो सज्झविरुद्धो त्ति ते मई होज्जा ।

मुत्ताइपसंगाओ तं न संसारिणो दोसो ॥ २२ ॥ (१५७०)

Jo kattāi sa jīvo sajjhaviruddho tti te mai hojjā ।

Muttāipasangāo tam na samsārino doso ॥ 22 (1570)

[यः कर्त्रादि स जीवः साध्यविरुद्ध इति तव मतिर्भवेत् ।

मूर्तादिप्रसङ्गात् तद् न संसारिणो दोषः ॥ २२ ॥ (१५७०)

Yah kartrādi sa jīvah sādhyaviruddha iti tava matirbhavet ।

Mūrtadiprasangāt tad na samsārino dosah ॥ 22 (1570)]

Trans —22 You may be thinking that, that soul which is a doer etc, is opposed to what is to be established, owing to its having a chance of being proved *mūrta* etc But this is not a fault in the case of the mundane soul (1570)

टीका—यश्चायमनन्तरं देहेन्द्रियादीनां कर्ता, अविष्टाता, आदाता, भोक्ता, अर्थी चोक्तः स सर्वोऽपि जीव एव, अन्यस्येश्वरादेर्युक्त्यक्षमत्वेन कर्तृ-

स्वायसम्मभादिति । अथ साध्यविरुद्धसाधकत्वाद् विरुद्धा ण्ते हेतव इति तत्र मतिर्मवेत्, तथाहि—घटादीनां कत्रातिरूपाः कुलालादयो मूर्तिमन्तः, संघातरूपाः, अनित्यादिस्वभावाश्च दृष्टाः, इत्यतो जीवोऽप्येवमिदं एव सिध्यति, एतद्विपरीतञ्च किलास्माकमाधयितुमिष्टं, इत्येव साध्यविरुद्धसाधकत्वं हतूनामिति । तदेतदयुक्तत्वाद् न, यतः सत्तु संसारिणो जीवस्य साधयितुमिष्टस्याऽप्योऽप्यम् । स एतदकमपुद्गलसंघातोपगृह्यत्वाद् सत्त्वरीरत्वाच्च कथंचिन्मूर्तत्वादिधर्मयुक्त एवेति भावः ॥ २२ (१५७०) ॥

D C—Up till now it has no doubt been proved that it is the soul and the soul alone which is a *doer adhiṣṭhātṛ* an enjoyer and the *stratus* of the body organs of sense etc. For God or the like cannot be admitted as a doer etc. of the body since such a statement will be opposed to reason. But it must be admitted that the *hetus* put forward to prove that the soul is a doer etc. are *viruddha* (contrary) as they establish such a type of the soul which is just the contrary to what is desired. To be explicit, a potter who is a doer of a pitcher has a body and he is in the form of a collection and is of an unpermanant nature. The same must be the case with the soul. But this type of soul is just opposed to what we are aiming at to establish. And hence these *hetus* lead us to the conclusions we are opposed to. This is not so for we are at present establishing the existence of a mundane soul and not that of a liberated one and that a mundane soul is somehow *mista* for it is certainly embraced by a collection of eight *karmans* a kind of matter and it has a body.

There is another *anumana* for establishing the existence of the soul

अस्थि श्चिय ते जीवो ससयओ सोम्म ! थाणुपुरिसो व ।
ज सदिद्ध गोयम ! त तत्थन्नत्थ वत्थि धुव ॥ २३ ॥ (१५७१)

Atthi cciya te jīvo samsayō somma ! thānupuriso vva ।
Jam sandiddham Goyama ! te tathannattha vatthi dhuvam ॥ 23 (1571)

[अस्त्येव तव जीवः संशयतः सौम्य ! स्थाणु-पुरुषाविव ।

यत् सन्दिग्धं गौतम ! तत् तत्रान्यत्र वास्ति ध्रुवम् ॥ २३ ॥ (१५७१)

Astyeva tava jīvaḥ saṁśayataḥ saumya ! sthāṇu-puruṣāviva ।
Yat sandigdham Gautama ! tat tatrānyatra vāsti dhruvam ॥23 (1571)]

Trans —23 O lovely Gautama ! Indeed you have a soul since you have a doubt (about your existence) as is the case with a branch-less trunk of a tree and a man Whatever is doubted, certainly exists either there or elsewhere (1571)

टीका—हे सौम्य ! गौतम ! अस्त्येव तव जीवः, संशयतः संशयसद्भावात्, यत्र यत्र संशयस्तत् तदस्ति, यथा स्थाणु-पुरुषौ, संशयश्च तव जीवे, तस्मादस्त्येवायम्, तथाहि—स्थाणु-पुरुषयोरूर्ध्वत्वारोह-परिणाहाद्युभयसाधारणधर्म-प्रत्यक्षतायां चलन-शिरः कण्डूयनवयोनिलयन-वल्यारोहणाद्युभयगतविशेषधर्माप्रत्यक्षतायां चोभयगतैतद्वर्मानुसरणे च सत्येकतरविशेषनिश्चयचिकीर्षोः “ किमिदम् ? इति विमर्शरूपः संशयः प्रादुरस्ति । एवंभूते च स्थाणु-पुरुषादिगतसंशये तत् स्थाणु-पुरुषादिकं वस्त्वस्त्येव, अवस्तुनि संशयायोगात् । एवमात्मशरीरयोरपि प्रागुपलब्धसामान्य-विशेषधर्मस्य प्रमातुस्तयोः सामान्यधर्मप्रत्यक्षतायां विशेषधर्माप्रत्यक्षत्वेऽपि च तद्विषयानुस्मृतौ सत्यामेकतर-विशेषोपलिप्सोः, “ किमयमात्मा किं वा शरीरमात्रमिदम् ? इति विमर्शरूपः संशयो जायते । अयं चात्म-शरीरयोः सत्त्व एवोपपद्यते, नैकतरस्याऽप्यभावे, अतोऽस्ति जीवः । अथैवं ब्रूये—अरण्यादिषु स्थाणुपुरुषसंशये तत्र विवक्षितप्रदेशेऽनयोरेकतर एव भवति, न पुनरुभयमपि, तत्कथमुच्यते—‘ विद्यमान एव वस्तुनि संशयो भवति ’ इति ? । तदयुक्तम् अभिप्रायापरिज्ञानात्, न हि वयमेवं ब्रूमः—“ तत्रैव प्रदेशे तदुभयमप्यस्ति ” इति, किन्तु यद्गतसंदेहस्तद् वस्तु तत्राऽन्यत्र वा प्रदेशे ध्रुवमस्त्येव, अन्यथा पष्ठभूतविषयोऽपि संशयः स्यात् । एतदेवाह—‘ जं संदिद्धमित्यादि ’ तस्मात् संशयविषयत्वादस्त्येव जीव इति स्थितम् ॥ २३ (१५७१) ॥

D C—A branch-less trunk of a tree is seen from a distance, as if it were a man For, certain attributes such as

loftiness etc., which are common to this trunk and a man, are observed while their distinguishing characteristics, viz. a movement, scratching dwelling of birds ascending of creepers etc., are not noticeable. Such being the case there arises a doubt as to whether this is a trunk of a tree or a person for both of these objects exist (though not in the same place). This proves that the doubt can arise only in the case of objects that do exist. You have a doubt as to whether this is a soul or a body as you realise their common features but fail to notice their distinguishing characteristics. Such a doubt proves that there is a soul for it cannot arise unless there existed two entities viz. a soul and a body. It may be here noted that in order that a doubt may arise, it is not absolutely necessary that the objects about which a doubt arises must be in one and the same place.

एव नाम विज्ञाण खरस्स पच्च न त खरे चेव ।

अस्यस्य तदस्यि विद्य एव विवरीयगाहे वि ॥ २४ ॥ (१५७२)

Evam nāma viñāṇam kharassa pattam na tam khare ceva ।
Annattha tad atthi cciya evam vivariyagāhe vi ॥ 24 (1572)

[एवं नाम विज्ञाण खरस्य प्राप्तं न तत् खर एव ।

अन्यत्र तदस्येव एव विपरीतग्रहेऽपि ॥ २४ ॥ (१५७२)

Evam nāma viñāṇam kharasya prāptam na tat khara eva ।
Anyatra tadastyeva evam viparītagrahe pi ॥ 24 (1572)]

Trans.—24 Such being the case, an ass will indeed have a horn but certainly he has not. It surely exists somewhere else. So is the case even when the perverse view is taken. (1572)

टीका—इत्त ! यदि यत्र संशयस्तेनादभ्यमेव सवितम्बम्, एवं ततः खरविषयमप्यस्तीति प्राप्तम्, तथापि कस्यचित् संशयसद्भावात् । उच्यते—नन्वमिद्विषयत्र यदुक्त—तत्रान्यत्र वा विद्यमान एव वस्तुनि संशयो भवति, नाविद्यमाने । खरस्य विषयं खरविषाण नास्तीत्यत्र च कोऽर्थः ? । इत्याह

“न तं खरे चेव त्ति” खर एव तद्विपाणं नास्ति, अन्यत्र गवादावस्त्येवेति न कश्चिद् व्यभिचारः । ‘एवं विवरीयमाहे वि त्ति’ इदमुक्तं भवति—यदा विपर्यस्तः कश्चित् स्थाणौ ‘पुरुष एवायम्’ इत्यादिविपरीतग्रहं करोति तदाप्ययमेव न्यायो वाच्यः—सोऽपि विपरीतग्रहो विपरीते पुरुषादिके वस्तुनि सत्येवोपपद्यते, नाविद्यमान इत्यर्थः । एवं भवदभिप्रायेण योऽस्मादृशां शरीर आत्मास्तित्वाभिमानः, नायमात्मनः सर्वथा नास्तित्वे युज्यत इति ॥ २४ (१५७२) ॥

D C—If it is that the object which is doubted, must be existing in the very place where the doubt arises, then even an ass will have a horn, for, somebody may doubt its existence so far as the ass is concerned No, this is not true What we want to imply is that the doubted object exists either in the very place where the doubt arises, or even somewhere else That an ass has no horns, means that horns are not associated with the ass, but they are found elsewhere, *e g*, on the head of a cow Similar is the case when one object is definitely mistaken for the other For instance, a man may take a branch-less trunk to be a man Such a perverse view proves the existence of the object mistaken Hence Gautama! you may think that we are in the wrong when we admit the existence of a soul in our body This is our perverse notion according to you If so, even then it establishes the existence of the soul.

The soul exists, for the following reason, to —

अत्थि अजीवविवक्खो पडिसेहाओ घडोऽघडस्सेव ।

नत्थि घडो त्ति व जीवत्थित्तपरो नत्थिसद्धोऽयं ॥२५॥ (१५७३)

Atthi ajīvavivakkho padisehāō ghado' ghadasseva ।

Natthi ghado tti va jīvatthittaparo natthi saddo'yam ॥ 25 (1573)

[अस्त्यजीवविपक्षः प्रतिषेधाद् घटोऽघटस्सेव ।

नास्ति घट इतीव जीवास्तित्वपरो नास्तिशब्दोऽयम् ॥ २५ ॥ (१५७२)

Astya jiva vipakṣeṭh pratisedhat ghaṭo ghatasyeva :

Nasti ghaṭa itiva jīastitvaparo nāsti kaddo'yam ॥ 25 (1573)]

Trans — 25 Just as there is a *ghata* as opposed to a-*ghata*, so there is an object *viz.*, the soul a *vipaksa* (the opposite) of an inanimate object | owing to denial This sentence, *viz.*, it does not exist establishes the existence of the soul, as does the sentence, *viz.*, there is no *ghata* (establish its existence). (1573)

टीका—अत्र प्रयोगः—प्रतिपक्षवानयमजीवः, अत्र व्युत्पत्तिमच्छुद्ध पदप्रतिषेधात्, यत्र व्युत्पत्तिमतः शुद्धपदस्य प्रतिषेधो दृश्यते स प्रतिपक्षवान् दृष्टः, यथाऽघटो घटप्रतिपक्षवान्, अत्र घटप्रयोगे शुद्धस्य व्युत्पत्तिमतश्च पदस्य प्रतिषेधः, अतोऽवश्यं घटलक्षणेन प्रतिपक्षेण मथितव्यम् । यस्तु न प्रतिपक्षवान् न तत्र शुद्धस्य व्युत्पत्तिमतश्च पदस्य प्रतिषेधः, यथाऽखरविपाणम्, अद्वित्य इति । अखरविपाणमित्यत्र खरविपाणलक्षणस्याशुद्धस्य सामासिकपदस्य प्रतिषेध इति, अतोऽत्र खरस्य विपाण खरविपाणमित्यादिव्युत्पत्तिमत्त्वे सत्यपि खरविपाणलक्षणो विपक्षो नास्ति । अद्वित्य इत्यत्र तु व्युत्पत्तिरहितस्य द्वित्यपदस्य प्रतिषेधः, इति समासरहितत्वेन शुद्धत्वे सत्यपि नावश्यं मवस्थितो द्वित्यलक्षणः कोऽपि पदार्थो जीववद् विपक्षमृतोऽस्तीति ।

“ नत्थि पद्धो ति म ” इत्यादि पञ्चार्थम् । “ नास्यात्मा ” इति च योऽयं मात्म निषेधश्च निः म जीवास्तित्वनान्तरीयक एव, यथा “ नास्त्यत्र घटः ” इति शब्दोऽन्यत्र घटास्तित्वादिनामाशब्देन । प्रयोगः—यस्य निषेधः क्रियमाणो दृश्यते तत् कश्चिदस्त्येव, यथा घटादिकम्; निषिध्यते च मवता “ नास्ति जीवः ” इति वचनाजीवः, तस्मादस्त्येवासौ, यत्र सर्वथा नास्ति तस्य निषेधो न दृश्यत एव, यथा खरविपाणकल्पानां पञ्चमूलातिरिक्तमूतानाम्, निषिध्यते च स्वया जीवः, तस्माद् निषेध एवाय तत्सत्त्वसाधक इति ॥ २५ ॥ १५७३ ॥

D C—The underlying argument is this that since *astya* is a word of which an etymology exists and is furthermore a *suddha pada* (a pure syllable) it has a *pratispalpa* (a rival) *viz. jiva*. A *pratispalpa* exists in the case of the negation of

one which has an etymology or a dissolution, over and above its being a *'suddha pada*. As for example, a *pratīpakṣa*, viz., *ghata* exists in the case of *aghata* which is a negation of *ghata*, for, there is an etymology of *ghata*, and that it is a *'suddha pada* too. One which has no *pratīpakṣa*, has no negation possible as existing, so far as a *'suddha pada* having an etymology is concerned. For instance, *akṣaravisāna* is wanting in a *pratīpakṣa*, viz., *kṣaravisāna* since *kṣaravisāna* is not a *'suddha pada* but is a *sāmāsika* one — is a compound, though, no doubt, there is a dissolution of this compound, and as such it has a *vyutpatti*.

We may now examine the case of *adittha*. *Dittha* is its *pratīpakṣa*, but, since this *dittha* is wanting in a *vyutpatti*, it is out of consideration here. For, two conditions must be satisfied —

(1) It should be a *'suddha pada*

(2) At the same time, it must have a *vyutpatti*

In the case of *kṣaravisāna* the first condition is not satisfied, whereas in the case of *dittha*, the second is violated. So there exists neither *kṣaravisāna*, a *pratīpakṣa* of *akṣaravisāna* nor practically *dittha*, a *pratīpakṣa* of *adittha*.

Now the second hemistich. Just as when one says that 'here there is no *ghata*' establishes the existence of a *ghata* elsewhere, so the statement that there is no soul, proves its existence at least somewhere. The reasoning in this case is as under —

One of which a negation is being predicated surely exists somewhere, e g, a *ghata*. You are predicating the negation of a soul etc. So it does exist somewhere. For, what is absolutely non-existent has no negative predication. *Kṣara-visāna* may be cited as an instance. It is non-existent, so, there is no possibility for affirming the existence of its negation. The very fact that you predicate negation in the case of the soul, establishes its existence.

This *hetu* is *anavānta*

असतो नरि निसेहो सजोगाइपडिसेहओ सिद्ध ।

सजोगाइचउक्क पि सिद्धमत्थन्तरे नियय ॥ २६ ॥ (१५७४)

Asaṭ natthi niseho sanjogāṭṭhapaḍisehaṭ siddham ।

Sanjogāṭṭhaukkam pi siddham atthantare niyaṇam ॥ 26 (1574)

[असतो नास्ति निषेधः संयोगादिप्रतिषेधतः सिद्धम् ।

संयोगादिचतुष्कमपि सिद्धमर्थान्तरे नियतम् ॥ २६ ॥ (१५७४)

Asaṭo nassī nissedhaḥ saṇyogadipratissedhataḥ siddham ।

Samyogadīcatuṣkamapi siddham arthantare niyatam ॥ 26 (1514)]

Trans.—26 It is proved that there is no negation in the case of a non-existent object owing to the *pratissedha* of *samyoga* (connection) etc., Even the quarter union consisting of *samyoga*, etc. is certainly proved (to be existing) elsewhere. (1574)

टीका—असतोऽविद्यमानस्य नास्ति न सम्भवत्येष निषेध इति सिद्धम् ।
 कृतः । इत्याह—संयोगादि प्रतिषेधात्, आदि शब्दात्, समवाय-सामान्य-विशेष
 परिग्रहः । एतदुक्तं भवति—इह यत्किञ्चित् कश्चित् देवदत्तादिकं निषिध्यते
 तस्यान्यत्र सत एव विवक्षितस्यान कस्मिञ्चित् संयोग-समवाय-सामान्य-
 विशेषलक्षणे चतुष्कमेव निषिध्यते, न तु सर्वथैव देवदत्तादीरमाव प्रतिपाद्यते ।
 अत्र “नास्ति गृहं देवदत्तः” इत्यादिषु गृहं देवदत्तादीनां सत्तामेव संयोग
 मात्रं निषिध्यते, न तु, तेषां सर्वथैवास्तिस्वमपाक्रियते । तथा, “नास्ति स्त्र
 विषाणम्” इत्यादिषु स्त्र विषाणादीनां सत्तामेव समवायमात्र निराक्रियते ।
 तथा “नास्त्यन्यध्वजः” इत्यादिषु विद्यमानस्यैव चन्द्रमसोऽन्यचन्द्रनिषेधा
 चन्द्रसामान्यमात्रं निषिध्यते, न तु सर्वथा चन्द्राभावः प्रतिपाद्यते । तथा “न
 सन्ति षट्प्रमाणा मुक्ताः” इत्यादिषु षट्प्रमाण्यानाममात्ररूपोविशयो मुक्तानां
 निषिध्यते, न तु मुक्ताऽभावः स्याप्यत इति । एव च सति “नास्त्यात्मा”
 इत्यत्र विद्यमानस्यैवात्मनो यत्र कश्चन येन क्त्वाचित् सह संयोगमात्रेण स्वया
 निषेधव्यम्; यथा “नास्त्यात्मा वपुसि” इत्यादि न तु सर्वथाऽऽत्मनः
 सम्भविषि ।

अत्राह कश्चित्—ननु यदि यद् निषिध्यते तदस्ति, तर्हि मन्त्रिलोकेश्वर-
ताऽप्यस्ति, युष्मदादिभिर्निषिध्यमानत्वात्; तथा चतुर्णां समवायादिप्रतिषे-
धानां पञ्चमोऽपि प्रतिषेधप्रकारोऽस्ति, त्वयैव निषिध्यमानत्वात्। तदयुक्तम्,
त्रिलोकेश्वरताविशेषमात्रं भवतो निषिध्यते, यथा घटप्रमाणत्वं मुक्तानाम्, न तु
सर्वथैवेश्वरता, स्वशिष्यादीश्वरतायास्तत्रापि विद्यमानत्वात्। तथा, प्रतिषेध-
स्यापि पञ्चसङ्ख्याविशिष्टत्वमपाक्रियते, न तु सर्वथा प्रतिषेधस्याभावः, चतुः-
सङ्ख्याविशिष्टस्य तस्य सङ्ख्यात्वात्। ननु सर्वमप्यसम्बद्धमिदम्, तथाहि—
मन्त्रिलोकेश्वरत्वं तावदसदेव निषिध्यते, प्रतिषेधस्यापि पञ्चसङ्ख्याविनिष्टत्वम-
विद्यमानमेव निवार्यते, तथा, संयोग-समवाय-सामान्य-विशेषाणामपि गृह-
देवदत्त-खरविषाणादिष्वसतामेव प्रतिषेधः, इत्यतो “यन्निषिध्यते तदस्त्येव”
इत्येतत् कथं न प्लवते ? इत्याशङ्क्याह—“ संजोगाश्चउक्तं पीत्यादि ”।
इदमुक्तं भवति—देवदत्तादीनां संयोगादयो गृहादिष्वेवासन्तो निषिध्यन्ते,
अर्थान्तरे तु तेषां ते विद्यन्त एव; तथाहि—गृहेणैव सह देवदत्तस्य संयोगो
न विद्यते, अर्थान्तरेण तु क्षेत्र-हट्ट-ग्रामादिना सह तस्यासौ समस्त्येव, गृह-
स्यापि देवदत्तेन सह संयोगो नास्ति, खट्वादिना तु सह तस्यासौ विद्यत
एव, एवं विषाणस्यापि खर एव समवायो नास्ति, गवादावस्त्येव; सामान्यमपि
द्वितीयचन्द्राभावाच्चन्द्र एव नास्ति, अर्थान्तरे तु घटगवादावस्त्येव; घटप्रमा-
णत्वमपि मुक्तासु नास्ति, अर्थान्तरे तु कूष्माण्डादावस्त्येव। त्रिलोकेश्वरताऽपि
भवत एव नास्ति, तीर्थकरादावस्त्येव, पञ्चसङ्ख्याविशिष्टत्वमपि प्रतिषेधे
नास्ति, अर्थान्तरे त्वनुत्तरविमानादावस्त्येव। इत्यनया विवक्षया ब्रूमः—
“यद् निषिध्यते तत् सामान्येनास्त्येव, न त्वेवं प्रतिजानीमहे”—“यद् यत्र
निषिध्यते तत् तत्रैवास्ति ” इति येन व्यभिचारः स्यात् ॥

वयमपि शरीरे जीवं निषेधयामः, नान्यत्रेति चेत्। साधुक्तम्, अस्मत्
समीहितस्य सिद्धत्वात्, जीवसिद्ध्यर्थमेव हि यतामहे वयम्, स चेत् सिद्धः,
तर्हि तत्सिद्ध्यन्यथानुपपत्तेरेव तदाश्रयः सेत्स्यति, किं तथा चिन्तया ?। न
च शरीरमन्तरेण जीवस्याश्रयान्तरमुपपद्यते, तत्रैव तदवस्थानलिङ्गोपलब्धेः। न
च वक्तव्यम्—शरीरमेव जीवः, “जीवति”, “मृतः”, “मूर्च्छितः” इत्यादि
व्यवस्थाऽनुपपत्तेः इत्यादेरभिधास्यमानत्वादिति ॥ २६ ॥ १५७४ ॥

D C—When a negation is predicated in the case of any object this negation is to be understood regarding *samyoga* (conjunction) *samaraya* (inherence) *saṃanya* (generality) or *viśeṣa* (speciality) but, not in one and all the aspects. For instance Devadatta is not at home means that the *samyoga* between a house and Devadatta each of which exists is not admitted. This does not mean that the existence of either of them is denied in toto. Similarly an ass has no horns means the negation of *samaraya* between an existing ass and horns. Similarly there is no other moon implies that there is a negation of commonness. That is to say we have only one moon and that there is no parallel to it.

That there are no pearls equal to a *ghaṭa* in bulk conveys the idea that the distinguishing feature viz. a measure equal to that of a *ghaṭa* is denied and not the non-existence of pearls.

Such being the case Gautama | you may refuse to admit only the *samyoga* of the existing soul with something in some way by saying something like this that the soul does not exist in the body but you cannot refuse to admit its existence from all other stand-points. Some one may come forward to argue as under —

If there exists that of which negation is predicated then in my case there must be the sovereignty of the three worlds as it is not admitted by you in my case. Furthermore you refuse to believe a fifth *pratishedha* over and above the four well-known *pratishedhas* viz. *samyoga* etc. So there must be a fifth *pratishedha*. These arguments can be refuted as below —

We do not admit in your case the sovereignty of the three worlds i. e. only a particular aspect of sovereignty but not your sovereignty which exists owing to your being a master of several pupils of yours. Thus you will see that only a particular

type of sovereignty is not admitted but not all types of it. Similarly, when we refuse to admit the fifth *pratishedha*, it is the number 'five' associated with it that is denied, and not a *pratishedha* in all its aspects

Regarding this refutation, it may be argued that this is all moonshine For, you refuse to admit in me the sovereignty of the three worlds—a thing that does exist in my case The number 'five' not admitted in the case of *pratishedha* is also non-existent Moreover, *samyoga* in the case of a house and Devadatta, which is not admitted, is also non-existent Same is the case with *samavāya*, *sāmānya* and *vis'esa* Such being the case, how can you say that what is negatived does exist? The answer to this sort of argument may be given as follows —

That the *samyoga* between the house and Devadatta is not admitted, does not mean refusal to admit the *samyoga* of Devadatta with a field, a market, a village or the like Moreover, the house has no *samyoga* with Devadatta only, but it has a *samyoga* no doubt with a bed-stead or the like

Similarly the *samavāya* in the case of an ass and horns is not admitted, but the *samavāya* in the case of a cow and its horns and the like, is certainly admitted

Likewise *sāmānya* is not admitted in the case of the moon but it is surely admitted in the case of *ghatas*, cows, etc. that are more than one in number

Similarly the measure equal to a *ghata* is refused so far as the pearls are concerned but it no doubt exists as regards a melton etc The sovereignty of the three worlds is not admitted, Gautama¹ in your case, but it does exist as far as *Tñthamkanas* are concerned

Similarly the number five is not admitted regarding the *pratishedhas*, but it is surely admitted when the question of *anuttaras* is being discussed

From this, you will see that what we wish to suggest is this —

That which is denied exists ordinarily By no means we want to convey that about which negation is predicated, exists there and nowhere else Thus there is no *vyabhicāra* (inconsistency) in what we say

Gautama ! If you wish to retort that you (Gautama) do not admit the existence of the soul in the body only and admit it elsewhere that is good, for it establishes what is desired by us We have been all this while trying simply to establish the existence of the soul And if it is thus established then the *asraya* (substratum) of the soul will be proved as it is not possible to justify its existence in any other way

It is not justifiable to admit any other *asraya* of the soul except the body for the *līngas* of the soul are seen there It may be borne in mind that it will not do to say that the body itself is the soul for in that case we cannot have a *vyavasthā* (fixity) of the types *viz.* he lives he is dead he has fainted and the like Of course this *vyavasthā* will be expounded hereafter

For the proof of the existence of the soul another etymology can be given —

जीवो त्ति सत्थयमिण सुद्धत्तणओ घढाभिहाण व ।
 जेण त्थेण सदत्थ सो जीवो अह मई होज्ज ॥ २७ ॥ (१५७५)
 अत्थो देहो धिय से त नो पज्जायवयणभेआओ ।
 नाणाइगुणो य जओ भणिओ जीवो न देहो त्ति ॥ २८ ॥ (१५७६)

Jīvo tti satthayaminam suddhattanaō ghaḍābhīhāṇam va ।
 Jēnatthēna sadattham so jīvo aha mai hojja ॥ 27 (1575)

Attho deho cāya se taṇ no pajjāyavayanaṇheāō ।
 Nāṇāgūṇo ya jaō bhankō jīvo na deho tti ॥ 28 (1576)

[जीव इति सार्थकमिदं शुद्धत्वतो घटाभिधानमिव ।

येनार्थेन सदर्थं स जीवोऽथ मतिर्भवेत् ॥ २७ ॥ (१५७५)

अर्थो देह एव तस्य तद् नो पर्यायवचनभेदात् ।

ज्ञानादिगुणश्च यतो भणितो जीवो न देह इति ॥ २८ ॥ (१५७६)

Jīva iti sārthakam idam śuddhatvato ghatabhīdhanam iva ।

Yenārthena sadartham sa jīvo'tha matir bhavet ॥ 27 (1575)

Artho deha eva tasya tad no paryāyavacanabhedat ।

Jñānādiguṇaś ca yato bhanito jīvo na deha iti ॥ 28 (1576)]

Trans —27-28 This word “jīva” is significant owing to its being *śuddha*, as is the word *ghata* That *artha* (meaning) by means of which it is pregnant with a meaning is *jīva* If you, however, think that that *artha* is only the body, that is not so, on account of a difference in synonymous words, for, *jīva* is said to have *guṇas* such as knowledge, etc, and not that the body (is so said) (1575-1576)

टीका—जीव इत्येतद् वचनं सार्थकमिति प्रतिज्ञा व्युत्पत्तिमत्त्वे सति शुद्धपदत्वात्, इह यद् व्युत्पत्तिमत्त्वे सति शुद्धपदं तदर्थवद् दृष्टम्, यथा घटादिकम्, तथा च जीवपदम्, तस्मात् सार्थकम्, यत्तु सार्थकं न भवति तद् व्युत्पत्तिमत् शुद्धपदं च न भवति, यथा छित्थादिकं खरविषाणादिकं च, न च तथा जीवपदम्, तस्मात् सार्थकम् । यद् व्युत्पत्तिमद् न भवति तच्छुद्धपदमपि सद् न सार्थकं, यथा छित्थादिपदम्, इति हेतोरनैकान्तिकता-परिहारार्थं व्युत्पत्तिमत्त्वविशेषणं द्रष्टव्यम् । यदपि शुद्धपदं न भवति किन्तु सामासिकम्, तदपि व्युत्पत्तिमत्त्वे सत्यपि सार्थकं न भवति, यथा खरविषाणादिकम्, इति शुद्धत्वविशेषणम् ।

अथ मन्यसे—देह एवास्य जीवपदस्यार्थः, न पुनरर्थान्तरम्; उक्तं च—“ देह एवास्यमनुप्रयुज्यमानो दृष्टः, यथैष जीवः, एनं न हिनस्ति ” इति, अतो देह एवास्यार्थो युक्त इति । तदेतद् न । कुतः ? इत्याह—देह-जीवयोः पर्यायवचनभेदात्, यत्र हि पर्यायवचनभेदस्तत्रान्यत्वं दृष्टम्, यथा घटा-ऽऽकाशयोः । तत्र घट-कुट-कुम्भ-कलशादयो घटस्य पर्यायाः, नभो-

व्योमाञ्तरिक्षा-ऽऽकाशादयस्त्वाकाशपर्यायाः । प्रस्तुते च जीवो अन्तर्लुप्तमान् प्राणी सखो भूत इत्यादयो जीवपर्यायाः, शरीरं वपुः कायो देहः क्लेशरमित्यादयस्तु शरीरपर्यायाः । पर्यायवचनमेवेऽपि च वस्त्वैकत्वे सर्वैकत्व-प्रसङ्गोऽत्र बाधकम् । यत् पुनरिदमुक्तम्—“देह एवायमनुप्रयुज्यमानो वृष्टः” इत्यादि, तच्छरीरसदृशरसा-ऽवस्थानादितः शरीरे जीवोपचारः क्रियते । किञ्च, इत्यमपि श्रूयत एव—‘गतं स जीवः’ ‘वक्षतामिदं शरीरम्’ इति । किञ्च “नाजार्इत्यादि” यस्याद्यज्ञानादिगुणयुतो अन्तुः, जडश्च देहः, तत् कर्यं देह एव जीवः । प्रागिहैव चोक्तम्—‘न ज्ञानादिगुणो देहः, मूर्षि मरणात्, घटवत्; तथा, देहेन्द्रियातिरिक्त आत्मा, तदुपरमेऽपि तदुपलम्भा र्यानामनुस्मरणात्, वातायनपुरुषवदिति’ ॥ २७-२८ ॥ १५७५-१५७७ ॥

D C—Here the *pratyaya* is The word *jīva* is significant. For over and above this it has a *vyutpatti* and it is a *suddha pada*. Whatever is a *suddha pada* and has a *vyutpatti* is here seen to be one having an *artha* (meaning) *Ghaṭa* etc. may be mentioned as instances so is the word *jīva*. Therefore it too is significant. What is not significant is wanting in *vyutpatti* and besides it is not a *suddha pada*. *Dittha bhava-śānta* etc., are words of this type for the former has no *vyutpatti* whereas the latter is not a *suddha pada*. Such is not the case with the word *jīva*. Therefore it is significant. The condition that it should have a *vyutpatti* is stated here to avoid *dittha* etc., which are *suddha padas* but which are not significant; for they fail to satisfy both the conditions. Same is the case with *bhava-śānta* for though it has a *vyutpatti* it is not a *suddha pada*. And therefore it is not significant.

If you believe that simply the body is the *artha* of *jīva* because we come across the following line it is not correct since there is a difference in the synonyms of the body and *jīva*.

“*Deha evaṃ anuprayujyamāno dīpaḥ yathāśa jīvaḥ, enam na hinasti*”

The words of which the synonyms differ are seen to be non-identical. For instance, *ghaṭa* is not the same as *ālāsa*

as the synonyms of the former, viz, *ghata*, *kuta*, *kumbha* and *kalāśa* differ from those of the latter, viz, *nabhas*, *vyoman*, *antarikṣa*, *ākāśa* and the like In the pertinent case, the synonyms of *jīva* are *jantu*, *asumat*, *prāṇin*, *sattva*, *bhūta*, etc, and these are by no means the same as *śarīra*, *vāyu*, *kāya*, *kalavara*, etc, the synonyms of *deha* If this difference in synonyms is neglected, anything will be identical with anything else, and this is certainly undesirable.

Now “*deha evāyam anuprayujyamāno dr̥stah*”. Herein, there is an *upacāra* (metaphorical application) of *jīva* to the body, as it is with the help of the body that the soul walks etc

Moreover, we do hear, “*gataḥ sa jīvaḥ, dahyatām idam śarīram*”, i e, the soul has departed and let this body be burnt

Furthermore, the soul has an attribute like knowledge, whereas the body is *jada* and has no knowledge So, how can we equate the body with the soul ?

The reasons why the body is not the same as the soul, have been already mentioned while concluding the commentary on verse 1562

जीवो ति वा० सच्चं मवयणाओऽवसेसवयणं व ।

सवण्णुवण्णयो वा अणुमयसवण्णुवयणं व ॥ २९ ॥ (१५७७)

Jīvo tithi vāḥ saṁcam mavvayanāḥ vasesavayanam va ।

Savannuvayanaḥ vā anumayasavannuvayanam va ॥ 29 (1577)

[जीवोऽस्ति वचः सत्यं मद्वचनादवशेषवचनमिव ।

सर्वज्ञवचनतो वाऽनुमतमवज्ञवचनमिव ॥ २९ ॥ (१५७७)

Jīvo'sti vacah satyam madvacanādavaśeṣavacanam iva ।

Sarvajñavacanato vā'numatasarvajñavacanam iva ॥ 29 (1577)]

Trans — 29 Like my other statement, (i e, one pertaining to your doubt), the statement (of mine) that the soul exists,

is true, as it is my statement Or it is correct owing to its being a statement of an omniscient being as is the case with the statement of one whom you look upon as omniscient. (1577)

टीका—“ वीक्षोऽस्ति ” इत्यतद् वच सत्यम्, मद्बचनत्वात्, भवत्सं श्रयविषयाद्यवशेषवचनवत्, यच्च सत्यं न भवति तद् मदीयवचनमपि न भवति, यथा कूटसाक्षिवचनम् । अथवा सत्यं “ वीक्षोऽस्ति ” इति वचनम्, सर्वज्ञवचनत्वात्, भवदनुमतसर्वज्ञवचनवदिति ॥ २९ (१५७७) ॥

D C—Just as my statement about your doubt is correct so this statement of mine that the soul exists is correct; for it is my statement. The statement which is not correct, is not mine e g, the statement of a false witness Or the correctness of this statement can be also established as under —

The statement that the soul exists is correct because it is the statement of an omniscient being as is the case with a statement of one whom you look upon as *sarvajña*

भय-राग-दोष-मोहाभावाद् सच्चमणइवाह च ।

सब चिय मे वयण जाणय मज्झत्यवयण व ॥ ३० ॥ (१५७८)

Bhaya-rāga-dosa-mohābhāvāḥ saccamaṇaivāhi ca ।

Savvam caya me vayanam jāṇaya ma||hatthavayanam va ||30 (1578)

[भय-राग-द्वेष-मोहाभावात् सत्यमनतिपाति च ।

सत्यमेव मे वचन ज्ञायकमभ्यस्तवचनमिव ॥ ३० ॥ (१५७८)

Bhaya-raga-dveṣa-mohābhavat satyam anatipati ca ।

Satyam eva me vacanam jñāyakaṁ adhyasthavacanam iva ||30 (1578)]

Trans —30 Everything that I say is certainly true and free from any fault on account of the (complete) absence of fear attachment aversion and infatuation (in me) as is the case with the words of an intelligent and impartial person (1578)

टीका—सर्वमपि मद्बचनं सत्यमनतिपाति च बोधव्यम्, भय-राग-द्वेषा-ज्ज्ञानरहितत्वात्, इह यद् मयाविरहितस्य वचनं तत् सत्यं दृष्टम्, यथा

मार्गज्ञस्य भयरहितस्य प्रष्टरि राग-द्वेषरहितस्य मार्गोपदेशवचनम्, तथा च मद्वचः, तस्मात् सत्यमनतिपाति चेति ॥ ३० (१५७८) ॥

D C—Whatever I say, should be taken to be true and flawless, as I am (entirely) free from fear, attachment, aversion and ignorance In this world, it is a matter of common experience that whatever is said by one devoid of fear, etc., is true For instance, the words spoken to one who has lost his way, by one who knows it, who is fearless and who is devoid of attachment and aversion, are true My statement belongs to the same category So it is true and flawless

The doubt of Gautama svāmin is being answered

कह सवण्णु त्ति मई जेणाहं सवसंसयच्छेई ।

पुच्छसु व जं न जाणसि जेण व ते पच्चओ होज्जा ॥३१॥ (१५७९)

Kaha savvannu tti mai jēnāham savvasamsayacchei ।

Pucchasu va jam na jānasī jena va te paccaò hojjā ॥ 31 (1579)

[कथं सर्वज्ञ इति मतिर्येनाहं सर्वसंशयच्छेदी ।

पृच्छ वा यद् न जानासि येन वा ते प्रत्ययो भवेत् ॥ ३१ ॥ (१५७९)

Katham sarvajña iti matir yenāham sarvasamśayacchedī ।

Priccha vā yad na jānāsī yena vā te pratyayo bhavet ॥ 31 (1579)]

Trans.—31 You may be thinking as to how I am omniscient This is so, for, I can remove all doubts Or you may ask (me) what you do not know so that you may be convinced (about my omniscience) (1579)

टीका—कथं नाम ' त्वं सर्वज्ञः ' इति ते मतिः ? एवं त्वं मन्यसे, तथा भय-राग-द्वेष-मोहाभावश्चासिद्ध इति मन्यसे । तदयुक्तम्, येनाहं सर्व-संशयच्छेदी, यश्च सर्वसंशयच्छेत्ता स सर्वज्ञ एव । दृष्टान्ताभावेनान्वयासिद्धे-रनैकान्तिकोऽयं हेतुरिति चेत् । न, सर्वसंशयच्छेत्तृत्वानुपपत्तिरेवेह विपर्यये

बाधक प्रमाणम्, किमिहान्वयान्वेषणेन ? । यत्ति वा, पृच्छयतां यत् त्रैलोक्या
न्तर्गत वस्तु त्व न जानासि, येन सर्वज्ञत्वप्रत्ययस्तव जायते । मयाप्रमाणोऽपि
तल्लिङ्गादर्शनाद् मयि सिद्ध एवेति स्वयमेव द्रष्टव्यम् । कदाचिदपि लिङ्गादर्शने
लिङ्गिनोऽस्तित्वशङ्कायामपिप्रसङ्ग इति ॥ ३१ (१५७९) ॥

D C—You may be thinking as to how I am omniscient and you may be believing that I am not entirely free from fear attachment, aversion and infatuation In that case I reply as under —

I can remove all doubts Whoever can do so is certainly omniscient. So I, too am omniscient. If you were to argue that this *hetu* is *anulanta* (inconclusive) owing to want of an illustration and impossibility of establishing *anvaya* it is not so for in this *viparyaya* the *anupatti* (inapplicability) itself of state of removing doubts is a proof that goes against it What is the use of searching for *anvaya* ? Or you may ask me anything that you do not know so that you may become convinced about my omniscience

That I am free from fear etc is proved in my case owing to their characteristics being not seen in me To suspect the existence of a *linga* even when there is a total absence of a *linga* is too much.

Concluding the author says :—

एवमुवाङ्गलिङ्ग गोयम ! सर्वप्रमाणसंसिद्धम् ।

ससारी-यर यावर तसाहमेय मुणे जीव ॥ ३२ ॥ (१५८०)

Evam uvaṅgalingam Goyama ! sarvaprāmāṇasiddham ।
Sasārī yam-thāvaram tassaahameyam muṇe jīvam ॥ 32 (1580)

[एवमुपयोगलिङ्ग गौतम ! सर्वप्रमाणसंसिद्धम् ।

समारी तर-स्थावर-यसमद् मुण जीवम् ॥ ३२ ॥ (१५८०)

Evam upayogalingam Gautama ! sarvaprāmāṇasiddham ।
Sasārī tara-sthāvaram trasabhedam muṇa jīvam ॥ 32 (1580)]

Trans—32 Thus Gautama ! know the soul as one having *upayoga* (attention) as the characteristic mark, as one proved by all the valid proofs and (also) as one having classifications like *samsārīn* (mundane) and *itara* (not mundane) and the mundane having two sub-classifications, viz, *sthāvara* (immobile) and *trasa* (mobile). (1580)

टीका—एवमुक्तेन प्रकारेण जीवमात्मानं गौतम ! मुण-प्रतिपद्यस्वेति सम्बन्धः । कथम्भूतम् ? उपयोग एव लिङ्गं यस्य स तथा, सर्वैः प्रत्यक्षाऽनुमाना-ऽऽगमप्रमाणैः संसिद्धं-प्रतिष्ठितम्, तथा संसारी-तर-स्थावर-त्रसादि-भेदम् । संसारिणश्चेतरे सिद्धाः । आदिशब्दाच्च सूक्ष्म-वादर-पर्याप्ता-ऽपर्याप्तादि-भेदपरिग्रह इति ॥ ३२ ॥ १५८० ॥

अत्र वेदान्तवादी प्राह—ननु बहुभेदत्वमात्मनोऽसिद्धम्, तस्य सर्वत्रैकत्वात्, तदुक्तम्—

“ एक एव हि भूतात्मा भूते भूते प्रतिष्ठितः ।

एकधा बहुधा चैव दृश्यते जलचन्द्रवत् ॥ १ ॥

यथा विशुद्धमाकाशं तिमिरोपप्लुतो जनः ।

सङ्कीर्णमिव मात्राभिर्भिन्नाभिरभिमन्यते ॥ २ ॥

तथेदममलं ब्रह्म निर्विकल्पमविद्यया ।

कलुषत्वमिवापन्नं भेदरूपं प्रकाशते ॥ ३ ॥

ऊर्ध्वमूलमधःशाखमश्वत्थं प्राहुरव्ययम् ।

छन्दांसि यस्य पर्णानि यस्तं वेद स वेदवित् ॥ ४ ॥ ”

तथा ‘पुरुष एवेदं ग्निं सर्वं, यद् भूतं यच्च भाव्यम्, उतामृतत्वस्येशानः, यदन्नेनातिरोहति, यदेजति, यद् नैजति, यद् दूरे, यद् अन्तिके, यदन्तरस्य सर्वस्य, यत् सर्वस्यास्य बाह्यतः’ इत्यादि । इत्येतदेव पूर्वार्धेनाक्षिप्योत्तरार्धेन परिहरन्नाह—

D C—In this way, Gautama ! admit that there is a soul which has *upāyoga* as its *linga*, of which the existence is proved by all the three *pramāṇas*, viz, *pratyakṣa*,

anumāna and *agama* and which can be variously classified. Some of these classifications are -*samāra* (mundane) and *mukta* (liberated) *sūkṣma* (subtle) and *bādhara* (gross) *paryāpta* (developed) and *aparyāpta* (non developed), etc. Furthermore the mundane beings are sub-divided as *sthāvara* (immobile) and *trasa* (mobile)

Here a Vedāntin may say that many varieties of the soul are unwarranted for the soul is everywhere the same. This is corroborated by the following verses —

“*Ekā eva hi bhūtātma bhūte bhūte pratyakṣitā :*

Ekādha bahudhā caita dṛṣyate jalāndhravat ॥ 1 ॥

Yathā viśuddham akāśam tinnropapṛiṣṭo janah :

Sankṛnam va matrābhīr bhinnābhīr abhīmanyate ॥ 2 ॥

Tathedam amalam brahma nūrvikalpānāndyaya :

Kalūṣatoṣa svapannam bhedarūpam prakāśate ॥ 3 ॥

Ūrdhvamūlam adakṣakṣham abhāttham prahīr avyayam :

Chandam yasya pānām yastam veda sa vedant ॥ 4 ॥”

And

*Purusa evadam gū sarvām, yad bhūtam, yacca bhavyata
utāntatānyesaṇah yadannenatirohah yad ejaṭ yad nāyati
yad dūre yadu antile yad antarya sarvāya yat sarvāyasya
bahyatah.*

This view of the Vedāntin is now being refuted :—

जह पुण सो एगो खिय हवेज वोम व सव्वपिण्डेसु ।

गोयम ! तदेगलिङ्ग पिण्डेसु तहा न जीवोऽय ॥३३॥ (१५८१)

Jai puna so ego cciya have]]a vomam va savvapinḍesu :

Goyama ! tad egalingam pinḍesu taha na jīvo yam ॥ 33 (1581)

[यदि पुनः स एक एव भवेद् व्योमेव सर्वपिण्डेषु ।

गौतम ! तदकलिङ्ग पिण्डेषु तथा न जीवोऽयम् ॥ ३३ ॥ (१५८१)

Yadi punah sa eka eva bhaved vyomeva sarvapindesu |
Gautama ! tad ekalingam pindesu tathā na jīvo'yam || 33 (1581)]

Trans —33 O Gautama ! if that soul were really one in all the *pindas* (bodies) as is the case with the sky, then that (sky) is (only) of one form in different corporeal *pindas* but such is not the soul (1581)

टीका—परः ग्राह—यदि पुनर्दर्शितन्यायेन स आत्मा सर्वेष्वपि नारक—
तिर्यङ्—नरा—ऽमरपिण्डेषु व्योमवदेक एव भवेद् न तु संसारीतरादिभेदभिन्नः,
तर्हि किं नाम दूषणं स्यात् ? । एवमुक्ते भगवानाह—गौतम ! तद् व्योम
सर्वेष्वपि पिण्डेषु मूर्तिविशेषेषु स्थितमेकलिङ्गं वैसदृश्याभावादेकरूपमेव, इति
युक्तं तस्यैकत्वम्, जीवस्त्वयं विचार्यत्वेन प्रस्तुतो न तथा—नैकलिङ्गः सर्वत्र
दृश्यते, प्रतिपिण्डं तस्य विलक्षणत्वात्, लक्षणभेदे च लक्ष्यभेदात्, इति न
तस्यैकत्वमिति ॥ ३३ (१५८१) ॥

D C—Some one may ask a question What harm is there, if, on the basis of the verses, etc., just quoted, the soul is, on the analogy of the sky, looked upon as one : *i.e.* having no such classifications, as mundane and non-mundane and the like, so far as all the *pindas*, *viz.*, the bodies of a denizen of hell, *tryac*, a human being and a celestial being, are concerned ?

The answer is this As regards the sky, it is alright to say that it is only one, for, the sky, even while permeating all the corporeal *pindas*, is seen to be uniform—free from any distinctions Such is not, however, the case with the soul in question It is not observed to be uniform, for, it differs from *pinda* to *pinda* Moreover, the difference in characteristics presupposes, the difference in those having these characteristics Hence, the soul is not one in number

Here is the illustration —

नाणाजीवा कुमादउ व सुवि लक्खणाइमेयाओ ।
सुह-दुक्ख-बन्ध-मोक्खाभावो य जओ तदेगत्ते ॥३४॥ (१५८२)

Nāṇajīvā kumbhādaṭṭha vva bhuvi lakkhaṇābheyāṭṭha ।
Suha-dukkha-bandha-mokkhābhāvo ya jaṭṭha tadegatte ॥34(1582)

[नानाजीवाः कुम्भादय इव भुवि लक्षणादिभेदात् ।
सुख-दुःख-बन्ध-मोक्षभावश्च यस्तदेकत्वे ॥ ३४ ॥ (१५८२)

Nāṇajīvāḥ kumbhādaya iva bhuvi lakṣaṇādibhedat ।
Sukha-duḥkha-bandha-mokṣābhāvaśca yatas tadekatve ॥34(1582)]

Trans.—34 In this world, there are different souls like (different) water-pots etc., on account of the difference in their characteristics etc. For, if they were (only) one, there will be non-existence of *sukha* (happiness) *dukkha* (misery) *bandha* (bondage) and *moksa* (emancipation) (1582)

टीका—नानारूपा सुवि जीवाः परस्परं भेदमाद्य इत्यर्थः । लक्षणादि भेदादिति हेतुः, कुम्भादय इवेति दृष्टान्तः, यद्य न भिन्नं न तस्य लक्षणभेदः, यथा नमस इति । सुख-दुःख-बन्ध-मोक्षभावश्च यस्मात् तदेकत्वे, तस्मात् भिन्ना एव सर्वेऽपि जीवा इति ॥ ३४ (१५८२) ॥

D C—The living beings in this world differ from one another for there is a difference in their characteristics etc. As a parallel example may be mentioned water-pots etc. Whatever is not different from another object does not differ in characteristics from it. As for example the sky is everywhere the same (since *ghataṇasa* does not differ from *maṭṭhakasa*). Moreover if there were only one soul then there will be nothing like happiness misery bondage and emancipation. But these do exist. Therefore all the souls are different and their number is not one but many

How do the characteristics differ in each body ?

जेणोवओगलिङ्गो जीवो भिन्नो य सो पइसरीरं ।

उवओगो उक्करिसा-वगरिसओ तेण तेऽणंता ॥३५॥ (१५८३)

Jenovaogalingō jīvo bhinnō ya so paisarīram ।

Uvaogo ukkarisā-vagarisaō tena te'nantā ॥ 35 (1513)

[येनोपयोगलिङ्गो जीवो भिन्नश्च स प्रतिशरीरम् ।

उपयोग उत्कर्षा-ऽपकर्षतस्तेन तेऽनन्ताः ॥ ३५ ॥ (१५८३)

Yenopayogalingo jīvo bhinnas ca sa pratiśarīram ।

Upayoga utkarsā-pakarsatas tena te'nantāh ॥ 35 (1583)]

Trans —35 That *upayoga* (attention) by means of which the soul has attention as the characteristic mark, is different in every body The *upayoga* has maximum and minimum scales Therefore they (souls) are infinite in number (1583)

टीका—येन ज्ञान-दर्शनोपयोगलक्षणोऽसौ जीवः, स चोपयोगः प्रतिशरीरमुत्कर्षा-ऽपकर्षभेदानन्तभेदः, तेन जीवास्तद्वेदादनन्तभेदा एवेति । तदेवं भावितं “ नाणाजीवा ” इत्यादि पूर्वार्धम् ॥ ३५ (१५८३) ॥

D C—This soul has as its characteristic, *upayoga* (attention) consisting of two kinds of knowledge, viz, differentiated and undifferentiated This *upayoga* has infinite varieties, for, it differs from body to body, some having the *utkarsa* (maximum) *upayoga*, some having the *apakarsa* (minimum) *upayoga* and some having *upayoga* between these two extremes Therefore the souls are of infinite kinds owing to the infinite varieties of *upayoga* This has been already alluded to, in the first hemistich of verse 1582

Now, with regards to happiness, misery, etc., & c, exposition of the second hemistich of verse 1582, the author says

एगत्ते सव्वगयत्तओ न मोक्खादओ न भस्सेव ।

कत्ता भोता मंता न य संसारी जहागासं ॥ ३६ ॥ (१५८४)

Egatie savvagayattañ na mokkhādañ nabhasseva ।

Kattā bhottā mantā na ya samsārī jahāgāsam ॥ 36 (1584)

[एकत्वे सर्वगतत्वस्यो न मोक्षादयो नमस इव ।

कर्ता भोक्ता मन्ता न च संसारी यथाऽऽकाशम् ॥ ३६ ॥ (१५८४)

Ekatto sarvagatatvato na mokasdayo nabhasa iva ।

Karta bhokta manta na on samsari yathaka kam ॥ 36 (1584)]

Trans.—36 On oneness (being accepted in the case of souls) there will not be liberation etc., owing to (the soul) being all-pervading as is the case with the space. Moreover like space the soul will not be a *kartr* (a doer) a *bhoktr* (an enjoyer) a *mantr* (thinker) and a *samsārīn* (a mundane being) (1584)

टीका—एकस्य जीवानां सुख-दुःख-स-स-मोक्षादयो नोपपद्यन्ते, सर्वगतत्वात्, नमस इव । यत्र तु सुखादयो न सन् सर्वगतं, यथा द्रवदच इति । किञ्च न कर्ता, न भोक्ता, न मन्ता, न संसारी जीवः, एकत्वात् सवजीवानाम्, यथैक न तस्य कर्तृत्वादयः, यथा नमस इति ॥ ३६ (१५८४) ॥

D O—If there is only one soul then there is no scope for happiness and misery bondage and liberation and the like since one soul will be all-pervading Space may be here cited as a pertinent case

One where in there are happiness misery etc is not all-pervading e g., Devadatta

Furthermore since the number of the souls is only one and not more the soul cannot be an agent an enjoyer a thinker and a mundane being That which is one in number is not a doer etc —a fact which is corroborated by the example of space

Besides

एगत्ते नस्यि सुही यदूयघाउ ति दसनिरुउ स ।

यहुतरयदत्तणओ न य मुफो दसमुफो स । ३६ ॥ (१५८४)

Egatte natthi suhī bahūvaghāu tti desaniruu vva ।
Bahuttara baddhattanao na ya mukko desamukko vva ॥ 37 (1585)

[एकत्वे नास्ति सुखी बहूपघात इति देशनिरुज इव ।

बहुतरबद्धत्वतो न च मुक्तो देशमुक्त इव ॥ ३७ ॥ (१५८५)

Ekatve nāsti sukhi bahūpaghāta iti deśaniruja iva ।
Bahutarabaddhtvato na ca mukto deśamukta iva ॥ 37 (1585)]

Trans—37 When there is oneness (of the souls), none is (completely) happy on account of many diseases, as is the case with one who is partially free from disease Furthermore, none is (entirely) liberated owing to many bondages, as is the case with one who is partially free (1585)

टीका—इदमत्र हृदयम्—नारक-तिर्यगादयोऽनन्ता जीवा नानाविध-
शरीर-मानसोपघातसंपातैर्दुःखिता एव, तदनन्तभागवर्तिनस्तु सुखिनः,
एवमनन्ता बद्धाः, तदनन्तभागवर्तिनस्तु मुक्ताः, तेषां च सर्वेषामेकत्वे न
कोऽपि सुखी प्राप्नोति, बहुतरोपघातान्वितत्वात्, यथा सर्वाङ्गरोगग्रस्तोऽ-
ङ्गल्येकदेशेन नीरोगो यज्ञदत्तः, एवं न कोऽपि मुक्तस्तत्सुखभाक् च न कोऽपि
घटते, बहुतरबद्धत्वात्, यथा सर्वाङ्गकीलितोऽङ्गल्येकदेशमुक्तः । तस्मादेकत्वे
सुखाद्यनुपपत्तेर्नानात्वं जीवानामिति स्थितम् ॥ ३७ (१५८५) ॥

D C.—There are infinite living beings viz, denizens of hell, *tyracs* and others, who are certainly unhappy on account of their suffering from various types of physical and mental diseases, and only an infinitesimal portion of them is happy Similarly infinite beings are tied down by the bondages of *karmans*, and only an infinitesimal part of them is liberated. If all these living beings are not looked upon as different entities, but are considered as only one, then none can be seen happy owing to a great many diseases, as is the case with *Yajñadatta* who has a disease in all parts of the body except in a finger Similarly none is liberated, and hence none can enjoy the bliss accruing from liberation, since there is a

Egatto savvagayattaṃ na mokkhādaṃ nabhasseva ।

Kattā bhottā mantā na ya samsārī [ahāgāsam ॥ 36 (1584)

[एकत्वे सर्वगतत्वतो न मोक्षादयो नमस इव ।

कर्ता भोक्ता मन्ता न च संसारी यथाऽऽकाशम् ॥ ३६ ॥ (१५८४)

Ekatto savvagataivato na mokṣadayo nabhasa iva ।

Kartā bhoktā mantā na ca samsārī yathakāśam ॥ 36 (1584)]

Trans —36 On oneness (being accepted in the case of souls) there will not be liberation etc. owing to (the soul) being all-pervading as is the case with the space. Moreover like space, the soul will not be a *kartr* (a doer) a *bhoktr* (an enjoyer) a *mantr* (thinker) and a *samsārīn* (a mundane being) (1584)

टीका—एकत्वं जीवानां सुख-दुःख-बन्ध-मोक्षादयो नोपपद्यन्ते, सर्वगतत्वात्, नमस इव । यत्र तु सुखादयो न तत् सर्वगत, यथा देवदत्त इति । किञ्च न कर्ता, न भोक्ता, न मन्ता, न संसारी जीवः, एकत्वात् सर्वजीवानाम्, यथैकं न तस्य कर्तृत्वादयः, यथा नमस इति ॥ ३६ (१५८४) ॥

D C—If there is only one soul then there is no scope for happiness and misery bondage and liberation and the like since one soul will be all-pervading Space may be here cited as a pertinent case

One where in there are happiness, misery etc is not all-pervading e. g., Devadatta

Further more since the number of the souls is only one and not more the soul cannot be an agent an enjoyer a thinker and a mundane being That which is one in number is not a doer etc —a fact which is corroborated by the example of space

Besides

एगत्ते नत्थि सुही बहुवघाउ सि देसनिरुउ व ।

बहुतरघद्वत्तणओ न य मुक्को देसमुक्को व ॥ ३७ ॥ (१५८५)

Egatte natthi suhī bahūvagghāu tti desaniruu vva ।
Bahuttara baddhattanao na ya mukko desamukko vva ॥ 37 (1585)

[एकत्वे नास्ति सुखी बहुपघात इति देशनिरुज इव ।
बहुतरबद्धत्वतो न च मुक्तो देशमुक्त इव ॥ ३७ ॥ (१५८५)

Ekatve nāsti sukhī bahūpaghata iti deśaniruja iva ।
Bahutarabaddhtvato na ca mukto deśamukta iva ॥ 37 (1585)]

Trans —37 When there is oneness (of the souls), none is (completely) happy on account of many diseases, as is the case with one who is partially free from disease Furthermore, none is (entirely) liberated owing to many bondages, as is the case with one who is partially free (1585)

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एवमनन्ता बद्धाः, तदनन्तभागवर्तिनस्तु मुक्ताः, तेषां च सर्वेषामेकत्वे न
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ङ्गल्येकदेशेन नीरोगो यज्ञदत्तः, एवं न कोऽपि मुक्तस्तत्सुखभाक् च न कोऽपि
घटते, बहुतरबद्धत्वात्, यथा सर्वाङ्गकीलितोऽङ्गल्येकदेशमुक्तः । तस्मादेकत्वे
सुखाद्यनुपपत्तेर्नानात्वं जीवानामिति स्थितम् ॥ ३७ (१५८५) ॥

D. C.—There are infinite living beings viz, denizens of hell, *tiryacs* and others, who are certainly unhappy on account of their suffering from various types of physical and mental diseases, and only an infinitesimal portion of them is happy. Similarly infinite beings are tied down by the bondages of *karmans*, and only an infinitesimal part of them is liberated. If all these living beings are not looked upon as different entities, but are considered as only one, then none can be seen happy owing to a great many diseases, as is the case with *Yajñadatta* who has a disease in all parts of the body except in a finger. Similarly none is liberated, and hence none can enjoy the bliss accruing from liberation, since there is a

great deal of bondages. One who has fetters all along his body except a finger may be mentioned as an illustration.

Thus owing to oneness there is no possibility for happiness etc. So it follows that there are many souls and not only one.

Refutation of the view-point of the *Naiyayikas* who admit (the existence of) many souls but take them to be all pervading —

जीवो तणुमेत्तरथो जह कुम्भो तग्गुणोवलम्भाओ ।

अहवाऽणुवलम्भाओ भिन्नस्मि घटे पटस्सेव ॥३८॥ (१५८६)

Jīvo taṇumettattho jaha kumbho taggunovalambhāo ।

Ahavaṇuvalambhāo bhinnammi ghate padasseva ॥ 38 (1586)

[जीवस्तनुमात्रस्थो यथा कुम्भस्तद्गुणोपलम्भात् ।

अथवाऽनुपलम्भाद् भिन्ने घटे पटस्सेव ॥ ३८ ॥ (१५८६)

Jīvaṣṭānumatrstho yatha kumbhastadguṇopalambbhat ।

Athavaṇupalambbhād bhinne ghate paṭasyeva ॥ 38 (1586)]

Transe — 38 The soul permeates the body only since its attributes are found there as is the case with a pitcher. Or because it is not found (elsewhere) as is the case with a piece of cloth (which does not permeate) a pitcher is different from it (1586)

टीका—तनुमात्रस्थो जीव इति प्रतिज्ञा, तत्रैव तद्गुणोपलम्भे, यथा घटा, 'स्वात्ममात्रे' इति शेष । "अहवत्यादि" अथवा, यो यत्र प्रमापैर्नो पलम्प्यते तस्य तत्राभाव एव, यथा भिन्ने घटे पटस्य, नोपलम्प्यते च शरीराद् बहिर्जीव, तस्मात् तस्य तत्राभाव एवेति ॥ ३८ (१५८६) ॥

D C—The measure of the soul is only as much as that of the body it occupies. That is to say there is no soul outside the body it occupies. For its attributes are found only in that body. To give an illustration the attributes of a pitcher exist only in a pitcher and not outside it.

As an alternative argument it may be said —That is non-existent there, where it cannot be realized by any of the *pramānas* As for example, a piece of cloth does not permeate a pitcher which is separate from it

The soul is not seen outside the body Consequently it should be taken to be non-existent there

While concluding the author says —

तम्हा कत्ता भोत्ता बंधो मोक्खो सुहं च दुक्खं च ।
संसरणं च बहुत्ता—ऽसव्वगयत्ते सुजुत्ताइं ॥ ३९ ॥ (१५७७)

Tamhā kattā bhottā bandho mukkho suham ca dukkham ca ।
Samsaranam ca bahutāt'savvagayatte sujuttām ॥ 39 (1587)

[तस्मात् कर्ता भोक्ता बन्धो मोक्षः सुखं च दुःखं च ।

संसरणं च बहुत्वा--ऽसर्वगतत्वयोः सुयुक्तानि ॥ ३९ ॥ (१५८७)

Tasmāt kartā bhoktā bandho moksaḥ sukham ca duḥkham ca ।
Samsaranam ca bahūtva'sarvagatatvayoh suyuktāni ॥ 39 (1587)]

Trans —39 Therefore a doer, an enjoyer, bondage, liberation, happiness, misery, mundane existence and metamorphosis are thoroughly justifiable when the souls are admitted as many and non-all-pervading (1587)

टीका—तस्माद् बहुत्वा—सर्वगतत्वयोरेव सतोः कर्तृत्वादयो धर्मा जीवस्य
युज्यन्ते, नान्यथा, इत्येवंविधं प्रमाणसिद्धं जीवं प्रतिपद्यस्वेति ॥३९(१५८७)॥

D C —Therefore it is only when it is admitted that souls are many and that none of them is all-pervading, action etc, which are the attributes of the soul, can have any place. If not, these attributes will be meaningless So please admit the soul which is thus established by *pramānas*.

Now the meaning of the sentences of the Veda which may be troubling you

गोयम । वेयपयाण इमाण अत्थ च त न याणासि ।
 ज विन्नाणघणोच्चिय भूयेहिंतो समुत्थाय ॥ ४० ॥ (१५८८)
 मण्णसि मज्जगेसु व मयभावो भूयसमुदउब्भूओ ।
 विन्नाणमेत्तमाया भूयण्णु विणस्सइ स भूओ ॥ ४१ ॥ (१५८९)
 अत्थि न य पेच्चसण्णा ज पुब्बभवेऽभिहाणममुगो त्ति ।
 ज भणिय न भवाओ भवत्तर जाइ जीवोत्ति ॥ ४२ ॥ (१५९०)

Goyama ! Veyapayaṇam imaṇa attham ca tam na yāṇāsi ।
 Jam vinnānaghano cciya bhūyehinto samutthāya ॥ 40 (1588)

Mannasi majjangesu va mayabhāvo bhūyasamudaḍḍbhūō ।
 Vinnānamettamāyā bhūe nu vinassai sa bhūō ॥ 41 (1589)

Atthi na ya peccasannā jam purvabhavē'bhīhānamamugo tti ।
 Jam bhanīyam na bhavāō bhavāntaram jāi jīvo tti ॥ 42 (1590)

[गौतम ! वेदपदानामेषामर्थं च त्वं न जानासि ।
 यद् विज्ञानघन एव भूतेभ्यः समुत्थाय ॥ ४० ॥ (१५८८)

मन्यसे मद्याङ्गेष्विव मदभावो भूतसमुदयोद्भूतः ।
 विज्ञानमात्रमात्रमा भूतेऽनु विनश्यति स भूयः ॥ ४१ ॥ (१५८९)

अस्ति न च प्रेत्यसंज्ञा यत् पूर्वभवेऽभिधानममुक इति ।
 यद् मणित न भवाद भवान्तरं याति जीव इति ॥ ४२ ॥ (१५९०)

Gautama ! Veda padānaśameśamārthanā ca tvam na jānāsi ।
 Yad vijñānaghana eva bhūtebhyah samutthāya ॥ 40 (1588)

Manyase madyaṅgeṣviva madabhāvo bhūtasamudayodbhūtah ।
 Vijñānamātramātrma bhūte nu vinaśyati sa bhūyah ॥ 41 (1589)

Asti na ca pretyasanyā yat pūrvabhavē'bhīdhānamamuka iti ।
 Yad bhaṣitam na bhavad bhavāntaram yāti jīva it ॥ 42 (1590)

Trans —40-41-42 Gautama! You do not know the (real) meaning of these sentences of the Veda For, you believe that none but the assemblage of (the particles of) knowledge, after having arisen from elements, in the way in which intoxication arises, from the sources of spirituous liquors, is a soul consisting of knowledge only—the soul which has sprung up from the collection of elements It again perishes after the elements (have perished), and that there is no designation in the previous birth to the effect that it was named as such and such in the former birth (existence) and hence it is said that the soul does not go from one *bhava*, to another existence (1588-1589-1590)

टीका—गौतम ! इत्यामन्त्रणम्, वेदपदानां श्रुतिवाक्यानाममीषां “ विज्ञानघन एवैतेभ्यः ” इत्यादीनां चेतसि वर्तमानानामर्थं यथावस्थितं त्वं न जानासि नावबुध्यसे । किमिति ? अत आह—यद् यस्मात् त्वमात्माभि-प्रायेणैवंभूतमिहार्थं मन्यसे विकल्पयसीति संबन्धः । कथं भूतम् ? इत्याह—“ विष्णाणघनो च्चियत्ति ” पृथिव्यादिभूतानां विज्ञानलवसमुदायो विज्ञानघनः पृथिव्यादिविज्ञानांशानां पिण्ड इत्यर्थः, अवधारणं त्वात्मवादिपरिकल्पितस्य भूतसमुदायातिरिक्तस्य ज्ञान-दर्शनादिगुणाश्रयस्यात्मनो निरासार्थम् । भूतेभ्यः पृथिव्यादिभ्यः समुदितेभ्यो न तु व्यस्तेभ्यः, ज्ञानस्य तत्समुदायपरिणामाङ्गीकारादिति भावः, मद्याङ्गेषु मद्यकारणेषु धातव्यादिषु मदभाव इव; कथंभूतो विज्ञानघनः ? इत्याह—“ भूयसमुदउब्भूओ विन्नाणमेत्तमायत्ति ” भूतसमुदयादुद्भूतस्तदैव जातो न तु परभवात् कश्चिदायातो विज्ञानमात्ररूप आत्मेत्यर्थः, समुत्थायोत्पद्य ततस्तान्येव पृथिव्यादीनि भूतानि विनाशमश्नुवानान्यनु लक्षीकृत्य भूयः पुनरपि स विज्ञानघनो विज्ञानमात्ररूप आत्मा विनश्यति, न त्वात्मवादिनामिवान्यभवं याति । अत एव न प्रेत्यभवे परभवे संज्ञास्ति, यत् पूर्वभवे नारकादिजन्मन्यभिधानमासीत् तत् परभवे नास्ति, यदुत—अमुको नारको देवो वा भूत्वेदानीं मनुष्यः संवृत इत्यादि, नारकादेः प्रागेव सर्वनाश नष्टत्वादिति भावः । किमिह वाक्ये तात्पर्यवृत्त्या प्रोक्तं भवति ? इत्याह—“ जं भणियमित्यादि ” सर्वथात्मनः समुत्पद्य विनष्टत्वाद् न भवाद्

मवान्तरं कोऽपि यासीत्युक्तं भवति ॥ ४०-४१-४२ (१५८८-१५८९
१५९०) ॥

D C—By these sentences of the Veda are meant those which Gautama had in his mind.

The assemblage of knowledge consists of the united particles of knowledge arising from elements such as earth etc. combined together

The restriction viz none else but is here mentioned with a view to exclude a soul according to the *Ātmaবাদins* (believers in universal soul) is distinct from the collection of elements and which is an abode or substratum of attributes like *jñāna* (knowledge) etc

The sources of spirituous liquors are *dhātāḥ* etc.

Gautama believes that the soul has not come from any previous birth but it has been generated by the elements—it has been evolved out of them. So when these elements perish the soul too perishes and it is not born once more as the *Ātmaবাদins* believe. In short it has neither any incarnation nor any transmigration. Such being the case it is not possible to say that such and such a one who was previously a denizen of hell or a celestial being is now born as a human being. For on the termination of a stage as that of a denizen of hell or the like everything was over—nothing was left not even the soul.

Thus when the soul altogether arises from—gets evolved out of—a collection of elements and completely perishes as soon as these elements perish there is none who proceeds from one birth to another

I understand the meaning of these sentences as follows -

गोयम ! पयस्यमेव ममृतो नरिय ममृसे जीव ।
वक्त्ररेसु य पुनो भणिओ जीवो जमस्थि ति ॥४३॥ (१५९१)

अग्निहवणाङ्किरियाफलं च तो संसयं कुणसि जीवे ।
मा कुरु न पयत्थोऽयं इमं पयत्थं निसामेहि ॥ ४४ ॥ (१५९२)

Goyama ! payatthamevam mannanto natthi mannase jīvam ।
Vakkantaresu ya puno bhanio jīvo jamaatthi tti ॥ 43 (1591)

Aggihavanāṅkiriyaṅphalam ca to samsayam kunasi jīve ।
Mā kuru na payattho'yam imam payattham nisāmehi ॥ 44 (1592)

[गौतम ! पदार्थ एवं मन्यमानो नास्ति मन्यसे जीवम् ।
वाक्यान्तरेषु च पुनर्मणितो जीवो यदस्तीति ॥ ४३ ॥ (१५९१)

अग्निहवनादिक्रियाफलं च ततः संशयं करोपि जीवे ।
मा कुरु न पदार्थोऽयमिमं पदार्थं निशमय ॥ ४४ ॥ (१५९२)

Gautama ! padārtha evam manyamāno nāsti manyase jīvam ।
Vākyañtāresu ca punar-bhanito jīvo yadastiti ॥ 43 (1591)

Agni havanādi kriyāphalam ca tataḥ saṁśayam karosi jīve ।
Mā kuru na padārtho'yamimam padārtham niśamaya ॥ (1592)]

Trans —43-44 Gautama ! While construing the sentences in this way, you believe that there is no soul And, in other sentences it is said that there is a soul, and, moreover there is a fructification of an oblation to fire etc Consequently, you entertain a doubt about (the existence of) the soul, but do not do it This is not the meaning of the sentences But hear this is the meaning of the sentences (1591-1592)

टीका--गौतम । अस्य वाक्यस्य दर्शितरूपमेव पदार्थं मन्यमानस्त्वं ' नास्ति ' इत्येवं जीवं मन्यसे । यस्माच्च पुनः " न ह वै सशरीरस्य प्रिया-ऽप्रिययोरपहतिरस्ति, अशरीरं वा वसन्तं प्रिया-ऽप्रिये न स्पृशतः " इत्यादिषु वेदावाक्यान्तरेषु " अस्ति " इत्येवं जीवो भणितः प्रतिपादितः । तथा " अग्निहोत्रं जुहुयात् स्वर्गकामः " इत्यादिहवनादग्निहवनादिक्रियायाः फलं च पारमविकं श्रूयते । न चेदं भवान्तरयायिनमात्मानमन्तरेणोपपद्यते । अतः

“ किं जीवोऽस्ति नास्ति वा ? ” इत्येष संशय जीव करोपि त्वम् । तदपि मां कृपाः, यस्माद् “ विज्ञानघन एव ” इत्यादिवाक्यस्य नायमर्थो य ममानप्यवस्यति, किन्त्वपि वक्ष्यमाण पदार्थमिह निश्चयमाऽऽकर्मयेति ॥ ४३-४४ (१५९१-१५९२) ॥

D U—O Gautama ! You interpret this sentence in the way just shown. And hence, you conclude that the soul does not exist. At the same time you notice that the following sentences of the veda establishing the existence of the soul —

*Na ha vai sasaritrasya priya priyayor apahataś asti a-
saritrasya va vasaṇam priya'priye na sprhataś "*

Moreover from the sentences such as

“ Agnihotrm juhuyat svargakamam

it follows that there accrues a fruit of an offering oblation to fire etc — a fruit to be enjoyed during the next birth and this fruit can have no meaning unless it is admitted that the soul goes in for another existence or birth.

These various statements lead you to doubt the existence of the soul. But there is no need of entertaining such a doubt as this doubt is due to your misinterpreting the sentence viz, “ *vijñānaghana eva* ” etc

The real interpretation of this sentence is as follows please hear it.

विष्णाणाओऽणणो विष्णाणघणो ति सङ्खओवावि ।
स भवइ भूयहिंसो चडविष्णाणाइभावेण ॥ ४५ ॥ (१५९३)
ताइ चिय भूयाइ सोऽणु विणस्सइ विणस्समाणाइ ।
अत्थत्तोवओगे कमसो विण्णेयभावेण ॥ ४६ ॥ (१५९४)

Vinnānāo'nanno vinnānaghanno tti savvaovāvi ।

Sa bhavaī bhūehinto ghadavinnānāī bhāvena ॥ 45 (1593)

Tāim ciya bhūyāim so'nu vinassai vinassamānāim ।

Atthantarovaōge kamaso vinneya bhāve nam ॥ 46 (1594)

[विज्ञानादनन्यो विज्ञानघन इति सर्वतोव्यापी ।

स भवति भूतेभ्यो घटविज्ञानादिभावेन ॥ ४५ ॥ (१५९३)

तान्येव भूतानि सोऽनु विनश्यति विनश्यमानानि ।

अर्थान्तरोपयोगे क्रमशो विज्ञेयभावेन ॥ ४६ ॥ (१५९४)

Vijñānādananyo vijñānaghana iti sarvatovyāpī ।

Sa bhavati bhūtebhyo ghatavijñānādibhāvena ॥ 45 (1593)

Tānyeva bhūtāni so'nu vinaśyati vinaśyamānāni ।

Arthantaropayoge kramaśo vijñeyabhāvena ॥ 46 (1594)]

Trans —45-46 The soul (itself) is the assemblage of *vijñānas* owing to its being non-separate from *vijnāna*, or it is so, on account of its pervasive all around It arises from elements in the form of the *vijñāna* of a pitcher, etc When those very elements perish as *vijñeya-bhāvas* (objects coming within the range of *vijñāna*) on the attention being gradually directed to another object, it (the soul) subsequently perishes (1593-1594)

टीका—इह विज्ञानघनो जीव उच्यते । कथम् ? इति चेत् । उच्यते--
विशिष्टं ज्ञानं विज्ञानं ज्ञान—दर्शनोपयोग इत्यर्थः, तेन विज्ञानेन सहानन्यभूत-
त्वादेकतया घनत्वं निबिडत्वमापन्नो विज्ञानघनो जीवः, यदिवा “सर्वओवा
वि त्ति ” सर्वतः प्रतिप्रदेशमनन्तानन्तविज्ञानपर्यायसङ्घातघटितत्वाद्
विज्ञानघनो जीवः । एवकारेण तु विज्ञानघन एवासौ, न तु नैयायिकादीनामिव
“स्वरूपेण निर्विज्ञानत्वाज्जडोऽसौ, बुद्धिस्तु तत्र समवेतैव ” इति नियम्यते ।
स भवति—उद्यत इति क्रिया । केभ्यः ? इत्याह—“भूएहितो त्ति” भूतानीह
घट-पटादिज्ञेयवस्तुरूपाण्यभिप्रेतानि, तेभ्यो ज्ञेयभावेन परिणतेभ्यः । केन
भवति ? इत्याह—“घटोऽयम्” “पटोऽयम्” इत्यादिविज्ञानभावेन घटादिविज्ञान-

“ किं जीवोऽस्ति नास्ति वा ? ” इत्येष संशय जीवे करोषि त्वम् । तदमु मा
 कृथाः, यस्माद् “ विज्ञानघन एव० ” इत्यादिवाक्यस्य नापमर्थो यं मवान
 भवत्यसि, किन्त्वमु वक्ष्यमाण पदार्थमिह निश्चययाऽऽकर्णयेति ॥ ४३-४४
 (१५९१-१५९२) ॥

D O—O Gautama ! You interpret this sentence in the way
 just shown. And hence you conclude that the soul does not
 exist. At the same time you notice that the following sentences
 of the veda establishing the existence of the soul —

Na ha vai sasaritasya priya priyayor apahater asti a-
saritasya va vasantam priya priye na spreatah. ”

Moreover from the sentences such as

“ Agnihotram juhuyat svargakanish

it follows that there accrues a fruit of an offering oblation
 to fire etc a fruit to be enjoyed during the next birth and this
 fruit can have no meaning unless it is admitted that the soul
 goes in for another existence or birth.

These various statements lead you to doubt the existence
 of the soul But there is no need of entertaining such a
 doubt as this doubt is due to your misinterpreting the sentence
 viz., “ *vyjñānaghana eva* ” etc

The real interpretation of this sentence is as follows:
 please hear it.

विण्णाणाओऽणण्णो विण्णाणघण्णो चि सव्वओवावि ।
 स भवइ भूयहिंसो घटविण्णाणाइभावेण ॥ ४५ ॥ (१५९३)
 ताइ चिय भूयाइ सोऽणु विणस्सइ विणस्समाणाइ ।
 अर्यंतरोवओगे कमसो विण्णेयभावेण ॥ ४६ ॥ (१५९४)

to know them : e., ceases to exist as knowledge of these objects. This is here looked upon as its destruction. The sum and substance is this —

When a soul comes to know any object, it is said to have been produced from that object, but, when it ceases to think of it and directs its attention somewhere else, it is said to have perished, for, the object with which it once identified itself, has perished.

Does the soul perish entirely in this way ? The answer is in the negative as suggested in the following verse —

पुवावरविण्णाणोवओगओ विगम-संभवसहावो ।

विण्णाणसंतईए विण्णाणघणोऽयमविणासी ॥ ४७ ॥ (१५९५)

Puvvāvaravinnānovaōgao vīgama-sambhavasahāvo ।

Vinnānasantaie vinnānaghano' yamavināsī ॥ 47 (1595)

[पूर्वा-ऽपरविज्ञानोपयोगतो विगम-संभवस्वभावः ।

विज्ञानसंतत्या विज्ञानघनोऽयमविनाशी ॥ ४७ ॥ (१५९५)

Pūrvā'para vijñānopayogato vīgama-sambhava svabhāvaḥ ।

Vijñānasantatyā vijñānaghano'yamavināśī ॥ 47 (1595)]

Trans — 47 This *vijñānaghana* (the soul) has the nature of destruction and that of origination on account of the (corresponding) *upayogas* being associated with the previous *vijñāna* and the subsequent one It is immortal owing to the continuity of *vijñāna* . (1595)

टीका—एक एवायमात्मा त्रिस्वभावः । कथम् ? इत्युच्यते—अर्थान्त-
रोपयोगकाले पूर्वविज्ञानोपयोगेन तावदयं विगमस्वभावो विनश्वररूपः,
अपरविज्ञानोपयोगस्तु संभवस्वभाव उत्पादस्वरूपः, अनादिकालप्रवृत्तसामा-
न्यविज्ञानमात्रसंतत्या पुनरयं विज्ञानघनो जीवोऽविनष्ट एवावतिष्ठते । एव-
मन्यदपि सर्व वस्तूत्पाद-व्यय-ध्रौव्यस्वभावमेवावगन्तव्यम्, न पुनः किमपि
सर्वथोत्पद्यते, विनश्यति चेति ॥ ४७ (१५९५) ॥

पर्यायेण । ततः किम् ? इत्याद्यहं “तान्येषानु विनश्यति” इत्यस्यार्थमाह—
 “ताद् विद्येत्यादि” तान्येषां ज्ञानालम्बनभूतानि घटादिभूतानि क्रमशः
 कालक्रमेण व्यवधानं स्पृगनाऽन्यमनस्कृतादिनाऽर्चान्तरोपयोगे सति विज्ञे
 यभावेन ज्ञानविषयभावेन विनाशमश्नुवानानि, अनु-पश्चात् तद्विषयपर्यायेण,
 स विज्ञानघनो विनश्यतीति संबन्धः । ज्ञानपर्यायेण घटादिभ्यो ज्ञेयभूतेभ्यो
 जीवः समुत्थाय कालक्रममाह व्यवधानादिनाऽर्चान्तरोपयोगे सति ज्ञेयभावेन
 तान्येषां विनाशमश्नुवानान्यनु विनश्यतीति तात्पर्यार्थः ॥ ४५-४६ (१५९३)
 (१५९४) ॥

D C—Here the soul is said to be *viñānaghana*—an assemblage of *viñāna* for either of the two reasons viz. (1) the soul is non-separate from—is identical with *viñāna* which is *upayoga* either of the type of *jñāna* or that of *darsana* and (2) the soul has each and every *pradeśa* (the minutest portion) of it formed from a collection of infinite modifications of *viñāna*.

The word *eva* used in connection with *viñānaghana* shows that the belief of the *Naiyayikas* and others conveyed by the following sentence is untenable :

“*Svarupena nirviñānatvaj jado saṃ buddhis tu tatra samavetata.*”

This soul is evolved out of the elements which are objects fit to be known—the objects like a pitcher a piece of cloth etc. That is to say it gets transformed as the knowledge of a pitcher etc., on realizing that this is a pitcher this is a piece of cloth etc.

These very elements such a pitcher etc. which had once served as substratum for knowledge perish that is to say they cease to be objects fit to be known when the attention of the soul is directed towards another object when these objects are hidden or concealed from sight or when the mind is working in some other channel. Such being the case the soul ceases

D. C—When the attention of the soul is diverted from one object to another, *e g.*, from a pitcher to a piece of cloth, then it ceases to be styled as *ghatopayoga* (attention to a pitcher) but acquires a new designation viz., *patopayoga* (attention to a piece of cloth) Such being the case, this soul is named as *vyñānaghana* in the Veda. Therefore, Gautama! admit that the soul exists

एवं पि भूयधम्मो नाणं तब्भावभावओ बुद्धी ।
तं नो तदभावम्मि वि जं नाणं वेयसमयम्मि ॥ ४९ ॥ (१५९७)

अत्थमि ए आइच्चे चंदे संतासु अग्गि—वायासु ।
किंजोइरयं पुरिसो अप्पज्जोइ त्ति निदिट्ठो ॥ ५० ॥ (१५९८)

Evam pi bhūyadhammo nānam tabbhāvabhāvaō buddhī ।
Tam no tadabhāvammi vi jam nānam Veyasamayamm ॥ 49 (1597)
Atthamie āicce cande santāsu aggi—vāyāsu ।
Kimjorayam puriso appajjoi tti niddittho ॥ 50 (1598)

[एवमपि भूतधर्मो ज्ञानं तद्भावभावतो बुद्धिः ।
तद् न तदभावेऽपि यज्ज्ञानं वेदसमये ॥ ४९ ॥ (१५९७)
अस्तमित आदित्ये चन्द्रे शान्तयोरग्नि—वाचोः ।
किंज्योतिरयं पुरुष आत्मज्योतिरिति निर्दिष्टः ॥ ५० ॥ (१५९८)

Evamapi bhūtadharma jñānam tadbhāvabhāvato buddhiḥ ।
Tad na tadabhāve'pi yajñānam Vedasamaye ॥ 49 (1597)
Astamita aditye candre śāntayor—agni—vācoḥ ।
Kimjyotirayam purusa ātmajyotiriti nirdistah ॥ 50 (1598)]

Trans—49-50 You may think that even in this way, knowledge is the *dharma* of elements owing to its existing when they exist (and that it does not exist when there is their non-existence) This is not proper, for, even

D C—This very soul, though one has a three-fold nature When it is attentive to another object, it has died, for at that time its attention to the former object is gone but it has originated so far as the attention to this new object is concerned. Side by side with its twofold nature pertaining to destruction and origination it has permanence owing to the continuity of the general *vijñāna* existing from the beginning-less time. Similarly every object has a three-fold nature consisting of *utpada* (origination), *vyaya* (destruction) and *dharavya* (permanence) and that there is nothing which is created in all respects and that there is nothing which entirely perishes

न च पेक्षणासण्णावतिट्ठप्प सपओवओगाओ ।

विण्णाणघणाभिक्खो जीवोऽय वेयपयमिहिओ ॥ ४८ ॥ (१५९६)

Na ca peccanānasannāvatitthae sampavogāo ।

Vimānagghanābhikkho jīvo yam Veyapayamhiho ॥ 48 (1596)

[न च प्रेत्यज्ञानसंज्ञावतिष्ठते सांप्रतोपयोगात् ।

विज्ञानघनामिक्खो जीवोऽय वेदपदमिहितः ॥ ४८ ॥ (१५९६)

Na ca pretyajñāna sañjñā vatisthate sampratayogāt ।

Vijñāna ghanābhikhyo jīvo yam Vedapadabhihitah ॥ 48 (1596)]

Trans — 48 The designation pertaining to former knowledge does not exist owing to the *upayoga* being directed to (a) present object. This soul is named *vijñānaghaṇa* as said in the sentences of the *Veda* (1596)

टीका—न च प्रेत्येति—न चायवस्तुपयोगकाले प्राक्तनी ज्ञानसंज्ञास्ति । कुतः ? सांप्रतवस्तुविषयोपयोगात् । इदमुक्तं भवति—यदा घटोपयोगनिवृत्तौ पटोपयोग उत्पद्यते, तदा घटोपयोगसंज्ञा नास्ति, तदुपयोगस्य निवृत्तत्वात् ; किन्तु पटोपयोगसंज्ञैवास्ति, तदुपयोगस्यैव तदानीमुत्पन्नत्वात् । तस्माद् विज्ञानघनामिक्खो वेदपदेष्वभिहितोऽय जीवः । ततो गौतम ! प्रतिपद्यस्ते नमिति ॥ ४८ (१५९६) ॥

D. C—When the attention of the soul is diverted from one object to another, *e g*, from a pitcher to a piece of cloth, then it ceases to be styled as *ghatopayoga* (attention to a pitcher) but acquires a new designation viz., *patopayoga* (attention to a piece of cloth) Such being the case, this soul is named as *vyñānaghana* in the Veda Therefore, Gautama ! admit that the soul exists.

एवं पि भूयधम्मो नाणं तब्भावभावओ बुद्धी ।

तं नो तदभावम्मि वि जं नाणं वेयसमयम्मि ॥ ४९ ॥ (१५९७)

अत्थमिण्ण आइच्चे चंदे संतासु अग्गि—वायासु ।

किंजोइरयं पुरिसो अप्पज्जोइ त्ति निदिट्ठो ॥ ५० ॥ (१५९८)

Evam pi bhūyadhammo nānam tabbhāvabhāvaō buddhī ।

Tam no tadabhāvammi vi jam nānam Veyasamayamm ॥ 49 (1597)

Atthamie āicce cande santāsu aggi—vāyāsu ।

Kimjorayam puriso appajjoi tti niddittho ॥ 50 (1598)

[एवमपि भूतधर्मो ज्ञानं तद्भावभावतो बुद्धिः ।

तद् न तदभावेऽपि यज्ज्ञानं वेदसमये ॥ ४९ ॥ (१५९७)

अस्तमित आदित्ये चन्द्रे शान्तयोरग्नि—वाचोः ।

किंज्योतिरयं पुरुष आत्मज्योतिरिति निर्दिष्टः ॥ ५० ॥ (१५९८)

Evamapi bhūtadharma jñānam tadbhāvabhavato buddhih ।

Tad na tadabhāve'pi yajñānam Vedasamaye ॥ 49 (1597)

Astamita āditye candre śāntayor—agni—vācoḥ ।

Kimjyotirayam purusa ātmajyotiriti nirdistah ॥ 50 (1598)]

Trans—49-50 You may think that even in this way, knowledge is the *dharma* of elements owing to its existing when they exist (and that it does not exist when there is their non-existence) This is not proper, for, even

when they are non-existent knowledge is said to exist in the following doctrine of the *Veda* —

What *jyotis* (light) has this man when the Sun has set the Moon has set and when (even) fire and speech are quiet ? It is said that is the light of the soul (1597-1598)

टीका—“ बुद्धी ” ति स्याद् बुद्धिः प्रेरकस्त्व-एवमपि—“ स मवद् भूषितो ” इत्यादिना युष्मद्वयास्त्यानप्रकारेणापीत्यर्थः, पृथिव्यादिभूतधर्म एव ज्ञान-भूतस्वभावात्मकमेव ज्ञानमिति भावः । कुतः ? इत्याह—“ तस्मा-वभाषत चि ” “ एतेभ्यो भूतेभ्यः समुत्थाय सान्नेषानु विनश्यति ”—इति वचनाद् भूतसङ्गाधे ज्ञानस्य भावात्, तदभावे चाभावादित्यर्थः, यस्य च भाव एव यद् भवति, अभावे च न भवति तत् तस्यैव धर्मः, यथा चन्द्रमस अन्धिका, तथा च ज्ञानमनुविदधाति भूतान्वय-व्यतिरेकौ, तस्मात् तद् भूतधर्म एव । तदयुक्तम्, विशिष्टमेव हि नील-पीतादिभूतग्राहकं ज्ञान तदन्वय-व्यतिरेकावनुविदधाति न तु सामान्य ज्ञानमात्रम्, यस्माद् भूत-भावेऽपि वेदलक्षणे ममये सिद्धान्ते “ सामान्यज्ञानं मथितमेव ” इति श्लेषः । केन वाक्येन ? इत्याह—“ अत्यमिण इत्यादि ” अस्तमिते आदित्ये, याज्ञवल्क्यः, चन्द्रमसस्तमिते, श्रान्तेऽग्नौ, श्रान्तायां वाचि, किंन्योतिरेवायं पुरुषः, आत्मज्योतिः सम्राडिति बोधाच्च, ज्योतिरिति ज्ञानमाह । आदित्यास्तमयादौ किं ज्योतिः ? इत्याह—“ अयं पुरुष इति ”, पुरुष आत्मेत्यर्थः । अयं च क्व भूतः ? इत्याह—“ अप्यत्रोऽपि चि ” आत्मैव ज्योतिरस्य सोऽयमात्मज्योतिर्ज्ञानात्मक इति हृदयम्, निर्दिष्टो वेदविशिष्टः कथितः, ततो न ज्ञान भूतधर्म इति स्थितम् ॥ ४९-५० (१५९७-१५९८) ॥

D C—Gautama may think as under —

Even in this way—the way in which is interpreted the second hemistich of verse 1593 beginning with “ *sa bhavas bhuchanto* ” it gets proved that knowledge is the *dharma* of elements such as earth etc. For knowledge exists when the elements exist. This is what follows from “ *etebhyo bhutebhyah samutthaya tanyevam vinas yati.* ” Furthermore in the absence of the elements knowledge does not exist.

That which exists only when another exists and which is non-existent when that another is non-existent, is the *dharma* of that another e g, the moon-light of the moon Knowledge is associated with elements both *anvaya* and *vyatireka*. Consequently it is the *dharma* of elements This thought is unjustifiable, for, only a particular type of knowledge which has for its object, the elements, blue, yellow etc, is associated with these elements by *anvaya* and *vyatireka* and not the entire knowledge in general For, even when the elements are absent, the *Veda* declares that ordinary knowledge exists This is what we learn from *yājñavalkya* who says “*Astamite āditye, candramasyastamite, śante'gnau, śāntāyām vāci, kim jyoti evāyam puruṣa ātmajyotiḥ samīd itī hovāca*” Herein the soul having a flame in the form of knowledge is alluded to Hence it follows that knowledge is not the *dharma* of elements

The reason is as under —

तदभावे भावाओ भावे चाभावओ न तद्धम्मो ।

जह घडभावाभावे विवज्जयाओ पडो भिन्नो ॥ ५१ ॥ (१५९९)

Tadabhāve bhāvāo bhāve cābhāvaō na taddhammo ।

Jaha ghadabhāvābhāve vivajjayāo pado bhinnno ॥ 51 (1599)

[तदभावे भावाद् भावे चाभावतो न तद्धर्मः ।]

यथा घटभावाभावे विपर्ययात् पटो भिन्नः ॥ ५१ ॥ (१५९९)

Tadabhāve bhāvād bhāve cābhāvato na taddharmah ।

Yathā ghatabhāvābhāve viparyayāt pato bhinnah ॥ 51 (1599)]

Trans — 51 One that exists when another does not exist and does not exist when that another exists, is not its *dharma*.

difference in (i.e. speciality of) an object a genus a substance an action or an attribute? Your doubt is ill-based, for it is not proper to draw a sweeping conclusion regarding the *dharma* of an object that it is only this or that it is certainly not this. For each and every thing (*sarva*) is certainly all things (*sarvamaya*) from the stand-point of its own modifications and those of the rest, and that *sarva* is *a-sarvamaya* too from the stand-point of separateness. Therefore it is proper (to believe) that a substance has a generality and speciality according to the stand-point taken and that its nature is varied from the view-point of its *paryāyas* (1600-1603)

टीका—तस्मादेषां पूर्वोक्तानां वेदपदानां यथा मया व्याख्यातोऽवस्तथा स्व न वेत्ति, तेन जीवे संशयं करोपि । अथवा, सर्वेषामप्यशेषवेदपदानामर्थं स्व न जानासि, यस्मात् सर्वेष्वपि वेदपदेषु विषये तद्वैयर्थ्यः संशयोऽस्तीति संशयः । कर्त्तव्यं भूतं ? इत्याह—“अतो किं होञ्ज सुहत्यादि,” किमतेषां वेदपदानामर्थं भ्रुतिः शब्दो भवत्, यथा मेरी-पटह-इकादीनां शब्दस्य शब्द एवार्थः ?; अथवा यद् घटादिशब्दे समुच्चारिते तदभिधेयार्थविषय विज्ञान भवत् दृश्यतः, तत् तेषामर्थः ?; किंवा घटशब्दे समुत्कीर्तिते “पृथुष्णोदरायाकारान् घटलक्षणोऽर्थाज्जेनोक्तः, न तु पटादिः” इत्येव यो वस्तुमेदः प्रतीयते स एवामर्थः ?; यदिवा, किं वातिरमीषामर्थः, यथा गोशब्दे समुच्चारिते गोवातिरवसीयते ?; यदिवा, किं द्रव्यमेवामर्थः, यथा दण्डीत्यादिषु दण्डादिमद् द्रव्यम् ?; किंवा घावतीत्यादीनामिव घावनादि क्रियाऽमीषामर्थः; अथवा, किं शुद्धादीनामिव शुद्धादिगुण एतेषामर्थः ? इति । अथ च संशयस्तथायुक्तः; यस्मात् “अयमेव, नैव वाऽयम्” इत्येव कस्यापि वस्तुनो धर्मोऽवधारयितुं न युक्तः । शब्दोऽपि वस्तुविशेष एव, ततः “एवभूतस्यैवार्थस्यायमभिधायकः, नैव वेत्तव्यभूतस्यार्थस्याप्यप्रतिपादकः” इत्येवमेतदर्थस्याप्यवधारणमयुक्तमेव । कुतः ? इत्याह—“सर्वं चित्तेत्यादि” यस्मात् सर्वमपि वाच्यवाचकादिकं वस्तु नियतं निश्चितं स्व-परपर्यायैः स्वार्थमकमेव सामान्यविशेषव्यत्यर्थः । तथा, मर्मममबमपमप्यस्ति विविक्तं रूपं सर्वतो व्यावृत्तम् । कया ? इत्याह—विबधया, कवलस्वपर्यायापेक्षयेत्यर्थः,

विशेषविषययेति तात्पर्यार्थः । तस्मात् सर्वेषामपि पदानां विवक्षावशतः सामान्यमयो विशेषमयश्च पदार्थो युक्तः, न पुनरेकान्तेनेत्यंभूत एव, अनित्यंभूत एव वेति । कुतः ? इत्याह—“ वत्थुस्सेत्यादि ” यस्मात् सर्वोऽपि वाच्यस्य वाचकस्य वा वस्तुनः स्वभावः पर्यायापेक्षया विश्वरूपो नानाविधो वर्तते । ततश्च सामान्यविवक्षया घटशब्दः सर्वात्मकत्वात् सर्वेषामपि द्रव्य-गुण-क्रियाद्यर्थानां वाचकः, विशेषविवक्षया तु प्रतिनियतरूपत्वाद् य एवास्येह पृथुबुधोदराद्याकारवानर्थो वाच्यतया रूढस्तस्यैव वाचकः । एवमन्योऽपि शब्दो विशेषविवक्षया या यत्र देशादौ यस्यार्थस्य वाचकतया रूढः स तस्य वाचको द्रष्टव्यः । सामान्यविवक्षया तु “ सर्वः सर्वस्य वाचकः, सर्वं च सर्वस्य वाच्यम् ” इत्यनया दिशा सकलं स्वधिया भावनियमिति ।

तदेवं तेन त्रिजगत्स्वरूपवेदिना भगवता श्रीमन्महावीरेण निःशेषपर-प्रबोधनोपायकुशलतया तीक्ष्णपरशुनेव निपुणयुक्तिप्रवन्धेन गुपिलवल्लीवितान इव मूलाच्छिन्नः समस्तोऽपि तस्य तत्समामन्नपरमकल्याणस्येन्द्रभूतेः संशयः ॥ ५२-५५ (१६००-१६०१-१६०२-१६०३) ॥

D C—Gautama ! you have not followed my exposition of these *padas* (sentences) of the *Veda* Hence, you have a doubt regarding the soul Or, you do not know the meaning of these, as well as, the remaining sentences of the *Veda*

Consequently, you raise the following queries in connection with all the sentences of the *Veda* —

- 1 Just as 'śabda' is the meaning of the 'śabda' (sound) of a kettle-drum, a tabor, a double drum, etc , so, is the meaning of these sentences 'śruti, & e, 'śabda' ?
- 2 Is it *vyñāna*—the *vyñāna* which arises and which is associated with the object connoted by it when the word like *ghata* is pronounced ?
- 3 Do the *padas* of the *Veda* mean *vastu-bhed* of the type noticed when the word *ghata* is pronounced, the type, *vrz*, that this connotes an object which has a wide bottom, an expansive belly, etc , and not a piece of cloth ?

For instance, a piece of cloth is different (from a pitcher) owing to its *viparyaya* regarding the existence and non-existence of the pitcher (1599)

टीका—न भूतधर्मो ज्ञानम्, मुक्त्यवस्थायां भूताभावेऽपि भावात्, मृतशरीरादौ तद्भावेऽपि चाभावात्, यथा घटस्य धर्मः पटो न भवति, किन्तु तस्माद् भिन्न एव । कृतः ? इत्याह—घटभावाभावे विपर्ययात्—घटभावेऽप्यभावात् तदभावेऽपि च भावादित्यर्थः ॥ ५१ (१५९९) ॥

D C—Just as a piece of cloth is not the *dharma* of a pitcher but is different from it, for even when a pitcher exists a piece of cloth does not exist and that even when that pitcher is non-existent the piece of cloth exists so knowledge is not the *dharma* of elements for, in the liberated state it exists even though the elements do not and that it does not exist even when the elements are present in a dead body etc.

Having explained the meaning of some of the sentences of the *Veda* the author while concluding the subject explains briefly the meaning of the remaining sentences of the *Veda*.

एसि वेयपयाण न तमस्य वियसि अहव सवेसि ।

अस्यो किं होज्ज सुई विण्णाण वस्युमेओ वा ॥ ५२ ॥ (१६००)

जाई दध किरिया गुणोऽह्वा ससओ तवाजुत्तो ।

अयमेवेति नवाय न वस्युधम्मो जओ जुत्तो ॥ ५३ ॥ (१६०१)

सव्वं चिय सव्वमय स—परपज्जायओ जओ नियय ।

सव्वमसव्वमय पि य विवित्तरूप विवक्खाओ ॥ ५४ ॥ (१६०२)

सामण्ण—विसेसमओ तेण परस्यो विवक्खया जुत्तो ।

वस्युस्स विस्सरूओ पज्जायावेक्खया सव्वो ॥ ५५ ॥ (१६०३)

Esīm Veyapayānam na tamattham viyaṣi ahava savveṣim ।
Attho kim hojja suī vinnānam vatthubheo vā ॥ 52 (1600)

Jāi davvam kiriyaṁ guno'havā samsaḥ tavājutto ।
Ayameveti na vāyam na vatthu dhammo jaḍo jutto ॥ 53 (1601)

Savvam ciya savvamayam sa-parapajjāyao jao niyayam ।
Savvamasavvamayam pi ya vivittarūpam vivakkhāo ॥ 54 (1602)

Sāmanṇa-vīsesamaḥ tena payattho vivakkhayā jutto ।
Vatthussa viṣṣarūvo pajjāyāvekkhayā savvo ॥ 55 (1603)

[एषां वेदपदानां न त्वमर्थं वेत्सि, अथवा सर्वेषाम् ।

अर्थः किं भवेत् श्रुतिर्विज्ञानं वस्तुभेदो वा ॥ ५२ ॥ (१६००)

जातिर्द्रव्यं क्रिया गुणोऽथवा संशयस्तवायुक्तः ।

अयमेवेति न वायं न वस्तुधर्मो यतो युक्तः ॥ ५३ ॥ (१६०१)

सर्वमेव सर्वमयं स्व-परपर्यायतो यतो नियतम् ।

सर्वमसर्वमयमपि च विविक्तरूपं विवक्षया ॥ ५४ ॥ (१६०२)

सामान्य-विशेषमयस्तेन पदार्थो विवक्षया युक्तः ।

वस्तुनो विश्वरूपः पर्यायापेक्षया सर्वः ॥ ५५ ॥ (१६०३)

Esām Vedapadanām na tvamartham vetsi athavā sarvesām ।
Arthah kim bhavet śrutir-vijñānam vastubhedo vā ॥ 52 (1600)

Jātir-dravyam kriyā guno'thavā samśayas tavāyuktah ।
Ayameveti navāyam na vastudharmo yato yuktah ॥ 53 (1601)

Sarvameva sarvamayam sva-para paryāyato yato niyatam ।
Sarvamasarvamayamapi ca viviktarūpam vivakṣayā ॥ (1602)

Sāmānya-vīśeṣamayastena padārtho vivakṣayā yuktah ।
Vastuno viśvaiūpah paryāyapekṣayā sarvah ॥ 55 (1603)]

Trans — 52-55 You do not know the *artha* (meaning)
of these sentences of the *Veda* or that of all (Hence you
have a doubt) What can *artha* be ? Is it *śruti*, knowledge,

difference in (i. e. speciality of) an object a genus a substance, an action or an attribute? Your doubt is ill-based for it is not proper to draw a sweeping conclusion regarding the *dharma* of an object that it is only this or that it is certainly not this. For each and every thing (*sarva*) is certainly all things (*sarvamaya*) from the stand-point of its own modifications and those of the rest, and that *sarva* is *a-sarvamaya* too from the stand-point of separateness. Therefore, it is proper (to believe) that a substance has a generality and speciality according to the stand-point taken and that its nature is varied from the view-point of its *paryāyas* (1600-1603)

टीका—तस्मादेषां पूर्वोक्तानां वेदपदानां यथा मया व्याख्यातोऽ-
थस्तथा त्वं न वेत्सि, तेन जीवे संशयं करोषि । अथवा, सर्वेषामप्यशेषवेद-
पदानामर्थं त्वं न जानासि, यस्मात् सर्वेष्वपि वेदपदेषु विषये तत्रैवभूतः
संशयोऽस्तीति संशयः । कथंभूतः ? इत्याह—“अथो किं होञ्ज सुईत्मादि,”
किमेतेषां वेदपदानामर्थः भ्रुतिः शब्दो भवेत्, यथा मेरी—पटह—इकादीनां
शब्दस्य शब्द एवार्थः ?; अथवा यद् घटादिशब्दे समुच्चारिते तदभिधेया
र्थविषय विज्ञानं मयद् दृश्यते, तद् तेषामर्थः ?; किंवा घटादिशब्दे समुत्कीर्तिते
“पृथुष्णोदराधाकारवान् घटलघ्वोऽर्धोऽनेनोक्तः, न तु पटादिः” इत्येव
यो वस्तुमेव प्रतीयते स एवामर्थः ?; यदिवा, किं खातिरमीषामर्थः, यथा
गोशब्द समुच्चारिते गोखातिरवसीयते ?; यदिवा, किं द्रव्यमेषामर्थः, यथा
दण्डीत्यादिषु दण्डादिमद् द्रव्यम् ?; किंवा भावतीत्यादीनामिव भावनादि
क्रियाऽमीषामर्थः; अथवा, किं शुद्धादीनामिव शुद्धादिगुण एतेषामर्थः ? इति ।
अथ च संशयस्तथायुक्तः ; यस्मात् “अयमेव, नैव बाऽयम्” इत्येष
कस्यापि वस्तुनो धर्मोऽवधारयितुं न युक्तः । शब्दोऽपि वस्तुमिश्रेण एव, ततः
“एवंभूतस्यैवायस्यायमभिधायकः, नैव वेत्थभूतस्यार्थस्याय प्रतिपादकः”
इत्येवमेतदमस्याप्यवधारणमयुक्तमेव । कुतः ? इत्याह—“सर्वं चिदेत्यादि”
यस्मात् सर्वमपि वाच्यवाचकादिकं वस्तु नियतं निश्चितं स्व-परपर्याये
सर्वात्मकमेव सामान्यविबक्ष्यतेत्यर्थः । तथा, सर्वममर्थमयमप्यस्ति विविक्त
रूपं सर्वतो व्याप्यम् । कया ? इत्याह—विवक्षया, केवलस्वपर्यायापेक्षयेत्यर्थः,

विशेषविषययेति तात्पर्यार्थः । तस्मात् सर्वेषामपि पदानां विवक्षावशतः सामान्यमयो विशेषमयश्च पदार्थो युक्तः, न पुनरेकान्तेनेत्यभूत् एव, अनित्यं-भूत् एव वेति । कुतः ? इत्याह—“वत्थुस्सेत्यादि” यस्मात् सर्वोऽपि वाच्यस्य वाचकस्य वा वस्तुनः स्वभावः पर्यायापेक्षया विश्वरूपो नानाविधो वर्तते । ततश्च सामान्यविवक्षया घटशब्दः सर्वात्मकत्वात् सर्वेषामपि द्रव्य-गुण-क्रियाद्यर्थानां वाचकः, विशेषविवक्षया तु प्रतिनियतरूपत्वाद् य एवास्येह पृथुबुधोदराद्याकारवानर्थो वाच्यतया रूढस्तस्यैव वाचकः । एवमन्योऽपि शब्दो विशेषविवक्षया या यत्र देशादौ यस्यार्थस्य वाचकतया रूढः स तस्य वाचको द्रष्टव्यः । सामान्यविवक्षया तु “सर्वः सर्वस्य वाचकः, सर्वं च सर्वस्य वाच्यम्” इत्यनया दिशा सकलं स्वधिया भावनियमिति ।

तदेवं तेन त्रिजगत्स्वरूपवेदिना भगवता श्रीमन्महावीरेण निःशेषपर-प्रबोधनोपायकुशलतया तीक्ष्णपरशुनेव निपुणयुक्तिप्रबन्धेन गुपिलवल्लीवितान इव मूलाच्छिन्नः समस्तोऽपि तस्य तत्समामन्नपरमकल्याणस्येन्द्रभूतेः संशयः ॥ ५२-५५ (१६००-१६०१-१६०२-१६०३) ॥

D C—Gautama ! you have not followed my exposition of these *padas* (sentences) of the *Veda* Hence, you have a doubt regarding the soul Or, you do not know the meaning of these, as well as, the remaining sentences of the *Veda*

Consequently, you raise the following queries in connection with all the sentences of the *Veda* —

- 1 Just as 'śabda' is the meaning of the 'śabda' (sound) of a kettle-drum, a tabor, a double drum, etc , so, is the meaning of these sentences 'śruti', i e, 'śabda' ?
- 2 Is it *vyñāna*—the *vyñāna* which arises and which is associated with the object connoted by it when the word like *ghata* is pronounced ?
- 3 Do the *padas* of the *Veda* mean *vastu-bhed* of the type noticed when the word *ghata* is pronounced, the type, viz, that this connotes an object which has a wide bottom, an expansive belly, etc , and not a piece of cloth ?

- 4 Is their meaning *jāti*-the *jāti* (genus) of the kind one realizes when the word *go* (cow) is uttered
- 5 Just as when the word *dandin* is pronounced we take it to be a *dravya* having a *danda* etc. similarly does the meaning of the sentences of the *Veda* connote such a *dravya*?
- 6 In the words *dhavati* (runs), etc. we take them to mean the *kriyā* (act) of running etc. so do these sentences mean any such *kriyā*
- 7 Just as the word *śukla* (white) means the *guṇa* (attribute) of being white so do these sentences convey a meaning of the type of this *guṇa*?

These seven queries of yours are out of place—are useless. For it is not possible to say regarding any *vastu* (substance or material) this is only this and nothing else. *Śabda*, too, is certainly a kind of *vastu* so it is not proper to say that it connotes only this meaning and none else. The reasons are:—

Every *vastu* whether in the form of a *vaśya* (direct expression) or a *vācaka* (indicatory word) is *sarvamaya* (representing all objects) from the stand-point of *samanya* (generality) when all the *paryayas* (modifications) including its own *paryayas* and those of the rest are taken into account. Where as every *vastu* is *a-sarvamaya* when examined from the stand-point of its own *paryayas* which lays stress upon *viśeṣa*.

Consequently all the sentences either convey a general sense or a particular one according to the stand-point we take. Hence it is no use saying that they mean only this and nothing else for the nature of every *vastu* whether it is a *vaśya* or *vācaka* varies according to the stand-points from which they are viewed.

Thus from the general stand point, the word *ghaṭa* is the *vācaka* of *dravya guṇa kriyā* etc. since it is then *sarvamaya*.

But, when examined from a special stand-point, it is a *vācaka*, of only the *rudha* (conventional) meaning, viz, that it has an expansive bottom, a wide belly, etc., for, this stand-point makes it definite

Similarly, any other word is a *vācaka* of only that *artha* which is *rudha* in that country, etc, when we examine it from the special stand-point.

But from the *general stand-point*, each and every word is a *vācaka* of one and all, and each and every word is a *vācya* of one and all This is the line one should sensibly follow

Thus, *Śramana*, *Bhagvān Mahāvīra* who knew the nature of all the three worlds, completely removed the doubts of *Indrabhūti* who was about to acquire the most excellent merit by advancing clever arguments capable of fully instructing others as is the case with a sharp hatchet which eradicates a cluster of creepers

छिन्नम्मि संसयम्मि जिणेण जर-मरणविप्पमुक्केण ।

सो समणो पव्वइओ पंचहिं सह खंडियसएहिं ॥५६॥ (१६०४)

Chinnammi samsayammi Jinena jara-marana vippamukkenam ।
So samano pavvaio pancahim saha khandiyasaehim ॥ 56 (1604)

[छिन्ने संशये जिनेन जरा-मरणविप्रमुक्तेन ।

स श्रमणः प्रव्रजितः पञ्चभिः सह खण्डिकशतैः ॥५६॥ (१६०४)

Chinne samśaye Jinena jarā-marana vipramuktena ।
Sa śramanaḥ pravrajitaḥ pancabhiḥ saha khandikaśataih ॥56 (1604)]

Trans —56 When the doubt was removed by the *Tirthankara* who was entirely free from old age and death, the saint *Indrabhūti* took *दीक्षा Dikśā* along with his five hundred pupils.

टीका—सुबोधा, नवरं श्राम्यतीति श्रमणः सन्नसौ पापाद् व्रजितः प्रव्रजितो भागवतीं दीक्षां प्रतिपन्न इत्यर्थः । ‘संयतः संयतो भवति नासंयतः’

इति निश्चयनयमसाम्यजायेत्युक्तमितीह मावार्थः । सन्धिकास्तच्छात्रा
इति ॥ ५६ (१६०४) ॥

O O—That one who is a *samyata* becomes so and not one who is not so is a statement here made from the transcendental point of view The rest is easy

एव कम्माईसु वि ज सामण्ण तय समाउज्ज ।

जो पुण जरथ विसेसो समासओ त पवक्खामि ॥५७॥ (१६०५)

Evam kammāisu vi jam samannam tayam samaujjam ।

Jo puna jattha viseso samāsaō tam pavakkhami u 57 (1605)

[एवं कर्मादिष्वपि यत् सामान्यं तत् सामायोज्यम् ।

यः पुनर्यत्र विशेषः समासतस्तं प्रवक्ष्यामि ॥ ५७ ॥ (१६०५)

Evam karmadivapi yat samānyam tat samayojyam ।

Yah punar-yatra viśeṣaḥ samāsatastam pravakṣyam ॥ 57(1605)]

Trans—57 Thus what is applicable to *karman*, etc., (the *Vūdas* of the remaining *Gaṇādhara*s) should be applied (there) And I shall briefly expound there, that which is a speciality (of it) (1605)

टीका—एवं यदिहात्मवादप्रक्रमे प्रत्यक्षा-ऽनुमाना-ऽऽगमप्रमाणवक्तव्यतादिकं ब्रह्ममाणकर्मादिवादस्थानकेः किमपि तस्य तत् स्वधिया तत्र तत्रायोजनीयम् । यस्तु यत्र यादस्थानके विशेषस्तं तत्र संक्षेपतः स्वयमेव वक्ष्यामि ॥ इति मत्तपञ्चाशद्वाधार्थः ॥ ५७ (१६०५) ॥

D C—Here while establishing the existence of the soul several points have been discussed. Out of them, those that are applicable to the other discussions which are to follow may be applied there by the reader himself. So I shall now briefly discuss in the remaining *vūdas* (discussions) only such points as happen to be their specialities

End of the Discussion with the First Gaṇādhara.

Chapter II

द्वितीयगणधरवक्तव्यता

Discussion with the Second Ganadhara

[Arguments advanced to prove the non-existence of
Karman and their refutation]

तं पवइअं सोउं बीओ आगच्छइ अमरिसेणं ।

वच्चामि णमाणेमी पराजिणित्ता ण तं समणं ॥ ५८ ॥ (१६०६)

Tam pavvaiaṃ sōuṃ bio āgacchai amarisenam ।

Vaccāmi namāṇemī parājinitthā na taṃ samanam ॥ 58 (1606)

[तं प्रव्रजितं श्रुत्वा द्वितीय आगच्छत्यमर्येण ।

व्रजाम्यानायामि पराजित्य तं श्रमणम् ॥ ५८ ॥ (१६०६)

Tam pravrajitam śrutvā dvitiya āgacchatyamarsena ।

Vrajāmyānayami parājitya taṃ śraṃaṇam ॥ 58 (1606)]

Trans —58 Having heard that he (*Indrabhūti*) had renounced the world, the second (*Ganadhara*) comes exasperated (He thinks) —I may go and having vanquished that asin, I may bring (*Indrabhūti*) back (1606)

टीका-तमिन्द्रभूतिं प्रव्रजितं श्रुत्वा द्वितीयोऽग्निभूतिनामा तत्सोदर्य-
बन्धुगत्रान्तरेऽमर्येणाकुलितचेताः समागच्छति भगवत्समीपम् । केनाभिप्रा-
येण ? इत्याह—व्रजामि । “ ण ” इति वाक्यालङ्कारे । आनयामि
निजभ्रातरमिन्द्रभूतिं “ ततः ” इति गम्यते । ‘ ण ’ इत्ययमपि वाक्या-
लङ्कारे । तं श्रमणमिन्द्रजालिकं कमपि पराजित्येति ॥ ५८ (१६०६) ॥

D C—On having heard that *Indrabhūti* had taken *dīkṣā* *Agnibhūti* his younger brother is exasperated. He comes to *Śrāvāna Bhagavan Mahavira* with the object of defeating him and taking *Indrabhūti* back

Agnibhūti thought—

छलिओ छलाइणा सो मण्णे माइदजालिओ वा वि ।
को जाणइ कह वत्त एत्ताहे वट्टमाणी से ॥ ५९ ॥ (१६०७)

Chalio chalaṇṇa so maṇṇe māidajālīo vā vi ।
Ko jāṇai kaha vattam ettāhe vattamāṇi se ॥ 59 (1607)

[छलितश्छलादिना स मन्य मायेन्द्रजालिको वापि ।
को जानाति कथ वृत्तमेतस्माद् वर्तमाना तस्य ॥ ५९ ॥ (१६०७)

Chalitaśchalaḍina sa manye mayendrajāliko vāpi ।
Ko jānati katham vṛttametasmaḍ vartamāṇa tasya ॥ 59 (1607)]

Trans—59 I think he has been cheated by *chala* (artful fraud) etc., or he is a clever juggler practising deceit. Who knows as to what happened there ? Consequently (the world will see) what will happen in his case. (1607)

टीका—दुर्बयस्त्रिभुवनस्यापि मद्भातेन्द्रभूतिः, केवलमहमिदं मन्ये—
छलादिना छलितोऽसौ तेन घूर्तेन—च्छल—आति—निग्रहस्थान—ग्रहणनिपुणेन
तेन केनापि बुधेन भ्रमितो मद्भुरिस्पर्ध । अथवा, मायेन्द्रजालिकः
कोऽपि निश्चितमसौ, येन तस्यापि अगव्यगुरोर्मद्भातुर्भ्रमितं चेत्तः । तस्माद्
किं बहुना ? को जानाति तद्वादस्थानकं तयोस्तत्र कथमपि वृत्तम्,
मत्परोक्षत्वात् ? । इत् ऊर्षं पुनर्मपि तत्र गते तस्य तदिन्द्रजालव्यतिकरभ्रमि
तमानससत्पर-नरा-ऽमरवातचन्दनमात्रहृदिषत्तमः, भ्रमकस्य “ बहुमाणी
चि ” या कापिद् वार्ता वर्तनी वा भविष्यति तां द्रष्टव्यमप्यममोऽपि
लोक इति ॥ ५९ (१६०७) ॥

D C—My brother *Indrabhūti* cannot be defeated by any one in the three worlds so I think he has been deceived by

the rogue *Mahāvīra*, who must be an expert in using *chala* (a trick resulting in the destruction of the statement in discussion by use of ambiguities of meaning) *Jāti* (an argument based on the same ground as put forth by the first speaker and *nigraha sthāna* (fallacy) etc. Or this *Mahāvīra* must certainly be a deceitful juggler. That is why he could change his (*Indrabhūti's*) mind. So what more? I was not present there, so who knows as to what discussion took place between my brother and *Mahāvīra* there? So let me, first of all, go there and let the world see as to what happens, so far as this saint *Mahāvīra* is concerned—*Mahāvīra* who has been puffed up with pride owing to his being saluted by a collection of *khacaras* (demi-gods) human beings and celestial beings whose minds have been perplexed by jugglery.

While going there, *Agnibhūti* said,

सो पक्खंतरमेगं पि जाइ जइ मे तओ मि तस्सेव ।
सीसत्तं होज्ज गओ वोत्तुं पत्तो जिणसगासे ॥ ६० ॥ (१६०८)

So pakkhantaramegam pi jāi jai me taō mi tasseva ।
Sīsattam hojja gaō vottum patto Jinasagāse ॥ 60 (1608)

[स पक्षान्तरमेकमपि याति यदि मे ततस्तस्यैव ।
शिष्यत्वं भवेयं गत उक्त्वा प्राप्तो जिनसकाशे ॥ ६० ॥ (१६०८)

Sa paksāntaramekamapi yāti yadi me tatastasyaiva ।
Śiṣyatvam bhaveyam gata uktvā prāpto Jinasakaśe ॥ 60 (1608)]

Trans—60 If he clearly understands the weak point of any one of *paksas* (premises), I shall become a pupil of his. Having said so, he went and came up into the presence of *Tirthankara Mahāvīra* (1608)

टीका—को जानाति तावदिन्द्रभूतिस्तेन कथमपि तत्र निर्जितः ? ।
मम पुनरप्येकमपि पक्षान्तरं प्रक्षविशेषं स यदि यात्यवबुध्यते—मद्विहितस्य

D C—On having heard that *Indrabhūti* had taken *dīkṣā* *Agnibhūti* his younger brother is exasperated. He comes to *Śramaṇa Bhagavan Mahavira* with the object of defeating him and taking *Indrabhūti* back

Agnibhūti thought—

छलिओ छलाइणा सो मण्णे माइदजालिओ वा वि ।
को जाणइ कह वत्त एत्ताहे वट्टमाणी से ॥ ५९ ॥ (१६०७)

Chalo chalaṇā so maṇṇe māinda-jālō vā vi ।
Ko jānaḥ kaha vattaṃ eṭṭāhe vatta-māṇi se ॥ 59 (1607)

[छलितश्छलादिना स मन्य मायेन्द्रजालिको वापि ।
को जानाति कथं वृत्तमेतस्माद् वर्तमाना तस्य ॥ ५९ ॥ (१६०७)

Chalitaśchalādina sa manye mayendra-jaliko vāpi ।
Ko janati katham vṛttametasmaḍ vartamāna tasya ॥ 59 (1607)]

Trans—59 I think he has been cheated by *chala* (artful fraud), etc., or he is a clever juggler practising deceit Who knows as to what happened there ? Consequently (the world will see) what will happen in his case. (1607)

टीका—दुर्बयस्त्रिभुवनस्यापि मद्भातन्त्रभूतिः, केवलमहमिदं मन्ये—
छलादिना छलितोऽसौ तेन घृतेन—च्छल—जाति—निग्रहस्वान—ग्रहणनिपुणेन
तन केनापि दुष्टेन अमितो मद्गन्धुरित्यर्थ । अथवा, मायेन्द्रजालिकः
कोऽपि निश्चितमसौ, येन तस्यापि अगदगुरोर्मद्भातुर्भूमितं येतः । तस्मात्
किं बहुना ? को जानाति तद्वादस्यानकं तयोस्तत्र कथमपि वृत्तम्,
मत्परोक्षत्वात् ? । इत ऊर्ध्वं पुनर्मयि तत्र गते तस्य तदिन्द्रजालव्यतिकरममि
तमानमस्त्रर—नरा—ऽमरघातवन्दनमात्रं हिषेतनः, भ्रमणकस्य “ बहुमाणी
चि ” वा काश्चिद् वार्ता वतनी वा भविष्यति तां ब्रह्मण्यर्थं ममप्रोऽपि
लोक इति ॥ ५९ (१६०७) ॥

D C—My brother *Indrabhūti* cannot be defeated by any one in the three worlds so I think he has been deceived by

the rogue *Mahāvīra*, who must be an expert in using *chala* (a trick resulting in the destruction of the statement in discussion by use of ambiguities of meaning) *Jāti* (an argument based on the same ground as put forth by the first speaker and *nigraha sthāna* (fallacy) etc. Or this *Mahāvīra* must certainly be a deceitful juggler. That is why he could change his (*Indrabhūti's*) mind. So what more? I was not present there, so who knows as to what discussion took place between my brother and *Mahāvīra* there? So let me, first of all, go there and let the world see as to what happens, so far as this saint *Mahāvīra* is concerned—*Mahāvīra* who has been puffed up with pride owing to his being saluted by a collection of *khacaras* (demi-gods) human beings and celestial beings whose minds have been perplexed by jugglery.

While going there, *Agnabhūti* said,

सो पक्खंतरमेगं पि जाइ जइ मे तओ मि तस्सेव ।
सीसत्तं होज्ज गओ वोत्तुं पत्तो जिणसगासे ॥ ६० ॥ (१६०८)

So pakkhantaramegam pi jāi jai me tao mi tasseva ।
Sīsattam hojja gaō vottum patto Jinasagāse ॥ 60 (1608)

[स पक्षान्तरमेकमपि याति यदि मे ततस्तस्यैव ।

शिष्यत्वं भवेयं गत उक्त्वा प्राप्तो जिनसकाशे ॥ ६० ॥ (१६०८)

Sa paksantaramekamapi yāti yadi me tatastasyaiva ।
Śiṣyatvam bhaveyam gata uktva prāpto Jinasakāśe ॥ 60 (1608)]

Trans—60 If he clearly understands the weak point of any one of *paksas* (premises), I shall become a pupil of his. Having said so, he went and came up into the presence of *Tirthankara Mahāvīra* (1608)

टीका—को जानाति तावदिन्द्रभूतिस्तेन कथमपि तत्र निर्जितः ? ।
मम पुनरप्येकमपि पक्षान्तरं प्रक्षविशेषं स यदि यात्यवबुध्यते—मद्विहितस्य

सहेत्-दाहरणस्य पक्षविशेषस्य स यदुत्तरप्रदानेन कथमपि पारं गच्छतीति हृदयम्, ततो 'मि' इति वाक्यालङ्कारे, तस्यैव भ्रमणस्य क्षिप्तत्वेन गतोऽहं भवेयम् इति निश्चयः । सत इत्यादि बाग्वर्जिं कृत्वा जिनस्य श्रीम न्महावीरस्यान्तिकं प्राप्त इति ॥ ६० (१६०८) ॥

D O—Who knows how *Indrabhūti* was defeated by him? If however he gives a satisfactory answer to any one of my *pakṣas* (promises) I shall become a pupil of that saint. He made a firm resolution. Having said so he went to *Śrāvastī Bhagavan Mahāvīra*

आभट्ठो य जिणेण जाइ-जरा-मरणविप्पमुक्केण ।

नामेण य गोत्तेण य सबण्णू सबदरिस्सि ण ॥ ६१ ॥ (१६०९)

Abhattho ya Jhenaṃ jāi-jarā-marana vipṣamukkena ।

Nāmena ya gottena ya savvaṇṇū savvadarissī ṇa ॥ 61 (1609)

[आमापितश्च जिनेन जाति-जरा मरणविप्रमुक्तेन ।

नाम्ना च गोत्रेण च सर्वज्ञेन सबदर्शिना ॥ ६१ ॥ (१६०९)

Abhasitashca Jinena jati-jarā-marana vipramuktena ।

Namna ca gotreṇa ca sarvajñena sarvadarśina ॥ 61 (1609)]

Trans—61 He was addressed by his name and *gotra* (lineage) by the *Tīrthankara* who was free from birth old age and death who was all-knowing and who had complete *darśana* (undifferentiated knowledge) (1609)

टीका-आमापितश्च संतुष्टश्च जाति-जरा-मरणविप्रमुक्तेन सर्वज्ञेन सर्व दर्शिना च जिनेन । कथम् ?-नाम्ना च-हे अग्निभूते ! गोत्रेण च-हे गौतमसगोत्र ! इति । इत्थं च नाम-गोत्राभ्यां संतुष्टस्य तस्य चिन्ताऽभूत्-अहो ! नामापि मम विज्ञानाति, भवता, जगत्प्रसिद्धोऽहम्, कः किं मां न वेत्ति ? । यदि हि मे हृदय संशय आस्पति, अपनेष्यति वा, तदा भवेद् मम विस्मयः ॥ ६१ (१६०९) ॥

D O—The omniscient *Tīrthankara* addressed the second *Ganadhara* by name as *Agnebhūti* and as one having *Gautama*,

as apineage When he was so spoken of, he was taken aback. But an after-thought came to him as under —

I am famous in the world, so it is but natural that *Mahāvīra* should be knowing my name and lineage It will be, however, a matter of surprise to me if *Mahāvīra* comes to know about my doubt or removes it

When he was thinking so, *Śīamana Bhagavān Mahāvīra* said,

किं मन्ने अत्थि कम्मं उयाहु न त्थि त्ति संसयो तुज्झं ।
वेयपयाण य अत्थं न याणासि तेसिमो अत्थो ॥६२॥ (१६१०)

Kim manne atthi kammam uyāhu na tthi tti samsayo tujjham ।
Veyapayāna ya attham na yānāsī tesimo attho ॥ 62 (1610)

[किं मन्यसेऽस्ति कर्म उताहो नास्तीति संशयस्तव ।

वेदपदानां चार्थं न जानासि तेषामयमर्थः ॥ ६२ ॥ (१६१०)

Kim manyase'sti karma utāho nāstīti saṁśayastava ।

Vedapadānām cārtham na jānāsī tesāmayamarthah ॥ 62 (1610)]

Trans —62 You think whether a *Karman* exists or not This is your doubt You do not know the (real) meaning of the sentences of the *Veda* Their meaning is this (1610)

टीका—हे अग्निभूते ! गौतम ! त्वमेतद् मन्यसे चिन्तयसि यदुत-
क्रियते मिथ्यात्वादिहेतुसमन्वितेन जीवेनेति कर्म ज्ञानावरणादिकम् तत्
किमस्ति, नास्ति वा ? इति । नन्वयमनुचितस्तव संशयः । अयं हि भवतो
विरुद्धवेदपदनिबन्धनो वर्तते, तेषां च वेदपदानां त्वमर्थं न जानासि, तेन
संशयं करोषि । तेषां च वेदपदानामयं वक्ष्यमाणलक्षणोऽर्थः इति॥६२(१६१०)॥

D. C —‘ O *Agnībhūta* ! of *Gautama* lineage ’ You have a doubt as to whether the *Karman* which is being done by the soul under the influence of *Mithyātva* (False Belief), etc , and which is of the type of *Jñānāvarana* (knowledge-obscuring), etc , exists or not This doubt of yours is based on your un-realization of the exact significance of the sentences of the *Veda*. This significance is what will be just expounded

सदेव-दाहरणस्य पथविशेषस्य स यदुत्तरप्रदानेन कथमपि पारं गच्छतीति हृदयम्, ततो 'मि' इति वाक्यालङ्कारे, तस्यैव भ्रमणस्य शिष्यत्वेन गतोऽहं भवेयम् इति निश्चयः । तत इत्यादि वाग्मात्रं कृत्वा जिनस्य भीम-न्महावीरस्यान्तिकं प्राप्त इति ॥ ६० (१६०८) ॥

D C—Who knows how *Indrabhūti* was defeated by him? If however he gives a satisfactory answer to any one of my *pakṣas* (promises) I shall become a pupil of that saint. He made a firm resolution. Having said so he went to *Śramaṇa Bhagavan Mahāvīra*

आभट्ठो य जिणेण जाइ-जरा-मरणविप्पमुक्केण ।

नामेण य गोत्तेण य सव्वण्णू सव्वदरिस्सि ण ॥ ६१ ॥ (१६०९)

Abhattho ya Jīṇaṃ jāi-jarā-marana vippamukkena ।

Nāmena ya gottena ya savvaṇṇū savvadarissī ṇa ॥ 61 (1609)

[आमापितश्च जिनेन आति-जरा-मरणविप्रमुक्तेन ।

नाम्ना च गोत्रेण च सर्वज्ञेन सर्वदर्शिना ॥ ६१ ॥ (१६०९)

Abhaṣitaśca Jinena jati-jarā-marana vipramuktena ।

Nāmaṃ ca gotreṇa ca sarvajñena sarvadarśina ॥ 61 (1609)

Trans—61 He was addressed by his name and *gotra* (lineage) by the *Tirthankara* who was free from birth old age and death who was all-knowing and who had complete *darśana* (undifferentiated knowledge) (1609)

टीका-आमापितश्च संलस्य आति-जरा-मरणविप्रमुक्तेन सर्वज्ञेन सर्व दर्शिना च जिनेन । कथम् ?-नाम्ना च-हे अग्निभूते ! गोत्रेण च-हे यौतमसगोत्र ! इति । इत्थं च नाम-गोत्राभ्यां संलस्य तस्य चिन्ताऽभूत्-अहो ! नामापि मम विद्यानाति, अथवा, अगत्यासिद्धोऽहम्, कः किञ्च मां न वेत्ति ? । यदि हि मे हृदयं सख्यं ज्ञास्यति, अपनप्यति वा, तदा भवेद् मम विस्मयः ॥ ६१ (१६०९) ॥

D C—The omniscient *Tirthankara* addressed the second *Ganadhara* by name as *Agnishāhi* and as one having *Gautama*

as apineage When he was so spoken of, he was taken aback. But an after-thought came to him as under —

I am famous in the world, so it is but natural that *Mahāvīra* should be knowing my name and lineage It will be, however, a matter of surprise to me if *Mahāvīra* comes to know about my doubt or removes it

When he was thinking so, *Śramana Bhagavān Mahāvīra* said,

किं मन्ने अत्थि कम्मं उयाहु न त्थि त्ति संसयो तुज्झं ।
वेयपयाण य अत्थं न याणासि तेसिमो अत्थो ॥६२॥ (१६१०)

Kim manne atthi kammam uyāhu na tthi tti samsayo tujjham ।
Veyapayāṇa ya attham na yāṇasī tesimo attho ॥ 62 (1610)

[किं मन्यसेऽस्ति कर्म उताहो नास्तीति संशयस्तव ।

वेदपदानां चार्थं न जानासि तेषामयमर्थः ॥ ६२ ॥ (१६१०)

Kim manyase'sti karma utāho nāstīti saṁśayastava ।

Vedapadānām cārtham na jānāsī tesāmayamarthah ॥ 62 (1610)]

Trans —62 You think whether a *Karman* exists or not This is your doubt You do not know the (real) meaning of the sentences of the *Veda* Their meaning is this (1610)

टीका—हे अग्निभूते ! गौतम ! त्वमेतद् मन्यसे चिन्तयसि यदुत-
क्रियते मिथ्यात्वादिहेतुसमन्वितेन जीवेनेति कर्म ज्ञानावरणादिकम् तत्
किमस्ति, नास्ति वा ? इति । नन्वयमनुचितस्तव संशयः । अयं हि भवतो
विरुद्धवेदपदनिबन्धनो वर्तते, तेषां च वेदपदानां त्वमर्थं न जानासि, तेन
संशयं करोषि । तेषां च वेदपदानामयं वक्ष्यमाणलक्षणोऽर्थः इति ॥६२॥ (१६१०)॥

D. C.—' O *Agnībhūti* ! of *Gautama* lineage ' You have a doubt as to whether the *Karman* which is being done by the soul under the influence of *Mithyātva* (False Belief), etc , and which is of the type of *Jñānāvarana* (knowledge-obscuring), etc , exists or not This doubt of yours is based on your unrealisation of the exact significance of the sentences of the *Veda* This significance is what will be just expounded

कम्मे तुह सदेहो मन्नसि त नाणगोयराईय ।

तुह तमणुमाणसाहणमणुभूइमय फल जस्स ॥ ६३ ॥ (१६११)

Kamme tuha sandeho mannasī tam nāṇagoyarāīyam ।

Tuha tamaṇumaṇa sāhaṇamaṇubhūimayam phalam jassa ॥ 63 (1611)

[कर्मणि तव संदेहो मन्यसे तज्ज्ञानगोचरातीतम् ।

तव तदनुमानसाधनमनुभूतिमय फलं यस्य ॥ ६३ ॥ (१६११)

Karmaṇi tava sandeho manyase tajjñānagocaratitam ।

Tava tadanumāna sādhanamanubhūtinmayam phalam tasya ॥ 63 (1611)]

Trans — 63 You have a doubt about (the existence of) the *Karman*. You think it to be beyond the range of knowledge, That (*Karman*) of which experience is the fruit is provable (to you) by means of *anumāna*. (1611)

टीका—हे आयुष्मन्नग्निभूते ! ज्ञानावरणादिपरमाणुसंघातरूपे कर्मणि तव संदेहः, यतः प्रत्यक्षा-ऽनुमानादिसमस्तप्रमाणात्मकज्ञानगोचरातीतमेव तत् त्व मन्यसे, तथा हि—न तावत् प्रत्यक्ष कर्म, अतीन्द्रियत्वात्, स्वरूपिणोऽपि, इत्यादि प्रमाद्विषयातीतत्वे प्राग्बलीवस्थेव कर्मणोऽपि समान प्रायत्वाद् साधनीयमिति । तदेतत् सौम्य ! मा मयास्त्वम्, यतो मम तावत् प्रत्यक्षमेव कर्म, तथाप्यनुमान साधनं यस्य तदनुमानसाधनं वर्तते तत् कर्म, न पुनः सर्वप्रमाणगोचरातीतम् । यस्य, किम् ? इत्याह—“अणु भूइमय फलं जस्स सि ” सुख-दुःखानामनुभूतिरनुमनं तन्मय तदात्मकं फलं यस्य छुमा-ऽष्टमकर्मण इति । अनन चेदनुमानं व्यथितम्—अस्ति सुख-दुःखानुमनस्य हेतुः, कार्यत्वाद्, अङ्गुरस्यैवेति ।

अथ यदि मयतः प्रत्यक्ष कर्म, तर्हि मयापि तत्प्रत्यक्ष कस्माद् न मयति ! इति चेत् । तद्व्युक्तम्, न हि यदेकस्य कस्यचित् प्रत्यक्षं तेनापरस्यापि प्रत्यक्षेण मयिष्ठम्यम् । न हि सिंह-सरप-इसादयः सर्पस्यापि लोकस्य प्रत्यक्षाः, न च ते न सन्ति बालादीनामपि तत्सर्वस्य प्रसिद्धत्वात् । तस्मादस्ति कर्म, सर्वज्ञत्वेन मया प्रत्यक्षीकृतत्वात्, मयत्संसर्गविज्ञानवदिति ।

न च वक्तव्यम्—त्वयि सर्वज्ञत्वमस्मान् प्रत्यसिद्धम् “ कद्द सवणु त्ति मई जेणाहं सवसंसयच्छेई, पुच्छसु व जं न याणामि ” इत्यादिना प्रागेव प्रतिविहितत्वात् । कार्यप्रत्यक्षतया भवतोऽपि च प्रत्यक्षमेव कर्म, यथा घटा-
दिकार्यप्रत्यक्षतया परमाणव इति ॥ ६३ (१६११) ॥

D C—O long-lived *Agnibhūti* ! You entertain a doubt about the existence of the *Karman*, which is a multitude of *paramāṇus*, in the form of *jñānāvarana*, etc , for you think that its existence cannot be established by any one of the *pramāṇas* such as *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna*, etc , the *pramāṇas* which are knowledge To be explicit, you argue as under —

Karman is not directly perceived, because it is super-sensuous as is the case with the horn on the head of an ass

Other arguments that you advance are the same as mentioned by your brother in the case of the soul

But these lines of arguments are faulty For, this *Karman* is certainly *pratyakṣa* to me Moreover, its existence is such as can be realized by you, by means of inference Hence, it is not justifiable to believe that no *pramāṇa* can establish its existence The *Karman* is either good or bad The good *Karman* makes us experience happiness, where as, the bad *Karman* misery

This leads to an inference as under —

There is a cause for experiencing happiness and misery since it is a *Kārya* (an act) as is the case with a sprout It is no use arguing that since the *Karman* is *pratyakṣa* to me (i e *Mahāvīra*) it should be so to you For, there is no such rule that what is *pratyakṣa* to one, should be necessarily so to another. A lion, a *śarbhā* (a fabulous eight-legged animal a match for lions and elephants), a swan, etc are not *pratyakṣa* to one and all the beings But, on that account, it is not that they do not exist, for, even children know them Therefore, there does exist the *Karman* since

कम्मे तुह सदेहो मन्नसि त नाणगोयराईय ।

तुह तमणुमाणसाहणमणुभूइमय फल जस्स ॥ ६३ ॥ (१६११)

Kamme tuha sandeho mannasī tam nānagoyarāīyam ।

Tuha tamanumāna sāhanamanubhūimayam phalam jassa ॥ 63 (1611)

[कर्मणि तव संदेहो मन्यसे तज्ज्ञानगोचरातीतम् ।

तव तदनुमानसाधनमनुभूतिमय फल यस्य ॥ ६३ ॥ (१६११)

Karmanī tava sandeho manyase tajñānagocaratītam ।

Tava tadanumāna sadhanamanubhūtimayam phalam tasya ॥ 63 (1611)]

Trans — 63 You have a doubt about (the existence of) the *Karman*. You think it to be beyond the range of knowledge. That (*Karman*) of which experience is the fruit is provable (to you) by means of *anumāna*. (1611)

टीका—हे आयुष्मन्नग्निभूते ! ज्ञानावरणादिपरमाशुसंघातरूपे कर्मणि तव संदेहः, यतः प्रत्यक्षा-ऽनुमानादिसमस्तप्रमाणात्मकज्ञानगोचरातीतमेव तत् त्वं मन्यसे, तथा हि—न तावत् प्रत्यक्षं कर्म, अतीन्द्रियत्वात्, स्वरविपाणवत्, इत्यादि प्रमाणाविषयातीतत्वं प्राग्वक्तीवस्येव कर्मणाऽपि समानप्रायत्वात् मावनीयमिति । तदेतत् सौम्य ! मा मन्यास्त्वम्, यतो मम तावत् प्रत्यक्षमेव कर्म, तवाप्यनुमान साधनं यस्य तदनुमानसाधनं वर्तते तत् कर्म, न पुनः सर्वप्रमाणगोचरातीतम् । यस्य, किम् ? इत्याह—“अणुभूइमय फल जस्स ति” सुख-दुःखानामनुभूतिरनुभवः तन्मर्थं तदात्मकं फलं यस्य क्षुमा-ऽष्टमकर्मण्य इति । अनन चेदनुमान व्यधितम्—अस्ति सुख-दुःखानुभवस्म इति, कार्यत्वात्, अदुरस्येवेति ।

अथ यदि भवतः प्रत्यक्षं कर्म, तर्हि मयापि तत्प्रत्यक्षं कस्मात् न भवति ? इति चेत् । तदशुक्तम्, न हि यदेकस्य कस्यचित् प्रत्यक्षं तेनापरस्यापि प्रत्यक्षेण भवितव्यम् । न हि सिंह-सरम-इत्यादयः सर्वस्यापि लोकस्य प्रत्यक्षाः, न च ते न सन्ति बालादीनामपि तत्सर्वस्य प्रसिद्धत्वात् । तस्मादस्ति कर्म, सर्वज्ञत्वेन मया प्रत्यक्षीकृतत्वात्, भवत्संशयविज्ञानवदिति ।

न च वक्तव्यम्—त्वयि सर्वज्ञत्वमस्मान् प्रत्यसिद्धम् “ क ह सवणु त्ति मई जेणाहं सवसंमयच्छेई, पुच्छसु व जं न याणामि ” इत्यादिना प्रागेव प्रतिविहितत्वात् । कार्यप्रत्यक्षतया भवतोऽपि च प्रत्यक्षमेव कर्म, यथा घटा-
दिकार्यप्रत्यक्षतया परमाणव इति ॥ ६३ (१६११) ॥

D. C.—O long-lived *Agnibhūti* ! You entertain a doubt about the existence of the *Karman*, which is a multitude of *paramānus*, in the form of *jñānāvarana*, etc , for you think that its existence cannot be established by any one of the *pramānas* such as *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna*, etc , the *pramānas* which are knowledge. To be explicit, you argue as under —

Karman is not directly perceived, because it is super-sensuous as is the case with the horn on the head of an ass

Other arguments that you advance are the same as mentioned by your brother in the case of the soul

But these lines of arguments are faulty For, this *Karman* is certainly *pratyakṣa* to me Moreover its existence is such as can be realized by you, by means of inference Hence, it is not justifiable to believe that no *pramāna* can establish its existence The *Karman* is either good or bad The good *Karman* makes us experience happiness, where as, the bad *Karman* misery.

This leads to an inference as under —

There is a cause for experiencing happiness and misery since it is a *Kārya* (an act) as is the case with a sprout It is no use arguing that since the *Karman* is *pratyakṣa* to me (i. e. *Mahāvīra*) it should be so to you For, there is no such rule that what is *pratyakṣa* to one, should be necessarily so to another A lion, a *śarabha* (a fabulous eight-legged animal a match for lions and elephants), a swan, etc are not *pratyakṣa* to one and all the beings But, on that account, it is not that they do not exist, for, even children know them Therefore, there does exist the *Karman* since

it is *pratyakṣa* to me an omniscient being just as your doubt is *pratyakṣa* to me. If you doubt my omniscience I may repeat what I said to your elder brother *viz.*

*Kaha savvanu ti mai jeham sarva sammayaccheṭ
puccasu va jam na yanam* (verse 1679)

Moreover this *Karman* is *pratyakṣa* to you too since you realize its *Kārya* (effect) as is the case with *paramanus*, which though not directly realizable to you are *pratyakṣa* to you since their *Kāryas* like a pitcher etc. are directly perceived by you.

अथि सुह—दुक्खहेऊ कज्जाओ धीयमकुरस्सेव ।

सो दिट्ठो चेव मई वमिचाराओ न त जुत्त ॥ ६४ ॥ (१६१२)

जो तुल्लसाहणाण फले विसेसो न सो विणा हेउ ।

कज्जत्तणओ गोयम । घढो व्व, हेऊ य सो कम्म ॥ ६५ ॥ (१६१३)

Atthi suha-dukkhaheṭṭi kajjāṇo biyamankurssseva ।

So dīṭṭho ceva mai vabhikāraṇā na tam juttam ॥ 64 ॥ (1612)

Jo tullasāhanāṇam phale vīseso na so viṇā heum ।

kajjattanaṇo Goyama । ghado vva heṭṭi ya so kammam ॥ 65 ॥ (1613)

[अस्ति सुखदुःखहेतुः कार्यत्वात् धीयमकुरस्येव ।

स इष्ट एव मतिर्भ्यमिचाराद् न तद् युक्तम् ॥ ६४ ॥ (१६१२)

यस्तुल्यसाधनयोः फले विक्षेपो न स विना हेतुम् ।

कार्यत्वतो गौतम । घट इव, हेतुश्च स कर्म ॥ ६५ ॥ (१६१३)

Anta sukduhkkkhetuḥ karyatvat biyamankurasyeva ।

So drṣṭa eva matir-vyabhiṇāś na tad yuktam ॥ 64 (1612)

Yastulyasadhanayoh phale vīśeṣo na sa viṇa hetum ।

Karyatvato Gautama । ghaṭa eva hetuśca sa karma ॥ 65 (1613)]

Trans —64-65 Just as a sprout has a seed for its *hetu*, (because it is a *kārya*) so there is a *hetu* for happiness and misery owing to their being a *kārya* (an action)

You may think —That (*hetu*) is certainly seen. This (thought) is not proper owing to *vyabhicāra* (irrelevancy)

O *Gautama* ! That difference which exists in the fructification in the case of those who have equal means is not without a *hetu*, since it is a *kārya*, as is the case with a pitcher That *hetu* is *Karman* 64-65 (1612-1613)

टीका—प्रतिप्राणि प्रसिद्धयोः सुख-दुःखयोर्हेतुरस्ति, कार्यत्वात्, अङ्कुरस्येव बीजमिति । यथेह सुख-दुःखयोर्हेतुस्तत् कर्मेव, इत्यस्ति तदिति । स्याद् मतिः—स्रक्-चन्दना-ऽङ्गनादयः सुखस्य हेतवः, दुःखस्य त्वहि-विष-कण्टकादयः, इति दृष्ट एव सुख-दुःखयोर्हेतुरस्ति, किमदृष्टस्य कर्मणस्तद्वेतुत्वकल्पनेन ? । न हि दृष्टपरिहारेणादृष्टकल्पना संगतत्वमावहति, अतिप्रसङ्गात् । तदयुक्तम्, व्यभिचारात्, तथाहि—‘ जो तुल्येत्यादि ’ इह यस्तुल्यसाधनयोरिष्टशब्दादिविषयसुखमाधनसमेतयोरनिष्टार्थमाधनसंयुक्तयोश्च द्वयोर्वहुनां वा फले सुख-दुःखानुभवनलक्षणे विशेषस्तारतम्यरूपो दृश्यते, नासावदृष्टं कमपि हेतुमन्तरेणोपपद्यते, कार्यत्वात्, घटवत् । यश्च तत्र विशेषाधायकोऽदृष्टहेतुस्तद् गौतम ! कर्मेति प्रतिपद्यस्वेति ॥६४-६५॥ (१६१२-१६१३)

D C—Just as a sprout which is a *Kārya*, has a seed for its *hetu*, so happiness and misery, which are well-known to every individual, have a cause, because they are *kāryas* And this cause is nothing else but *Karman* and so it exists. It may be that you may here raise a question as under —

A garland, sandal, a woman and the like are the *hetus* of happiness, whereas a serpent, poison, a thorn, etc, are those of misery All these *hetus* of happiness and misery as well, are seen—are the objects of the sense of sight So, why should we believe *Karman* to be their *hetu*—the *Karman* which is not seen ? To admit a thing not seen in the place of one that is seen is not justifiable, as it out-shoots the mark

- This question is out of place owing to the *vyabhicāra* (irrelevancy) It is a matter of common experience that we

D C.—The body in childhood must have some body to precede it, since it has organs of sense, happiness, misery, *piāna* (sign of vitality) *apāna* (the vital air which goes downwards and out at the *anus*), winking of the eyes, opening of the eyes, life, etc, as is the case with the body in youth. This body which precedes one in child-hood, cannot be the body belonging to the previous birth, for it does not exist in the *apāntarāla gata* (state previous to the interval stage) and so it has no scope here. Moreover, it is not possible for one having no body, to have a body in a particular womb, country, place, etc, as there is none to so direct it. Even nature cannot so direct it as we shall soon prove. So the body which precedes one in child-hood is *Kārmāna*—one which is known as a *Kārmāna* body, as suggested by “ *jeena kammaenam āhāreṇ anantaram jīvo* ”

There is another inference also,

किरियाफलभावाओ दाणाईणं फलं किसीए व ।

तं चिय दाणाइफलं मणप्पसायाई जइ बुद्धी ॥ ६७ ॥ (१६१५)

किरियासामण्णाओ जं फलमस्सावि तं मयं कम्मं ।

तस्स परिणामरूपं सुह—दुक्खफलं जओ भुज्जो ॥ ६८ ॥ (१६१६)

Kiriyā phala bhāvāo dānāṇam phalam kisīe vva ।

Tam ciya dānāṇaphalam manappasāyāi jai buddhī ॥ 67 (1615)

Kiriyāsāmannāo jam phalamassāvi tam mayam kammam ।

Tassa parināmarūvam suha—dukkhaphalam jaō bhujjo ॥ 68 (1616)

[क्रियाफलभावाद् दानादीनां फलं कृपेरिव ।

तदेव दानादिफलं मनःप्रसादादि यदि बुद्धिः ॥ ६७ ॥ (१६१५)

क्रियासामान्याद् यत्फलमस्यापि तद् मतं कर्म ।

तस्य परिणामरूपं सुख—दुःखफलं यतो भूयः ॥ ६८ ॥ (१६१६)

find that persons having the same means for enjoying happiness do not get the same type of happiness

Same is the case with those who have the same means to suffer misery

This difference in each case cannot be without any *hetu* which is not seen

This very unseen *hetu* is *Karman*.

बालशरीर देहतरपुष इदियाइमत्ताओ ।

अह बालदेहपुषो जुवदेहो पुषमिह कम्म ॥ ६६ ॥ (१६१४)

Bālasarīram dehantarapuvvam indiyāimattāo ।

Jaha bāladehapuvvo juvadeho puvvamiha kammam ॥ 66 ॥ (1614)

[बालशरीरं देहान्तरपूर्वकमिन्द्रियादिमत्त्वात् ।

यथा बालदेहपूर्वो जुवदेहः पूर्वमिह कम्म ॥ ६६ ॥ (१६१४)

Bālasarīram dehantarapūrvakanindriyadimattvat ।

Yatha baladehapūrho yuvadehah pūrvamiha karma ॥ 66 (1614)]

Trans—66 Just as the body in youth is preceded by a body in child-hood so is the body in child-hood preceded by another body since it has organs of sense etc. Here-in this very body which is prior to that in child-hood is *Karman*. (1614)

टीकाः—शरीरान्तरपूर्वकमाद्यं बालशरीरम्, इन्द्रियादिमत्त्वात्, जुव शरीरवदिति, आदिशब्दात् सुख-दुःखित्व-प्राणाऽपान-निमेषो-न्मेष जीवनादिमत्त्वाद्योऽपि हेतवो प्राप्ताः । न च अन्मान्तरातीतशरीरपूर्वकमेवेदमिति शङ्क्यते यस्तुम्, तस्यापान्तरालगतत्वसत्त्वेन तत्पूर्वकत्वानुपपत्तेः । न चाशरीरिणो नियतगर्भ-वेद्य-स्थानप्राप्तिपूर्वकः शरीरग्रहो युज्यते, नियामककारणभावात् । नापि स्वभावो नियामकः, तस्य निराकरिष्यमाणत्वात् । एवेह बालशरीरस्य पूर्वं शरीरान्तरं तत् “कर्म” इति मन्तव्यम्—कर्मण्यं शरीरमित्यर्थः, “लोपण कम्मण्य माहारेई अर्जतरं जीवो” इत्यादि वचनादिति ॥ ६६ (१६१४) ॥

D C.—The body in childhood must have some body to precede it, since it has organs of sense, happiness, misery, *māna* (sign of vitality) *apāna* (the vital air which goes downwards and out at the *anus*), winking of the eyes, opening of the eyes, life, etc, as is the case with the body in youth. This body which precedes one in child-hood, cannot be the body belonging to the previous birth, for it does not exist in the *apāntarāla gati* (state previous to the interval stage) and so it has no scope here. Moreover, it is not possible for one having no body, to have a body in a particular womb, country, place, etc, as there is none to so direct it. Even nature cannot so direct it as we shall soon prove. So the body which precedes one in child-hood is *Kārmana*—one which is known as a *Kāmana* body, as suggested by “ *jeena kammaenam āhāreṭi anantaram jīvo* ”

There is another inference also,

किरियाफलभावाओ दाणाईणं फलं किसीए व ।

तं चिय दाणाइफलं मणप्पसायाई जइ बुद्धी ॥ ६७ ॥ (१६१५)

किरियासामण्णाओ जं फलमस्सावि तं मयं कम्मं ।

तस्स परिणामरूपं सुह-दुक्खफलं जओ भुज्जो ॥ ६८ ॥ (१६१६)

Kiriya phala bhāvāo dānāṇam phalam kisiē vva ।

Tam ciya dānāṇaphalam manappasāyāi jai buddhī ॥ 67 (1615)

Kiriyaśāmannāo jam phalamassāvi tam mayam kammam ।

Tassa parināmarūvam suha-dukkhaphalam jaō bhujjo ॥ 68 (1616)

[क्रियाफलभावाद् दानादीनां फलं कृपेरिव ।

तदेव दानादिफलं मनःप्रसादादि यदि बुद्धिः ॥ ६७ ॥ (१६१५)

क्रियासामान्याद् यत्फलमस्यापि तद् मतं कर्म ।

तस्य परिणामरूपं सुख-दुःखफलं यतो भूयः ॥ ६८ ॥ (१६१६)

find that persons having the same means for enjoying happiness do not get the same type of happiness

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This difference in each case cannot be without any *hetu* which is not seen

This very unseen *hetu* is *Karman*.

बालसरीर देहतरपुष इदियाहमत्ताओ ।

जह बालदेहपुषो जुवदेहो पुषमिह कम्म ॥ ६६ ॥ (१६१४)

Bālasarīram dehantarapuvvam indiyāhmatāo ।

Jaha bāladehapuvvo juvadeho puvvamiha kammam ॥ 66 ॥ (1614)

[बालशरीरं देहान्तरपूर्वकमिन्द्रियादिमत्त्वात् ।

यथा बालदेहपूर्वो युवदेहः पूर्वमिह कम् ॥ ६६ ॥ (१६१४)

Bālasarīram dehantarapūrvakanūndriyadimattvat ।

Yatha bāladehapūrho yuvadehah pūrvamiha karma ॥ 66 (1614)]

Trans—66 Just as the body in youth is preceded by a body in child-hood so is the body in child-hood preceded by another body since it has organs of sense etc. Here in this very body which is prior to that in child-hood is *Karman*. (1614)

टीकाः—शरीरान्तरपूर्वकमाद्य बालशरीरम्, इन्द्रियादिमत्त्वात्, युवशरीरवदिति, आदिशब्दात् सुख-दुःखित्व-प्राणाज्यान-निमेषो-न्मेष जीवनादिमत्त्वादयोऽपि हेतवो प्राणाः । न च जन्मान्तरातीतशरीरपूर्वकमेवेदमिति शक्यते यत्तुम्, तस्यापान्तरालगतान्तरत्वेन तत्पूर्वकत्वानुपपत्तिः । न चाशरीरिणो नियतगर्भ-द्वय-स्थानप्राप्तिपूर्वकः शरीरग्रहो युज्यते, नियामककारणमावात् । नापि स्वभावो नियामकः, तस्य निराकरिष्यमाणत्वात् । यथेह बालशरीरस्य पूर्वं शरीरान्तरं तत् “कर्म” इति मन्तव्यम्—कार्मेयशरीरमित्यर्थः, “लोप्य कम्मयणं आहारं यणंतरं जीवो” इत्यादिपपनादिति ॥ ६६ (१६१४) ॥

D C.—The body in childhood must have some body to precede it, since it has organs of sense, happiness, misery, *prāna* (sign of vitality) *apāna* (the vital air which goes downwards and out at the *anus*), winking of the eyes, opening of the eyes, life, etc., as is the case with the body in youth. This body which precedes one in child-hood, cannot be the body belonging to the previous birth, for it does not exist in the *apāntarāla gati* (state previous to the interval stage) and so it has no scope here. Moreover, it is not possible for one having no body, to have a body in a particular womb, country, place, etc., as there is none to so direct it. Even nature cannot so direct it as we shall soon prove. So the body which precedes one in child-hood is *Kārmāna*—one which is known as a *Kārmāna* body, as suggested by “ *jeena kammācchaṃ āhāret anantaram jīvo* ”

There is another inference also,

किरियाफलभावाओ दाणाईणं फलं किमीए व ।
तं चिय दाणाइफलं मणप्पसायाई जइ बुद्धी ॥ ६७ ॥ (१६१५)
किरियासामण्णाओ जं फलमस्सावि तं मयं कम्मं ।
तस्स परिणामरूवं सुह—दुक्खफलं जओ भुज्जो ॥ ६८ ॥ (१६१६)

*Kiriya phala bhāvāo dānāinam phalam kisie va ।
Tam ciya dānāiphalam manappasāyāi jai buddhi ॥ 67 (1615)*

*Kiriysāmannāo jam phalamassāvi tam mayam kammam ।
Tassa parināmarūvam suha—dukkhaphalam jaō bhujjo ॥ 68 (1616)*

[क्रियाफलभावाद् दानादीनां फलं कृपेरिव ।
तदेव दानादिफलं मनःप्रसादादि यदि बुद्धिः ॥ ६७ ॥ (१६१५)
क्रियासामान्याद् यत्फलमस्यापि तद् मतं कर्म ।
तस्य परिणामरूपं सुख—दुःखफलं यतो भूयः ॥ ६८ ॥ (१६१६)

Kriyaphalabhavad danadānam phalam kṛiseriva :

Tadeva danadāphalam manapprasadaḍi yaḍi buddhiḥ ॥ 67 (1615)

Kriya samanyad yatphalamasyapi tad matam karma :

Tasya pariṇamerūpam sukha-duḥkha phalam yato bhūyadh ॥ 68 (1616)

Trans—67-68 Just as there is a fruit of agriculture, so there is a fruit of charity etc., owing to the fructification of an act. If you think that the fruit of charity etc., is serenity of mind, etc. then (we say that) that which is its fruit is looked upon as *Karman* owing to the commonness of *kriya*—the *Karman* from which arises again and again the fructification in the form of happiness and misery which are the results of *Karman*. (1615-1616)

टीका—“ दानार्णं फलं चि ” इह दानादिक्रियाणां फलमस्ति “ किरियाफलभाषाओ चि ” सचेतनारब्धक्रियाणां फलभाषात् फलभाषदर्शनादित्यर्थः, यथा कृषिक्रियायाः । इह या चेत्तनारब्धक्रिया तस्या फल इष्टम्, यथा कृष्यादिक्रियायाः, चेत्तनारब्धाश्च दानादिक्रियाः, तस्मात् फलवत्यः, यच्च तासां फलं तत् कर्म । या तु निष्फला क्रिया सा सचेतनारब्धापि न भवति, यथा परमाष्वादिक्रिया, सचेतनारब्धाश्च दानादिक्रियाः, तस्मात् फलवत्यः । स्यादसत्, अनैकान्तिकोऽयं हेतुः, चेत्तनारब्धानामपि का सांक्षित् कृष्यादिक्रियाणां निष्फलत्वदर्शनात् । तदुक्तम्, फलमस्त्वामिप्राये णैव तदारम्भात् । यच्च कश्चित् निष्फलत्वमपि इष्टवते तत्सम्पन्नानाद्यमा येन सामग्रीवैकल्याद् द्रष्टव्यम्, मनःशुद्ध्यादिसामग्रीविकलतया दानादिक्रिया अपि निष्फला इत्यन्त एवेत्यदोषः ।

यदि चात्र परस्यैवभूता बुद्धिः स्यात् । कथंभूता ? इत्याह—“ तं चिदेत्वादि ” तदेव दानादिक्रियाणां फलं यदस्मादश्चामपि प्रत्यर्थं मनःप्रसादादि । इदमुक्तं भवति—कृष्यादिक्रिया इष्टभाषायाश्चास्तिफला इष्टा, अतो दानादिक्रियाणामपि इष्टमेव मनःप्रसादादिक फलं भविष्यति, किमिष्टकर्म लक्षणफलसाधनेन ? । तव इष्टविरुद्धसाधनाद् विरुद्धोऽयं हेतुः । तस्मात् नयं भूमः—“ किरियासामान्याओ इत्यादि ” अस्यापि मनःप्रसादस्य यत्

फलं तद् मम कर्म संमतम् । ननु मनः प्रसादस्यापि कथं फलमभिधीयते ? इत्याह—“ किरियासामण्णाओ त्ति ” इदमुक्तं भवति—मनः प्रसादोऽपि क्रियारूप एव, ततश्च यथा दान—कृष्यादिकाः क्रियाः फलवत्यः, तथा क्रियासाम्याद् मनः प्रसादस्यापि फलेन भवितव्यमेव, यच्च तस्य फलं तत् कर्मैव, इति न कश्चिद् व्यभिचारः ।

यतः कर्मणः सकाशात्, किम् ? इत्याह—“ सुह-दुःखफलं जउ त्ति ” सुख-दुःखरूपं फलं सुख-दुःखफलं यतो यस्मात् कर्मणः सकाशाज्जायते । कथम् ? भूयः पुनः पुनरपि । कथं भूतं यत् सुख-दुःखफलम् ? इत्याह—तस्यैव कर्मणस्तज्जनकत्वेन यत् परिणमनं परिणामस्तद्रूपमिति । एतदुक्तं भवति—यतः कर्मणः सकाशात् प्रतिक्षणं तत्परिणतिरूपं सुख-दुःखफलं प्राणिनां समुपजायते, तत् कर्म मनः प्रसादादिक्रियाया अपि फलमभिम-तम् । आह—नन्वनन्तरगाथायां “ दानादिक्रियाफलं कर्म ” इति वदता दानादिक्रियैव कर्मणः कारणमुक्ता, अत्र तु मनःप्रसादादिक्रिया तत्कारण-मुच्यते, इति कथं न पूर्वापरविरोधः ? इति । सत्यम्, किन्तु मनः प्रसादादि-क्रियैवानन्तर्येण कर्मणः कारणम्, केवलं तस्या अपि मनः प्रसादादि-क्रियाया दानादिक्रियैव कारणम्, अतः कारणकारणे कारणोपचाराददोष इति ॥ ६७-६८ (१६१५-१६१६) ॥

D C—In this world, we find that each and every act performed by a living being, yields a fruit, as is seen in the case of tilling of ground, etc. The acts of charity are undertaken by a living being, so they too, must bear a fruit, and that fruit is nothing else but *Karman*. That act which is fruitless, is not commenced by a living being, e g, the act of electrons etc, but the acts of charity, etc, are commenced by living beings, so they are fruitful.

It may here be argued that this *hetu* is *anarkāntika*; for, the act like tilling the ground commenced by living beings, is at times seen to yield no fruit. But, this argument is not justifiable since such an act is commenced with the hope that it will be fruitful. Moreover, the failure which occurs sometimes

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is due to something wanting in materials—a defect arising from want of real knowledge

We may add that we are glad to admit that the act as that of charity if done without the serenity of mind, is fruitless; for it is an *upapatti* (a desirable acquisition) to us

Some one may here argue as under:—

The act like tilling the ground is seen to yield a visible fruit *viz* acquisition of crop. So, the act like charity must yield a visible fruit like the serenity of mind. Such being the case why should we think of a fruit like *Karman* which is invisible? Hence this *hetu* is *viruddha* (inconsistent) for it establishes just the contrary to what is desired.

This argument may be refuted as below —

Even the serenity of mind is certainly a *kriya*. So just as acts like charity yield a fruit, so this serenity of mind too must yield a fruit. And that fruit is *Karman* and nothing else. So there is no *vyabhicāra* (irrelevancy).

It may be here noted that that *Karman* whence living beings experience happiness and misery which are its *parināma* (consequences) is certainly the fruit of the act *viz* serenity of mind.

It may be argued that in the preceding verse (v 1615) while saying that *danādā kriyāphalam Karma* "only the act like charity was mentioned as the cause of *Karman* and here the act like serenity of mind is stated as the cause of *Karman*. So are not these statements contradictory? Yes they are. But, it should be borne in mind that since the act like the serenity of mind is the intermediate cause of *Karman* and that the act like charity is the cause of the act like the serenity of mind, there arises no flaw because here we have an *upāśāna* (compliment) of *Kāraṇa* in *Kāraṇa*-

kāraṇa, that is to say, the cause of the cause is here taken to be cause.

होज मणोवित्तीए दाणाइकिए व जइ फलं बुद्धी ।
तं न निमित्तताओ पिंडो व घटस्स विन्नेओ ॥ ६९ ॥ (१६१७)

Hojja manovittie dāṇākie va jai phalam buddhī ।

Tam na nimittatāo pindo vva ghadassa vinneo ॥ 69 (1617)

[भवेद् मनोवृत्तेर्दानादिक्रियैव यदि फलं बुद्धिः ।

तद् न निमित्तत्वात् पिण्ड इव घटस्य विज्ञेयः ॥ ६९ ॥ (१६१७)

Bhaved manovriter-dāṇādīkriyāiva yadī phalam buddhīh ।

Tad na nimittatvāt pinda iva ghatasya vijñeyah ॥ 69 (1617)]

Trans —69 If you think that only the acts like charity, etc., are the fruits of the mental inclination, it is not (so) owing to there being a *numitta* (instrumental cause) For instance, a lump (of clay) should be realized as (a *numitta*) of a pitcher (1617)

टीका—अत्र परस्य यद्येवंभूता बुद्धिः स्यात् । कथंभूता ? इत्याह—ननु मनोवृत्तेर्मनःप्रसक्त्यादिक्रियाया दृष्टरूपा दानादिक्रियैव फलम्, न त्वदृष्टं कर्मेति भावः । अयमभिप्रायः—दानादिक्रियातो मनःप्रसादादयो जायन्ते, तेभ्यश्च प्रवर्धमानदित्सादिपरिणामः पुनरपि दानादिक्रियां करोति, एवं पुनः पुनरपि दानक्रियाप्रवृत्तेः सैव मनः प्रसादादेः फलमस्तु, न तु कर्मेति भावः, दृष्टफलमात्रेणैव चरितार्थत्वात् किमदृष्टफलकल्पनेन ? इति हृदयम् । तदेतद् न । कुतः ? निमित्तत्वाद्—मनःप्रसादादिक्रियां प्रति दानादिक्रियाया निमित्त-कारणत्वादित्यर्थः, यथा मृत्पिण्डो घटस्य निमित्तं विज्ञेयस्तथा दानादि-क्रियापि मनः प्रसक्तेः । दृश्यन्ते हि पात्रदानादिभ्यश्चित्ताह्लादादयो जायमानाः । न च यद् यस्य निमित्तं तत् तस्यैव फलं वक्तुमुचितम्, दुरविरुद्धत्वादिति ॥ ६९ ॥ (१६१७ ॥

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Tam na nimittatāo pindo vva ghadassa vinneo ॥ 69 (1617)

[भवेद् मनोवृत्तेर्दानादिक्रियैव यदि फलं बुद्धिः ।

तद् न निमित्तत्वात् पिण्ड इव घटस्य विज्ञेयः ॥ ६९ ॥ (१६१७)

Bhaved manovriter-dānādikriyāiva yadī phalam buddhīh ।

Tad na nimittatvāt pinda iva ghatasya vijñeyah ॥ 69 (1617)]

Trans —69 If you think that only the acts like charity, etc., are the fruits of the mental inclination, it is not (so) owing to there being a *nimitta* (instrumental cause) For instance, a lump (of clay) should be realized as (a *nimitta*) of a pitcher (1617)

टीका—अत्र परस्य यद्येवंभूता बुद्धिः स्यात् । कथंभूता ? इत्याह—ननु मनोवृत्तेर्मनःप्रसत्त्यादिक्रियाया दृष्टरूपा दानादिक्रियैव फलम्, न त्वदृष्टं कर्मेति भावः । अयमभिप्रायः—दानादिक्रियातो मनःप्रसादादयो जायन्ते, तेभ्यश्च प्रवर्धमानदित्सादिपरिणामः पुनरपि दानादिक्रियां करोति, एवं पुनः पुनरपि दानक्रियाप्रवृत्तेः सैव मनः प्रसादादेः फलमस्तु, न तु कर्मेति भावः, दृष्टफलमात्रेणैव चरितार्थत्वात् किमदृष्टफलकल्पनेन ? इति हृदयम् । तदेतद् न । कुतः ? निमित्तत्वाद्—मनःप्रसादादिक्रियां प्रति दानादिक्रियाया निमित्त-कारणत्वादित्यर्थः, यथा मृत्पिण्डो घटस्य निमित्तं विज्ञेयस्तथा दानादिक्रियापि मनः प्रसत्तेः । दृश्यन्ते हि पात्रदानादिभ्यश्चित्ताह्लादादयो जायमानाः । न च यद् यस्य निमित्तं तत् तस्यैव फलं वक्तुमुचितम्, दुरविरुद्धत्वादिति ॥ ६९ ॥ (१६१७ ॥

D C—Serenity of mind arises from the act of charity and this serenity gives an impetus to give donations and in virtue of this inclination one goes in for charity

Thus the fruit of the serenity of mind is nothing else but the act of charity and not a *Karman*, which is invisible

But such a belief is untenable for just as a lump of clay is the *nimitta* (instrumental cause) of a pitcher so the act of charity is the *nimitta* of the serenity of mind.

We see that one gets pleased when a donation is given to a deserving individual.

Such being the case it won't do to look upon that which is a *nimitta* of something as its fruit, as it is highly objectionable.

Besides asserting that all actions are attended by fruits which are seen as is the case with the tilling of ground, the debator says —

एव पि दिट्ठफलया किरिया न कम्मफला पसत्ता ते ।
सा तम्मत्तफल खिय जह मसफलो पसुविणासो ॥७०॥ (१६१८)

Evam pi diṭṭhaphalayā kiriyaṃ na kammaphalā pasattā te ।
Sā tammettaphala cciyaṃ jaha mansaphalo pasuvīnaaso ॥ 70 (1618)

[एवमपि दृष्टफला क्रिया न कर्मफला प्रसक्ता ते ।
सा तन्मात्रफलैव यथा मंसफलः पशुविनाशः ॥ ७० ॥ (१६१८)

Evamapi dr̥ṣṭaphalā kriyā na karmaphalā prasakta te ।
Sā tanmatraphalāiva yatha mānsaphalaḥ paśuvīnaśaḥ ॥ 70 (1618)]

Trans —70 In this way too an act is proved to have a fruit which is seen and not a *Karman* by way of its fruit. That (act) certainly has a fruit only to that extent as is the case with (the act of) killing of a beast—the killing which has flesh as its fruit. (1618)

टीका-नन्वेमपि युष्मदुपन्यस्तकृष्यादिक्रियानिदर्शनेनापीत्यर्थः, सर्वा दानादिकापि क्रिया दृष्टफलदैव प्रसक्ता न कर्मफला । इदमुक्तं भवति-यथा कृष्यादिक्रिया दृष्टफलमात्रेणैवावसितप्रयोजना भवति, तथा दानादिक्रियाया अपि श्लाघादिकं किञ्चिद् दृष्टफलमस्तु, किमदृष्टफलकल्पनेन ? किं बहुना ? सा क्रिया सर्वापि तन्मात्रफलैव युज्यते, नादृष्टफला, यथा दृष्टमांसमात्रफला पशुविनाशक्रिया; न हि पशुविनाशनक्रियामदृष्टाधर्मफलार्थं, कोऽप्यारभते, किन्तु मांसभक्षणार्थम्; अतस्तन्मात्रफलैव सा, तावतैवावसितप्रयोजनत्वात् । एवं दानादिक्रियाया अपि दृष्टमात्रमेव श्लाघादिकं किञ्चित् फलम्, नान्यदिति ॥ ७० ॥ (१६१८)

D C—Just as the act of tilling the ground has no other fruit than what is seen, so, the act of charity may have a fruit like some sort of praise which can be seen

What more ? All these acts are such as only visible fruits, and not any invisible one, as is seen in the act of killing a beast For, the act of killing a beast has no other purpose underlying it except the acquisition of flesh None kills a beast for some other motive, such as committing a sin which is invisible

Similarly, the fruit of the act of charity, must be nothing else but some sort of praise which is seen

Here, another argument is advanced as follows —

पायं व जीवलोगो वट्टइ दिट्ठफलासु किरियासु ।

अदिट्ठफलासु पुण वट्टइ नासंखभागो वि ॥ ७१ ॥ (१६१९)

Pāyam va jīvalogo vattai ditthaphalāsu kiriyāsu ।

Aditthaphalāsu puṇa vattai nāsamkhabhāgo vi ॥ 71 (1619)

[प्रायो वा जीवलोको वर्तते दृष्टफलासु क्रियासु ।

अदृष्टफलासु पुनर्वर्तते नासंख्यभागोऽपि ॥ ७१ ॥ (१६१९)

D U—Serenity of mind arises from the act of charity and this serenity gives an impetus to give donations and in virtue of this inclination one goes in for charity

Thus the fruit of the serenity of mind is nothing else but the act of charity and not a *Karman* which is invisible

But such a belief is untenable for just as a lump of clay is the *nimitta* (instrumental cause) of a pitcher so the act of charity is the *nimitta* of the serenity of mind.

We see that one gets pleased when a donation is given to a deserving individual

Such being the case it won't do to look upon that which is a *nimitta* of something as its fruit as it is highly objectionable

Besides asserting that all actions are attended by fruits which are seen as is the case with the tilling of ground the debator says —

एव पि दिट्ठफलया किरिया न कम्मफला पसत्ता ते ।
सा तम्मेत्तफल खिय जह मसफलो पसुविणासो ॥७०॥ (१६१८)

Evam pi diṭṭhaphalayā kiriya, na kammaphalā pasattā te ।
Sā tammettaphala cciya jaha mansaphalo pasuvīnaaso n 70 (1618)

[एवमपि दृष्टफला क्रिया न कर्मफला प्रसक्ता ते ।
सा तन्मात्रफलैव यथा मांसफलः पशुविनाशः ॥ ७० ॥ (१६१८)

Evamapi dr̥ṣṭaphala kriyā na karmaphalā prasakta te ।
Sī tanmatrophalaiva yathā mānsaphalaḥ paśuvīnaśaḥ n 70 (1618)]

Trans—70 In this way too an act is proved to have a fruit which is seen and not a *Karman* by way of its fruit. That (act) certainly has a fruit only to that extent, as is the case with (the act of) killing of a beast—the killing which has flesh as its fruit (1618)

टीका-नन्वेमपि युष्मदुपन्यस्तकृष्यादिक्रियानिदर्शनेनापीत्यर्थः, सर्वा दानादिकापि क्रिया दृष्टफलदैव प्रसक्ता न कर्मफला । इदमुक्तं भवति-यथा कृष्यादिक्रिया दृष्टफलमात्रेणैवावसितप्रयोजना भवति, तथा दानादिक्रियाया अपि श्लाघादिकं किञ्चिद् दृष्टफलमस्तु, किमदृष्टफलकल्पनेन ? किं बहुना ? सा क्रिया सर्वापि तन्मात्रफलैव युज्यते, नादृष्टफला, यथा दृष्टमांसमात्रफला पशुविनाशक्रिया; न हि पशुविनाशनक्रियामदृष्टाधर्मफलार्थं, कोऽप्यारभते, किन्तु मांसभक्षणार्थम्; अतस्तन्मात्रफलैव सा, तावतैवावसितप्रयोजनत्वात् । एवं दानादिक्रियाया अपि दृष्टमात्रमेव श्लाघादिकं किञ्चिद् फलम्, नान्यदिति ॥ ७० ॥ (१६१८)

D C—Just as the act of tilling the ground has no other fruit than what is seen, so, the act of charity may have a fruit like some sort of praise which can be seen

What more ? All these acts are such as only visible fruits, and not any invisible one, as is seen in the act of killing a beast For, the act of killing a beast has no other purpose underlying it except the acquisition of flesh None kills a beast for some other motive, such as committing a sin which is invisible

Similarly, the fruit of the act of charity, must be nothing else but some sort of praise which is seen

Here, another argument is advanced as follows —

पायं व जीवलोगो वट्टइ दिट्ठफलासु किरियासु ।

अदिट्ठफलासु पुण वट्टइ नासंखभागो वि ॥ ७१ ॥ (१६१९)

Pāyam va jīvalogo vattai ditthaphalāsu kiriyāsu ।

Aditthaphalāsu puṇa vattai nāsamkhabhāgo vi ॥ 71 (1619)

[प्रायो वा जीवलोको वर्तते दृष्टफलासु क्रियासु ।

अदृष्टफलासु पुनर्वर्तते नासंख्यभागोऽपि ॥ ७१ ॥ (१६१९)

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Evam pi diḍḍhaphalayā kīriyā na kammaphalā pasatta te ।
Sā tammattaphala cciya jaha māsaphalo pasuvināso ॥ 70 (1618)

[एवमपि दृष्टफला क्रिया न कर्मफला प्रसक्ता ते ।
सा तन्मात्रफलैव यथा मांसफलः पशुविनाशः ॥ ७० ॥ (१६१८)

Evamapi drṣṭaphala kriyā na karmaphala prasakta te ।
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Trans—70 In this way too an act is proved to have a fruit which is seen and not a *Karman* by way of its fruit. That (act) certainly has a fruit only to that extent as is the case with (the act of) killing of a beast—the killing which has flesh as its fruit. (1618)

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D C—Just as the act of tilling the ground has no other fruit than what is seen, so, the act of charity may have a fruit like some sort of praise which can be seen

What more ? All these acts are such as only visible fruits, and not any invisible one, as is seen in the act of killing a beast For, the act of killing a beast has no other purpose underlying it except the acquisition of flesh None kills a beast for some other motive, such as committing a sin which is invisible

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Here, another argument is advanced as follows —

पायं व जीवलोगो वट्टइ दिट्ठफलासु किरियासु ।
अदिट्ठफलासु पुण वट्टइ नासंखभागो वि ॥ ७१ ॥ (१६१९)

Pāyam va jīvalogo vattai ditthaphalāsu kiriyāsu ।
Aditthaphalāsu puṇa vattai nāsamkhabhāgo vi ॥ 71 (1619)

[प्रायो वा जीवलोको वर्तते दृष्टफलासु क्रियासु ।
अदृष्टफलासु पुनर्वर्तते नासंख्यभागोऽपि ॥ ७१ ॥ (१६१९)

Prāyo va jīvaloko vartate dristaphalaśu kriyaśu ।

Adristaphalaśu punar-vartate naśamkhyabhāgo pi ॥ 71 (1619)]

Trans —71 Moreover the people indulge mostly in such acts of which the fruits are seen and not even an infinitesimal part of them, in acts of which the fruits are not visible. (1619)

टीका—लोकोऽपि च प्रायेण दृष्टमात्रफलास्वेव कृपि-वाणिज्यादि क्रियासु प्रवर्तते, अदृष्टफलासु पुनर्दानादिक्रियासु तदसंख्येयभागोऽपि न वर्तते—कतिपयमात्र एव लोकस्तासु प्रवर्तते, न बहुतरित्यर्थः । ततश्च हिमादीनामक्षुभक्रियाणामदृष्टफलाभावाच्छुभक्रियाणामपि दानादीनामदृष्ट फलाभावो भविष्यति । इति परामिप्राय इति ॥ ७१ (१६१९) ॥

D C—People mostly do such acts as agriculture business etc. of which the fruits are certainly seen. And only a very negligible number of them, indulges in acts like charity of which the fruits are not seen

Consequently just as evil acts such as killing have not got such fruits as are not seen so must be the case with good acts like charity That is to say they too cannot have such fruits as are not seen.

This is what may be advanced as an argument by *Agnibhāṭa*.

Śramana Bhagavan Mahavira refutes it as under —

सौम्म ! जउ खिय जीवा पाय दिट्ठफलासु वट्ठसि ।

अदिट्ठफलाओ वि य साओ पडिबज्ज तेणेव ॥ ७२ ॥ १६२० ॥

Somma ! Jau cciya jivā pāyam diṭṭhaphalaśu vattanti ।

Adiṭṭha phalāo vi ya tāo padibajja teneva n 72 n (1620)

[सौम्य ! यत एव जीवाः प्रायो दृष्टफलासु वर्तन्ते ।

अदृष्टफला अपि च साः प्रतिपद्यन्ते तैरेव ॥ ७२ ॥ (१६२०)

Sauṃya ! Yata eva jivāḥ prāyo dri taphalaśu vartante ।

Adristaphalā apl ca tah pratipadyante teneiva n 72 ॥ (1620)]

Trans—72 O gentle one ! By the very fact that the souls are active mostly in (doing) deeds, the fruits of which are visible (in this very life) learn (from me) that by that very (reason) those are also (deeds) the fruits of which are invisible, *i e*, to be had in a subsequent birth (1620)

टीका—सौम्य ! इत्यग्निभूतेरामन्त्रणम्, यत एव प्राणिनः प्रायेण कृषि-वाणिज्य-हिंसादिकास्वेव दृष्टफलास्वशुभक्रियासु प्रवर्तन्ते, अदृष्टफलासु पुनर्दानादिकासु शुभक्रियासु स्वल्पा एव प्रवर्तन्ते, तेनैव तस्मादेव कारणात् ता अपि कृषि-हिंसादिका दृष्टफलाः क्रिया अदृष्टफला अपि प्रतिपद्यस्वाभ्युपगच्छ । इदमुक्तं भवति—यद्यपि कृषि-हिंसादिक्रियाकर्तारो दृष्टफलमात्रार्थमेव ताः समारभन्ते नाधर्मार्थम्, तथापि तेऽधर्मलक्षणं पापरूपमदृष्टफलमश्नुवत एव, अनन्तसंसारिजीवान्यथानुपपत्तेः । ते हि कृषि-हिंसादिक्रियानिमित्त-मनभिलषितमप्यदृष्टं पापलक्षणं फलं बद्ध्वाऽनन्तं संसारं परिभ्रमन्तोऽनन्ता इह तिष्ठन्ति, दानादिक्रियानुष्ठातारस्तु स्वल्पा अदृष्ट धर्मरूपं फलमासाद्य क्रमेण मुच्यन्त इति ।

ननु दानादिक्रियानुष्ठातृभिर्यददृष्टं धर्मलक्षणं फलमाशंसितं तत् तेषां भवतु, यैस्तु कृषि-हिंसादिक्रियाकर्तृभिरदृष्टमधर्मरूपं फलं नाशंसितं तत् तेषां कथं भवति ? इति चेत् । तदयुक्तम्, न ह्यविकलं कारण स्वकार्यं जनयत् कस्याप्याशंसामपेक्षते, किन्त्वविकल कारणतया स्वकार्यं जनयत्येव । वस्तुरज्ञातमपि हि कोद्रवादिबीजं कचिद् भूप्रदेशे पतितं जलादिसामग्रीसङ्घावे-विकलकारणतां प्राप्तं वप्राशंसाभावेऽपि स्वकार्यं जनयत्येव अविकलकारण-भूताश्च कृषि-हिंसादयोऽधर्मजनने । अतस्तत्कर्तृगताशंसा तत्र कोपयुज्यते ? । न च दानादिक्रियायामपि विवेकिनः फलाशंसां कुर्वते, तथाप्यविकलकारण-तया विशिष्टतरमेव ता धर्मफलं जनयन्ति । तस्मात् शुभाया अशुभायाश्च सर्वस्या अपि क्रियाया अदृष्टं शुभाऽशुभं फलमस्त्येवेति प्रतिपत्तव्यम्, अनन्तसंसारजीवसत्तान्यथानुपपत्तेरिति स्थितम् ॥ ७२ (१६२०) ॥

D C—O gentle one ! Thus *Agñabhūta* is addressed By the very fact that creatures generally become active in (doing)

Prayo va jivaloko varitate dristaphalāsu kṛiyāsu)

Adristaphalāsu punar varitate nāsamkhyabhāgo pi ॥ 71 (1619)]

Trans—71 Moreover the people indulge mostly in such acts of which the fruits are seen and not even an infinitesimal part of them, in acts of which the fruits are not visible. (1619)

टीका—लोकोऽपि च प्रायेण दृष्टमात्रफलास्वेव कृपि-वाणिज्यादि क्रियासु प्रवर्तते, अदृष्टफलासु पुनर्दानादिक्रियासु तदसंख्येयभागोऽपि न वर्तते—कतिपयमात्र एव लोकस्तासु प्रवर्तते, न बहुरित्यर्थः । तत्र हिंसादीनामश्रुमक्रियाणामदृष्टफलाभावाच्छ्रुमक्रियाणामपि दानादीनामदृष्ट फलाभावो भविष्यति । इति परामिप्राय इति ॥ ७१ (१६१९) ॥

D C—People mostly do such acts as agriculture business etc. of which the fruits are certainly seen. And only a very negligible number of them, indulges in acts like charity of which the fruits are not seen

Consequently just as evil acts such as killing have not got such fruits as are not seen so must be the case with good acts like charity That is to say they too cannot have such fruits as are not seen.

This is what may be advanced as an argument by *Agnibhadra*

Śramaṇa Bhagavan Mahāvīra refutes it as under—

सौम्म ! जउ छिय जीवा पाय दिट्ठफलासु वट्ठति ।

अदिट्ठफलाओ वि य ताओ पडिबज्ज तेणेष ॥ ७२ ॥ १६२० ॥

Somma ! jau cciya jivā pāyam diṭṭhaphalāsu vatantī .

Adiṭṭha phalāo vi ya tāo paḍibajja teneva ॥ 72 ॥ (1620)

[सौम्य ! यत एव जीवाः प्रायो दृष्टफलासु वतन्ते ।

अदृष्टफला अपि च ताः प्रतिपद्यस्व तेनैव ॥ ७२ ॥ (१६२०)

Saumya ! yata eva jivāḥ prayo dṛiṣṭaphalāsu vatanto ।

Adṛiṣṭaphalā api ca tāḥ pratipadyasva tenaiva ॥ 72 ॥ (1620)]

Trans—72 O gentle one ! By the very fact that the souls are active mostly in (doing) deeds, the fruits of which are visible (in this very life) learn (from me) that by that very (reason) those are also (deeds) the fruits of which are invisible, *i e.*, to be had in a subsequent birth (1620)

टीका—सौम्य ! इत्यग्निभूतेरामन्त्रणम्, यत एव प्राणिनः प्रायेण कृषि-वाणिज्य-हिंसादिकास्वेव दृष्टफलास्वशुभक्रियासु प्रवर्तन्ते, अदृष्टफलासु पुनर्दानादिकासु शुभक्रियासु स्वल्पा एव प्रवर्तन्ते, तेनैव तस्मादेव कारणात् ता अपि कृषि-हिंसादिका दृष्टफलाः क्रिया अदृष्टफला अपि प्रतिपद्यस्वाभ्युपगच्छ । इदमुक्तं भवति—यद्यपि कृषि-हिंसादिक्रियाकर्तारो दृष्टफलमात्रार्थमेव ताः समारभन्ते नाधर्मार्थम्, तथापि तेऽधर्मलक्षणं पापरूपमदृष्टफलमश्नुवत एव, अनन्तसंसारजीवान्यथानुपपत्तेः । ते हि कृषि-हिंसादिक्रियानिमित्तमनभिलषितमप्यदृष्टं पापलक्षणं फलं बद्धाऽनन्तं संसारं परिभ्रमन्तोऽनन्ता इह तिष्ठन्ति, दानादिक्रियानुष्ठातारस्तु स्वल्पा अदृष्ट धर्मरूपं फलमासाद्य क्रमेण मुच्यन्त इति ।

ननु दानादिक्रियानुष्ठातृभिर्द्यददृष्टं धर्मलक्षणं फलमाशंसितं तत् तेषां भवतु, यैस्तु कृषि-हिंसादिक्रियाकर्तृभिरदृष्टमधर्मरूपं फलं नाशंसितं तत् तेषां कथं भवति ? इति चेत् । तदयुक्तम्, न ह्यविकलं कारण स्वकार्यं जनयत् कस्याप्याशंसामपेक्षते, किन्त्वविकल कारणतया स्वकार्यं जनयत्येव । वस्तुरज्ञातमपि हि कोद्रवादिबीजं क्वचिद् भूप्रदेशे पतितं जलादिसामग्रीसद्भावेऽविकलकारणतां प्राप्तं वज्राशंसाभावेऽपि स्वकार्यं जनयत्येव अविकलकारणभूताश्च कृषि-हिंसादयोऽधर्मजनने । अतस्तत्कर्तृगताशंसा तत्र कोपयुज्यते ? । न च दानादिक्रियायामपि विवेकिनः फलाशंसां कुर्वते, तथाप्यविकलकारणतया विशिष्टतरमेव ता धर्मफलं जनयन्ति । तस्मात् शुभाया अशुभायाश्च सर्वस्या अपि क्रियाया अदृष्टं शुभाऽशुभं फलमस्त्येवेति प्रतिपत्तव्यम्, अनन्तसंसारजीवसत्तान्यथानुपपत्तेरिति स्थितम् ॥ ७२ (१६२०) ॥

D C—O gentle one ! Thus *Agnibhūti* is addressed By the very fact that creatures generally become active in (doing)

evil deeds only viz cultivation of land trading doing injury to life etc. the fruits of which are visible, but only a few become active in (doing) good deeds giving a gift etc. the fruits of which are invisible—by that same fact & c by that very reason admit that also those very activities—cultivation of land injury to living beings etc. are also activities the fruits of which are invisible. The substance of what is said is this—Though the people who do the deeds cultivation of land injury to living beings etc. only for the sake of the reward which is visible (& c attained in this very birth) and not for the sin (involved in their performance) yet they do get an invisible fruit of the nature of religious demerit (*adharmā*) viz.,—the sin (*papa*)—because if it were otherwise there will be no explanation (*upapatti*) of there being in this world innumerable transmigrating souls. Because they having earned (*baddhva* lit. having bound) an invisible fruit of the nature of sin (*papa*) though not sought by them accrues to them due to the activities viz cultivation of land injury to life etc. exist in this world in an indefinite number (*anantaḥ tūṣṭhanti*) revolving in the endless cycle of births (*samsāra*). But those persons few in number who perform the deeds of giving a gift (*dāna*) etc. attain an invisible reward of the nature of religious merit (*dharma*) and then they are liberated. Such is the sense.

An opponent may argue. Let those (persons) who do the deeds of giving a gift (*dāna*) etc. have that invisible reward of the nature of religious merit (*dharma*) which they expect. But how do those people who do the deeds of cultivation of land injury to living beings etc. get that invisible fruit of the nature of sin (*adharmā*) which they never wish to get ?

To this doubt the reply is as follows:—That (argument) is improper. For a cause complete in itself (*avibala*) does not stand in need of a wish or expectation on the part of

anybody (including even the doer of a deed) when it is (in the process of) producing its effect, it rather, never fails to produce (*janayanti eva*) its effect because it is a self-complete cause. For, even though not known to the sower, the seed of *codrava*, etc, fallen in some tract of land and reaching the state of a self-complete cause by the presence of the materials, viz, the water, etc, does produce its effect even in the absence of a desire (for that effect) on the part of the sower. And deeds like cultivation of land, injury to living beings, etc., are of the nature (*bhūta*) of self-complete causes in so far as the production of sin (*a-dharma*) is concerned. Hence in such causes, where does the desire (if) present in the performer of those deeds become useful ? On the other hand (meaning of *ca*) the wise (*i e*, those who do their duties disinterestedly—*vivekinah*) have no desire for the fruits even in doing such deeds as giving a gift, etc, instead of this, such deeds being of the nature of “ self-complete causes ” produce the fruit in the form of religious merit (*dharma*) which is only of a superior quality

Therefore, it must be admitted that there is always an invisible fruit good or bad of any action whatsoever, whether it be good or bad, because otherwise there will be no propriety (*anupapatti*) of the existence of innumerable transmigrating souls.

To demonstrate the same the author says —

इहरा अदिट्ठरहिया सव्वे मुच्चेज्ज ते अपयत्तेणं ।
अदिट्ठारंभो चेव केसवहुलो भविज्जाहि ॥ ७३ ॥ (१६२१)

Iharā adittharahiyā savve muccejja te apayattenam ।
Aditthārambho ceva kesabahulo bhavijjāhi ॥ 73 ॥ (1621)

[इतरथाऽदृष्टरहिताः सर्वे मुच्येरंस्तेऽप्रयत्नेन ।
अदृष्टारम्भ एव क्लेशबहुलो भवेत् ॥ ७३ ॥ (१६२१)

Itarathā dṛṣṭarāhitāḥ sarve mucyeransto prayatnena ।

Adṛṣṭārambha eva kleśabāhulo bhavet ॥ 73 (1621)]

Trans — 73 Otherwise they being without an unseen (fruit of their actions viz. cultivation etc.) will be all of them freed (from transmigration) without any effort (to be free) on their part And the performance (ārambha) of (the good deeds like a gift to a worthy recipient dāna etc. which give the) unseen (good rewards) will be itself (eva) the cause of much trouble (lit. that in which there is much trouble) (1621)

टीका—इतरथा यदि कृपि-हिंसाद्यष्टमक्रियाणामदृष्टं फलं नाभ्युपगम्येत, तदा ते तत्कर्तारोऽदृष्टफलाभावाद् मरणानन्तरमेव सर्वेऽप्ययत्नेन मुच्येरन्-संसारकारणभावाद् मुक्तिं गच्छेयुः, ततश्च प्रायः धून्य एव संसारः स्यादित्यर्थः । यथादृष्टारम्भोऽदृष्टफलानां दानादिक्रियाणां समारम्भः स एव क्लेशपटुलः संसारपरिभ्रमणकारणतया दुरन्तः स्यात् ; यथाहि-ते दानादिक्रियानुष्ठातारस्तदनुष्ठानेनादृष्टफलानुबन्धं विदध्युः, ततो भवमान्तरे वद्विपाकमनुभवन्तस्त्वत्प्रतिष्ठाः पुनरपि दानादिक्रियास्त्वेव प्रवर्तेरन्, ततो भूयस्तत्फलसंघयात् वद्विपाकानुभूतिः, पुनरपि दानादिक्रियारम्भः, इत्येषमनन्तसंततिमयः संसारस्तेषां भवेत् ।

तत्रैतत् स्वात्, इत्यमप्यस्तु, काश्च किलास्माकं बाधा ? । अत्रोन्यते-इयमत्र गरीयसी भवतां बाधा, यत् कृपि हिंसाद्यष्टमक्रियानुष्ठातृणामदृष्टसंघयभावे सर्वेषां मुक्तिगमन एकोऽपि तत्क्रियानुष्ठाता संसारे कापि नोपलभ्येत, अष्टम तत्फलविपाकानुभवविषा चैकोऽपि न दृश्येत, दानादिशुभक्रियानुष्ठातारः शुभ तत्फलविपाकानुभववितार एव च केवलाः सर्वत्रोपलभ्येरन्, न चैव दृश्यते ॥ ७३ (१६२१) ॥

D C — Otherwise — If no unseen (evil) reward of evil deeds like cultivation of land injury to living beings etc be assumed (to accrue to the agent along with their visible reward in the shape of corn) They — those who do those unseen evil deeds They would be all of them freed without

any effort of their own immediately after death, there being no invisible evil fruit (of their evil deeds like cultivation of land), *i e*, they will attain Liberation, because there would be no reason for their transmigration. And, then, the author means, the world of transmigration would be mostly empty

[Now, the latter half of the verse] *Adṛstāmbha* the performance of meritorious deeds like ' *dāna* ' ' a gift to a worthy recipient, etc , the fruits of which are invisible (or the unseen principle). This performance itself would be *klesābahulā* *i e*, its result will be bad as it will be the cause of wandering in the mundane world To explain the same— Those who perform the deeds of ' *dāna* ' ' a gift to a worthy recipient ' etc , would by performing them, aim at (*anubandham vidadhyuh*) the invisible fruit, then, in a succeeding birth while experiencing the maturity of that fruit (*i e*, the object of enjoyment resulting from it) they being propelled by it would be once again active in doing the same deeds of *dāna*, etc, then again by earning their fruit, the experience of its maturity (will result) and once again the performance of the deeds of *dāna* etc In this way, they will have transmigratory existence consisting of an endless series

* (1) Here we beg to differ from the commentator, who seems to us, to have missed the force of *kleśa* in the original verse The author seems to mean that if we do not assume the evil unseen fruit of the evil deeds of *kṛt* etc., then we have one out of two possibilities viz , all souls will be liberated immediately after their death, and (2) if we do not assume the conclusion, then, we shall have to take performance of the good deeds of *dāna* etc , as partly giving their good rewards and also partly but unfailingly giving the bad rewards leading to misery in a succeeding birth in this world In this latter case, the performance of good deeds alone (*eva* in the verse) will be cause of much misery (*kleśa*) We have to explain the great deal of misery in this world We take it as an

invisible result of either bad deeds like *kṛm* or of good deeds like *dāna* alone. If we do not make either of these two assumptions then we should have no misery in the world and every soul should be freed from the world immediately on departure from this world. Thus the latter half of the verse is meant to lead to the contingency of assuming the good deeds *done* as the cause of the misery of the soul and thus the cause of the *samsara* of the soul. The commentator however does not seem to us to emphasise the contingency of this assumption that he takes the good deeds as cause of the worldly existence which may be in the form of repeated enjoyment in a series of successive births of only the good rewards of good deeds there being no bad rewards of good deeds—*The Translator's Note*

To the above view of the *Siddhāntin* an opponent may raise an objection as follows—Let the case may be as you suggest, i. e. let the good deeds alone be assumed to give an unending series of births and deaths. What inconsistency (*badha*) will there be in our system (if the good deeds alone be the cause of transmigration)

To this objection we reply—the following will be the greatest inconsistency for you:—All souls will attain Liberation there being no collection of (bad) invisible fruit by those who perform the bad deeds viz cultivation of the land injury to living beings etc and in that case not a single person performing those (bad) deeds (of cultivation of land etc) will be found anywhere in the world and not a single person experiencing the maturity of their rewards which are evil will be seen anywhere and only persons who perform the good deeds of *dāna* etc and experience the maturity of their rewards which are good will be found everywhere. And such is not the world which we see

(†) In our opinion this objection and its reply show the weakness of the commentary. The opponent, will receive

the reply as a welcome conclusion (*istāpatti*) and say that even though we do not at present find the world as occupied only by those who do the good deeds and get the good rewards, let it be so in future according to our assumption, since the assumption leads to a welcome result. Even though no body would get Liberation, the world in any case would be better than it is now “ *Na carvam dīśyate* ” is, in any case not justified by any word in the original verse —The Translator's Note

An opponent may ask “ What, therefore ” So, the author replies —

जमणिद्वभोगभाजो बहुतरगा जं च नेह मइपुवं ।
अदिट्ठाणिद्वफलं कोइ वि किरियं समारभइ ॥ ७४ ॥ (१६२२)
तेण पडिवज्ज किरिया अदिट्ठेगंतियप्फला सवा ।
दिट्ठाणेगंतफला सावि अदिट्ठाणुभावेण ॥ ७५ ॥ (१६२३)

Jamanitthabhogabhājo bahutaragā jam ca neha maipuvvam ।
Aditthānitthaphalam koī vi kiriyam samārabhaī ॥ 74 (1622)
Tenā padivajja kiriyā aditthegantiyapphalā savvā ।
Ditthānegantaphalā sāvi aditthānubhāvena ॥ 75 (1623)

[यदनिष्टभोगभाजो बहुतरका यच्च नेह मतिपूर्वम् ।
अदृष्टानिष्टफलां कश्चिदपि क्रियां समारभते ॥ ७४ ॥ (१६२२)
तेन प्रतिपद्यस्य क्रियाऽदृष्टैकान्तिकफला सर्वा ।
दृष्टानैकान्तिकफला साप्यदृष्टानुभावेन ॥ ७५ ॥ (१६२३)

Yadanistabhogabhājo bahutaraka yacca neha matipūrvam ।
Adṛstānistaphalam kaścidapi kriyām samārabhate ॥ 74 (1622)
Tena pratipadyasva kriyā'dṛstāikāntikaphalā sarvā ।
Dṛstānikāntikaphalā sāpyadrstānubhāvena ॥ 75 (1623)]

Trans —74-75 Since a great majority of souls experience undesired objects, and since none whatsoever is this world,

intentionally performs a deed giving an invisible and undesired reward therefore, do conclude that all actions (good and bad) invariably give an unseen fruit and that action (which produces a *dr̥ṣṭa* fruit) does not invariably produce a visible fruit because of the power of the *adr̥ṣṭa* (the evil)unseen of the doer †

टीका—यस्मादनिएमोगमाद्यो बहुतरा भूयांसः—अष्टमकर्मविपाक अनितदुःखमात्र एव प्राणिनः प्रचुरा इहोपलभ्यन्ते, शुभकर्मविपाकनिबन्धन सुखानुभवितास्तु स्वल्पा एवेति भावः । तेन तस्मात् कारणात् सौम्य ! प्रतिपद्यस्व क्षुमाऽक्षुमा वा सर्वाऽपि क्रिया, अदृष्ट शुभाशुभं कर्मरूपमेकान्तिक फलं यस्याः साऽदृष्टैकान्तिकफलेत्युत्तरगाथायां संबन्धः । इदमुक्तं भवति—येन दुःखिनाऽत्र बहवः प्राणिनो दृश्यन्ते सुखिनस्तु स्वल्पाः, तेन ज्ञायते—कृपि-वाणिज्य-हिमादिक्रियानिबन्धनाशुभकर्मरूपादृष्टफलविपाको दुःखिनाम्, इत रेपां तु दानादिक्रियाहेतुकशुभकर्मरूपादृष्टफलविपाक इति । न्यस्ययः कस्माद् न भवति इति चेत् । उच्यते—अष्टमक्रियारम्भिणामेव बहुत्वात्, शुभक्रिया नुष्टातृणामेव च स्वल्पत्वादिति ।

अत्राह—नन्वष्टमक्रियारम्भफलमपि यद्यदृष्टफलं भवति, तत् किमिति दानादिक्रियारम्भक इव तदारम्भकोऽपि कश्चित् तदाश्रयां कुर्वाणो न दृश्यते ? इत्याह—“अथ नेहेत्यादि” यस्माच्च नेहाऽदृष्टमनिष्टमशुभं फलं यस्याः साऽदृष्टा निष्टफला तामित्वैभूतां क्रियां मतिपूर्वमाश्रयाशुद्धिपूर्विकां कोऽपि समारमते, इत्यतो न कोऽपि तदाश्रयां कुर्वाणो दृश्यते । तस्मात् सर्वापि क्रियाऽदृष्टैकान्तिकफलेति प्रतिपद्यस्वेति ।

पुनरपि कथंभूताः ? इत्याह—“ दिङ्मात्रेणतफलं चि ” दृष्ट धान्य-द्रविणलामादिकमनैकान्तिकमनवश्यमावि फलं यस्याः कृपिवाणिज्यादि क्रियायाः सा दृष्टानैकान्तिकफला सर्वापि क्रिया । इदमुक्तं भवति—सर्वस्या अपि क्रियाया अदृष्टं फलं साबद्धकान्तेनैव भवति, यस्तु दृष्टफलं तदनैकान्तिकमेव—कस्याभित् तद् भवति कस्याभित् नेत्यर्थः । एतच्च दृष्टफलस्यानैकान्तिकत्वमदृष्टानुभावेनैवेति प्रतिपद्यम्यम् । न हि समानसाधनारम्भतुल्यक्रि

याणां द्वयोर्बहूनां वैकस्य दृष्टफलविधातः, अन्यस्य तु न, इत्येतददृष्टहेतुमन्तरेणोपपद्यत इति भावः। एतच्चेहैव प्रागुक्तमेवेति ॥७४-७५ (१६२२-१६२३)॥

D C—"Since..... .. objects " means "because in this world innumerable beings are found to be only unhappy due (*janita*) to the maturity of evil actions," it also means "Only few are those who enjoy happiness which depends upon (*nibandhana*) the maturity of good actions " *Tena*—because of that reason, O gentle student! know that (*i c* conclude that) each and every action good or bad, is *adrstākāntika phala i c*, such as gives a reward which is invariably of the form of a (new) action which is unseen and both good and bad Thus, "*anīstabhogabhājo bahutarakāh*" is to be connected with "*tena... ..sarva*" the first half of the succeeding verse (*v/1623*) The sense of the sentence is as follows —Because in this world we find a great majority of beings to be suffering and only a few to be enjoying, we should infer that in the case of the suffering, the fruit of the unseen principle (*adrsta*) in the form of "evil *karma*"† based upon (*nibandhana*) activities like cultivation of land, trade, injury to living beings etc., has ripened, but in the case of the rest (the enjoying) the fruit of the unseen principle (*adrsta*) in the form of good *karma* produced by (*hetuka*) the activities of giving a gift to a worthy recipient has ripened An opponent may ask "Why not the reverse of what you say? The reply is as follows —Just because in the world only those who do evil activities are in a majority and only those who perform good deeds are in a minority

Here the opponent argues —If even those who do evil deeds get a fruit in the form of an *adrsta* (in addition to the *drsta* or visible fruit *e g*, the crops by means of cultivation of the land), then why is it that, just like one who does

† The word "*karma*" is here used in the sense of *samcita karma* which is also called *adrsta*—Tr

the deed of *dāna* that man also who does the evil deed is never found to hold an expectation for that *adrṣṭa*?

To this the reply is:— And since etc. And because none in this world does intentionally i. e. with a previous expectation (*ārambha buddhi pūrvakām*) such deed as would give a fruit unseen and evil. It is due to this reason that no body is found to hold an expectation for the evil unseen (*adrṣṭa*) [while he does the deeds of *kṛtā* etc.]. Therefore conclude that all actions (good like *dāna* and bad like *kṛtā*) whatever invariably give a result which is *adrṣṭa* (unseen).

What other qualifications do actions possess! To this the reply is — *disūhāmeganta phala it* " (beginning of the latter half of v 1628). All actions—cultivation of land trade etc. bear a visible fruit viz. the acquisition of corn money etc. which is not absolute i. e. which is not invariably accruing (*anavṛtyam bhavi*) It means that every action invariably produces an invisible fruit, but the visible fruit which is to be produced is not absolute or invariably happening i. e. some action produces it and some action does not produce it. And this uncertainty of the visible fruit must be accepted as the effect of the power of an *adrṣṭa* (a destiny of the man who does the deed of *kṛtā* etc.,) because when one out of two or many persons who do the same action (e. g., cultivation of land) with the same means suffers the loss of his visible fruit (crops) while another does not, it never happens without a cause in the form of *adrṣṭa* the evil unseen. Moreover this has been already explained in this very book.†

[The commentator is anxious to explain *sarva kṛiyā* as all actions good (like *dāna*) and bad (like *kṛtā*) but it is very difficult to explain how the good actions (like *dāna*)

† When the crops of a cultivator fails the failure is due to his *adrṣṭa* and not to his action of cultivation which is a *dṛṣṭa* or visible deed

can bear a visible fruit (*datthānecanta phala*), so even the commentator has somehow to explain it as referring only to the bad actions like *kṛsī* etc.

We hold that by *savva kīṛiyā* we should take *only the bad actions* like cultivation of land, trade, etc. The purpose of the verse is to explain how all bad actions bear invariably a bad fruit which is invisible (*adittha*) and how even the visible fruits which these bad actions bear and which the agent intentionally aims at, are *uncertain* and therefore the result of the man's *adrsta*, the invisible *karma*. The visible action which a man does *e g*, *kṛsī* bears two kinds of fruits *invisible* and *visible*, both of which are dependent upon the man's *adrsta* (*aditthānubhāvena*). Since we find most people suffering and since we find that none does any bad action even *e g* *kṛsī* with the intention that the result be bad and invisible *i e* that he may be unhappy in his next life as a result of *kṛsī*, we must conclude that all bad actions like *kṛsī* give invariably an *adrsta* invisible bad result.

Thus, in our opinion the proper conclusion (*padīvajja*) from the whole of v 1622 is the first half of v 1623. The latter half of v 1623 is only an additional remark. The commentator connects the first half of v 1623 with first half of v 1622 and the latter half of the former, with the latter half of the latter. As the latter half of v 1622 refers only to *adrsta anista*, it cannot be connected with the latter half of v 1623 which refers only to the *drṣṭa* phala and traces it to *adrsta karmas*. Tr]

Or, of what avail is this trouble? ' *Karma* ' is a foregone conclusion. By what argument? He replies —

अहवा फलाउ कम्मं कज्जत्तणओ पसाहियं पुवं ।

परमाणवो घडस्स व किरियाण तयं फल भिन्नं ॥७६॥ (१६२४)

Ahavā phalāu kammam kajjattanao pasāhiyam puṇṇam ।

Paramānava ghadassa va kiriyāna tayam phalam bhinnam ॥76 (1624)

[अथवा फलात् कर्म कार्यत्वतः प्रसाधितं पूर्वम् ।

परमाणवो घटस्येव क्रियाणां तत् फलं भिन्नम् ॥ ७६ ॥ (१६२४)

Athava phalat karma karyatvataḥ prasādhitam pūrvam ।

Paramaṇavo ghaṭasyeva kriyāṇāṃ tat phalam bhinnam ॥ 76 (1624)

Trans—76 Or rather *karman* is already proved from the fruit (*i. e.*, the special fruit) *i. e.*, from (the fact that that special fruit is) an effect. Just as the atoms of a pot (are different from a pot) the effect of actions is different from those actions (1624)

ओ तुल्लासाहणाण फले विसेसो न सो विणा हेठ ।

कज्जत्तणओ गोयम ! घटो व, हेठ य सो कम्म ॥

Jo tullasaṇaṇaṇam phale viśeso na so viṇa heṭṭim ।

Kajjattaṇao Goyama ! ghaṭo vva heṭṭi ya so kammaṇ ॥ (verse 1613)

टीका—इत्यस्यां गाथायां प्रागस्माभिः कर्म प्रसाधितमेव । कुतः ? इत्याह—फलात् तुल्यसाधनानां यः फले विशेषस्तस्मादित्यर्थः । ततोऽपि फलविशेषात् कस्मात् प्रसाधितं कर्म ? इत्याह—कार्यत्वात् तस्य फलविशेषस्य, यच्च कार्यं तस्य कारणं भवत्येव, यथा घटस्य परमाणवाः, यथेह कारणं तत् कर्म । “किरियाण तयं फलं भिन्नं ति” तदेव च कर्म सर्वासामपि क्रियानाम इष्ट फलमित्येवमिहापि साध्यते । कथं भूतम् ? ताम्यः क्रियाम्यो भिन्नम्, कर्मणः कार्यत्वात्, क्रियाणां च कारणत्वात्, कार्यकारणयोश्च परस्परं मेदादिति भावः ॥ ७६ (१६२४) ॥

D C—Or there is a difference as to the fruit achieved, though those who try to achieve it, use the same and equal means. That difference cannot take place without a cause *O Gautama* ! like the pot, that cause is *karma*” on account of the fact that that (difference) is an effect.

While explaining this verse we have already proved

“ *karma*. ” Whence ? He replies—“ From the fruit : *e.*, from that difference in the fruit (achieved by different people with *equal* means) ” How is ‘ *karma* ’ proved on the strength of that difference of fruit ? He replies —

“ From its being an effect, ” : *e.*, because that difference of fruit is an effect There is invariably a cause corresponding to what is an effect, just as atoms of earth are the cause of a pot, ” and in this case the cause is an action “ The effect of actions is different from those actions ” and it can be proved here that that very ‘ *karma* ’ is the unseen fruit of all actions whatever. What kind of action is it ? It is different from those actions Since this ‘ *karma* ’ is an effect and since actions are the cause, and since an effect and a cause must be mutually different, the ‘ *karma* ’ is different from those actions 1624

The author states an objection to this and its reply —

आह ननु मुत्तमेवं मुत्तं चिय कज्जमुत्तिमत्ताओ ।

इह जह मुत्तत्तणओ घडस्स परमाणवो मुत्ता ॥७७॥ (१६२५)

Āha nanu muttamevam muttam ciya kajjamuttimattāo ।

Iha jaha muttattanao ghaḍassa parmānavo mūttā ॥ 77 (1625)

[आह ननु मूर्तमेवं मूर्तमेव कार्यमूर्तिमत्त्वात् ॥

इह यथा मूर्तत्वतो घटस्य परमाणवो मूर्ताः ॥ ७७ (१६२५) ॥

Āha nanu mūrtamevam mūrtameva kāryamurtimattvāt ।

Iha yathā mūrtatvato ghaṭasya parmānavo mūrtāḥ ॥ (1625)]

Trans—77 (The opponent will say,) “ Then the action (*karma*) has a physical form (*mūrta*) ” We (the *Siddhāntin*) would reply, “ The action has indeed a physical form because its effect (*viz.*, the body) has a physical form In this world the atoms (*paramāṇus*) the cause of the pot, the effect which has a physical form, will have also a physical form ” (1625)

टीका—आह प्रेरकः—ननु यदि कार्याणां शरीरादीनां दर्शनात् तत्का—

रणभूतं कर्म साध्यते, तर्हि कार्यस्य मूर्तत्वात् कर्मापि मूर्तं प्राप्नोति ।
 आचार्य उचरमाह—“ युक्त विधेत्यादि ” यदस्माभिः प्रयत्नेन साध्यितव्यम्,
 तद्वत्तापि परसिद्धान्तानभिप्रबालमुद्धितयाऽनिष्टापादनामिप्रायेण साधित
 मेव, तथाहि—ययमपि श्रूयः—मूर्तमेव कर्म, तत्कार्यस्य धरीरादेर्मूर्तत्वात्, इह
 यस्य यस्य कार्यं मूर्तं तस्य तस्य कारणमपि मूर्तम्, यथा घटस्य परमाणवः,
 यच्चामूर्तं कार्यं न तस्य कारणं मूर्तं, यथा घ्नानस्यात्मेति । समवायिकारणं
 चेदाधिक्रियते, न निमित्तकारणभूता रूपाऽऽलोकादय इति । आह—ननु
 सुख-दुःखादयोऽपि कर्मणः कार्यम्, अस्त्येवाममूर्तत्वात् कर्मणोऽमूर्तत्वमपि
 प्राप्नोति । न हि मूर्तादमूर्तप्रसवो युज्यते । न चैकस्य मूर्तत्वममूर्तत्वं च
 युक्तम्, विरुद्धत्वात् । अत्रोच्यते—नन्वत एवात्र समवायिकारणमधिक्रियते,
 न निमित्तकारणम्, सुख-दुःखादीनां चात्मधर्मत्वादारमैव समवायिकारणम्,
 कर्म पुनस्त्येवामम-पानाऽहि-विपादिवद् निमित्तकारणमेवेत्यदोष इति ॥
 ७७ (१६२५) ॥

D C—The opponent asks If on the ground that we can see (physically) the body etc which are the effects the *karmān* is proved to be their cause then on the ground that the effect has a physical form the *karmān* also will have to be admitted as something having a physical form. "

The *Ācārya* replies — *Karmān* has indeed a physical form. What we intend to prove with great effort, you also have already proved with an intention to lead us to an unacceptable position because your intelligence is like that of a child (or a fool) who does not know the doctrine of others. To explain the same—We also say A *karmān* is nothing but possessed of a physical form because its effect the body etc, has a physical form. In this world, the causes of the various effects having a physical form are also possessed of a physical form e. g., the atoms which are the cause of a pot. And if an effect is without a physical form its cause is not possessed of a physical form e. g., *Ātman* which is the cause of knowledge (*jñāna*). And in this discussion the essential cause (*samavāyī*

kāraṇa) is the topic of consideration and not the objects which are only the instrumental causes, such as the form (*rūpa*), the light (*āloka*) etc

The opponent will argue—"The pleasure, the pain, etc, are also of the nature of effects (like the body, etc). Hence, since they have no physical form, we would argue that the *karman* is also devoid of a physical form, because the rise of something devoid of a physical form is not possible (or reasonable) as taking place from something which has a physical form. Nor is it possible that one and the same thing be both *mūrta* (possessed of a physical form) and *a-mūrta* (devoid of a physical form) since that would be self-contradictory."

To this objection we reply —Indeed, for this very reason, the intimate or essential cause only is taken as the topic of our consideration and we have excluded the discussion of the instrumental cause. As the pleasure, the pain, etc, are the properties of the soul (*Ātman*), the soul alone is their essential cause, while *karman* is only the instrumental cause, while *karman* is only the instrumental cause of the pleasure, the pain, etc, just as are the food, the drink, the poison of a snake, etc. Thus there is no flaw in our doctrine 1625

The *Ācārya* mentions also other arguments proving the physical nature (*mūrtatva*) of an action (*karman*) —

तह सुहसंविक्तीओ संबंधे वेयणुब्भवाओ य ।

बज्जबलाहाणाओ परिणामाओ य विण्णेयं ॥ ७८ ॥ (१६२६)

आहार इवानल इव घडु व्व नेहाइकयबलाहाणो ।

खीरमिवोदाहरणाइं कम्मरूवित्तगमगाइं ॥ ७९ ॥ (१६२७)

Taha suhasamvittio sambandhe veyanubbhavāo ya ।

Bajjhabalāhānāo parināmāo ya vinneyam ॥ 71 (1626)

Āhāra ivānala iva ghaḍu vva nehāi kaya balāhāno ।

Khīramivodāharanāim kammarūvittagamagāim ॥ 79 (1627)

[तथा सुखसंविद्येः संबन्धे वेदनोद्भवाच्च ।

बाह्यबलाधानात् परिणामाच्च विद्येयम् ॥ ७८ (१६२६) ॥

आहार इवानल इव घट इव स्नेहादिकृतबलाधानः ।

धीरभिबोदाहरणानि कर्मरूपित्वगमकानि ॥ ७९ (१६२७) ॥

Tatha sukhāsamvitteḥ sambandhe vedanodbhavaśca ।

Bāhyabalādhanāt pariṇāmaśca vidheyam ॥ 78 (1626)

Āhara ivanala iva ghata iva snehadikṛtbalādhanāḥ ।

Kṣīramuvodaharaṇāni karmarūpitvagamakāni ॥ 79 (1627)]

Trans—78-79 Also the fact that the *karman* has a physical form should be admitted because in the association (with the *karman*) the consciousness of pleasure, etc., (becomes possible) and because of the rise of experience of heat (*vedanā*) when one is in association (with the *karman*)† because it is possible to add to the strength of the *karman* by external means and because of the fact that *karman* undergoes change

The following four illustrations are conclusive for the fact that *karman* has a physical form (and are to be taken respectively with each of the four arguments stated in the above verse—(1) Like food, (2) like fire, (3) like the addition of strength made by means of oil, etc. to a pot of earth (and) (4) like the (change of) milk. (1626-1627)

टीका—इह प्रथममाद्योपन्यस्तद्वेतुचतुष्टयस्य द्वितीयगाथायां यथा संसृज्य चत्वारो दृष्टान्ता द्रष्टव्याः । तत्र मूर्तं कर्म तत्संबन्धे सुखादिसंविद्येः, इह यत्संबन्धे सुखादि संवेद्यते तद् मूर्तं दृष्टम्, यथाऽऽग्निनावाहारा, यथामूर्तं न तत्संबन्धे सुखादिसंविदस्ति, यथाऽऽकाशसंबन्धे, संवेद्यते च तत्संबन्धे सुखादि, तस्मात् मूर्तं कर्मेति । तथा, यत्संबन्धे वेदनोद्भवो भवति तद् मूर्तं दृष्टम्, यथाऽऽनलोग्निः, भवति च कर्मसंबन्धे वेदनोद्भवः तस्मात् तद् मूर्तं

† This *Sambandhe* is to be construed with both *sukhasamvitteḥ* and *vedanodbhava*.

मिति । तथा, मूर्तं कर्म, आत्मनो ज्ञानादीनां च तद्धर्माणां व्यतिरिक्तत्वे सति बाह्येन स्रक्-चन्दना-ऽङ्गनादिना बलस्योपचयस्याधीयमानत्वात्, यथा स्नेहाद्याहितबलो घटः, इह यस्यानात्म-विज्ञानादेः सतो बाह्येन वस्तुना बलमाधीयते तद् मूर्तं दृष्टम्, यथा स्नेहादिनाऽऽधीयमानबलो घटः, आधीयते च बाह्यैर्मिथ्यात्वादिहेतुभूतैर्वस्तुभिः कर्मण उपचयलक्षणं बलम्, तस्मात् तद् मूर्तमिति । तथा, मूर्तं कर्म, आत्मादिव्यतिरिक्तत्वे सति परिणामित्वात्, क्षीरमिवेति । एवमादीनि हेतूदाहरणानि कर्मणो रूपित्व-गमकानीति ॥ ७८-७९ (१६२६-१६२७) ॥

D C—The four illustrations stated in the second verse should be respectively taken as those of the four arguments presented in the first verse *viz* —The *karman* has a physical form (*mūrtam*) because of the experience of pleasure etc when one is united with that *karman* in this world that in association with which the pleasure etc are experienced is found to be something having a physical form, just as the food one eats etc, and there is no experience of pleasure etc in association with that which is without a physical shape, just as in connection with the ether

But in association with that *i e*, *karman* we do experience pleasure etc therefore, the *karman* has a physical form Similarly, that in association with which a burning sensation arises is found to be something having a physical form, just as in association with the fire, and the rise of a burning sensation, pain occurs when one is in association with the *karman*; therefore, it has a form Here the author states an objection and its reply —

अहं मयमसिद्धमेयं परिणामात् तत्ति सो वि कज्जाओ ।

सिद्धो परिणामो से दहिपरिणामादिव पयस्स ॥ ८० ॥ (१६२८)

Aha mayamasiddhameyam parināmāu tti so vi kajjāo ।

Siddho parināmo se dahiparināmādiva payassa ॥ 80 (1628)

[अथ मतमसिद्धमेतत् परिणामादिति सोऽपि कार्यात् ।

सिद्धः परिणामस्तस्य दधिपरिणामादिव पयसः ॥ ८० ॥ (१६२८)

Atha matamasiddhametat parinamāditi so'pi karyat ।

Siddhah parinamastasya dadhiparinamādiva payasah ॥ 80 (1628)

Trans—80 Again (the opponent will say) this (*i.e.* *Karmarūpa*) could not be accomplished by (virtue of) the *hela* that it undergoes change. (But) even that is due to *Kārya*. Just as the mutability of milk is established by the mutability of curds, its mutability could (also) be established (by that of *Kārya*). (1628)

टीका—अथ 'परिणामित्वात्' इत्यसिद्धोऽयं हेतुरिति मतं मततः । एतदप्ययुक्तम्, यतः सोऽपि परिणामः सिद्धः कर्मणः, 'कञ्जातं चि' कर्मकार्यस्य क्षरीरादेः परिणामित्वदर्शनादित्यर्थः । इह यस्य कार्यं परिणाम्युपलभ्यते तस्यात्मनोऽपि परिणामित्वं निश्चीयते, यथा दध्नस्तक्रादिभावेन परिणामात् पयसोऽपि परिणामित्वं विज्ञायत एवेति ॥ ८० ॥ (१६२८)

D O—Again you would believe that *Karman* is *asiddha* by reason of its *parinama*. But that is not proper. The *parinama* of *Karman* is apprehended from the *parinama* of its *Kāryas* like *dartra* etc. For when the effect is mutable mutability of the action is automatically recognized just as the mutability of milk is recognized from the *parinama* of its *Karya* viz curds in the form of butter milk.

Agnibhuṭi asks —

अब्भादिविगाराण जह वेचित्तं विणा वि कम्मेण ।

तह जइ ससारीण हवेज्ज को नाम तो दोसो ? ॥ ८१ ॥ (१६२९)

Abbhādivigārāṇam jaha vecittam viṇā vi kammēṇa ।

Taha jai samsārīṇam havejja ko nāma to doso ? ॥ 81 (1629)

[अब्भादिविकाराणां यथा वैचित्र्यं विनापि कर्मणा ।

तथा यदि संसारिणां मवेत्तु को नाम ततो दोषः ? ॥ ८१ ॥ (१६२९)

Abhrādivikārāṇām yathā vaicitryam vināpi karmanā ।
Tathā yadī saṁsārīnām bhavet ko nāma tato doṣaḥ ॥ 81 (1529)]

Trans.—81 Just as a variety of visible changes in the clouds etc is apprehended even without (the help of) *Karman* in the same way, what harm is there if it is so in the case of *mundane* souls also ? (1629)

टीका—आह—ननु यथाऽभ्रादिविकाराणामन्तरेणापि कर्म वैचित्र्यं दृश्यते, तथा तेनेव प्रकारेण संसारिजीवस्कन्धानामपि सुख-दुःखादिभावेन वैचित्र्यं यदि कर्मविनापि स्यात्, ततः को नाम दोषो भवेत्?—न कोऽपीत्यर्थः ॥ ८१ ॥ (१६२९)

D. C.—A variety of various visible changes in the clouds is apprehended even in the absence of *Karman* In the same way, in the case of *mundane* souls also, there would be no harm if we believe that a variety of *vikāras* like *sukha*, *duḥkha* etc exists without the help of *Karman*

The *Ācārya* replies —

कम्मम्मि व को भेओ जह बज्झक्खधचित्तया सिद्धा ।
तह कम्मपोग्गलाण वि विचित्तया जीवसहियाणं ॥ ८२ ॥ (१६३०)

Kammammi va ko bheo jaha bajjhakkhandhacittayā siddhā ।
Taha kammapoggalāṇa vi vicittayā jīvasahiyāṇam ॥ 82 (1630)

[कर्मणि वा को भेदो यथा बाह्यस्कन्धचित्रता सिद्धा ।

तथा कर्मपुद्गलानामपि विचित्रता जीवसहितानाम् ॥ ८२ ॥ (१६३०)

Karmani vā ko bhedo yathā bahyaskandhacitratā siddhā ।
Tathā karmapudgalānāmapi vicitratā jīvasahitānām ॥ 82 (1630)]

Trans.—82 (Then) what difference (would it make) even in the case of *Karman* ? Just as the variegation of external objects is proved, variegation of the *Karmapudgalaś* could also be proved (1630)

टीका—यद्यत्रविकाराणां गन्धर्वनगरेन्द्रधनुरादीनां गृह—वेणुकल—प्राकार—तट—कुण्ड—नील—रक्तादिभावेन वैचित्र्यमिष्यते सौम्य ! । बाह्यद्वयस्यापि शब्दार्थत्वात्, तर्हि कर्मण्यपि को भेदः को विशेषः, येन तत्र वैचित्र्यं नास्म्युपगम्यते ? । ननु हन्त ! यथा सकललोकप्रत्यक्षाणाममीषां गन्धर्वपुर—शक्र—कोदण्डादीनां बाह्यस्कन्धानां विचित्रता मभवतोऽपि सिद्धा, तथा तेनैव प्रकारेणान्तराणामपि कर्मस्कन्धानां पुद्गलमयत्वे समानेऽपि जीवसहितत्वस्य विशेषवतो वैचित्र्यकारणसत्त्वादेऽपि सुख—दुःखादिजनकरूपतया विचित्रता किमिति नेष्यते ? । यदि क्षत्रादयो बाह्यपुद्गला नानारूपतया परिणमन्ति, तर्हि जीवैः परिगृहीताः सुतरां ते तथा परिणस्यन्तीति भावः ॥ ८२ (१६३०) ।

D C—O Saumya ! If forms such as a house a temple a wall black green red etc. are believed as the variety of visible changes like a gandharva city or a rain-bow in the sky what harm is there if the same kind of variety is accepted in the case of Karma also ? Variegation of objects having external forms is admissible to you Now the internal Karma-skandhas consist of the same substance as the bahya skandhar and on the top of that, they are alive Moreover as they produce sukha dukkha etc as their vikaras there is all the more reason to admit vatsarya of the Karma-pudgalas. Thus when various transformations in the case of lifeless bahya pudgalas are admitted they are all the more acceptable in the case of Karma-pudgalas which are surrounded by the octana jras.

यज्ज्ञाण चित्तया जडं पटिवस्त्रा कम्मणो विसेसेण ।

जीवाणुगयस्स मया भत्तीण व सिप्पिनत्थाण ॥ ८३ ॥ (१६३१)

Bajjhāna cittaṃ jā padivannā kammāno visesena ।

Jivānugayassa mayā bhattīna va sippinatthānam ॥ 83 (1631)

[बाह्यानां चित्रता यदि प्रतिपन्ना कर्मणो विद्वयेण ।

जीवानुगतस्य मया भक्तीनामिषि सिद्ध्यन्त्यस्तानाम् ॥ ८३ ॥ (१६३१)

Bahyanāni citrata yadi pratipanna karmāṇo vidveṇa ।

Jivānugatasya mayā bhaktīnāmīṣi siddhyantastānam ॥ 83 (1631)]

Trans—83 If variety (in the case) of external (objects) is established, variety (in the case) of *Karman* which is surrounded by soul should (all the more) be accepted (as positive) like the variety of forms laid down in a piece of art. (1631)

टीका—यदि हि जीवापरिगृहीतानामपि बाह्यानामभ्रादिपुद्गलानां नानाकारपरिणतिरूपा चित्रता त्वया प्रतिपन्ना, तर्हि जीवानुगतानां कर्म-पुद्गलानां विशेषत एवास्माकं भवतश्च सा सम्मता भविष्यति, भक्तयो विच्छिन्नयस्तासामिव चित्रादिषु शिल्पिन्यस्तानाम् । अयमभिप्रायः—चित्रकरादिशिल्पिजीवपरिगृहीतानां चित्र-लेप्य-काष्ठकर्मानुगतपुद्गलानां या परिणामचित्रता सा विस्रसापरिणतेन्द्रधनुरादिपुद्गलपरिणामचित्रतायाः सकाशाद् विशिष्टैवेति प्रत्यक्षतः एव दृश्यते । अतो जीवपरिगृहीतत्वेन कर्म-पुद्गलानामपि सुखदुःखादिवैचित्र्यजननरूपा विशिष्टतरा परिणामचित्रता कथं न स्यात् ? इति ॥ ८३ (१६३१) ॥

D C—Now that you have accepted *citratā* in the form of manifold transformations in the case of *bāhya-pudgalas* like *abhra* etc which are not surrounded by *jīva*, you shall have to accept the same in the case of *Karma-pudgalas* also as they have already been surrounded by *jīvas*

Again, the *citratā* of forms drawn by an artist in painting, sculpturing, carpentry etc is peculiarly distinct from the *citratā* of the manifold *vikāras* of *bāhya-pudgalas* like rain-bow etc, while in the case of *Karma-pudgalas* also, the *parināmacitratā* is peculiarly distinct from the other two varieties, firstly because it gives rise to alterations like *sukha*, *dukkha* etc and secondly because it is aided by *jīva*

Again, the opponent asks —

तो जइ तणुमेत्तं चिय हवेज्ज का कम्मकप्पणा नाम ? ।

कम्मं पि नणु तणु चिय सण्हयरब्भंतरा नवरं ॥ ८४ ॥ (१६३२)

To jaī tanumettam ciya havejja kā kammakappanā nāma ? ।

Kammam pi nanu tanu cciya sanhayarabbhantarā navaram ॥ (1632)

टीका—यद्यत्रविकाराणां गन्धर्वनगरेन्द्रघनुरादीनां गृह-देवकुल-प्राकार-तल-कृष्ण-नील-रक्तादिभावेन वैचित्र्यमिष्यते सौम्य ।। बाह्यव्यस्यापि शब्दार्थत्वात्, तर्हि कर्मव्यपि को भेदः को विशेषः, येन तत्र वैचित्र्यं नाम्युपगम्यते ? । ननु हन्त ! यथा सकललोकप्रत्यक्षाणाममीषां गन्धर्वपुर-शुक्रकोदण्डादीनां बाह्यस्कन्धानां विचित्रता भवतोऽपि सिद्धा, तथा तेनैव प्रकारेणान्तराणामपि कर्मस्कन्धानां पुद्गलमयत्वं समानेऽपि जीवसहितत्वस्य विशेषवतो वैचित्र्यकारणसद्भावेऽपि सुख-दुःखादिजनकरूपतया विचित्रता किमिति नेष्यते ? । यदि सद्भादयो बाह्यपुद्गला नानारूपतया परिणमन्ति, तर्हि भवैः परिगृहीताः सुतरां ते तथा परिणस्यन्तीति भावः ॥ ८२ (१६३०) ॥

D O — O Saumya ! If forms such as a house a temple a wall black green red etc. are believed as the variety of visible changes like a gandharva city or a rain-bow in the sky what harm is there if the same kind of variety is accepted in the case of Karma also ? Variegation of objects having external forms is admissible to you. Now the internal Karma-skandhas consist of the same substance as the bahya skandhas and on the top of that they are alive. Moreover as they produce sukha dukha etc. as their vibhavas there is all the more reason to admit vasatrya of the Karma-pudgalas. Thus when various transformations in the case of lifeless bahya pudgalas are admitted they are all the more acceptable in the case of Karma-pudgalas which are surrounded by the cetana-jivas.

वज्रज्ञान चित्तया जह पटिवज्रा कम्मणो विसेसेण ।

जीवानुगयस्स मया भक्तीण व सिप्पिनस्थाण ॥ ८३ ॥ (१६३१)

Bajjhāna cittaया jai padivannā kammāno vīsesena ।

Jivānugayassa mayā bhattīṇa va sippinattāṇam ॥ 83 (1631)

[बाह्यानां चित्रता यदि प्रतिपन्ना कर्मणो विशेषेण ।

जीवानुगतस्य मया भक्तीनामिदं सिप्पिन्यस्तानाम् ॥ ८३ ॥ (१६३१)

Bahyanam citrata yadi pratipanna karmaṇo vīśeṣeṇa ।

Jivānugatasya mayā bhaktīnāmiva śippinyastānām ॥ 83 (1631)]

is very subtle as it is beyond the cognizance of senses and it is of an interior nature because it is so closely connected with *jīva*. So, *viśvānā* in the case of a *Kārmanā sarīra* should be recognized just as variegation of an external gross object is apprehended as that of *vikāras* of the clouds etc

Again, the author states an objection and its reply —

को तीए विणा दोसो थूलाए सव्वाहा विप्पमुक्कस्स ।
देहग्गहणाभावो तउ य संसारवोच्छित्ती ॥ ८५ ॥ (१६३३)

Ko tie vinā doso thūlāe savvahā vippamukkassa ।
Dehaggahanābhāvo tāu ya samsāravocchittī ॥ 85 (1633)

[कस्तया विना दोषः स्थूलया सर्वथा विप्रमुक्तस्य ।
देहग्रहणाभावस्ततश्च संसारव्यवच्छित्तिः ॥ ८५ ॥ (१६३३)

Kastayā vinā dosah sthūlayā sarvathā vipramuktasya ।
Dehagrahanābhāvastataśca samsāravvyavacchittih ॥ 85 (1633)]

Trans—85 (The opponent will say—) What harm is there in (believing) its absence ? (The reply is—) It is impossible for (the soul) liberated from a gross body to enter a (new) body in that case, and ultimately a (complete) break-off of the *mundane* world (will follow) (1633)

टीका—प्रेरकः प्राह—ननु बाह्यायाः स्थूरतन्वा वैचित्र्यं प्रत्यक्षदृष्टत्वादेवा-
भ्रादिविकारवदभ्युपगच्छामः । अन्तरङ्गायास्तु कर्मरूपायाः सूक्ष्मतनोवैचित्र्यं
कथमिच्छामः, तस्याः सर्वथाऽप्रत्यक्षत्वात् ? । अथ तदनभ्युपगमे दोषःकोऽ-
प्यापतति, ततोऽर्थापत्तेरेव तद्विचित्रताऽभ्युपगन्तव्या, तर्हि निवेद्यतां कस्तया
विना दोषोऽनुषज्यते ? । आचार्यः प्राह—मरणकाले स्थूलया दृश्यमानतन्वा
सर्वथा विप्रमुक्तस्य जन्तोर्भवान्तरगतस्थूलतनुग्रहणनिबन्धनभूतां सूक्ष्मकर्म-
तनुमन्तरेणाग्रेतनदेहग्रहणाभावलक्षणो दोषः समापद्यते । न हि निष्कारणमेव
शरीरान्तरग्रहणं युज्यते । ततश्च देहान्तरग्रहणानुपपत्तेर्मरणानन्तर सर्वस्याप्य-
शरीरत्वादयत्नेनैव संसारव्यवच्छित्तिः स्यात् ॥ ८५ (१६३३) ॥

[ततो यदि तनुमात्रमेव भवेत् का कर्मकल्पना नाम ? ।

कर्मापि ननु तनुरेव सूक्ष्मतराम्पन्तरा नवरम् ॥ ८४ ॥ (१६३२)

Tato yadi tannumatrameva bhavet ka karma kalpana nama ! !

Karmāpi nanu tanureva sūksmatarambhyantara navaram ॥ 84 (1632)]

Trans—84 Now if *Karman* is itself the body why should *Karman* be assumed at all ? That is not proper In fact *Karman* is also a body though subtle and interior to a great extent (1632)

टीका-एष मयत परः-यद्यन्नादिविकाराणामिव कमपुद्गलानां विविध परिणतिरभ्युपगम्यते । ततो बाह्यं मकलञ्जनप्रत्यक्षं तनुमात्रमवद् सुरूप-
कुरूप-सुख-दुःखादिमाद्यैः स्वभावत एवाद्वादिविकारवद् विविधरूपतया परिणमति, इत्येतदवास्तु, का नाम पुनस्तद्वैशिष्ट्यहेतुभूतस्यान्तर्गद्गुरुत्वस्य कर्मणः परिकल्पना, स्वभावात्पि सबस्यापि पुद्गलपरिणामवैशिष्ट्यस्य सिद्धत्वात् ? इति । भगवानाह-“कम्म पीत्यादि” । अपममिप्रायः-यद्यन्नादिवि-
काराणामिव तनोर्वैशिष्ट्यमभ्युपगम्यते, तर्हि ननु कमापि तनुरेव, कर्मण
क्षरीरमधेस्यर्थः, केवल स्रष्टृत्वात्, अतीन्द्रियत्वात् ; अभ्यन्तरा च, जीवेन महातिसंसिद्धत्वात् । ततश्च यथाऽन्नादिविकारवद् वाय्वभ्युपगम्यते तनोर्वैशिष्ट्यमभ्युप-
गम्यते, तथा कर्मतनोरपि तस्मिन्नाभ्युपगम्यते ? इति भावः ॥ ८४ (१६३२) ॥

D C—The opponent—Now that *Karma pudgalas* have been accepted as having variegated transformations like various visible changes in clouds etc this body also which is *pratyakṣa* to all can undergo a number of alternations by virtue of its *anubhūta* in the form of *sūrūpa kurūpa sukla duḥkha* etc. And hence it is not at all necessary to assume an intervening agent like *Karman* for the production of *airāra* etc For a variety of visible change in the case of all *pudgalas* is accomplished by its very *anubhūta*.

The *Ācārya*—Because we take the transference of *taṇu* as being similar to that of *varā* in *airāra* in *uḍḍāra* etc the *Karman* should not be taken as *taṇu*. This *Kūrmāna* body

is very subtle as it is beyond the cognizance of senses and it is of an interior nature because it is so closely connected with *jīva*. So, *vicatātā* in the case of a *Kāmanā saṁīra* should be recognized just as variegation of an external gross object is apprehended as that of *vikāras* of the clouds etc

Again, the author states an objection and its reply —

को तीए विणा दोसो थूलाए सव्वाहा विप्पमुक्कस्स ।

देहग्गहणाभावो तउ य संसारवोच्छिन्ती ॥ ८५ ॥ (१६३३)

Ko tie vinā doso thūlāe savvahā vippamukkassa ।

Dehaggahanābhāvo tau ya saṁsāravocchittī ॥ 85 (1633)

[कस्तया विना दोषः स्थूलया सर्वथा विप्रमुक्तस्य ।

देहग्रहणाभावस्ततश्च संसारव्यवच्छिन्तिः ॥ ८५ ॥ (१६३३)

Kastayā vinā dosah sthūlayā sarvathā vipramuktasya ।

Dehagrahanābhāvastataśca saṁsāravayavacchittih ॥ 85 (1633)]

Trans—85 (The opponent will say—) What harm is there in (believing) its absence ? (The reply is—) It is impossible for (the soul) liberated from a gross body to enter a (new) body in that case, and ultimately a (complete) break-off of the *mundane* world (will follow) (1633)

टीका—प्रेरकः प्राह—ननु बाह्यायाः स्थूरतन्वा वैचित्र्यं प्रत्यक्षदृष्ट्वा देवा-
भ्रादिविकारवदभ्युपगच्छामः । अन्तरङ्गायास्तु कर्मरूपायाः सूक्ष्मतनो वैचित्र्यं
कथमिच्छामः, तस्याः सर्वथाऽप्रत्यक्षत्वात् ? । अथ तदनभ्युपगमे दोषः कोऽ-
प्यापत्तिः, ततोऽर्थापत्तेरेव तद्विचित्रताऽभ्युपगन्तव्या, तर्हि निवेद्यतां कस्तया
विना दोषोऽनुपप्यते ? । आचार्यः प्राह—मरणकाले स्थूलया दृश्यमानतन्वा
सर्वथा विप्रमुक्तस्य जन्तोर्भवान्तरगतस्थूलतनुग्रहणनिवन्धनभूतां सूक्ष्मकर्म-
तनुमन्तरेणाग्रेतनदेहग्रहणाभावलक्षणो दोषः समापद्यते । न हि निष्कारणमेव
शरीरान्तरग्रहणं युज्यते । ततश्च देहान्तरग्रहणानुपपत्तेर्मरणानन्तरं सर्वस्याप्य-
शरीरत्वादयत्नेनैव संसारव्यवच्छिन्तिः स्यात् ॥ ८५ (१६३३) ॥

D C—The opponent—We recognize the variety of *sthūla śarīra* by virtue of its being *pratyakṣa*. But we cannot apprehend the variety of a *sūkṣma śarīra* as it is absolutely *a-pratyakṣa* (imperceptible). Hence if we do not accept the *sūkṣma-śarīra* at all will you kindly tell me what difficulty would arise?

Ācārya—If the *sūkṣma Kārmāṇa śarīra* is not accepted in its absence the soul when liberated from the *sthūla-śarīra* after death will not be able to enter the new body at the next birth. For this *Kārmāṇa śarīra* is the only agency through which a new body could be attained in the next birth. So in case this *sūkṣma karmāṇa śarīra* is not accepted *jīva* will not enter a new body after death and ultimately the whole of the *mundane* world will become disjuncted in absence of effort on the part of *jīvas*.

And even if it were so what would happen?

सर्वविमोक्षावत्ती निष्करणउ व्व सव्वससारो ।
भवमुक्खण व पुणो ससरणमओ अणासाओ ॥ ८६ ॥ (१६३४)

Savvavimokkhāvattī nikkāranau vva savvasamsāro ।
Bhavamukkhānam va puṇo saṁsaranamao anāsāo ॥ 86 (1634)

[सर्वविमोक्षापत्तिर्निष्कारणको वा सर्वसंसारः ।
भवमुक्तानां वा पुनः संसरणमतोज्जाश्रासः ॥ ८६ ॥ (१६३४)

Savvavimokṣāpattir nikkārapako va savvasamsārah ।
Bhavamuktānam va puṇah saṁsaranamatato naśvasaḥ ॥ 86 (1784)]

Trans.—86 (In that case) all will attain *Mokṣa* the whole of *mundane* world would become useless those who are exempted from existence will have birth and re-birth and there will be no consolation for *Mokṣa* even (1634)

टीका—ततः संसारव्यवच्छेदानन्तरं सर्वस्यापि जीवराक्षेमोक्षापत्तिर्भवेत् ।
अथाक्षरीराणामपि संसारपर्यन्तम्, तर्हि निष्कारण एव सर्वस्यापि संसारः
स्यात्, भवमुक्तानां च सिद्धानामितरेषु पुनरप्यकस्माद् निष्कारण एव

संसारपातः स्यात् । तथैव च तत्र संसरणम् । ततश्च मोक्षेऽप्यनाश्वास इति
॥ ८६ (१६३४) ॥

D C—In that case there is disjunction of the entire *mundane* world, all the living beings will attain *mokṣa*. Again those that are bodiless will also wander in the world along with others that have bodies, the *mundane* world will become *niskārana* or good-for-nothing. Moreover, *Siddhas* that are exempted from existence will also have to fall back into *samsāra* and hence into the cycle of birth and re-birth. Ultimately there will be no consolation even in *mokṣa*. Thus, along with disjunction of the entire *mundane* world, all the above stated difficulties will arise if *Karman* is not admitted as the cause of variety.

Again the opponent asks —

मुत्तस्सामुत्तिमया जीवेण कहं हवेज्ज संबन्धो ? ।

सोम्म ! घडस्स व नभसा जह वा दव्वस्स किरियाए ॥ ८७ ॥ (१६३५)

Muttassāmuttimayā jīvena kahaṃ havejja sambandho ? ।

Somma ! ghadassa vva nabhasā jaha va dāvassa kiriyāe ॥ (1635)

[मूर्तस्यामूर्तिमता जीवेन कथं भवेत् संबन्धः ? ।

सौम्य ! घटस्येव नभसा यथा वा द्रव्यस्य क्रियया ॥ ८७ ॥ (१६३५)

Mūrtasyāmūrtimatā jīvena katham bhavet sambandhah ? ।

Saumya ! ghatasyeva nabhasā yathā vā dravyasya kriyayā ॥ 87 (1635)]

Trans—87 “ How can the corporeal (*Karman*) be related to the incorporeal *Jiva* ? ” (The *Ācārya* replies –) *O Saumya* ! (Their relation is) like the relation of *ghata* with sky or like that of substance (*dravya*) with action (*kriyā*) (1635)

टीका—ननु मूर्तं कर्मेति प्राग् भवद्भिः समर्थितम् । तस्य च मूर्तस्य कर्मणोऽमूर्तेन जीवेन सह कथं संयोगलक्षणः समवायलक्षणो वा संबन्धः

D C—The opponent—We recognize the variety of *sthūla* *kartra* by virtue of its being *pratyakṣa*. But we cannot apprehend the variety of a *subtma* *kartra* as it is absolutely *a-pratyakṣa* (imperceptible) Hence if we do not accept the *subtma-kartra* at all will you kindly tell me what difficulty would arise ?

Ācārya—If the *subtma Kārmāṇa kartra* is not accepted in its absence the soul when liberated from the *sthūla-kartra* after death will not be able to enter the new body at the next birth For this *Kārmāṇa kartra* is the only agency through which a new body could be attained in the next birth So in case this *subtma karmāṇa kartra* is not accepted *jīva* will not enter a new body after death and ultimately the whole of the *mundane* world will become disjuncted in absence of effort on the part of *jīvas*

And even if it were so what would happen ?

सर्वविमोक्तावप्ती निष्कारण उ च सवससारो ।
भवमुक्ताण व पुनो संसरणमओ अणासाओ ॥ ८६ ॥ (१६३४)

Savvavimokkhāvattī nikkāraṇau vva savvasamsāro ।
Bhavamukkāṇam va puno saṁsaranamao anāsāo ॥ 86 (1634)

[सर्वविमोक्षापत्तिर्निष्कारणको वा सर्वसंसारः ।

भवमुक्तानां वा पुनः संसरणमतोज्जायासः ॥ ८६ ॥ (१६३४)

Savvavimokṣāpattir-niskarapako va sarvasamsārah ।
Bhavamuktānaṁ va punaḥ saṁsaraṇamato nāvyaśaḥ ॥ 86 (1734)]

Trans.—86 (In that case) all will attain *Mokṣa* the whole of *mundane* world would become useless those who are exempted from existence will have birth and re-birth and there will be no consolation for *Mokṣa* even (1634)

टीका—उतः संसारव्यवच्छेदानन्तरं सर्वस्यापि जीवराक्षेर्मोक्षापत्तिर्भवेत् ।
अथाक्षरीराणामपि संसारपर्यटनम्, तर्हि निष्कारण एव सर्वस्यापि संसारः
स्यात्, भवमुक्तानां च सिद्धानामित्ये पुनरप्यकस्माद् निष्कारण एव

टीका-अथवा, यथेदं बाह्यं स्थूलशरीरं जीवोपनिबन्धनं जीवेन सह संबद्धं प्रत्यक्षोपलभ्यमानमेव तिष्ठति सर्वत्र चेटते, एवं भवान्तरं गच्छता जीवेन सह संयुक्तं कार्मणशरीरं प्रतिपद्यस्व । अथ ब्रूये-धर्माऽधर्मनिमित्तं जीवसंबद्धं बाह्यं शरीरं प्रवर्तते, तर्हि पृच्छामो भवन्तम्-तावपि धर्मा-धर्मौ मूर्तौ वा भवेताम्, अमूर्तौ वा ? । यदि मूर्तौ, तर्हि तयोरप्यमूर्तेनात्मना सह कथं संबन्धः ? । अथ तयोस्तेन सहासौ कथमपि भवति, तर्हि कर्मणोऽपि तेन सार्धमयं कस्माद् न स्यात् ? । अथामूर्तौ धर्माऽधर्मौ, तर्हि बाह्यमूर्तस्थूल-शरीरेण सह तयोः संबन्धः कथं स्यात्, मूर्ताऽमूर्तयोर्भवदभिप्रायेण संबन्धा-योगात् ? । न चासंबद्धयोस्तयोर्बाह्यशरीरस्चेष्टानिमित्तत्वमुपपद्यते, अतिप्रसङ्गात् । अथ मूर्तयोरपि तयोर्बाह्यशरीरेण मूर्तेण सहेष्यते संबन्धः, तर्हि जीव-कर्मणो-स्तत्सद्भावे कः प्रद्वेषः ? इति ॥ ८८ (१६३६) ॥

D C—This *sthūla śarīra*, as it is *pratyakṣa* and connected with *jīva*, moves its limbs here and there, in this world, while the *Kārmāṇa śarīra* is connected with *jīva* in the next world.

Here again, if you think that it is the *sthūla śarīra*—with *dharma* and *adharma* as its *nimittas*—that exhibits all movements when connected with *jīva* I would ask you to consider whether *dharma* and *adharma* are *mūrta* or *amūrta*

In the first case, if you take *dharma* and *adharma* to be *mūrta* how could they be related to *ātman* which is *amūrta* ? But, if their relation to *ātman* is, anyhow, approved of by you, why should you not approve of their relation to *Karman* also ? Secondly, if you believe that *dharma* and *adharma* are *amūrta* they could not have any relation with the *bāhya* and *sthūla* body which is *mūrta* For, according to you, connection between *mūrta* and *amūrta* is improper Thus, if *dharma* and *adharma* become the *nimitta kāraṇas* of all the gestures of body even though there is no mutual relation between them, the fault of *atiprasaṅga* would arise Moreover, if these *amūrta dharma* and *adharma* have been believed as being connected with the external *mūrta śarīra*, what objection would there be to assume a similar relation between *jīva* and *Karman* ?

स्यात् ? । अतः कर्गसिद्धावप्येतदपरमेव रक्षं पश्यामः । मगवानाह—सौम्य !
यथा मूर्तस्य घटस्यामूर्तेन नमसा संयोगलक्षणः सव्यस्तथाऽपि जीव-
कर्मणोः । यथा वा द्रव्यास्पातुलयादेः क्रिययाऽऽङ्गुष्ठनादिकया सह समवा-
यलक्षणः संबन्धः, तथाऽपि जीव-कर्मणोरयमिति ॥ ८७ (१६३५) ॥

D C—Agnibhūti—You have already asserted that *Karman* is *mūṛta*. Now how could this *mūṛta Karman* be connected with the *amūṛta jīva* either by means of the *samavāya* relation or even by *Samyoga* ? This is one more difficulty in the way of the accomplishment of *Karman*.

The *Ācārya*—O blessed one ! just as a *mūṛta ghata* is connected with the *amūṛta ālaka* by means of *samyoga* and an object like finger is connected with *kriyā* like contraction by means of the *samavāya* relation so here also *Karman* is connected with *jīva*.

The relation of *jīva* with *Karman* is proved in another way:—

अथवा पञ्चक्त्व चिय जीवोपनिबन्धन जह् सरीर ।
चिट्ठह् कम्मयमेव भवतरे जीवसजुत्त ॥ ८८ ॥ (१६३६)

Athavā pañcakkham ciya jīvoṇaṇibandhanam jaha sarīram ।
Cīṭṭhai kammayamevam bhavantare jīvasanjuttam ॥ (1636)

[अथवा प्रत्यक्षमेव जीवोपनिबन्धन यथा शरीरम् ।
तिष्ठति कर्मण्यमेव भवान्तरे जीवसंयुक्तम् ॥ ८८ ॥ (१६३६)

Athava pratyakṣameva jīvoṇaṇibandhanam yatha śarīram ।
Tīṭṭhati karmāṇamevam bhavantare jīvasamyuktam ॥ 88 (1636)

Trans —88 Or just as the (coarse) body being perceptible (to the senses) is connected with the soul (in this world) the *Kārmanā* body is connected with the soul in the next world. (1636)

टीका—अथवा, यथेदं बाह्यं स्थूलशरीरं जीवोपनिबन्धनं जीवेन सह संबद्धं प्रत्यक्षोपलभ्यमानमेव तिष्ठति सर्वत्र चेष्टते, एवं भवान्तरं गच्छता जीवेन सह संयुक्तं कार्मणशरीरं प्रतिपद्यस्व । अथ त्रूपे-धर्माधर्मनिमित्तं जीवसंबद्धं बाह्यं शरीरं प्रवर्तते, तर्हि पृच्छामो भवन्तम्—तावपि धर्मा-धर्मो मूर्तो वा भवेताम्, अमूर्तो वा ? । यदि मूर्तो, तर्हि तयोरप्यमूर्तेनात्मना सह कथं संबन्धः ? । अथ तयोस्तेन सहासौ कथमपि भवति, तर्हि कर्मणोऽपि तेन सार्धमयं कस्माद् न स्यात् ? । अथामूर्तो धर्माधर्मो, तर्हि बाह्यमूर्तस्थूलशरीरेण सह तयोः संबन्धः कथं स्यात्, मूर्तामूर्तयोर्भवदभिप्रायेण संबन्धयोगात् ? । न चासंबद्धयोस्तयोर्बाह्यशरीरचेष्टानिमित्तत्वमुपपद्यते, अतिप्रसङ्गात् । अथ मूर्तयोरपि तयोर्बाह्यशरीरेण मूर्तेण महेष्यते संबन्धः, तर्हि जीव-कर्मणोस्तत्सद्भावे कः प्रद्वेषः ? इति ॥ ८८ (१६३६) ॥

D C—This *sthūla śarīra*, as it is *pratyakṣa* and connected with *jīva*, moves its limbs here and there, in this world, while the *Kārmāṇa śarīra* is connected with *jīva* in the next world

Here again, if you think that it is the *sthūla śarīra*—with *dharma* and *adharma* as its *nimittas*—that exhibits all movements when connected with *jīva* I would ask you to consider whether *dharma* and *adharma* are *mūrta* or *amūrta*

In the first case, if you take *dharma* and *adharma* to be *mūrta* how could they be related to *ātman* which is *amūrta* ? But, if their relation to *ātman* is, anyhow, approved of by you, why should you not approve of their relation to *Karman* also ? Secondly, if you believe that *dharma* and *adharma* are *amūrta* they could not have any relation with the *bāhya* and *sthūla* body which is *mūrta*. For, according to you, connection between *mūrta* and *amūrta* is improper. Thus, if *dharma* and *adharma* become the *nimitta kāraṇas* of all the gestures of body even though there is no mutual relation between them, the fault of *atiprasaṅga* would arise. Moreover, if these *amūrta dharma* and *adharma* have been believed as being connected with the external *mūrta śarīra*, what objection would there be to assume a similar relation between *jīva* and *Karman* ?

Here there is an objection and its refutation—

मुत्तेणामुत्तिमश्चो उवघाया-ऽणुग्गहा कह होज्जा ? ।

जह विण्णाणार्हण मइरापाणोसहाईहिं ॥ ८९ ॥ (१६३७)

Muttenāmuttimao uvaghāya- nuggahā kaham hojjā ?

Jaha vimāṇāṇam mairāpaṇosahāīhiṃ ॥ 89 (1637)

[मूर्तेणामूर्तिमत उपघाता-ऽनुग्रहौ कथ मवेताम् ? ।

यथा विज्ञानादीनां मदिरापानौ-पचादिभिः ॥ ८९ ॥ (१६३७)

Mūrteṇāmūrtimata upaghata nūgrahau katham bhavetaṃ !

Yathā vijñānadīnam madirāpanau-pachadibhiḥ ॥ 89 (1637)]

Trans—89 How could the *amūrta* (soul) be supported or damaged by the *mūrta* (*Karman*) ? (The answer is—) In the way as *vijñāna* etc. are (damaged or supported) by a drink of wine, medicine etc. (1637)

टीका-ननु मूर्तेन कर्मणामूर्तिमतो जीवस्य कथमाहुदपरितापाद्य
नुग्रहो-पघातौ स्याताम् ? । न ह्यमूर्तस्य नभसो मूर्तेर्मलयजज्वलनज्वाला
दिमिस्तौ युज्येते इति भावः । अत्रोत्तरमाह—‘जह विण्णाणार्हणमित्यादि’
यथाऽमूर्तानामपि विज्ञान-विशिदिपा-धृति-स्मृत्यादिजीवधर्माणां मूर्तेरपि
मदिरापान-हृत्पूर विष-पिपीलिकादिभिर्मिश्रितैरुपघात क्रियते, पयः-शर्करा-
धृतपूर्णमेपचादिभिस्त्वनुग्रह इत्येवमिहापीति । एतच्च जीवस्यामूर्तत्वमभ्युप-
गम्योक्तम् ॥ ८९ १६३७ ॥

D C—Agnibhūti—In fact, the *amūrta* *ātman* cannot feel joy or sorrow as an *anāgraha* (favour) or *upaghata* (offence) by virtue of a *mūrta* *Karman* just as the *amūrta* *akāśa* is neither supported nor damaged by the *mūrta* sandalwood or fire-flame

Ācārya—Desire for discussion of *vijnana*, moral courage remembrance etc are the *amūrta* qualities of soul These qualities are weakened by taking wine, poison and a white thornapple etc.† and are nourished by taking the *mūrta* drugs which contain

† Popularly known as *dhaturā* in Western India.

milk, *ghee*, sugar-candy etc So the *amūrta jīva* is also nourished or weakened by the *mūrta Karman*

अहवा नेगंतोऽयं संसारी सब्वा अमुत्तो ति ।

जमणाइकम्मसंतइपरिणामवन्नरूवो सो ॥ ९० ॥ (१६३८)

Ahavā neganto'yam samsārī savvahā amutto tti ।

Jamanāikammasantaiparināmavannarūvo so ॥ 90 (1631)

[अथवा नैकान्तोऽयं संसारी सर्वथाऽमूर्त इति ।

यदनादिकर्मसन्ततिपरिणामापन्नरूपः सः ॥ ९० ॥ (१६३८)

Athavā naikānto'yam samsārī sarvathā'mūrta iti ।

Yadanādikarmasantatiparināmāpannarūpaḥ sah ॥ 90 (1638)]

Trans —90 Or, this *mundane* soul is not entirely *amūrta* in the extreme For, it has attained an alteration in the continuous range of *Karman*, which has no beginning (1638)

टीका—अथवा, नायमेकान्तो यदुत—संसारी जीवः सर्वथाऽमूर्त इति ।
कुतः ? । यद् यस्मादनादिकर्मसन्ततिपरिणामापन्नं ब्रह्मययः पिण्डन्यायेना-
नादिकर्मसंतानपरिणतिस्वरूपतां प्राप्तं रूपं यस्य स तथा । ततश्च मूर्तकर्मणः
कथञ्चिदनन्यत्वाद् मूर्तोऽपि कथञ्चिज्जीवः । इति मूर्तेन कर्मणा भवत एव
तस्यानुग्रहो-पघातौ, नभसस्त्वमूर्तत्वाद्, अचेतनत्वाच्च तौ न भवत एवेति
॥ ९० (१६३८) ॥

D C—Or, this *samsārī jīva* is also not wholly *amūrta* because it has assumed an alteration distinct from the expanse of *Karman* *Ātman* is attached to *Karman* as *agni* is attached to an iron-rod Now, since *Karman* is *mūtra* and *ātman* is similar to *Karman* to a certain extent, the *ātman* is also *mūrta* to a certain extent even though it is *amūrta* by its *svabhāva* Consequently, the *amūrta* and lustrous *jīva* feels *anugraha* or *upaghāta* by virtue of a *mūrta Karman* while *ākāśa* being *amūrta* and *acetana* feels neither *anugraha* or *upaghāta*.

Then how is the *Karma-santāna* born? The reply is:—

सन्तानोऽणाई उ परोप्पर हेउहेउभावाओ ।

देहस्स य कम्मस्स य गोयम ! वीय—कुराण व ॥९१॥ (१६३९)

Santāno nāi u paropparam heuheubhāvāo ।

Dehassa ya kammaṣṣa ya Goyama ! biyam-kuraṇaṃ va ॥91(1639)

[सन्तानोऽनादिस्तु परस्परं हेतुहेतुभावात् ।

देहस्य च कर्मणश्च गौतम ! बीजा—कुरयोरिव ॥ ९१ ॥ (१६३९)

Santāno nādistu parasparam hetuhetubhavat :

Dehasya ca karmaṇaśca Gautama ! bījāṅkurayoriva ॥ 91 (1639)]

Trans —91 And O Gautama ! as Karman and body are mutually related as the causes of each other like the seed and sprout the continuous range of Karman will have no beginning (1639)

टीका—अनादिः कर्मणः सन्तान इति प्रतिज्ञा । दहकर्मणोः परस्परं हेतुहेतुमद्भावादिति इतुः । बीजा—कुरयोरिवेति दृष्टान्तः । यथा बीजेनाङ्कुरो जन्यते, अङ्कुरादपि क्रमेण बीजमुपजायते, एव देहेन कर्म जन्यते, कर्मणा तु देह इत्येवं पुनः पुनरपि परस्परमनादिकालीनहेतुहेतुमद्भावादित्यर्थः । इह ययोरन्योऽन्यं हेतुहेतुमद्भावास्तयोरनादिः सन्तानः, यथा बीजा—कुर-पितृपुत्रादीनाम्, तथा च देह—कर्मणोः, ततोऽनादिः कर्मसन्तान इति ॥ ९१ (१६३९) ॥

D O—The expanse of Karman has no beginning as deha and Karman are related to each other as hetu and hetumat Just as a sprout is born of seed and the seed in turn is produced from the sprout; in the same way Karman is also produced from deha and deha in turn is born of Karman. Thus deha and Karman are related as the causes of each other like bīja and ākura. So just as the continuous range of bīja and ākura or pūā and mārā is anādi; that of deha and Karman should also be anādi

Karman can be established by means of *Veda-vacana* also—

कम्मे चासइ गोयम ! जमग्गिहोत्ताइ सग्गकामस्स ।
वेयविहियं विहण्णइ दाणाइफलं च लोयम्मि ॥९२॥ (१६४०)

Kamme cāsaḥ Goyama ! jamaggihoṭṭāḥ sagga-kāmaḥsaḥ ।
Veyavihiyam vihaṇṇaḥ dāṇāḥphalam ca loyammi ॥ 92 (1640)

[कर्मणि चासति गौतम ! यदग्निहोत्रादि स्वर्गकामस्य ।
वेदविहितं विहन्यते दानादिफलं च लोके ॥ ९२ ॥ (१६४०) ॥

Karmanī cāsati Gautama ! yadagnihoṭtrādi svargakāmasya ।
Veda-viḥitam vihanyate dānādi phalam ca loke ॥ 92 (1640)]

Trans —92 If, *O Gautama* ! the existence of *Karman* is denied, rites like the performance of Sacred-fire for a person aspiring for Salvation and the reward of munificence etc in this world prescribed by the *Veda*, would be refuted. (1640).

टीका—कर्मणि चास्सति गौतम ! अग्निहोत्रादिना स्वर्गकामस्य वेदविहितं यत् किमपि स्वर्गादिफलं तद् विहन्यते, स्वर्गादिः शुभकर्महेतुत्वात्, तस्य च भवताऽनभ्युपगमात् । लोके च यद् दानादिक्रियाणां फलं स्वर्गादिकं प्रसिद्धं तदपि विहन्येत । अयुक्तं चेदम्, “ किरियाफलभावाओ दाणाईणं फलं किसीए व ” इत्यादिना प्रतिविहितत्वादिति ॥ ९२ (१६४०) ॥

D C—If *O Gautama* ! The existence of *Karman* is denied the commandment of *Vedas* that a person desiring to attain Salvation can do so by performing *agnihotra* etc would be null and void Again, the wellknown *phalas* like *svarga* etc prescribed for actions like *dāna* etc would also be refuted, if you don't believe in *Karman* But that is not proper as it is opposed by “*Kiriyāphala bhāvāo dānāḥnam phalam kisiḥe vvaḥ*” etc Hence you shall have to accept *Karman* with its *anādi santāna*

Then how is the *Karma-santāna* born ? The reply is —

सन्तानोऽणाई उ परोप्पर हेउहेउभावाओ ।

देहस्स य कम्मस्स य गोयम ! धीय-कुराण व ॥९१॥ (१६३९)

Santāno nāi u paropparam heuheubhāvāo ।

Dehassa ya kammaassa ya Goyama ! bhiyam-kurāṇam va ॥91(1639)

[सन्तानोऽनादिस्तु परस्परं हेतुहेतुमाणात् ।

देहस्य च कर्मण्यथ गौतम ! धीया-कुरयोरिव ॥ ९१ ॥ (१६३९)

Santāno nādistu parasparam hetuhetubhavaṭ ।

Dehasya ca karmapaśca Gautama ! bhiṅkurayoriva ॥ 91 (1639)

Trans—91 And, *O Gautama* ! as *Karman* and body are mutually related as the causes of each other like the seed and sprout the continuous range of *Karman* will have no beginning (1639)

टीका-अनादिः कर्मणः सन्तान इति प्रतिष्ठा । देहकर्मणोः परस्परं हेतुहेतुमङ्गावादिति हेतुः । धीया-कुरयोरिवेति दृष्टान्तः । यथा धीजेनाऽकुरो जल्पते, अकुरादपि क्रमेण धीजमुपजायते, एवं देहेन कर्म जल्पते, कर्मणा तु देह इत्येवं पुनः पुनरपि परस्परमनादिकालीनहेतुहेतुमङ्गावादित्यर्थः । इह ययोरन्योऽन्य हेतुहेतुमङ्गावस्त्वयोरनादिः सन्तानः, यथा धीया-कुर-पितृपुत्रादीनाम्, तथा च देह-कर्मणोः, सतोऽनादिः कर्मसन्तान इति ॥ ९१ (१६३९) ॥

D C—The expanse of *Karman* has no beginning as *deha* and *Karman* are related to each other as *hetu* and *hetumat*. Just as a sprout is born of seed and the seed in turn is produced from the sprout; in the same way *Karman* is also produced from *deha* and *deha* in turn is born of *Karman*. Thus *deha* and *Karman* are related as the causes of each other like *bija* and *mukura*. So just as the continuous range of *bija* and *mukura* or *putā* and *putra* is *anādi*; that of *deha* and *Karman* should also be *anādi*.

Karman can be established by means of *Veda-vacana* also—

कम्मे चासइ गोयम ! जमग्गिहोत्ताइ सग्गकामस्स ।
वेयविहियं विहण्णइ दाणाइफलं च लोयम्मि ॥९२॥ (१६४०)

Kamme cāsaḥ Goyama ! jamagghihottāḥ saggakāmassa ।
Veyavihiyam vihanṇaḥ dāṇāḥ phalam ca loyammi ॥ 92 (1640)

[कर्मणि चासति गौतम ! यदग्निहोत्रादि स्वर्गकामस्य ।
वेदविहितं विहन्यते दानादिफलं च लोके ॥ ९२ ॥ (१६४०) ॥

Karmanī cāsati Gautama ! yadagnihotrādi svargakāmasya ।
Veda-viḥitam vihanyate dānādi phalam ca loke ॥ 92 (1640)]

Trans—92 If, *O Gautama* ! the existence of *Karman* is denied, rites like the performance of Sacred-fire for a person aspiring for Salvation and the reward of munificence etc in this world prescribed by the *Veda*, would be refuted. (1640).

टीका—कर्मणि चासति गौतम ! अग्निहोत्रादिना स्वर्गकामस्य वेदविहितं यत् किमपि स्वर्गादिफलं नद् विहन्यते, स्वर्गादेः शुभकर्महेतुत्वात्, तस्य च भवताऽनभ्युपगमात् । लोके च यद् दानादिक्रियाणां फलं स्वर्गादिकं प्रसिद्धं तदपि विहन्येत । अयुक्तं चेदम्, “ किरियाफलभावाओ दाणाईणं फलं किसीए व ” इत्यादिना प्रतिविहितत्वादिति ॥ ९२ (१६४०) ॥

D C—If *O Gautama* ! The existence of *Karman* is denied the commandment of *Vedas* that a person desiring to attain Salvation can do so by performing *agnihotra* etc would be null and void. Again, the wellknown *phalas* like *svarga* etc prescribed for actions like *dāna* etc would also be refuted, if you don't believe in *Karman* But that is not proper as it is opposed by “*Kiṇṇiāphala bhāvāo dāṇāṇam phalam kiṇṇe vvaṭṭa*” etc Hence you shall have to accept *Karman* with its *anāda santāna*

On the non-apprehension of *Karman* if *Īśvara* etc were taken to be the creators of the manifold variations in the world a number of difficulties would arise

कम्ममणिच्छतो वा सुद्ध चिय जीवमीसराइ वा ।

मण्णसि देहाईण ज कचार न सो जुत्तो ॥ ९३ ॥ (१६४१)

उवगरणाभावाओ निषेद्धा-ऽमुत्तयाइओ वा वि ।

ईसरदेहारमे वि तुल्लया वाऽणवत्था वा ॥ ९४ ॥ (१६४२)

Kammamanicchanto vā suddham ciya jivamsarāim vā ।

Mannasi dehāṇam jam kattāram na so jutto ॥ 93 (1641)

Uvagaranābhāvāo nicceṭṭhā muttayālo vā vi ।

Īsaradehārambhe vi tullayā vā navatthā vā ॥ 94 (1642)

[कर्मानिच्छन् वा शुद्धमेव जीवमीशरादि वा ।

मन्यसे देहादीनां य कर्तारं न स युक्तः ॥ ९३ ॥ (१६४१) ॥

उपकरणामावाद् निषेधा-ऽमूर्तवादिसो वापि ।

ईशरदेहारम्भेऽपि तुल्यता वाऽनवस्था वा ॥ ९४ ॥ (१६४२) ॥

Karmanicchan vā suddhameva jivamśvarādim vā ।

Manyase dehādīnam yam kartāram na sa yuktah ॥ 93 (1641)

Upakarapabhavad niśeṣa- mūrtatadito vāpi ।

Īśvaradehārambhe pi tulyatā vā navasthā vā ॥ 94 (1642)

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टीका—कर्म वाऽनिच्छन्नग्निभूते गौतम ! यं कर्मरहितत्वात् शुद्धमेव जीवमात्मानमीश्वराव्यक्तकाल-नियति-यदृच्छादिक वा देहादीनां कर्तारं मन्यसे, तत्राप्युच्यते—नासौ शुद्धजीवे-श्वरादिः कर्ता युज्यत इति ॥

टीका—नायमीश्वरजीवादिरकर्मा शरीरादिकार्याण्यारभते, उपकरणाभावात्, दण्डाद्युपकरणरहितकुलालवत् । न च कर्म विना शरीराद्यात्मभे जीवादीनामन्यदुपकरणं घटते, गर्भाद्यवस्थास्वन्योपकरणासंभवात्, शुक्र-शोणितादि ग्रहणस्याप्यकर्मणोऽनुपपत्तेः । अथवा, अन्यथा प्रयोगः क्रियते—“निचेष्टेत्यादि” नाकर्मा शरीराद्यारभते, निश्चेष्टत्वात्, आकाशवत्, तथाऽमूर्तत्वात्, आदिशब्दादशरीरत्वात्, निष्क्रियत्वात्, सर्वगतत्वात्, आकाशवदेव, तथा, एकत्वात्, एकपरमाणुवदित्यादि । अथोच्यते—शरीरवानीश्वरः, सर्वाण्यपि देहादिकार्याण्यारभते । नन्वीश्वरदेहारम्भेऽपि तर्हि तुल्यता पर्यनुयोगस्य, तथाहि—अकर्मा नारभते निजशरीरमीश्वरः, निरुपकरणत्वात्, दण्डादिरहितकुलालवदिति । अथान्यः कोऽपीश्वर स्तच्छरीरात्मभाय प्रवर्तते । ततः सोऽपि शरीरवान्, अशरीरो वा ? । यद्यशरीरः, तर्हि नारभते, निरुपकरणत्वात्, इत्यादि सैव वक्तव्यता । अथ शरीरवान्, तर्हि तच्छरीरारम्भे तुल्यता, सोऽप्यकर्मा निजशरीरं नारभते, निरुपकरणत्वादित्यादि । अथ तच्छरीरमन्यः शरीरवानारभते । अतस्तस्याप्यन्यः, तस्याप्यन्य इत्येवमनवस्था । अनिष्टं च सर्वमेतत् । तस्माद्नेश्वरो देहादीनां कर्ता, किन्तु कर्ममद्वितीयो जीव एव । निष्प्रयोजनश्चेश्वरो देहादीन् कुर्वन्नुन्मच्चकल्प एव स्यात्, सप्रयोजनकर्तृत्वे पुनरनीश्वरत्वप्रसङ्गः । न चानादिशुद्धस्य देहादिकरणेच्छा युज्यते, तस्या रागविकल्परूपत्वात्, इत्याद्यत्र बहुवक्तव्यम्, ग्रन्थगहनताप्रसङ्गात् नोच्यत इति । अनेनैव विधानेन विष्णु-ब्रह्मादयोऽपि प्रत्युक्ता द्रष्टव्या इति ॥ ९३-९४ (१६४१-१६४२) ॥

D C—O *Agnibhūti Gautama* ! Leaving the *Karman* aside, it is absolutely improper to accept any one of *jīva*, *Īśvara*, *kāla* (Time) *avyakta* (*Viśnu*) *nyati* (Destiny) or *yadrucchā* (self-will) to be the *kartā* of *deha* etc

It is not possible for *jīva* and *Īśvara* etc, to accomplish *Kāryas* such as *saṁśāra* etc, without the help of *Karman Jīva*

On the non-apprehension of *Karmān* if *Īśvara* etc. were taken to be the creators of the manifold variations in the world a number of difficulties would arise

कम्ममणिच्छतो वा सुद्ध चिय जीवमीसराइ वा ।

मण्णसि देहाईण ज कत्तार न सो जुत्तो ॥ ९३ ॥ (१६४१)

उवगरणाभावाओ निञ्चेट्ठा-ऽमुत्तयाइओ वा वि ।

ईसरदेहारभे वि तुल्लया वाणवत्था वा ॥ ९४ ॥ (१६४२)

Kammamanicchanto vā suddham ciya jīvamīsaraīm vā ।

Mannasi dehāīṇam jam kattāram na so jutto ॥ 93 (1641)

Uvagarāṇābhāvāo niccettṭhā muttayāo vā vi ।

Isaradehārambhe vi tullayā vā navattṭhā vā ॥ 94 (1642)

[कर्मानिच्छन् वा सुद्धमेव जीवमीशरादि वा ।

मन्यसे देहादीनां यं कर्तारं न स युक्तः ॥ ९३ ॥ (१६४१) ॥

उपकरणभावाद् निषेष्टा-ऽमूर्तवादितो वापि ।

ईश्वरदेहारम्भेऽपि तुल्यता वाऽनवस्था वा ॥ ९४ ॥ (१६४२) ॥

Karmānīcchan vā suddhameva jīvamīśvarādīm vā ।

Manyase dehādīnām yaṁ kartāram na sa yuktah ॥ 93 (1641)

Upakaraṇābhāvad niṣeṣṭa- mūrtatādito vāpi ।

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purpose If *Īs'vara* creates body without any purpose he would be taken as frantic, and if he does so with some intention he would lose his *Īs'varatva* For a *siddha* and *anādi ātman* is not expected to cherish desire for creating *deha* etc, as desire is one of the forms of illusion and so on A number of such arguments could be advanced in this connection, but for fear of *grantha-vistāra* (extension of the work) they are not stated here But in line of the arguments stated above it can also be proved that neither *Brahmā* nor *Viṣṇu* nor any one else can be taken as the *Kartā* of *śarīra* etc

Īs'vara therefore is not acceptable as the creator of *śarīra* etc, from any point of view, but *jīva* accompanied by the *upakarana Karman*, should alone be accepted as the *Kartā* of *śarīra* etc

अहव सहावं मन्नसि विण्णाणघणाइवेयवुत्ताओ ।
तह बहुदोसं गोयम ! ताणं च पयाणमयमत्थो ॥२५॥ (१६४३)

Ahava sahāvam mannasi vinnana ghanāi Veyavuttāo ।
Taha bahudosam Goyama ! tāṇam ca pavānamayamattho ॥95॥(1643)

[अथवा स्वभाव मन्यसे विज्ञानघनादिवेदोक्तात् ।

तथा बहुदोषं गौतम ! तेषां च पदानामयमर्थः ॥ ९५ ॥ (१६४३)

Athavā svabhāvam manyase vijñānaghanadivedoktāt ।
Tathā bahudosam Gautama ! tesāṃ ca padānamayamarthah ॥95॥(1643)

Trans —95 Again, O *Gautama* ! if you think *svabhāvam* (to be the *kartā* of *śarīra* etc), from the sentences of the *Vedas* such as “ *viññāna ghana* ” etc, a number of difficulties will arise But (*ca*) the real interpretation of those sentences is this

टीका—अथ “विज्ञानघन एवैतेभ्यो भूतेभ्यः” इत्यादि वेदवचनश्रवणात्
स्वभावं देहादीनां कर्तारं मन्यसे, यतः केचिदाहुः—

cannot accomplish objects like *śarīra* on account of the following reasons —

(1) If *jīva* is presumed to be the *Karta* of *śarīra* etc it must have some means to produce them. Just as a potter cannot produce a *ghaṭa* without the help of an *upakarana* like *danda* so also *jīva* cannot accomplish *Kāryas* like *śīra* in absence of an *upakarana*. Now *jīva* is not supposed to have any other *upakarana* except *Karman* in producing *śarīra* etc. For no other *upakarana* except *Karman* can exist in the state of embryo etc.

(2) In the process of accomplishment of *Kāryas* like *śarīra* *jīva* would not be able to suck up semen blood etc. without the help of *Karman*.

(3) *Jīva* cannot accomplish *śarīra* etc. on account of its inactive incorporeal and all pervading nature like *ākāśa*.

Again it is useless to believe that *śarīratvān* *Īśvara* produces each and every object such as *deha* etc. Because the above-mentioned difficulties are bound to arise in that case also. In absence of an *upakarana* *Īśvara* like a potter without a *danda* is not supposed to create his own body. Now here if it is assumed that a second *Īśvara* creates the body of this *Īśvara* consider whether that *Īśvara* has a body or not. If he has no body it is clear from what has already been discussed that he cannot create *śarīra* in absence of an *upakarana*. But if it is said that a third *Īśvara* having a body creates the body of this *Īśvara* a fourth *Īśvara* shall have to be supposed to create the body of the third one and a fifth *Īśvara* to create that of the fourth one and so on until ultimately it results in an *anavastha* which is not at all desirable.

Thus it is clear that *Īśvara* is not the creator of *śarīra* etc. But in spite of that if it is believed that *Īśvara* creates *śarīra* etc. consider whether he does so with or without any

purpose If *Īśvara* creates body without any purpose he would be taken as frantic, and if he does so with some intention he would lose his *Īśvaratva* For a *siddha* and *anādi ātman* is not expected to cherish desire for creating *deha* etc, as desire is one of the forms of illusion and so on A number of such arguments could be advanced in this connection, but for fear of *grantha-vistāra* (extension of the work) they are not stated here But in line of the arguments stated above it can also be proved that neither *Brahmā* nor *Viṣṇu* nor any one else can be taken as the *Kartā* of *śarīra* etc

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सबहेतुनिराश्रंसं भावानां जन्म वर्धते ।

स्वभाववादिभिस्ते हि नाहुः स्वमपि कारणम् ॥ १ ॥

राजीवकण्टकादीनां वैचित्र्यं कः करोति हि ? ।

मयुरचन्द्रिकादिर्वा विचित्रः केन निर्मित ? ॥ २ ॥

कादाचित्कं पदव्याप्ति निःशेषं तदहेतुकम् ।

यथा कण्टकचैस्त्वेपादि तथा चैते मुत्तादयः ॥ ३ ॥

तदेतच्च यथा त्वं ज्ञायस गौतम ! तथाऽभ्युपगम्यमान बहुदोषमेव; तथाहि — यो देहादीनां कर्ता स्वभावोऽभ्युपगम्यते, स किं वस्तुविशेषो वा, अकारणता वा, वस्तुधर्मो वा, ? इति श्रुती गतिः । तत्र न तावच्च वस्तुविशेषः, तद्व्यापक प्रमाणाभावात् । अप्रमाणकस्याभ्युपगमे कर्मापि किं नाभ्युपगम्यते, तस्यापि त्वदभिप्रेतेनाप्रमाणकत्वात् ? । किञ्च, वस्तुविशेषः स स्वभावो मूर्तो वा स्यात् अमूर्तो वा ? । यदि मूर्तः, तर्हि स्वभाव इति नामान्तरेण कर्मवोक्तं स्यात् । अथामूर्तः, तर्हि नासौ कस्यापि कृता, अमूर्तत्वात्, निरुपकरणत्वाच्च, व्योम वदिति । न च मूर्तस्य शरीरादेः कार्यस्यामूर्त कारणमनुरूपम्, आकाशवदिति । अथाकारणता स्वभाव इष्यते, तत्राप्यभिदध्महे—नन्वेवं सत्यकारण शरीराद्युत्पद्यत इत्यपमर्यः स्यात्, तथा च सति कारणाभावस्य समानत्वाच्च युगपदेवाक्षेपदेहोत्पादप्रसङ्गः । अपि च, इत्यमहेतुकमाकस्मिकं शरीराद्युत्पद्यत इत्यभ्युपगतं भवेत् । एतद्व्यायुक्तमेव, यतो यदहेतुकमाकस्मिकं न तदादिमत्प्रति नियताकारम्, यथाऽभ्रादिषिकारः, आदिमत्प्रतिनियताकारं च शरीरादि । तस्माच्च नाकस्मिकम्, किन्तु कर्महेतुकमेव । प्रतिनियताकारत्वादेव व्योपकरण सहितकर्तृनिर्बन्धमेव शरीरादिकं घटादिवदिति गम्यत एव । न च गर्भाद्य वस्थासु कर्मणोऽन्यदुपकरणं भवति इत्युक्तमेव । अथ वस्तुनो धर्मः स्वभावोऽभ्युपगम्यते । तथाप्यसौ यथात्मधर्मो विज्ञानादिवत्, तर्हि न शरीरादि कारणमसौ, अमूर्तत्वात्, आकाशवत्, इत्यभिहितमेव । अथ मूर्तवस्तुधर्मोऽसौ, तर्हि सिद्धसाध्यता, कर्मणोऽपि पुद्गलास्तिकायपर्यायविशेषत्वेनास्माभिरभ्युपगतत्वादिति ।

अपि च, “ पुरुष एवेद सर्वम् ” इत्यादिवेदवाक्यभवात् मयतः

कर्मास्तित्वसंशयः। एषां हि वेदपदानामयमर्थस्तव चेतसि विपरिवर्तते—पुरुष आत्मा, एवकारोऽवधारणे, स च पुरुषातिरिक्तस्य कर्म-प्रकृती-श्वरादेः सत्ताव्यवच्छेदार्थः, इदं सर्वं—प्रत्यक्षं वर्तमानं चेतनाचेतनस्वरूपम्, “ श्रिं ” इति वाक्यालङ्कारे, यद् भूतम्-अतीतम्, यच्च भाव्यं-भविष्यद् मुक्तिसंसारवपि स एवेत्यर्थः। उतामृतत्वस्येशान इति। उतशब्दोऽप्यर्थः। अपिशब्दश्च समुच्चये। अमृतत्वस्य च अमरणभावस्य मोक्षस्येशानः प्रभुरित्यर्थः। यदन्नेनातिरोहतीति। चशब्दस्य लुप्तस्य दर्शनाद् यच्चाग्नेन-आहारेण, अतिरोहति-अतिशयेन वृद्धिमुपैति। यदेजति-चलति, पश्चादि। यद् नैजति-न चलति पर्वतादि। यद् दूरे मेवादि। यदु अन्तिके-उशब्दोऽवधारणे, यदन्तिके समीपे तदपि पुरुष एवेत्यर्थः। यदन्तः-मध्ये, अस्य-चेतनाचेतनस्य सर्वस्य; यदेव सर्वस्याप्यस्य बाह्यतः, तत् सर्वं पुरुष एवेति। अतस्तद्व्यतिरिक्तस्य कर्मणः किल सत्ता दुःश्रद्धेयेति ते मतिः। तथा, “ विज्ञानघन एवैतेभ्यो भूतेभ्यः ” इत्यादीन्यपि वेदपदानि कर्माभावप्रतिपादकानि मन्यसे त्वम्, अत्राप्येवकारस्य कर्मादिसत्ताव्यवच्छेदपरत्वात्।

तदेवमेतेषां “ पुरुष एवेदम् ” इत्यादीनां “ विज्ञानघन ”—आदीनां च वेदपदानां नायमर्थो यो भवतश्चेतमि वर्तते, किन्तु तेषां पदानामयं भावार्थः—“ पुरुष एवेद सर्वम् ” इत्यादीनि तावत् पुरुषस्तुतिपराणि जात्यादिमदत्यागहेतोरद्वैतभावनाप्रतिपादकानि च वर्तन्ते, न तु कर्मसत्ता-व्यवच्छेदकानि। वेदवाक्यानि हि कानिचिद् विधिवादपराणि, कान्यप्यर्थ-वादप्रधानानि, अपराणि त्वनुवादपराणि। तत्र “ अग्निहोत्रं जुहुयात् स्वर्गकामः ” इत्यादीनि विधिवादपराणि। अर्थवादस्तु द्विधा-स्तुत्यर्थवादः, निन्दार्थवादश्च। तत्र “ पुरुष एवेदं सर्वम् ” इत्यादिकः स्तुत्यर्थवादः तथा तत्र “ स सर्वविद् यस्यैषा महिषा भुवि दिव्ये ब्रह्मपुरे ह्येष व्योम्नि आत्मासु प्रतिष्ठितस्तमक्षरं वेदयते यस्तु स सर्वज्ञः सर्ववित् सर्वमेवाविवेश ” इति; तथा, “ एकया पूर्णयाहूत्या सर्वान् कामानवाप्नोति ” इत्यादिकश्च सर्वोऽपि स्तुत्यर्थवादः। “ एकया पूर्णया ” इत्यादिविधिवादोऽपि कस्माद् न भवति? इति चेत्। उच्यते—शेषस्याग्निहोत्राद्यानुष्ठानस्य वैयर्थ्यप्रसङ्गादिति। “ एषः वः प्रथमो यज्ञो योऽग्निष्टोमः योऽग्नेनानिष्ठाज्येन यजते स गर्तमभ्यपतत् ” अत्र

पञ्चमेधादीनां प्रथमकरणं निन्द्यत इत्ययं निन्दार्थवाद् ॥ “श्रद्धासाः संवत्सरः” “अमिरुष्णः” “अमिर्हिमस्य मेघजम्” इत्यादीनि तु वेदवाक्यान्त्यनुवादप्रधानानि, लोकप्रसिद्धस्यैवार्थस्यैतेष्वनुवादादिति ।

तस्मात् “पुरुष एवेदं सत्तम्” इत्यादीनि वेदपदानि स्तुत्यर्थवाद् प्रधानानि द्रष्टव्यानि । “विज्ञानघन एवैतेभ्यः” इत्यत्राप्ययमर्थः—विज्ञानघनाख्यः पुरुष एवायं भूतेभ्योऽर्थान्तरं वर्तते । स च कर्ता, कार्यं च शरीरादिकमिति प्राक् साधितमेव । ततश्च कर्तृकार्याभ्यामर्थान्तरं करणमनुमीयते; तथाहि—यत्र कर्तृ-कार्यभावस्तत्रावश्यमावि करणम्, यथाऽयस्काराऽयःपिण्डसङ्गावे संदृष्टः यथाऽत्रात्मनः शरीरादिकार्येणैव कर्णमात्रमापद्यते तत् कर्म इति प्रतिपद्यस्व । अपिच, साक्षादेव कर्मसत्ताप्रतिपादकानि श्रूयन्त एव वेदवाक्यानि, तथा—“पुण्यः पुण्येन कर्मणा पापः पापेन कर्मणा” इत्यादि । तस्मादागमादपि सिद्धं प्रतिपद्यस्व कर्मेति ॥ ९५ (१६४३) ॥

D C—You too *O Agnibhūta*! like others presume *svabhāva* and *svabhāva* only to be the *kartā* of *deha* etc on hearing the *Vedapadas* such as “*Vijnānaghana evaitebhyo bhūtebhyah*” etc. It is therefore said by some people that—

Sarvāhetunirāśamsam bhavanam janma varṇyate |
Svabhāvaavadibhiste hi naḥuḥ svamapī karaṇam || 1 ||

Rajīvakantakadīnam valōitryam kaḥ karoti hi ! |
Mayūracandrikadīrva vōitralī kona nirmutah || 2 ||

Kadaścikam yadatrasti nīḥśevah tadāhetukam |
Yatha kaptakataikāpyadi tatha caito sukhadayah || 3 ||

So *Gautama*! If you also hold the same view., viz., that *svabhāva* is the *kartā* of *deha* etc a number of *doṣas* will crop up. In the first instance consider whether *svabhāva* is (1) a *vastuśeṣa* (an object in particular) or (2) a-*karanata* (causelessness) itself or (3) *vastudharma* (quality of an object).

(1) *Śvabhāva* can never be recognized as a *vastuśeṣa* as there exists no *pramāṇa* (ground of assurance) to prove

that it is a *vastu*. Now here, if you are prepared to accept an *a-pramāṇaka* (unauthorized) *vastu* as the *vastu* itself, you should also accept *Karman* as a *vastu*, for according to you, *Karman* is also *a-pramāṇaka*. Secondly, if that *svabhāva* is *vastuvis'eṣa*, is it *mūṛta* or *amūṛta* ? If it is *mūṛta*, it is nothing but *Karman* with a synonym of *svabhāva*. If it is *amūṛta* it is not supposed to have any sort of *upakāraṇa* and hence like *ākāśa* it can never be a *kāṛtā* of any object. Moreover, it is improper to accept an *amūṛta svabhāva* to be the *kāraṇa* of a *mūṛta kārya* such as *deha* etc. So, it is clear that *svabhāva* is not a *vastuvis'eṣa* in any case.

2 If *svabhāva* were supposed to be *a-kāraṇatā*, all objects will have to be taken as being produced without cause and *Kāraṇa* will be absent uniformly at all places, consequently all objects will have to be supposed to have been produced accidentally all at a time. But it would be absurd to believe like that. For one that is produced spontaneously without any reason, does never possess, like the *vikāras* of *abhra* etc, a beginning or a definite form. Objects like *s'asīṇa* should never be believed to have been born without cause, because they are produced by means of *Karman*, they are *ādimān* and they possess a definite form as that of a *ghata*. This shows that such objects are produced by a *kāṛtā* by means of an *upakāraṇa*, and *Karman* is the only possible *upakāraṇa* in the state of embryo. So, *Karman* ought to be accepted as its real *hetu* and not the *svabhāva*.

3 Now, consider if *svabhāva* can be taken as a *vastu-dharma*. If *svabhāva* is supposed to be the quality of a *vastu* like *ātman* it would be *amūṛta* like *ākāśa* and hence it would not become the cause of *sarīra* etc. But there would be no objection if *svabhāva* were taken to be the quality of a *mūṛta* object. For, in that case, *Karman* will become a *paryāya* of the *svabhāva* of a *mūṛta* object. So, we have no objection in accepting *svabhāva* as a *dharma* of the *mūṛta* object.

पशुमेवादीनां प्रथमकरण निन्द्यत इत्ययं निन्दार्थवादः ॥ “ द्वादशमासाः संवत्सरः ” “ अग्निरुष्ण ” “ अग्निर्हिमस्य मेघन्म ” इत्यादीनि तु वेदवाक्यान्यनुवादप्रधानानि, लोकप्रसिद्धस्यैवार्थस्यैतेष्वनुवादादिति ।

तस्मात् “ पुरुष एवेद सर्वम् ” इत्यादीनि वेदपदानि स्तुत्यर्थवाद् प्रधानानि द्रष्टव्यानि । “ विद्वानघन एवैतेभ्यः ” इत्यत्राप्ययमर्थः— विद्वानघनाख्यः पुरुष एवायं भूतेभ्योऽर्थान्तरं वर्तते । स च कर्ता, कार्यं च शरीरादिकमिति प्राक् साधितमेव । ततश्च कर्तृकार्याभ्यामर्थान्तरं करणमनुमीयते; तथाहि—यत्र कर्तृ-कार्यमात्रस्तथावश्यमात्रं करणम्, यथाऽयस्काराऽयःपिण्डसद्भावे संदृष्टः यथात्रात्मनः शरीरादिकार्यनिवृत्तौ करणमावमापद्यते तत् कर्म इति प्रतिपद्यस्व । अपिच, साक्षादेव कर्मसचाप्रतिपादकानि भुवन्त एव वेदवाक्यानि, तद्यथा—“ पुण्यः पुण्येन कर्मणा पापः पापेन कर्मणा ” इत्यादि । तस्मादागमादपि सिद्धं प्रतिपद्यस्व कर्मेति ॥ ९५ (१६४३) ॥

D C—You too *O Agnēśīta* ' like others presume *svabhāva* and *svabhāva* only to be the *kartā* of *deha* etc. on hearing the *Vedapadas* such as “ *Vijñānaghāna evaitebhyo bhūtebhyah* etc. It is therefore said by some people that—

*Sarvāhetunirāśamaṁ bhāvanam janma varpyate ।
Svabhāvavadibhūte hi nāhuḥ svamapī karaṇam ॥ १ ॥
Rajivakantakadīnam vaicitryam kaḥ karoti hi ? ।
Mayūracandrikadīva vicitraḥ kena nirmitaḥ ॥ २ ॥
Kadacitkam yadatrasti nihśeṣaḥ tadāhetukam ।
Yathā kṣiptakataikāpyadī tathā cante sukhadayaḥ ॥ ३ ॥*

So *Gautama* ' If you also hold the same view viz. that *svabhāva* is the *kartā* of *deha* etc. a number of *doxas* will crop up. In the first instance consider whether *svabhāva* is (1) a *vastuvisesā* (an object in particular) or (2) a-*kāraṇata* (causelessness) itself or (3) *vastudharma* (quality of an object).

(1) *Svabhāva* can never be recognized as a *vastuvisesā* as there exists no *pramāṇa* (ground of assurance) to prove

that it is a *vastu*. Now here, if you are prepared to accept an *a-pramāṇaku* (unauthorized) *vastu* as the *vastu* itself, you should also accept *Karman* as a *vastu*, for according to you, *Karman* is also *a-pramāṇaku*. Secondly, if that *svabhāva* is *vastuvis'eṣa*, is it *mūrta* or *amūrta*? If it is *mūrta*, it is nothing but *Karman* with a synonym of *svabhāva*. If it is *amūrta* it is not supposed to have any sort of *upakāraṇa* and hence like *ākāś'a* it can never be a *kartā* of any object. Moreover, it is improper to accept an *amūrta svabhāva* to be the *kāraṇa* of a *mūrta kārya* such as *deha* etc. So, it is clear that *svabhāva* is not a *vastuvis'eṣa* in any case.

2 If *svabhāva* were supposed to be *a-kāraṇatā*, all objects will have to be taken as being produced without cause and *Kāraṇa* will be absent uniformly at all places, consequently all objects will have to be supposed to have been produced accidentally all at a time. But it would be absurd to believe like that. For one that is produced spontaneously without any reason, does never possess, like the *vikāras* of *abhra* etc, a beginning or a definite form. Objects like *s'arīra* should never be believed to have been born without cause, because they are produced by means of *Karman*, they are *ādimān* and they possess a definite form as that of a *ghata*. This shows that such objects are produced by a *kartā* by means of an *upakāraṇa*, and *Karman* is the only possible *upakāraṇa* in the state of embryo. So, *Karman* ought to be accepted as its real *hetu* and not the *svabhāva*.

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पशुपेवादीनां प्रथमकरण निन्द्यत इत्ययं निन्दार्थवादः ॥ “ द्वादशमासाः संवत्सरः ” “ अग्निरुष्णः ” “ अग्निर्हिमस्य मेघजम् ” इत्यादीनि तु वेदवाक्यान्पनुवादप्रधानानि, लोकप्रसिद्धस्यैवार्थस्यैतेष्वनुवादादिति ।

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D O—You too O Agnibhuṣ! like others presume svabhāva and svabhāva only to be the kartā of deha etc on hearing the Vedapadas such as Vynānaghana evaitebhyo bhutobhyah etc It is therefore said by some people that—

*Sarvāhetunirāsamam bhāvanam janma varpyate |
Svabhāvavadibhiste hi nahuḥ avamapi karaṇam || 1 ||*

*Rajivakantakadinam vacitryam kaḥ karoti hi |
Mayūracandrikadīva vicitraḥ kena nirmitaḥ || 2 ||*

*Kadācitkam yadatrastī nīhāṇaḥ tadāhetukam |
Yatha kaptakataikāpyadī tatha calte sukha-dayaḥ || 3 ||*

So *Gautama* ! If you also hold the same view *viz.* that *svabhāva* is the *kartā* of *deha* etc. a number of *dopas* will crop up In the first instance consider whether *svabhāva* is (1) a *vastuvisēṣa* (an object in particular) or (2) a-*kāranata* (causelessness) itself or (3) *vastuḍharmā* (quality of an object).

(1) *Svabhāva* can never be recognized as a *vastuvisēṣa* as there exists no *pramāṇa* (ground of assurance) to prove

of *Vidhivāda* But if it illustrates *Vidhivāda*, the rest of the *anusthānas* like *agnihotra* would be of no avail.

In the sentence “ *esa vaha prathamo yajno yo'gnistomaah, yo'nenānistavānyena yajate sa gartamabhyapatat* ” the sacrifice of animals is censured and hence it illustrates the *nindārtha-vāda* Lastly *Veda-vākyas* such as “ *dvādaśamāsāḥ samvat saraḥ* ” “ *agnirusanah* ” “ *agni rhimasya bheśajam* ” etc, are *anuvāda pradhāna* as they state mere explanatory repetitions of well-known facts

It is, therefore, clear that *Vedapadas* like “ *purusa evedam sarvam* ” are meant to illustrate the *stuti—arthavāda*

“ *Vijnāna ghana evatebhyah* ” etc can be interpreted in this way—*Atman*, as an assemblage of *knowledge* is distinct from *bhūtas* and it itself is the *kartā* of the *kāryas* such as *śarīra* etc Now that, it has become the *kartā* it must have a *karana* (instrument) to accomplish the *Kāryas* For, wherever there are *kartā* and *kārya* there ought to be *karana* also Like a forceps in the case of a blacksmith and iron-rod, *Karman* is used as an instrument in the accomplishment of *Kāryas* like *śarīra* by *Ātman* So, you shall have to accept the existence of *Karman*

Moreover, *Karman* can be established by the help of *Veda-vacanas* like “ *punyah punyena karmanā, pāpah pāpena karmanā* ” also Thus *Karman* is proved by means of *āgama* also Hence, leave all the doubts aside and know it for certain that *Karman* does exist and *Karman* is the only instrument to accomplish *Kāryas* like *śarīra* etc

छिन्नमि संसयमि जिणेण जरा—मरणविप्पमुक्केण ।

सो समणो पवइओ पंचहिं सह खंडियसएहिं ॥९६॥ (१६४४)

Chinnammi samsayammi Jinena jarā—maranavippamukkenam ।

So samaṇo pavvaio pancāhim saha khandiya saehim ॥96॥(1644)

Moreover *O Agnibhūti* ! you entertain doubt as regards *Karman* by hearing sentences such as ' *puruṣa evadam sarvam* ' of the *Vedas*. According to you the interpretation of those sentences is as follows —

" Everything that is animate and inanimate past and future movable and immovable distant and near interior and exterior everything that is nourished by food and one who is the lord of *mokṣa*—all this is *puruṣa* and *puruṣa* alone. No other object as *Karman* exists as distinct from this *puruṣa*.

Similarly according to you sentences such as " *vyāṇa ghaṇa* " also establish the non-existence of *Karman*. Because in both the above-mentioned *śūtras* you interpret *eva* as referring to the non-existence of *Karman*.

Your interpretation of the *Veda-śūtras* is not correct. Sentences like " *puruṣa evadam* " etc are meant to praise the *ātman* and to establish the *advaita-bhāva* in order to avoid the arrogance of *jñāi* etc but they are not meant to establish the non-existence of *Karman*.

Sentences are generally divided into three kinds :—(1) *Vidhivādapara* : i. e. sentences that are laid down as rules (2) *Arthavādapara* : i. e. sentences that are laid down as the explanatory remarks and (3) *Anuvādapara* : i. e. sentences that are laid down as explanatory repetitions— *Agnihotram yukhyāi svargakāmak* " is an example of *vidhivāda*. *Arthavāda* is of two kinds —(1) *Stuti-arthavāda* and (2) *Nindā arthavāda*. Sentences such as ' *puruṣa evadam sarvam* " etc as well as those *Sa sarvavid yasyaiva mahimā bhūmī vyoḥ brahmapure hyeṣṭī tyomni ātmāsu prathīṣṭastatamāḥ aram vedyaḥ yastu sa sarvayna sarvavi sarvamavavīṣa* " and " *ekayā purnayāśūyā sarvān kāmānavāpnōti* " etc are also the examples of *stuti-arthavāda*.

Again you may raise a question as to why the sentences like " *ekayā purnayā* " etc. be not taken as the illustrations

of *Vidhivāda* But if it illustrates *Vidhivāda*, the rest of the *anusthānas* like *agnihotra* would be of no avail.

In the sentence “ *esa vaha prathamo yajno yo'gnistomaah, yo'nenānistavānyena yajate sa gartamabhyapatat* ” the sacrifice of animals is censured and hence it illustrates the *nindāṭhāvāda* Lastly *Veda-vāhyas* such as “ *dvādaśamāsāh samvat saraḥ* ” “ *agnirushah* ” “ *agni rihmasya bhe'sajam* ” etc, are *anuvāda pradhāna* as they state mere explanatory repetitions of well-known facts

It is, therefore, clear that *Vedapadas* like “ *purusa evedam sarvam* ” are meant to illustrate the *stuti-arthavāda*

“ *Vijnāna ghana evatebhyah* ” etc can be interpreted in this way—*Atman*, as an assemblage of *knowledge* is distinct from *bhūtas* and it itself is the *kartā* of the *kāryas* such as *śarīra* etc Now that, it has become the *kartā* it must have a *karana* (instrument) to accomplish the *Kāryas* For, wherever there are *kartā* and *kārya* there ought to be *karana* also Like a forceps in the case of a blacksmith and iron-rod, *Karman* is used as an instrument in the accomplishment of *Kāryas* like *śarīra* by *Ātman* So, you shall have to accept the existence of *Karman*.

Moreover, *Karman* can be established by the help of *Veda-vacanas* like “ *punyah punyena karmanā, pāpak pāpena karmanā* ” also Thus *Karman* is proved by means of *āgama* also Hence, leave all the doubts aside and know it for certain that *Karman* does exist and *Karman* is the only instrument to accomplish *Kāryas* like *śarīra* etc

छिन्नम्मि संसयम्मि जिणेण जरा-मरणविप्पमुक्केण ।

सो समणो पव्वइओ पंचहिं सह खंडियसएहिं ॥९६॥ (१६४४)

Chinnammi samsayammi Jmena jarā-maranavippamukkenam ।

So samano pavvaio pancamim saha khandiya saehim ॥96॥(1644)

[छिन्ने संशये जिनेन जरा-मरणविप्रमुक्तेन ।

स धममः प्रवर्जितः पञ्चभिः सह स्वष्टिकस्य ॥ ९६ ॥ (१६४४)

Chinno samśayo Jinena jarā maraṇavipramuktena :

Sa śramanaḥ pravrajitaḥ pañcabhiḥ saha khaṇḍikāśataiḥ ९६ (1644)

Trans —96 When the doubt was removed by the *Tīrthaṅkara* who was entirely free from old age and death the saint *Agnibhūti* accepted *Dīkṣā* along with his five hundred pupils. (1644)

End of the Discussion with the Second Gaṇadhara.



Chapter III



तृतीयगणधरवक्तव्यता

Discussion with the Third Ganadhara

ते पव्वइए सोउं तइओ आगच्छइ जिणसगासं ।
वच्चामि वंदामी वंदित्ता पज्जुवासामि ॥ ९७ ॥ (१६४५)

Te pavvaie sòum taio āgacchai Jinasagāsam ।
Vaccāmi vandāmi vandittā pajjuvāsāmi ॥ 97 ॥ (1645)

[तौ प्रव्रजितौ श्रुत्वा तृतीय आगच्छति जिनसकाशम् ।
व्रजामि वन्दे वन्दित्वा पर्युपासे ॥ ९७ ॥ (१६४५)

Tau pravrajitau śrutvā tritīya āgacchatu Jinasakaśam ।
Vrajāmi vande vanditvā paryupāse ॥ 97 ॥ (1645)]

Trans —97 Having heard that both of them (*Indrabhūti* and *Agnibhūti*) had renounced the world, the third (*Ganadhara*) comes before the *Tīrthankara* (He thinks) —I may go, pay my homage and worship him (1645)

टीका—ताविन्दभूत्य—ऽग्निभूती प्रव्रजितौ श्रुत्वा तृतीयो वायुभूतिनामा द्विजोपाध्यायो जिनसकाशमागच्छति सातिशयनिजबन्धुद्वयनिष्क्रमणार्कर्णना-
ज्झगिति विगलिताभिमानो भगवति संजातसर्वज्ञप्रत्ययः सन्नेवमवधार्यागतः—
व्रजामि तत्राहमपि, वन्दे भगवन्तं श्रीमन्महावीरम्, वन्दित्वा च पर्युपासे—
पर्युपास्ति करोमि तस्य भगवत इति ॥ ९७ (१६४५) ॥

D C —On having heard that *Indrabhūti* and *Agnibhūti* had accepted the *Dīkṣā* (and were defeated,) the third *ganadhara* named *Vāyubhūti* approached *Śramana Bhagavān Mahāvīra* with an humble and obedient motive of bowing down to him and worshipping him.

[छिन्ने संशये जिनेन जरा-मरणविप्रमुक्तेन ।

स भ्रमणः प्रयत्नितः पञ्चमिः सह स्वष्टिद्वयतः ॥ ९६ ॥ (१६४४)

Chhino sambhaye Jinena jara maraṇavipramuktena :

Saśraṇaṇaḥ pravrajitaḥ pañcabhiḥ saha khaṇḍikāśatāniḥ96a(1644)]

Trans —96 When the doubt was removed by the *Tīrthaṅkara* who was entirely free from old age and death the saint *Agnibhūll* accepted *Dīksā* along with his five hundred pupils.
(1644)

End of the Discussion with the Second Gaṇadhara.



Ābhattho ya Jīnenam jāi-jarā-maranavippamukkenam ।
Nāmena ya gottena ya savvannū savvadarisī nam ॥ 100 ॥ (1648)

[आभाषितश्च जिनेन जाति-जरा-मरणविप्रमुक्तेन ।

नाम्ना च गोत्रेण च सर्वज्ञेन सर्वदर्शिना ॥ १०० ॥ (१६४८)

Ābhāsitaśca Jinena jāti-jarā-maranavipramuktena ।
Nāmnā ca gotrena ca sarvajñena sarvadarsinā ॥ 100 ॥ (1648)]

Trans — 100 He was addressed by his name and lineage by the *Tirthankara* who was free from birth, old age, and death, who was all-knowing, and who had complete *darśana* (undifferentiated knowledge) (1648)

D C — Although thus respectfully and directly addressed by the Lord and seeing the beauty and splendour of his eminence extending over the three worlds, and being unable to disclose the doubt remaining in his mind, out of agitation *Vāyubhūta* remained silent with amazement But he was again addressed thus —

तज्जीव तस्सरीरं ति संसओ न वि य पुच्छसे किंचि ।

वेयपयाण य अत्थं न याणसी तेसिमो अत्थो ॥१०१॥ (१६४९)

Tajjīva tassarīram ti samsao na vi ya pucchase kimci ।
Veyapayāna ya attham na yānasī tesimo attho ॥ 101 ॥ (1649)

[तज्जीवस्तच्छरीरमिति संशयो नापि च पृच्छसि किञ्चित् ? ।

वेदपदानां चार्थं न जानासि तेषामयमर्थः ॥ १०१ ॥ (१६४९)

Tajjivastaccharīramiti samśayo nāpi ca pucchasi kimcit ? ।
Vedapadanām cārtham na jānāsī tesamayamarthah ॥101॥ (1649)]

Trans — 101 You entertain the doubt as to whether that which is *jīva* is *śarīra* itself and yet you do not ask me (about it) But (*ca*) you do not know the real meaning of *Veda-padas* Here is their real interpretation (1649)

And, what more did he think when he approached ?

सीसत्तेणोवगया सपयमिंद गिभूहणो जस्स ।

तिहूयणकयप्पणामो स महाभागोऽभिगमणिज्जो ॥९८॥ (१६४६)

तदभिगमण—वदणो—वासणाइणा होज्ज पूयपावोऽह ।

वोच्छिण्णससओ वा वोसु पत्तो जिणसगासे ॥९९॥ (१६४७)

Sisattenovagayā sampayaminda-ggibhūṇo jassa ।

Tihūyanakayappanāmo sa mahabbāgo bhigamanijjo ॥98॥ (1646)

Tadobhigamana-vandano-vāsanāṇṇā hojja pūyapāvo ham ।

Vocchina samsao vā vottum patto Jīnasagāse ॥ 99 ॥ (1647)

[क्षिप्यत्वेनोपगतौ सांप्रतमिन्द्राग्निभूती यस्य ।

त्रिभुवनकृतप्रणामः स महाभागोऽभिगमनीयः ॥ ९८ ॥ (१६४६)

तदभिगमन—वन्दनो—पासनादिना भवेय पूतपापोऽहम् ।

व्यवच्छिन्नसंशयो वोक्त्वा प्राप्तो विनसकाशे ॥ ९९ ॥ (१६४७)

Siṣṣatvenopagatau sampratanindrāgnibhūtī yasya ।

Tribhuvanakṛitapraṇāmah sa mahabbhago'bhigamanīyaḥ ॥98॥ (1646)]

Tadabhigamana-vandano-pāśanādina bhavo'jam pūtapapo ham

Vyavacchinnaśaśayo vokta prapto Jīnasakaśe ॥ 99 ॥ (1647)]

Trans —98-99 I should approach the revered *Bhagvān Mahāvīra* whom *Indrabhūti* and *Agnibhūti* have recently accepted as their preceptor and to whom (people of) the three worlds pay their obeisances Having approached him, I shall get myself purged of sins by bowing down to him and worshipping him, and I shall get my doubts cleared." Having said so he came to *Śramaṇa Bhagvān Mahāvīra* (1646-1647).

Then what next ?

आभट्ठो य जिणेण जाह-जरा-मरणाविप्पमुक्केणं ।

नामेण य गोत्तेण य सव्वण्णू सव्वदरिसी ण ॥१००॥ (१६४८)

Ābhattho ya Jinenam jāi-jarā-maranavippamukkenam ।
Nāmena ya gottena ya savvannū savvadarisī nam ॥ 100 ॥ (1648)

[आभाषितश्च जिनेन जाति-जरा-मरणविप्रमुक्तेन ।

नाम्ना च गोत्रेण च सर्वज्ञेन सर्वदर्शिना ॥ १०० ॥ (१६४८)

Ābhasitaśca Jinena jāti-jarā-maranavipramuktena ।
Nāmnā ca gotrena ca sarvajñena sarvadarsinā ॥ 100 ॥ (1648)]

Trans — 100 He was addressed by his name and lineage by the *Tirthankara* who was free from birth, old age, and death, who was all-knowing, and who had complete *darśana* (undifferentiated knowledge) (1648)

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तज्जीव तस्सरीरं ति संसओ न वि य पुच्छसे किंचि ।
वेयपयाण य अत्थं न याणसी तेसिमो अत्थो ॥१०१॥ (१६४९)

Tajjīva tassarīram ti samsao na vi ya pucchase kimci ।
Veyapayāna ya attham na yānāsī tesimo attho ॥ 101 ॥ (1649)

[तज्जीवस्तच्छरीरमिति संशयो नापि च पृच्छसि किञ्चित् ? ।

वेदपदानां चार्थं न जानासि तेषामयमर्थः ॥ १०१ ॥ (१६४९)

Tajjivastaccharīramiti samśayo nāpi ca pricchasi kimcit ? ।
Vedapadanām cārtham na jānāsī tesamayamarthah ॥ 101 ॥ (1649)]

Trans — 101 You entertain the doubt as to whether that which is *jīva* is *śārīra* itself and yet you do not ask me (about it) But (*ca*) you do not know the real meaning of *Veda-padas* Here is their real interpretation (1649)

टीका—हे आयुष्मन् वायुभूते ! “तदेव वस्तु जीवस्तदव च शरीरम्, न पुनरयत् ” इत्येवम्भूतस्तव संशयो वर्तते, नापिच तदपनोदार्थं किञ्चित् मा पृच्छसि । ननु यक्षपाटाद् निर्गच्छता त्वयाऽभिहितमासीत्—“ बोद्धि-
ष्णसंसओ वा ” इति, तत् किमिति न किञ्चित् पृच्छसि ? । अयं च संशयस्तव विरुद्धवेदपदयवनिबध्नो वर्तते । तेषां च वेदपदानार्थं त्वं न जानासि, तेन संशयः कुरुते । तेषां चार्थं वक्ष्यमाणलक्षणोऽर्थ इति ॥१०१॥
(१६४९)

D O—You entertain the doubt in your mind as to whether that which is *śra* be called *sarira* also But you do not put any question about it to remove that doubt. This doubt of yours is based upon hearing the *Veda-padas* of contradictory senses. But that is not the correct interpretation. Here is the real interpretation

Moreover

वसुहाइभूयसमुदयसंभूया चेषण त्ति ते सका ।
पत्तेयमदिद्धा वि हु मज्जगमउ व समुदाये ॥ १०२ ॥ (१६५०)
जह मज्जगेसु मओ वीसुमदिद्धो वि समुदये होउ ।
कालतरे विणस्सइ सह भूयगणम्मि चेषणम् ॥१०३॥ (१६५१)

Vasuhāi bhūya samudaya sambhūyā ceyana tti te sankā ।
Patteyamadiṭṭhā vi hu majjangamau vva samudāye u 102 ॥ (1650)
Jaha majjangesu mao vīsumadiṭṭho vi samudāe hōum ।
Kālantare viṇassai taha bhūya gaṇammī ceyamam ॥103॥ (1651)

[वसुधादिभूतसमुदयसंभूता चैतनेति तव श्रद्धा ।
प्रत्येकमदृष्टोऽपि सत्त्व मयाङ्गमव इव समुदाये ॥ १०२ ॥ (१६५०)
यथा मयाङ्गेषु मदो विश्वमदृष्टोऽपि समुदाये भूत्वा ।
कालान्तरे विनश्यति तथा भूतमण्डोऽपि चैतन्यम् ॥ १०३ ॥ (१६५१)

Vasudhādi bhūta samudaya sambhūta cetanoti tava śankā ।

Pratyekamadrīṣṭa'pī khalu madyāṅgamada iva samudāye ॥102॥ (1651)

Yathā madyāṅgesu mado viśvagadrīṣṭo'pī samudāye bhūtvā ।

Kālāntare vīnaśyati tathā bhūtagane'pī caitanyaṃ ॥103॥ (1651)]

Trans — 102-103 Your presumption is that consciousness (*cetana*) is produced from the collection (*samudaya*) of *bhūtas* like *prithvi* etc because like intoxication (*mada*) though not found in each separate constituent, it is apprehended in the collection (of those constituents) Just as intoxication, though not present in each separate constituent of wine (*madya*) is produced in the collection of these constituents and disappears after a particular period of time, similarly consciousness (*caitanya*) is also produced in the collection of *bhūtas* and perishes as time passes (1650-1651)

टीका—वसुधा पृथ्वी, आदिशब्दादप्-तेजो-वायु-परिग्रहः, वसुधादय एव भवन्तीति कृत्वा भूतानि वसुधादिभूतानि, तेषां समुदायः परस्परमीलन-परिणतिवसुधादिभूतसमुदायः, तस्मात् प्रागसती संभूता संजाता, चेतनेत्येवं-भूता तव शङ्का । सा च चेतना पृथिव्यादिभूतेषु प्रत्येकावस्थायामदृष्टापि धातकीकुसुम-गुडो-दकादिषु मद्याङ्गेषु मद इव तत्समुदाये संभूतेति प्रत्यक्षत एव दृश्यते । तदेवमन्वयद्वारेण चेतनाया भूतसमुदायधर्मता दर्शिता । अथ व्यतिरेकद्वारेण तस्यास्तां दर्शयितुमाह—“ जह मज्जगेषु इत्यादि ” यथा मद्याङ्गेषु मदभावः प्रत्येकावस्थायामदृष्टोऽपि तत्समुदाये भूत्वा ततः कियन्तमपि कालं स्थित्वा कालान्तरे तथाविधसामग्रीवशात् कृतश्चिद् विनश्यति, तथा भूतगणेऽपि प्रत्यक्समचैतन्यं भूत्वा ततः कालान्तरे विनश्यति । ततोऽन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां निश्चीयते-भूतधर्म एष चैतन्यम् ।

इदमत्र हृदयम्-यत् समुदायिषु प्रत्येकं नोपलभ्यते तत्समुदाये चोपलभ्यते, तत् तत्समुदायमात्रधर्म एव, यथा मद्याङ्गसमुदायधर्मो मदः । स हि मद्याङ्गेषु विश्वोपलभ्यते, तत्समुदाये चोपलभ्यते, अतस्तद्धर्मः । एवं चेतनापि भूतसमुदाये भवति, पृथग् न भवति, अतस्तद्धर्मः ।

धर्म-धर्मिणोश्चामेद एव, मेद पट पटयोरिव धर्मि धर्ममावाप्रसङ्गात् । तस्मात् स एव जीवस्तदेव च क्षरीरम् । वाक्यान्तरेषु पुनः क्षरीराद् मित्रः भूयते जीवः, तद्यथा " तदि वै स क्षरीरस्य प्रियाऽप्रिययोरपह्निरस्ति, अक्षरीरं वा वसन्त प्रियाप्रिये न स्पृशतः " इत्यादि । ततस्तव संक्षप इति ॥ १०२-१०३ (१६५०-१६५१) ॥

D C—According to your presumption *oetana* is produced from the *samudāya* of *bhūtas* such as *prithvī aptejas vāyū* etc. Just as *mada* cannot be seen in each separate constituent a. g. *dhātakt* flower jaggery etc of the wine but it can be produced only when all those constituents are combined together. In the same way *oetana* is recognized in the *samudāya* of *bhūtas* only and not in a separate constituent like *prithvī*. So *oetana* becomes the quality of the *samudāya* of *bhūtas*. Again, this *oetana* after being produced in the *samudāya* of *bhūtas* perishes after having stayed for some time, just as the quality of *mada* after being produced in the combination of the constituents of wine vanishes as time passes. Thus it is proved by means of *antaya* as well as *vyatireka* in the above two cases that *oetanya* is a *dharma* of the *samudāya* of *bhūtas*.

Again that which is not present in a constitution of *samudāya* but in the *samudāya* itself becomes the quality of *samudāya* only and not of a constituent. So *oetanya* being found only in *samudāya* and not in each of its individual constituents becomes a *dharma* of the *samudāya* of *bhūtas* as *mada* becomes a *dharma* of the *samudāya* of *madyāṅgas*. Now there can be no distinction between *dharma* and *dharmin*. For if they were distinct they could not be related as *dharma* and *dharmin*. *Sārira* is nothing but the *samudāya* of *bhūtas* and *jīva* is formed of *oetanā*. Hence *jīva* and *sārira* are nothing but *dharma* and *dharmin* and as such they should be considered as one and the same.

Now on the other hand there are several *Veda-pālas* which establish *jīva* to be distinct from *sārira* a. g. " *Nā hi*

va sa-s'arīśya priyāpriyayo r-apahatnasti, a-s'arīram va
vasantam priyāpriye na sprś'atah." And that is the reason why
you have raised this doubt

The doubt is refuted as follows :—

पत्तेयमभावाओ न रेणुतेहं व समुदये चेया ।

मज्झङ्गेषु तु मओ वीसुं पि न सबसो नत्थि ॥१०४॥ (१६५२)

भमि-धणि-वितण्हयाई पत्तेयं पि हु जहा मयंगेसु ।

तह जइ भूएसु भवे चेया तो समुदये होज्जा ॥१०५॥ (१६५३)

Patteyamabhāvāo na renutellam va samudaye ceyā ।

Majjangesu tu mao vīsum pi na savvaso natthi ॥ 104 ॥ (1652)

Bhami-dhani-vitanhayāi patteyam pi hu jahā mayangesu ।

Taha jai bhūesu bhave ceyā to samudaye hojjā ॥ 105 ॥ (1653)

[प्रत्येकमभावाद् न रेणुतैलमिव समुदये चेतना ।

मद्याङ्गेषु तु मदो विष्वगपि न सर्वशो नास्ति ॥ १०४ ॥ (१६५२)

भ्रमि-ध्रणि-वितृष्णतादयः प्रत्येकमपि खलु यथा मदाङ्गेषु ।

तथा यदि भूतेषु भवेच्चेतना ततः समुदये भवेत् ॥ १०५ ॥ (१६५३)

Pratyekamabhāvaḍ na renutailamiva samudaye cetanā ।

Madyaṅgesu tu mado viṣvagaṇi na sarvaśo nāsti ॥ 104 ॥ (1652)

Bhrami-dhrāṇi-vitrisnatādayah pratyekamaṇi khalu yathā madāṅg

Tathā yadi bhūtesu bhavecchetanā tatah samudaye bhavet ॥105॥ (1653)

Trans — 104-105 Consciousness (*cetanā*) can never exist in a collection if it is absent in case of (its) individual constituents, just as oil cannot be found in a collection of sand if it is not present in each individual particle of the sand. Again, intoxication (*mada*) is not absolutely absent even in an individual constituent of wine (For), every constituent (of wine) possesses some capacity or other like that of inducing

धर्म-धर्मिणोश्चामेव एव, मेदे पट-पटयोरिव धर्मि-धर्ममात्राप्रसङ्गात् । तस्मात् स एव जीवस्तदेव च क्षरीरम् । वाक्यान्तरेषु पुनः क्षरीराद् भिन्नः भूयते जीवः, तद्यथा “ तद्वि वै स क्षरीरस्य प्रियाऽप्रिययोरपहतिरस्ति, वक्षरीरं वा वसन्त प्रियाप्रिये न स्पृशतः ” इत्यादि । ततस्तव संशय इति ॥ १०२-१०३ (१६५०-१६५१) ॥

D C—According to your presumption *oetana* is produced from the *samudāya* of *bhūtas* such as *prithvī aptejaś vāyus* etc. Just as *mada* cannot be seen in each separate constituent e. g. *dhātakt* flower jaggery etc of the wine but it can be produced only when all those constituents are combined together In the same way *oetana* is recognized in the *samudāya* of *bhūtas* only and not in a separate constituent like *prithvī* So *oetana* becomes the quality of the *samudāya* of *bhūtas*. Again this *oetana* after being produced in the *samudāya* of *bhūtas* perishes after having stayed for some time just as the quality of *mada* after being produced in the combination of the constituents of wine vanishes as time passes Thus it is proved by means of *antaya* as well as *vyatireka* in the above two cases that *oetanya* is a *dharma* of the *samudāya* of *bhūtas*.

Again that which is not present in a constitution of *samudāya* but in the *samudāya* itself becomes the quality of *samudāya* only and not of a constituent. So *oetanya* being found only in *samudāya* and not in each of its individual constituents becomes a *dharma* of the *samudāya* of *bhūtas* as *mada* becomes a *dharma* of the *samudāya* of *madyāṅgas* Now there can be no distinction between *dharma* and *dharmin*. For if they were distinct they could not be related as *dharma* and *dharmin*. *Sarīra* is nothing but the *samudāya* of *bhūtas* and *jīva* is formed of *oetanā*. Hence *jīva* and *sarīra* are nothing but *dharma* and *dharmin* and as such they should be considered as one and the same

Now on the other hand there are several *Veda-pālas* which establish *jīva* to be distinct from *sarīra* e. g. “ Na hi

the combination of the *bhūtas* also, just as oil cannot be found in a *samudāya* of sands when it is not present in each individual particle of sand. From this, a rule can be deduced that whatever is absent in an individual state should be absent in the collective state also, and whatever is present in collection should be present in the individual also, e. g., oil when present its *prithak avasthā* of *sesamum* is found in its collective state also.

In the present case, *cetanā* is not found in the *prithak avasthā* of *bhūtas* and hence it is improper to accept that *cetanā* is produced in the *samudāya* of *bhūtas*. Really speaking, it is produced by some other cause totally different from *bhūta-samudāya*. That cause is nothing else but *jīva* which is *amūrta* on account of the *amūrta cetanā*.

Here again, the opponent may argue that the above-mentioned rule is wrong. For, *mada* is not found in the individual state of a constituent like *dhātakī puspā* of the *madya*, and yet the quality of intoxication does exist in its *samudāya*. But it is not proper to say that *mada-bhāva* is altogether absent from *dhātakī puspā* etc. For, *mada* does exist in the individual state to a certain extent. A *dhātakī puspā* can induce insanity in its individual capacity, the juice of jaggery, vine, sugar-cane etc. can produce contentment and water can quench the thirst. By the word “*ādi*” other constituents of wine should also be included, as they too, possess some capacity or the other as far as possible. Now, if *caitanya-śakti* were present in the individual *bhūtas* like *prithvī* etc. even to a limited extent, *caitanya* would certainly have been manifested in their combination also. But when *cetanā* is absent in the very *prithak* state, it can never be produced in the combined state.

Now, what would happen if the constituents of wine had no power of intoxication at all ?

Insanly producing satiety and quenching thirst etc. In its individual state. If consciousness were present in (each of the) *bhūtas* (separately) it could be (found) in the collection (also) (1652-1653)

टीका—“न समुदये चेयं चि” न भूतसमुदायमात्रप्रमत्ता चेतना, “पच्यमानावातं चि” भूतप्रत्येकावस्थायां तस्या अंशतोऽपि सर्वथाऽनुपलब्धेरित्यर्थः । किं यथा किंप्रमत्तं न भवति ? इत्याह—“न रेणुतेलं च चि” यथा प्रत्येकं सर्वथाऽनुपलब्धमाह रेणुकणसमुदायप्रमत्तं तैलं न भवतीत्यर्थः । प्रयोगः—यद् येषु पृथगवस्थायां सर्वथा नोपलभ्यते तत् तेषां समुदायेऽपि न भवति, यथा सिक्ताकणसमुदाये तैलम्, यच्च तेषां समुदाये भवति न तस्य पृथग् व्यवस्थितेषु तेषु सर्वथाऽनुपलब्धमा, यच्चैकैकतिलावस्थायां तैलस्य, सर्वथा नोपलभ्यते च भूतेषु प्रत्येकावस्थायां चेतना, तस्माद् नासौ तत्समुदायमात्रप्रमत्ता, किन्त्वर्थापेक्षेरेवान्यत् किमपि जीवलक्षण कारणान्तरं भूतसमुदायातिरिक्तं तत्र संपादितं, यत् इयं प्रभवतीति प्रतिपत्तव्यम् । आह—“प्रत्येकावस्थायां सर्वथाऽनुपलब्धमाह” इत्यनैकान्तिकोऽयं हेतुः, । प्रत्येकावस्थायां सर्वथाऽनुपलब्धस्यापि मदस्य मघाङ्गसमुदाये दर्शनात्, इत्याह स्वप्नाह—“मङ्गलेषु इत्यादि” चातकीकुसुमादिषु मघाङ्गेषु पुनर्विष्यद् पृथग् न सर्वथा मदो नास्ति, अपि तु या च यावती च मदमात्रा पृथगपि तेष्वस्त्वेषेत्यर्थः । ततो ज्ञानैकान्तिकत्वा हेतोरिति ।

टीका—यथा प्रत्येकावस्थायां चातकीकुसुमेषु या च यावती च भ्रमिभित्तमापादनशक्तिरस्ति, गुड-ग्राह्ये-क्षुरसादिषु पुनर्वाधिरसृष्टिजननशक्तिरस्ति, उदके तु वितृष्णताकरणशक्तिरस्ति, आदिष्वन्दाद्यन्तेष्वपि मघाङ्गेष्वन्यापि यथासंभवं शक्तिर्वान्या, तथा तेनैव प्रकारेण व्यस्तेष्वपि पृथिव्यादिभूतेषु यदि काश्चित्तन्यशक्तिरभिव्यज्यते, तदा तत्समुदाये संपूर्णा स्वप्ता चेतना स्यात्, न चैतदस्ति, तस्माद् न भूतसमुदायमात्रप्रमत्तवेयमिति ॥ १०४-१०५ (१६५२-५३) ॥

D C—Since *cetanā* is not present in the individual state of a *bhūta*, even to a limited extent it can never be found in

the combination of the *bhūtas* also, just as oil cannot be found in a *samudāya* of sands when it is not present in each individual particle of sand. From this, a rule can be deduced that whatever is absent in an individual state should be absent in the collective state also, and whatever is present in-collection should be present in the individual also, e g, oil when present its *prithak avasthā* of *sesamum* is found in its collective state also.

In the present case, *cetanā* is not found in the *prithak avasthā* of *bhūtas* and hence it is improper to accept that *cetanā* is produced in the *samudāya* of *bhūtas*. Really speaking, it is produced by some other cause totally different from *bhūta-samudāya*. That cause is nothing else but *jīva* which is *amūrta* on account of the *amūrta cetanā*.

Here again, the opponent may argue that the above-mentioned rule is wrong. For, *mada* is not found in the individual state of a constituent like *dhātakī puspā* of the *madya*, and yet the quality of intoxication does exist in its *samudāya*. But it is not proper to say that *mada-bhāva* is altogether absent from *dhātakī puspā* etc. For, *mada* does exist in the individual state to a certain extent. A *dhātakī puspā* can induce insanity in its individual capacity, the juice of jaggery, vine, sugar-cane etc. can produce contentment and water can quench the thirst. By the word “*ādi*” other constituents of wine should also be included, as they too, possess some capacity or the other as far as possible. Now, if *cāntanya-sakti* were present in the individual *bhūtas* like *prithvī* etc. even to a limited extent, *cāntanya* would certainly have been manifested in their combination also. But when *cetanā* is absent in the very *prithak* state, it can never be produced in the combined state.

Now, what would happen if the constituents of wine had no power of intoxication at all ?

जइ वा सव्वामावो वीसु तो किं तदगनियमोऽय ।

तस्समुदयनियमो वा अण्णेषु वि तो हवेज्जाहि ॥१०६॥ (१६५४)

Jai vā savvābhāvo vīsum to kim tadanāṇiyamo'yaṃ ।

Tassamudayanīyamo vā anṇesu vi to havejjāhi ॥ 106 ॥ (1654)

[यदि वा सव्वामावो विष्वक् ततः किं तदङ्गनियमोऽय ।

तस्समुदयनियमो वाऽन्येष्वपि ततो भवेत् ॥ १०६ ॥ (१६५४)

Yadi vā sarvābhāvo viśvak tataḥ kim tadanāṇiyamo'yaṃ ।

Tassamudayanīyamo vā nyesvapi tato bhavet ॥ 106 ॥ (1654)]

Trans.—106 Or if the power of intoxication were altogether absent from all (the constituents of wine) individually how could they be called its divisions at all ? and why should there be any rule regarding its collection also ? (For) in that case it must be produced by means of (the collection) other objects also (1654)

टीका—यदि च मघाङ्गेषु पृथगवस्थायां सर्वत्रैव मदप्रत्ययमात्रः, तर्हि कोऽय तदङ्गनियमः—कोऽय घातकीकुसुमादीनां मघाङ्गानियमः, तस्स मुदायनियमो वा—किमिति मघार्थी घातकीकुसुमादीन्येवान्वेपयति, तस्समुदायं किमपि नियमेन मीलयति ? इत्यर्थः, नन्वन्येष्वपि च मग्ना जग्म गोमयादिषु समुदितेषु मघ भवेदिति ॥ १०६ (१६५४) ॥

D C—If the power of intoxication is denied to exist in the *prthak avasthā* of the constituents like *dhātāḥ puspā* etc they cannot be called the constituents of wine at all. Again if *dhātāḥ puspā* etc had no power of intoxication at all why should people desirous of wine collect all the constituents like *dhātāḥ puspā* in order to prepare wine ? and why do they not prepare wine by combining other objects like ashes stones cowdung etc ? This clearly indicates that the power of intoxication does exist in the individual state of constituents like *dhātāḥ puspā* etc and as a result of that, it appears in wine which is the combined state of all such constituents.

At this point, an opponent may advance the following argument —

भूयाणं पत्तेयं पि चेयणा समुदए दरिसणाओ ।

जह मज्जंगेसु मओ मइ त्ति हेऊ न सिद्धोऽयं ॥१०७॥ (१६५५)

Bhūyānam patteyam pi ceyanā samudae darisanāo ।

Jaha majjangesu mao mai tti heū na siddho'yam ॥ 107 ॥ (1655)

[भूतानां प्रत्येकमपि चेतना समुदाये दर्शनात् ।

यथा मद्याङ्गेषु मदो मतिरिति हेतुर्न सिद्धोऽयम् ॥ १०७ ॥ (१६५५)

Bhūtanām pratyekampī cetanā samudaye darśanāt ।

Yathā madyāṅgesu mado matiriti heturna siddho'yam ॥ 107 ॥ (1655)]

Trans 107 Since consciousness is found in the collection of *bhūtas*, if an argument is advanced that consciousness is present in each individual *bhūta* also as intoxication is present in various constituents of wine, it can never be approved of (1655)

टीका—स्यात् परस्य मतिः—माधूक्तं यत्-पृथगपि मद्याङ्गेषु किञ्चिद् मदसामर्थ्यमस्तीति । एतदेव हि मम भूतेषु व्यस्तावस्थायां चैतन्यास्तित्वसिद्धावुदाहरणं भविष्यति, तथाहि—व्यस्तेष्वपि भूतेषु चैतन्यमस्ति, तत्समुदाये तद्दर्शनात्, मद्याङ्गेषु मदवदिति । यथा मद्याङ्गेषु मदः पृथगल्पत्वाद् नातिस्पष्टः, तत्समुदाये त्वभिव्यक्तिमेति, तथा भूतेष्वपि पृथगवस्थायामणीयसी चेतना, तत्समुदाये तु भूयसीयमिति । अत्रोत्तरमाह—“हेऊ न सिद्धोऽयमिति ” “ चेतनाया भूतसमुदाये दर्शनात् ” इत्यसिद्धोऽयं हेतुरित्यर्थः, आत्मनो भूतसमुदायान्तर्गतत्वेन चेतनायास्तद्धर्मत्वात्, आत्माभावे च तत्समुदायेऽपि तदसिद्धेरसिद्धोऽयं हेतुरिति भावः । यदि हि भूतसमुदायमात्रधर्मश्चेतना भवेत् तदा मृतशरीरेऽप्युपलभ्येत । वायोस्तदानीं तत्राभावात् तदनुपलम्भ इति चेत् । नैवम्, नलिकादिप्रयोगतत्प्रक्षेपेऽपि तदनुपलब्धेः । तेजस्तदानीं तत्र नास्तीति चेत् । न, तत्प्रक्षेपेऽपि तदनुपलम्भात् । विशिष्टतेजो—वाय्व-

मावाद्नुपलम्भ इति चेत् । किं नामात्मसत्त्वं विहायाज्यत् सदैशिष्यम् ?
ननु संज्ञान्तरेणात्मसत्त्वमेव स्वयापि प्रविपादित स्यादिति ॥१०७ (१६५५)॥

D O—An opponent may advance the following line of argument —

As *mada* is present in each separate constituent of wine, it is found in the *samudāya* of those *bhūtas* also. In the same way it can be said that since *oetanā* is completely manifested in the collection of *bhūtas* it should be present in each independent *bhūta* at least to a certain extent. Just as *mada* is not clearly perceptible in its individual state but distinct in the *samudāya* so also *oetanā* is not clearly perceptible in the individual state on account of its minute form, but it is more distinct in the collective state.

But it is not in the fitness of things to state that because *oetanā* is found in the *bhūta samudāya* it should be present in each individual *bhūta* also as *oetanā* is the quality of Soul and the Soul is contained within (*antargata*) the *bhūta samudāya*. So if *atman* is absent from the *bhūta samudāya* *oetanā* cannot exist in the *samudāya*. Thus your argument that *oetanā* is found in the collection of *bhūtas* is not valid. For if *oetanā* were taken to be a quality of mere *bhūta samudāya* it ought to be found in a dead body also. Here again, it is improper to advance an excuse that *oetanā* is absent in a dead body on account of the absence of *vāyu*. For *oetanā* could never be found in a dead body even if *vāyu* were made to enter the body by means of a pipe etc. Similarly, if it is argued that *oetanā* does not exist in a dead body due to the absence of *tejas* *tejas* also could be made to enter the dead body by the same sort of means and proved that *oetanā* is absent in that case also. Lastly if it is said that on account of the non-existence of a peculiar type of *vāyu* and *tejas* *oetana* is absent from a dead body the peculiarity in the case would be due to nothing else but the excellence of *atman* which would automatically mean that you admit the existence of *atman*.

नणु पच्चक्खविरोहो गोयम ! तं नाणुमाणभावाओ ।
तुह पच्चक्खविरोहो पत्तेयं भूयचेयं त्ति ॥ १०८ ॥ (१६५६)

Nanu paccakkhaviroho Goyama ! tam nānumānabhāvāo ।
Tuha paccakkhaviroho patteyam bhūyaceyam tti ॥ 108 ॥ (1656)

[ननु प्रत्यक्षविरोधो गौतम ! तद् नानुमानभावात् ।
तव प्रत्यक्षविरोधः प्रत्येकं भूतचेतनेति ॥ १०८ ॥ (१६५६)

Nanu pratyakṣavirodho Gautama ! tad nānumāna bhāvāt ।
Tava pratyakṣavirodhah pratyekam bhūtacetaneti ॥ 108 ॥ (1656)]

Trans—108 Certainly *O Gautama* ! that is not an evident contradiction (as you think) on account of the existence of *anumāna* (On the contrary), your assumption that *cetanā* exists in each and every *bhūta* constituents is an evident contradiction (1656)

टीका—ननु प्रत्यक्षविरुद्धमेवेदं यत्—भूतसमुदाये सत्पुलभ्यमानापि चेतना न तत्समुदायस्येत्यभिधीयते । न हि घटे रूपादय उपलभ्यमाना न घटस्येति वक्तुमुचितम् । तदयुक्तम्, यतो न भू-जलसमुदायमात्रे उपलभ्यमाना अपि हरितादयस्तन्मात्रप्रभवा इति शक्यते वक्तुम् । तद्वीजसाधकानुमानेन बाध्यतेऽसावुपलम्भ इति चेत् । तदेतदिहापि ममानम् । एतदेवाह—
“ गोयमेत्यादि ” वायुभूतेरपीन्द्रभूतिसोदर्यभ्रातृत्वेन समानगोत्रत्वाद् गौतम ! इत्येवमामन्त्रणम्, यत्त्वं ब्रूषे—तदेतद् न, भूतसमुदायातिरिक्तात्म-साधकानुमानसद्भावात्, ततस्तेनैव त्वत्प्रत्यक्षस्य बाधितत्वादिति भावः । प्रत्युत तवैव प्रत्यक्षविरोधः । किं कुर्वतः ? इत्याह “ पत्तेयं भूयचेयं त्ति ” ‘ ब्रुवतः ’ इति शेषः । प्रत्येकावस्थायां पृथिव्यादिभूतेषु चैतन्याभावस्यैव दर्शनात् तदस्तित्वं प्रत्यक्षेणैव बाध्यत इति “ प्रत्येकं भूतेषु चेतना ” इति ब्रुवतस्तवैव प्रत्यक्षविरोध इत्यर्थः ॥ १०८ (१६५६) ॥

D C—*Vāyubhūta*—That *cetanā* though perceived in a collection of *bhūtas*, does not belong to the *bhūta samudāya* seems to be incongruent For, just as it is improper to assert

that qualities like *rūpa* etc. seen in a *ghata* do not belong to the *ghata* so here also it is not proper to state that *cetanā* though apprehended in a collection of *bhūtas* does not belong to the *bhūta samudāya*.

Ācārya—The argument advanced by you O *Gautama* ! is absolutely invalid. Just as vegetables etc. found in a collection of earth and water can never be considered to have been produced from the collection of earth and water, since they are produced from their seeds in the same way *cetanā* also should never be taken to have been produced from the collection of *bhūtas* though it is found in a body made of *bhūtas* such as *prithvi* etc. For that *cetanā* is produced from *ātman* which is altogether distinct from the *bhūta samudāya*. Thus there is no contradiction in my argument. But the contradiction lies in your assertion that *cetanā* is produced in each and every individual *bhūta*.

भूइदियोवलद्धाणुसरणओ तेहिं भिन्नरूपस्स ।

चेया पच्चगवक्खोवलद्धपुसिस्स वा सरओ ॥ १०९ ॥ (१६५६)

Bhūindiyovaladdhānusarāṇo tehiṃ bhinnarūpāssa ।

Ceyā paṇcagavakkhōvaladdhapuṇisāssa vā sarāṇo ॥ 109 ॥ (1657)

[भूतेन्द्रियोपलब्धानुस्मरणतस्तम्यो भिन्नरूपस्य ।

चेतना पञ्चगवाक्षोपलब्धपुरुषस्वेव स्मरतः ॥ १०९ (१६५७) ॥

Bhutendriyopalabdhānusmaratāstebhyo bhinnarūpasya ।

Cetana paṇcagavakṣōpalabdhā puruṣasyeva smarataḥ ॥ 109 ॥ (1657)]

Trans—109 Like a man who perceives (an object) from five windows and recalls (it) to his mind, *cetanā* being itself (the quality) of an object different from them (i. e. *bhūtas*) perceives (an object) by means of sense-organs (in the form) of *bhūtas* and recalls (the object) to his mind. (1657)

टीका—तेम्यो भूतेन्द्रियेम्यो भिन्नरूपस्य कस्यापि चर्मचेतनसि प्रतिष्ठा ।

भूतेन्द्रियोपलब्धार्थानुस्मरणादिति हेतुः । यथा पञ्चभिर्गवाक्षैरुपलब्धानर्थाननुस्मरतस्तदतिरिक्तस्य कस्यापि देवदत्तादेः पुरुषस्य चेतनेति दृष्टान्तः । अयमत्र तात्पर्यार्थः—इह य एको यैरनेकैरुपलब्धानर्थाननुस्मरति स तेभ्यो भेदवान् दृष्टः, यथा पञ्चभिर्गवाक्षैरुपलब्धानर्थाननुस्मरन् देवदत्तः, यश्च यस्माद् भूतेन्द्रियात्मकसमुदायाद् भिन्नो न भवति, किं तर्हि ? अनन्यः, नायमेकोऽनेकोपलब्धानामर्थानामनुस्मर्ता, यथा शब्दादिग्राहकमनोविज्ञानविशेषः, तैरुपलभ्यानुस्मरतोऽपि च तदनतिरिक्तत्वे देवदत्तस्यापि गवाक्षमात्रप्रसङ्गो बाधकं प्रमाणम् । इन्द्रियाण्येवोपलभन्ते, न पुनस्तैरन्य उपलभत इति चेत् । न, “तदुपरमेऽपि तदुपलब्धार्थानुस्मरणात्, तद्व्यापारे च कदाचिदनुपलम्भात्” इत्यनन्तरमेव वक्ष्यमाणत्वादिति ॥ १०९ (१६५७) ॥

D C—The point is that *cetanā* who remembers an object perceived by its sense-organs in the form of *bhūtas*, becomes the quality of something which is different from those *bhūten dṛiṣyas*, just as *Devadatta* who remembers an object perceived through five windows by means of five *indriyas*, is distinct from those windows. So, that which is not *bhinnā* from the *samudāya* of *bhūten dṛiṣyas*, can never remember an object apprehended by more than one means. For, after having perceived an object through a number of means if *cetanā* were *abhinnā* from those means, then *Devadatta* who recognizes an object through a number of windows, would become the window itself.

Again, in recognizing an object it is improper to say that mere *indriyas* (sense organs) apprehend the object and nothing else. For, even when the *indriyas* have ceased working the object perceived by them is recalled, and sometimes, in spite of their working, the object is not apprehended.

तदुपरमे वि सरणओ तद्वावारे वि नोवलंभाओ ।

इंदियभिन्नस्स मई पंचगवक्खाणुभविणो व ॥ ११० ॥ (१६५८)

Taduparame vi saranao tadvāvāre vi novalambhāo |
Indriyabhinnassa mai pancagavakkhānubhavino vva || 110 || (1658)

[तदुपरमेऽपि स्मरन्तस्तद्व्यापारेऽपि नोपलम्भात् ।

इन्द्रियभिन्नस्य मतिः पञ्चगवाक्षानुमतिरिव ॥ ११० ॥ (१६५८)

Taduparame pi smaranatastadvyapāre pi nopalambhat |
Indriyabhinnasya matih pancagavakkhānubhavina iva || 110 || (1658)]

Trans — 110 As in the case of a person perceiving (an object) from five windows cognition (in the form of knowledge) is distinct from sense-organs because an object apprehended by the sense-organs is remembered even when the *Indriyas* have ceased working and (sometimes) in spite of their working, the object is not perceived. (1658)

टीका—इन्द्रियेभ्यो भिन्नस्यैव कस्यापीय षटादिज्ञानलक्षणा मतिरिति प्रतिज्ञा । तदुपरमेऽपि—अचत्व—वाचिर्याद्यवस्थायामिन्द्रियव्यापाराभावेऽपि, तद्वहारेषोपलम्भानामर्थानामनुस्मरणादिति हेतुः । अथवा, अस्यामेव प्रतिज्ञायां तद्व्यापारेऽपि—इन्द्रियव्यापृतावपि कदाचिदनुपपुष्कावस्थायां, यस्त्वनुलम्भादित्यपरो हेतुः । यदि हीन्द्रियाण्येव द्रष्टृणि भवेयुः, तर्हि किमिति विस्फारितावस्थापि प्रगुणश्रोत्रादीन्द्रियवर्गस्यापि योग्यदेशस्थिता नामपि रूप-शब्दादिबस्तूनामनुपपुष्कस्य अन्यमनस्कस्य धून्पक्षितस्योपलम्भो न भवति ? । सतो ज्ञायते—इन्द्रियग्रामव्यतिरिक्तस्यैव कस्यचिदयमुपलम्भः, यथा पञ्चभिर्गवाक्षैर्योपिदादिबस्तून्पनुमभितुर्दर्शकस्येति दृष्टान्तः ।

अत्रापि प्रयोगाभ्यां तात्पर्यमुपदर्शयते, तद्यथा—इह यो यदुपरमेऽपि यैरुपलम्भानामर्थानामनुस्मर्ता स तेभ्यो व्यतिरिक्तो दृष्टः, यथा गवाक्षैरुपलम्भानामर्थानां गवाक्षोपरमेऽपि देवदत्तः, अनुस्मरति चायमात्माञ्च-वाचिरत्वादिकालेऽपिन्द्रियोपलम्भानर्थान्, अतः स तेभ्योऽर्चान्तरमिति । तथा, इन्द्रियेभ्यो व्यतिरिक्त आत्मा, तद्व्यापारेऽप्यवानुपलम्भात्, इह यो यद्व्यापारेऽपि यैरुपलम्भानर्थान् नोपलभते स तेभ्यो भिन्नो दृष्टः, यथाऽस्थगितगवाक्षोऽप्यन्यमनस्कतयाऽनुपपुष्कोऽप्यर्शस्तेभ्यो देवदत्त इति ॥ ११० (१६५८) ॥

D C—Cognition (*mati*) which constitutes the knowledge of *ghata* etc., belongs to something which is distinct from sense-organs. For, even if the senses are benumbed as in the state of deafness, blindness etc., the object perceived by the *indriyas* is remembered, while on the other side, even if the senses are working, the object is not recognized.

Now, if the sense-organ itself were to apprehend an object, how is it that an absent-minded man is not able to apprehend an object even with open eyes, efficient ears and substances of *rūpa* and *śabda* placed at proper places? It follows, therefore, that some one, who like a person looking at an object like a woman from five windows, is different from the sense-organs, is able to apprehend it. A rule can be deduced from this that one who remembers an object even after its *indriyas* have ceased working is distinct from those *indriyas*. When *Devadatta* recalls an object seen through a number of windows even after the windows are closed, it is *ātman*, who remembers the object perceived by sense-organs even when the sense-organs have ceased working as in the state of blindness, deafness etc. This proves that *ātman* is different from *indriyas*. Again, that which does not recognize an object even if the *indriyas* are working, is different from the sense-organs like an absent-minded *Devadatta* looking through the open windows.

उवलब्धन्नेन विगारगहणओ तदहिओ ध्रुवं अत्थि ।

पुवावरवातायणगहणविगाराइपुरिसो व ॥ १११ ॥ (१६५९)

Uvalabbhannena vigāragahanao tadahio dhuvam atthi ।

Puvvāvaravātāyanagahanavigārāpuriso vva ॥ 111 ॥ (1659)

[उपलब्धान्येन विकारग्रहणतस्तदधिको ध्रुवमस्ति ।

पूर्वापरवातायनग्रहणविकारादिषुरप्य इव ॥ १११ ॥ (१६५९)

Upalabhyānyena vikāragrahanatastadadhiko dhruvamasti ।

Pūrvāparavātāyanagrahaṇavikāradīpurusa iva ॥ 111 ॥ (1659)]

Trans—111 Just as a person apprehending (an object) from an eastward window and perverting himself (due to its sight) at the opposite window is different from those windows, so also the soul who apprehends (an object) by means of one (sense-organ) and exhibits perversion by means of another is decidedly different from those sense organs (1659)

टीका—इह ध्रुवं निमित्तं तदधिकस्तेभ्य इन्द्रियेभ्यः समधिको भिन्नः समस्ति जीवः, अन्येनोपलभ्यान्वन विकारग्रहणात्, इह योज्येनोपलभ्यान्वेन विकारं प्रतिपद्यते स तस्माद् भिन्नो दृष्टः, यथा प्रवरप्रासादोपरीतस्ततः पदपरिपटी कुर्वाणः पूर्ववातायनेन रमणीमवलोक्यापरवातायनेन समागता पास्तस्याः करादिना कुचस्पर्शादिविकारमुपदर्शयन् देवदत्तः, तथा चायमात्मा चक्षुषाञ्जलीकामभक्तं दृष्ट्वा रसनेन हृष्टास-लालास्रावादिविकारं प्रतिपद्यते, तस्मात् सयोर्भिन्न इति। अथवा, ग्रहणशब्दमिहाऽऽदानपर्यायं कृत्वाऽन्यथानुमानं विधीयते—इन्द्रियेभ्यो व्यतिरिक्त आत्मा, अन्येनोपलभ्यान्वेन ग्रहणात्, इह य आदेयं घटादिकमर्थमन्येनोपलभ्यान्वेन गृह्णाति स ताम्यां भेदवान् दृष्टः, यथा पूर्ववातायनेन घटादिकमुपलभ्यापरवातायनेन गृह्णानस्ताम्पां देवदत्तः, गृह्णाति च चक्षुषोपलभ्य घटादिकमर्थं हस्तादिना जीवः, ततस्ताम्पां भिन्न इति ॥ १११ (१६५९) ॥

D C—*Jīva* who apprehends an object by means of one *indriya* and exhibits *vikāras* by means of another is *bhinnā* from both the *indriyas*. Just as *Devulatta* who looks at a woman from an eastward window and exhibits his perversion of the sight of *stanaśparsa* etc by her hands at the other is really speaking different from both the windows in the same way the Soul who observes a person eating tamarind by means of eyes and exhibits *vikāras* in the form of distilling *saliva* etc by means of tongue, is decidedly different from both. Or *ātman* is different from *indriyas* because having seen an object by means of eyes *ātman* holds it by means of hands

Another inference

सर्वेदिउवलद्धाणुसरणओ तदहिओऽणुमंतवो ।

जह पंचभिन्नविज्ञाणपुरिसविज्ञाणसंपन्नो ॥ ११२ ॥ (१६६०)

Savvendiūvaladdhānusarānao tadahio'numantavvo ।

Jaha pañcabhinnavinnānapurisavinnānasampanno ॥ 112 ॥ (1660)

[सर्वेन्द्रियोपलब्धानुस्मरणतस्तदधिकोऽनुमन्तव्यः ।

यथा पञ्चभिन्नविज्ञानपुरुषविज्ञानसंपन्नः ॥ ११२ ॥ (१६६०)

Sarvendriyopalabdhānusmaranatastadadhiko'numantavyah ।

Yathā pañcabhinnavijnāna purusavijnānasampannah ॥112॥ (1660)]

Trans —112 Just as from five different persons having five different *vijnānas* a sixth person possessing all the five *vijnānas* is different, so also, the soul who remembers an object cognized by all the sense-organs should be inferred as being distinct from them (1660)

टीका—सर्वेन्द्रियोपलब्धार्थानुस्मरणतः कारणात् तदधिकोऽस्ति जीवः ।

दृष्टान्तमाह—यथा पञ्च च ते भिन्नविज्ञानाश्च पञ्चभिन्नविज्ञाना इच्छावशात् प्रत्येकं स्पर्श-रस-गन्ध-रूप-शब्दोपयोगवन्त इत्यर्थः, पञ्चभिन्नविज्ञानाश्च ते पुरुषाश्च पञ्चभिन्नविज्ञानपुरुषास्तेषां यानि स्पर्शादिविषयाणि विज्ञानानि तैः संपन्नस्तद्वेत्ता यः षष्ठः पुरुषस्तेभ्यः पञ्चभ्यो भिन्नः । इदमत्र तात्पर्यम्—य इह यैरुपलब्धानामर्थानामेकोऽनुस्मर्ता स तेभ्यो भिन्नो दृष्टः, यथेच्छानुविधायिशब्दादिभिन्नजातीयविज्ञानपुरुषपञ्चकात् तदशेषविज्ञानाभिज्ञः पुमान्, इच्छानुविधायिशब्दादिभिन्नजातीयविज्ञानेन्द्रियपञ्चकाशेषविज्ञानवेत्ता चायमेक आत्मा, तस्मादिन्द्रियपञ्चकाद् भिन्न एवेति । शब्दादिभिन्नविज्ञानपुरुषपञ्चस्येव पृथगिन्द्रियाणामुपलब्धिप्रसङ्गतोऽनिष्टापादनाद् विरुद्धोऽयं हेतुरिति चेत् । न, इच्छानुविधायिविशेषणात्, इच्छायाश्चेन्द्रियाणामसंभवात्, सहकारिकारणतयोपलब्धिकारणमात्रताया इन्द्रियेष्वपि सङ्गावात्, उपचारतस्तेषामुपलब्धेरविरोधाददोषः । किञ्च, प्रतिपक्ष्युपायमात्रमेवैतत्, न ह्यतीन्द्रियेष्वर्थेष्वेकान्तेनैव युक्त्यन्वेषणपरैर्भाव्यम्; उक्तं च—

आगमोपपत्तिश्च संपूर्णं दृष्टिकारणम् ।

अतीन्द्रियाणामर्थानां सद्भाषप्रतिपत्तये ॥१॥ इति ॥ ११२ (१६६०) ॥

D O—Since *jīva* remembers an object perceived by all the sense-organs *jīva* should be distinguished from *indriyas*. From five different persons possessing five different *vyñānas* such as *sparśa*, *rasa* etc according to their will, a sixth *puruṣa* having all the five *vyñānas* together is distinguished. In the same way the Soul that possesses the cognizance of all the five sense-organs should be distinguished from each of the five sense-organs. In short one who is the only *anuśmāntā* of the objects cognized is distinguished from those by means of which the objects are perceived.

An objection may be raised at this point that like five different *puruṣas* having five different *vyñānas* such as *śabda*, *rasa* etc the five *indriyas* should also possess the power of cognizance. For if they have no cognizance the argument stated above would be *a-siddha*. But the contention is not valid. For there would be no difficulty in this case by reason of the adjective “*icchātvasāt*.” *Indriyas* are not supposed to have any sort of desire. Or by way of the co-operative cause the reason of perception lies in *indriyas* and hence there is no harm, if *indriyas* were metaphorically believed to be *jñāna* itself. Or say this illustration is nothing but a means to an end. Consequently for the recognition of objects which are *atīndriya* (beyond perception) *āgama* and *yukti* are the only resorts. For it is said

Āgamasco'papatīśca samyūctam dṛṣṭikāraṇam;
Atīndriyāṇāmārtihānām sādabhāva pratīpattaye.

A few more inferences are laid down in support of the distinction of Soul

विष्णाणतरपुष्टं घालणाणमिह नाणभावाओ ।

जह घालणापुष्टं जुवनाण त च देहहिअ ॥११३॥ (१६६१)

Vinnānantarapuvvam bālannānamīha nānabhāvāo ।

Jaha bālannānapuvvam yuvanānam tam ca dehahīam ॥113॥ (1661)

[विज्ञानान्तरपूर्वं बालज्ञानमिह ज्ञानभावात् ।

यथा बालज्ञानपूर्वं युवज्ञानं तच्च देहाधिकम् ॥ ११३ ॥ (१६६१)

Vijnānantarapūrvam bālaynānamīha jñānabbhāvāt ।

Yathā bālaynānapūrvam yuvajñānam tacca dehādhīkam ॥113॥ (1661)]

Trans—113 Just as cognizance in youth is similar to cognizance in childhood, the latter is similar to other cognizances because of its being cognizance And that (cognizance) is distinguished from *deha* (1661)

टीका—अन्यविज्ञानपूर्वकमिदं बालविज्ञानम्, विज्ञानत्वात्, इह यद् विज्ञानं तदन्यविज्ञानपूर्वकम् दृष्टम्, यथा बालविज्ञानपूर्वकं युवविज्ञानम्, यद्विज्ञानपूर्वकं चेदं बालविज्ञानं, तच्छरीरादन्यदेव, पूर्वशरीरत्यागेऽपीहत्य-विज्ञानकारणत्वात्, तस्य च विज्ञानस्य गुणत्वेन गुणिनमात्मानमन्तरेणा-संभवात्, तच्छरीरव्यतिरिक्तमात्मानं व्यवस्यामः, न तु शरीरमेवात्मेति । विज्ञानत्वादिति प्रतिज्ञार्थैकदेशत्वादसिद्धो हेतुरिति चेत् । न, विशेषस्य पक्षी-कृतत्वात् । भवति च विशेषे पक्षीकृते सामान्यं हेतुः, यथाऽनित्यो वर्णात्मकः शब्दः, शब्दत्वात्, मेघशब्दवत् । एवमिहापि बालविज्ञानमन्यविज्ञानपूर्वक-मिति विशेषः पक्षीकृतः, न तु सामान्यविज्ञानमन्यविज्ञानपूर्वकमिति पक्षीकृतं, येन विज्ञानत्वादिति प्रतिज्ञार्थैकदेशः स्यात्, यथाऽनित्यः शब्दः, शब्द-त्वादित्वादि ॥ ११३ (१६६१) ॥

D C—Here the *bālaynāna* is similar to other *vijnānas* on account of its *vijnānatva* Just as *yuvajñāna* resembles *bālaynāna*, the *vijnāna* to which the *bālaynāna* resembles is distinguished from *deha* because it continues to be the cause of *vijnāna* even after it has left the former body Now, since *vijnāna* is a quality, it cannot remain without a *gunin viz, ātman*; consequently, we recognize *ātman* to be distinct from body and not the body itself

Vāyubhūti—The *hetu vyanānavāṭ* stated by you becomes nothing but a portion of the proposition to be proved in that case

Ācārya—It is not so The particular is pointed out in this case and when particular is emphasized the *hetu* stated there-in is common e. g. the *varnātmaka śabda* is *anvaya* because of its *śabdatva* as in the case of a *meghāśabda*. Similarly in the proposition that *bālavynāna* is similar to other *vynānas* only a particular case of *vynāna* is emphasized and *vynāna* in general is not emphasized consequently this does not form a part of the proposition as it forms in the case of “*anvaya śabdah śabdatvāt*”

पदमो यणाहिलासो अण्णाहाराहिलासपुर्वोऽयम् ।

जह सपयाहिलासोऽणुभूओ सो य देहहिओ ॥११४॥ (१६६२)

Padhamo thanāhīlāso anāhārāhīlāsapurvō yam ।

Jaha sampayāhīlāso nubhūto so ya dehahio ॥ 114 ॥ (1662)]

[प्रथमः स्तनामिलापोऽन्याहारामिलापपूर्वोऽयम् ।

यथा सांप्रतामिलापोऽनुभूतिः स च देहाधिकः ॥ ११४ ॥ (१६६२)

Prathamah stanabhīlāso anyahārāhīlāsapūrvō yam ।

Yatha sampratāhīlāso nubhūtiḥ sa ca dehādhikah ॥ 114 ॥ (1662)]

Trans—114 The first desire (of the child) to suck the breasts (of mother) is like the desire in the present case just similar to other desires for food on account of (the same) experience And that desire is distinct from body (1662)

टीका—गौतम ! आद्यः स्तनामिलापो बालस्यायमन्यामिलापपूर्वकः, अनुभूतेः—अनुभवात्मकत्वात्, सांप्रतामिलापवदिति । अथवा, “अमिलापत्वात् ” इत्ययमनुक्तोऽपि हेतुर्दृष्ट्यः, इह योऽमिलापः सोऽन्यामिलापपूर्वको दृष्ट, यथा सांप्रतामिलापः, यदमिलापपूर्वकभायमाद्यः स्तनामिलापः स शरीरादन्य एव, पूर्वशरीरपरिस्थागेऽपीहस्यामिलापकारणत्वात् । ज्ञानगुणभा

भिलाषो न गुणिमन्तरेण संभवति । अतो यस्तस्याश्रयभूतो गुणी स शरीरातिरिक्त आत्मेति ।

आह—नन्वनैकान्तिकोऽयम्, सर्वस्याऽप्यभिलाषपूर्वकत्वानुपपत्तेः । न हि मोक्षाभिलाषो मोक्षाभिलाषपूर्वकी घटते । तदयुक्तम्, अभिप्रायापरिज्ञानात्, यो हि स्तनाभिलाषः स सामान्येनैवाभिलाषपूर्वक इत्येतदेवास्माभिरुच्यते, न पुनर्विशेषेण ब्रूमः—“ स्तनाभिलाषोऽन्यस्तनाभिलाषपूर्वकः ” इति । एवं च सामान्योक्तौ मोक्षाभिलाषपक्षेऽपि घटत एव, मोक्षाभिलाषस्यापि सामान्येनाऽन्याभिलाषपूर्वकत्वादिति ॥ ११४ (१६६२) ॥

D C—The first desire of the child to suck the breasts of the mother is just similar to the other *abhlāśas* on account of its being an *abhlāśa*. Now, the desire to which the child's *stanābhlāśa* resembles is distinct from body, because it continues to be the cause of this *abhlāśa* even after it has left the body. *Abhlāśa* is the quality of knowledge which cannot exist without a support, which is nothing but the soul, independent of *deha*.

Vāyubhūti —The *hetu* stated in the above-named *anumāna* involves the fault of uncertainty as all *abhlāśas* are not the same e g, an *abhlāśa* for *mokṣa* does not resemble another *abhlāśa* for *mokṣa*. So, why not to believe the same in the case of this *abhlāśa* also ?

The *Ācārya* —You have not understood the point, *O Gautama* ! The point is that we have compared the desire for breasts only with other desires in general. We have not stated in particular that the desire for breasts is just similar to other desires for breasts. Similarly, in the case of *mokṣābhlāśa* also, the *mokṣābhlāśa* should not be compared with other *mokṣābhlāśas* but only with other *abhlāśas* in general (1662)

Another inference,

बालसरिर देहतरपुष इन्दियाइमत्ताओ ।

जुवदेहो बालादिव स जस्स देहो स देहि ति ॥११५॥ (१६६३)

Bālasarīram dehantarapuvvā indiyāimattāo ।

Juvadeho bālādīva sa jassa deho sa dehi ti ॥ 115 ॥ (1663)

[बालशरीरं देहान्तरपूर्वमिन्द्रियादिमत्त्वात् ।

युवदेहो बालादिव स यस्य देहः स देहीति ॥ ११५ ॥ (१६६३)

Bālasarīram dehāntarapūrvamindriyādimattvāt ।

Yuvadeho bālādīva sa yasya dehaḥ sa dehīti ॥ 115 ॥ (1663)]

Trans — 115 As the body in youth resembles the body in infancy the body in infancy is just similar to other bodies because it possesses the sense-organs One to whom that body belongs is the owner of body (and not the body itself) (1663)

टीका—बालशरीरं शरीरान्तरपूर्वकम्, इन्द्रियादिमत्त्वात्, इह यदिन्द्रियादिमत्, तदन्यदेहपूर्वकं दृष्टम्, यथा युवशरीरं बालदेहपूर्वकम्, यत्पूर्वकं चेद बालशरीरं तदस्मात् शरीरादर्शान्तरम्, तदत्ययेऽपीहत्यशरीरोपादानात्, यस्य च तच्छरीरं स भवान्तरयापीशरीरादर्शान्तरभूतो दद्वयानस्स्यात्मा, न पुनः शरीरमेवास्मेति सिद्धमिति ॥ ११५ (१६६३) ॥

D O—Just as a body in youth resembles a body in infancy the body in infancy is just similar to other bodies because of its possessing the *indriyas* Now the body to which this *bālasarīra* resembles is distinct from the latter for this body rises up even if the former body has perished. Again that to whom this body belongs is nothing but Soul who travels from life to life and who being not the body itself is distinct from this body

Another inference

अणुसुह—दुक्खपुष सुहाइ बालस्स सपइसुह व ।

अणुभूइमयत्तणओ अणुभूइमओ य जीवो ति ॥११६॥ (१६६४)

Annasuha-dukkhapuvvam suhāi bālassa sampaisuham va ।
Anubhūmayattanao anubhūmao ya jīvo tti ॥ 116 ॥ (1664)

[अन्यसुख-दुःखपूर्वं सुखादि बालस्य सांप्रतसुखमिव ।

अनुभूतिमयत्वतोऽनुभूतिमयश्च जीव इति ॥ ११६ ॥ (१६६४)

Anyasukha-dukkhapūrvam sukhādi bālasya sāmpratasukhamiva ।
Anubhūtimayatvato'nubhūtimayaśca jīva iti ॥ 116 ॥ (1664)]

Trans.—116 Happiness in the state of childhood like the present-day happiness resembles happiness, misery etc, in other states And the Soul is possessed of the faculty of perception because of its being capable of perceptivity (1664)

टीका—अन्यसुखपूर्वकमिदमाद्यं बालसुखम्, अनुभवात्मकत्वात्, सांप्र-
तसुखवत्, यत्सुखपूर्वकं चेदमाद्यं सुखम्, तच्छरीरादन्यदेव, तदत्ययेऽपीह-
त्यसुखकारणत्वात् । गुणश्चायम्, स च गुणिनमन्तरेण न संभवति, अतो
यस्तस्याश्रयभूतो गुणी स देहादर्थान्तरम्, इति सुखानुभूतिमयो जीव इति
सिद्धम् । एवं दुःख-राग-द्वेष-भय-शोकादयोऽप्यायोजनीया इति ॥ ११६
(१६६४) ॥

D C—Happiness in the state of childhood resembles the present-day happiness, because of its *anubhūtimayatva* Now, the happiness to which this *bālasukha* resembles is distinct from body, because it continues to be the cause of happiness even if a former body has perished Moreover, *sukha* is a *guna* which cannot exist without the support of *gunin* which, too, is distinct from body This proves that the Soul is possessed of *anubhūti* of happiness According to the same argument, we can prove that *ātman* possesses the *anubhūti* of *dukkha*, *rāga*, *dvesa*, *bhaya*, *śoka*, etc Now, the *anumānas* that have already been laid down to establish the existence of *jīva* and *karman* are re-stated here in order to refresh the memory

संताणोऽणार्ई उ परोप्परं हेउ-हेउभावाओ ।

देहस्स य कम्मस्स य गोयम ! बीयं-कुराणं व ॥११७॥(१६६५)[†]

Santāno nāi u paropparam heu-heubhāvāo ।

Dehassa ya kaminassa ya Oyamama biyam-kurānam va ॥117॥ (1665)

[सन्तानोऽनादिस्तु परस्परं हेतु-हेतुभावात् ।

देहस्य च कर्मणश्च गौतम । धीमा ऽकुरयोऽरिष ॥ ११७ ॥ (१६६५)

Santāno naḍistu paraṣparam hetu-hotubhavat ।

Dehassa o karmapaṣaṇa Gautama । bīja nkurayoriva ॥117॥ (1665)]

Trans—117 And *O Gautama* ! as *Karman* and body are naturally related as the causes of each other like seed and sprout the continuous range of *Karman* will have no beginning (1665)

If the relation of *Karman* with body is eternal, how can the existence of *jīva* be established ?

तो कम्म-सरीराण कत्तार करण-कज्जभावाओ ।

पढिषज्ज तदब्भहिअ दढ घडाण कुलाल व ॥ ११८ ॥ (१६६६)

अरिथ सरीरविहाया पडनिययागारओ घटस्सेव ।

अक्खाण च करणओ दढाईण कुलालो व ॥ ११९ ॥ (१६६७)

अरिथिदियविसयाण आयाणादेयभावओऽवस्स ।

कम्मर इषादाया लोए सडास-लोहाण ॥ १२० ॥ (१६६८)

भोत्ता देहाईण भोज्जत्तणओ नरो व भत्तस्स ।

सघायाइत्तणओ अरिथ य अरथी घरस्सेव ॥ १२१ ॥ (१६६९)

जो कत्ताइ स जीवो सज्जविउद्धो चि ते मई होज्जा ।

मुत्ताइपसगाओ त नो ससारिणो दोसो ॥ १२२ ॥ (१६७०)

To kamma-sarīrānam kattiāram karana kaḍḍabhāvāo ।

Padivaḍḍa tadabbhahīam danḍa-ghadānam kulālam va ॥118॥ (1666)

[ततः कर्म-शरीरयोः कर्तारं करण-कार्यभावात् ।

प्रतिपद्यस्व तदभ्यधिकं दण्ड-घटयोः कुलालमिव ॥ ११८ ॥ (११६६)

Tataḥ karma-śarīrayoh kartāram karana-kāryabhavāt ।

Pratipadyasva tadabhyadhikam danda-ghatayoh kulālamiva ॥118॥

Trans—118 So, like a potter (to be distinct) from *danda* and *ghata*, know the creator of *Karman* and *śarīra* to be distinct from both on account of the existence of cause and effect (1666)

119 (1667) Vide verse 1567.

120 (1668) Vide verse 1568

121 (1669) Vide verse 1569

122 (1670) Vide verse 1570

Since all objects are *kṣanika* according to *Buddhist* theory, an opponent may argue here that *jīva* vanishes with body and hence it is no use trying to prove that Soul is different from body The *Ācārya* refutes this argument as follows —

जाइस्सरो न विगओ सरणाओ बालजाइसरणो व ।

जह वा सदेसवतं नरो सरंतो विदेसम्मि ॥ १२३ ॥ (१६७१)

Jāissaro na vigao saraṇāo bāla-jāissarano vva ।

Jaha vā sadesavattam naro saranto videsammi ॥123॥ (1671)

[जातिस्मरो न विगतः स्मरणाद् बालजातिस्मरण इव ।

यथा वा स्वदेशवृत्तं नरः स्मरन् विदेशे ॥ १२३ ॥ (१६७१)

Jātismaro na vīgataḥ smaranād bāla-jāti-smarana iva ।

Yatha vā svadeśavṛttam narah smaran videse ॥ 123 ॥ (1671)]

Trans—123 Like a person recollecting (his) childhood (in old age) or recollecting in a foreign country the incident, (that happened) in his own country, the Soul who recollects the former existence does not perish by virtue of (its power of) recollection (1671)

टीका—इह यो जातिस्मरो धीवः स प्राग्मविकल्परविवर्तमेव सति न विगत इति प्रविष्टा । 'सरणात् चि' स्मरणादिति हेतुः । यथा बालजातो बालबन्धनि वृत्तं स्मरतीति बालजातिस्मरणो बृद्ध इति दृष्टान्तः । यथा वा, स्वदेशे मालवकमन्यदेशादी वृत्त विदेशेऽपि गतो नरः स्मरन् न विगतः । इदमुक्तं भवति—योज्यवद्व—कालाधनुभूतमर्थं स्मरति सोऽयिनष्टो दृष्टः, यथा बालकालानुभूतानामर्थानामनुस्मर्ता ब्रह्माद्यवस्थार्या देवदत्तः । यस्तु विनष्टो नासौ किञ्चिदनुस्मरति, यथा बन्धान्तरमेवोपरत । न च पूर्वपूर्वक्षणानुभूत माहितसंस्कारा उत्तरोत्तरक्षणाः स्मरन्तीति वक्तव्यम्, पूर्व पूर्वक्षणानां सर्व निरन्तरविनाशेन सर्वथा विनष्टत्वात्, उत्तरोत्तरक्षणानां सर्वथाऽन्यत्वात् । न चान्याननुभूतमन्योऽनुस्मरति, देवदत्तानुभूतस्य यद्वदत्तानुस्मरणप्रसङ्गादिति ॥ १२३ (१६७१) ॥

D C—Here the proposition is that the Soul that remembers former existence cannot vanish even after the disappearance of the former body by virtue of its *smaranasakti*. Just as an old person who remembers his state of childhood does not himself perish even if childhood has vanished, or just as a person who recollects in a foreign country the incidents that happened in his own country does not himself perish even if the incidents are no more existing so also the Soul that remembers former existence does not vanish even if the body of former existence has already vanished. In short, one who recollects incidents that happened in former time and place is *vidyamāna* (existing) like *Devadatta* who is able to recollect his experiences of childhood in old age. But if he be only the *anusmarta* nothing can be recollected in the next life as he himself is not alive in that existence.

Again it is not correct to say that all experiences of former moments are recollected in the later moments as former moments are absolutely separate from the later moments and they disappear as soon as their relations with the later ones disappear.

Lastly, one can never remember the experience of another. If it were so, *Yajnadatta* would be able to remember the experience of *Devadatta*.

अह मन्नसि खणिओ वि हु सुमरइ विज्जाणसंतइगुणाओ ।
तहवि सरीरादण्णो सिद्धो विण्णाणसंतानो ॥ १२४ ॥ (१६७२)

Aha mannasī khaṇio vi hu sumaraī vinnānasantaigunāo ।
Tahavi sasīrādanno siddho vinnānasantāno ॥ 124 ॥ (1672)

[अथ मन्यसे क्षणिकोऽपि खलु स्मरति विज्ञानसंततिगुणात् ।
तथापि शरीरादन्यः सिद्धो विज्ञानसंतानः ॥ १२४ ॥ (१६७२)

Atha manyase kṣaṇiko'pi khalu smarati vijñānasantatigunāt ।
Tathāpi śarīradanyaḥ siddho vijñānasantānaḥ ॥ 124 ॥ (1672)]

Trans—124 Again if you believe that (the soul) though transitory, remembers (the former existence) by virtue of its having a continuous range of knowledge, the continuous range of knowledge in that case also, has been proved to be distinct from body (1672)

टीका—अथैवं मन्यसे त्वम्-क्षणिकोऽपि क्षणभङ्गुरोऽपि जीवः पूर्ववृत्तान्तं स्मरत्येव । कुतः ? इत्याह—विज्ञानानां विज्ञानक्षणानां संततिः संतानस्तस्या गुणस्तत्सामर्थ्यरूपस्तस्मादिति, क्षणसंतानस्यावस्थितत्वात् क्षणनश्वरोऽपि स्मरतीत्यर्थः । अत्रोत्तरमाह—ननु तथाप्येवमपि सति ज्ञानलक्षणसन्तानस्या-ग्रेतनशरीरसंक्रान्तेर्भवान्तरसद्भावः सिध्यति, सर्वशरीरेभ्यश्च विज्ञानसंतानस्ये-त्यमर्थान्तरता साधिता भवति, अविच्छिन्नविज्ञानसन्तानात्मकश्चैवं शरीरा-दर्थान्तरभूत आत्मा सिद्धो भवतीति । तदेवं परमवमङ्गीकृत्याविनष्टस्मरण-मावेदितम् ॥ १२४ (१६७२) ॥

D C—*Vāyubhūta* —Even though the Soul is *kṣaṇika*, it is able to remember the incidents of former life because of the continuous range of the moments of *vijñāna*

The *Acārya* —Even in that case, the continuous range of

टीका—इह यो जातिस्मरो जीवः स प्राग्मविकल्परविवर्गमेव सति न विगत इति प्रतिज्ञा । ‘सरमात्त चि’ स्मरणादिति हेतुः । यथा बालजातौ बालजन्मनि ह्यस्मरतीति बालजातिस्मरणो बद्ध इति दृष्टान्तः । यथा वा, स्वदेशे मालवकमप्यदेशादौ ह्यविदेशेऽपि गतो नरः स्मरन् न विगतः । इदमुक्तं भवति—योऽन्यदेश-कालाद्यनुभूतमर्थं स्मरति सोऽप्यन्यतो दृष्टः, यथा बालकालानुभूतानामर्थानामनुस्मर्ता बद्धाद्यप्यस्यायां देवदत्तः । यस्तु विनष्टो नास्तीति किञ्चिदनुस्मरति, यथा जन्मानन्तरमेवोपरतः । न च पूर्वपूर्वक्षणानुभूतमाहितसंस्कारा उत्तरोत्तरक्षणाः स्मरन्तीति वक्तव्यम्, पूर्वपूर्वक्षणानां सर्वानिरन्वयविनाशेन सर्वथा विनष्टत्वात्, उत्तरोत्तरक्षणानां सर्वथाऽन्यत्वात् । न चान्याननुभूतमन्योऽनुस्मरति, देवदत्तानुभूतस्य पद्मदत्तानुस्मरणप्रसङ्गादिति ॥ १२३ (१६७१) ॥

D C—Here the proposition is that the Soul that remembers former existence cannot vanish even after the disappearance of the former body by virtue of its *smaranasakti*. Just as an old person who remembers his state of childhood does not himself perish even if childhood has vanished, or just as a person who recollects in a foreign country the incidents that happened in his own country, does not himself perish even if the incidents are no more existing so also the Soul that remembers former existence does not vanish even if the body of former existence has already vanished. In short, one who recollects incidents that happened in former time and place is *vidyamāna* (existing) like *Devadatta* who is able to recollect his experiences of childhood in old age. But if he be only the *anumarta* nothing can be recollected in the next life as he himself is not alive in that existence.

Again it is not correct to say that all experiences of former moments are recollected in the later moments as former moments are absolutely separate from the later moments and they disappear as soon as their relations with the later ones disappear.

Lastly, one can never remember the experience of another. If it were so, *Yajnadatta* would be able to remember the experience of *Devadatta*.

अहं मन्नसि खणिओ वि हु सुमरइ विज्जाणसंतइगुणाओ ।
तहवि सरीरादण्णो सिद्धो विण्णाणसंतानो ॥ १२४ ॥ (१६७२)

Aha mannaṣi khaṇiyo vi hu sumarai vinnāṇasantaigunāo ।
Tahavi sasirādanno siddho vinnāṇasantāno ॥ 124 ॥ (1672)

[अथ मन्यसे क्षणिकोऽपि खलु स्मरति विज्ञानसंततिगुणात् ।
तथापि शरीरादन्यः सिद्धो विज्ञानसंतानः ॥ १२४ ॥ (१६७२)

Atha manyase kṣaṇiko'pi khalu smarati vijnānasantatigunāt ।
Tathāpi śarīradanyaḥ siddho vijnānasantānaḥ ॥ 124 ॥ (1672)]

Trans—124 Again if you believe that (the soul) though transitory, remembers (the former existence) by virtue of its having a continuous range of knowledge, the continuous range of knowledge in that case also, has been proved to be distinct from body (1672)

टीका—अथैवं मन्यसे त्वम्-क्षणिकोऽपि क्षणभङ्गुरोऽपि जीवः पूर्ववृत्तान्तं स्मरत्येव । कुतः ? इत्याह—विज्ञानानां विज्ञानक्षणानां संततिः संतानस्तस्या गुणस्तत्सामर्थ्यरूपस्तस्मादिति, क्षणसंतानस्यावस्थितत्वात् क्षणनश्वरोऽपि स्मरतीत्यर्थः । अत्रोत्तरमाह—ननु तथाप्येवमपि सति ज्ञानलक्षणसन्तानस्या-
ग्रेतनशरीरसंक्रान्तेर्भवान्तरसद्भावः सिध्यति, सर्वशरीरेभ्यश्च विज्ञानसंतानस्ये-
त्यमर्थान्तरता साधिता भवति, अविच्छिन्नविज्ञानसन्तानात्मकश्चैवं शरीरा-
दर्थान्तरभूत आत्मा सिद्धो भवतीति । तदेवं परभवमङ्गीकृत्याविनष्टस्मरण-
मावेदितम् ॥ १२४ (१६७२) ॥

D C—*Vāyubhūta* —Even though the Soul is *kṣaṇika*, it is able to remember the incidents of former life because of the continuous range of the moments of *vijnāna*

The *Acārya* —Even in that case, the continuous range of

knowledge extends to the former life and hence its existence is also established in the former life. Thus *vijnānasantāna* is proved to be distinct from all bodies. Consequently the Soul that contains this *vijnānasantāna* would also be distinguished from body.

In this way indestructibility of Soul is apprehended to the expectation of another life. And the same could be established in connection with this life also.

न य सर्वहेव खणिअ नाण पुब्बोवलद्धसरणाओ ।

खणिओ न सरइ भूय जह जम्माणतरविनट्ठो ॥१२५॥ (१६७३)

Na ya sarvahaeva khaṇiyam nānam purvvaladdhasaraṇāo ।
Khaṇio na sarai bhūyam jaha jammānantaravinaṭṭho ॥125॥ (1673)

[न च सर्ववैव क्षणिकं ज्ञानं पूर्वोपलब्धस्मरणात् ।

क्षणिको न स्मरति भूतं यथा जमानन्तरविनष्टः ॥ १२५ ॥ (१६७३)

Na ca sarvathaiva kṣāṇikam jñānam pūrvopalaḍḥasmaranāt ।
Kṣāṇiko na smarati bhutam yatha jamanantaratvinasthaḥ ॥ (1673)]

Trans—125 Or (ca) knowledge is not absolutely indurable (*kṣāṇika*) by (virtue of the power of) recollecting an object apprehended in the past. (For) one that is *kṣāṇika* is like an object perished after its very birth not able to remember the past. (1673)

टीका—न च सर्ववैव क्षणिकं ज्ञानं वक्तुं युज्यते । कथञ्चित्तु क्षणिकतां मगवानपीच्छन्त्येव, इति “सर्ववैव” इत्युक्तम् । कस्मात् पुनर्ज्ञानं न क्षणिकम् ? इत्याह—पूर्वोपलब्धस्य बालकालाद्यनुभूतस्पर्शस्य बुद्धस्वाद्यवस्थायामपि स्मरणवर्धनात् । न चैतदेकान्तक्षणिकत्वे सत्युपपद्यते । कुतः ? इत्याह—“खणिओ इत्यादि” यः क्षणिको नायं भूतमतीतं स्मरति, यथा जमानन्तरविनष्टः, एकान्तक्षणिकं चेत्पते ज्ञानम्, अतः स्मरनाभावप्रसङ्ग इति ॥ १२५ (१६७३) ॥

D. C—Jñāna should never be said to be ontirely *ksanika*. It may be *ksanika* to a certain extent. If knowledge were taken to be absolutely transient, there would be no recognition in old age of objects perceived in childhood, as in the case of one who is perished after its birth. Ultimately *smarana* will not exist at all even if *jñāna* were taken to be *ksanika* in every way.

And there is another difficulty also

जस्सेगमेगबंधणमेगंतेण खणियं य विण्णाणं ।

सवखणियविण्णाणं तस्साजुत्तं कदाचिदपि ॥१२६॥ (१६७४)

Jassegamegabandhanamegantena khaniyam ya vinnānam ।
Savvakhaniyavinnānam tassājuttam kadācidapi ॥ 156 ॥ (1674)

[यस्यैकमेकबन्धनमेकान्तेन क्षणिकं च विज्ञानम् ।

सर्वक्षणिकविज्ञानं तस्यायुक्तं कदाचिदपि ॥ १२६ ॥ (१६७४)

Yasyaikamekabandhanamekāntena ksanikam ca vijñānam ।
Sarvaksanikavijñānam tasyāyuktam kadācidapi ॥ 126 ॥ (1674)]

Trans — 126 It is never reasonable to accept *vijnāna* (of an object) as *vijnāna* having all-pervading *ksanikatā*, as it is one independant *vijnāna* exclusively connected with one moment (1674)

टीका—यस्य वादिनो बौद्धस्य ‘एकविज्ञानसंततयः सत्त्वाः’ इति वचनादेकमेवासहायं ज्ञानं तस्य ‘सर्वमपि वस्तु क्षणिकम्’ इत्येवंभूतं विज्ञानं कदाचिदपि न युक्तमिति संबन्धः । इष्यते च सर्वक्षणिकताविज्ञानसौगतैः, “यत् सत् तत् सर्वं क्षणिकम्” तथा “क्षणिकाः सर्वसंस्काराः” इत्यादिवचनात् । एतच्च क्षणिकताग्राहकज्ञानस्यैकत्वे न संभवत्येव । यदि हि त्रिलोकीतलगतैः सर्वैरपि क्षणिकैः पदार्थैः पुरः स्थित्वा तदेकं विज्ञानं जन्येत, तदा तदेतज्ज्ञानीयाद् यदुत—“क्षणिकाः सर्वेऽप्यमी पदार्थाः” इति । न चैवं सर्वैरपि तैस्तज्जन्यते । कुतः ? इत्याह—‘एगबंधणं ति’ यस्मादेकमेव

knowledge extends to the former life and hence its existence is also established in the former life Thus *vyñānasantāna* is proved to be distinct from all bodies. Consequently the Soul that contains this *vyñānasantāna* would also be distinguished from body

In this way indestructibility of Soul is apprehended to the expectation of another life. And the same could be established in connection with this life also

न य सव्वहेव खणिअ नाण पुब्बोवलद्धसरणाओ ।

खणिओ न सरइ भूय जह जम्माणतरविनट्ठो ॥१२५॥ (१६७३)

Na ya savvaheva khanlyam nānam puvvovaladdhasaraṇāo ।
Khanlo na saral bhūyam jaha jammānantaravinaṭṭho ॥125॥ (1673)

[न य सर्वथैव क्षणिक ज्ञान पूर्वोपलब्धस्मरणात् ।

क्षणिको न स्मरति भूतं यथा जन्मानन्तरविनष्टः ॥ १२५ ॥ (१६७३)

Na ca sarvathauva kṣaṇikam jñānam pūrvopalaḍḍhasmarapat ।
Kṣaṇiko na smarati bhutam yathā janmānantaravinaṣṭaḥ ॥ (1673)]

Trans — 125 Or (*ca*) knowledge is not absolutely indurable (*kṣaṇika*) by (virtue of the power of) recollecting an object apprehended in the past (For) one that is *kṣaṇika* is like an object perished after its very birth not able to remember the past. (1673)

टीका—न य सर्वथैव क्षणिक ज्ञानं बलं युज्यते । कश्चित्तु क्षणिकतां भगवानपीच्छत्येव, इति “सर्वथैव” इत्युक्तम् । कस्मात् पुनर्ज्ञानं न क्षणिकम् ? इत्याह—पूर्वोपलब्धस्य बालकालाद्यनुभूतस्मार्यस्य हृदस्वाद्यवस्थायामपि स्मरणदर्शनात् । न चैतदेकान्तक्षणिकत्वे सत्युपपद्यते । कुतः ? इत्याह—“सखिमोह त्यादि” यः क्षणिको नायं भूतमतीतं स्मरति, यथा जन्मानन्तर विनष्टः, एकान्तक्षणिकं वेप्यते ज्ञानम्, अतः स्मरणाभावप्रसङ्ग इति ॥ १२५ (१६७३) ॥

all such *jñānas*, then and then only it would be possible to recognize the transitoriness of all objects. But simultaneous production of *jñāna* as regards all objects is never possible and hence the apprehension of *sarvaksanīkāvijnāna* is also impossible

Again, if *vijnāna* of an object were not to vanish soon after its birth, one might get an opportunity to apprehend *sarvaksanīkatā*. For, in that case, *vijnāna* being contained within indestructibility, one could naturally remark at the destruction of all other objects that "every thing except us and those of our class is *ksanika* " But that is not possible For, according to *Buddhist* theory, knowledge being exclusively *ksanika*, cannot last for a long time and hence it is not possible to apprehend *ksanīkatā* in case of all objects Authentic knowledge should therefore be considered as *a-ksanika* This being a *guṇa*, it can never exist without a suitable resort viz, *ātman*, which leads automatically to prove that soul is distinct from body

जं सविसयनिययं चिय जम्माणंतरहयं च तं किह णु ।
नाहिति सुबहुयविण्णाणविसयखयभंगयाईणि ॥१२७॥ (१६७५)

Jam savisayanīyayam ciya jammānantarahayam ca tam kiha nu ।
Nāhiti subahuyavinnānavīsayakḥayabhangayāṇi ? ॥ 127 ॥ (1675)

[यद् स्वविषयनियतमेव जन्मान्तरहतं च तत् कथं नु ।

ज्ञास्यति सुबहुकविज्ञानविषयक्षयभङ्गादीनि ? ॥ १२७ ॥ (१६७५)

Yad svavīsayanīyatameva janmāntarahatam ca tat katham nu ।
Jnāsyati subahukavijñānavīsayaksayabhangakādīni ? ॥127॥ (1675)]

Trans —127 How could that (knowledge) which is restricted to its own self and scope and which vanishes soon after its birth understand qualities such as indurability etc, pertaining to the scope of *vijnāna* ? (1675)

प्रतिनियत वचन निबन्धनमालम्बन यस्य तदेकवचनं ज्ञानम्, अतः कथमशेषवस्तुस्तोमव्यापिनीं क्षणिकतामवबुध्येत ? । अपि च, एकालम्बन स्वेऽपि यद्यशेषपदार्थविषयाणामपि ज्ञानानां युगपदुत्पत्तिरिष्यते, आत्मा च तदर्थानुस्मर्ता, तदा स्यादशेषपदार्थक्षणिकतापरिज्ञानम् । न चाशेषार्थग्राहकानेकज्ञानानां युगपदुत्पत्तिरिष्यते ।

किञ्च, तदेकमप्येकार्थविषयमपि च विज्ञान सर्वपदार्थगतां क्षणिकता मज्ञास्यदेव यद्युत्पत्त्यनन्तरञ्चसि नामविष्यत् । अविनाशित्वे हि तदवस्थित तयोपषिष्ट सदन्वमन्य चार्थमुत्पत्त्यनन्तरमुपरमन्त दृष्ट्वा “सर्वमेवास्मद्वर्त्म स्मत्सञ्जातीयवर्जं च वस्तुक्षणिकमेव ” इत्यवबुध्येत, न चैतदस्ति । कुतः ? इत्याह—“एगतेन स्वणिय चेति ” यस्य च बौद्धस्यैकान्तेन क्षणिक क्षण एवमेव विज्ञान, न पुनश्चिरावस्थापि, तस्य कथं सर्ववस्तुगतक्षणिकतापरि ज्ञान स्यात् ? । तस्मादक्षणिकमेव प्रमातृ ज्ञानमेष्टव्यम् । तच्च गुणत्वादनु रूप गुणिनमात्मानमन्तरेण न संभवति । अतः सिद्धः क्षरीराद् व्यतिरिक्त आत्मेति ॥ १२६ (१६७४) ॥

D C—According to the theory that there is one and only one continuous range of *vyñāna* to all living beings the *Bauddhas* believe that *vyñāna* is *eka* (one) and *asahāya* (independent) and hence it can never recognise all objects as all objects would become *kāmlā* according to that theory *Saṃgatas* (*Bauddhas*) however try to establish *sarvakaṇṭhikā* *vyñāna* by the help of statements such as all that exists is *kāṇṭha* and all *samskāras* are *kāṇṭha* ' etc. Now *jñāna* having all pervading *kāṇṭhikā* is not possible at all For if one were able to produce such *jñāna* in presence of all objects in the Universe then only it could be apprehended that all these objects are *kāṇṭha*. But *jñāna* could never be produced by means of all those objects in that manner For how could *kāṇṭhikā* extended to all objects be recognized when *jñāna* resorts to one and only one *ālambana* ? In such cases if all *jñānas* of all objects were taken to have been produced at the same time and if *ātman* were accepted as the *anumarta* of

all such *jñānas*, then and then only it would be possible to recognize the transitoriness of all objects. But simultaneous production of *jñāna* as regards all objects is never possible and hence the apprehension of *sarvaksamktāvijnāna* is also impossible

Again, if *vijnāna* of an object were not to vanish soon after its birth, one might get an opportunity to apprehend *sarvaksamktā*. For, in that case, *vijnāna* being contained within indestructibility, one could naturally remark at the destruction of all other objects that “every thing except us and those of our class is *ksanika*” But that is not possible. For, according to *Buddhist* theory, knowledge being exclusively *ksanika*, cannot last for a long time and hence it is not possible to apprehend *ksamktā* in case of all objects. Authentic knowledge should therefore be considered as *a-ksanika*. This being a *guna*, it can never exist without a suitable resort viz, *ātman*, which leads automatically to prove that soul is distinct from body

जं सविसयनिययं चिय जम्माणंतरहयं च तं किह णु ।
नाहिति सुबहुयविण्णाणविसयखयभंगयाईणि ॥१२७॥ (१६७५)

Jam savisayanīyayam ciya jammānantarahayam ca tam kiha nu ।
Nāhiti subahuyavinnānavisayakhayabhangayāīni ? ॥ 127 ॥ (1675)

[यद् स्वविषयनियतमेव जन्मान्तरहतं च तत् कथं नु ।

ज्ञास्यति सुबहुकविज्ञानविषयक्षयभङ्गकादीनि ? ॥ १२७ ॥ (१६७५)

Yad svavīsayanīyatameva janmāntarahatam ca tat katham nu ।
Jñāsyati subahukavijñānavīsayakṣayabhangakādīni ? ॥127॥ (1675)]

Trans —127 How could that (knowledge) which is restricted to its own self and scope and which vanishes soon after its birth understand qualities such as indurability etc, pertaining to the scope of *vijnāna* ? (1675)

टीका—यत् स्वविषयमात्रनियत जन्मानन्तरइत च प्रमाद विज्ञानं, तत्कथं
सुषुप्तविज्ञानविषयगतान् क्षणभग-निरात्मकत्व-सुखि-दुःखितादीन् धर्मान्
ज्ञास्यति ? न कश्चिदित्यर्थः ॥ १२७ (१६७५) ॥

D C—Pramāṇa jñāna (authentic knowledge) is restricted
to its own self and scope. It is destroyed immediately after
its own production. So it could never understand a number
of attributes e g transitoriness subjectivity and sense of
happiness misery etc related to the *viśaya* (subject) of *vijñāna*.

गिण्हिज्ज सव्वभग जइ य मई सविषयाणुमाणाओ ।

त पि न जओऽणुमाण जुत्त सत्ताइसिद्धीओ ॥१२८॥ (१६७६)

Gihhiṇja savvabhaṅgam jaṇ ya mai saviṣayānumāṇāo ।

Tam pi na jaṇnumāṇam juttam sattādisiddhīo ॥ 128 ॥ (1676)

[गृहीयात् सर्वभग यदि च मतिः स्वविषयानुमानात् ।

तदपि न यतोऽनुमान युक्त सत्तादिसिद्धौ ॥ १२८ ॥ (१६७६)

Gṛhītyat sarvabhaṅgam yadi ca matiḥ svaviṣayanumanāt ।

Tadapi na yato numāṇam yuktam sattādisiddhau ॥ 128 ॥ (1676)]

Trans—128 Again it is not even proper to believe that
vijñāna apprehends indurability of all (objects) by means of
anumāna from its own self and scope. Because, *anumāna* is
proper only with regard to the establishment of existence
etc. (1676)

टीका—यदि च परस्मैबभूता मतिः स्यात् यदुक्त-एकमपि-एकालम्बन
मपि क्षणिकमपि च प्रमाद विज्ञानं सर्ववस्तु गतधृष्यमङ्गं गृहीयात् । कुतः ?
इत्याह—स्वविषयानुमानात् । एतदुक्तं भवति—यस्मादयमस्मद्विषयः
क्षणिकः, अहं च क्षणनश्वररूपम्, ततो विज्ञानसाम्यादन्यान्यपि विज्ञानानि
क्षणिकानि, विषयसाम्याच्चान्येऽपि विषयाः सर्वेऽपि क्षणिकाः, इत्येवं स्वं च
विषयाच्च स्वविषयास्तदनुमानात् सर्वस्यापि वस्तुस्तोमस्य क्षणिकत्वादि गृह्यते ।
अत्र दूषणमाह—“तं पीत्यादि” तदपि न युक्तं न षटमानकम् । कुतः ? इत्याह—

यतस्तत् स्वविषयानुमानमन्येषां विज्ञानानामन्यविषयाणां च पक्षीकृतानां सत्तादि प्रसिद्धावेव युज्यते । नहि सत्त्वेनाप्यप्रसिद्धधर्मिणि क्षणिकतादिधर्मः साध्यमानो विभ्राजते । को हि नाम शब्दादिष्वादावेव सत्त्वेनाप्रतीतेषु कृतकत्वादिनाऽनित्यत्वादिधर्मान् साधयति, “ तत्र पक्षः प्रसिद्धोधर्मो ” इत्यादिवचनात् ? । न चेदमेकमेकालम्बनं क्षणिकं च ज्ञानमेतद् बोद्धुं शक्नोति यदुत—अन्यज्ञानानि सन्ति, तद्विषयाश्च विद्यन्ते, तेषां च विषयाणां स्वविषयज्ञानजनन-स्वभावादय एवं भूता धर्माः सन्तीति । एतदपरिज्ञाने च कथमेतेषां क्षणिकतां साधयिष्यति, धर्मिण एवाप्रसिद्धेः ? ।

स्यादेतत्, स्वविषयानुमानादेवान्यविज्ञानादिसत्तापि सेत्स्यत्येव, तथाहि—यथाऽहमस्मि तथान्यान्यपि ज्ञानानि सन्ति, यथा च मद्विषयो विद्यते, एवमन्येऽपि ज्ञानविषया विद्यन्ते एव; यथा चाहं मद्विषयश्च क्षणिकः, एवमन्यज्ञानानि तद्विषयाश्च क्षणिका एवेति, एवं सर्वेषां सत्त्वं क्षणिकता च स्वविषयानुमानादेव सेत्स्यतीति । एतदप्ययुक्तम्, यतः सर्वक्षणिकताग्राहकं ज्ञानं क्षणनश्वरत्वाज्जन्मान्तरं “मृत इवाहमस्मि, क्षणिकं च” इत्येवमात्मानमपि नावबुध्यते, अन्यपरिज्ञानं तु तस्य दूरोत्सारितमेव । किञ्च, तत् स्वविषयमात्रस्यापि क्षणिकतां नावगच्छति, समानकालमेव द्वयोरपि विनष्टत्वात् । यदि हि स्वविषयं विनश्यन्तं दृष्ट्वा ततद्गतक्षणिकतां निश्चित्य स्वयं पश्चात् कालान्तरे तद् विनश्येत्, तदा स्यात् तस्य स्वविषयक्षणिकताप्रतिपत्तिः, न चैतदस्ति, ज्ञानस्य विषयस्य च निजनिजक्षण जनयित्वा समानकालमेव विनाशाभ्युपगमात् । न च स्वसंवेदनप्रत्यक्षेण वा क्षणिकता गृह्यत इति सौगतैरिष्यते, अनुमानगम्यत्वेन तस्यास्तैरभ्युपगमादिति ॥ १२८ (१६७६) ॥

D C—An opponent may advance the following objection in this case—

Pramātrivijnāna though *ksanika* and resorting to only one *ālambana* is able to recognize *ksanikatā* of its own self as well as sphere For, just as the knowledge that we are *ksanika* as our *visaya* is *ksanika* is common in other cases also, all other objects and their spheres should also be considered as *ksanika*

टीका—यत् स्वविषयमात्रनियतं बन्मानन्तरहतं च प्रमातृ विज्ञानं, तत्कथं सुषुप्तविज्ञानविषयगतान् क्षणभग-निरात्मकत्व-सुप्ति-दुःखितादीन् धर्मान् आस्यति ? न कश्चिदित्यर्थः ॥ १२७ (१६७५) ॥

D C—Pramātra jñāna (authentic knowledge) is restricted to its own self and scope. It is destroyed immediately after its own production. So it could never understand a number of attributes e. g. transitoriness, subjectivity and sense of happiness, misery etc. related to the *viśaya* (subject) of *vijnāna*.

गिणिहृज्ज सधमग जइ य मई सविषयाणुमाणाओ ।

त पि न जओऽणुमाण जुत्त सत्ताइसिद्धीओ ॥१२८॥ (१६७६)

Gihijja savvabhangam jai ya mai savisayānumāṇo ।

Tam pi na jaonumānam juttam sattāsisiddhio ॥ 128 ॥ (1676)

[गृहीयात् सर्वमङ्गं यदि च मतिः स्वविषयानुमानात् ।

तदपि न यतोऽनुमान युक्तं सत्तादिसिद्धौ ॥ १२८ ॥ (१६७६)

Gṛhītyat sarvabhangam yadi ca matih svavisayanumanat ।

Tadapi na yato numanam yuktam tattādisiddhau ॥ 128 ॥ (1676)]

Trans—128 Again it is not even proper to believe that *vijnāna* apprehends indurability of all (objects) by means of *anumāna* from its own self and scope. Because, *anumāna* is proper only with regard to the establishment of existence etc. (1676)

टीका—यदि च परस्मैबन्धूता मतिः स्याद् यदुत-एकमपि-एकालम्बन-मपि क्षणिकमपि च प्रमातृ विज्ञानं सर्ववस्तु गतक्षणमङ्गं गृहीयात् । कुतः ? इत्याह—स्वविषयानुमानात् । एतदुक्तं भवति—यस्मादयमस्मद्विषयः क्षणिकः, अहं च क्षणनश्वररूपम्, ततो विज्ञानसाम्यादन्यान्यपि विज्ञानानि क्षणिकानि, विषयसाम्याच्चान्येऽपि विषयाः सर्वेऽपि क्षणिकाः, इत्येष स्व च विषयाश्च स्वविषयास्तदनुमानात् सर्वस्यापि वस्तुस्तोमस्य क्षणिकत्वादि गृह्यते । अत्र दूषणमाह—“त पीत्यादि” तदपि न युक्तं न षट्मानकम् । कुतः ? इत्याह—

यतस्तत् स्वविषयानुमानमन्येषां विज्ञानानामन्यविषयाणां च पक्षीकृतानां सत्तादि प्रसिद्धावेव युज्यते । नहि सत्त्वेनाप्यप्रसिद्धधर्मिणि क्षणिकतादिधर्मः साध्यमानो विभ्राजते । को हि नाम शब्दादिष्वादावेव सत्त्वेनाप्रतीतेषु कृतकत्वादिनाऽनित्यत्वादिधर्मान् साधयति, “ तत्र पक्षः प्रसिद्धोधर्मी ” इत्यादिवचनात् ? । न चेदमेकमेकालम्बनं क्षणिकं च ज्ञानमेतद् बोद्धुं शक्नोति यदुत—अन्यज्ञानानि सन्ति, तद्विषयाश्च विद्यन्ते, तेषां च विषयाणां स्वविषयज्ञानजनन-स्वभावादय एवं भूता धर्माः सन्तीति । एतदपरिज्ञाने च कथमेतेषां क्षणिकतां साधयिष्यति, धर्मिण एवाप्रसिद्धेः ? ।

स्यादेतत्, स्वविषयानुमानादेवान्यविज्ञानादिसत्तापि सेत्स्यत्येव, तथाहि—यथाऽहमस्मि तथान्यान्यपि ज्ञानानि सन्ति, यथा च मद्विषयो विद्यते, एवमन्येऽपि ज्ञानविषया विद्यन्ते एव; यथा चाहं मद्विषयश्च क्षणिकः, एवमन्यज्ञानानि तद्विषयाश्च क्षणिका एवेति, एवं सर्वेषां सत्त्वं क्षणिकता च स्वविषयानुमानादेव सेत्स्यतीति । एतदप्ययुक्तम्, यतः सर्वक्षणिकताग्राहकं ज्ञानं क्षणनश्वरत्वाज्जन्मान्तरं “मृत इवाहमस्मि, क्षणिकं च” इत्येवमात्मानमपि नावबुध्यते, अन्यपरिज्ञानं तु तस्य दूरोत्सारितमेव । किञ्च, तत् स्वविषयमात्रस्यापि क्षणिकतां नावगच्छति, समानकालमेव द्वयोरपि विनष्टत्वात् । यदि हि स्वविषयं विनश्यन्तं दृष्ट्वा ततद्वतक्षणिकतां निश्चित्य स्वयं पश्चात् कालान्तरे तद् विनश्येत्, तदा स्यात् तस्य स्वविषयक्षणिकताप्रतिपत्तिः, न चैतदस्ति, ज्ञानस्य विषयस्य च निजनिजक्षणं जनयित्वा समानकालमेव विनाशाम्युपगमात् । न च स्वसंवेदनप्रत्यक्षेण वा क्षणिकता गृह्यत इति सौगतैरिष्यते, अनुमानगम्यत्वेन तस्यास्तैरभ्युपगमादिति ॥ १२८ (१६७६) ॥

D C—An opponent may advance the following objection in this case—

Pramātrivṛtyāna though *ksanika* and resorting to only one *ālambana* is able to recognize *ksanikatā* of its own self as well as sphere For, just as the knowledge that we are *ksanika* as our *visaya* is *ksanika* is common in other cases also, all other objects and their spheres should also be considered as *ksanika*

The argument stated above is not correct. *svavayānumāna* can be applied only in case of establishing the existence etc. of other *vyñānas* and *viśayas* and not otherwise. Just as in case of *śabda* etc. which are not accepted as existent, one could not establish properties like *anūyatā* by reason of their mere constructive utility so in this case also, properties like *kāṣṭhātā* could not be proved to exist in objects which are not known at all.

Moreover *vyñāna* which is said to be *kāṣṭhika* and *ebālan-bana* is not able to understand whether there are other *jñānas* and *viśayas* and whether those *jñānas* and *viśayas* possess the property of producing *jñāna* of its own self and sphere. So if such *jñāna* could not be produced and if the objects in which *kāṣṭhātā* is to be established are not known how could *kāṣṭhātā* be proved to exist at all?

At this point the opponent may argue that existence etc. of other *vyñānas* could be established by the help of *svavayānumāna*. One would say in this case that "Just as I exist and my *viśaya* exists other *jñānas* and their *viśayas* also exist and just as I and my *viśaya* are *kāṣṭhika* other *jñānas* and their *viśayas* are also *kāṣṭhika*." Thus existence as well as *kāṣṭhātā* of all the objects could easily be established.

The above objection is entirely fallacious. *Jñāna* which apprehends *svakāṣṭhikata* is not able to recognize even its own self after its production on account of its being *kāṣṭhika*—as good as dead. Thus when it is not able to recognize its own self how can it perceive that there are other *jñānas* and their *viśayas* also? Such indurable *jñāna* does not recognize *kāṣṭhikata* of its own *viśaya* because according to them that *jñāna* and *viśaya* vanish within equally short time. If that *jñāna* ascertains the *kāṣṭhikata* of its own *viśaya* from its disappearance within a short time before the *jñāna* itself dies away then and then only would the *kāṣṭhātā* of its

visaya be recognized by it But this argument is not accepted by *Bauddhas* They believe that *jñāna* and its *visaya* disappear at the same time after being produced for a moment

Moreover, according to *Saugatas*, *ksaṇṇikatā* is recognized neither by means of self-perception nor by the help of perception by sense-organs, but by means of *anumāna* only

जाणेज्ज वासणा उ सा वि हु वासित्त-वासणिज्जाणं ।

जुत्ता समेच्च दोण्हं न उ जम्माणंतरहयस्स ॥१२९॥ (१६७७)

Jāṇeja vāsanā u sā vi hu vāsitta-vāsanijjānam ।

Juttā samecca donham na u jammānantarahayassa ॥129॥ (1677)

[जानीयात् वासना तु सापि खलु वासि-वासनीययोः ।

युक्ता समेत्य द्वयोर्न तु जन्मानन्तरहतस्य ॥ १२९ ॥ (१६७७)

Jāṇīyat vāsanā tu sāpi khalu vāsi-vāsanīyayoh ।

Yuktā sametya dvayorna tu janmānantarahatasya ॥129॥ (1677)]

Trans—129 Again, the opponent might argue that desire could understand *sarvaksanikatā*, but that also is in fact proper (only) because it is related to both—one that desires and the desired (object), and not in case of that which vanishes soon after (its birth) (1677)

टीका—स्यादेतत् पूर्वपूर्वविज्ञानक्षणैरुत्तरोत्तरविज्ञानक्षणानामेवंभूता वासना जन्यते, यथाऽन्यविज्ञान-तद्विषयाणा मत्त्व-क्षणिकतादीन् धर्मानेक-मेकालम्बनं क्षणिकमपि च विज्ञानं जानाति, अतः सर्वक्षणिकताज्ञानं सौगतानां न विरुध्यते । तदप्ययुक्तम्, यतः सापि वासना वासक वासनीययो-र्द्वयोरपि समेत्य संयुज्य विद्यमानयोरेव युक्ता, न तु जन्मान्तरमेव हतस्य विनष्टस्य । वास्य-वासकयोश्च संयोगेनावस्थाने क्षणिकताहानिप्रसङ्गः । किञ्च, सापि वासना क्षणिका, अक्षणिका वा ? । क्षणिकत्वे कथं तद्वशात् सर्वक्षणि-कतापरिज्ञानम् ? । अक्षणिकत्वे तु प्रतिज्ञाहानिरिति ॥ १२९ (१६७७) ॥

D C—Here, again the opponents may argue that the

The argument stated above is not correct. *Śravaṇānumāna* can be applied only in case of establishing the existence etc. of other *vyñānas* and *viśayas* and not otherwise. Just as in case of *śabda* etc. which are not accepted as existent, one could not establish properties like *anūyāta* by reason of their mere constructive utility so in this case also, properties like *kāṁkṣā* could not be proved to exist in objects which are not known at all.

Moreover *vyñāna* which is said to be *kṣaṇika* and *ekālam-bana* is not able to understand whether there are other *jñānas* and *viśayas* and whether those *jñānas* and *viśayas* possess the property of producing *jñāna* of its own self and sphere. So if such *jñāna* could not be produced and if the objects in which *kāṁkṣā* is to be established are not known how could *kāṁkṣā* be proved to exist at all?

At this point the opponent may argue that existence etc. of other *vyñānas* could be established by the help of *śra-vaṇānumāna*. One would say in this case that "Just as I exist and my *viśaya* exists other *jñānas* and their *viśayas* also exist and just as I and my *viśaya* are *kṣaṇika* other *jñānas* and their *viśayas* are also *kṣaṇika*." Thus existence as well as *kāṁkṣā* of all the objects could easily be established.

The above objection is entirely fallacious. *Jñāna* which apprehends *svakāṁkṣā* is not able to recognize even its own self after its production on account of its being *kṣaṇika*—as good as dead. Thus when it is not able to recognize its own self how can it perceive that there are other *jñānas* and their *viśayas* also? Such indurable *jñāna* does not recognize *kāṁkṣā* of its own *viśaya* because according to them that *jñāna* and *viśaya* vanish within equally short time. If that *jñāna* ascertains the *kāṁkṣā* of its own *viśaya* from its disappearance within a short time before the *jñāna* itself dies away then and then only would the *kāṁkṣā* of its

visaya be recognized by it But this argument is not accepted by *Bauddhas* They believe that *jnāna* and its *visaya* disappear at the same time after being produced for a moment.

Moreover, according to *Saugatas*, *ksanikatā* is recognized neither by means of self-perception nor by the help of perception by sense-organs, but by means of *anumāna* only

जाणेज वासणा उ सा वि हु वासित्त-वासणिज्जाणं ।

जुत्ता समेच्च दोण्हं न उ जम्माणंतरहयस्स ॥१२९॥ (१६७७)

Jāṇeja vāsanaṃ u sā vi hu vāsitta-vāsanijjāṇam ।

Juttā samecca donham na u jammānantarahayassa ॥129॥ (1677)

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युक्ता समेत्य द्वयोर्न तु जन्मानन्तरहतस्य ॥ १२९ ॥ (१६७७)

Jāṇiyāt vāsanaṃ tu sāpi khalu vāsi-vāsanīyayoh ।

Yukta sametya dvayorna tu janmānantarahatasya ॥129॥ (1677)]

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टीका—स्यादेतत् पूर्वपूर्वविज्ञानक्षणैरुत्तरोत्तरविज्ञानक्षणानामेवंभूता वासना जन्यते, यथाऽन्यविज्ञान-तद्विषयाणां मत्त्व-क्षणिकतादीन् धर्मानेकमेकालम्बनं क्षणिकमपि च विज्ञानं जानाति, अतः सर्वक्षणिकताज्ञानं सौगतानां न विरुध्यते । तदप्ययुक्तम्, यतः सापि वामना वासक वासनीययोर्द्वयोरपि समेत्य संयुज्य विद्यमानयोरेव युक्ता, न तु जन्मान्तरमेव हतस्य विनष्टस्य । वास्य-वासकयोश्च संयोगेनावस्थाने क्षणिकताहानिप्रसङ्गः । किञ्च, सापि वासना क्षणिका, अक्षणिका वा ? । क्षणिकत्वे कथं तद्वशात् सर्वक्षणिकतापरिज्ञानम् ? । अक्षणिकत्वे तु प्रतिज्ञाहानिरिति ॥ १२९ (१६७७) ॥

D C—Here, again the opponents may argue that the

earlier moments of apprehension create such a desire during the later moments of apprehension that by means of that desire even a *ksanika vyākāṇa* having only one support is 'able to apprehend other *gnanas* and their *viśayas* having existence transitoriness etc. as their qualities. Consequently there is no harm in believing that all objects are *ksanika*.

But even that is not correct. For *vāsana* in the above case could be applied only when it is related to *vāsaka* and *vāsantiya* and hence it could not be applied to the knowledge that vanishes immediately after its birth. Again in accepting the *avasthāna* (retention) of *vāsya* and *vasaka* connected together *ksanikata* itself would not exist. And is that *vāsana ksanika* or a *ksanika*? If it were *ksanika* it would not be able to apprehend *sarvaksanikatā*, and if it were a *ksanika* the very proposition that everything is *ksanika* would be violated.

So the theory of *Bauddhas* that everything is *ksanika* does not fit in in any way.

Thus having refuted the opponents view the *Ācārya* now illustrates his own

धनुर्विण्णाणप्पभवो जुगवमणेगत्थयाऽह्वेगस्स ।

विण्णाणावस्था वा पट्टच्चवित्तीविघाओ वा ॥१३०॥ (१६७८)

विण्णाणखणविणासे दोसा इच्चादयो पसज्जति ।

न उ ठियसभूयच्चुयविण्णाणमयम्मि जीवम्मि ॥१३१॥ (१६७९)

तस्स विचित्तावरणखओवसमजाइ चित्तरूपाइ ।

खणियाणि य कालतरवित्तीणि य मइविहाणाइ ॥१३२॥ (१६८०)

Bhūvinnanappabhavo jugavamanegatthayā'havegassa ।

Vimāṇāvattthā vā paduccavittivighāo vā ॥ 130 ॥ (1678)

Vimāṇakhanāvinnāse dosā iccādayo pasajjanti ।

Na u ṭhiyasambhūyaccuyavimāṇanayammi jīvammi ॥ 131 ॥ (1679)

Tassa vicittāvaranakhaovasamañāim cīttarūvāim ।

Khamiyāni ya kālāntaravittīni ya maivihānāim ॥ 132 ॥ (1680)

[बहुविज्ञानप्रभवो युगपदनेकार्थताऽथवैकस्य ।

विज्ञानावस्था वा प्रतीत्यवृत्तिविघातो वा ॥ १३० ॥ (१६७८)

विज्ञानक्षणविनाशे दोषा इत्यादयः प्रसजन्ति ।

न तु स्थितसंभूतच्युतविज्ञानमये जीवे ॥ १३१ ॥ (१६७९)

तस्य विचित्रावरणक्षयोपशमजानि चित्ररूपाणि ।

क्षणिकानि च कालान्तरवृत्तीनि च मतिविधानानि ॥ १३२ ॥ (१६८०)

Bahuvijnānaprabhavo yugapadanekārthata'thavaikasya ।

Vijnānāvasthā vā pratītyavrittivighāto vā ॥ 130 ॥ (1678)

Vijnānaksanāvināśe doṣa ityādayaḥ prasajanti ।

Na tu sthitasambhūta'cyutavijnānamaye jīve ॥ 131 ॥ (1679)

Tasya vicitrāvaraṇaksayopasamajāni citrarūpāni ।

Kṣanikāni ca kālāntaravrittīni ca matividhānāni ॥ 132 ॥ (1680)]

Trans — 130-131-132 If *vijnāna* were taken to be *ksana vināśi* a number of faults such as production of many *vijnānas*, yielding more than one meaning at a time, or, one yielding more than one meaning at a time, retention (*avasthā*) of *vijnāna*, violation of the law of cause and effect etc would arise This would not happen only in case of *jīva*, having *vijnāna* which is *sthita* (settled) *sambhūta* (born) and *cyuta* (dropped) being accepted (For), it manifests various (types of) intellectual forms that are born of various types of diminutions and relaxations and that are *ksanika* as well as permanent (1678-1679-1680)

टीका—तदेवं विज्ञानस्य प्रतिक्षणं विनाशेऽभ्युपगम्यमाने इत्यादयो दोषाः प्रसजन्ति । के पुनस्ते दोषाः ? इत्याह—“ बहुविष्णाणेत्यादि ” इत्येवं संबन्धः । क्षणनश्वरविज्ञानवादिना भुवनत्रयान्तर्वर्तिसर्वाथग्रहणार्थं युगपदेव बहूनां ज्ञानानां प्रभव उत्पादोऽभ्युपगन्तव्यः, तदाश्रयभूतश्च तद्दृष्टानाम-

earlier moments of apprehension create such a desire during the later moments of apprehension that by means of that desire even a *ksanika* *viñāṇa* having only one support is 'able to apprehend other *jñānas* and their *viṣayas* having existence transitoriness etc. as their qualities. Consequently there is no harm in believing that all objects are *ksanika*.

But even that is not correct. For *vasana* in the above case could be applied only when it is related to *vāsaka* and *vāsantiya* and hence it could not be applied to the knowledge that vanishes immediately after its birth. Again in accepting the *avasthāna* (retention) of *vāsa* and *vasaka* connected together *ksanikata* itself would not exist. And is that *vasanā* *ksanika* or *a-ksanika*? If it were *ksanika* it would not be able to apprehend *sarvaksanikā*, and if it were *a-ksanika* the very proposition that everything is *ksanika* would be violated.

So the theory of *Bauddhas* that everything is *ksanika* does not fit in in any way.

Thus having refuted the opponents view the *Ācārya* now illustrates his own

घट्टविण्णाणप्पमवो जुगवमणेगतथयाऽहवेगस्स ।

विण्णाणावस्था वा पट्टच्चवित्तीविघाओ वा ॥१३०॥ (१६७८)

विण्णाणस्खणविणासे दोसा इच्छादयो पसज्जति ।

न उ ठियसभूयच्चुयविण्णाणमयम्मि जीवम्मि ॥१३१॥ (१६७९)

तस्स विचित्तावरणस्वओवसमजाइ चित्तरूपाइ ।

खणियाणि य कालतरवित्तीणि य मइविहाणाइ ॥१३२॥ (१६८०)

Bahuvrīhanappabhaso jugavamanegatthayā'havegassa ।

Vimāṇāvattā vā paḍuccavittivighāo vā ॥ 130 ॥ (1678)

Vimāṇakhaṇāvinnāse dosā icchādayo pasajjanti ।

Na u tthiyasambhūyaccuyavimāṇamayammī jīvammi ॥ 131 ॥ (1679)

कालान्तरवृत्तीनि । उपलक्षणं च मतिविधानानि, श्रुता-स्वधि-मनःपर्यायविधानान्यपि यथासंख्यं श्रुता-स्वधिमनःपर्यायज्ञानावरणक्षयोपशमवैचित्र्याद् विचित्ररूपाणि यथासंभव तस्य द्रष्टव्यानि । केवलज्ञानं त्वेकमेवाविकल्पं केवलज्ञानावरणक्षयादेव द्रष्टव्यमिति ॥ १३२ (१६८०) ॥

D. C—If *gnāna* were taken to be *ksanika* as stated before, a number of *dosas* would get in, in the following manner —

1. In order that all the objects that pervade the three worlds, should be recognized, a *ksanikatā-vādin* ought to admit that all sorts of *gnānas* are produced at the same time and the Soul that rememebers the objects in which those *gnānas* are produced should be taken to stay on permanently. Otherwise, statements such as “Whatever exists is all *ksanika*” “All *bhāvas* are *ksanika*” etc that established *sarvaksanikatā* would be futile

Moreover, when more than one *gnāna* are accepted, the original theory of *ekavyñānasantati* has also been violated.

2. Again, if *ksaṇa vyñāna* were accepted, another fault would also crop up In this case, one and the same *vyñāna* would be able to recognize all the objects that exist in all the the worlds But this could never happen, nor be believed

3 In order to recognize a number of objects, *vyñāna* must be taken to last for a long time. As a result of this, *vyñāna* would be able to recognize the *ksanikatā* of all as they are *ksanika* also But believing so, the Soul which is known as nothing but *vyñāna* would have to be accepted, and it would go against the original proposition

4 Again, if the production of many *vyñānas* were not accepted, there would be violation of *pratityavrtti*. When *kāraṇa* is not anyhow apprehended in the state of *kārya*, *Baudhas* call it the violation of *pratityavrtti*. As the production of a *kārya* depends upon a *kāraṇa* this would gives rise to *dosa*. If *Baudhas* were to accept this, processes such as that of

यानामनुस्मर्ताऽवस्थित आत्माऽभ्युपगन्तव्यः, अन्यथा “यत् सत् तत् सर्वं क्षणिकम्” “क्षणिकाः सर्वे संस्काराः” “निरात्माना सर्वे मायाः” इत्यादि सर्वक्षणिकतादिविज्ञानं नोपपद्येत, तदभ्युपगमे च स्वमतत्यागप्रसक्तिः । अथवा, क्षणिकं विज्ञानमिच्छतैकस्यपि विज्ञानस्य युगपदनकार्यता—सर्वमव नान्तर्गतार्थग्राहिताभ्युपगन्तव्या, येन सर्वक्षणिकतादिविज्ञानमुपपद्यते, न चैतद्विध्यते, दृश्यते वा । “विष्णाणावत्या यं हि” यदिवा, अवस्था नमवस्था, विज्ञानस्यावस्था विज्ञानावस्थाभ्युपगन्तव्या भवति । इदमुक्तं भवति—विज्ञानस्यानल्पकल्पाग्रक्षोऽवस्थानमेष्टव्यम्, येन तत् सर्वदा समा सीनमन्यान्यवस्तुविनश्वरतां वीक्षमाणं सवक्षणिकतामवगच्छेदिति सर्वं प्रागे वोक्तमेव । एव चाभ्युपगमे विज्ञानसंज्ञामात्रविशिष्टआत्मैवाभ्युपगतो भवति ।

अथेतद् बहुविज्ञानप्रमवादिकं नेष्यते, तर्हि प्रतीत्यवृत्तिविषातः प्राप्नोति । इदमत्र हृदयम्—कारणं प्रतीत्याभित्य कार्यस्य वृत्तिः प्रवृत्तिरूपमिति यावत्, न पुनः कारणं कार्यावस्थायां कथञ्चिदप्यन्वेति, इत्येष सौगतरभ्युपगम्यते । इत्थं चाभ्युपगम्यमानेऽतीतस्मरणादिसमस्तव्यवहारोच्छेदप्रसङ्गः । एव हि व्यवहारप्रवृत्तिः स्याद् यद्यतीतानकसंस्कृतादिज्ञानाभ्यस्तच्छिज्ञानरूपेण परिणामादन्वयी आत्माऽभ्युपगम्यते । तथाभ्युपगमे च सति प्रतीत्यवृत्त्यभ्युपगमविषातः स्यादिति । ननु यदि विज्ञानस्य क्षणनिनाश एव दोषा प्रसजन्ति, तर्हि कामी दोषा न भवन्ति ? इत्याह—“न उ ठियेत्यादि” न त्वस्मदभ्युपगते जीवेऽभ्युपगम्यमान एते दोषाः प्रसजन्ति । कथमूते जीवे ? स्थितसंभूतच्युतविज्ञानमये—कथञ्चिद् द्रव्यरूपतया स्थितम्, कथञ्चित्तर पर्यायेण संभूतम्, कथञ्चित्पुनः पूर्वपराभिजं व्युत्तं विनष्टं यद् विज्ञानं तन्मय इत्यर्थः । तस्मादगममवोत्पादव्यय धौम्यमुक्त क्षरीरादर्थान्तरभूतमस्मदभ्युपगतमात्मानं समस्तव्यवहारसिद्धयं प्रतिपद्यस्वेति ॥ १३०-१३१ (१६७८-१६७९) ॥

टीका—मतेर्मतिज्ञानस्य विज्ञानानि नानामेदरूपाणि तस्य यथोक्त रूपस्यात्मनः प्रवर्तन्ते । कथमूतानि ? इत्याह—विचित्रो योऽसौ मतिज्ञानावरणक्षयोपशमस्ततो जातानि, अत एव स्वकारणभूतक्षयोपशमवैचित्र्याद् विधित्ररूपाणि । तथा, पर्यायरूपतया क्षणिकानि, द्रव्यरूपतया तु नित्यत्वात्

कालान्तरवृत्तीनि । उपलक्षणं च मतिविधानानि, श्रुता-स्वधि-मनःपर्यायविधानान्यपि यथासंख्यं श्रुता-स्वधिमनःपर्यायज्ञानावरणक्षयोपशमवैचित्र्याद् विचित्ररूपाणि यथासंभवं तस्य द्रष्टव्यानि । केवलज्ञानं त्वेकमेवाविकल्पं केवलज्ञानावरणक्षयादेव द्रष्टव्यमिति ॥ १३२ (१६८०) ॥

D. C—If *jñāna* were taken to be *ksanika* as stated before, a number of *dosas* would get in, in the following manner—

1. In order that all the objects that pervade the three worlds, should be recognized, a *ksanikatā-vādin* ought to admit that all sorts of *jñānas* are produced at the same time and the Soul that remembers the objects in which those *jñānas* are produced should be taken to stay on permanently. Otherwise, statements such as “Whatever exists is all *ksanika*” “All *bhāvas* are *ksanika*” etc that established *sarvaksanikatā* would be futile

Moreover, when more than one *jñāna* are accepted, the original theory of *ekavijnānasantati* has also been violated

2. Again, if *ksana vijnāna* were accepted, another fault would also crop up. In this case, one and the same *vijnāna* would be able to recognize all the objects that exist in all the worlds. But this could never happen, nor be believed

3. In order to recognize a number of objects, *vijnāna* must be taken to last for a long time. As a result of this, *vijnāna* would be able to recognize the *ksanikatā* of all as they are *ksanika* also. But believing so, the Soul which is known as nothing but *vijnāna* would have to be accepted, and it would go against the original proposition

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remembering the past incident etc. would be abolished. Again if the soul which is the abode of knowledge such as a number of past allusions etc. were believed to have been related to the *pariṇāma* in the form of *vyñāna* then also the law of *pratyavṛtti* would be violated. For believing so the Soul is taken as related to the *pariṇāma*.

Thus in case *vyñāna* is accepted as *kṣaṇika*, all the above mentioned faults would arise. But if the Soul possessing *vyñāna* which is produced anyhow in the form of substance or in any other new equivalent form and which has already ceased to exist as *vyñāna* the faults enumerated above would never arise. This proves that *ātman* that has utility stability and productivity for the sake of all *vyavahara* is undoubtedly distinct from body. For such an *ātman* possesses various *matyñānabhēdas* produced from various types of diminutions and relaxations of the *matyñāna* itself. These *bhēdas* are *kṣaṇika* on account of their wavering nature and they are everlasting on account of their substantiality.

Again by means of implication the soul manifests various types of *jñāna* e. g. *śrūta* (ascertained by intellect); *avada* (applied by intellect) and *manahparyaya* (mental perception) etc. are respectively produced from the knowledge ascertained applied and perceived by mind. 180-181-182 (1678-1679-1680)

The *Kevala jñāna* or Absolute knowledge is attained only when all its interruptions are warded off.

निष्प्रो सत्ताणो सिं सखावरणपरिसंख्ये ज च ।

केवलमुदिय केवलभावेणाणतमविगप्प ॥ १३३ ॥ (१६८१)

Nicco santāno sim savvāvaranaparisaṃkhae jam ca ।

Kevalamudiyam kevalabhāvenāṇantamaviḡappam ॥ 133 ॥ (1681)

[निस्पः सन्तानः एषां सर्वावरणपरिसंख्ये यच्च ।

केवलमुदितं केवलभावेनानन्तमविकल्पम् ॥ १३३ ॥ (१६८१)

Nityah santāna esām sarvavarāṇa parisamksaye yacca ।
Kevalamuditam kevalabhāvenānantamavikalpam ॥ 133 ॥ (1581)]

Trans.—133 They (*matijñānādi vidhānas*) have a perpetual continuance (*nitya santāna*)—in the form of *sāmānyajñāna*—which being free from all interruptions is said to be *ananta* (endless) and *avikalpa* (illusionless) *Kevala* (Absolute) exists by (virtue of) its *Kevalabhāva* (Absoluteness) (1681)

टीका—“ सिं ति ” एतेषां च मतिज्ञानादिविधानानामविशेषितज्ञान-
मात्ररूपसंतानो नित्योऽव्यवच्छिन्नरूपः । केवलज्ञानं त्वविकल्पं भेदरहितमु-
दितमाख्यातं भगवद्भिः यतः सर्वस्यापि निजावरणस्य क्षय एव तदुपजायते ।
अतोऽविकल्पं केवलभावेनानन्तकालावस्थायित्वात्, अनन्तार्थविषयत्वाश्चा-
नन्तमिति ॥ १३३ (१६८१) ॥

D. C.—The *avisesitajñāna* or *sāmānyajñāna* of an object is the only everlasting offspring of its various expedients like cognizance of memory etc But the Absolute cognizance which is said to be *ananta* and *avikalpa* by revered preceptors is attained only when it is free from all *āvaranas*. Thus *Kevalajñāna* is *avikalpa* (i e positive and illusionless) because it is *ananta* (endless) because it lasts for ever and concerns the infinite object (*anantārtha*) 1681

Here again *Vāyubhūti* raises a doubt and the *Tīrthanāra* removes it —

सो जइ देहादन्नो तो पविसंतो व निस्सरंतो वा ।
कीस न दीसइ, गोयम! दुविहाऽणुवलद्धि उ सा य ॥ १३४ ॥ (१६८२)

So jaī dehādanno to pavisanto va nissaranto vā ।
Kīsa na dīsaī, Goyama ! duvihā’nuvaladdhi u sā ya ॥ 134 ॥ (1682)

[स यदि देवादन्यस्ततः प्रविशन् वा निःसरन् वा ।

कस्माद् न दृश्यते, गौतम ! द्विविधाऽनुपलब्धिस्तु सा च ॥ १३४ ॥ (१६८२)

Sa yadī dehādanyastatah praviśan vā nihsaran vā ।
Kasmād na dṛśyate Gautama ! dvividhā’nupalabdhistu sā ca ॥ 134 ॥ (1682)

remembering the past incident etc would be abolished. Again if the soul which is the abode of knowledge such as a number of past allusions etc. were believed to have been related to the *parināma* in the form of *vyñāna* then also the law of *pratyavṛtti* would be violated. For believing so the Soul is taken as related to the *parināma*.

Thus in case *vyñāna* is accepted as *kṣanika* all the above mentioned faults would arise. But if the Soul possessing *vyñāna* which is produced anyhow in the form of substance or in any other new equivalent form and which has already ceased to exist as *vyñāna* the faults enumerated above would never arise. This proves that *ātman* that has utility stability and productivity for the sake of all *vyavahara* is undoubtedly distinct from body. For such an *ātman* possesses various *matyñānabhedas* produced from various types of diminutions and relaxations of the *matyñāna* itself. These *bhedas* are *kṣanika* on account of their wavering nature and they are everlasting on account of their substantiality.

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निश्चो सत्ताणो सिं सद्वावरणपरिसंख्ये ज च ।

केवलमुदिय केवलभावेणाणत्तमविगप्प ॥ १३३ ॥ (१६८१)

Nicco santāno sim savvāvaranaparisaṃkhae j am ca ।

Kevalamudiyam kevalabhāvenāṇantamavigappam ॥ 133 ॥ (1681)

[नित्यः सन्तानः एषां सर्वावरणपरिसंख्ये यच्च ।

केवलमुदित केवलभावेनानन्तमविकल्पम् ॥ १३३ ॥ (१६८१)

Nityaḥ santāna esām sarvavarāṇa parisamksaye yacca ।
Kevalamuditam kevalabhāvenānantamavikalpam ॥ 133 ॥ (1581)]

Trans.—133 They (*matijnānādi vidhānas*) have a perpetual continuance (*nitya santāna*)—in the form of *sāmānyajñāna*—which being free from all interruptions is said to be *ananta* (endless) and *avikalpa* (illusionless) *Kevala* (Absolute) exists by (virtue of) its *Kevalabhāva* (Absoluteness) (1681)

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कस्माद् न दृश्यते, गौतम ! द्विविधाऽनुपलब्धिस्तु सा च ॥१३४॥(१६८२)
Sa yadi dehadanyastataḥ praviśan vā nihsaran vā ।
Kasmād na dr̥śyate Gautama ! dvividhā'nupalabdhistu sā ca ॥ 134 ॥ (1682)

remembering the past incident etc would be abolished. Again if the soul which is the abode of knowledge such as a number of past allusions etc. were believed to have been related to the *pariṇāma* in the form of *vyñāna* then also the law of *pratityavṛtti* would be violated. For believing so the Soul is taken as related to the *pariṇāma*.

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निश्चो सत्ताणो सिं सव्वावरणपरिसखए ज ष ।

केवलमुदिय केवलभावेणाणत्तमविगप्प ॥ १३३ ॥ (१६८१)

Nicco santāno sim savvāvaranaparisaṃkhae jam ca ।

Kevalamudiyam kevalabhāvenānantamavigappam ॥ 133 ॥ (1681)

[नित्यः सन्तानः एषां सर्वावरणपरिसंख्ये यच्च ।

केवलमुदितं केवलभावेनानन्तमविकल्पम् ॥ १३३ ॥ (१६८१)

Nityah santāna esām sarvavarana parisauksaye yacca ।
Kevalamuditam kevalabhāvenānantamavikalpam ॥ 133 ॥ (1581)]

Trans.—133 They (*matijnānādi vidhānas*) have a perpetual continuance (*nitya santāna*)—in the form of *sāmānyajnāna*—which being free from all interruptions is said to be *ananta* (endless) and *avikalpa* (illusionless) *Kevala* (Absolute) exists by (virtue of) its *Kevalabhāva* (Absoluteness) (1681)

टीका—“सिं ति” एतेषां च मतिज्ञानादिविधानानामविशेषितज्ञानमात्ररूपसंतानो नित्योऽव्यवच्छिन्नरूपः । केवलज्ञानं त्वविकल्पं भेदरहितमुदितमाख्यातं भगवद्भिः यतः सर्वस्यापि निजावरणस्य क्षय एव तदुपजायते । अतोऽविकल्पं केवलभावेनानन्तकालावस्थायित्वात्, अनन्तार्थविषयत्वाश्चानन्तमिति ॥ १३३ (१६८१) ॥

D. C.—The *avisesitajnāna* or *sāmānyajnāna* of an object is the only everlasting offspring of its various expedients like cognizance of memory etc But the Absolute cognizance which is said to be *ananta* and *avikalpa* by revered preceptors is attained only when it is free from all *āvaranas* Thus *Kevalajnāna* is *avikalpa* (i e positive and illusionless) because it is *ananta* (endless) because it lasts for ever and concerns the infinite object (*anantārtha*) 1681

Here again *Vāyubhūti* raises a doubt and the *Tīrthankara* removes it —

सो जइ देहादन्नो तो पविसंतो व निस्सरंतो वा ।

कीस न दीसइ, गोयम! दुविहाऽणुवलद्धि उ सा य॥१३४॥(१६८२)

So jai dehādanno to pavisanto va nissaranto vā ।

Kīsa na dīsaī, Goyama ! duvihā’nuvaladdhi u sā ya ॥ 134 ॥ (1682)

[स यदि देवादन्यस्ततः प्रविशन् वा निःसरन् वा ।

कस्माद् न दृश्यते, गौतम ! द्विविधाऽनुपलब्धिस्तु सा च ॥१३४॥(१६८२)

Sa yadi dehadanyastatah praviśan vā nihsaran vā ।

Kasmād na drśyate Gautama ! dvividhā’nupalabdhistu sā ca ॥ 134 ॥ (1682)

असओ खरसगस्स व सओ वि दूराइभावओऽभिहिता ।

सुहुमा ऽमुत्तणओ कम्माणुगयस्स जीवस्स ॥ १३५ ॥ (१६८३)

Asao kharasangassa va sao vi dūrāibhāvao bhīhiyā ।

Suhumā muttattanao kammānugayassa jīvassa n 135 n (1683)

[असतः खरशृङ्गस्येव सतोऽपि दूरादिभावतोऽभिहिता ।

सुहृन्माऽमूर्तस्वतः कर्मानुगतस्य जीवस्य ॥ १३५ ॥ (१६८३)

Asatah kharasṅgasyeva sato'pi dūrādibhavato'bhihita ।

Sūkāma mūrtatvatah karmānugatsya jīvasya n 135 n (1683)]

Trans—134-135 If the Soul is different from body how is it that it is not perceived while entering (the body) or issuing forth (from it)?

But again *O Gautama*! non-perception (*anupalabdhi*) is of two types —1 Non perception of a non-existent object like a *kharasṅga* and 2. Non-perception of an existent object by reason of its distance etc. Non perception of the Soul which is *karmānugata* is due to its exquisite formlessness (*sūkāmāmūrtatva*) (1682-1683)

टीका—यदि नाम शरीरादन्योऽसौ जीवस्ततो घटे षट्क इव शरीरे प्रविष्टन् निःसरन् वा किमिति नोपलभ्यते ? । मगधानाह—“गोयमेत्यादि” यतो द्विविधाऽनुपलम्बिरस्ति, अस्तस्तस्यानुपलम्बेः कारणाद् गौतम ! जीवो न दृश्यते । कथं पुनः साऽनुपलम्बिर्द्विविधा ? इत्याह—सा चानुपलम्बेरेकाऽस्तो भवति, यथा खरशृङ्गस्य । द्वितीया तु सतोऽप्यर्थस्य भवति । कुतः ? इत्याह—दूरादिभावादिति, दूरात् सम्प्यर्थो न दृश्यते, यथा स्वर्गादिः, आदिशब्दात्—अतिसंनिकर्षात्, अति सौक्ष्म्यात्, मनोऽनवस्थानात्, इन्द्रियापाट्यात्, भविमान्धात्, अशक्यत्वात्, आपरणात्, अभिमबात्, सामान्यात्, अनुपयोगात्, अनुपायात्, विस्मृते, दूरागमात्, मोहात्, विदर्शनात्, विकारात्, अक्रियातः, अनभिगमात्, कालविप्रकर्षात्, स्वभावविप्रकर्षाद्येति ।

तत्रातिसंनिकर्षात् सम्प्यर्थो नोपलभ्यते, यथा नेत्र दृष्टिका-यस्मादिः ।

अतिसौक्ष्म्यात् परमाण्वादिः । मनोऽनवस्थानात्, सतोऽप्यनुपलब्धिर्यथा नष्टचेतसाम् । इन्द्रियापाटवात् किञ्चिद्भधिरादीनाम् । मतिमान्द्यादनुपलब्धिः सतामपि सूक्ष्मशास्त्रार्थं विशेषाणाम् । अशक्यत्वात् स्वकर्ण-कृकाटिका-मस्तक-पृष्ठादीनाम् । आवरणाद् हस्तादिस्थगितलोचनानां कटकुट्याद्यावृत्तानां वा । अभिभवात् प्रसृतस्रस्तेजसि दिवसे तारकाणाम् । सामान्यात् सूपलक्षितस्यापि मापादेः समानजातीयमापादिराशिपतितस्याप्रत्यभिज्ञानात् सतोऽप्यनुपलब्धिः । अनुपयोगाद् रूपोपयुक्तस्य शेषविषयाणाम् । अनुपायात् शृङ्गादिभ्यो गोमहिष्यादिष्यःपरिणामजिज्ञासोः । विस्मृतेः पूर्वोपलब्धस्य । दुरागमाद् दुरुपदेशात् तत्प्रतिरूपकरीतिकादिविप्रलम्भितमतेः कनकादीनां सतामप्यनुपलब्धिः । मोहात् सतामपि जीवादितत्त्वानाम् । विदर्शनात् सर्वथाऽन्धादीनाम् वार्धक्यादिविकाराद् बहुशःपूर्वोपलब्धस्य सतोऽप्यनुपलब्धिः । अक्रियातो भूखननादिक्रियाऽभावाद् वृक्षमूलादीनामनुपलब्धिः । अनधिगमात् शास्त्राश्रवणात् तदर्थस्य सतोऽप्यनुपलब्धिः । कालविप्रकर्षाद् भूतभविष्यदृषभदेवपन्नानाभतीर्थकरादीनामनुपलब्धिः । स्वभावविप्रकर्षाद् नभः पिशादीनामनुपलम्भः । तदेवं सतामप्यर्थानामेकविंशतिविधाऽनुपलब्धिः प्रवर्तते । अतोऽस्य कर्मानुगतस्य संसारिणो जीवस्याऽमूर्तत्वाद् नभस इव, कर्मणस्य तु सौक्ष्म्यात् परमाणोरिव सतोऽनुपलब्धिः, नासतः । कथं पुनरेतज्ज्ञायते—नासत आत्मनोऽनुपलब्धिः, किन्तु सतः ? इति चेत् । उच्यते—अनुमानैस्तत्सत्त्वस्य साधितत्वादिति ॥ १३४-१३५ (१६८२-१६८३)

D C—Vāyubhūta—If this soul is different from body, how is it that it is not seen entering or issuing forth from the body like a *cataka* (sparrow) from a *ghata* (vessel) ?

Bhagawān—Because of the two-fold *anupalabdhi*, *O Gautama!* the Soul is not perceived. These two types are —(1) *Anupalabdhi* of a non-existent object e g a *kharasṅga* (horn of an ass) and (2) *Anupalabdhi* of an existent object.

Now, for the non-perception of an existent object there are twenty-one reasons

1. *Atidūratva* (Extreme remoteness)—Places like *svarga*,

do exist. But as they are extremely remote they are not perceivable

- ii. *Atisannikarṣa* (Close vicinity)—Certain objects like eyelashes and secretion of eyes though existent cannot be seen on account of their close vicinity
- iii. *Atisūbhinna* (Exquisite fineness)—*Paramāṇus* are imperceptible because they are exquisitely fine. These *paramāṇus* are so minute in form that they are not perceptible even to the naked eye even though they are considered to be existent.
- iv. *Maṇḍanavasthāna* (Instability of mind)—Sometimes even a *mūṛta* object is not apprehended by reason of *maṇḍanavasthāna* or the instability of mind as in the case of an insane man.
- v. *Indriyāpatulva* (Dullness of senses)—Non perception arises also when a sense or senses are benumbed e. g. a deaf man.
- vi. *Matimāṇḍya* (Dullness of intellect)—Certain subtleties of the *sāstras* are always *anupalabhya* to a dull witted man due to his *matimāṇḍya*.
- vii. *Abakyaiva* (Impossibility)—One can never see his own ear head or back as it is utterly impossible to do so
- viii. *Āvarana* (Obstruction)—When eyes are covered with hands or when hands are obscured by means of a mat or a wall it is *āvarana* that causes non perception
- ix. *Abhībhava* (Predominance)—Predominance of Sun in the sky makes the stars *anupalabhya* on a sun-bright day
- x. *Sāmānya*—(Commonness) When beans are mixed with beans of the same quality there is non-apprehension of beans owing to the *sāmānyaiva* present in both.

- xi *Anupayoga* (Lack of Attention)—When an object is touched by a particular *indriya*, say, *Rūpa* (the sense of eye), it is not perceived by the rest of senses because of their *anupayoga* to the object.
- xii *Anupāya* (Want of Means)—If a person wants to take an estimate of milk (contained) in a cow or a buffalo by means of *śrnga* etc, he can never do so because there is no such means available
- xiii *Vismṛti*—(Forgetfulness)—An object perceived before becomes *anupalabhya* afterwards by reason of *vismṛti*
- xiv. *Durāgama*—(Wrong Instruction) When an object like gold is presented in the style of a forged edict, it is not recognized in its true form, because there is *durupadeśa* or wrong instruction as regards its form
- xv. *Moha* (Delusion)—Objects like *jīva* do exist, but they are not perceived due to *moha* (on the part of those who try to perceive them)
- xvi *Viḍarśana* (Absence of Sight)—is the absolute cause of *anupalabdhi* in the case of blind persons
- xviii *Vikāra* (Loss of Health)—Mostly, it so happens that things that are once perceived are not apprehended in later life on account of *vikāras* like *vārdhakya* (old age) etc
- xviii *Akriyā* (Want of Action)—There is non-perception of roots of trees because of the scarcity of actions like *bhūkhanana* etc
- xix *Anadhigama* (Non-acquisition)—Owing to the *anadhigama* of *śāstrīśravaṇa*, the meaning of *Śāstrīś* becomes incomprehensible
- xx. *Kāla viprakarsa* (Remoteness of Time)—*Rsabhadeva* and other *Tīrthankaras* of the past and *Padma Nābha* of future cannot be recognized due to the remoteness of time

- xxi. *svabhāva viprataraḥ* (Natural Remoteness)—Things like *nabhas* and *pīṣa*† are non-cognisable by reason of their *svabhāva viprataraḥ*

In this way *anupalabdhi* of an existent object takes place in twenty-one different ways

So *Jīva* is imperceptible like *nabhas* due to its *amūrtatā*, and *śarīra* being an assemblage of the *Kārmāṇ paramāṇus* is *anupalabhya* because of *saukṣmya* of a *paramāṇu*. Thus non-perception of the Soul and body is positively the non-perception of an existent object and not of a non-existent one

An argument may here be advanced that "If you take *Ātman* to be existent how do you apprehend its existence?" The reply is —

The existence of *Ātman* is established by means of *anumāna*. And hence its *anupalabdhi* is not the *anupalabdhi* of a non-existent object like a *bharaṅga* but it is the *anupalabdhi* of an existent object like *nabhas* and *paramāṇu*. Then the distinction of Soul from body is established by the help of *Vedatāvāna*

देहाणण्णे व जिण् जमग्गिहोत्ताइ सग्गकामस्स ।

वेयविहिय विहण्णइ दाणाइफल च लोयम्मि ॥१३६॥ (१६८४)

Dehāṇaṇṇe va jīe jamaḡḡihottāīṇu saggakāmaṣṣa ।

Veyavihiyam vihaṇṇaī dāṇaīphalam ca loyammi ॥ 136 ॥ (1684)

† The word *Pīṣa* = *ruṣa* a kind of deer according to *Sāyanaśāstra*. The deer is called *Pīṣa* probably because it is *Pīṣa* (reddish) in colour. The *anupalabdhi* of the *Pīṣa* deer may be taken to be due to its nature of being always far away from human habitations. The word however seems rather improper when placed with *nabhas*. If we read *pīṣa* instead of *Pīṣa* it would suit our purpose better.—Fr

[देहानन्ये वा जीवे यदग्निहोत्रादि स्वर्गकामस्य ।

वेदविहितं विहन्यते दानादिफलं च लोके ॥ १३६ ॥ (१६८४)

Dehānanyē vā jīve yadagnihotrādi svargakamasya ।

Vedavihitam vihanryate dānādīphalam ca lōke ॥ 136 ॥ (1684)]

Trans —136 Or, if *Jīva* is (believed to be) identical with *deha* (the body), then, (obstruction of the) rites like *agnihotra* (the worship of sacred-fire) for a person aspiring for Salvation and the reward of munificence etc (*dānādīphala*) in the world prescribed by the *Vedas*, would be refuted (1684)

टीका—शरीरमात्रे जीवे सति गौतम ! यत् स्वर्गकामस्य वेदविहित-
मग्निहोत्राद्यनुष्ठानं तद् विहन्यते, देहस्य वह्निनाऽत्रैव भस्मीकरणात्, जीवा-
भावे कस्यासौ स्वर्गो भवेत् ? इति भावः । दानादिफलं चानुभवितुरभावात्
कस्य भवेत् ? इति ॥ १३६ (१६८४) ॥

D C—O *Gautama* ! If each and every *s'arīra* is believed to be identical with *jīva*, the commandment of the *Vedas* that a person who desires to attain Salvation should perform the rite of *Agnihotra*, would be null and void. Because, when body is reduced to ashes by fire in this world, the *Jīva* being taken to be identical with body is also supposed to have vanished with the body. And then, who would attain Salvation when *Jīva* itself does not exist ?

Similarly, who would be there to enjoy the fruits of good deeds like *dāna* when there would be none to receive them at all ?

Vāyubhūti entertains doubt as regards the distinction of Soul from body by hearing the various *Veda-padas* bearing contradictory arguments *Bhagavān Mahāvīra* interprets these *Veda-padas* correctly and clears his doubt.

विष्णाणघणार्ईणं वेयपयाणं तमत्थमविदंतो ।

देहाणणं मन्नसिं ताणं च पयाणमयमत्थो ॥ १३७ ॥ (१६८५)

Vijñānaghāṇānam Veyapayānam tamatthamavāḍanto ।

Dehānamnam mannaṣi tānam ca payānamayamattho ॥137॥ (1685)

[विज्ञानघनादीनां वेदपदानां स्वमर्थमविदन् ।

देहानन्य मन्यसे तेषां च पदानामयमर्थः ॥ १३७ ॥ (१६८५)

Vijñānaghāṇādinam Veda-padanam tvamarthamarḍan ।

Dehānanyam manyase teṣāṃ ca padānamayamarthaḥ ॥137॥ (1685)]

Trans—137 You not knowing the (real) meaning of sentences like “ *Vijñānaghāṇa* ” etc. of the *Vedas* think that the Soul is identical with body But (*ca*) their real interpretation is this.† (1685)

टीका—विज्ञानघनाख्यः पुरुष एवाय भूतेभ्योऽप्यन्तरमित्यादिभ्याख्या पूर्वं ब्रूय । अत एव प्रागुक्तम्—“ क्षरीरतया परिणतो भूतसंघातोऽयं विद्यमानकर्तृकः, आदिमत्प्रतिनियताकारत्वात्, घटवद्, यच्च तत्कर्ता स तदतिरिक्तो जीवः ” इति । भूतारिक्तात्मप्रतिपादकानि च वेदवाक्यानि तथापि प्रतीतान्येव । तद्यथा—“ सत्पतनं सम्यस्तपमा ह्येष ब्रह्मचर्येण नित्यं ज्योतिर्मयो विद्युद्धो यं पश्यन्ति जीरा यतयः संयतात्मानः ” इत्यादि । तदेवं सर्वेषामपि वेदवाक्यानां भूतारिक्तस्य जीवस्य प्रतिपादकत्वाद् भूतेभ्योऽतिरिक्तं जीवं प्रतिपद्यस्यति ॥ १३७ (१६८५) ॥

D C—That the Soul itself is *vijñānaghāṇa* and that it is distinct from other *bhūtas* has already been discussed. It has already been said that

Sarīrataya paṇṇato bhūtasamghato yaṃ vidyamanakartṛikaḥ ।

Ādimatpratiniyātakaratyat ghaṭavat yuṣm tatkarṭa sa tadatiricto jīvaḥ iti ॥

Moreover sentences of the *Vedas* that prove *Ātman* to be *atirikta* from *bhūtas* have not been beyond your comprehension. e. g

† The real interpretation of sentences like “ *vijñānaghāṇa* ” etc. has already been stated and discussed in the First *Vāda*. vide Vs. 1588-1595

“ Satyena labhyastapasā hyesa brahmacāryena nityam jyotirmayo ।
Viśuddho'yaṁ paśyanti dhīra yatayaḥ samyatatmanah ॥ ”

In the same way, all *Veda-padas* have proved that *Jīva* is *atvīkṭa* from *bhūtas*. Hence, you too, shall have to admit that the Soul is distinct from *bhūtas*.

छिन्नम्भि संसयम्भि जिणेणं जरा-मरणविप्पमुक्केणं ।

सो समणो पवइओ पंचहिं सह खंडियसाहिं ॥१३८॥ (१६८६)

Chinnammi samsayammi jīnenam jarā-marānavippamukkenam ।
So samaṇo pavvaio pañcahiṁ saha khandīyaśaehiṁ ॥ 138 ॥ (1686)

[छिन्ने संशये जिनेन जरा-मरणविप्रमुक्तेन ।

स श्रमणः प्रव्रजितः पञ्चभिः सह खण्डिकशतैः ॥ १३८ ॥ (१६८६)

Chinne saṁśaye jīneṇa jarā-marānavipramuktena ।

Sa śramaṇaḥ pravrajitaḥ pañcabhiḥ saha khandīkaśataiḥ ॥138॥(1686)]

Trans.—138 When the doubt was removed by the *Tīrthankara*, who was entirely free from *jarā* (old age) and *marāna* (death), the saint *Vāyubhūti* accepted the *Dīksā* along with his five hundred followers (1686)

End of the Discussion with the Third Gaṇadhara,



Chapter IV

चतुर्थगणधरवक्तव्यता ।

Discussion with the Fourth Ganadhara.

ते पव्वहए सोउं वियत्तु आगच्छइ जिणसगास ।

वव्वामि ण वदामी वदित्ता पज्जुवासामि ॥ १३९ ॥ (१६८७)

Te pavvaho sōum Vyattu Vāgacchal jinasagāsam ।

Vaccāmi na vandāmi vanditthā pajjuvāsāmi ॥ 139 ॥ (1687)

[तान् प्रव्रजितान् ध्रुत्वा व्यक्त आगच्छति जिनसकाशम् ।

वव्वामि वन्दे वन्दित्ता पयुपासे ॥ १३९ ॥ (१६८७)

Tan pravrajitan hrutva Vyakta āgacchati jinasakāśam ।

Vrajāmi vande vanditva paryupāse ॥ 139 ॥ (1687)]

Trans—139 Having heard that they (*i. e.* *Vāyabhūti* and his fellow mendicants) had renounced the world, *Vykta* comes before the *Tīrthankara*. (He thinks) “ I may go, pay my homage (to the *Tīrthankara*) and serve him. (1687)

आभट्ठो य जिणेण जाइ-जरा-मरणविप्पमुक्केण ।

नामेण य गोत्तेण य सव्वण्णू सव्वदरिसीण ॥ १४० ॥ (१६८८)

Ābhaṭṭho ya jīṇenam jāi-jarā-marānavippamukkenam ।

Nāmena ya gottēṇa ya savvaṇṇū savvadarisīṇam ॥ 140 ॥ (1688)

[आभापितम् जिनेन जाति-जरा मरणविप्रमुक्केन ।

नाम्ना य गोत्रेण य सर्वेण सर्वदर्शिना ॥ १४० ॥ (१६८८)

Ābhasitaśoa jineṇa jāti-jarā-maraṇavipramuktena ।

Nāmnā ca gotreṇa ca sarvajñeṇa sarvadarśinā ॥ 140 ॥ (1681)]

Trans — 140 He was addressed by his name and *gotra* (lineage) by the *Tīrthankara* who was free from *jāti* (birth) *jarā* (old age) and *marana* (death), who was *Sarvajña* (omniscient) and who had (attained) complete *darśana* (1628)

Bhagavān said —

किं मण्णे अत्थि भूया उदाहु नत्थि त्ति संसओ तुज्झ ।

वेयपयाण य अत्थं न याणसी तेसिमो अत्थो ॥ १४१ ॥ (१६८९)

Kim manne atthi bhūyā udāhu natthi tti samsao tujjha ।

Veyapayāṇa ya attham na yānasī tesimo attho ॥ 141 ॥ (1689)

[किं मन्यसे सन्ति भूतान्युताहो न सन्तीति संशयस्तव ।

वेदपदानां चार्थं न जानासि तेषामयमर्थः ॥ १४१ ॥ (१६८९)

* Kim manyase santi bhūtānyutāho na santīti samśayastava ।

Vedapadānām cārtham na jānāsī tesāmayamarthah ॥ 141 ॥ (1689)]

Trans. — 141 O *Vyakta* ! What are you thinking of ? You entertain the doubt as to whether *Bhūtas* exist or not But (*ca*) you have not understood the (real) interpretation of the sentences of the *Vedas* Here is their (real) interpretation (1689)

टीका—पृथिव्य-स्प-तेजो-वाय्वा-ऽऽकाशलक्षणानि पञ्चभूतानि, तानि च किं सन्ति न वा ? इति त्वं मन्यसे । संशयश्च तत्रायं विरुद्धवेदपदश्रवण-निबन्धनो वर्तते । तानि चामूनि वेदपदानि—“ स्वप्नोपमं वै सकलमित्येष ब्रह्मविधिरञ्जसा विज्ञेयः ” इत्यादि, तथा, “ द्यावा-पृथिवी ” इत्यादि, तथा, “ पृथिवी देवता, आपो देवताः ” इत्यादि । एतेषां चायमर्थस्तव प्रतिभासते—“ स्वप्नोपमम्-स्वप्नसदृशम्, वैनिपातोऽवधारणे, सकलम्-अशेषं जगत्, इत्येष ब्रह्मविधिः—परमार्थप्रकारः, अञ्जसा—प्रगुणेन न्यायेन, विज्ञेयः—ज्ञातव्यः ” इति । तदेवमादीनि वेदपदानि किल भूतनिहवपराणि, “ द्यावा-

पृथिवी " इत्यादीनि तु सत्ताप्रतिपादकानि, अतस्तत्र संशयः । तदेतेषां वेद
पदानां स्वमर्थं न जानासि, चक्षुष्माद् युक्तिरुदयं च न वेत्सि । तेन संशय
कुरुते । तेषां चायमर्थो ब्रह्ममाणस्य इति ॥ १४१ (१६८९) ॥

D O—This is your query— Do the *pancabhūtas* viz. *Prithvi* (earth) *āp* (water) *tejas* (fire) *pāyu* (air) and *ākāśa* (ether) exist or not ? This query is based upon your misapprehension of certain sentences of the *Vedas* that are mutually contradictory. The sentences are—

- (1) " *Svapnopamam vai sakalanūtyesa brahmavedhīranjasa vijñeyah* etc
- (2) " *Dyava-prithvi* " etc. and
- (3) " *Prithvi-devatā āpo devatā* " etc.

Your interpretation of these sentences runs thus —

All this world is nothing but a dream or illusion. So one should honestly endeavour to know the *Brahma* which is the only *paramārthaprakāśa* worth attaining

Such sentences refute the existence of the five elements while others like *Dyavā prithvi* and " *Prithvi devatā āpo devatā* " establish the existence of those very elements. These contradicting sentences of the *Vedas* have given rise to your doubt.

Really speaking you have not understood the real purport of the above sentences. Here I give their correct interpretation. Listen to it

भूपसु सुज्झ सका सुविणय-माभोवमाह होज्ज ति ।
न विचारिज्जंताह भयति ज सव्वहा जुत्ति ॥ १४२ ॥ (१६९०)

Bhūesu tujjha sankā suvīṇaya-mābhovamāh hojja tī ।
Na viyārijjantāhm bhayanti jam savvaha juttim ॥ 142 ॥ (1690)

[भूतेषु तत्र श्रद्धा स्वप्नक-मायोपमानि भवेयुरिति ।
न विचार्यमाणानि भयन्ति यद् सर्वथा युक्तिम् ॥ १४२ ॥ (१६९०)

Bhūtesu tava śankā svapnaka-māyopamāni bhaveyuriti ।
Na vicāryamānāni bhajanti yat sarvathā yuktim ॥ 142 ॥ (1690)]

भूयाइसंसयाओ जीवाइसु का कह ति ते बुद्धी ।
तं सव्वसुण्णसंकी मन्नसि मायोवमं लोयं ॥ १४३ ॥ (१६९१)

Bhūyāisamsayāo jīvāisu kā kaha tti te buddhī ।
Tam savvasunnasankī mannasī māyovamam loyam ॥ 143 ॥ (1691)

[भूतादिसंशयात् जीवादिषु का कथेति ते बुद्धिः ।
त्वं सर्वशून्यशङ्की मन्यसे मायोपमं लोकं ॥ १४३ ॥ (१६९१)

Bhūtādisamśayat jīvādisu kā katheti te buddhih ।
Tvam sarvaśūnyaśankī manyase māyopamam lokam ॥ 143 ॥ (1691)]

Trans—142-143 You entertain the doubt about the elements that they are (unreal) like dreams and illusions And when you question the (existence of) elements (themselves), what to talk of objects like *jīva* etc ? You being dubious about the existence of everything, believe the whole world to be (as unreal as) *māyā* (1690-1691)

टीका—आयुष्मन् व्यक्त ! भूतेषु भवतः सन्देहः, यतः स्वप्नोपमानानि मायोपमानानि चैतानि भवेयुरिति त्वं मन्यसे । यथा हि स्वप्ने किल कश्चिद् निःस्वोऽपि निजगृहाङ्गणे गजघटा-तुरगनिवह-मणि-कनकराश्यादिकमभूतमपि पश्यति, मायायां चेन्द्रजालविलसितरूपायामविद्यमानमपि कनक-मणि-मौक्तिक-रजतभाजना-सराम-पुष्प-फलादिकं दृश्यते, तथैतान्यपि भूतान्येवंविधान्येवेति मन्यसे, यद् यस्माद् विचार्यमाणान्येतानि सर्वथैव न काश्चिद् युक्तिं भजन्ते सहन्ते । भूतेषु च संशये जीव-पुण्य-पापादिषु किल का वार्ता भूतविकाराधिष्ठानत्वात् तेषाम् ? इति तव बुद्धिः । तस्मात् सर्वस्यापि भूत-जीवादिवस्तुनस्त्वदभिप्रायेणाभावात् सर्वशून्यताशङ्की त्वं निरवशेषमपि लोकं मायोपमं स्वप्ने-न्द्रजालतुल्यं मन्यस इति ॥ १४२-१४३ (१६९०-१६९१) ॥

D O—Long-lived *Vyakta* ! You question the existence of *Bhūtas*. Just as in a dream a poor man sees before his own house multitudes of elephants and horses or treasures of jewellery and gold but actually he does not possess them and just as under the illusion of the *Indrajāla* precious things e g dishes (made) of gold silver jewels etc., or beautiful objects e g parks flowers, fruits etc are perceived but really speaking, they are not existing in the same way according to your belief *bhūtas* like *prithivī* are perceived by us but as a matter of fact they are unreal and illusory like objects seen in a dream or an *Indrajāla*. But this belief of yours is absolutely unfounded.

Again as you have a doubt in the existence of elements the doubt is bound to arise in the case of *jīva pāpa* and *punya* also. Because these objects are contained in the various *vikāras* of the *bhūtas* themselves. It follows therefore that according to you all *bhūtas* like *Prithivī* and all *padārthas* (objects) like *jīvas* are a *vidyamāna* (non-existent). This indicates that you are *sarvakarmyātāsakti* and according to you the whole Universe is just like *svapna vāya* or *Indrajāla*.

Now *Sramana Bhagavan Mahāvīra* gives a number of arguments for doubts which *Vyakta* entertained in his mind —

जह किर न सओ परओ नोभयओ नावि अन्नओ सिद्धी ।
भावाणमवेक्खाओ वियत्त ! जह दीह-हस्साण ॥१४४॥ (१६९२)

Jaha kira na sao parao nobhayao nāvi annao siddhiḥ ।
Bhāvānamavekkhao Viyatta ! Jaha dīha-hassāṇam ॥144॥ (1692)

[यथा किर न स्वतः परतो नोभयतो नाप्यन्यतः सिद्धिः ।

भावानामपेक्षतो व्यक्त ! यथा दीर्घ-ह्रस्वयो ॥ १४४ ॥ (१६९२)

Yatha kiḥ na svataḥ parato nobhayato napyanyataḥ siddhiḥ ।
Bhavanāmappekṣato Vyakta ! yatha dīrgha-hrasvayoh ॥144॥ (1692)

Trans—144 Accomplishment of objects, *O Vyakta* ! like (the accomplishment of) *hrasva* (short) and *dirgha* (long) can never be attained by means of itself, through another, by means of both, or through any other object (1692)

टीका—व्यक्त ! भवतोऽयमभिप्रायः—यथा किल न स्वतः, न परतः, न चोभयतः, नाप्यन्यतो भावानां सिद्धिः संभाव्यते । कुतः ? इत्याह—अपेक्षातः—कार्यकारणादिभावस्यापेक्षिकत्वादित्यर्थः, ह्रस्व-दीर्घव्यपदेशवत् । तथाहि—यत् किमपि भावजातमस्ति तेन सर्वेणापि कार्येण वा भवितव्यम्, कारणेन वा । तत्र कार्यं कारणेन क्रियत इति कारणायत्त एव तस्य कार्यत्वव्यपदेशः, न तु कार्यस्य कार्यत्वं स्वतः सिद्धं किमप्यस्ति । एवं कारणमपि कार्यं करोतीति कार्यायत्त एव तस्य कारणत्वव्यपदेशः, न तु तस्य कारणत्वं स्वतः सिद्धं किञ्चिदस्ति । तदेवं कार्यादिभावः स्वतो न सिध्यति । यच्च स्वतो न सिद्धं तस्य परतोऽपि सिद्धिर्नास्ति, यथा खरविपाणस्य । ततश्च न स्वतः कार्यादिभावः, नापि परतः । स्व-परोभयतस्तर्हि तस्य सिद्धिरिति चेत् । तदयुक्तम्, व्यस्तादुभयतस्तत्सिद्धेरभावात् तत्समुदायेऽपि तदयोगात् । न हि सिकताकणेषु प्रत्येकममत् तैलं तत्समुदाये प्रादुर्भवति ।

अपि च, उभयतः सिद्धिपक्ष इतरेतराश्रयदोषः प्राप्नोति । यावद्धि कार्यं न सिध्यति न तावत्कारणसिद्धिरस्ति । यावच्च कारणं न सिध्यति न तावत् कार्यं सिद्धिमासादयति । अत इतरेतराश्रयदोषः । तस्माद् नोभयतोऽपि कार्यादिभावसिद्धिः । नाप्यन्यतः—अनुभयत इत्यर्थः, स्व-परो-भयव्यतिरेकेणान्यस्य वस्तुनोऽसत्त्वेन निर्हेतुकत्वप्रमज्जात् । एवं ह्रस्व-दीर्घलक्षणे दृष्टान्तेऽपि “अपेक्षातः” इत्यस्य ह्रस्व-दीर्घत्वासिद्धिलक्षणेन साध्येनान्वयो भावनीयः । तथाहि—प्रदेशिन्या अद्भुष्टमपेक्ष्य दीर्घत्वं प्रतीयते । मध्यमां त्वपेक्ष्य ह्रस्वत्वम्, परमार्थेन त्वयं स्वतो न ह्रस्वा, नापि दीर्घा । तदेवं न स्वतो ह्रस्व-दीर्घत्वयोः सिद्धिः । ततः परतः, उभयतः, अनुभयतश्च तत्सिद्ध्यभावो यथोक्तवद् भावनीयः, तदुक्तम्—

न दीर्घस्तीह दीर्घत्वं न ह्रस्वे नापि च द्वये ।

तस्माद् सिद्धं शून्यत्वात् सदित्याख्यायते क्व हि ? ॥ १ ॥

“ह्रस्वं प्रतीत्य सिद्धं दीर्घं, दीर्घं प्रतीत्य ह्रस्वमपि ।

न किञ्चिदस्ति सिद्धं व्यवहारवशाद् वदन्त्येवम् ॥ १ ॥ (१६९२)

D A.—Long-lived *Vyakta* ! You question the existence of *Bhūtas* Just as in a dream a poor man sees before his own house multitudes of elephants and horses or treasures of jewellery and gold but actually he does not possess them, and just as under the illusion of the *Indrajāla* precious things e. g. dishes (made) of gold silver jewels etc. or beautiful objects e. g. parks flowers, fruits etc. are perceived but really speaking they are not existing in the same way according to your belief *bhūtas* like *prithvī* are perceived by us but as a matter of fact they are unreal and illusory like objects seen in a dream or an *Indrajāla* But this belief of yours is absolutely unfounded.

Again as you have a doubt in the existence of elements the doubt is bound to arise in the case of *jīva pāpa* and *punya* also Because these objects are contained in the various *vikāras* of the *bhūtas* themselves It follows, therefore that according to you all *bhūtas* like *Prithvī* and all *parāthas* (objects) like *jīva* are a *vidyamāna* (non-existent). This indicates that you are *sarvasamyatāśakti* and according to you the whole Universe is just like *svapna māya* or *Indrajāla*

Now *Sramana Bhagavan Mahāvīra* gives a number of arguments for doubts which *Vyakta* entertained in his mind :—

जह किर न सओ परओ नोभयओ नावि अन्नओ सिद्धी ।
भावाणमवेक्खाओ वियत्त ! जह दीह-हस्साण ॥१४४॥ (१६९२)

Jaha kira na sao parao nobhayao nāvi annao siddhi ।
Bhāvāṇamavekkhao Viyatta ! jaha diha-hassanāṇ ॥144॥ (1692)

[यथा किल न स्वतः परतो नोभयतो नाप्यन्यतः सिद्धिः ।
भावानामपेक्षातो व्यक्त ! यथा दीर्घ-ह्रस्वयो ॥ १४४ ॥ (१६९२)

Yatha kil na svataḥ parato nobhayato napyanyataḥ siddhiḥ ।
Bhāvanāmapokṣato Vyakta ! yatha dirgha-hrasvayoh ॥144॥ (1692)

Nor even by any other means--*anubhayatah*—the *siddhi* is possible. For, there is no *vastu* (object) available except *sva*, *para* and *ubhaya* in this world. So, even if we presume the accomplishment of *bhāvas anyatah* or *anubhayatah* (i. e., by means of any object excepting *sva*, *para* and *ubhaya*) the *siddhi* would be *nir-hetuka* (void of cause). To take an example the *pradeśinī* finger (next to thumb) looks *dīrgha* when compared with the thumb and *hrasva* when compared with the middle finger. But the finger by itself is neither short nor long.

Since it is not *hrasva* or *dīrgha* by virtue of itself, it is not so by means of another object, nor by both taken together, nor by any extra means whatsoever. So it is said—

“ Na dīrge'steeha dīrghatvam na hrasve nāpi ca dvaye ।

Tasmādasiddham sūnyatvāt saditya khyayate kva hi ? ॥

“ Hrasvam pratītya siddham dīrgham, dīrgham pratītya hrasvamapi ।

Na kincidasti siddham, vyavahāraśād vadantyevam ॥ ” (1692)

In support of the *prima facie* assertion that there is *sarva'sūnyatā*, a number of examples are given

अत्थित्त-घडेगाणेगया व सवेगयाइदोसाओ ।

सवेऽणभिलप्पा वा सुण्णा वा सव्वहा भावा ॥ १४५ ॥ (१६९३)

Atthitta-ghadegāṇegayā va savvegayāidosāo ।

Savve'nabhiḷappā vā sunṇā vā savvahā bhāvā ॥ 145 ॥ (1693)

[अस्तित्व-घटैकानेकता वा सर्वैकतादिदोषात् ।

सर्वेऽनभिलप्पा वा शून्या वा सर्वथा भावाः ॥ १४५ ॥ (१६९३)

Astitva-ghataikānekatā vā sarvaikatādidosāt ।

Sarve'nabhiḷāpyā vā sūnyā vā sarvathā bhāvā ॥ 145 ॥ (1693)]

Trans—145 Unity or distinction of *astitva* and *ghata* would either give rise to faults like *sarvaikatā* (i. e. universal

D C—Vyakta ! your argument is this —Complete attainment of (the existence of) objects is not possible either *svataḥ* or *parataḥ* or *ubhayaṭaḥ* or *anyataḥ* as in the case of (the accomplishment of the existence of) the *krava* and *dirgha*, there being *apekṣitatva* (expectation) of the *Kārya Kāraṇādibhāva* (i. e. relations like that of cause and effect) of the *padārthas*. Hence each and every object is expected to be either *kārya* or *kāraṇa*. As every *kārya* is done by *kāraṇa* its *kāryatva* is subjugated by *kāraṇatva*. But the *kāryatva* of a *kārya* is not *svabhāva-siddha* (self-accomplished)

Similarly *kāraṇa* accomplishes *kārya*. So that, *kāraṇatva* of *kāraṇa* is subjugated by the *kāryatva* of *kārya*. But *kāraṇatva* also is not *svataḥ siddha*.

Now one which is not *svataḥ-siddha* by virtue of its own self cannot be accomplished by means of another also as in the case of the horn of an ass. So *kāryādibhāva* is accomplished neither by itself nor by another

Again it is improper to consider the possibility of *kāryādibhāvas* even by *sva* and *para* taken together. Because since *siddhi* is not found in either of them separately how could it be attained in the *samudāya* of the two ? Take the example of oil and sand. When oil is not present in every single particle of sand it is not found in the collection of sand also. Thus the accomplishment of an object by means of *ubhaya*, (both) is also impossible

In case of accomplishment by means of *ubhaya* there is another difficulty also. During the process of *siddhi* so long as *kārya* is not accomplished there is *kāraṇa-siddhi* and so long as *kāraṇa* is not accomplished there is *kārya-siddhi*. Consequently *kārya* and *kāraṇa* depend upon each other and hence there is *staretarārayadoṣa* or the fault of affecting each other. Thus it is clear that the *siddhi* of *kāryādibhāva* is not possible even if *sva* and *para* are taken together

Nor even by any other means -*anubhayatah*—the *siddhi* is possible. For, there is no *vastu* (object) available except *sva*, *para* and *ubhaya* in this world. So, even if we presume the accomplishment of *bhāvas anyatah* or *anubhayatah* (i. e., by means of any object excepting *sva*, *para* and *ubhaya*) the *siddhi* would be *nir-hetuka* (void of cause) To take an example the *pradeśinī* finger (next to thumb) looks *dīṅgha* when compared with the thumb and *hrasva* when compared with the middle finger. But the finger by itself is neither short nor long.

Since it is not *hrasva* or *dīṅgha* by virtue of itself, it is not so by means of another object, nor by both taken together, nor by any extra means whatsoever. So it is said—

“ Na dīṅghe'steeḥa dīṅghatvam na hrasve nāpi ca dvaye ।

Tasmādasiddham śūnyatvāt saditya khyāyate kiṁ hi ? ॥

“ Hrasvam pratītya siddham dīṅgham, dīṅgham pratītya hrasvamapi ।
Na kinoidasti siddham, vyavahāravaśād vadantyevam ॥ ” (1692)

In support of the *prima facie* assertion that there is *sarvasūnyatā*, a number of examples are given

अतिथि-घडेगाणेगया व सवेगयाइदोसाओ ।

सवेऽणभिलप्पा वा सुण्णा वा सव्वहा भावा ॥ १४५ ॥ (१६९३)

Atthitta-ghadegānegayā va savvegavāidosāo ।

Savve'ṇabhlappā vā sunnā vā savvahā bhāvā ॥ 145 ॥ (1693)

[अस्तित्व-घटैकानेकता वा सर्वैकतादिदोषात् ।

सर्वेऽनभिलप्पा वा शून्या वा सर्वथा भावाः ॥ १४५ ॥ (१६९३)

Astitva-ghataikānekata vā sarvaikatādidosāt ।

Sarve'ṇabhlappā vā śūnyā vā sarvathā bhāvā ॥ 145 ॥ (1693)]

Trans—145 Unity or distinction of *astitva* and *ghata* would either give rise to faults like *sarvaikatā* (i. e. universal

oneness) or all the objects would become inexpressible (by word or speech) or non-existent in all respects (1693)

टीका-नन्वस्तित्व-घटयोरेकत्वम्, अनेकत्वं वा ? । पक्षकत्वम्, तर्हि सर्वैकता प्राप्नोति-यो योऽस्ति स स घट इत्यस्तित्वे घटस्य प्रवेक्षात् सर्वस्य घटत्वप्रसङ्गः स्यात्, न पटादि पदार्थान्तरम् । घटो वा सर्वसत्त्वाभ्यतिरेकात् सर्वात्मकः स्यात्, अथवा, यो घटः स एवास्तीति घटमात्रेऽस्तित्वं प्रविष्टम्, ततोऽन्यत्र सत्त्वाभावादघटस्य सर्वस्याप्यभावप्रसङ्गतो घट एवैकः स्यात् । सोऽपि वा न भवेत्, अघटभ्याश्चो द्वि घटो भवति, यदा च तस्मिन् पक्षभूतोऽघट एव नास्ति, तदा किमपेक्षोऽसौ घटः स्यात् ? । इति सर्वभूत्य स्वमिति । अथ घट-सत्त्वयोरन्यत्वमिति द्वितीयो विकल्पः । तर्हि सत्त्वरहितत्वादसन् घटः, स्वरविषाणवदिति । अपिच, सतो भावः सत्त्वमुच्यते, तस्य च स्वाधारमूलेभ्यो घटादिभ्यः सङ्गद्योऽन्यत्वेऽसत्त्वमेव स्यात्, आधा राद्यत्वे आधेयस्याप्यनुपपत्तेः । तदेवमस्तित्वेन सह घटादीनामेकत्वा-ऽन्यत्वविकल्पाभ्यामुक्तन्यायन सर्वैकतादिदोषप्रसङ्गात् सर्वेऽपि भावा अनमिश्रभ्या वा भवेयुः, सर्वेषां भूत्या वा स्युः, सर्वैश्च सधामभावो वा भवेदित्यर्थः । अपिच, यद् नोत्पद्यते तच्चायद् निर्बिबाद स्वरविषाणवदनवेव, इति निवृत्त्या तत्कथा । यदप्युत्पत्तिमल्लोकऽभ्युपगम्यते, तस्यापि ज्ञाता ज्ञातादि विकल्पयुक्तिमिरुपायो न घटत, इति भूत्यैव युक्तेति ॥ १४५ (१६९३) ॥

D O—(1) If *ghata* and *astitra* are taken to be one all objects will have to be taken as one. For when *ghata* is said to be *abhinna* from *astitra* all objects that have existence will be called *ghata* and there will be no distinction of objects like *pata* etc. Thus there will arise the difficulty of *sarvasikā* or Universal one-ness. Moreover *ghata* will become a *sarvātma* or all-pervading object since it is taken as inseparable from the *astitra* of all objects. Again if *ghata* is believed to be *astitra* itself existence will be restricted to *ghata* only. All other objects that are not *ghata* will in that case have no existence. Consequently *ghata* alone will exist.

Or, say, *ghata*, too, will not exist according to this argument. Whatever is different from *a-ghata* is called *ghata*. Now, since *ghata* and *astitva* go together, *a-ghata* which is opposite to *ghata* will also have no existence. Thus, *a-ghata* does not exist. So, also *ghata* will not exist. For, in comparison with what, will the object be *ghata* if *a-ghata* is absent?

Hence it is better to resort to *sarvaśūnyatā*

(2) Now, the second alternative that—*ghata* is distinct from *astitva*—may be considered. If *ghata* is *bhīna* from *astitva*, it is devoid of *astitva* also. For, *astitva* being the quality of existence, is the *ādheya*, and *ghata* which contains the quality is *ādhāra*. *Ādheya* is not supposed to exist, when *ādhāra* is away from it. So, *ghata* is devoid of existence and hence it is said to be *a-vidyamāna* like the horn of an ass.

Thus, the above discussion of unity or distinction of *astitva* and *ghata* leads either to the difficulty of *sarvakatā* or to the *anabhilāpyatva* and *śūnyatva* as regards each and every object.

Again, that which is not produced is undoubtedly *a-vidyamāna*, like the horn of an ass, and it has already been discussed before. With regard to objects that have been produced in this world, it can also be proved that their production is not in the fitness of things, if properly thought of.

जायाऽजायो-भयओ न जायमाणं च जायए जम्हा ।

अणवत्था-ऽभावो-भयदोसाओ सुणया तम्हा ॥१४६॥(१६९४)

Jāyā' jāyo-bhayao na jāyamānam ca jāyae jamhā ।

Anavatthā' bhāvo-bhayadosāo sunnayā tamhā ॥ 146 ॥ (1694)

[जाता-ऽजातोभयतो न जायमानं च जायते यस्मात् ।

अनवस्था ऽभावो-भयदोषात् शून्यता तस्मात् ॥ १४६ ॥ (१६९४)

Jāta'jatobhayato na jāyamānam ca jāyate yasmāt ।

Anavasthā'bhāvo-bhayadosāt śūnyatā tasmāt ॥ 146 ॥ (1694)]

Trans—146 (An object) which has (already) been produced or which is in both the conditions or which is (in the state of) being produced can never be produced on account of faults like disorder non-entity or both. So it is non-existent

टीका—इह तावत् न जात जायत, जातत्वादेव, निष्पन्नघटवत् । अथ जातमपि जायते, तर्ह्यनवस्था, जातत्वाविशेषेण पुनःपुनर्जन्मप्रसङ्गात् । अथाजात जायत । तत्रोत्तरमाह—“ अमात्रं चि ” सूत्रकत्वात् सूत्रस्य, तर्ह्यमात्रोऽपि स्वरविषाणलक्षणो जायताम्, अजातत्वाविशेषात् । अथ जाताजात रूपं जायते । तदप्ययुक्तम् । कुतः ? इत्याह—उभयदोषात् प्रत्येकोभयपक्षोक्त दोषापक्षेतित्यर्थः । किञ्च, एतज्जाताजातलक्षणमुभयमस्ति वा, न वा ? । यद्यस्ति, तर्हि जातमेव सत्, न पुनरुभयम्, तत्र पक्षोक्तो दोषः । अथ नास्ति तथापि नोभय सत्, किन्त्वजातमेव, तत्रापि चाभिहितमेव दूषणम् । नापि जायमानं जायते, पूर्वोक्तविकल्पद्वयानतिवृत्तेः, तथाहि—तदपि जायमानमस्ति न वा ? । यद्यस्ति, तर्हि जातमेव सत् । नास्ति चेत्, तर्ह्यजातमेव । पक्षद्वयेऽपि चास्मिन्नभिहित एव दोषः । उक्तं च—

गतं न गम्यते तावद्गतं नैव गम्यते ।

गतागतविनिर्मुक्तं गम्यमानं न गम्यते ॥ १ ॥

इत्यादि । यस्मादेवम्, तस्मादनवस्थाविदोषप्रसङ्गेन भस्तूनाहुत्वादायोगाजगतः सून्यतैव युक्तेति ॥ १४६ (१६९४) ॥

D C—(1) An object which is once produced has not to undergo the process of production again just as a *ghata* which has already been *jāta* has not to be produced again. Even then if it is said that objects that have once been produced can be produced again and again there would be *anavasthā*. Hence *utpatti* of an already *jāta* object is absolutely impossible

(2) Again if an *a-jāta* object is believed to be capable of being produced objects like *kharasāṇa*—that have never

been produced so far—should also be taken as capable of being produced. Because, *ajātātva* is present in *kharaviśāna* also. But this is absurd. So, *utpatti* of an *ajāta* object is never possible.

(3) In the case of an object which is both *jāta* and *a-jāta*, the *utpatti* is not possible. Because *dosas* that are found in each one of the above two cases separately are certainly found in the combination of the two also.

Moreover, if an object which is *ubhaya rūpa* is taken to be *vidyamāna* it becomes *jāta* and loses its *jātājāta ubhaya rūpa*. Similarly, if it is *a-vidyamāna*, it cannot be called *ubhaya rūpa*, but *anutpanna* only. Now, when it is *utpanna* or *anutpanna*, *dosas* like *anavasthā* and *abhāva* do arise.

(4) In the case of a *jūyamāna* object also, the above argument may be applied and the *dosas* like *anavasthā* and *abhāva* arise in that case also, according as it becomes *jāta* or *a-jāta* due to its being *vidyamāna* or *a-vidyamāna*. So, *utpatti* in this case is also impossible.

So, it is said,

“ Gatam na gamyate tāvadagatam naiva gamyate ।
Gatāgatavinirmuktam gamyamānam na gamyate ॥ ”

Thus, in all the above-mentioned four *avasthās* of an object, it has been clearly pointed out that its *utpatti* is impossible. Hence, it is proper to believe in the Universal non-entity.

हेतु-पच्चयसामग्गि वीसु भावेसु नो व जं कज्जं ।
दीसइ सामग्गिमयं सव्वाभावे न सामग्गी ॥ १४७ ॥ (१६९५)

Heū-paccayasāmaggi vīsu bhāvesu no va jaṃ kajjaṃ ।
Disaī sāmaggi mayam savvābhāve na sāmaggi ॥ 147 ॥ (1695)

[हेतु-प्रत्ययसामग्री विष्वग् भावेषु नो वा यत् कार्यम् ।
दृश्यते सामग्रीमयं सर्वाभावे न सामग्री ॥ १४७ ॥ (१६९५)

Hetu-pratyayasamagri visvā bhavatu na va yat karyam ।
 Drīkṣyate samagrimayam sarvabhavo na samagri ॥ 147 ॥ (1695)]

Trans.—147 An object is accomplished by means of a group of causes taken together and not by *hetu* or *pratyaya* in its individual capacity (This) collection of causes cannot be (found) in the (midst of) all-pervading negation

टीका—हेतवः—उपादानकारणानि, प्रत्ययास्तु निमित्तकारणानि, तेषां हेतु-प्रत्ययानां या सामग्री तस्या विष्वग् मावेषु पृथगवस्थासु पद कार्यं न दृश्यते, दृश्यते च सामग्रीमयम्—संपूर्ण सामग्र्यवस्थायां पुनदृश्यत इत्यर्थः । एवं च सति कार्यस्य सर्वाभाव एव युक्त इति श्लेषः । सर्वाभावे च न सामग्री-नैव सामग्रीसङ्भावः प्राप्नोतीत्यर्थः । ततः सर्वशून्यतैवेति भावः । इदमत्र हृदयम्—हेतवश्च प्रत्ययाश्च स्वस्वन्पदार्थं किमेकैकशः कुर्वन्ति, समूय वा ? । न तावदेकैकशः, तथाऽनुपलभ्येः । तत एकैकस्मात् कार्यस्याभावात् सामग्र्यामपि तदभाव एव स्यात्, सिक्ताकण्वतैलवदिति । इत्य च तदवस्थापि कार्यस्योत्पत्त्यभावे सामग्रीसङ्भावो न प्राप्नोति, अनुत्पन्नायाः सामग्र्या अप्ययोगात् । ततश्च सर्वशून्यतैव वगतः । उक्तं च

हेतु-प्रत्ययसामग्री पृथग् भावेभ्यदर्शनात् ।

तेन ते नामिलप्या हि भावाः सर्वे स्वभावतः ॥ १ ॥

लोके यावत् संज्ञा सामग्र्यामेष दृश्यते यस्मात् ।

तस्माद् न सन्ति भावा भाव सति नास्ति सामग्री ॥ १ ॥

इत्यादि । अस्य च व्याख्या—पृथग् भावेभ्यदर्शनात् “कार्यस्य” इति श्लेषः । तेन ते घटादयो भावा सर्वेऽपि स्वभावतः स्वरूपतो नामिलप्या, पृथगेकैकावस्थायाः कार्यस्त्रानुत्पादात्, उत्पत्तिमन्तरेण च घटादिसंज्ञाऽप्रवृत्तेः, संज्ञाऽभावे चामिलप्युपलभ्यत इति । कुतः पुनः पृथगवस्थायां संज्ञाऽप्रवृत्तिः ? इत्याह—“लोके यावदित्यादि” लोके यावत् संज्ञा “घटोऽयम्” इत्यादिसंज्ञाप्रवृत्तिः, तावत् संपूर्ण कार्यं संपूर्णसामग्र्यामेष यस्माद् दृश्यते, पृथगभावे च सामग्र्यामप्यभावात् सिक्ताकण्वतैलवद् न सन्त्येव भावा, भावासत्त्वे च कुतः सामग्रीसङ्भावः ? इति ॥ १४७ ॥ (१६९५) ॥

D. C.—An object is said to have been accomplished only when all *upādāna* and *nimitta* causes are assembled together. But when each one of these causes operates separately, the *kārya* could never be accomplished. In other words, there is *abhāva* of the *kārya* and ultimately there will be *sarvābhāva*. Again, in the midst of *sarvābhāva*, *sāmagrī* cannot exist. Consequently, there will be *sarvas'ūnyatā*.

Moreover, just as oil cannot be found in the collection of sands when it is not present in each individual particle, so also *kārya* cannot be found in the combination of many *kāranas* when it is absent in each individual *kāraṇa* separately.

Thus, when the existence and production of all *kāryas* are denied, the existence and production of *sāmagrī* are also denied. So here also, *sarvas'ūnyatā* is the only resort of belief. Again, it is said that

“ Hetu-pratyayasāmagrī prthag bhavēśvadarśanāt ।
Tena te nābhilapyā hi bhavaḥ sarve svabhāvataḥ ॥ ”

“ Loke yāvat samjñāsamagryāmeva dṛśyate yasmāt ।
Tasmād na santi bhāva, bhave satī nāsti sāmagrī ॥147॥(1695)”

परभागादरिसणओ सव्वाराभागसुहमयाओ य ।

उभयाणुवलम्भाओ सव्वाणुलद्धिओ सुण्णं ॥ १४८ ॥ (१६९६)

Parabhāgādarisanao savvārābhāgasuhamayāo ya ।

Ubhayānuvalambhāo savvānuladdhīo sunnam ॥ 148 ॥ (1696)

[परभागादर्शनतः सर्वाराद्भागसौक्ष्म्याच्च ।

उभयाणुपलम्भात् सर्वानुपलब्धितः शून्यम् ॥ १४८ ॥ (१६९६)

Parabhāgādarśanataḥ sarvarādbhāgasauksmyacca ।

Ubhayānupalambhat sarvānupalabdhītaḥ śūnyam ॥ 148 ॥ (1696)]

Trans.—148 The rear portion (of an object) is not perceptible, and its front-most part is very minute. So, on

account of the non-perception of these two there is non-perception of all, which results in complete negation

टीका-इह यत् तावददृश्य तदसदेव, अनुपलम्भात्, स्वरविषयवदिति निवृत्त्या सशर्ता दृश्यस्यापि च स्वप्न-कुम्भ-कुम्भादेः परमस्य भागयोरस स्वमेव, अर्वागमागान्तरितत्वेन तयोरप्यवर्धनात्, आराग्न्यागस्यापि च सावयवत्वात् पुनरयः स्वत्वाराराग्न्यागः तस्याप्यन्यः पुनस्तस्याप्यन्य इत्येव तावत्, पावत् सर्वांरातीयभागस्य, परमाणुप्रवरमात्रत्वेनापिसौहृदस्यात्, पूर्वेषां चाराग्न्यागानामन्यस्यान्येनान्तरितत्वेनानुपलम्भेः । सतश्चोक्तन्यायेन परमाणुसर्वांरातीयभागलक्ष्णोमयभागानुपलम्भात् सर्वस्यापि वस्तुजातस्यानुपलम्भेः शून्य अगदिति । उक्त च

“ पावद् दृश्य परस्तावद् भागः स च न दृश्यते ।

तेन ते नामिलाप्या हि भावाः सर्वे स्वमावतः ॥ १ ॥ ”

तदेवमुक्तयुक्त्या सर्वस्यापि भूतादरमावः प्राप्नोति, भूयते च भूतौ भूवादिसद्भावोऽप्यीति संशयः । इति पूर्वपक्ष ॥ १४८ (१६९६) ॥

D C—It has already been discussed that objects like *kharaṇṣaṇa* do not exist because they are non-perceptible. In case of perceptible objects like pillar jar wall etc, the rear and middle portions are not perceived because they are screened by the front portion coming in their way. So they are said to be *a-rūpyamāna*.

Again the front portion consists of a number of divisions. Out of all these divisions every one is screened by the other coming in its immediate front which again is screened by a third one in its immediate vicinity and so on. Ultimately the front-most particle is left unscreened. But it is extremely small in size and hence becomes non-cognizable. Now since the rear and front-most parts are non-perceptible it can be said that objects and ultimately all the objects in the Universe—are non-cognizable or *avijyā*. Moreover it is said that

“ Yavad-dṛśyam parastāvad bhāgah sa ca na dṛśyate ।
Tena te nābhilāpyā hi bhāvāḥ sarve svabhāvatāḥ ॥ ”

So, you have a doubt in the existence of *Bhūta* etc, and according to your belief, they are non-existent This finishes the *pūrvapakṣa* (the argument of the opponent)

Now follows the refutation of the argument—

मा कुरु वियत्त ! संसयमसइ न संसयसमुब्भवो जुत्तो ।
खकुसुम-खरसिंगेसु व, जुत्तो सो थाणु-पुरिसेसु ॥१४९॥ (१६९६)

Mā kuru Viyatta ! samsayamasai na samsayasamubbhavo jutto ।
Khakusuma-kharasingesu va jutto so thānu-purisesu ॥149॥ (1697)

[मा कुरु व्यक्त ! संशयमसति न संशयसमुद्भवो युक्तः ।

खकुसुम-खरशृङ्गयोरिव युक्तः स स्थाणु-पुरुषयोः ॥१४९॥ (१६९७)

Mā kuru Vyakta ! samśayamasati na samśayasamudbhavo yuktah ।
Khakusuma kharasṛṅgayoriva yuktah sa sthānu puruṣayoh ॥149॥]

Trans.—149 O *Vyakta* ! Do not entertain doubt The doubt about non-existent (objects) is improper as in the case of *kha-kusuma* (flower of the sky) and *kharasṛnga* (horn of an ass) It is proper (only) with regard to (existent objects like) *sthānu* and *puruṣa* (1697)

टीका-आयुष्मन् व्यक्त ! मा कृथाः संशयं-मा भूताभावं बुध्यस्व,
गतोऽसति भूतकदम्बके संशयः खकुसुम-खरविपाणयोरिव न युक्तः, अपि
त्वभावनिश्चय एव स्यात् । सत्स्वेव च भूतेषु स्थाणु-पुरुषादिष्विव संशयो
युक्तः । यदि पुनरसत्यपि वस्तुनि संदेहः स्यात् तदाऽविशेषेण खरविपाणा-
दिष्वपि स्यादिति भावः ॥ १४९ ॥ (१६९७) ॥

D C—O long-lived *Vyakta* ! Don't be dubious about the existence of *bhūtas* Because the doubt about non-existent objects is totally unjustifiable as in the case of *kha-kusuma* and *kharasṛnga* where *abhāva* is already fixed up It can be

justified only in the case of existent objects like *sthānu* and *puruṣa*. But if you raise any doubt as regards a non-existent object the doubt will be raised in the case of *kharavṛṣṇa* also which too is non-existent in general

को वा विसेसहेतुः सद्वाभावे वि थाणु-पुरिसेसु ।

संका न खपुष्पादिसु विवज्जओ वा कह न भवे ? ॥१५०॥ (१६९८)

Ko vā vīśesaheṭṭu savvābhāve vi thānu-purisesu ।

Sankā na khapupphādisu vivajjao vā kaṇham na bhavē ? ॥ 150 ॥ (1698)

[को वा विशेषहेतुः सर्वाभावेऽपि स्वाणु-पुरुषयोः ।

संका न खपुष्पादिसु विपर्ययो वा कथं न भवेत् ? ॥१५०॥ (१६९८)

Ko vā vīśaheṭṭu sarvābhāve pi sthānu-puruṣayoh ।

Sankā na khapupphādisu viparyayo vā katham na bhavet ? ॥ 150 ॥

Trans—150 Or what special reason can there be in (entertaining) doubt about *sthānu* and *puruṣa* and not about *kha-puṣpa* (flower of the sky) etc, even in (the midst of) all-pervading non-entity? Or why should not the reverse take place ? (1698)

टीका—को वाऽत्र विशेषहेतुरुच्यतां पत्-सर्वाभावे सर्वशून्यतायाम
विशिष्टायामपि स्वाण्वादिषु संशयो भवति । न खपुष्पादिषु ? । ननु
विशेषहेत्वभावादविशेषेण सर्वत्र संशयोऽस्तु, नियामकभावाद् । विपर्ययो वा
भवेत्—खपुष्पादिषु संशयः स्याद् न स्वाण्वादिभिरिति भावः ॥१५०॥ (१६९८) ॥

D O—Even when there was all-pervading negation on what special ground could you entertain doubt about existent objects like *sthānu* etc and not about non-existent objects like *kha-puṣpa* etc? If there is no *vīśesaheṭṭu* on which your belief is based the *samsāya* in general, may rise at all places. Or in absence of clear explanation reverse may be the case ; e The doubt may arise about non-existent objects like *kha-puṣpa* etc and not about existent objects like *sthānu* etc.

Moreover,

पञ्चस्वओऽणुमानादागमओ वा पसिद्धिरत्थाणं ।

सवप्पमाणविसयाभावे किह संसओ जुत्तो ? ॥१५१॥ (१६९९)

Paccakkhao'numānādāgamao vā pasiddhiratthāṇam ।

Savappamānavisayābhāve kiha samsao jutto ? ॥ 151 ॥ (1699)

[प्रत्यक्षतोऽनुमानादागमतो वा प्रसिद्धिरर्थानाम् ।

सर्वप्रमाणविषयाभावे कथं संशयो युक्तः ? ॥ १५१ ॥ (१६९९)

Pratyaksato'numanādāgamato vā prasiddhirarthāṇām ।

Sarvaprāmānavisayābhāve katham saṁśayo yuktah ? ॥ 151 ॥ (1699)]

Trans—151 The accomplishment of objects is (attained) either by (means of) visible evidence (*pratyaksa*) or by inference (*anumāna*) or by documentary evidence (*āgama*). (But) in absence of all (such) *Pramānas* (evidences) and *visayas* (topics) how could the *samsaya* be justified ? (1699)

टीका—यदा हि प्रमाणैरर्थानां प्रसिद्धिर्जाता भवेत् तदा कथञ्चित् कचिद् वस्तुनि संशयो युज्यते । यदा च सर्वेषां प्रमाणानां सर्वेषां च तद्विषयाणाम्भावस्तदा कथं संशयोऽस्तु, संशयस्य ज्ञातृ-ज्ञेयाद्यर्थमामग्रीजन्यत्वात् ? । सर्वशून्यत्वे च तदभावाद् न संशयोऽद्भूतिः, निर्मूलत्वादिति भावः ॥ १५१ ॥ (१६९९) ॥

D C—When the object is accomplished by means of *pramānas* (evidences) a doubt may arise in several objects to a certain extent But when all such *pramānas* and *visayas* are absent, how can the doubt exist ? The doubt springs up from materials like *jñātā* and *jñeya* But when everything is believed as *s'ūnya*, materials like *jñātā* and *jñeya* are not supposed to exist, and hence, the *sams'aya* has also no reason to rise

जं संसयादु नाणपज्जया तं च नेयसंवच्चं ।

सबन्नेयाभावे न संसओ तेण ते जुत्तो ॥ १५२ ॥ (१७००)

justified only in the case of existent objects like *sthānu* and *puruṣa*. But if you raise any doubt as regards a non-existent object, the doubt will be raised in the case of *kha-puṣpa* also which too is non-existent in general

को वा विसेसहेतुः सत्त्वाभावे वि थाणु-पुरिसेसु ।

संका न खपुष्पादिसु विवज्जओ वा कह न भवे ? ॥१५०॥ (१६९८)

Ko vā visesaheṭṭu savvābhāve vi thānu-purisēsu ।

Saṅkā na khapupfālsu vivaḷḷao vā kaḥam na bhavē ? ॥ 150 ॥ (1698)

[को वा विशेषहेतुः सर्वाभावेऽपि स्थाणु-पुरुषयोः ।

शङ्का न खपुष्पादिषु विपर्ययो वा कथं न भवेत् ? ॥१५०॥ (१६९८)

Ko vā visesaheṭṭu sarvābhāve pi sthānu-puruṣayoh ।

Śaṅkā na khapuppadisu viparyayo vā katham na bhavet ? ॥150॥]

Trans —150 Or what special reason can there be in (entertaining) doubt about *sthānu* and *puruṣa* and not about *kha-puṣpa* (flower of the sky) etc, even in (the midst of) all-pervading non-entity? Or why should not the reverse take place ? (1698)

टीका—को मास्य विशेषहेतुरुच्यतां यत्—सर्वाभावे सर्वसून्यतायाम
विशिष्टायामपि स्थाण्वादिषु संशयो भवति । न खपुष्पादिषु ? । ननु
विशेषहेतुस्वभावादविशेषेण सर्वत्र संशयोऽस्तु, निषामकामावात् । विपर्ययो वा
भवेत्—खपुष्पादिषु संशयः स्यात् न स्थाण्वादिष्विति मास्यः॥१५०॥ (१६९८)॥

D O—Even when there was all-pervading negation on what special ground could you entertain doubt about existent objects like *sthānu* etc and not about non-existent objects like *kha-puṣpa* etc? If there is no *visesaheṭṭu* on which your belief is based the *samsāya* in general, may rise at all places. Or in absence of clear explanation reverse may be the case i. e. The doubt may arise about non-existent objects like *kha-puṣpa* etc and not about existent objects like *sthānu* etc.

Moreover,

पञ्चक्वओऽणुमाणादागमओ वा पसिद्धिरत्थाणं ।
सवप्पमाणविसयाभावे किह संसओ जुत्तो ? ॥१५१॥ (१६९९)

Paccakkhao'numānādāgamao vā pasiddhiratthāṇaṃ ।
Savvappamānavisayābhāve kiha samsao jutto ? ॥ 151 ॥ (1699)

[प्रत्यक्षतोऽनुमानादागमतो वा प्रसिद्धिरर्थानाम् ।
सर्वप्रमाणविषयाभावे कथं संशयो युक्तः ? ॥ १५१ ॥ (१६९९)

Pratyaksato'numānādāgamato vā prasiddhirarthanām ।
Sarvaprāmānavisayābhāvo katham saṁśayo yuktah ? ॥ 151 ॥ (1699)]

Trans—151 The accomplishment of objects is (attained) either by (means of) visible evidence (*pratyaksa*) or by inference (*anumāna*) or by documentary evidence (*āgama*) (But) in absence of all (such) *Pramānas* (evidences) and *visayas* (topics) how could the *samsāya* be justified ? (1699)

टीका—यदा हि प्रमाणैरर्थानां प्रसिद्धिर्जाता भवेत् तदा कथञ्चित् कचिद् वस्तुनि संशयो युज्यते । यदा च सर्वेषां प्रमाणानां सर्वेषां च तद्विषयाणाम्-भावस्तदा कथं संशयोऽस्तु, संशयस्य ज्ञातृ-ज्ञेयार्थसामग्रीजन्यत्वात् ? । सर्वशून्यत्वे च तदभावाद् न संशयोद्भूतिः, निर्मूलत्वादिति भावः ॥ १५१ ॥ (१६९९) ॥

D. C—When the object is accomplished by means of *pramānas* (evidences) a doubt may arise in several objects to a certain extent But when all such *pramānas* and *visayas* are absent, how can the doubt exist ? The doubt springs up from materials like *gnātā* and *jñeya* But when everything is believed as *s'ūnya*, materials like *gnātā* and *jñeya* are not supposed to exist, and hence, the *samsāya* has also no reason to rise

जं संसयादु नाणपज्जया तं च नेयसंवच्चं ।

सवन्नेयाभावे न संसओ तेण ते जुत्तो ॥ १५२ ॥ (१७००)

Jam samsayādayo nānapajjayā tam ca neyasambaddham ।
Savvanneyābhāve na samsao tena te jutto ॥ 152 ॥ (1700)

[यत् संशयादयो ज्ञानपर्ययास्तच्च ज्ञेयमबद्धम् ।

सर्वज्ञेयामावे न संशयस्तेन ते युक्तः ॥ १५२ ॥ (१७००)

Yat samśayādayo jñānaparyayaस्तासां jñeyasambaddham ।
Sarvajñeyābhāve na samśayastena te yuktaḥ ॥ 152 ॥ (1700)]

Trans—152 Since doubt etc. are the synonyms of *jñāna*, they are related to the *jñeya* (cognizable object) also So in absence of all *jñeyas* your doubt has also no place (to exist) (1700)

टीका—यस्मात् संशय-विपर्यया-अन्यवसाय-निर्बया विज्ञानपर्यया,
सच ज्ञेयनिबन्धनमेव, सर्वशून्यतायां न ज्ञेयमस्ति, तस्माद् न तव संशयो
युक्तः । सति च संशयेऽनुमानसिद्धा एव मायाः ॥ १५२ (१७००) ॥

D C—Since doubt, inversion (*viparyaya*) non-apprehension (*anadhyavasāya*) and affirmation (*nirvaya*) are the (various) synonyms of knowledge they are automatically connected with the cognizable also Now since everything is *sāmya*, nothing can be apprehended when there is nothing *jñeya* there can be no *jñāna* and no *samśaya* also as *samśaya* is nothing but a *paryāya* of the knowledge

Still however if you insist upon entertaining doubt, *siddhis* of objects will have to be apprehended only by means of *anumāna* and not by virtue of perception as there can be no perception on account of the absolute *abhāva* of everything

सति चिद्य ते भावा ससयओ सोम्म ! थाणु—पुरिस व ।
अह दिट्ठतमसिद्ध मणसि नणु ससयाभावो ॥१५३॥(१७०१)

Santi cciya te bhāvā samsayao Somma ! thānu—purisa vva ।
Aha diṭṭhanāmasiddham manasi nanu samsayābhāvo ॥ 153 ॥

[सन्त्येव ते भावाः संशयतः सौम्य ! स्वाणु—पुरुषादिव ।

अथ दृष्टान्तमसिद्ध मणसे ननु संशयामावः ॥१५३ ॥ (१७०१)

Santyeva te bhāvāḥ saṁśayataḥ Saumya ! sthānu-purusāviva !
Atha dṛṣṭāntamasiddham manyase nanu saṁśayābhāvah ॥153॥(1701)]

Trans—153 O Saumya ! Because of (your) doubt (about them), those objects do exist like *sthānu* and *puruṣa*, But, again, if you believe the example (of *sthānu* and *puruṣa*) to be *asiddha* (i e unaccomplished), existence of the doubt will be denied (1701)

टीका—सौम्य ! सन्ति भवतोऽपि भावाः, संशयसमुत्थानात्, इह यत् संशय्यते तदस्ति, यथा स्थाणु-पुरुषौ; यच्चासद् न तत् संशय्यते, यथा खपुष्प-खरविपाणे। अथ स्थाणु-पुरुषलक्षणं दृष्टान्तमसिद्धं मन्यसे त्वम्, सर्वे-पामपि स्थाणु-पुरुषादिभावानामविशेषेणैवासत्त्वाभ्युपगमात्। तदयुक्तम्, यतो ननु सर्वभावासत्त्वे संशयाभाव एव स्यात्, इत्युक्तमेवेति ॥१५३॥ (१७०१)

D. C—O Saumya ! The very doubt that you have raised against the objects proves that the objects are *vidyamāna* like *sthānu* and *puruṣa* For, there cannot exist any doubt about non-existent objects like *ālās'apuspa* and *lharaviśāna*

Again, if you think that the above example of (the existent objects like) *sthānu* and *puruṣa* is wrong, you are not justified For, in that case, all objects whether *vidyamāna* as *sthānu* etc, or *a-vidyamāna* as *lhapuspa* etc. will have to be considered as *a-vidyamāna* according to your belief So, when the existence of each and every object will be denied, naturally the existence of doubt will also be denied

सत्त्वाभावे वि मई संदेहो सिमिणए व, नो तं च ।

जं सरणाइनिमित्तो सिमिणो न उ सव्वाभावावो ॥१५४॥(१७०२)

Savvābhāve vi maī samdeho simīṇae vva, no taṁ ca ।

Jam saranānimitto simiṇo na u savvahābhāvo ॥ 154 ॥ (1702)

[सर्वाभावेऽपि मतिः संदेहः स्वप्न इव, नो तच्च ।

यत् स्मरणादिनिमित्तः स्वप्नो न तु सर्वथाऽभावः ॥१५४॥(१७०२)

Sarvabhāve'pi matih samdehaḥ svapnaka iva no taccā ।

Yat smaraṇādinimittatḥ svapno na tu sarvathā'bhavaḥ ॥154॥ (1709)

Trans—154 It is improper to believe that inspite of all-pervading negation doubt does spring up in a dream. For dream consists of (a number of) *nimittas* like remembrance etc. and it is not absolutely non-existent (1702)

टीका—स्यान्मतिः परस्य—सर्वाभावेऽपि स्वप्न दृष्टः संशयः, यथा किल कश्चित् पामरो निजगृहाङ्गणे “ किमयं द्विपेन्द्रो महीधो वा ? इति सञ्चेते, न च सत् तत्र किञ्चिदप्यस्ति, एवमन्यत्र सर्वभावाभावेऽपि संशयो भविष्यति । तच्च न, यद् यस्मात् स्वप्नेऽपि पूर्वदृष्टानुभूतस्मरणादिनिमित्तः संदेहः, न तु सर्वथा भावाभावेऽसौ कापि प्रवर्तते । अन्यथा हि यत् पटुभूतादिकं कश्चिदपि नास्ति तत्रापि संशयः स्यात्, बिशेषभावादिति । ननु किं स्वप्नोऽपि निमित्तमन्तरेण न प्रवर्तते ? । एवमेव ॥ (१७०२) ॥

D O—In support of the belief that doubt springs up even in *sarvābhāva* an opponent may advance an argument as follows—Just as in a dream a poor pauper raises a doubt and questions whether there is an elephant or a mountain before his house though in fact nothing exists like that; so also at other places doubt can be raised inspite of the absolute *abhāva* of things. Thus we can say that even though there is *sarvābhāva* *samaya* does exist in dream.

But the above argument is totally groundless. In dream doubt arises on account of various reasons. Say for instance when an object is seen or experienced the remembrance of that experience etc gives rise to the doubt. So for the rise of doubt in the dream there is some sort of reason which brings the dream—and hence the doubt—into existence. Thus doubt arises from an existent object and not from the absolute *abhāva* of it.

But, suppose even then if you believe that the *samdeha* springs up from the absolute *abhāva* also the doubt should

also have to arise from objects like sixth element which have never been existent so far. Because, *abhiāva* is present in them also.

अणुहूय-दिट्ठ-चिंतिय-सुय-पयइवियार-देवयाऽणूया ।

सिमिणस्स निमित्ताइं पुण्णं पावं च नाभावो ॥१५५॥ (१७०३)

Anuhūya-dittha-cintiya-suya-payaiviyāra-devayā'nūyā ।

Siminassa nimittāim punnam pāvam ca nābhāvo ॥ 155 ॥ (1703)

[अनुभूत-दृष्ट-चिन्तित-श्रुत-प्रकृतिविकार-देवताऽनूपाः ।

स्वप्नस्य निमित्तानि पुण्यं पापं च नाभावः ॥ १५५ ॥ (१७०३)

Anubhūta-dṛṣṭa-cintita-śruta-prakṛti-vikāra-devatā'nūpāḥ ।

Svapnasya nimittāni puṇyam pāpam ca nābhāvaḥ ॥155॥ (1703)]

Trans.—155 (Previous) experience, observation, attentive consideration, and hearing (of an object), ill-health (*prakṛti*) *vikāra*), a deity, watery place, meritorious act and sin—these are the prominent causes (*nimittas*) of dream. So it is not non-existent (1703)

टीका—स्नान-भोजन-विलेपनादिकमन्यदाऽनुभूतं स्वप्ने दृश्यते, इत्यनुभूतोऽर्थः स्वप्नस्य निमित्तम् । अथवा, करि-तुरगादिकोऽन्यदादृष्टोऽर्थस्तन्निमित्तम् । विचिन्तितश्च प्रियतमालाभादिः । श्रुतश्च स्वर्ग-नरकादिः । तथा, वात-पितादिजनितः प्रकृतिविकारः स्वप्नस्य निमित्तम् । तथा, अनुकूला प्रतिकूला वा देवता तन्निमित्तम् । तथा, अनूपः सजलप्रदेशः । तथा पुण्यमिष्टस्वप्नस्य निमित्तम् । पापं चानिष्टस्य तस्य निमित्तम्, न पुनर्वस्वभावः । किञ्च, स्वप्नोऽपि तावद् भाव एव । ततस्तस्यापि सत्त्वे कथं “ शून्यं जगत् ” इति भवता प्रतिज्ञायते ? ॥ १५५ (१७०३)

D C—The *nimittas* that bring dream into existence are treated as follows.—

1. *Previous experience*—Certain acts like *snāna*, *bhōjana*,

vilepana etc. that have once been experienced are perceived again in dream due to this reason.

3 *Observation*—When objects like elephants horses etc. are perceived in dream the dream is said to have been caused by the *dr̥ṣṭārtha* reason.

3 *Attentive Consideration*—A dream representing acquisition of a beloved etc. is called the dream of *antīkārtha*

4 *Hearing*—When places like *svarga* and *naraka*—which are only heard of, and not seen—are perceived in dream the *śrūṭa* is *śrīārtha*

5 *Disturbance of Health*—Ill health caused by diseases like *vīta* and *pitta* is also one of the *śrūṭas* of dream.

6 *A deity*—When one beholds a deity—adverse or favourable—in dream the dream can be called *deva-śrūṭa*.

7 *Watery place*—This is also one of the *śrūṭas* when one dreams in the midst of watery region

8-9 *Punya* and *pāpa*—A dream is said to be good or bad according as there is *puṇya* or *pāpa* as its *śrūṭa*.

Thus it is clear that a *svapna* is brought about by one of the above-mentioned *śrūṭas*. And hence *svapna* is nothing but an object which can be brought into existence by means of a *śrūṭa* or *śrūṭas*. In this way when the dream itself is existent how can you call the world to be non-existent like *svapna*?

विष्णाणमयत्तणओ घडविष्णाण व सुमिणओ भावो ।

अहवा विहियनिमित्तो घडो व नेमित्तियत्ताओ ॥ १५६ ॥ (१७०४)

Vimāṇamayattanao ghaḍavimāṇam va suminao bhāvo ।

Ahava vihiyanimitto ghaḍo vva nemittiyattāo ॥ 156 ॥ (1704)

[विज्ञानमयत्वतो घटविज्ञानमिदं स्वप्नको भावः ।

अथवा विहितनिमित्तो घट इव नैमित्तिकत्वात् ॥ १५६ ॥ (१७०४)

Vijñānamayatvato ghaṭāvijnānamiva svapnako bhāvah ।
Athavā vihitanimitto ghata iva naimittikatvāt ॥ 156 ॥ (1704)]

Trans.—156 The existence of dream is (apprehended)
either because dream is *vijnānamaya* (i. e. full of knowledge)
like *ghata* or because it is *naimittika* (i. e. caused by *numitta*)
like *ghata* as mentioned before (1704)

टीका—भावः स्वप्न इति प्रतिज्ञा । विज्ञानमयत्वादिति हेतुः । घटविज्ञानव-
दिति दृष्टान्तः । अथवा, भावः स्वप्नः, नैमित्तिकत्वात् निमित्तैर्निष्पन्नो
नैमित्तिकस्तद्भावस्तत्त्वं तस्मादित्यर्थः, घटवदिति । कथं पुनः स्वप्नो
नैमित्तिकः ? इत्याह—यतो विहितनिमित्तः, विहितानि—“ अणुह्य-दिङ्गु-
चितिय ” इत्यादिना प्रतिपादितानि निमित्तानि यस्यासौ विहितनिमित्त
इति ॥ १५६ (१७०४) ॥

D. C.—Existence of dream can be proved in either of
these two ways —

1 Dream is full of cognizance as *ghata* is So, like
ghata, dream can also be perceived on account of its
being existent

2 As *ghata* is caused by various *numittas*, dream is
also caused by *numittas*, like *anubhava*, *smarana*, *vyantana* etc
that are mentioned before. So, it is clear that dream is a
mūrta kārya, and hence existent like *ghata*

सद्वाभावे च कओ सुमिणोऽसुमिणो त्ति सच्चमलियं ति ।

गंधवपुरं पाडलिपुत्तं तत्थो वयारो त्ति ? ॥ १५७ ॥ (१७०५)

कज्जं ति कारणं ति य सज्झमिणं साहणं ति कत्त त्ति ।

वत्ता वयणं वच्चं परपक्खोऽयं सपक्खोऽयं ? ॥ १५८ ॥ (१७०६)

किं वेह थिर-द्वो-सिण-चलया-ऽरूवित्तणाइं निययाइं ।

सद्दादओ य गज्झा सोत्ताइयाइं गहणाइं ? ॥ १५९ ॥ (१७०७)

समया विवज्जओ वा सव्वागहण व किं न सुण्णम्मि ।
 किं सुण्णया व सम्म सग्गहो किं व मिच्छत्त ? ॥१६०॥ (१७०८)
 किह स-परो भयबुद्धी कह च तेसिं परोप्परमसिद्धी ।
 अह परमईय मण्णह स-परमहविसेसण कत्तो ? ॥१६१॥ (१७०९)

Savvābhāve ca kao sumino sumino tti saccamaliyam ti ।
 Gandhavvapuram Pādaliuttam tattho vayāro tti ? ॥ 157 ॥ (1705)
 Kajjam ti kāranam ti ya sajjhaminam sāhanam ti katta tti ।
 Vattā vayanam vaccam parapakkho yam sa-pakkho yam ? ॥ 158 ॥ (1706)
 Kim veva thira-davo-sina-calayā-rūvittanāim niyayāim ।
 Saddādao ya gajjhā sottāiyāim gahanāim ? ॥ 159 ॥ (1707)
 Samayā vivajjao vā savvagahanam va kim na sumammī ।
 Kim sumaya va sammam saggaho kim va micchattam ? ॥ 160 ॥ (1708)
 Kiha sa-paro-bhaya buddhi kaham ca tesim paropparamasiddhi ।
 Aha paramaṭṭe bhamma sa paramaṭṭisesanam katto ? ॥ 161 ॥ (1709)

[सर्वाभावे च कुतः स्वप्नोऽस्वप्न इति सत्यमलीकमिति ।
 गन्धर्वपुरं पाटलिपुत्रं तथ्य उपचार इति ॥ १५७ ॥ (१७०५)
 कार्यमिति कारणमिति च साध्यमिदं साधनमिति कर्तेति ।
 वक्ता वचनं वाच्यं परपक्षोऽयं स्वपक्षोऽयम् ॥ १५८ ॥ (१७०६)
 किं वेह स्थिर-द्रवो-प्लव-बलना ऽरूपित्वानि नियतानि ।
 शब्दादयश्च ग्राह्याः भोगादिकानि ग्राह्याणि ॥ १५९ ॥ (१७०७)
 समता विपर्ययो वा सर्वाग्रहण वा किं न ह्यन्ये ।
 किं ह्यन्यता वा सम्यक् सवृत्तः किं वा मिथ्यात्वम् ॥ १६० ॥ (१७०८)
 कथं स्व-परो-भयबुद्धिः कथं च तेषां परस्परमसिद्धिः ।
 अथ परमस्या भण्यते स्व-परमविविशेषणं कुतः ? ॥ १६१ ॥ (१७०९)

Sarvabhāve ca kutaḥ svapno svapna iti satyamalīkamiti ।
 Gandharvapuram Pāṭaliputram tathya upacara iti ? ॥ 157 ॥ (1705)

Kāryamiti kārāṇamiti ca sādhyamidaṁ sādhanamiti kartetī ।
 Vaktā vacanam vācyaṁ para pakṣo'yaṁ svapakṣo'yaṁ ? ॥158॥(1706)
 Kim vaha sthira-dravo-sṇa-calatā-rūpitvāni niyatāni ।
 Śabdādayaśca grāhyāḥ śrotrādīkāni grāhyāni ? ॥ 159 ॥ (1707)
 Samatā viparyayo vā sarvāgrahanam vā kim na śunye ।
 Kim śūnyatā vā samyak sadgrahaḥ kim vā mithyātvam ॥160॥(1701)
 Katham sva paro-bhaya buddhiḥ katham ca tesāṁ parasparamasiddhiḥ
 Atha para-matyā bhanyate sva-para-mativiśesanam kutah ? ॥161॥]

Trans —157-161 Again, in case of all-pervading negation how could there be distinction between dream and otherwise? between truth and false-hood? between (an imaginary) *Gandharva* city and (a real) *Pāṭliputra*?† between a fact and fancy? between cause and effect? between end, means, and (their) agent? between speaker, speech, and (that which is) to be spoken? between one's own party, and the opposite party? Or, in such a case, how could (properties like) stability, fluidity, heat, activeness etc as well as (the rule) that sound etc are *grāhya* (to be received) and the ear etc are *grāhaka*s (receivers)—be ascertained at all? Or, why should (faults like) uniformity, contraity or non-acceptibility of all, not arise in (the state of all-pervading) negation? And, is this (apprehension of) *śūnyatā* really substantial or worthless? Moreover, how could *sva*, *para*, and *ubhaya* be distinguished and how would their mutual accomplishment be possible (in case of all-pervading negation)? And, if it is said to be due to another's intellect, how could the intellect of *sva* and *para* be distinguished? (1705-1709)

टीका-सर्वाभावे च सर्वशून्यताया चाभ्युपगम्यमानायां “ स्वप्नोऽयम् ” “ अस्वप्नोऽयम् ” इति कुतः-क्रिकृतोऽयं विशेषः ? इत्यर्थः । तथा, सत्यमिदम्, अलीकं वा; तथा, गन्धर्वपुरमेतत्, पाटलीपुत्रादि चेदम्; तथा, “ तत्थो वयारो ति ” अयं तथ्यो निरुपचरितो मुख्यश्चतुष्पदविशेषः सिंहः,

† Known as *Patnā* at the present time.

अयं स्वौपचारिको मनुष्यविशेषो भाणवकः, तथा, कार्यमिदं घटादि, कारणं
 चेदं भुत्सिण्डादि, तथा, साम्यमिदमनित्यत्वादि, साधनं कृतकत्वादि, कर्ता
 घटादेः कुलालादिः; तथा, अयं वक्ता, वादी, वचनं चेदं अवयव पञ्चावयवं
 वा; इदं च वाच्यमविषेयमस्य शब्दसदर्मस्य; तथा, अयं स्वपक्षः, अयं च
 परपक्ष इति सर्वशून्यत्वे कुतोऽसौ विशेषो गम्यते?। “ किं वेदं विरेत्यादि ”
 पृथिव्याः स्थिरत्वम्, अपां द्रव्यत्वम्, वह्निरुष्णत्वम्, वायोबलत्वम्, आकाश
 स्यात्स्वपितृत्वमित्यादयो नियताः सर्वदेवैकस्वभावाः विशेषाः सर्वशून्यतायां
 कुतो गम्यन्ते?। तथा, शब्दादयो ब्राह्मा एव, इन्द्रियाणि च भोग्यादीनि
 ग्राहकाण्येवेति कुतो नियमसिद्धिः?।

“ मममेत्यादि ” न सर्वशून्यतायां स्वप्नाऽस्वप्न-सत्याऽश्लीका
 दीनां विशेषनिबन्धनाभावात् अप्येव कस्माद् न भवति-यादृशः स्वप्नः,
 अस्वप्नोऽपि तादृश एव; यादृशभास्वप्नः, स्वप्नोऽपि तादृश एवेत्यादि?।
 अथवा, विपर्ययः कुतो न भवति-याऽस्वप्नाऽसौऽस्वप्नः यस्त्वस्वप्नः स स्वप्न
 इत्यादि?। यदिवा, सर्वेषामपि स्वप्नाऽस्वप्नादीनां सर्वेषां शून्यत्वेऽग्रहणमेव
 कस्माद् न भवति?। आन्तिवशादेव स्वप्नाऽस्वप्नादिग्रहणमिति चेत्।
 तदप्युक्तम्-देष्ट-काल-स्वभावादिनैयत्येन तद्व्याहकज्ञानोत्पत्तेः। किञ्च, इयं
 आन्तिः किं विद्यते, न वा?। यदि विद्यते, तर्ह्यप्युपगमविरोधः। अथ न
 विद्यते, तर्हि आन्तेरसत्त्वाभावाद्ग्राहकज्ञानस्य निर्गन्तित्वात् सन्त्येव सर्वे
 भावाः, न पुनः शून्यतेति। अथवा, अन्यम् पृच्छामो भवन्तम्-ननु सर्व
 शून्यत्वे शून्यतैव सम्यक्च सतां भावानां ग्रहणं मद्ग्रहः, भावसत्त्वग्रहण
 पुनर्भिष्यात्वमित्यत्र कस्ते विशेषहेतुः?।

यदुक्तम्-“ न स्वतो भावानां सिद्धिः ” इत्यादि; तत्प्रतिविधाना-
 र्थमाह-“ किञ्च स-परो ममेत्यादि ” ननु कथं इत्स्व-दीर्घो-भयविषये “ इदं
 इत्स्वम् ” “ इदं दीर्घम् ” “ एतत्तु तदुभयम् ” इत्येवभूतो स्व परो मयं बुद्धिर्युग
 पदाभीयते भवता? कथं च तेषां इत्स्व-दीर्घो-भयानां परस्परमसिद्धिरुच्यु-
 प्यते?-पूर्वापरविरुद्धत्वाद् नैतद् भवतुं युज्यत इत्यर्थः। अयमत्र भावार्थः-
 न स्वत्वापेक्षिकमेव वस्तुनां सत्त्वम्, किन्तु स्वविषयज्ञानजननार्थकिया
 कारित्वमपि। ततश्च इत्स्व-दीर्घो-भयान्यात्मविषय चेज्ज्ञानजनयन्ति, तदा
 सन्त्येव तानि, कथं तेषामसिद्धिः?। यदप्युक्तम्-“ मममाश्रुतिमपश्य

प्रदेशिन्यां ह्रस्वत्वमसदेवोच्यते” इत्यादि; तदप्ययुक्तम्, यतो यदि मध्यमा-
मपेक्ष्य प्रदेशिन्यां स्वतः सर्वथाऽसत्यामपि ह्रस्वत्वं भवति, तदा विशेषाभावात्
खरविषाणेऽपि तद् भवेत्, अतिदीर्घेष्विन्द्रियध्यादिष्वपि च तत् स्यात् ।
अथवा, प्रदेशिन्याः स्वापेक्षया स्वात्मन्यपि ह्रस्वत्वं स्यात्, सर्वत्रासत्त्वाविशे-
षात्; न चैवम् । तस्मात् स्वतः सत्यामेव प्रदेशिन्यां वस्तुतोऽनन्तधर्मात्मकत्वात्
तत्तत्सहकारिसंनिधौ तत्तद्रूपाभिव्यक्तेस्तत्तज्ज्ञानमुत्पद्यते, न पुनरसत्यामेव
तस्यामपेक्षामात्रत एव ह्रस्वज्ञानमुपजायते । एवं दीर्घो-भयादिष्वपि वाच्यम् ।

अथ “ इदं ह्रस्वम् ” “ इदं दीर्घम् ” “ एतच्चोभयम् ” इत्यादि स्व-
परो-भयबुद्धिः परमत्या-पराभ्युपगमेनोच्यते, न पुनः स्वतः सिद्धं स्वविषय-
ज्ञानजनकं ह्रस्वादिकं किञ्चिदस्ति, अतो न कश्चित् पूर्वापरविरोध इत्यत्राह-
ननु सर्वशून्यत्वे “ इदं स्वमतम्, ” “ एतच्च परमतम् ” इत्येतदपि स्व-
परभावेन विशेषणं कुतः ?—न कुतश्चिदित्यर्थः, स्व-परभावेऽपि “ समया
विवल्लओ वा ” इत्याद्येवावर्तत भावः । स्व-परभावाद्यभ्युपगमे च शून्य-
त्वाभ्युपगमहानिरिति ॥ १५७-१५८-१५९-१६०-१६१ ॥ (१७०५-
१७०६-१७०७-१७०८-१७०९) ॥

D C—If the idea of all-pervading negation were taken as true, there would not exist any distinction between dream and reality, truth and falsehood, between an imaginary *Gandharvapura* and a real *Pātaliputra*, between a natural four-legged lion and an artificial man-lion *Mānavaka*, between *kānyas* like *ghata*, etc and *kānanas* like lump of earth etc. Again, there would be no distinction between *sādhya* (say, e g *antya*) *sādhana* (say, e g the artificial instrument—by means of which *antya* is brought about) and *kartā* (e g a potter) who is the doer of the *sādhya*. There would be no distinction between a speaker, his speech (composed of three or five parts) and a number of words that are to be uttered, and there would be no distinction between *svapaksa* and *parapaksa* also

Moreover properties such as stability of earth fluidity of water activeness of wind formlessness of sky etc. as well as the rule that *śabda rūpa gandha* etc. are *grāhya* and ears eyes nose etc. are *grāhaka* could not be established in the midst of *sarvasūnyatā*.

Again in the midst of all-pervading negation there being no possibility of distinction between *satya* and *asatya* either (1) there would be uniform apprehension of *svapna* as well as *asvapna* or (2) there would be inverse apprehension of *svapna* as *asvapna* and *asvapna* as *svapna* or (3) there would be absolute non-apprehension of *svapna*, *asvapna* and many other things. Here *O Vyakta* ! It is absolutely incorrect to assert that the apprehension of *svapna*, *asvapna* etc. is due to *bhṛānti* (delusion). For cognizance that apprehends an object is produced only by means of definite ascertainment of time place and properties.

And is that *bhṛānti* which according to you apprehends *svapna asvapna* etc., *vidyamāna* or *a-vidyamāna* ? If it is *vidyamāna* then naturally *sarvasūnyatā* does not exist. If it is *a-vidyamāna* the *jñāna* that apprehends an object being devoid of *bhṛānti*, all objects would automatically be taken as *vidyamāna* and there would be nothing like *sarvasūnyatā* at all.

And how is it *O Vyakta* ! that the apprehension of existent objects as *bhūya* is according to you a right apprehension and that which apprehends them as *vidyamāna* is worthless ? Will you tell me what particular purpose do you hold in believing this *sarvasūnyatā* ?

According to the rule that objects could never be accomplished merely by themselves you apprehend objects that are short, long or either distinctly as short long or either. Thus on one side you are utilizing your power of discrimination in the apprehension of objects while on the other side you are trying to assert the mutual non-accomplishment of those very

objects. This involves self-contradiction in your own argument which, O *Vyakta* ' is not at all worthy of you

The point is that in case of establishing the existence of objects mere *apeksā* would not do. Quality of undertaking an action in an object which produces *jñāna* about its own self is also an active cause. And that is the reason why *hrasva*, *dīrgha*, and *ubhaya*—each one of which would be producing *jñāna* about its own self—should be taken as existing

Again, O *Vyakta* ' you believe that to the *apeksā* of the middle finger, the *pradeśinī* finger is considered as *hrasva* even if it does not exist. But your argument is absolutely unfounded. For, in comparison with the middle finger if *pradeśinī* were taken as *hrasva* even though it is *a-vidyamāna* by its very nature, the horns of an ass that are also *a-vidyamāna* should be taken as *hrasva* and a very long substance like *indrādhvaja* should also be taken as *hrasva* as the quality of *a-vidyamānatā* is common in all the three cases. But that is not so. Really speaking, *pradeśinī* finger being *vidyamāna* by nature and being possessed of a number of properties by virtue of various co-operative causes, manifests manifold variations along with the corresponding types of cognizance also. So it is not correct to assert that the cognizance of *hrasva*, *dīrgha* etc. is produced in the absolutely non-existent *angulī* only by means of *apeksā*. You might argue at this point that in such cases also, *dīrgha*, *hrasva*, *ubhaya* etc. are apprehended and the intellects as regards *sva para* and *ubhaya* are discriminated only in comparison with another's opinion and further that according to you, *hrasva*, *dīrgha* etc. that are *svataḥ siddha* and that produce *jñāna* with regard to their own selves are nothing at all. Even if you believe like that, O *Vyakta* ' how would you distinguish between your opinion and another's opinion in the midst of all-pervading negation? Naturally there would be no distinction between *sva* and *para* at all. On the other hand, if you accept this distinction there would be nothing like *sūnyatā* at all (1705-1709)

Moreover properties such as stability of earth fluidity of water activeness of wind formlessness of sky etc. as well as the rule that *śabda rūpa gandha* etc. are *grāhya* and ears eyes nose etc. are *grāhaka* could not be established in the midst of *sarvasūnyatā*.

Again in the midst of all-pervading negation there being no possibility of distinction between *satya* and *asatya* either (1) there would be uniform apprehension of *svapna* as well as *astvapna* or (2) there would be inverse apprehension of *svapna* as *astvapna* and *astvapna* as *svapna* or (3) there would be absolute non-apprehension of *svapna astvapna* and many other things. Here *O Vyakta!* It is absolutely incorrect to assert that the apprehension of *svapna astvapna* etc. is due to *bhṛānti* (delusion) For cognizance that apprehends an object is produced only by means of definite ascertainment of time place and properties.

And is that *bhṛānti* which according to you apprehends *svapna astvapna*, etc. *vidyamāna* or *a-vidyamāna*? If it is *vidyamāna* then naturally *sarvasūnyatā* does not exist. If it is *a-vidyamāna* the *jñāna* that apprehends an object being devoid of *bhṛānti*, all objects would automatically be taken as *vidyamāna* and there would be nothing like *sarvasūnyatā* at all

And how is it *O Vyakt'a!* that the apprehension of existent objects as *anya* is according to you a right apprehension and that which apprehends them as *vidyamāna* is worthless? Will you tell me what particular purpose do you hold in believing this *sarvasūnyatā*?

According to the rule that objects could never be accomplished merely by themselves you apprehend objects that are short long or either distinctly as short long or either Thus on one side you are utilizing your power of discrimination in the apprehension of objects while on the other side you are trying to assert the mutual non-accomplishment of those very

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The point is that in case of establishing the existence of objects mere *apekṣā* would not do. Quality of undertaking an action in an object which produces *jñāna* about its own self is also an active cause. And that is the reason why *hrasva*, *dīrgha*, and *ubhaya*—each one of which would be producing *jñāna* about its own self—should be taken as existing.

Again, *O Vyakta* ' you believe that to the *apekṣā* of the middle finger, the *pradeśinī* finger is considered as *hrasva* even if it does not exist. But your argument is absolutely unfounded. For, in comparison with the middle finger if *pradeśinī* were taken as *hrasva* even though it is *a-vidyamāna* by its very nature, the horns of an ass that are also *a-vidyamāna* should be taken as *hrasva* and a very long substance like *indrādhvaja* should also be taken as *hrasva* as the quality of *a-vidyamānatā* is common in all the three cases. But that is not so. Really speaking, *pradeśinī* finger being *vidyamāna* by nature and being possessed of a number of properties by virtue of various co-operative causes, manifests manifold variations along with the corresponding types of cognizance also. So it is not correct to assert that the cognizance of *hrasva*, *dīrgha* etc. is produced in the absolutely non-existent *angula* only by means of *apekṣā*. You might argue at this point that in such cases also, *dīrgha*, *hrasva*, *ubhaya* etc. are apprehended and the intellects as regards *sva para* and *ubhaya* are discriminated only in comparison with another's opinion and further that according to you, *hrasva*, *dīrgha* etc. that are *svataḥ siddha* and that produce *jñāna* with regard to their own selves are nothing at all. Even if you believe like that, *O Vyakta* ' how would you distinguish between your opinion and another's opinion in the midst of all-pervading negation? Naturally there would be no distinction between *sva* and *para* at all. On the other hand, if you accept this distinction there would be nothing like *s'ūnyatā* at all (1705-1709)

जुगव क्रमेण वा ते विण्णाण होज्ज दीह—इस्सेसु ।

जइ जुगव कावेक्खा क्रमेण पुव्वम्मि काऽवेक्खा ? ॥१६२॥ (१७१०)

आइमविण्णाण वा ज बालस्सेह तस्स काऽवेक्खा ।

तुल्लेसु व काऽवेक्खा परोप्पर लोयणदुगे व ? ॥ १६३ ॥ (१७११)

Jugavam kamena vā te vimānam hojja diha-hassesu ।

Jai jugavam kāvekkhā kamena puṇvammī kā'vekkhā ? ॥162॥ (1710)

Almavimānam vā jām bālasseha tassa kā'vekkhā ।

Tullesu vā kā'vekkhā paropparam loyanaduge vva ? ॥163॥ (1711)

[युगपत् क्रमेण वा ते विज्ञान भवेद् दीर्घ—इत्ययोः ।

यदि युगपत् काऽपेक्षा क्रमेण पूर्वस्मिन् काऽपेक्षा ? ॥१६२॥ (१७१०)

आदिमविज्ञान वा यद् बालस्वेह तस्य काऽपेक्षा ।

तुल्ययोर्वा काऽपेक्षा परस्परं लोचनद्विक इव ॥ १६३ ॥ (१७११)

Yugapat kramena vā te vijñānam bhaved dīrgha-hrasvayoh ।

Yadi yugapat kā'pekṣā kramena pūrvasmin kā'pekṣā ? ॥162॥ (1710)

Adimavijñānam vā yad bālasyeha tasya kā'pekṣā ।

Tulyayorvā kā'pekṣā parāparam lochanadvika iva ? ॥163॥ (1711)]

Trans — 162-163 Is that *vijñāna* of yours as regards *dīrgha* and *hrasva* (produced) all at once or in regular course ? If (it is produced) all at once, what *apekṣā* (is there) ? (And) if (it is produced) in regular course, to what *apekṣā* is the first produced ? Or to what *apekṣā* has the first and foremost cognizance of a child been produced ? Or what mutual *apekṣā* (could there be) in the case of two similar (objects) like a pair of eyes ? (1710-1711)

टीका—नेनु मर्यामा—प्रदक्षिण्यादिदीर्घ—इत्ययोस्त्वमिप्रायेण स्वा-
कारप्रतिमासि ज्ञानं किं युगपदेव भवेद्, क्रमेण वा ? यदि युगपत् तर्हि
परानपेक्षं द्वयोरपि युगपदेव स्वप्रतिमासिनि ज्ञाने प्रतिमासात् कस्य किल

काऽपेक्षा ? । अथ क्रमेण, तदापि पूर्वमेव स्वप्रतिभासिना ज्ञानेन परानपेक्ष-
मेव ह्रस्वस्य प्रदेशिन्यादेर्गृहीतत्वादुत्तरस्मिन् मध्यमादिके दीर्घे काऽपेक्षा ? ।
तस्माच्चक्षुरादिसामग्रीसद्भावे परानपेक्षमेव स्वकीयविविक्तरूपेण सर्वभावानां
स्वज्ञाने प्रतिभासात् स्वत एव सिद्धिः । अथवा, बालस्य तत्क्षणमेव जातस्य
शिशोर्यदिह नयनोन्मेषानन्तरमेवादौ विज्ञानम्, तत् किमपेक्ष्य प्रादुरस्ति ? ।
यदि वा, ये न ह्रस्वे नापि दीर्घे, किन्तु परस्परं तुल्ये एव वस्तुनी, तयोर्यु-
गपदेव स्वप्रतिभासिना ज्ञानेन गृह्यमाणयोः काऽन्योन्यापेक्षा ?—न काचित्,
यथा तुल्यस्य लोचनयुग्मस्य । तस्मादङ्गुल्यादिपदार्थानां नान्यापेक्षमेव
रूपम्, किन्तु स्वप्रतिभासवता ज्ञानेनान्यनिरपेक्षा एव ते स्वरूपतोऽपि गृह्यन्ते ।
उत्तरकालं तु तत्तद्रूपजिज्ञासायां तत्तत्प्रतिपक्षस्मरणादिसहकारिकारणान्तर-
वशाद् दीर्घ-ह्रस्वादिष्वपदेशाः प्रवर्तन्ते, इति स्वतःसिद्धा एव सन्ति
भावा इति ॥ (१७१०-१७११) ॥

D C—Consider whether *gnāna* in case of objects that are *hrasva* and *dīrgha* is produced at the same time or in regular course. If both the *gnānas* are produced simultaneously, there would be no scope for *apeksā*, both being recognized in their own form at the same time. On the other hand, if *gnānas* of the two were produced one after another the *hrasva* object would be apprehended by virtue of its own *gnāna*, but later on, to whose *apeksā* would the *dīrgha* object be apprehended ? This leads us to conclude that in spite of the existence of mediums like eyes etc., in absence of *apeksā* all objects are apprehended in various forms only by virtue of their individual *gnānas*. This proves that the existence of all objects is very natural.

Again, to whose *apeksā* is the *gnāna* attained by a child immediately after its birth produced ? And, what mutual *apeksa* could there exist in reflecting a similar cognizance in two similar objects which are neither *hrasva* nor *dīrgha* but exactly identical to each other ? This shows that various forms of objects like fingers etc. are not apprehended by

virtue of their *apeksā* to others but by means of their corresponding cognizances which are independent of *apeksā*. Later on in the curiosity of observing the forms in details the objects are recognized as *hrasva dīrgha* etc., on account of certain co-operative causes such as recalling the opposite faction etc. Each and every object would therefore be taken as existent by virtue of no other factor but its own *svabhāva*.

Moreover

किं हस्ताओ दीहे दीहाओ चेव किं न दीहम्मि ।

कीस व न खपुप्फाउ किं न खपुप्फे खपुप्फाओ ? ॥ १६४ ॥

Kim hassāo dīhe dīhāo ceva kim no dīhammi ।

Kīsa va na khapupphāu kim na khapupphe khapupphāo ? ॥ 164 ॥ (1712)

[किं हस्ताद् दीर्घे दीर्घदिष किं न दीर्घे ।

कस्माद् वा न खपुप्पात् किं न खपुप्फे खपुप्पात् ? ॥ १६४ ॥ (१७१२)

Kim hrasvad dīrghhe dīrghādeva kim na dīrghhe ।

Kasmād va na khapuspat kim na khapuppe khapuspat ? ॥ 164 ॥ (1713)]

Trans.—164 Why (is the knowledge) about *dīrgha* (acquired) from *hrasva* and not from *dīrgha* (itself) ? Or why not from *khapussa* ? Or why not (the knowledge) about *khapussa* (acquired) from *khapussa* (itself) ? (1712)

टीका—इत्थ ! यदि सर्वज्ञान्यता, ततः किमिति हस्तादेव प्रदेक्षिनी प्रभृतिद्रव्याद् दीर्घे मध्यमादिद्रव्ये दीर्घज्ञानाभिधानव्यवहारः प्रवर्तते—दीर्घपिष एव दीर्घेन ज्ञानाभिधानेन व्यवहारः किं न प्रवर्तते, असत्त्वाविशेषात् ? इति भावः । एव “ किं दीहाओ हस्ते हस्ताउ चेव किं न हस्सम्मि ” इत्यतदपि द्रष्टव्यम् । तथा, किमिति वा न खपुप्पाद् दीर्घे हस्ते वा तज्ज्ञानाभिधानव्यवहृतिर्विधीयते ? । तथा, असत्त्वाविशेषत एव किमिति खपुप्पात् खपुप्फ एव हस्व-दीर्घज्ञानादिव्यवहारो न प्रवर्तते ? । न चैवम्, तस्मात् सन्त्येव भावाः, न तु शून्यता जगत इति ॥ १६४ (१७१२) ॥

D C—If everything is *s'ūnya* according to the theory of *sarva s'ūnyatā*, how is it that the cognizance of *dīrgha* is acquired only from its *apeksā* to *hrasva* as seen in the case of *prades'inî* and *madhyamā* fingers, and not from its *apeksā* to the *dīrgha* itself? Similarly, why is the practice of apprehending *dīrghatva* from *dīrgha* and *hrasvatva* from *hrasva* not followed? Moreover, the practice of acquiring knowledge of *khapuspa* as well as the knowledge of *hrasvatva* and *dīrghatva* in *khapuspa* from the *khapuspa* itself is not followed even though *s'ūnyatā* is common to all of them. This shows that there is nothing like *sarvas'ūnyatā* in this world.

Moreover,

किं वाऽविक्खाए चिय होज्ज मई व सभाव एवायं ।
सो भावो त्ति सभावो वंझापुत्ते न सो जुत्तो ॥१६५॥ (१७१३)

Kim vā'vikkhāe ciya hojja mai va sabhāva evāyam ।
So bhāvo tti sabhāvo vanjhāputte na so jutto ॥ 165 ॥ (1713)

[किंवापेक्षयैव भवेद् मतिर्वा स्वभाव एवायम् ।

स्वो भाव इति स्वभावो वन्ध्यापुत्रे न स युक्तः ॥ १६५ ॥ (१७१३)

Kimvapeksayaiva bhaved matirvā svabhāva evāyam ।
Svo bhāva iti svabhāvo vandhyāputre na sa yuktah ॥165॥ (1713)]

Trans—165 Or, of what avail is the *apeksā* at all? (The opponent may argue here that) “ Apprehension by means of *apeksā* is natural ” (But) the *bhāva* (existence) of *sva* (one's own self) means *svabhāva*, (and) that does not apply to the son of a barren woman (1713)

टीका—अथवा, सर्वस्याप्येवमत्रे ह्रस्वादेर्दीर्घापेक्षयापि किं कर्तव्यम्, शून्यताप्रतिकूलत्वात् तस्याः, घटाद्यर्थमत्त्ववत् ? । अथ परस्य मतिर्मवेत्-स्वभावादेवापेक्षयैव ह्रस्व-दीर्घादिव्यवहारः प्रवर्तते । न च स्वभावः पर्यन्ययोगमर्हति; तथा चोक्तम्—“ अग्निर्दहति नाकाशं कोऽत्र पयनुर्युज्यताम् ? ”

इति । इन्त । इत्यमपि इतोऽसि, यत् स्वो मावः स्वमावस्ततः स्व-परमावा-
म्युपगमात् शून्यताम्युपगमद्वानि । न च वन्त्यापुत्रकल्पानामर्थानां स्वमाव-
परिकल्पना युक्तेति । भवतु वाऽपेक्षा, तथापि शून्यताऽसिद्धिः ॥ १६५ ॥
(१७१३) ॥

D O—If there is absolute negation in the world, what is the use of *apekṣā* in apprehending *hrasva* etc. to the *apekṣā* of *dirgha* etc. ? For the very conception of *apekṣā* is contrary to the absolute negation

Vyakta—Apprehending *hrasva dirgha* etc by means of *apekṣā* is very natural.

Ācārya—That is not so *O Vyakta* ! *svabhāva* is the root cause in cases like fire burns The sky does not burn etc But that is not applicable to the above-named example of the apprehension of *hrasva dirgha* etc Hence *svabhāva* should not be blamed in such cases. It is absurd to assume *svabhāva* in the apprehension of non-existent objects like *vandhyaputra*

Svabhāva means existence of one's own self The rest can be distinguished as *parabhāva*—the existence of everything else. Apart from your belief in *apekṣā* the principle of *svasvasamyatā* would be violated even from this point of view

How ?

होज्जावेक्खाओ वा विण्णाण वामिहाणमेत्तं वा ।

दीह ति व हस्स ति व न उ सत्ता सेसधम्मा वा ॥१६६॥ (१७१४)

Hojjāvekkhāo vā viññāṇam vābhihāṇamettam vā ।

Dham ti va hassam ti va na u sattā sesadhammā vā ॥166॥ (1714)

[भवेदपेक्षावो वा विज्ञान वामिधानमात्र वा ।

दीर्घमिति वा ह्रस्वमिति वा न तु सत्ता शेषधर्मा वा ॥१६६॥(१७१४)

Bhavedapeksāto vā vijnānam vābhidhānamātram vā ।
 Dīrghamiti vā hrasvamiti vā na tu sattā śesadharmā vā ॥166॥

Trans.—166 By means of *apeksā* either *vijnāna* or mere acknowledgment (of an object) as short or long would be (attained) but not the existence of the rest of the properties (1714)

टीका—अथवा, स्वतः सिद्धे वस्तुन्यपेक्षातो भवेत् । किम् ? इत्याह—
 विज्ञानमभिधानमात्रं वा । केनोल्लेखेन ? इत्याह—“ दीर्घम् ” इति वा
 “ ह्रस्वम् ” इति वेति । किं पुनर्न भवेत् ? इत्याह—न त्वन्यापेक्षया वस्तुनां
 सत्ता भवति, नाप्यापेक्षिकह्रस्व-दीर्घत्वादिधर्मैभ्यः शेषा रूप-रसादयो
 धर्मा अन्यापेक्षया सिद्ध्यन्ति । उत्पद्यन्ते च वस्तुसत्ताग्राहकाणि, रूपादिधर्म-
 ग्राहकाणि च ज्ञानानि । अतोऽन्यापेक्षाभावतः कथं स्वतः सिद्धस्य वस्तु-
 सत्तादेरभावः ? तत्सद्भावे च कथं शून्यता जगतः ? इति ॥१६६(१७१४)॥

D C—By virtue of its *apeksā* to another object, a self-
 accomplished object would gain either *vijnāna* or the acknow-
 ledgment of its own self as *hrasva* or *dīrgha* and nothing more
 Neither existence nor qualities such as *rūpa*, *rasa*, *sparśa* etc.,
 that are distinct from *hrasvatva*, *dīrghatva* etc could be
 established by the help of *apeksā* Now, *jñānas* that enable
 us to apprehend existence along with those qualities are
 produced spontaneously So, how could existence etc of a
 self-accomplished object be refuted by means of *apeksā* ? And
 when the existence etc of an object are not denied, how
 could the principle of all-pervading negation be accepted
 at all ?

इहरा हस्ताभावे सबविणासो हवेज्ज दीहस्स ।

न य सो, तम्हा सत्तादयोऽणविक्खा घडाईणं ॥१६७॥(१७१५)

Iharā hassābhāve savvavināso havejja dihasa ।

Na ya so, tamhā sattādayo'navikkhā ghadāīṇam ॥ 167 ॥ (1715)

[इतरथा इस्वामावे सर्वविनाशो भवेद् दीर्घस्य ।

न च सः, तस्मात् सचादयोऽनपेक्षा घटादीनाम् ॥ १६७ ॥ (१७१५)

Itaratha hrasyabhavo sarvavināśo bhaved dīrghasya :

Na ca saḥ tasmāt sattadayo napekṣa ghaṭādinām ॥167॥ (1715)]

Trans—167 Otherwise, in the absence of *hrasva*, there should have been an absolute negation of *dīrgha* also. But that is not so. Hence the existence etc. of *ghata* etc. are (established as) independant of (their) *apeksā* (to other objects). (1715)

टीका-इतरथा-यदि घटादीनां सचादयोऽप्यन्यापेक्षया भवेयुः, तदा इस्वामावे इस्वस्य सर्वविनाशे दीर्घस्यापि वस्तुनः सर्वविनाशः स्यात्, इस्वसचापेक्षित्वाद् दीर्घसचादीनाम् । न चैवमसौ दीर्घस्य सर्वविनाशो दृश्यते । तस्मात् निश्चीयते-सन्त्यन्यानपेक्षा एव घटादीनां सचा-रूपादयो धर्माः, तत्सर्वे चापास्ता शून्येति ॥ १६७ ॥ (१७१५) ॥

D C—If the qualities like existence etc of the objects such as *ghata* etc. were dependant upon their comparison with other objects destruction of a *hrasva* object would have effected the destruction of a *dīrgha* object also. But really speaking existence etc. of a *dīrgha* object are not denied when a *hrasva* object turns into an absolute negation. This leads us to the conclusion that objects like *ghata* etc. have their properties such as existence *rūpa* etc. totally independant of their *apeksā* to other objects and hence the idea of all-pervading negation is automatically refuted.

जावि अविक्र्वाऽविक्र्णमविक्र्गोऽविक्र्णिज्जमणविक्र् ।

सा न मया सवेसु वि सतेसु न सुन्नया नाम ॥१६८॥ (१७१६)

किंचि सओ तह परओ तदुभयओ किंचि निश्चसिद्ध पि ।

जलओ घटओ पुरिसो तह ववहारओ नेय ॥१६९॥ (१७१७)

निच्छयओ पुण बाहिरनिमित्तमेत्तोवओगओ सबं ।

होइ सओ जमभावो न सिज्झइ निमित्तभावे वि ॥ १७० ॥

Jāvi avikkhā'vikkhanamavikkhago' vikkhanijjamanavikkha ।
Sā na mayā savvesu vi santesu na sunnayā nāma ॥168॥ (1716)

Kim ci sao taha parao tadubhayao kim ci nīccasiddham pi ।
Jalao ghaḍao puriso taham vavahārao neyam ॥ 169 ॥ (1717)

Nīcchayao puna bāhīranimittamettovao-gao savvam ।
Hoi sao jamabhāvo na sījjhai nimittabhāve vi ॥ 170 ॥ (1718)

[याऽप्यपेक्षाऽपेक्षणमपेक्षकोऽपेक्षणीयमनपेक्ष्य ।

सा न मता सर्वेष्वपि सत्सु न शून्यता नाम ॥ १६८ ॥ (१७१६)

किञ्चित् स्वतस्तथा परतस्तदुभयतः किञ्चिद् नित्यसिद्धिमपि ।

जलदो घटकः पुरुषस्तथा व्यवहारतो ज्ञेयम् ॥ १६९ ॥ (१७१७)

निश्चयतः पुनर्बहिर्निमित्तमात्रोपयोगतः सर्वम् ।

भवति स्वतो यदभावो न सिध्यति निमित्तभावेऽपि ॥१७०॥(१७१८)

Yā'pyapeksā'peksanamapeksako'pekṣaṇīyamanapeksya ।
Sā na mata sarvesvapi satsu na śūnyatā nāma ॥ 168 ॥ (1716)

Kimcit svatastathā paratastadubhayatah kimcid nītyasiddhamapi ।
Jalado ghatakah puruṣastathā vyavahārato jñeyam ॥169॥ (1717)

Nīṣcayatah punar-bahīr-nimittamatropayogatah sarvam ।
Bhavati svato yadabhavo na sīdhyati nimittabhāve'pi ॥170॥(1718)]

Trans—168-169-170 Even *apeksā*—being identical to (the nature of) action (*apeksanam*), agent (*apeksakah*), and object (*apeksaṇīyam*)—could not be accepted When all are existing there could not be *śūnyatā* at all Some are spontaneous *e g* a cloud, some (are produced) by means of others as in the case of *ghata*, and Some (are produced) in both the ways *e g* a man, while some are produced even for ever Again, it is certain that each one (of them) becomes existent by its own self only by resorting to the external

[इतरथा इस्वामावे सर्वविनाशो भवेद् दीर्घस्य ।

न च स*, तस्मात् सचादयोऽनपेक्षा घटादीनाम् ॥ १६७ ॥ (१७१५)

Itaratha hrasyabhavo sarvavināśo bhaved dirghasya :

Na ca sah tasmāt sattadayo napekṣa ghatadinām ॥167॥ (1715)]

Trans.—167 Otherwise, in the absence of *hrasva*, there should have been an absolute negation of *dirgha* also. But that is not so Hence the existence etc. of *ghata* etc. are (established as) independant of (their) *apekṣā* (to other objects). (1715)

टीका—इतरथा—यदि घटादीनां सचादयोऽप्यन्यापेक्षया भवेत्, तदा इस्वामावे इस्वस्य सर्वविनाश दीर्घस्यापि वस्तुनः सर्वविनाशः स्यात्, इस्वसचापक्षित्वाद् दीर्घसचादीनाम् । न चैवमसौ दीर्घस्य सर्वविनाशो दृश्यते । तस्मात् निश्चीयत—सन्त्यन्यानपेक्षा एव घटादीनां सचा—रूपादयो धर्माः, तस्मिन्ने चापास्ता शून्यतेति ॥ १६७ ॥ (१७१५) ॥

D C —If the qualities like existence etc of the objects such as *ghata* etc were dependant upon their comparision with other objects destruction of a *hrasva* object would have effected the destruction of a *dirgha* object also. But really speaking existence etc. of a *dirgha* object are not denied when a *hrasva* object turns into an absolute negation. This leads us to the conclusion that objects like *ghata* etc. have their properties such as existence *rūpa* etc totally independant of their *apekṣā* to other objects and hence the idea of all-pervading negation is automatically refuted

जात्रि अविक्त्वाऽविक्त्वणमविक्त्वगोऽविक्त्वणिज्जमणविक्त्व ।

सा न मया सवेसु वि सतेसु न सुन्नया नाम ॥१६८॥ (१७१६)

किंचि सओ तह परओ तदुमयओ किंचि निश्चसिद्ध पि ।

जलओ घटओ पुरिसो तह ववहारओ नेय ॥१६९॥ (१७१७)

about even if the external causes were present because non-existence is innate in them by their very *svabhāva*

In reply to the question whether *astitva* and *ghata* are one or different, the *Ācārya* argues thus —

अस्थित्त-घडेगाणेगया य पज्जायमेत्तचित्तेयं ।

अस्थि घडे पडिवन्ने, इहरा सा किं न खरसिंगे ? ॥१७१॥ (१७१९)

Atthitta-ghaḍegānegayā ya pajjāyamettacinteyam ।

Atthi ghade padivanne, iharā sā kim na kharasīnge ? ॥171॥ (1719)

[अस्तित्व-घटैकानेकता वा पर्यायमात्रचिन्तेयम् ।

अस्ति घटे प्रतिपन्ने, इतरथा सा किं न खरशृङ्गे ॥१७१॥ (१७१९)॥

Astitva-ghataikānekata vā paryāyamātracinteyam ।

Asti ghate pratipanne, itarathā sā kim na kharasṛṅge ॥ 171 ॥]

Trans—171 (The question) whether *ghata* and *astitva* are one or different is (nothing but the question) of synonym when *ghata* is existent (For,) otherwise why should it not arise in case of *kharaśṛṅga* (also) ? (1719)

टीका—इह “ अस्ति घटो न तु नास्ति ” इत्येवं प्रतिपन्ने सति तदनन्तरमेवास्तित्व-घटयोः “ किमेकता, अनेकता वा ? ” इत्यादिना घटास्तित्वयोरकत्वा-ऽनेकत्वलक्षणपर्यायमात्रचिन्तैव भवता कृता भवति, न तु तयोरभावः सिध्यति । अन्यथा ह्यभावरूपाविशेषाद् यथा घटा-ऽस्तित्वयोः, एवं खरविषाण-वन्ध्यापुत्रयोरप्येकत्वा-ऽनेकत्वचिन्ता भवतः किं न प्रवर्तते ? इति ॥ १७१ (१७१९) ॥

D C—After having asserted that “ *ghata* exists ” the question whether *ghata* and *astitva* are identical or not is reduced to the consideration of both as being mere synonyms of each other Moreover, this question should arise only in case of the existent *ghata* For, if it were not so, the question of *ekatā-anekatā* would arise in case of non-existent objects like *kharaśṛṅga* and *vandhyāputra* also

causes. (But) that which is non-existent is not produced even in the presence of external causes (1716-1717-1718)

टीका—याऽपीय इत्थादेर्वीषाद्यपेक्षा साऽप्यपेक्षणे क्रियारूपम्; तथा, अपेक्षक कर्तारम्, अपेक्षणीय च कर्म, अनपेक्ष्य न मत्ता—न विदुषां सम्मता । ततः किम् ? इत्याह—एतेषु चापेक्षणा-अपेक्षका-अपेक्षणीयेषु सर्वेषु वस्तुषु सत्सु न काचित् शून्यता नाम । अतोऽपेक्षकादिसंश्लेषणे विषय एवापेक्षालक्षणस्य हेतोर्ह्युक्तत्वाद् विरुद्धत्वमिति ॥ १६८ ॥ (१७१६) ॥

टीका—इह किञ्चित् स्वत एव सिद्ध्यति, यथा कर्तृनिरपेक्षस्तत्कारण द्रव्यसंघातविशिष्टपरिणामरूपो बलदः । किञ्चित् परतः, यथा कुलालकर्तृको पटः । किञ्चिदुभयतः, यथा माता-पितृभ्यां स्वकृतकर्मतश्च पुरुषः । किञ्चित् निस्वसिद्धमेव, यथाऽऽकाशम् । एतच्च व्यवहारनयापेक्षया द्रष्टव्यम् । निश्चयतस्तु बाह्य निमित्तमात्रमेवाधित्य सर्वं वस्तु स्वत एव सिद्ध्यति, यद् यस्माद् बाह्य निमित्तसद्भावेऽपि स्वरविषाणादिरूपोऽभावाः कदाचिदपि न सिद्ध्यति । उभयनयमतश्च सम्यक्त्वमिति ॥ १६९-१७० (१७१७-१७१८) ॥

D C—Consideration of *dirgha* etc in comparison with *krasta* etc. is itself nothing but *lartā lartma* and *krya*. Now when all objects are accomplished as existent by virtue of their being either *karta karma* or *kryā* where could the *śūnyatā* exist at all ?

The existence of all objects is either *svataḥ parataḥ* or *ubhayataḥ*. There are several objects such as cloud etc. which come into being only by coming into contact with some substance as their *kāraṇa* some like *ghata* are produced by the help of *lartā* some like *puruṣa* are produced by both (as *puruṣa* comes into existence on account of his parents as well as his deeds in the past life) Some objects like *ākāśa* are ever accomplished. Thus it is seen that various objects come into existence in various ways according to their usage. But really speaking all objects are existing by their very *sva/lāṅga* merely by resorting to their external causes. In case of objects that are non-existent existence could not be brought

विण्णाण-वयण-वाईणमेगया तो तदत्थिया सिद्धा ।

अण्णत्ते अण्णाणी निव्वयणो वा कहं वाई ? ॥१७३॥ (१७२१)

Vinnāṇa-vayana-vāīnamegayā to tadatthiyā siddhā ।

Annatte annāṇi nivvayano vā kaham vāi ? ॥ 173 ॥ (1721)

[विज्ञान-वचन-वादिनोरेकता ततस्तदस्तिता सिद्धा ।

अन्यत्वेऽज्ञानी निर्वचनो वा कथं वादी ? ॥ १७३ ॥ (१७२१)

Vijnāna-vacana-vādinorekata tatastadastita siddhā ।

Anyatve'jnāṇi nirvacano vā katham vādi ? ॥ 173 ॥ (1721)]

Trans—173 (If) knowledge and speech are identical, then its existence is proved (But) in case of difference, how could there be a disputant having no knowledge or speech ? (1721)

टीका—“ शून्यं सर्वमेव विश्वत्रयम् ” इत्येवंभूतं यद्विज्ञानं वचनं च, तेन सह शून्यवादिनो भवत एकत्वम्, अनेकत्वं वा ? यद्येकत्वम्, ततस्तदस्तिता वस्त्वस्तिता सिद्धेति कुतः शून्यता, वृक्षत्व-शिंशपात्वयोरिवैकत्वस्य वस्तुत्वात् ? । अन्यत्वे तु विज्ञान-वचनयोर्ज्ञानी निर्वचनश्च वादी कथं शून्यतां साधयेत्, शिलासंघातवत् ? इति ॥ १७३ (१७२१) ॥

D C—When the knowledge as well as the statement that all the three worlds are *śūnya* are identical to each other the existence—and not the *śūnyatā*—of an object is established For, their identity is similar to the identity of *vṛkṣatva* and *śiṃśapātva* But when *vijnāna* and *vacana* are dissimilar the disputant will either become ignorant or speechless like a rock and hence will be totally unfit to expound the theory of *śūnyatā*

घडसत्ता घडधम्मो तत्तोऽणणो पडाइओ भिण्णो ।

अत्थि त्ति तेण भणिए को घड एवेति नियमोऽयं ? ॥१७४॥ (१७२२)

Ghadasattā ghadadhammo tatto'anno padāio bhinno ।

Atthi tti teṇa bhaṇie ko ghada eveti niyamo'yam ? ॥174॥ (1722)

Following the example of *ghaṭa* and *astūva* there would be a probability of *ekata-anekatā* between *ghaṭa* and *śūnyatā* also—

घट-सुन्नयन्नयाए वि सुन्नया का घडाहिया सोम्म ! ।

एगत्ते घटमो खिय न सुण्णया नाम घटधम्मो ! ॥ १७२ ॥ (१७२०)

Ghaṭa-sunnaynnayāe vi sunnayā kā ghaḍāhiyā somma ! ।

Egatte ghaḍao cciya na sunnayā nama ghaḍadhammo ! ॥ 172 ॥ (1720)

[घट-सुन्नयन्नयतायामपि शून्यता का घटाधिका सौम्य ! ।

एकत्वे घटक एव न शून्यता नाम घटधर्मः ! ॥ १७२ ॥ (१७२०) ॥

Ghaṭa-śūnyatānyatāyamapi śūnyatā ka ghaṭādhika saumya ! ।

Ekatre ghaṭaka eva na śūnyatā nama ghaṭādharmah ! ॥ 172 ॥]

Trans—172 Even in case of *ghaṭa* and *śūnyatā* being different (from each other) what *śūnyatā*, exceeding *ghaṭa* could be (found) O *Saumya* ? In case of similarity also, it is the *ghaṭa* itself (which exists) *Śūnyatā* does never become the property of *ghaṭa* (1720)

टीका-ननु घट-शून्यत्वयोरन्यता, अनन्यता वा ? । यद्यन्यता, तर्हि “ सुन्नया का घडाहिया सोम्म ! वि ” सौम्य व्यक्त ! शून्यता का घटाधिका नाम ?—ननु घटमात्रमेव पश्यामः, न पुनः कश्चित् शून्यता घटाधिका समीक्ष्यते । अथानन्यता, तथापि सति घटशून्यत्वयोरैकत्वे घट एवासौ भुज्यते, प्रत्यक्षत एवोपलभ्यमानत्वात्, न तु शून्यत्व नाम कश्चित् सद्धर्मः, सर्वप्रमाणैरनुपलब्धेति ॥ १७१२ (१७२०) ॥

D O—If *ghaṭa* and *anyatā* are bhinnas from each other exceeding *ghaṭa* what more *śūnyatā* ! is required O *saumya* ? In case of both being similar to each other *anyatā* would be nothing but *ghaṭa* on account of its being perceived by *pratyakṣa pramāṇa*. But *anyatā* would never become a property of *ghaṭa* as it could never be accomplished by any possible means whatsoever

Moreover

विण्णाण-वयण-वाईणमेगया तो तदत्थिया सिद्धा ।

अण्णत्ते अण्णाणी निव्वयणो वा कहं वाई ? ॥१७३॥ (१७२१)

Vinnāṇa-vayana-vāinamegayā to tadatthiyā siddhā ।

Annatte annāni nivvayano vā kaham vāi ? ॥ 173 ॥ (1721)

[विज्ञान-वचन-वादिनोरेकता ततस्तदस्तिता सिद्धा ।

अन्यत्वेऽज्ञानी निर्वचनो वा कथं वादी ? ॥ १७३ ॥ (१७२१)

Vijnāna-vacana-vādinorekatā tatastadustitā siddhā ।

Anyatve'jñāni nirvacano vā katham vādī ? ॥ 173 ॥ (1721)]

Trans.—173 (If) knowledge and speech are identical, then its existence is proved (But) in case of difference, how could there be a disputant having no knowledge or speech ? (1721)

टीका—“ शून्यं सर्वमेव विश्वत्रयम् ” इत्येवंभूतं यद्विज्ञानं वचनं च, तेन सह शून्यवादिनो भवत एकत्वम्, अनेकत्वं वा ? यद्येकत्वम्, ततस्तदस्तिता वस्त्वस्तिता सिद्धेति कुतः शून्यता, वृक्षत्व-शिंशपात्वयोरिवैकत्वस्य वस्तुत्वात् ? । अन्यत्वे तु विज्ञान-वचनयोरज्ञानी निर्वचनश्च वादी कथं शून्यतां साधयेत्, शिलासंघातवत् ? इति ॥ १७३ (१७२१) ॥

D C—When the knowledge as well as the statement that all the three worlds are *śūnya* are identical to each other the existence—and not the *śūnyatā*—of an object is established. For, their identity is similar to the identity of *vriksatva* and *śiṃśapātva* But when *vijnāna* and *vacana* are dissimilar the disputant will either become ignorant or speechless like a rock and hence will be totally unfit to expound the theory of *śūnyatā*

घडसत्ता घडधम्मो तत्तोऽण्णो पडाइओ भिण्णो ।

अत्थि त्ति तेण भणिण् को घड एवेति नियमोऽयं ? ॥१७४॥ (१७२२)

Ghadasattā ghadadhammo tatto'nanno padāio bhinno ।

Atthi tti tena bhanie ko ghada eveti niyamo'yam ? ॥174॥ (1722)

[घटसत्ता घटधर्मस्ततोऽनन्यः पटादितो भिन्नः ।

अस्तीति तेन मणिते को घट एवेति नियमोऽयम् ? ॥१७४॥ (१७२२)

Ghaṭasāttā ghaṭadharmastato nanyah patādito bhinnah ।

Astīti tena bhaṇite ko ghaṭa eveti niyamoyam ? ॥174॥ (1722)

Trans—174 Existence of *ghata* is a property of *ghata*. So (it is) non-separable (from *ghata*) (and) distinct from *pata* etc. By saying therefore, that “ It exists ” how could you frame a rule that there exists *ghata* alone ? (1722)

टीका—घटास्तित्वलक्षणा घटसत्ता घटस्य धर्मः, स च ततो घटादनन्योऽभिन्नः, पटादिभ्यस्तु सर्वेभ्योऽपि भिन्नः । तेन ततो “ घटोऽस्ति ” इति मणिते ‘ घट एव ’ इति “ घट एवास्ति ” इति कोऽयं नियमः ?—निबन्धिसत्तायाः पटादिष्वपि भावात् सेऽपि सन्त्येवेति भावः ॥ १७४ ॥ (१७२२) ॥

D C—*Astīva* is the property of *ghata* and hence it is non-separable from *ghata* but distinct from objects like *pata* etc. So when it is said that “ *ghata* exists ” you cannot assert that *ghata* alone exists. For the property of *astīva* is present in objects like *pata* also and hence they too are existing

अ वा जदत्थि त त घटो ति सव्वघटयापसङ्गो को ।

भणिण् घटोत्थि व कह्म सव्वत्थिच्चावरोहो ति ? ॥१७५॥ (१७२३)

Jam vā jadatthi tam tam ghaṭo ti sabbaghaṭayāpasangaḥ ko ।
Bhaṇie ghaṭotthi va kahams avvatthittāvaroho ti ? ॥175॥ (1723)

[यदा यदस्ति तत्तद् घट इति सर्वघटताप्रसङ्गः कः ।

भणिते घटोऽस्ति वा कथं सर्वास्तित्वावरोध इति ? ॥१७५॥ (१७२३)

Yadā yadasti tattad ghaṭa iti sarvaghaṭatāprasangaḥ kaḥ ।
Bhaṇite ghaṭo sti vā katham sarvastīttāvarodha iti ? ॥175॥ (1723)]

Trans—175 Or by saying that whatever exists is *ghata*, how would the occasion of all being *ghata* arise ? Or by

asserting that *ghata* exists, how would the existence of all be obstructed ? (1723)

टीका—“ यद् वा प्रोक्तम्—यद् यदस्ति तत्तत् सर्वं घटः ” इति, तत्र कोऽयं सर्वघटताप्रसङ्गः ? । तथा, “ यो घटः स एवास्ति ” इत्यप्युक्ते कथं सर्वास्तित्वावरोधः—कथं घटस्य सर्वात्मकत्वम् ? इत्यर्थः । यदा हि घटसत्ता घट एवास्ति नान्यत्र, तदा “ यत्र यत्र घटास्तित्वं तत्र तत्र घटः ” इति न कश्चित् सर्वेषां घटताप्रसङ्गः, तथा, “ घटसत्त्वेन घट एवास्ति ” इत्येतस्मिन् अप्युक्ते न किञ्चिद् घटस्य सर्वात्मकत्वं प्रतीयत इति भावः ॥ १७५ ॥ (१७२३) ॥

D C—Since the *astitva* of *ghata* is restricted to *ghata* only and since *ghata* exists only when *ghatāstitva* is present there would be no fear of all objects being considered as *ghata* when we say that “ *yad yad asti, tat-tat sarvam ghataḥ* ” Again, *astitva* of other objects would not be injured by the assertion that *ghata* exists For, the all-pervading nature of *ghatā* is not apprehended when we say “ *ghatasattvena ghata eva asti* ” 175 (1723).

After refuting the opponent's view in this way the *Ācārya* is now asserting his own—

अथि त्ति तेण भणिण् घडोऽघडो वा घडो उ अत्थेव ।
चूओऽचूओ व दुमो चूओ उ जहा दुमो नियमा ॥१७६॥ (१७२४)

Atthi tti tena bhaṇiṇe ghado'ghado vā ghado u attheva ।
Cūo'cūo va dumo cūo u jahā dumo niyamā ॥ 176 ॥ (1724)

[अस्तीति तेन भणिते घटोऽघटो वा घटस्त्वस्त्येव ।

चूतोऽचूतो वा द्रुमश्चूतस्तु यथा द्रुमो नियमात् ॥ १७६ ॥ (१७२४)

Atthi tena bhaṇite ghato'ghato vā ghatastvastyeva ।
Cūto'eūto vā drumaścūtastu yathā drumo niyamāt ॥ 176 ॥ (1724)]

Trans—176 Just as from the assertion of "tree" (we understand) a mango tree or any other tree but from "mango tree" (nothing else but) "tree" is understood, in the same way by saying that "it exists" *ghaṭa* or (objects) other than *ghaṭa* (are apprehended) but from *ghaṭa asti* alone is understood (1724)

टीका—येन कारणेन घटस्य घटत्वमस्ति पट एवास्ति पटादिभ्यस्तु मिश्रा, तेन तस्मात् "अस्ति" इत्युक्ते घटः, अपटो वा—पटादिर्गम्यते, निजनिजसत्त्वस्य सर्वेषु पटादिष्वपि भावात् । "घटो उ अत्येव सि" पट इति तु प्रोक्तेऽस्त्येवेति गम्यते, निजसत्त्वस्य नियमेन पटे सम्भावात् । अत्र यथासंख्यमुदाहरणद्वयम् । यथा "द्रुमः" इत्युक्ते चूतः, अचूतो वा निम्बादिर्गम्यते, द्रुमत्वस्य सर्वत्र भावात् । "चूतः" इति तु निगदिते द्रुम एव गम्यते, अद्रुमस्य चूतत्वायोगादिति ॥ १७६ (१७२४) ॥

D C—As the quality of *tree* is present in all the trees when we say "tree" all the trees—whether a mango tree or any other tree—are understood. But when the word "mango tree" is spoken *tree* alone is understood. For the mango tree cannot exist without being a *tree*. Similarly here also existence of *ghaṭa* being the quality of *ghaṭa* is present in *ghaṭa* only and nowhere else while the common property of *asti* is present in all objects. So when we say *asti* all objects whether *ghaṭa* or *pata*—are recognized as each one of them has its own property of existence. But when we say "*ghaṭa*" *asti* alone is apprehended, because *ghaṭa* has its own *sattā*.

Now the *Acārya* replies to the argument that what has already been produced could not be produced and so on—

किं त जाय ति मई जायाऽजाओ-भय पि जदजाय ।

अह जाय पि न जाय किं न खपुप्फे वियारोऽय ॥१७७॥(१७२५)

Kim tam jāyam ti mai jāyā jāo-bhayam pi jadajāyam ।

Aha jāyam pi na jāyam kim na khapupphic viyāro yam ॥177॥ (1725)

[किं तज्जातमिति मतिर्जाता-ऽजातो-भयमपि यद्यजातम् ।

अथ जातमपि न जातं किं न खपुष्पे विचारोऽयम् ॥१७७॥ (१७२५)

Kim tajjātamiti matir-jāta'jāto-bhayamapi yadyajātam ।

Atha jātamapi na jātam kim na khapuspe vicāro'yam ॥177॥ (1725)]

Trans—177 If it is believed that neither *jāta* nor *a-jāta* nor *jātājāta* could be produced, what could be produced then? Again, if *jāta* is not *jāta* (according to you), why not think the same about *kha-puspa* (also)? (1725)

टीका—प्रष्टव्योऽत्र देवानांप्रियः, कथय—किं तद् वस्तु जातमिति प्रतिपद्यते तव मतिः, यज्जाता-ऽजातो-भयादिप्रकारैरजातं साध्यते—यस्य जाताजातादिप्रकारैर्जन्म त्वया निषिध्यत इत्यर्थः । यदि हि जातं किमपि वस्तु तव सिद्धं, तर्हि तत्सत्त्वेनैव प्रतिहता शून्यता, अतः “ किं तज्जातं जायते ? किं तदजातं जायते किं तज्जाताजातं जायते ? ” इत्यादयः शून्यतासिद्ध्यर्थ-मुपन्यस्यमाना निरर्थका एव विकल्पा इति प्रच्छकाभिप्रायः । अथ तदपि जातं जाताजातादिविकल्पाश्रय भूतं जातत्वेन भवतो न सिद्धम्, किन्त्वजात-मेव तत्, ननु स्ववचनविरुद्धमिदं—जातमप्यजातमिति । किञ्च, जातस्यासत्त्वे निराश्रयत्वाज्जाताजातादिविकल्पा निरर्थका एव । अथैतदाश्रयभूते जाताख्ये वस्तुन्यसिद्धेऽपि “न जातं जायते” इत्यादिविकल्पविचारः प्रवर्तते, तर्हि खपुष्पे-ऽप्यसौ किं न विधीयते, असत्त्वाविशेषेण “ समया विवज्जओ वा ” इत्यादि-व्यक्तदोष प्रसङ्गात् । न च वक्तव्यं—परेषां सिद्ध जातमुररीकृत्य विकल्पा विधीयन्ते, स्व-परभावाभ्युपगमे शून्यताहानिप्राप्तेरिति ॥१७७॥ (१७२५) ॥

D C—Tell me O *Vyakta* ' what object, according to you, could be proved as *jāta* when it has already been denied production as *jāta*, *a-jāta* or both? If anything that has been produced, is accepted by you *s'ūnyatā* would be denied on account of its very existence and hence alternative questions whether *jāta* *a-jāta* or *jātājāta* could be produced or not, would become useless

Again, if a *jāta* object which gives rise to a number of alternatives like *jāta*, *a-jāta* etc. is not, admissible to you as

jāta and if you take it as *a-jāta* there would be self-contradiction in your argument. Moreover when existence of a *jāta* object is denied alternatives like *jāta a-jāta* etc. would become useless in absence of their *āśrayas*

Now, If you admit the above-mentioned alternatives in case of non-existent objects also you shall have to apply those alternatives to the *kā-puṣpa* which is also non-existent. Here it could not be said that all those alternatives were applied by accepting things which were believed as *jāta* by others. Because it would bring in distinction between *eva* and *para* which violates the principle of *s'manyatā*

Moreover

जइ सव्वहा न जाय किं जम्माणतर तदुवलम्भो ।

पुव्व वाऽणुवलम्भो पुणो वि कालतरहयस्स ? ॥१७८॥ (१७२६)

Jai savvaha na jāyam kin jammānantaram taduvālabhho ।
Puvvam vāṇuvalambho puṇo vi kālantarahayassa ? ॥178a (1726)

[यदि सर्वथा न जाय किं जन्मानन्तरं तदुपलम्भः ।

पूर्वं वाऽनुपलम्भः पुनरपि कालान्तरइतस्य ? ॥ १७८ ॥ (१७२६)

Yadi sarvatha na jātam kin jannīnantaram tadupalambhaḥ ।
Pūrvam vā nupalambhaḥ punarapi kālantarahatasya ? ॥178a (1726)]

Trans.—178 If (according to you) it is not produced in all respects why its apprehension after production ? And why not before, or after one has been destroyed in future ? (1726).

टीका—यदि सर्वेरपि प्रकारैर्षटादिकार्यं न जायमिति शून्यवादिना प्रतिपाद्यते, तर्हि मृत्पिण्डाद्यवस्थायामनुपलम्भं झलालादिसामग्रीनिर्बन्धित जन्मानन्तरं किमिति तस्माद् तदुपलम्भ्यते ? । पूर्वं वा जन्मतः किमिति तस्यानुपलम्भः ? । पुनरपि च कालान्तरे लघुदादिना इतस्य किमिति तस्यानुपलम्भः ? । अत्रातस्य गगननलिनस्येव सर्वदेव घटादेरनुपलम्भ एव

स्यात्, यस्तु कदाचिदुपलम्भः, कदाचित्तु नोपलम्भः, असौ जातस्यैवोपपद्यत इति भावः ॥ १७८ ॥ (१७२६) ॥

D. C—If according to your *s'ūnyatā-vāda*, objects like *ghata* are not altogether produced, how is it that *ghata* which is not apprehended in the state of a lump of earth, is apprehended when produced by *namuttas* like potter etc ? And why is the *ghata* not apprehended before its production or after its being broken by the hit of a stick etc ? If objects like *ghata* were altogether *a-jāta*, like *khapusa* they would never be apprehended at all And, the quality of being apprehensible at one time and non-apprehensible at the other, is possible only in case of a *jāta* object. 178 (1726)

Besides,

जह सव्वाहा न जायं जायं सुण्णवयणं तहा भावा ।

अह जायं पि न जायं पयासिया सुण्णया केण ? ॥१७९॥ (१७२७)

Jaha savvahā na jāyam jāyam sunnavayanam tahā bhāvā ।

Aha jayam pi na jāyam payāsiyā sunnayā kena ? ॥179॥ (1727)

[यथा सर्वथा न जातं जातं शून्यवचनं तथा भावाः ।

अथ जातमपि न जातं प्रकाशिता शून्यता केन ? ॥ १७९ ॥ (१७२७)

Yathā sarvathā na jātam jātam śūnyavacanam tathā bhāvāh ।

Athā jātamapi na jātam prakāśitā śūnyatā kena ? ॥ 179 ॥ (1727)]

Trans—179 Just as the assertion about *śūnyatā* is *jāta*, even though not produced altogether, so also, other objects (should be taken as *jāta*) Again, if *jāta* were denied to have been produced, by what means would the *śūnyatā* be manifested ? (1727)

टीका—“ शून्यं सर्वं जगत् ” इत्येवंभूतं यच्छून्यताविषयं विज्ञानं वचनं च तद् यथा जाता-ज्जातादिप्रकारैः सर्वथा जातमप्यजातमपि सत् केनापि प्रकारेण तावज्जातम्, तथा भावा अपि घट-पटादयो जाता एष्टव्या

इत्यतो न शून्य भवत् । अयं शून्यताविज्ञान-वचनद्वयं जातमप्यजातमिष्यते,
तर्हि तद्विज्ञान-वचनाभ्यां विना केनासौ शून्यता प्रकाशिता ?—न केनचि
दिति शून्यतानुपपत्तिरिति ॥ १७९ ॥ (१७२७) ॥

D C—Just as the statement as well as knowledge that everything is *śūnya* are accepted as having been produced in any way whatsoever in the same way other objects such as *ghata pata* etc. should also be taken as *jāta*. And if you accept *vijnāna* and *vacana* about *śūnyatā* to be *a-jāta*, how would you be able to express *śūnyatā* without the help of *vijnāna* or *vacana* about it ? Hence *śūnyatā* is not acceptable in any way 179 (1727).

Also

जायङ् जायमजाय आयाजायमह जायमाण च ।
कज्जमिह विवक्खाए न जायए सब्बहा किञ्चि ॥ १८० ॥ (१७२८)
रूवि ति जाह जाओ कुभो संठाणओ पुणरजाओ ।
जायाजाओ दोहि वि तस्समय जायमाणो ति ॥ १८१ ॥ (१७२९)
पुव्वकओ उ घटतया परपज्जाएहि तवुभएहि च ।
जायतो य पटतया न जायए सब्बहा कुभो ॥ १८२ ॥ (१७३०)
योमाह निच्चजाय न आयए तेण सब्बहा सोम्म । ।
इय दटतया सब्ब भयणिज्ज पज्जवर्गए ॥ १८३ ॥ (१७३१)

*Jāyaṃ jāyamajāyam jāyā jāyamaha jāyamānam ca ।
Kajjamīha vivakkhāe na jāyae sabbhā kīnci ॥ 180 ॥ (1728)
Rūvi tti jāḥ jāo kumbho saṃṭhāṇao punarajāo ।
Jāyājāo dohi vi tassamayam jāvamāno tti ॥ 181 (1729)
Puvvakao u ghaṭatayā para pajjāhehi tadubhaehim ca ।
Jāyanto ya paṭatayā na jāyae sabbhā kumbho ॥ 182 ॥ (1730)*

Vomāi niccajāyam na jāyae tena savvahā somma ' |
Iya davvatayā savvam bhayanijjam pajjavagaie || 183 || (1731)

[जायते जातमजातं जाताजातमथ जायमानं च ।

कार्यमिह विवक्षया न जायते सर्वथा किञ्चित् || १८० || (१७२८)

रूपीति जायते जातःकुम्भः संस्थानतः पुनरजातः ।

जाताजातो द्वाभ्यामपि तत्समयं जायमान इति || १८१ || (१७२९)

पूर्वकृतस्तु घटतया परपर्यायेस्तदुभयैश्च ।

जायमानश्च पटतया न जायते सर्वथा कुम्भः || १८२ || (१७३०)

व्योमादि नित्यजातं न जायते तेन सर्वथा सौम्य ! ।

इति द्रव्यतया सर्वं भजनीयं पर्यवगत्या || १८३ || (१७३१)

Jāyate jātamajātam jātajātamatha jāyamānam ca ।

Kāryamha vivaksayā na jāyate sarvathā kimeit || 180 || (1728)]

Rūpiti jāyate jātaḥ kumbhaḥ samsthānataḥ punarajātaḥ ।

Jātajāto dvābhyāmapī tatsamayam jāyamāna itī || 181 || (1729)]

Pūrvakṛitastu ghatatayā paraparyayaistadubhayaśca ।

Jāyamānaśca patatayā na jāyate sarvathā kumbhaḥ ||182|| (1730)]

Vyomādi nityajātam na jāyate tena sarvathā saumya ' ।

Itī dravyatayā sarvam bhajānīyam paryavagatyā || 183 || (1731)]

Trans—180-183 *Jāta*, *a-jāta*, *jātājāta*, as well as the *jāyamāna* objects are produced in this world on account of various causes, (but) nothing is produced in perfection The *jāta* (*kumbha*) is produced, since it has form, the *a-jāta kumbha* is produced because of shape, the *jātājāta* (is produced) even by both, and the *jāyamāna* (is also produced) because the process of production takes place in the present tense But a *kumbha* which has been produced before, could never be produced on account of *ghatātā* or (by means of) the characteristics of other (objects) or by means of both, and the *jāyamāna kumbha* could also never be produced on account

इत्यसौ न शून्य वगत् । अथ शून्यतानिश्चान-वचनद्वयं ज्ञातमप्यज्ञातमिष्यते,
तर्हि तद्विज्ञान-वचनाभ्यां विना केनासौ शून्यता प्रकाशिता ?—न केनचि
दिति शून्यतानुपपत्तिरिति ॥ १७९ ॥ (१७२७) ॥

D C.—Just as the statement as well as knowledge that everything is *sūnya* are accepted as having been produced in any way whatsoever in the same way other objects such as *ghata pata* etc. should also be taken as *jāta*. And, if you accept *vyñāna* and *vacana* about *sūnyatā* to be *a-jāta*, how would you be able to express *sūnyatā* without the help of *vyñāna* or *vacana* about it ? Hence *sūnyatā* is not acceptable in any way 179 (1727).

Also

जायङ् जायमजाय जायाजायमह जायमाण च ।
कज्जमिह विवक्खाए न जायए सब्बहा किंचि ॥१८०॥ (१७२८)
रूवि ति जाङ् जाओ कुमो संठाणओ पुणरजाओ ।
जायाजाओ दोहि वि तस्समय जायमाणो ति ॥१८१॥ (१७२९)
पुव्वकओ उ घटतया परपज्जाएहिं तदुभएहिं च ।
जायतो य पटतया न जायए सब्बहा कुमो ॥ १८२ ॥ (१७३०)
धोमाङ् निच्चजाय न जायए तेण सब्बहा सोम्म ! ।
इय दटतया सब्ब भयणिज्ज पज्जवर्गए ॥ १८३ ॥ (१७३१)

Jāyā jāyamajāyam jāyājāyamaha jāyamānam ca ।
Kajjamīha vivakkhāe na jāyae sabbahā kimci u 180 u (1728)
Rūvi tti jāo kumbho samthānao punarjāo ।
Jāyājāo dohi vi tassamayam jāyamāno tti u 181 (1729)
Puvvakao u ghaḍatayā para pajjāehim tadubhaehim ca ।
Jāyanto ya paḍatayā na jāyae sabbahā kumbho u 182 u (1730)

इतीहापि संबध्यते, तद्रूपतया सदावस्थितत्वादिति भावः । पर्यायगत्या पर्यायचिन्तया पुनः सर्वं भेजनीयं विकल्पनीयम्—पूर्वजातं घटादिकं रूपादिभिः स्वपर्यायैरपि न जायते, पूर्वजातत्वादेव, अजातं तु तत् स्वपर्यायैर्जायते, परपर्यायैस्तु किञ्चिदपि न जायते, इत्येवं पर्यायचिन्तायां भजना । एतच्च प्रायो दर्शितमेवेति ॥ १८०-१८१-१८२-१८३ ॥ (१७२८-१७२९-१७३०-१७३१) ॥

D C—Several objects like *ghata* which have once been *jāta* in this world, could be produced by reason of their *rūpatva*. Before the *rūpa* of *ghata* is produced, the *rūpa* of earth is already there and hence the *ghata* which is *jāta* to the *apekṣā* of *rūpitva* is produced in this way. Thereafter, *ghata* is *a-jāta* as far as shape is considered. When it takes the shape in course of production, the *a-jāta ghata* comes into existence. The *jātājāta ghata* is produced in both the ways—*rūpitva* as well as the *ākāra*. Moreover, *ghata* which is *jāyamāna* is produced only during the present tense. The past having already vanished and future having not yet come, the process of being produced takes place only during the present tense.

There are several objects of peculiar types which do not go under any of the above-mentioned categories *e g.* A *ghata* which has already been produced in the past, could never be produced as a *ghata* again in any of the above-stated ways. Secondly, *ghata* could not be produced on account of the characteristics of other objects like *pata* etc. As *ghata* has its own process of production and characteristics, it could not be produced like an existent *pata* or a non-existent *kharas'ṅga*. Thirdly, *ghata* which is being produced during the present time, could never be produced as *pata* etc. For, *kārya* which is being produced as *ghata* etc. could never be produced as an absolutely different object like *pata*. So, all objects *e g.*, *ghata*, *pata*, *ākāśa* etc., could not be produced in the form of substance as they are primarily made in that state. But, as far as *paryāya* is concerned, all are said to have been produced

of *paṭatā*. Again sky etc. could also never be produced as they are *utyajāta*. Hence *O Saumya* ! nothing could be produced as a substance (but) everything should be taken according to the surrounding characteristics. (1728-1731)

टीका—इह कार्यं घटादिकं विषयया किमपि जात जायते, किञ्चिद् जातम्, किञ्चिज्जाताजातम्, किञ्चिज्जायमानम्, किञ्चित्तु सर्वथा न जायत इति । अथ यथाक्रममुदाहरणानि—“रूचीत्यादि” रूपितया घटो जातो जायते, मृदूप्रतायाः प्रागपि भावात्, तद्रूपतया जात एव घटो जायते इत्यर्थः । संस्थानतयाऽऽकारविशेषेण पुनः स एवाजातो जायते, मृत्पिण्डाद्यवस्थायामाकारस्यासंभवात् । मृदूप्रतया, आकारविशेषेण चेति द्वाभ्यामपि प्रकाराभ्यां जाताजातो जायते, तदनर्थान्तरभूतत्वाद् घटस्य । तथा, अती वा ज्नागतकालयोर्विनिष्टानुत्पन्नत्वाद् क्रियानुपपत्तवर्तमानसमय एव क्रिया सञ्जातात् तत्समयं वर्तमानसमयं जायमानो जायते । किञ्चित्तु सर्वथा जाताऽजातादिप्रकारैर्न जायते । किं पुनस्तत् ? इत्याह—“पुष्कलो उ इत्यादि” पूर्वकृतस्तु पूर्वनिष्पन्नो घटो घटतया जाताऽजातादिविकल्पानां मत्स्यादेके नापि प्रकारेण न जायते, पूर्वमेव जातत्वात् । किं घटतयैव न जायते ? । न, इत्याह—“परपञ्चादिति” तथा, पटादिगतै परपर्यायैश्च घटो न जायते, स्वपर्यायाणां पूर्वमेव जातत्वात्, परपर्यायैश्च कदाचित् कस्याप्यमभनात् । स्व-परपर्यायैः पूर्वकृतघटो न जायते, जाताऽजातपट-स्वरविषाणवदिति भावः ।

तथा, जायमानोऽपि वर्तमानक्रियाक्षणसमये पटतया घटो न जायत, पररूपतया कस्याप्यमभनात् । किं पूर्वकृतो घट एवेत्यं न जायते, आहोस्विदन्त्यदपि किञ्चित्तु न जायते ? इत्याह—“घोमाईत्यादि” न केवलं पूर्वकृतो घटो घटतया न जायते, तथा ष्योमादि च तेन कारणेन सौम्य ! सर्वथा जातादिभिः सर्वैरपि प्रकारैर्न जायते, यन किम् ? इत्याह—येन नित्यजातं सर्वदाऽवस्थितम्, हेतुद्वारेण विघ्नपणमिदम्, नित्यजातत्वाद् न जायत इत्यर्थः । उक्तस्यैवार्थस्योपसंहारव्याजेन तात्पर्यमुपदर्शयन्नाह—‘इयेत्यादि’ इत्युक्त प्रकारेण सर्वमपि पट-पट-ष्योमादिकं वस्तु द्रव्यरूपेण “न जायते”

इतीहापि संबध्यते, तद्वपतया सदावस्थितत्वादिति भावः । पर्यायगत्या पर्यायचिन्तया पुनः सर्वं भजनीयं विकल्पनीयम्—पूर्वजातं घटादिकं रूपादिभिः स्वपर्यायैरपि न जायते, पूर्वजातत्वादेव, अजातं तु तत् स्वपर्यायैर्जायते, परपर्यायैस्तु किञ्चिदपि न जायते, इत्येवं पर्यायचिन्तायां भजना । एतच्च प्रायो दर्शितमेवेति ॥ १८०-१८१-१८२-१८३॥ (१७२८-१७२९-१७३०-१७३१)॥

D C—Several objects like *ghata* which have once been *jāta* in this world, could be produced by reason of their *rūpatva*. Before the *rūpa* of *ghata* is produced, the *rūpa* of earth is already there and hence the *ghata* which is *jāta* to the *apekṣā* of *rūpitva* is produced in this way. Thereafter, *ghata* is *a-jāta* as far as shape is considered. When it takes the shape in course of production, the *a-jāta ghata* comes into existence. The *jātājāta ghata* is produced in both the ways—*rūpitva* as well as the *ākāra*. Moreover, *ghata* which is *jāyamāna* is produced only during the present tense. The past having already vanished and future having not yet come, the process of being produced takes place only during the present tense.

There are several objects of peculiar types which do not go under any of the above-mentioned categories *e g.* A *ghata* which has already been produced in the past, could never be produced as a *ghata* again in any of the above-stated ways. Secondly, *ghata* could not be produced on account of the characteristics of other objects like *pata* etc. As *ghata* has its own process of production and characteristics, it could not be produced like an existent *pata* or a non-existent *kharas'ringa*. Thirdly, *ghata* which is being produced during the present time, could never be produced as *pata* etc. For, *kānya* which is being produced as *ghata* etc. could never be produced as an absolutely different object like *pata*. So, all objects *e g.*, *ghata*, *pata*, *ākāśa* etc., could not be produced in the form of substance as they are primarily made in that state. But, as far as *pariyāya* is concerned, all are said to have been produced

In reply to the question viz. "Since everything is made up of some sort of materials how could those materials exist in the midst of all-pervading negation ? the *Ācārya* states—

दीप्तइ सामगिमय मवमिह त्थि न य सा, नणु विरुद्ध ।

धेप्पइ व न पच्चक्ख किं कच्छपरोमसामग्गी ? ॥१८४॥ (१७३२)

Disal sāmaggimayam savvamīha tthi na ya sā nanu viruddham
Gheppal va na paccakkham kim kaccaparoma sāmaggī ? ॥ 184 ॥ (1732)

[दृश्यते सामग्रीमय सर्वमिहास्ति न च सा, ननु विरुद्धम् ।

शृण्वते वा न प्रत्यक्ष किं कच्छपरोमसामग्री ? ॥ १८४ ॥ (१७३२)

Drīyate samaggrimayam sarvamihasti na ca sa, nanu viruddham
Grihyate vā na pratyakṣam kim kaccaparomassamagrī ? ॥ 184 ॥

Trans—184 All (objects) in this world appear as consisting of (some sort of) materials , but in fact reverse is the case (as) those materials do not exist Or, if it is accepted why is the ingredient of the hair of a tortoise not perceptible to the senses ? (1732)

टीका—इह यदुक्तम्—“सर्वमपि कार्यं सामग्र्यात्मकं दृश्यते, सर्वाभावे च नास्ति सामग्री ” इति । तदेतद् विरुद्धमेव, प्रस्तुतार्थप्रतिपादकत्वात्, वधोबनकफण्टौ पु-तात्वादिसामग्र्याः प्रत्यक्षत एवोपलभ्येः ॥ अथ ग्रन्थे-अविधोपप्लवादविद्यमानमपि दृश्यते, यत उक्तम्

काम स्वप्न मयो-न्मादैरविधोपप्लवात् तथा ।

पश्यन्त्यसन्तमप्यथ अनः कलेन्दुकादिवेत् ॥ १ ॥ इति ।

यद्येवम्, तर्ह्यमर्थे सामान्यऽपि कच्छपरोमजनकसामग्री किमिति प्रत्यक्षत एव नोपलभ्यत ? , समता विपर्ययो वा कथं न स्यादिति वाच्यम् ? इति ॥ १८४ ॥ (१७३२) ॥

D) C.—Vyakta —All objects are composed of some sort of *sāmagrī* in this world. But in the midst of *sarcasmya*

sāmāgrī ī, too, does not exist, because everything becomes *s'ūnya* at the end

Bhagavān —This belief of yours O *Vyakta* ' is totally wrong. For, constituents like *kantha*, *ostha*, *tālu* etc, which form *sāmāgrī* as well as *vacana* are directly perceptible. Hence, how could the existence of *sāmāgrī* be denied ?

Vyakta —One could perceive even an *a-vidyamāna* object on account of *kāma*, *svapna*, *bhaya*, *unmāda*, or *a-vidyā*, but in fact that does not exist

Bhagavān —If it is so, O *Vyakta* ' why is the *sāmāgrī* that produces the hair of a tortoise not produced ? *A-vidyamānatā* is common in both the cases. So, either this *sāmāgrī* should be apprehended like the *sāmāgrī* that produces *vacana* or both should not be apprehended Or, why should not the fault of *viparyāya* (contrariety) take place when the *sāmāgrī* that produces the hair of a tortoise is apprehended and the one that produces *vacana* is not ?

But,

सामग्निसमो वक्ता वयणं चत्थि जइ तो कओ सुणणं ।

अह नत्थि केण भणितं वयणाभावे सुयं केण ? ॥१८५॥ (१७३३)

Sāmaggimao vattā vayanam catthi jai to kao sunnam ।

Aha natthi kena bhanitam vayanābhāve suyam kena ? ॥185॥(1733)

[सामग्रीमयो वक्ता वचनं चास्ति यदि ततः कुतः शून्यम् ।

अथ नास्ति केन भणितं वचनाभावे श्रुतं केन ? ॥ १८५ ॥ (१७३३)

Sāmāgrīmayo vaktā vacanam caṣṭi yadi tataḥ kutah śūnyam ।

Atha nāsti kena bhanitam vacanābhāve śrutam kena ? ॥185॥(1733)]

Trans—185 And, if the speaker—accompanied by a group of constituent parts—as well as the speech exist, whence is the *śūnyatā* (produced) ? On the other hand, if they do not exist, in absence of (speaker as well as) words, by whom is the *śūnyatā* pronounced (and) by whom is (it) heard ? (1733)

टीका-सामग्री-उर-शिरः-कण्ठौ-घृ-तालु-बिह्वादिसमुदायात्मिका
तन्मय सामग्यात्मको वक्ता, तद्वचन चास्ति न वा ? । यद्यस्ति, तर्हि कुतो
अगच्छन्त्यत्वम्, तद्वक्तृ-वचनसम्बन्धेनैव व्यभिचारात् ? । अथ तद्वक्तृवचने
न स्तः, तर्हि वक्तृ-वचनाभावे केन मणितं शून्यं जगत् ?—न केनचित् ।
मर्षशून्यत्वे च प्रतिपाद्यस्याप्यभावात् केन तच्छून्यवचं श्रुतम् ? इति ॥१८५॥
(१७३३) ॥

D C—Are the speaker—possessed of a group of constituents like heart head throat, lips, palate tongue etc. and the speech, existing or not ? If they are *śūnyatā* will no more be existing on account of the very fact that they exist. If they are not in absence of the speaker and speech there will be none to announce that the world is *śūnya*. Moreover in the midst of all being non-existent neither the object to be proved will exist nor will there be anyone to hear that *śūnya vacana*.

Also

जेण चेव न वत्ता वयणं वा तो न सन्ति वयणिज्जा ।
भावा तो सुण्णमिदं वयणमिदं सच्चमलियं वा ? ॥ १८६ ॥
अहं सच्चं नाभावो अहालियं न प्पमाणमेयं ति ।
अब्भुवगयं ति व मईं नाभावे जुत्तमेयं ति ॥१८७॥ (१७३५)

*Jenam ceva na vattā vayanam vā to na santi vayanijja ।
Bhāvā to suṇṇamidam vayanamidam saccamaliyam vā ? ॥ 186 ॥ (1734)*

*Jai saccam nābhāvo ahāliyam na ppaṃānameyam ti ।
Abbhuvagayam ti va mai nābhāve juttameyam ti ॥ 187 ॥ (1735)*

[येनैव न वक्ता वचनं वा ततो न सन्ति वचनीयाः ।
भावास्ततः शून्यमिदं वचनमिदं सत्यमलीकं वा ? ॥ १८६ ॥ (१७३४)
यदि सत्यं नाभावोऽधालीकं न प्रमाणमेतदिति ।
अभ्युपगतमिति वा मतिर्नाभावे युक्तमेतदिति ॥ १८७ ॥ (१७३५)

Yenaiva na vaktā vacanam vā tato na santi vacanīyāḥ ।
 Bhāvastataḥ śūnyamidaṁ vacanamidaṁ satyamalīkam vā ॥186॥]
 Yadi satyam nābhāvo'thālīkam na pramāṇametaditi ।
 Abhyupagatamiti vā matī r-nābhāve yuktametaditi ॥187॥ (1735)]

Trans—186-187 (An opponenent may argue that)
 “ Just as a speaker or speech does not exist, the objects
 (that are) to be expressed will be non-existent (and hence)
 this (world) is also non-existent ” Is this statement true or
 false ? If it is true, there will be no negation and if it is false,
 that will no longer be a ground of assurance

Or, if you believed that *śūnyatā* is anyhow arrived at, it
 is not proper (to do so) in (the midst of all-pervading)
 negation (1734-1735)

टीका—येनैव न वक्ता, नापि च वचनम्, ततस्तेनैव न सन्ति
 वचनीया भावा इति, अतः शून्यमिदं जगदिति । अत्रोच्यते—यदेतद् वक्तृ-
 वचन-वचनीयानां भावानामभावप्रतिप्रादकं वचनं तत् सत्यमलीकं वा ? ।
 यदि सत्यम्, तर्ह्यस्यैव सत्यवचनस्य सद्भावाद् नाभावः सर्वभावानाम् ।
 अथालीकमिदं वचनम्, तर्ह्यप्रमाणमेतत्, अतो नातःशून्यतासिद्धिः । अथ
 यथा तथा वाभ्युपगतमस्माभिः शून्यताप्रतिपादकं वचनम्, अतोऽस्मद्वचन-
 प्रामाण्यात् शून्यतासिद्धिरिति तव मतिः । नैवम्, यतः “ सत्यम्, अलीक
 वा त्वयेदमभ्युपगतम् ? ” इत्यादि पुनस्तदेवावर्तते । किञ्च, अभ्युपगन्ता,
 अभ्युपगमः, अभ्युपगमनीयं चेत्येतत्रयस्य सद्भावेऽभ्युपगमोऽप्येष भवतो
 युज्यते, न च सर्वभावानामभावे एतत्रयं युक्तमिति ॥१८६-१८७॥ (१७३४-
 १७३५) ॥

D C — Vyakta—Now that *vaktā* and *vacana* have been
 established as *śūnya*, the *vacanīya bhāvas* will also be *śūnya*
 on account of the same reason So, ultimately, the whole
 world is non-existent in all respects

Bhagavān —If it is so, *O Vyakta* ! I ask you a question
 Is that statement which proves the non-existence of *vaktā*,

टीका-सामग्री-उर-शिरः-कण्ठौ-घृ-वाह-जिह्वादिसमुदायात्मिका
तन्मय सामग्र्यात्मको वक्ता, तद्वचनं चास्ति न वा ? । यद्यस्ति, तर्हि कुतो
जगच्छून्यत्वम्, तद्वक्तृ-वचनसत्त्वेनैव व्यभिचारात् ? । अथ तद्वक्तृवचने
न स्तः, तर्हि वक्तृ-वचनाभावे केन भणितं शून्यं जगत् ?—न केनचित् ।
सर्वशून्यत्वे च प्रतिपाद्यस्याप्यभावात् केन तच्छून्यवचं भुतम् ? इति ॥१८५॥
(१७३३) ॥

D C—Are the speaker—possessed of a group of constituents like heart head throat, lips, palate tongue etc. and the speech existing or not ? If they are *śūnya* will no more be existing on account of the very fact that they exist. If they are not in absence of the speaker and speech there will be none to announce that the world is *śūnya*. Moreover in the midst of all being non-existent neither the object to be proved will exist nor will there be anyone to hear that *śūnya vacana*.

Also

जेण खेव न वत्ता वयणं वा तो न सति वयणिज्जा ।
भावा तो सुण्णमिदं वयणमिदं सच्चमलियं वा ? ॥ १८६ ॥
अइ सच्च नामावो अहालियं न प्पमाणमेयं ति ।
अब्भुवगयं ति व मई नामावे जुत्तमेयं ति ॥१८७॥ (१७३५)

*Jenam ceva na vattā vayanam vā to na santi vayanijja ।
Bhāvā to suṇṇamidaṃ vayanamidaṃ saccamaliyaṃ vā ? ॥ 186 ॥ (1734)*

*Jai saccam nābhāvo ahāliyaṃ na ppaṃānameyaṃ ti ।
Abbhuvagayaṃ ti va mai nābhāve juttameyaṃ ti ॥ 187 ॥ (1735)*

[येनैव न वक्ता वचनं वा ततो न सन्ति वचनीयाः ।
भावास्ततः शून्यमिदं वचनमिदं सत्यमस्तीकं वा ? ॥ १८६ ॥ (१७३४)
यदि सत्यं नामावोऽप्यास्तीकं न प्रमाणमेतदिति ।
अभ्युपगतमिति वा मतिर्नाभावे युक्तमेतदिति ॥ १८७ ॥ (१७३५)]

टीका—सर्वभावानामसत्त्वे सर्वोऽपि प्रतिनियतो लोकव्यवहारः समु-
च्छिद्यते, तथाहि—भावाभावस्य सर्वत्राविशिष्टत्वात् किमि तिसिकताकणसामग्री-
तस्तैलं न भवति, तिलादिसामग्र्यां वा तत् किमस्ति ?। किं वा खपुष्पसामग्रीतः
सर्वमपि कार्यजातं न सिध्यति ?। न चैवम्, तस्मात् प्रतिनियतकार्यकारण-
भावदर्शनाद् नाभावसामग्रीतः किमप्युत्पद्यते, किन्तु यथा स्वभावसामग्रीतः,
तथा च सति न शून्यं जगदिति ॥ १८८ ॥ (१७३६) ॥

D C—In case of all objects being taken as non-existent, the entire course of *loka-vyavahāra* will be violated. If all the objects are of the same type—viz, that of absolute negation—how is it that oil is manufactured only from the *sāmagrī* of sesamum seeds and not from the materials like sand-particles etc ? Or, if there is all-pervading negation, why not all the objects be attained from the *sāmagrī* of *khapuspas* alone ? The fact that it never happens like this in the world, leads us to believe that the world is not *śūnya*.

And,

सर्वं सामग्गिमयं नेगंतोऽयं जओऽणुरपएसो ।

अह सो वि सप्पएसो जत्थावत्था स परमाणू ॥१८९॥(१७३७)

Savvam sāmaggimayam neganto'yam jao'nurapaeso ।

Aha so vi sappaesō jatthāvattthā sa paramānū ॥ 189 ॥ (1737)

[सर्वं सामग्रीमयं नैकान्तोऽयं यतोऽणुरप्रदेशः ।

अथ सोऽपि सप्रदेशो यत्रावस्था स परमाणुः ॥ १८९ ॥ (१७३७)

Sarvam sāmagrīmayam naikanto'yam yato'nurapradeśah ।

Atha so'pi sa-pradeśo yatravasthā sa paramānuh ॥ 189 ॥ (1737)]

Trans—189 That everything should be produced from a group of materials is not the one inevitable (rule) because atom does not occupy space. But (if even that occupies space according to you) wherever it resides there is a molecule (1737)

vacana and the *vacantiya bhāvas* true or false ? If it is true the *abhāva* of the above—mentioned objects could not be attained on account of its own existence. And if it is false the statement will cease to be a *pramāṇa* to establish *sūnyatā*. Thus it is not possible to establish *sūnyatā* in either of the two ways

Vyākta —But the statement which establishes *sūnyatā* has anyhow been accepted by us. Our *vacana* is therefore authentic and *sūnyatā* has undoubtedly been established.

Bhagavan —That is not true *O Vyākta* ! For in accepting the above—mentioned statement the same fault will arise when you ask the question as to whether that *vacana* is true or false and so on. Moreover you cannot accept the *vacana* unless the person who accepts the *vacana* to be accepted and the acceptance itself are existent.

The theory of *sarvasūnyatā* seems unfounded from this point of view also.

Moreover

सिक्कयासु किं न तेह सामग्गीउ तिलेसु वि किमस्ति ? ।
किं व न सव सिज्झइ सामग्गीउ खपुप्फाण ? ॥१८८॥ (१७३६)

Sikayāsu kim na taṇṇam sāmaggīu tīlesu vi kimasthi ? ।
kim va na savaṃ sijaḥai sāmaggīu khapupphāṇam ? ॥188॥ (1736)

[सिक्कयासु किं न तैल सामग्रीतस्तिलेष्वपि किमस्ति ? ।

किं वा न सर्वं सिज्यति सामग्रीतः खपुष्पानाम् ? ॥१८८॥ (१७३६) ॥

Sikatasu kim na taṇṇam samaggritastīleṣvapi kimasti ? ।
Kim va na sarvaṃ siddhyati samaggritāḥ khapuspānam ॥188॥ (1736)]

Trans—188 Why is the oil not (manufactured) from the materials like sands and why from sesamum seeds only ? Or why not everything be attained from the materials of *khapuspas* (only) ? (1736)

टीका—सर्वभावानामसत्त्वे सर्वोऽपि प्रतिनियतो लोकव्यवहारः समु-
च्छिद्यते, तथाहि—भावाभावस्य सर्वत्राविशिष्टत्वात् किमि तिसिकताकणसामग्री-
तस्तैलं न भवति, तिलादिसामग्र्यां वा तत् किमस्ति ? किं वा खपुष्पसामग्रीतः
सर्वमपि कार्यजातं न सिध्यति ? न चैवम्, तस्मात् प्रतिनियतकार्यकारण-
भावदर्शनाद् नाभावसामग्रीतः किमप्युत्पद्यते, किन्तु यथा स्वभावसामग्रीतः,
तथा च सति न शून्यं जगदिति ॥ १८८ ॥ (१७३६) ॥

D C—In case of all objects being taken as non-existent, the entire course of *loka-vyavahāra* will be violated. If all the objects are of the same type—viz, that of absolute negation—how is it that oil is manufactured only from the *sāmagrī* of sesamum seeds and not from the materials like sand-particles etc ? Or, if there is all-pervading negation, why not all the objects be attained from the *sāmagrī* of *khapuspas* alone ? The fact that it never happens like this in the world, leads us to believe that the world is not *śūnya*

And,

सर्वं सामग्गिमयं नेगंतोऽयं जओऽणुरपएसो ।

अह सो वि सप्पएसो जत्थावत्था स परमाणू ॥१८९॥(१७३७)

Savvam sāmaggimayam neganto'yam jao'nurapaeso ।

Aha so vi sappaesō jatthāvattthā sa paramānū ॥ 189 ॥ (1737)

[सर्वं सामग्रीमयं नैकान्तोऽयं यतोऽणुरप्रदेशः ।

अथ सोऽपि सप्रदेशो यत्रावस्था स परमाणुः ॥ १८९ ॥ (१७३७)

Sarvam sāmagrīmayam naikanto'yam yato'ṇurapradeśah ।

Atha so pi sa-pradeśo yatravasthā sa paramānuh ॥189॥ (1737)]

Trans—189 That everything should be produced from a group of materials is not the one inevitable (rule) because atom does not occupy space But (if even that occupies space according to you) wherever it resides there is a molecule (1737)

टीका-सर्वं सामग्रीमयं सामग्रीजन्यं वस्तिवस्त्ययमपि नैव गन्तः, यतो
 द्व्यणुकादयः स्कन्धाः सप्रदेशत्वाद् द्रव्यादिपरमाणुजन्यत्वाद् भवन्तु
 सामग्रीजन्याः, परमाणुः पुनरप्रदेश इति न केनचिद्व्यञ्ज्यते इति कथमसौ
 सामग्रीजन्यः स्यात् ? । अस्ति चासौ, कार्यलिङ्गगम्यत्वात्; उक्तं च

मूर्तेरणुरप्रदेशः कारणमन्त्यं तथा नित्यः ।

एकरस-वर्ण-गन्धो द्विस्पर्शः कार्यलिङ्गश्च ॥ १ ॥

अथायमपि सप्रदेशः, तत्रैतत्प्रदेशोऽणुमविष्पति, तस्यापि सप्रदेशत्वे
 तत्प्रदेशोऽणुरित्येवं तावत्, यावद् यत्र कचिद् निष्प्रदेशतया भवद्व्युद्भेदवस्थान
 मविष्पति, स एव परमाणुः, तेनापि च सामग्रीजन्यत्वस्य अभिचार इति
 ॥ १८९ ॥ (१७३६) ॥

D O—There cannot be a general rule that each and every object should be produced from *samagrī*. For objects composed of two or more atoms could be produced from the *samagrī* of those atoms but a *paramānu* by itself does never occupy space and hence could never be produced from any *samagrī*. This *paramānu* is produced only from *kārya-linga* as it is said—

Mūrtair-āṇurapradeśaḥ kāraṇamāntyaṃ bhavet tathā nityaḥ ।

Ekaraśa-varṇa-gandho dvīsparśaḥ kāryaliṅgaśca ॥

But if you believe this *paramānu* to occupy space wherever you apprehend *paramānu* there would be anu till ultimately it would be absolutely vacant where nothing but *paramānu* not produced from any *samagrī* would be found.

दीप्तइ सामग्रीमयं न याणवो सति नणु विरुद्धमिदं ।

किं वाणूणमभावे निष्फण्णमिण खपुप्फेहिं ॥ १९० ॥ (१७३८)

Disat sāmaggimāyāṃ na yānāvo santi naṇu viruddhamidaṃ ।

Kiṃ vāṇūṇamabhāve nipphannammiṇ khapupphēhiṃ ॥ 190 ॥ (1738)

[दुष्यते सामग्रीमयं न याणवः सन्ति ननु विरुद्धमिदम् ।

किं वाणूणामभावे निष्फणमिदं खपुप्फैः ? ॥ १९० ॥ (१७३८)

Driśyate sāmāgrīmayam na cānavah santi nanu viruddhamidam ।
Kim vānūnāmabhāve nispannamidam khapuspaḥ ॥190॥ (1738)]

Trans—190 It is really contradictory (to believe) that what is produced by materials is seen and that atoms do not exist Or, is it that, in absence of atoms, (all) this is produced by means of (mere) *khapuspa* ? (1738)

टीका—“सामग्रीमयं सर्वं दृश्यते” इति भवतैव प्रागुक्तम्, “अणवश्च न सन्ति” इत्यधुना ब्रूये, ननु विरुद्धमिदम्, यथा ‘ सर्वमप्यनृतं वचनम् ’ इति ब्रुवतः स्ववचनविरोधः, तथाऽत्रापीत्यर्थः । यदेव हि सामग्रीमयं किमपि दृश्यते भवता, तदेवाणुसंघातात्मकम्, अतः स्ववचनेनैव प्रतिपादितत्वात् कथमणवो न सन्ति ? इति भावः । किञ्च, अणूनामभाव इदं सर्वमपि घटादिकार्यजातं किं खपुष्पैर्निष्पन्नम्, परमाण्वभावे तज्जनकमृत्पिण्डादिसामग्र्यभावात् ? इति भावः । तस्माद् यस्मात् सामग्रीमयं दृश्यत इति प्रतिपद्यते भवता, तद्वदेव परमाणव इति ॥ १९० ॥ (१७३८) ॥

D C—If you are to state that those that are not *sāmāgrīyanya* are not *paramānus* at all, your own statement will be contradicting itself It has already been said that everything which is *sāmāgrīmaya* is apprehensible Again, all that you have accepted as *sāmāgrīmaya* or *sāmāgrīyanya* in this world, is nothing but a collection of atoms Thus, when you establish the existence of atoms by your own words, you cannot call them non-existent, in any case And, if you call those atoms non-existent, should the objects like *ghata*, *pata* etc, be taken to have been produced from the non-existent objects like *khapuspa* etc ? Because if *paramānu* is absent, a *sāmāgrī* like *mṛtipiṇḍa* would also be absent So, when you assert that *sāmāgrīmaya* is apprehended, the *paramānus* that form this *sāmāgrī* are automatically established as existent

Now, in reply to the argument *prima facie* that since

टीका—सर्वं सामग्रीमयं सामग्रीजन्यं वस्तिवस्त्ययमपि नैव गन्तः, यतो
द्व्यणुकादयः स्कन्धाः सप्रदेशत्वाद् द्रव्यादिपरमाणुजन्यत्वाद् भवन्तु
सामग्रीजन्याः, परमाणुः पुनरप्रदेश इति न कनचित्जन्यते इति कथमसौ
सामग्रीजन्यः स्यात् ? । अस्ति चासौ, कार्यलिङ्गगम्यत्वात् ; उक्तं च

मूर्तेरणुरप्रदेशः कारणमन्त्यं तथा नित्यः ।

एकरस-वर्ण-गन्धो द्विस्पर्शः कार्यलिङ्गश्च ॥ १ ॥

अत्रायमपि सप्रदेशः, तर्ह्येतप्रदेशोऽणुर्मविभ्यति, तस्यापि सप्रदेशत्वे
तत्प्रदेशोऽणुरित्येष तावत्, यावद् यत्र कश्चिद् निष्प्रदेशतया मध्वणुद्वेष्टस्वान
भविष्यति, स एव परमाणुः, तेनापि च सामग्रीजन्यत्वस्य व्यभिचार इति
॥ १८९ ॥ (१७३६) ॥

D C—There cannot be a general rule that each and every object should be produced from *samagrī*. For objects composed of two or more atoms could be produced from the *samagrī* of those atoms but a *paramāṇu* by itself does never occupy space and hence could never be produced from any *samagrī*. This *paramāṇu* is produced only from *kārya-linga* as it is said—

Mūrtair-ānurapradeśah karāṇamāntyaṁ bhavet tathā nityaḥ ।

Ekarasa-varṇa-gandho dvīsparśah kāryaliṅgaśca ॥

But if you believe this *paramāṇu* to occupy space wherever you apprehend *paramāṇu* there would be *anu* till ultimately it would be absolutely vacant where nothing but *paramāṇu* not produced from any *samagrī* would be found.

दीप्तइ सामग्रीमयं न याणवो सति नणु विरुद्धमिदं ।

किं वाणूणमभावे निष्फणमिणं स्वपुष्पेहिं ॥ १९० ॥ (१७३८)

Disai samagghimayam na yāṇavo santi nanu viruddhamidaṁ ।

Kim vāṇūṇamabhāve nipphamaminam khapupphehim ॥ 190 ॥ (1738)

[वृक्षस्य सामग्रीमयं न याणवः सन्ति ननु विरुद्धमिदम् ।

किं वाणूणामभावे निष्फणमिदं स्वपुष्पैः ? ॥ १९० ॥ (१७३८)

Dṛśyate sāmāgrīmayam na cāṇavah santi nanu viruddhamidam ।
Kim vānūnamabhāve nispannamidam khapuspaḥ ॥190॥ (1738)]

Trans—190 It is really contradictory (to believe) that what is produced by materials is seen and that atoms do not exist Or, is it that, in absence of atoms, (all) this is produced by means of (mere) *khapuspa* ? (1738)

टीका—“सामग्रीमयं सर्वं दृश्यते” इति भवतैव प्रागुक्तम्, “अणवश्च न सन्ति” इत्यधुना ब्रूये, ननु विरुद्धमिदम्, यथा ‘ सर्वमप्यनृतं वचनम् ’ इति ब्रुवतः स्ववचनविरोधः, तथाऽत्रापीत्यर्थः । यदेव हि सामग्रीमयं किमपि दृश्यते भवता, तदेवाणुसंघातात्मकम्, अतः स्ववचनेनैव प्रतिपादितत्वात् कथमणवो न सन्ति ? इति भावः । किञ्च, अणूनामभाव इदं सर्वमपि घटादिकार्यजातं किं खपुष्पैर्निष्पन्नम्, परमाण्वभावे तज्जनकमृत्पिण्डादिसामग्र्यभावात् ? इति भावः । तस्माद् यस्मात् सामग्रीमयं दृश्यत इति प्रतिपद्यते भवता, तद्वदेव परमाणव इति ॥ १९० ॥ (१७३८) ॥

D C—If you are to state that those that are not *sāmāgrījānya* are not *paramānus* at all, your own statement will be contradicting itself It has already been said that everything which is *sāmāgrīmaya* is apprehensible Again, all that you have accepted as *sāmāgrīmaya* or *sāmāgrījānya* in this world, is nothing but a collection of atoms Thus, when you establish the existence of atoms by your own words, you cannot call them non-existent, in any case And, if you call those atoms non-existent, should the objects like *ghata*, *pata* etc, be taken to have been produced from the non-existent objects like *khapuspa* etc ? Because if *paramānu* is absent, a *sāmāgrī* like *mṛtipiṇḍa* would also be absent So, when you assert that *sāmāgrīmaya* is apprehended, the *paramānus* that form this *sāmāgrī* are automatically established as existent

Now, in reply to the argument *prima facie* that since

rear portion is not perceptible and since front portion is very minute everything is *śunya*† the author indicates—

देसस्ताराभागो घेप्पइ न य सो ति नणु विरुद्धमिण ।
सवाभावे वि न सो घेप्पइ किं खरविषाणस्स ॥१९१॥ (१७३९)

Desassārābhago gheppai na ya so tti nanu viruddhamiṇam ।
Savvābhāve vi na so gheppai kim kharaviṣāṇassa ॥191॥ (1739)

[देखसाराभागो गृह्यते न च स इति ननु विरुद्धमिदम् ।
सर्वाभावेऽपि न स गृह्यत किं खरविषाणस्य ? ॥ १९१ ॥ (१७३९)

Deśasyārādbhago grihyate na ca sa iti nanu viruddhamidam ।
Sarvabhāve pi na sa grihyate kim kharaviṣāṇasya ? ॥191॥ (1739)]

Trans—191 To say that the foremost portion of a visible object is perceptible but it does not exist is really contradictory (For) even in the midst of all-pervading negation why is the front part of the horn of an ass not perceived ? (1739)

टीका—यदुक्तम्—“ वृक्षस्यापि वस्तुनः परमागस्तावद् न दृश्यते, आराद्भागस्तु गृह्यते, परं सोऽप्यन्यान्यपरभागकल्पनया प्रागुक्तयुक्तितो नास्ति ” इति । ननु विरुद्धमिदम्—“ गृह्यतेऽसौ, न च समस्ति ” इति । सर्वाभावाद् भ्रान्त्याऽसौ गृह्यत इति चेत् । तदुक्तम्, पतः सर्वाभावे तुल्येऽपि किमिति खरविषाणस्य संबन्धी आराद्भागो न गृह्यते ? । समता विपर्ययो वा कथं न भवति ? इति ॥ १९१ ॥ (१७३९) ॥

D O—It has been said before that only a front part of a visible object is perceived and not the rear part. This front part is in comparison with other parts in the rear very *śūnya* and hence that too becomes non-existent. This statement is self-contradicting. For to say that it is perceptible but it does not exist, is absurd.

Here if it is said that in the midst of *śarvābhāva* it is

perceptible because of *bhrānti*, that is also not proper For, since *abhāva* is common everywhere, why is the front part of non-existent objects like the horn of an ass etc., not apprehended ? Or, how does it not happen that the front part of objects like *kharavisāna* etc be apprehended and that of objects like *ghata*, *pata* etc not apprehended ?

Moreover,

परभागादरिसणओ नाराभागो वि किमणुमाणं ति ।

आराभागग्रहणे किं व न परभागसंसिद्धिः ? ॥१९२॥ (१७४०)

Parabhāgādarisanao nārābhāgo vi kīmanumānam ti ।

Arābhāgaggahane kim va na parabhāgasamsiddhī ? ॥192॥ (1740)

[परभागादर्शनतो नाराद्भागोऽपि किमनुमानमिति ।

आराद्भागग्रहणे किं वा न परभागसंसिद्धिः ? ॥ १९२ ॥ (१७४०)

Parabhāgādarśanato nārādbhāgo'pi kīmanumānamiti ।

Arādbhāgagrahane kim vā na parabhāgasamsiddhiḥ ? ॥192॥(1740)]

Trans — 192 On account of the rear part being imperceptible, what *anumāna* (is held) in case of even the front part (being imperceptible) ? Or, is it that the rear part is not apprehended when the front part is apprehended ? (1740)

टीका—“परभागमात्रादर्शनादाराद्भागोऽपि नास्ति” इत्यत्र किमनुमानं भवतः ? । एतदुक्तं भवति—यत् प्रत्यक्षेण सकललोकप्रसिद्धं तदग्नेरौष्ण्यमिव कथमनुमानेन बाध्यते ? । आराद्भागस्य ह्यापेक्षिकत्वात् तदन्यथानुपपत्तेः परभागानुमानं तावदद्यापि युज्यते । यस्तु परभागादर्शनमात्रेणैव तन्निहवः, सोऽसंबद्ध एव, सत्स्वपि देशादिविप्रकृष्टेषु मेरु-पिशाचादिष्वदर्शनसंभवात् । तस्माद् न परभागादर्शनमात्रेणाराद्भागोऽप्यहोतव्यः । किञ्च, आराद्भागग्रहणे परभागानुमानं युज्येतापीति भाष्यकारोऽप्याह—“ आराभागेत्यादि ” आराद्भागग्रहणे कथं न परभागसंसिद्धिः ? अपि तु तत्संसिद्धिरेव, तथाहि—दृश्यवस्तुनः परभागोऽस्ति, तत्संबन्धिभूतस्याराद्भागस्य ग्रहणात्, इह

यत्संबन्धिभूतो भागो गृह्यते तत् समस्ति, यथा नमसः पूर्वभागे गृहीते
 तत्संबन्ध्यपरभागः, गृह्यते च षटाक्षराराद्भागः, अतस्तत्संबन्धिभूतः परभागोऽ-
 प्यस्ति । यथोक्तम्—“ आराद्भागस्याऽप्यन्य आराद्भागः कल्पनीयः,
 तस्याप्यन्य इत्यादि तावत्, यावत् सर्वातीत्यभागः” इति । अत्रापि परभाग-
 स्यासत्त्वे सर्वातीत्यभागपरिकल्पनमुपपन्नमेव स्यात् । तस्मादस्ति परभाग
 इति ॥ १९२ ॥ (१७४०) ॥

D C—What *anumāna* do you hold when you assert that front part is also unapprehensible because of the rear part being so ? For how could you deny the existence of front part which is *pratyakṣa* to you like the heat of fire ?

It is proper to believe that front portion could exist only if the rear portion be existing and not otherwise. Since the front portion is existent to the *apekṣā* of the rear one *jñāna* about the rear portion will have to be derived from the front portion by means of *anumāna*. But from this it is absolutely inconsistent to conclude that front portion is not perceived because the rear one is not seen.

Even the commentator asserts in this connection that when the front portion is seen we can infer the rear one e g. A visible object has its rear portion apprehended because its front portion which is connected with the rear one is apprehended. It follows from this that an object which has one portion perceptible contains another portion also. Objects like *ghata* *pata* etc must contain rear portions since their front ones are easily apprehended.

Again the idea of the foremost part from the successive front portions will not fit your *anumāna*. As the rear part is a-*vidyamāna* the inference of foremost part being so is absolutely improper. Really speaking the front part is perceptible in this case and the inference of rear portion being *vidyamāna* is correct.

Again

सवाभावे वि कओ आरा-पर-मज्झभागनाणत्तं ।

अह परमईए भण्णइ स-परसइविसेसणं कत्तो ? ॥१९३॥ (१७४१)

आर-पर-मज्झभागा पडिवण्णा जइ न सुण्णया नाम ।

अप्पडिवण्णेषु वि का विगप्पणा खरविसाणस्स ? ॥१९४॥ (१७४२)

सवाभावे वाराभागो किं दीसए न परभागो ।

सवाग्रहणं व न किं किं वा न विवज्जओ होइ ? ॥१९५॥ (१७४३)

Savvābhāve vi kao ārā-para-majjhabhāganānattam ।

Aha paramaīe bhannai sa-paramaivisesanam katto ? ॥193॥ (1741)

Āra-para-majjhabhāgā padivannā jai na sunnayā nāma ।

Appadivannesu vi kā vigappanā kharavisānassa ? ॥194॥ (1742)

Savvābhāve vārābhāgo kim dīsaē na parabhāgo ।

Savvāgrahanam va na kim kim vā na vivaṃṃjao hoi ? ॥195॥ (1743)

[सर्वाभावेऽपि कुत आरात्-पर-मध्यभागानात्त्वम् ।

अथ परमत्या भण्यते स्व-परमतिविशेषणं कुतः ? ॥१९३॥ (१७४१)

आरात्-पर-मध्यभागाः प्रतिपन्ना यदि न शून्यता नाम ।

अप्रतिपन्नेष्वपि का विकल्पना खरविषाणस्य ? ॥ १९४ ॥ (१७४२)

सर्वाभावे वाराद्भागः किं दृश्यते न परभागः ? ।

सर्वाग्रहणं च न किं किं वा न विपर्ययो भवति ? ॥१९५॥ (१७४३)

Sarvābhāve'pi kuta ārāt-para-madhyabhāganānatvam ।

Atha paramatyā bhanyate sva-paramativiśesanam kutah ? ॥193॥]

Ārāt-para-madhyabhāgāḥ pratipannā yadi na śūnyatā nāma ।

Apratipannesvapi kā vikalpanā kharavisānasya ? ॥194॥ (1742)]

Sarvābhāve vārābhāgaḥ kim drīśyate na parabhāgaḥ ।

Sarvāgrahanam ca na kim kim vā na viparyayo bhavati ? ॥195॥]

Trans — 193-194-195 Even in the midst of all-pervading negation, how could the distinction between front, rear and

middle portions exist ? And if it is said so in the opinion of others whence is the distinction between one's own opinion and another's opinion ? If the front, rear and the middle portions are accepted as existing, there would be no *Sānyatā* at all. And if they are not proved (to be existing) why alternatives about (non-existent objects like) *kharavisāṇa* ? Or in the midst of the negation of all objects why is the front portion apprehended and why not the rear one ? Or why not absolute non-apprehension of both ? Or why not the reverse (apprehension) also ? (1741-1743)

Also,

परभागादरिसण वा फलिहार्हण ति ते ध्रुव सति ।

जइ वा ते वि न सता परभागादरिसणमहेउ ? ॥ १९६ ॥ (१७४४)

सवादरिसणठ च्चिय न भण्णइ कीस, मणई सत्ताम ।

पुव्वम्भुवगयहाणी पच्चक्खविरोहओ चेव ॥ १९७ ॥ (१७४५)

Parabbhāgadarisanam vā phallihāṇam ti te dhruvam santi ।

Jai vā te vi na santā parbhāgadarisana mahetū ? ॥ 196 ॥ (1744)

Savvādarisanāu cciya na bhannaṅkisa bhaṇati tannaṃma ।

Puvvabbhuvagayahāṇi paccakkhavirohāo ceva ॥ 197 ॥ (1745)

[परभागादर्शनं वा स्फटिकादीनामिति ते ध्रुवं सन्ति ।

यदि वा तेऽपि न सन्तः परभागादर्शनमहेतुः ॥ १९६ ॥ (१७४४)

सर्वादर्थनत एव न भण्यते कस्मात्, भणति तन्नाम ।

पूर्वाभ्युपगतहानिः प्रत्यक्षविरोधतश्चैव ॥ १९७ ॥ (१७४५)

Parabbhāgadarśanam vā sphatikādīnamiti te dhruvaṃ santi ।

Yadi vā te pi na śantaḥ parabbhāgadarśanamahetūḥ ॥ 196 ॥ (1744)]

Savvadarśanata eva na bhāṇyate kasmāt bhāṇati tannaṃma ।

Pūrvābhyugatahāṇiḥ pratyakṣavirodhataścāiva ॥ 197 ॥ (1745)]

Trans—196-197 Or since the rear portions of (objects

like) crystal etc are seen, they exist without doubt And, if they, too, do not exist (according to you), the proposition will fail, as the rear portion will not be seen Why is the reason—that nothing could be seen—not stated ? If it is stated, the proposition (which is) accepted before, will (constitute) direct contradiction (1744-1745)

टीका-ननु येषां स्फटिकाऽभ्रपटलादीनां भावानां परभागादर्शनमस्ति ते तावद् ध्रुव सन्त्येव, इति “ परभागादर्शनात् ” इत्यनेन हेतुना सर्वभावानामसत्त्वं न सिध्यति । अथ स्फटिकादयोऽपि न सन्ति तर्हि “ परभागादर्शनात् ” इत्ययमहेतुः, त्वदभिप्रेतस्य सर्वभावासत्त्वस्यासाधकत्वात् । अतोऽव्यापकममुं हेतुं परित्यज्य “ सर्वाददर्शनाद् न सन्ति भावाः ” इत्ययमेव व्यापको हेतुः कस्माद् न भण्यते ? । ‘ भणइ तन्नाम चि ’ अत्र पर उत्तरं भणति । किम् ? इत्याह-तन्नामास्तु “ सर्वाददर्शनात् ” इति-अयं हेतुस्तर्हि भवत्वित्यर्थः, यथा तथा शून्यतैवास्माभिः साधयितव्या, सा च “ सर्वाददर्शनात् ” इत्यनेनापि हेतुना सिध्यतु, किमनेनाऽऽग्रहेणास्माकम् ? इति भावः । अथ स्वरिराह-“ पुण्वेत्यादि ” नन्विदानीं “ सर्वाददर्शनात् ” इति व्रुवतो भवतः “ परभागादरिसणओ ” इति पूर्वाभ्युपगतस्य हानिः प्राप्नोति । किञ्च, ग्राम-नगर-सरित्-समुद्र-घट-पटादीनां प्रत्यक्षेणैव दर्शनात् सर्वाददर्शनलक्षणस्य हेतोः प्रत्यक्षविरोधः । ततः प्रत्यक्षविरोधतश्च “ सर्वाददर्शनात् ” इत्येतदयुक्तमिति ।

अत्र कश्चिदाह-ननु सपक्षस्य सर्वस्याव्यापकोऽपि विपक्षात् सर्वथा निवृत्तो हेतुरिष्यत एव, यथा “ अनित्यः शब्दः प्रयत्नानन्तरीयकत्वात् इति, न ह्यनित्योऽर्थः सर्वोऽपि प्रयत्नानन्तरीयकः विद्युद्-घन-कुसुमादिभिर्व्यभिचारात् ; तद्वदिहापि यद्यपि सर्वेष्वपि भावेषु परभागादर्शनं नास्ति, यथापि बहुषु तावदस्ति, अतस्तेषु शून्यतां साधयन्नसौ सम्यग् हेतुर्भविष्यति । तदयुक्तम्, यतस्तत्र “ यदनित्यं न भवति तत् प्रयत्नानन्तरीयकमपि न भवति, यथाऽऽकाशम् ” इत्येव व्यतिरेकः सिध्यति ; इह तु यत्र शून्यता नास्ति, किं तर्हि ? वस्तुनः सत्त्वम्, परभागादर्शनमपि तत्र नास्ति,

middle portions exist ? And if it is said so in the opinion of others whence is the distinction between one's own opinion and another's opinion ? If the front, rear and the middle portions are accepted as existing, there would be no *sānyatā* at all. And, if they are not proved (to be existing) why alternatives about (non-existent objects like) *kharavisāṇa* ? Or in the midst of the negation of all objects why is the front portion apprehended and why not the rear one ? Or why not absolute non-apprehension of both ? Or why not the reverse (apprehension) also ? (1741-1743)

Also

परभागदरिसण वा फलिहार्हण सि ते ध्रुव सति ।
जइ वा ते वि न सता परभागादरिसणमहेऊ ? ॥ १९६ ॥ (१७४४)
सद्वादरिसणउ चिय न भण्णइ कीस, भणई तत्ताम ।
पुव्वमुवगयहाणी पच्चक्खविरोहओ चेव ॥ १९७ ॥ (१७४५)

Parabhāgadarisanam vā phalīhānam ti te dhruvam santi ।
Jai vā te vi na santā parbhāgadarisana mahēū ? ॥ 196 ॥ (1744)
Savvādarisanāu cciya na bhaṇṇaṁkisa bhaṇaṁ tannāma ।
Puvvabbhuvagayahāṇi paccakkhavirohao ceva ॥ 197 ॥ (1745)

[परभागदर्शनं वा स्फटिकादीनामिति ते ध्रुवं सन्ति ।
पदि वा तेऽपि न सन्तः परभागदर्शनमहेतुः ॥ १९६ ॥ (१७४४)
सर्वदर्शनत एव न भण्यते कस्मात्, भणति तन्नाम ।
पूर्वाम्युपगतहानिः प्रत्यक्षविरोधतश्चैव ॥ १९७ ॥ (१७४५)

Parabhāgadarśanam vā sphatikādīnām iti te dhruvam santi ।
Yadi vā to pi na śantāḥ parabhāgadarśanamahetuh ॥ 196 ॥ (1744)]
Sarvadarśanata eva na bhāṇyate kasmāt bhaṇati tannāma ।
Purvabhūyugatahāṇiḥ pratyakṣavirodhataśchāiva ॥ 197 ॥ (1745)]

Trans—196-197 Or since the rear portions of (objects

ke) crystal etc are seen, they exist without doubt And, if they, too, do not exist (according to you), the proposition will fail, as the rear portion will not be seen Why is the reason—that nothing could be seen—not stated ? If it is stated, the proposition (which is) accepted before, will (constitute) direct contradiction (1744-1745)

टीका-ननु येषां स्फटिका-ऽभ्रपटलादीनां भावानां परभागादर्शनमस्ति ते तावद् ध्रुव सन्त्येव, इति “ परभागादर्शनात् ” इत्यनेन हेतुना सर्वभावा-
नामसत्त्वं न सिध्यति । अथ स्फटिकादयोऽपि न सन्ति तर्हि “ परभागादर्श-
नात् ” इत्ययमहेतुः, त्वदभिप्रेतस्य सर्वभावासत्त्वस्यासाधकत्वात् । अतोऽ-
व्यापकममुं हेतुं परित्यज्य “ सर्वादशनाद् न सन्ति भावाः ” इत्ययमेव
व्यापको हेतुः कस्माद् न भण्यते ? । ‘ भणइ तन्नाम त्ति ’ अत्र पर उत्तर
भणति । किम् ? इत्याह-तन्नामास्तु “ सर्वादशनात् ” इति-अयं हेतुस्तर्हि
भवत्वित्यर्थः, यथा तथा शून्यतैवास्माभिः साधयितव्या, सा च “ सर्वादश-
नात् ” इत्यनेनापि हेतुना सिध्यतु, किमनेनाऽऽग्रहेणास्माकम् ? इति भावः ।
अथ स्मरिराह-“ पुण्वेत्यादि ” नन्विदानीं “ सर्वादशनात् ” इति ब्रुवतो
भवतः “ परभागादरिसणओ ” इति पूर्वाभ्युपगतस्य हानिः प्राप्नोति । किञ्च,
ग्राम-नगर-सरित्-समुद्र-घट-पटादीनां प्रत्यक्षेणैव दर्शनात् सर्वादशनल-
क्षणस्य हेतोः प्रत्यक्षविरोधः । ततः प्रत्यक्षविरोधतश्च “ सर्वादशनात् ”
इत्येतदयुक्तमिति ।

अत्र कश्चिदाह-ननु सपक्षस्य सर्वस्याव्यापकोऽपि विपक्षात् सर्वथा
निवृत्तो हेतुरिष्यत एव, यथा “ अनित्यः शब्दः प्रयत्नानन्तरीयकत्वात् इति,
न ह्यनित्योऽर्थः सर्वोऽपि प्रयत्नानन्तरीयकः विद्युद्-धन-कुसुमादिभिर्य-
भिचारात् ; तद्वदिहापि यद्यपि सर्वेष्वपि भावेषु परभागादर्शनं नास्ति,
यथापि बहुषु तावदस्ति, अतस्तेषु शून्यतां साधयन्नसौ सम्यग् हेतुर्भवि-
ष्यति । तदयुक्तम्, यतस्तत्र “ यदनित्यं न भवति तत् प्रयत्नानन्तरीयक-
मपि न भवति, यथाऽऽकाशम् ” इत्येवं व्यतिरेकः सिध्यति; इह तु यत्र
शून्यता नास्ति, किं तर्हि ? वस्तुनः सत्त्वम्, परभागादर्शनमपि तत्र नास्ति,

किन्तु परमागदर्शनम्, यया क ? इति भवतः सर्वासद्वादिनो व्यतिरेकः
कचिदपि न सिध्यति, अतोऽहेतुरेवायमिति ॥१९६ १९७ (१७४४ १७४५)॥

D C—Non-existence of each and every object could not be proved by virtue of the non-apprehension of rear parts. The rear portions of transparent objects like crystal and moon are apprehended. Existence of those objects has therefore undoubtedly been established. Consequently non-apprehension of all objects can never be proved by means of the *hetu* that rear portions are not seen.

Here again if you contend that *sphatika* etc. also do not exist, your argument that rear portion is not seen will fail and hence be invalid as the rear portions of those objects are clearly apprehended. In spite of this faulty argument if you attempt to establish *śūnyatā* by means of a widely applicable statement that 'Nothing could be proved to exist as nothing is perceived' then also the previous *hetu* that rear part could not be seen would be violated. Secondly since village town river sea *ghata pata* etc. are directly apprehensible and hence the *hetu* will be evidently invalid in that way also.

The opponent may contend again that a reason which is not applicable to all the instances on the same side can be called a logical reason if it is absolutely inapplicable to the opposite side. e. g., *śabda* is *a-niṣya* because it is not produced without effort. But this does not mean that all *a-niṣya* objects could not be produced without effort. Because objects like lightning cloud etc. though produced without effort are *a-niṣya*. Similarly here also rear parts of all the objects are not non-apprehensible but as the rear parts of several objects are not apprehensible this *hetu* leads us to prove *śūnyatā* in them and that is why it is called a correct or logical reason !

But that is not proper *O Vyakta* ! In the *hetu* mentioned above pervasion of difference is found. Take for example the

position that "That which is *a-nitya*, is like *ālās'a*, produced without effort " If *vyatireka vyāpti* is applied in this case, nothing else but *vidyamānatā* of an object is inferred when *s'ūnyatā* is not found at all Moreover, rear part is also apprehended in this case So, *O sarvas'ūnyatāvādīn'* you shall never be able to obtain the *vyatireka vyāpti* Your *hetu* will, therefore, not remain as a *hetu* at all

स्थि पर-मज्झभागा अपच्चक्खत्तओ मई होज्जा ।

णु अक्ख-त्थावत्ती अपच्चक्खत्तहाणी वा ॥ १९८ ॥ (१७४६)

Na tthi para-majhabhāgā apaccakkhattao maī hojjā ।

Nanu akkha-tthāvattī apaccakkhattahānī vā ॥ 198 ॥ (1746)

[न स्तः पर-मध्यभागावप्रत्यक्षत्वतो मतिर्मवेत् ।

नन्वक्षा-स्थापित्तिप्रत्यक्षत्वहानिर्वा ॥ १९८ ॥ (१७४६)

Na stah para-madhyabhāgāvapratyaksatvato mati r-bhavet ।

Nanvaksa'rthāpattirapratyaksatvahānirvā ॥ 198 ॥ (1746)]

Trans—198 If the rear, as well as, middle portions (of an object) are accepted as non-existent on account of their imperceptibility, then either there will be perception of sense-organs, as well as, the objects or imperceptibility (itself) will be violated (1746)

टीका-अथ स्यान्मतिः—पर-मध्यभागौ न स्तः, अप्रत्यक्षत्वात्, खरविषाणवत् । तदसत्त्वे च तदपेक्षया निर्दिश्यमान आराद्भागोऽपि नास्ति, अतः सर्वशून्यतेत्यभिप्रायः । तदयुक्तम्, यतः—“अक्षमक्षमिन्द्रियमिन्द्रिय प्रति वर्तत इति प्रत्यक्षोऽर्थः, न प्रत्यक्षोऽप्रत्यक्षः. तद्भावोऽप्रत्यक्षत्वम्, तस्माद-प्रत्यक्षत्वात्” इत्युच्यमाने नन्वक्षाणामर्थस्य चाऽऽपत्तिः सता प्रामोति, तदा-पत्तौ च शून्यताभ्युपगमहानिः । शून्यतायां वाऽप्रत्यक्षत्वलक्षणस्य हेतोर्हानिः, अक्षा-स्थानामभावे प्रत्यक्षा-ऽप्रत्यक्षव्यपदेशानुपपत्तेरिति भावः ॥ १९८ ॥ (१७४६) ॥

D C—Vyākṛ.—The rear as well as the middle portions of an object do not exist, because they are imperceptible like *kharaviṇṇa*. The front parts will also not exist in that case because their existence depends upon the existence of the rear ones. This will ultimately lead to the idea of *sarvas anyatā*.

Bhagavan:—The argument is not valid. *Pratyakṣa* means existing at each of the sense-organs. So when the *hetu* of *a-pratyakṣatva* is advanced there would be apprehension of sense-organs as well as the objects to be apprehended and in their apprehension, *sanyatā* would never be accepted. For if *sanyatā* is taken along with the *hetu* of *a-pratyakṣatva*, the *hetu* itself will prove invalid. Or say in absence of *indriya* and *artha* the practical usage of *pratyakṣa* and *a-pratyakṣa* would never be possible.

Moreover

अरिथ अपञ्चकस्व पि हु जह भवओ ससयाइविज्ञाण ।
अह नत्थि सुणया का कास व केणोवलद्धा वा ? ॥१९९॥ (१७४७)

Atthi apaccakkham pi hu jaha bhavao samsayādivijñāṇam ।
Aha natthi sumayā kā kāsa va kenovaladdha va ? ॥199॥ (1747)

[अस्त्यप्रत्यक्षमपि स्तु यथा भवतः संशयादिविज्ञानम् ।

अथ नास्ति सून्यता का कस्य वा केनोपलब्धा वा ? ॥१९९॥ (१७४७)

Astyapratyakṣam pi khalu yathā bhavataḥ saṁśayādivijñāṇam ।
Atha nāsti śūnyatā ka kasya va kenopalabdha va ? ॥199॥ (1747)]

Trans — 199 Some object does exist in spite of its being imperceptible, just as your apprehension of doubt etc. exist, even though it is imperceptible (to others) And if that (doubt) does not exist what is that *śūnyatā*? Whose *śūnyatā* (is that)? And who has apprehended it? (1747)

टीका—नन्वप्रत्यक्षमप्यस्ति किञ्चिद् वस्तु, यथा भवतः संशयादि विज्ञानमन्यथामप्रत्यक्षमप्यस्ति, ततो यथैतद्, तथा पर-मप्यमागावप्रत्यक्षी

भविष्यत इत्यनैकान्तिको हेतुः । अथ भवत्संशयादिविज्ञानमपि नास्ति, तर्हि का नाम शून्यता ? कस्य वाऽसौ ? केन वोपलब्धा ? भवत एवेह तत्र किल संशयः, स चेद् नास्ति, तर्हि कस्यान्यस्य ग्राम-नगरादिसत्त्वे विप्रतिपत्तिः ? इति भावः ॥ १९९ ॥ (१७४७) ॥

D. C—Just as, your apprehension of doubt etc exists, even though it is not perceptible to others, in the same way, there are some objects which exist, in spite of their imperceptibility. Middle and rear portions of such objects do exist in spite of their *a-pratyakṣatva* Your *hetu* will, therefore, involve the fault of *anāntarīkatva*, since it has been applicable to more than one object

Again, if your apprehension of doubt etc., does not exist, what would be *s'ūnyatā* then ? To whom does that *s'ūnyatā* belong ? And, who has apprehended that *s'ūnyatā* ? The doubt, therefore, must exist Otherwise, who else will raise the doubt about the existence of *vidyamāna* objects like village, town, etc ?

After refuting the idea of *s'ūnyatā*, the *Bhagavān* now tries to establish the existence of elements like *prithvi* etc in the following way —

पञ्चक्खेसु न जुत्तो तुह भूमि-जला-ऽनलेसु संदेहो ।
अनिलाऽऽगासेसु भवे सोऽपि न जुत्तोऽणुमाणाओ ॥ २०० ॥

Paccakkhesu na jutto tuha bhūmi-jalā'-nalesu samdeho ।
Anilā-"gāsesu bhave so'vi na jutto'numānāo ॥ 200 ॥ (1748)

[प्रत्यक्षेषु न युक्तस्तव भूमि-जला-ऽनलेषु संदेहः ।

अनिला-ऽऽकाशयोर्भवेत् सोऽपि न युक्तोऽणुमानात् ॥ २०० ॥ (१७४८)

Pratyakṣesu na yuktastava bhūmi-jalā'-naleṣu samdehah ।
Anilā-"kaśayor-bhavet so'pi na yukto'numānāt ॥ 200 ॥ (1748)]

Trans—200 Your doubt about the objects like earth, water, and fire, is not proper, because they are (directly) per-

ceptible (to the senses). That (doubt) is out of place in the case of wind as well as sky also by virtue of *anumāna*. (1748)

टीका—तस्माद् भूमि-जल-वक्षिण प्रत्यक्षेषु तव सौम्य ! संशयो न युक्तः, यथा स्वस्वरूपे । तथा, अनिलोऽपि प्रत्यक्ष एव, गुणप्रत्यक्षत्वात्, घटमत्, ततस्तत्रापि न संशयो युक्तः । मयत्तु वा, अनिल-ऽऽकाशयोरप्रत्यक्षत्वेन संशयः, तथाऽप्यसौ न युक्तः, अनुमानसिद्धत्वात् तयोरिति ॥२००॥ (१७४८) ॥

D O—Just as, in the case of your own body you cannot raise doubt so in the case of *pratyakṣa* objects such as *bhūm* (earth) *jala* (water) and *anala* (fire) also you should not raise doubt. Moreover you cannot entertain doubt about *vāyu* (wind) and *ākāśa* (space) also because they are established by means of *anumāna*

Here is the *anumāna* about wind

अस्थि अदिस्सापाइयफरिसणार्ईण गुणी गुणत्तणओ ।

रूपस्स घटो व गुणी जो तेसिं सोऽनिलो नाम ॥२०१॥ (१७४९)

Atthi adissāpāyapharisaṇaṇnam guṇi guṇattanao ।

Rūpassa ghaṭo vva guṇi jo tesim soṇilo nama ॥201॥ (1749)

[अस्त्यइयापादितस्पर्शनादीनां गुणी गुणत्वतः ।

रूपस्य घट इव गुणी यस्तेषां सोऽनिलो नाम ॥ २०१ ॥ (१७४९)

Astyadīśyāpaditasparsanādīnam guṇi guṇatvataḥ ।

Rūpassya ghaṭa iva guṇi yasteṣāṃ soṇilo nama ॥201॥ (1749)]

Trans—201 Just as *ghata* is the object possessing the the property of *rūpa* wind is said to be (an element) consisting of properties like a sense of touch etc. produced by some invisible (force) (1749)

टीका—य एतेऽदृश्येन केनाप्यापादिता अनिताः स्पर्शादयस्ते विद्यमानगुणिनः, गुणत्वात्, आदि छद्वाच्छब्द-स्वास्थ्य-कम्पा गृह्यन्ते, एतेऽपि

हि वायुप्रभवाद् वायुगुणा एव, इह ये गुणास्ते विद्यमानगुणिनो दृष्टाः, यथा घट-रूपादयः, यथैषां स्पर्श-शब्द-स्वास्थ्य-कम्पानां गुणी स वायुः तस्मा-दस्त्यसाविति ॥ २०१ ॥ (१७४९) ॥

D. C—Properties like *spars'a*, *s'abda*, *svāsthya* and *kampā* are produced by means of some invisible force. Now, since these properties appear as existing in *vāyu* (wind), *vāyu* is said to possess those properties, just as *ghata*, possesses the property of *rūpa*.

The *anumāna* to establish *ākās'a* is this :—

अस्थि वसुहाइभाणं तोयस्स घडो व मुत्तिमत्ताओ ।

जं भूयाणं भाणं तं वोमं वत्त ! सुवत्तं ॥ २०२ ॥ (१७५०)

Atthi vasuhāibhānam toyassa ghado vva muttimattāo ।

Jam bhūyānam bhānam tam vomam Vatta ! suvattam ॥ 202 ॥

[अस्ति वसुधादिभाजनं तोयस्य घट इव मूर्तिमत्त्वात् ।

यद् भूतानां भाजनं तद् व्योम व्यक्त ! सुव्यक्तम् ॥ २०२ ॥ (१७५०)

Asti vasudhādibhājanam toyasya ghata iva mūrtimattvāt ।

Yad bhūtānām bhājanam tad vyoma Vyakta ! suvyaktam ॥ 202 ॥]

Trans.—202 Just as *ghata* becomes the receptacle of of water, so there is a receptacle for earth etc also The receptacle of (those) elements is nothing but *ākāśa*. (1750)

टीका—अस्ति वसुधा-जला-ऽनल-वायूनां भाजनमाधारः, मूर्तिम-त्त्वात्, तोयस्य घटवत्, यच्च तेषां भाजनं, तदायुष्मन् व्यक्त ! सुव्यक्तं व्योमेति । यदि च साध्यैकदेशतां दृष्टान्तस्य कश्चित् प्रेरयति, तदेत्थं प्रयोगः—विद्यमानभाजना पृथिवी, मूर्तत्वात्, तोयवत्; तथा, आपः, तेजो-वत्; तेजश्च वायुवत्, वायुश्च पृथिवीवदिति ॥ २०२ ॥ (१७५०)

D C—Earth, water, fire, and wind have their *ādharas* of the type of the *ghata* full of water on account of their being corporeal This *ādharā*, *O Vyakta* ! is well known as *ākās'a*. Since *prithvī*

ceptible (to the senses). That (doubt) is out of place in the case of wind as well as sky also by virtue of *anumāna*. (1748)

टीका-तस्मात् भूमि-जल-वह्निषु प्रत्यक्षेषु तत्र सौम्य ! संशयो न युक्तः, यथा स्वस्वरूपे । यथा, अनिलोऽपि प्रत्यक्ष एव, गुणप्रत्यक्षत्वात्, घटवत्, तद्वत्तत्रापि न संशयो युक्तः । भवतु वा, अनिल-ऽऽकाशयोरप्रत्यक्षत्वेन संशयः, यथाऽप्यसौ न युक्तः, अनुमानसिद्धत्वात् तयोरिति ॥२००॥ (१७४८) ॥

D C—Just as, in the case of your own body you cannot raise doubt so in the case of *pratyakṣa* objects such as *bhūmi* (earth) *jala* (water) and *anala* (fire) also you should not raise doubt. Moreover you cannot entertain doubt about *vāyu* (wind) and *ākāśa* (space) also because they are established by means of *anumāna*

Here is the *anumāna* about wind,

अथि अदिस्सापाइयफरिसणाईण गुणी गुणत्तणओ ।
रूपस्स घटो व गुणी जो तेसि सोऽनिलो नाम ॥२०१॥ (१७४९)

Atthi adissāpāyapharisaṇāṇiṇaṃ guṇi guṇattanao ।
Rūpaṃ va ghaṭṭo va guṇi jo tesmī soṇilo nama ॥ 201 ॥ (1749)

[अस्त्यदस्यापादितम्यशनादीनां गुणी गुणत्वतः ।

रूपस्य घट इव गुणी यस्तथा सोऽनिलो नाम ॥ २०१ ॥ (१७४९)

Astyanāśāpāditasparśanādīnāṃ guṇi guṇatvataḥ ।
Rūpasya ghaṭṭa eva guṇi yaste im soṇilo nama ॥ 201 ॥ (1749)]

Trans—201 Just as *ghaṭa* is the object possessing the the property of *rūpa* wind is said to be (an element) consisting of properties like a sense of touch etc. produced by some invisible (force) (1749)

टीका-य ज्ञेयद्रव्येन कनाप्यापादितानि गुणाः स्वभावात्तत्र विद्यमानगुणिन, गुणस्यान्, आदि प्रत्यक्षतुल्य-व्याख्य-रूपाश्च, यत्र वि

Trans.—204 (The opponent may ask) How are they animate ? (The answer is)—*Bhūtas* ending at *vāyu* are animate on account of (their possessing) that characteristic The sky being incorporeal by itself is merely a support (and hence) it is not animate

टीका—कथं पुनः सह जीवेन वर्तन्त इति सजीवानि भूतानि ? इति परस्य मतिः स्यात् । अत्रोच्यते—तस्य जीवस्य लिङ्गं तल्लिङ्गं तस्मात् तदुपलब्धेरित्यर्थः, सचेतनान्यनिलावसानानि चत्वारि भूतानि । व्योम—आकाशं पुनर्विगतमूर्तिभावमाधार एव, न तु सजीवमिति ॥ २०४ ॥ (१७५२)

D. C.—Vyakta —How are the *bhūtas sa-jīva* as they exist along with *jīva* ?

The *Ācārya* —*Prithvī*, *jala*, *agni*, and *vāyu* are *sa-jīva* because they possess the characteristics of *jīva* But the sky is not *sa-jīva* since it is *a-mūrta* and hence it acts merely as an *ādhāra*.

The living characteristic of *prithvī* can be laid down as follows —

जन्म-जरा-जीवन-मरण-रोहणा-हार-दोहला-मयओ ।
रोग-तिगिच्छाईहि य नारि व सचेयणा तरवो ॥२०५॥(१७५३)

Jamma-jarā-jīvana-marana-rohanā-hāra-dohalā-mayao ।
Roga-tigicchāihī ya nārī vva sa-ceyanā taravo ॥ 205 ॥ (1753)

[जन्म-जरा-जीवन-मरण-रोहणा-ऽऽहार-दौहृदा-ऽऽमयतः ।

रोग-चिकित्सादिभिश्च नारीव सचेतनास्तरवः ॥ २०५ ॥ (१७५३)

Janma-jarā-jīvana-marana-rohanā-”hāra-dauhrudā-”mayataḥ ।
Roga-cikitsādibhiśca nārīva sa-cetanastaravaḥ ॥ 205 ॥ (1753)]

Trans—205 Trees like woman are living (beings) by reason of (their having) birth, old age, life, death, growth, hunger, desire, disease and its diagnosis etc

has its *bhāyana vidyamāna* on account of its *mūrtatva* like water water has also the *bhāyana* same as that of fire and the fire in turn has the one similar to that of wind which ultimately will have the same one as *prithvī*

Having established the existence of all the five elements the *Ācārya* now concludes —

एव पञ्चक्त्वाहपमाणसिद्धाह सोम्म ! पट्टिवज्ज ।

जीव-सरीराहारोवओगधम्माह भूयाह ॥ २०३ ॥ (१७५१)

Evam paccakkhālpamānasiddhāhm somma ! padivajja ।
Jīva-sarīrāhāravaogadhammāhm bhūyāhm ॥ 203 ॥ (1757)

[एव प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणसिद्धानि सौम्य ! प्रतिपद्यस्व ।

जीव-शरीराधारोपयोगधर्माणि भूतानि ॥ २०३ ॥ (१७५१)

Evam pratyaksadīpramānasiddhāni saumya ! pratipadyasva ।
Jīva-sarīradhāropayogadharmaṇi bhūtāni ॥ 203 ॥ (1751)]

Trans.—203 So O Saumya ! accept those *bhūtas* that have *jīva* and *sarīra* as their *ādāras* along with the property of common usage to have been established by means of evidences such as those perceptible by senses etc.

Now the *bhūtas* are established as animate in this way—

किह सजीवाह मई तल्लिङ्गाओऽनिलायसाणाह ।

वोम विमुत्तिभावादाधारो चेव न सजीवम् ॥ २०४ ॥ (१७५२)

Kiha sajjivāhm mai talliṅgāo anilāyasāṇāhm ।
Vomam vimuttibhavadādhāro ceva na sa-jīvam ॥ 204 ॥ (1752)

[कथं सजीवानि मतिस्तल्लिङ्गादनिलायसानानि ।

व्योम विमूर्तिभावादाधार एव न सजीवम् ॥ २०४ ॥ (१७५२)

Katham sa-jīvāni matistallīṅgadanilāyasāṇāni ।
Vyoma vimūrtibhavadādhāra eva na sa-jīvam ॥ 204 ॥ (1752)]

Trans—204 (The opponent may ask) How are they animate ? (The answer is)—*Bhūtas* ending at *vāyu* are animate on account of (their possessing) that characteristic The sky being incorporeal by itself is merely a support (and hence) it is not animate.

टीका—कथं पुनः सह जीवेन वर्तन्त इति सजीवानि भूतानि ? इति परस्य मतिः स्यात् । अत्रोच्यते—तस्य जीवस्य लिङ्गं तल्लिङ्गं तस्मात् तदुपलब्धेरित्यर्थः, सचेतनान्यनिलावसानानि चत्वारि भूतानि । व्योम—आकाशं पुनर्विगतमूर्तिभावमाधार एव, न तु सजीवमिति ॥ २०४ ॥ (१७५२)

D. C—Vyakta —How are the *bhūtas sa-jīva* as they exist along with *jīva* ?

The *Ācārya* —*Prithvī*, *jala*, *agni*, and *vāyu* are *sa-jīva* because they possess the characteristics of *jīva* But the sky is not *sa-jīva* since it is *a-mūrta* and hence it acts merely as an *ādhāra*.

The living characteristic of *prithvī* can be laid down as follows.—

जन्म—जरा—जीवन—मरण—रोहणा—हार—दोहला—मयओ ।
रोग—तिगिच्छाईहि य नारि व सचेयणा तरवो ॥२०५॥(१७५३)

Jamma-jarā-jivana-marana-rohanā-hāra-dohalā-mayao ।
Roga-tigicchāihī ya nārī vva sa-ceyanā taravo ॥ 205 ॥ (1753)

[जन्म—जरा—जीवन—मरण—रोहणा—SSहार—दौहृदा—SSमयतः ।

रोग—चिकित्सादिभिश्च नारीव सचेतनास्तरवः ॥ २०५ ॥ (१७५३)

Janma-jarā-jivana-marana-rohana—"hāra-dauhrudā—"mayatah ।
Roga-cikitsādibhiṣca nārīva sa-cetanastaravah ॥ 205 ॥ (1753)]

Trans—205 Trees like woman are living (beings) by reason of (their having) birth, old age, life, death, growth, hunger, desire, disease and its diagnosis etc

टीका—“सचेतनास्तरवः” इति प्रतिष्ठा । “जन्म-जरा-जीवन-मरण-धृतसंरोहणा-ऽऽहार-दौर्द्धा-ऽऽमय-तपिक्रित्सादिसद्भावात्” इति हेतुः । “नारीवत्” इति दृष्टान्तः । आह-नन्वनैकान्तिकोऽयम्, अचेतनेऽपि जन्मादिभ्यपदेऽवर्धनात्; तथाहि—“जातं तद्वदधि” इति भ्यपदिश्यते, न चैतत् सचेतनम्; तथा, “जीवितं विषम्” “मृतं कुसुमम्” इत्यादि । अत्रोच्यते—वनस्पतौ सर्वाभ्यपि सचेतनलिङ्गानि जन्मादीन्नुपलभ्यन्ते, अतो मनुष्येष्वपि तानि तेषु निरुपचरितानि, दृष्ट्यादौ तु प्रतिनि यत एव कश्चिज्जातादिभ्यपदेऽपि दृश्यते, स औपचारिक एव—जातमिव जातं दधि, मृतमिव मृतं कुसुममकमित्यादि ॥ २०५ ॥ (१७५३)

D O—Trees are sa-octana like woman Because like woman they possess the living characteristics such as janma-jarā-jivana-marana etc. Some one might argue that this rule could be applied to the lifeless objects also Because several characteristics like life death etc are very well applied to the lifeless objects as well when it is said that “curds is produced or “(effect of) that poison is still alive” or (intoxication of) safflower† is dead” and so on even though the objects mentioned there—in are lifeless

The argument mentioned above is not justified since all the characteristics of *octana* are residing in the animate objects as their innate qualities. But in the case of lifeless objects those characteristics are rarely applied and that too in a particular sense and not as a rule

छिक्परोद्भया छिक्मेत्तसकोयओ कुलिङ्गो व ।

आसयसचाराओ धियत्त । वल्लीवियाणाइ ॥२०६॥ (१७५४)

सम्मादओ य साव-प्पयोइ-सकायणाइओऽभिमया ।

यउलादओ य सहाइविसयकालोवलभाओ ॥२०७॥ (१७५५)

† Popularly known as *Karumbi* in *Kāṭhāvatthū*

Chikkaparoiyā chikkamettasankoyao kulingo vva !
 Āsayasancārāo Viyatta ! valliviyānāim ॥ 206 ॥ (1754)
 Sammādao ya sāva-ppaboha-sankoyanāio'bhimayā !
 Baulādao ya saddāvisayakālovalambhāo ॥ 207 ॥ (1755)

[स्पृष्टप्ररोदिकाः स्पृष्टमात्रसंकोचतः कुलिङ्ग इव ।
 आश्रयसंचाराद् व्यक्त ! वल्लीचितानानि ॥ २०६ ॥ (१७५४)
 शम्यादयश्च स्वाप-प्रबोध-संकोचनादितोऽभिमताः ।
 बकुलादयश्च शब्दादिविषयकालोपलम्भात् ॥ २०७ ॥ (१७५५)

Spristprarodikāḥ spristamatrasankocanataḥ kulinga iva !
 Āsrayasancārād Vyakta ! vallivitanāni ॥ 206 ॥ (1754)]
 Samyādayaśca svāpa-prabodha-sankocanādito'bhimataḥ !
 Bakulādayaśca śabdādivisaya kālopalambhāt ॥ 207 ॥ (1755)]

Trans—206-207 For, sensitive plants *O Vyakta* ! contract themselves like worm at the touch (of others), clusters of creepers spread themselves for support, *śamī* etc are supposed to contain the properties of sleeping, waking, contraction, etc and *bakula* etc contain the properties like *śabda* etc and (the order of) time also (1754-1755)

टीका-सचेतनाः स्पृष्टप्ररोदिकादयो वनस्पतयः, स्पृष्टमात्रसंकोचात्, कुलिङ्गः कीटादिस्तद्वत् । तथा, सचेतना वल्ल्यादयः, स्वरक्षार्थं वृत्ति-वृक्ष-वरण्डकाद्याश्रयं प्रति संचरणात् । तथा, शम्यादयश्चेतनत्वेनाभिमताः, स्वाप-प्रबोध-संकोचादिमत्त्वात्, देवदत्तवत् । तथा, सचेतना बकुला-ऽशोक-कुरुवक-विरहक-चम्पक-तिलकादयः, शब्दादिविषयकालोपलम्भात्-शब्द-रूप-गन्ध-रस-स्पर्शविषयाणां काले प्रस्ताव उपभोगस्य यथासंख्यमुपलम्भादित्यर्थः, यज्ञदत्तवदिति । एवं पूर्वमपि दौहदादिलिङ्गेषु कूष्माण्डी-बीजपूरकादयो वनस्पतिविशेषाः पक्षीकर्तव्या इति ॥ २०६-२०७ ॥ (१७५४-१७५५)॥

D. C—Plants like *sparśaprarodikā* contract themselves like worm at a slight touch, and hence they are *sa-cetana*.

So are the creepers spreading over a wall tree or fence for self-protection. *Sams* etc are also *sa-oetana* since they have the tendency to sleep wake or feel shy like *Devadatta*. Trees like *batula as'aka kurabaka viharaka, campaka tilaka* etc, are respectively able to feel the sensations of *śabda rūpa rasa gandha sparsa* etc. Plants like *kumāruti* and *biṣapuraka* feel the longing of a pregnant woman. It is clear therefore that *vanaspati* is *sa-oetana*.

Moreover

मसकुरो व सामाजजाइरूवकुरोवलभाओ ।

तरुगण-विद्रुम-लवणो-पलादयो सासयावस्था ॥२०८॥ (१७५६)

Masankuro vva sāmānajaī-rūvamkurovalambhāo ।

Tarugana-vidduma-lavano-valādao sāsayāvatthā ॥ 208 ॥ (1756)

[मांसाहुर इव समानजातिरूपाहुरोपलम्भात् ।

तरुगण-विद्रुम-लवणो-पलादय स्वाध्यावस्था ॥२०८॥ (१७५६)

Masankura iva samana-jatirūpankuropalambhat ।

Tarugana-vadruma-lavano-paladayah svadrayavasthah ॥ 208 ॥ (1756)]

Trans -208 Trees, corals salts, and stones etc. (are alive) at their own places of production by reason of their having a sprout in the form of common generality similar to the sprout of flesh (1756)

टीका-तरुगणः, तथा विद्रुम-लवणो-पलादयश्च स्वाध्यावस्था स्वजन्यस्थानगताः सन्तमेतनाः, छिन्नानामप्यमीषां पुनस्त्वत्स्थान एव समानजातीयाहुरोत्थानात्, अर्शोमांसाहुरवत् । आह-ननु पृथिव्यादिभूतानामिह सचेतनस्य साधयितुमारम्भम्, तदा पृथिव्या एवादौ तद् साधयितुं युक्तम्, तस्या एवादावुपन्यासात्, तस्मिन्मिति “जम्म-अरा-मीवज्ज” इत्यादिना तरुणामेवादौ तद् साधितम्, पञ्चानु विद्रुम-लवणो-पलादीनामिति ? । सत्यम्, किन्तु पृथ्वीविकारतया पृथ्वीभूत एव तरुणामन्तर्भावो लोकप्रसिद्धः,

सुव्यक्तचैतन्यलिङ्गाश्च यथा तरवो न तथा लवणो-पल-जलादय इति
तेषामेवादौ चैतन्यं साधितमिति ॥ २०८ ॥ (१७५६) ॥

D. C—Trees, corals, salts, and stones etc, are *sa-cetana* at their own places of production. Because, the sprouts of these objects spring up again and again like the sprout of flesh springing up in the case of disease of piles etc

Vyakta —Really speaking, you had started to establish *sa-cetanatva* in the elements like *prithvî* etc. Then, what is the idea in proving *sa-cetanatva* first in the case of *vanaspati* and then in the case of *prithvî* ?

Bhagavāna —*Vanaspati* is nothing but a form of *prithvî*. Hence, out of the five *bhūtas*, *vanaspati* resides only in *prithvî*. Moreover, the spirit of life is not so clearly manifested in stones etc as it has been in case of *vanaspati*. For this reason *O Vyakta* ! *Caitanya* is established first in *vanaspati* and then in *prithvî*.

Now, the *sa-cetanatva* of water is established—

भूमिक्खयसाभावियसंभवओ दद्दुरो व जलमुत्तं ।

अहवा मच्छो व सभाववोमसंभूयपायाओ ॥ २०९ ॥ (१७५७)

Bhūmikkhayasābhāviyasambhavao dadduro vva jalamuttam ।

Ahavā maccho va sabhāvavomasambhūyapāyāo ॥ 209 ॥ (1757)

[भूमिक्खतस्वाभाविकसंभवतो दद्दुर इव जलमुत्तम् ।

अथवा मत्स्य इव स्वभावव्योमसंभूतपातात् ॥ २०९ ॥ (१७५७)

Bhūmiksatasvābhāvikasambhavato dardura iva jalamuktam ।

Athavā matsya iva svabhāvavyomasambhūtapātāt ॥ 209 ॥ (1757)

Trans—209 Water springing up naturally by digging the earth is said to be living like a frog, or, by reason of its falling naturally from the sky, water is living like a fish (1757)

टीका-मौममम्मः सचेतनमुक्तम्, धृतभूमिसत्त्वातीयस्वामाविकस्य
तस्य संभवात्, दर्दुरवत् । अथवा, सचेतनमन्तरिक्षमम्मा, अन्नादिविकार
स्वभावसंभूतपावात्, मत्स्यवदिति ॥ २०९ ॥ (१७५७) ॥

D C—Water springing from earth when dug out of it is *sa-cetana* like a frog or that which falls from the sky as natural rains is also called *sa-cetana* since it comes from *vulcanus* like cloud etc

Fire as well as wind can also be taken as *sa-cetana* in this way —

अपरप्पेरियतिरियानियमियदिग्गमणओऽणिलो गो व्व ।

अनलो आहाराओ विद्धि विगारोवलम्माओ ॥२१०॥ (१७५८)

Apprapperiyatiriyāniyamiya deggamanaonilo go vva ।

Analo āhārāo viddhi-vigārova-lambhāo ॥ 210 ॥ (1758)

[अपरप्रेरितविर्यगनियमितदिग्गमनतोऽनिलो गौरिव ।

अनल आहाराव् बुद्धि-विकारोपलम्भात् ॥ २१० ॥ (१७५८)

Aparaprentatiryganilyamitadiggamanato nilo gauriva ।

Anala āharād viddhi-vikaropalambhat u 210 ॥ (1758)]

Trans—210 Wind is (alive) like a cow on account of its moving to and fro in various directions without being impelled by others Fire (is *sa-cetana*) because it has attained growth as well as variety of forms by means of food. (1758)

टीका-सात्मको वायुः, अपरप्रेरितविर्यगनियमितदिग्गमनात्, गोवत् ।
यथा, मात्मकं ज्ञेयं, आहारोपादानात्, तद्वद्बुद्धौ विकारविशेषोपलम्भाच्च,
नरवत् । गाथापन्थानुलोम्याच्च, नरवत् । गाथापन्थानुलोम्याच्च व्यस्यये
नोपन्यास इति ॥ २१० ॥ (१७५८)

D C—Wind has life as it moves in all directions without the help of any external agency Fire is also *sa-jīva* as it is able to grow and manifest various forms by the help of *akura*

तणवोऽणव्भाइविगारमुत्तजाइत्तओऽणिलंताइं ।

सत्थासत्थहयाओ निज्जीव-सजीवरूवाओ ॥ २११ ॥ (१७५९)

Tanavo'nabbhāivigaramuttajāttao'nīlantāim ।

Satthāsattahayāo nijjīva-sa-jīvarūvāo ॥ 211 ॥ (1759)

[तनवोऽनभ्रादिविकारमूर्तजातित्वतोऽनिलान्तानि ।

शस्त्रा-ऽशस्त्रहता निर्जीव-सजीवरूपाः ॥ २११ ॥ (१७५९)

Tanavo'nabhrādivikāramūrtajātītvato'nīlantāni ।

Śastrā-śastrahatā nirjīva-sa-jīva rūpāḥ ॥ 211 ॥ (1759)]

Trans.—211 Bodies (made of the four *bhūtas*) ending at *vāyu* though different from forms like clouds etc become lifeless when smashed by weapons and alive when free from weapons on account of their corporeal form (1759)

टीका—पृथिव्याद्यनिलान्तानि चत्वारि भूतानि जीवनिर्वर्तितास्तदाधारभूतास्तनव इति प्रतिज्ञा, अभ्रादिविकारादन्यत्वे सति मूर्तजातित्वात्, गवादिशरीरवत् । अभ्रादिविकारस्तु विस्रसापरिणतपुद्गलसंघातरूपत्वेनाचेतनत्वाद् वर्जितः । ताश्च पृथिव्यादितनवः शस्त्रोपहता निर्जीवाः, अशस्त्रोपहतास्तु सजीवा वर्ण-गन्ध-रसादिलक्षणतः समवसेया इति ॥ २११ ॥ (१७५९)

D C—Objects made of *bhūtas* like *prathvī jala, tejas*, and *vāyu* are distinguished from objects like clouds etc on account of their definite corporeal forms Hence, these bodies are alive when free from the attack of any weapon, but they at once become lifeless when smashed by weapons

Bhūtas like *prathvī* etc can be proved as living in another way also —

सिज्झंति सोम्म ! बहुसो जीवा नवसत्तसंभवो नवि य ।

परिमियदेसो लोगो न संति चेगिंदिया जेसिं ॥ २१२ ॥ (१७६०)

ते सिं भवविच्छिन्ती पावइ नेट्टा य सा जओ तेण ।

सिद्धमणंता जीवा भूयाहारा य तेऽवस्सं ॥ २१३ ॥ (१७६१)

Sijjhanti Somma ! bahuso jīvā navasattasambhavo navi ya ।
Parimiyadeso loko na santi ceghudiyaṃ jesim ॥ 212 ॥ (1760)

Te sm bhavavicchitti pāvaṃ netthā ya sā jaṇe na ।
Siddhamanantā jīvā bhūyāhārā ya te vassam ॥ 213 ॥ (1761)

[सिध्यन्ति सौम्य ! बहुषो जीवा नवसत्त्वसंभवो नापि च ।

परिमितदेशो लोको न सन्ति चैकेन्द्रिया येपाम् ॥ २१२ ॥ (१७६०)

तेषां मयविच्छिन्ति प्राप्नोति नेष्टा च सा यतस्तेन ।

सिद्धमननन्ता जीवा भूताधाराश्च तेज्जइयम् ॥ २१३ ॥ (१७६१)

Sidhyanti Saumya ! bahuso jīva navasattvasambhavo nāpi ca ।
Parimitadeśo loko na santi cāikendriyam yepam ॥ 212 ॥ (1760)]

Tesaṃ bhavavicchittib prāpnoti ca sa yatastena :

Siddhamananta jīva bhūtādhārāśca te vāṣyam ॥ 213 ॥ (1761)]

Trans—212-213 Many a *jīvā*, O *Saumya* ! attains *mokṣa* and there is no possibility of new *jīvas* (to be born) The world is limited So, those according to whom plants *etc.* do not exist will have the whole mundane world destroyed. But (*ca*) that is not desirable. Hence it is definitely proved that they (*i. e.* plants *etc.*) are the endless *jīvas* with *bhūtas* as their supports (1760-1761)

टीका—सिध्यन्ति मुक्तिं यान्ति तावद्वत्स बहुषो जीवा, न च नवमयस्योत्पादः केनापीप्यत, परिमितदृश्य लोकाः, ततस्तदाधाराः स्थूलाः स्तोका एव जीवा घटन्ते । एवं च सति येषां मतेन वनस्पत्यादय एकन्द्रिया जीवा न सन्ति, तेषां मयस्य ससारस्य व्यविच्छिन्तिः प्राप्नोति । न चासौ कस्यापि तीर्यान्तीर्यस्यष्टा यतः, तेन तस्मात् कारणात् सिद्ध सत्त्वानामानन्त्यम् । ते च संसारित्वादवश्य भूताधाराः क्षीरीणि एवैत्यर्थः । न च वनस्पत्यादीनन्तरणा यत् तेषां क्षीरमुपपद्यत । निवेद्यन्तां वा यच्छरीरास्ते, अभ्युपगम्यतां वा वनस्पत्यादीनां मात्मकममिति भावः ॥ २१२-२१३ ॥ (१७६०-१७६१) ॥

D C.—Since many *jīvas* attain *mokṣa* there is no possibi-

lity of new *sattvas* to be born Moreover, this world is limited in space It is natural, therefore, that there will be a small number of *jīvas* depending upon it Under these circumstances, if one believes that plants etc are not *sa-cetana*, the whole of the mundane world will have to cease existing in no time But that is not desirable in any way. Hence, in order to account for the continuity of the mundane world, the continuity of the living beings is accepted Now since all these *jīvas* are the mundane *jīvas*, they must have *bhūtas* as their *ś'astras* (weapons) and since plants etc are based on *bhūtas* they should also be undoubtedly taken as *sa-jīva*

Now, the opponent's objection and its refutation—

एवमहिंसाभावो जीवघणं ति न य तं जओऽभिहिअं ।
सत्थोवहयमजीवं न य जीवघणं ति तो हिंसो ॥२१४॥ (१७६२)

Evamahimsābhāvo jīvaghaṇam ti na ya tam jao'bhīham ।
Satthovahayamajīvaṁ na ya jīvaghaṇam ti to himso ॥214॥ (1762)

[एवमहिंसाभावो जीवघनमिति न च तद् यतोऽभिहितम् ।
शस्त्रोपहतमजीवं न च जीवघनमिति ततो हिंसा ॥ २१४ ॥ (१७६२)

Evamahimsā'bhāvo jīvaghaṇamiti na ca tad yato'bhīhitam ।
Śastropahatamajīvaṁ na ca jīvaghaṇamiti tato himsā ॥214॥ (1762)]

Trans—214 (The opponent may ask that) There is no possibility of *ahimsa* in that case on account of the statement that “ (the world) is compact with *jīvas*.” (The reply is—) That is not so It has already been said that one is rendered lifeless (only) when beaten by weapons So, *himsā* could never be derived merely from the statement that “ (the world) is compact with *jīvas* ” (1762)

टीका—नन्वेवं सति लोकस्यातीवपृथिव्यादिजीवघनत्वादहिंसाऽभावः,
संयतैरप्यहिंसाव्रतमित्थं निर्वाहयितुमशक्यमिति भावः । तदेतद् न, यतो-
ऽनन्तरमेवाभिहितमस्माभिः—“ शस्त्रोपहतं पृथिव्यादिकमजीवं ” भवति ।

Sijjhanti Somma ! bahuso jīvā navasattasambhavo navi ya ।
Parimiyadeso logo na santi cegindiyā Jesim ॥ 212 ॥ (1760)

Te sm bhavavicchitti pāva netthā ya sā jao tena ।
Siddhamanantā jīvā bhūtyāhārā ya te vassam ॥ 213 ॥ (1761)

[सिध्यन्ति सौम्य ! बहुस्रो जीवा नवसत्त्वसंभवो नापि च ।

परिमितदेशो लोको न सन्ति चैकेन्द्रियां येषाम् ॥ २१२ ॥ (१७६०)

तेषां भवविच्छित्तिः प्राप्नोति नेष्टा च सा यतस्तेन ।

सिद्धमननन्ता जीवा भूताधाराश्च तेष्वव्ययम् ॥ २१३ ॥ (१७६१)

Sidhyanti Saumya ! bahuso jīva navasttrasambhavo nāpi ca ।
Parimitadeso loko na santi cakendriyam yesaṃ ॥ 212 ॥ (1760)]

Teṣaṃ bhavavicchittih prāpnoti ca sā yatastena ।

Siddhamananta jīva bhūtaadharāśca te vāryam ॥ 213 ॥ (1761)]

Trans—212-213 Many a *jīvā* O *Saumya* ! attains *mokṣa* and there is no possibility of new *jīvas* (to be born) The world is limited. So, those according to whom plants *etc* do not exist will have the whole mundane world destroyed. But (*ca*) that is not desirable. Hence it is definitely proved that they (*i. e.* plants *etc*) are the endless *jīvas* with *bhūtas* as their supports (1760-1761)

टीका—सिध्यन्ति मुक्तिं यान्ति तावदवस्य बहुस्रो जीवा, न च नवसत्त्वोत्पादः केनापीष्यते, परिमितदेशश्च लोकः, ततस्तदाधाराः स्पृताः स्तोका एव जीवा भवन्ते । एव च सति तेषां मतेन वनस्पत्यादय एकेन्द्रिया जीवा न सन्ति, तेषां भवस्य संसारस्य अपवच्छित्तिः प्राप्नोति । न चासौ कस्यापि तीथान्तरीयस्वेष्टा यतः, तेन तस्मात् कारणात् सिद्धं सत्त्वानामान न्यम् । ते च संसारित्वादवश्य भूताधाराः क्षरीरिण एवेत्यर्थः । न च वनस्पत्यादीनन्तरेणान्यत् तेषां क्षरीररूपपद्यते । निवेद्यन्तां वा यच्छरीरास्ते, अस्म्युपगम्यतां वा वनस्पत्यादीनां सात्मकत्वमिति भावः ॥ २१२-२१३ ॥ (१७६०-१७६१) ॥

D. C.—Since many *jīvas* attain *mokṣa* there is no possibi-

lity of new *sattvas* to be born. Moreover, this world is limited in space. It is natural, therefore, that there will be a small number of *jīvas* depending upon it. Under these circumstances, if one believes that plants etc. are not *sa-cetana*, the whole of the mundane world will have to cease existing in no time. But that is not desirable in any way. Hence, in order to account for the continuity of the mundane world, the continuity of the living beings is accepted. Now since all these *jīvas* are the mundane *jīvas*, they must have *bhūtas* as their *s'astras* (weapons) and since plants etc. are based on *bhūtas* they should also be undoubtedly taken as *sa-jīva*.

Now, the opponent's objection and its refutation—

एवमहिंसाभावो जीवघणं ति न य तं जओऽभिहिअं ।
सत्थोवहयमजीवं न य जीवघणं ति तो हिंसो ॥२१४॥ (१७६२)

Evamahimsābhāvo jīvaghaṇam ti na ya tam jao'bhihiam ।
Sattthovahayamajīvam na ya jīvaghaṇam ti to himso ॥214॥ (1762)

[एवमहिंसाऽभावो जीवघनमिति न च तद् यतोऽभिहितम् ।
शस्त्रोपहतमजीवं न च जीवघनमिति ततो हिंसा ॥ २१४ ॥ (१७६२)

Evamahimsā'bhāvo jīvaghaṇamiti na ca tad yato'bhihitam ।
Śastropahatamajīvam na ca jīvaghaṇamiti tato himsā ॥214॥ (1762)]

Trans—214 (The opponent may ask that) There is no possibility of *ahimsa* in that case on account of the statement that “ (the world) is compact with *jīvas*. ” (The reply is—) That is not so. It has already been said that one is rendered lifeless (only) when beaten by weapons. So, *himsā* could never be derived merely from the statement that “ (the world) is compact with *jīvas* ” (1762)

टीका—नन्वेवं सति लोकस्यातीवपृथिव्यादिजीवघनत्वादहिंसाऽभावः,
संयतैरप्यहिंसाव्रतमित्थं निर्वाहयितुमशक्यमिति भावः । तदेतद् न, यतो-
ऽनन्तरमेवाभिहितमस्माभिः—“ शस्त्रोपहतं पृथिव्यादिकमजीवं ” भवति ।

सदधीवत्त्वे चाकुता-ऽकारितादिपरिमोगेन निर्वहत्वेव यतीनां संयमः । न च
 “जीवघनो लोकः” इत्येतावन्मात्रेभैव हिंसा समवतीति ॥२१४॥ (१७६२)॥

D C—Vyakta —If the world is packed with *jivas* such as *prithvi* etc. even an *asotto* will not be able to follow the vow of *ahimsā*, as they will least require food etc. which they would not obtain without *himsa*.

Bhagavāna —For this, it has already been said *O Vyakta* ! that *prithvi* etc. become lifeless when beaten by weapons. Thus when they become *a-jivas* there is no objection for *yatis* to get their food from them. So it is not proper to deduce *himsa* merely from the statement that the world is full of *jivas*.

Moreover

न य घायतु चि हिंसो नाघायतो चि निच्छियमहिंसो ।
 न विरलजीवमहिंसो न य जीवघण तितो हिंसा ॥२१५॥ (१७६३)
 अहणतो वि ह्रु हिंसो दुदृत्तणओ मओ अहिमरो व ।
 घाहितो न वि हिंसो सुदृत्तणओ जहा विज्जो ॥२१६॥ (१७६४)

Na ya ghāyau tti himso nāghayanto tti nicchiyamahiṃso ।
Na viralajīvamahiṃso na ya jīvaghaṇam tti to himso ॥215॥ (1763)
Ahaṇanto vi hu himso duḍḍhattaṇao maō ahimaro vva ।
Bahigto na vi himso suddhattaṇao jaha vijjō ॥ 216 ॥ (1764)

[न च घातक इति हिंसो नामभ्रिति निश्चितमहिंसः ।

न विरलजीवमहिंसो न च जीवघनमिति ततोहिंसः ॥२१५॥ (१७६३)

अन्नमपि सलु हिंसो दुष्टस्वतो मतोऽमिमर इव ।

बाधमानो नापि हिंसः दृष्टस्वतो यथा वैद्य ॥ २१६ ॥ (१७६४)

Na ca ghātaka tti himsro naghannanti nāstamahimsrah ।
Na viralajīvamahimsro na ca jīvaghaṇananti tato himsrah ॥215॥

Aghnannapi khalu himsro dustatvato mato'bhimara iva ।
 Bādhamāno nāpi himsrah śuddhatvato yathā vaidyah ॥216॥]

Trans—215-216 One who is destructive, is not (necessarily) murderous, and one who is not destructive, is not certainly non-violent Nor is one having little *jīva*, a-*himsaka* and one that is packed with *jīvas* accepted as *himsaka* For, one is murderous, like a hunter, on account of his wicked motive even without killing, while another afflicting others with a good purpose, like a physician, is not murderous (1763-1764)

टीका-न हि “घातकः” इत्येतावता हिंस्रः, न चाग्नन्नपि निश्चयनय-
 मतेनाहिंस्रः, नापि “विरलजीवम्” इत्येतावन्मात्रेणाहिंस्रः, न चापि “जीव-
 घनम्” इत्येतावता च हिंस्र इति । किं तर्हि ? अभिमरो गजादिघातकः स
 इव दुष्टाध्यवसायोऽग्नन्नपि हिंस्रो मतः । बाधमानोऽपि च शुद्धपरिणामो न
 हिंस्रो यथा वैद्यः, इति ग्नन्नप्यहिंस्रः, अग्नन्नपि च हिंस्र उक्तः ॥ २१५-
 २१६ ॥ (१७६३-१७६४) ॥

D C—The point is that one committing actual *himsā* is not *himsaka* because of his good motive as in the case of a physician, while another, not actually committing *himsā* but having wicked purpose, is *himsaka* like a hunter.

Also,

पंचसमिओ तिगुत्तो नाणी अविहिंसओ न विवरीओ ।
 होउ व संपत्ती से मा वा जीवोवरोहेणं ॥ २१७ ॥ (१७६५)

Pancasamio tigutto nāṇi avihimsao na vivario ।

Hōu va sampattī se mā vā jīvovarohenam ॥ 217 ॥ (1765)

[पञ्चसमितस्त्रिगुप्तो ज्ञान्यविहिंसको न विपरीतः ।

भवतु वा संपत्तिस्तस्य मा वा जीवोपरोधेन ॥ २१७ ॥ (१७६५)

Panoṣsamitastriṅgupto jhānyavihimsako na viparītaḥ ।

Bhavatu vā sampattistasya mā vā jīvoparodhena #217# (1765)]

Trans—217 A wise person conversant with the five *samitis*† and guarded in three ways (i. e., by mind, speech and body) is a-*himsaka*, but not the one (having) contrary (characteristics) He may or may not attain the fulfilment (of) *himsā* on account of obstruction to *jīvas* (1765)

टीका—यच्चमिः समितिमिः समितः, विष्णुमिर्गुप्तिमिच्च गुप्तो ष्णानी जीवस्वरूप-तद्वशाक्रियामिद्धः सर्वथा जीववशापरिणामपरिभवः तस्यैव तच्च क्वचमपि हिंसन्नप्यविहिंसको भवः । एतद्विपरीतलक्षणस्तु नाहिंसकः, किन्तु हिंस एवायम्, अशुमपरिणामत्वात् । बाह्यजीवहिंसायास्तु जीवोपरोधेन जीवस्य कीटादरूपरोधेनोपघातेन संपत्तिर्भवतु, मा भूव वा ' स ' तस्य साध्यादेः, हिंसकत्वे तस्या अनैकान्तिकत्वादिति ॥ २१७ ॥ (१७६५) ॥

D C—A person conversant with all the five *samitis* and restraining himself in three ways—*manasa* (by mind) *vācā* (by speech) and *karmā* (by bodily actions)—is the *jñāta* of actual *jīvasvarūpa* and its protection. Such a person should be taken as a-*himsaka* even if he commits *himsa*. But one who is opposed to the nature of the above-mentioned *jñāta puruṣa* is *himsaka* as he brings about an a-*sambha parināma*. Fulfilment of *himsa* may or may not be attained by him due to *jīvoparodha* or the (natural) obstruction to *jīvas* but his *himsakavṛta* is undoubtedly established on account of his bad intention and its inauspicious consequence as laid down below —

असुभो जो परिणामो सा हिंसा सो उ बाहिरनिमित्त ।
को वि अवेक्खेज्ज न वा जम्हाऽणेगतियं बज्झ ॥२१८॥ (१७६६)

Asubho jo parināmo sā himsā so u bāhiraṇimittam ।
Ko vi avekkhejja na vā jamhanegantiyaṃ bajjham #218# (1766)

† Five Jaina rules of life.

[अशुभो यः परिणामः सा हिंसा स तु बाह्यनिमित्तम् ।

कोऽप्यपेक्षेत न वा यस्मादनैकान्तिकं बाह्यम् ॥ २१८ ॥ (१७६६)

Aśubho yah parināmah sā himsā sa tu bāhyanimittam ।

Ko'pyapekseta na vā yasmādanāikāntikam bāhyam ॥218॥(1766)]

Trans—218 What is (known as) inauspicious consequence is (itself) *himsā* But that is an external cause Some may or may not require (this cause), because the external (cause) is variable (1766)

टीका—यस्मादिह निश्चयनयतो योऽशुभपरिणामः स एव “ हिंसा ” इत्याख्यायते । स च बाह्यसत्त्वातिपातक्रियालक्षणं निमित्तं कोऽप्यपेक्षते, कोऽपि पुनस्तन्निरपेक्षोऽपि भवेत्, यथा तन्दुलमत्स्यादीनाम्; तस्मादनैकान्तिकमेव बाह्यनिमित्तम्, तत्सद्भावेऽप्यहिंसकत्वात्, तदभावेऽपि च हिंसकत्वादिति ॥ २१८ ॥ (१७६६) ॥

D. C—An action having inauspicious consequence is called *himsā* This sort of *himsā* results from the *nimitta* of *jīvahimsā* while sometimes *himsā* results without the *apeksā* of those *nimittas* as in the case of *tandulamatsya* As the *bāhya nimitta* is *anāikāntika*, an action is *himsaka* sometimes even in absence of *bāhya nimitta* and *a-himsaka* sometimes even in its own absence

अशुभपरिणामहेतु जीवाबाहो ति तो मयं हिंसा ।

जस्स उ न सो निमित्तं संतो वि न तस्स सा हिंसा ॥२१९॥(१७६७)

Aśubhaparīṇāmaheṭu jīvābāho tti to mayam himsā ।

Jassa u na so nimittam santo vi na tassa sā himsā ॥219॥ (1767)

[अशुभपरिणामहेतुर्जीवाबाध इति ततो मतं हिंसा ।

यस्य तु न स निमित्तं सन्नपि न तस्य सा हिंसा ॥ २१९ ॥ (१७६७)

Aśubhaparīṇāmahetu r-jīvābādha iti tato matam himsā ।

Yasya tu na sa nimittam sannapi na tasya sā himsā ॥219॥]

Pancasamitastrigupto jhanyavāhimsako na viparītaḥ ।

Bhavatu va sampattistasya ma va jivoparodhena ॥217॥ (1765)]

Trans—217 A wise person conversant with the five *samutis*† and guarded in three ways (*i. e.* by mind, speech and body) is a-*himsaka* but not the one (having) contrary (characteristics) He may or may not attain the fulfilment (of) *himsā* on account of obstruction to *jīvas*. (1765)

टीका—पञ्चमिः समितिमिः समितः, तिस्रभिर्गुप्तिभिश्च गुप्तो ज्ञानी जीवस्वरूप-तद्रक्षाक्रियामिहः सर्वथा जीवरक्षापरिणामपरिणतः तत्प्रयत्न कथमपि हिंसन्नप्पविहिंसको मतः । एतद्विपरीतलक्षणस्तु नाहिंसकः, किन्तु हिंस एवायम्, अष्टमपरिणामत्वात् । बाह्यजीवहिंसायास्तु जीवोपरोधेन जीवस्य कीटादेरुपरोधेनोपघातेन सपदिर्भवतु, सा भूद् वा 'स' तस्य साध्यादेः, हिंसकत्वे तस्या अनैकान्तिकत्वादिति ॥ २१७ ॥ (१७६५) ॥

D C—A person conversant with all the five *samutis* and restraining himself in three ways—*manasa* (by mind) *vacasa* (by speech) and *karmanā* (by bodily actions)—is the *jñātā* of actual *jīvasvarūpa* and its protection. Such a person should be taken as a-*himsaka* even if he commits *himsa*. But one who is opposed to the nature of the above-mentioned *jñātā puruṣa* is *himsaka* as he brings about an a-*subha parināma*. Fulfilment of *himsā* may or may not be attained by him due to *jivoparodha* or the (natural) obstruction to *jīvas* but his *himsakata* is undoubtedly established on account of his bad intention and its inauspicious consequence as laid down below :—

असुभो जो परिणामो सा हिंसा सो उ बाहिरनिमित्त ।

को वि अवेक्खेज्ज न वा जम्हाऽणेगसिय वज्झ ॥२१८॥ (१७६६)

Asubho jo parināmo sā himsā so u bāhiraṇimittam ।

Ko vi avekkhejja na vā jamhaṇegantiyaṃ vajjham ॥218॥ (1766)

शुभपरिणामजनकत्वे बाह्यं निमित्तमनैकान्तिकमेवेति । तस्माद् व्यक्त ! सन्ति पञ्चभूतानि, चेतनानि चाद्यानि चत्वारि, इत्येतत् प्रतीहीति स्थितम् । यच्च “स्वप्नोमयं वै सकलम्” इत्यादि । तत्रापि यस्तव चेतसि वर्तते नासावर्थः, किन्तु भवभयोद्विग्नानां भव्यसत्त्वानां धन-कनक-पुत्र-कलत्राद्यसारतामात्र-प्रतिपादनं तेन विधीयते, येन ते तदास्थां परित्यज्य मुक्तये प्रवर्तन्ते, न पुनस्तत्र भूताभावः प्रतिपाद्यते । इति मुञ्च संशयम्, प्रतिपद्यस्व भूतास्ति-त्वमिति ॥ २२० ॥ (१७६८)

D C—To a dispassionate saint, *s'abda*, *rūpa*, *rasa* etc do not become the attractive objects of pleasure because his mind is pure. A pure-minded man does never cherish desire for sensuous pleasure from a beautiful mother. In the same way, a self-restrained and persevering *muni* does never commit *himsā* even if he inflicts pain upon *jīvas* on account of his *s'uddha bhāvas*. It is clear, therefore, that *bāhya nimitta* is *anaskāntika* so far as *himsā* is concerned, and what is required is the intention pure and simple.

Hence *O Bhadra* ' accept the existence of the five *bhūtas* and know it for certain that the first four of them *viz*, *prithvī*, *jala*, *agni*, and *vāyu* are *sa-cetana*. Moreover, you have not understood the real meaning of the *Veda-padas* like “*Svano-pamam vai sakalam*” etc. The main object of those sentences is to assert the fragility of wealth, wife, progeny etc before the high-minded people who have been distressed by the *bhavabhaya*, so that they might abandon their attachment to the worldly *visayas* and strive for the attainment of *mokṣa*. Leave, therefore, all your doubts aside, *O Saumya* ' and admit the existence of *bhūtas*.

छिन्नामि संसयमि जिणेण जरा-मरणविप्पमुक्केण ।

सो समणो पवइओ पंचहिं सह खंडियसएहिं ॥२२१॥ (१७६९)

Chinnammi samsayammi Jinena jarā-maranavippamukkenam ।
So samano pavvaio pancāhim saha khandiyasaehim ॥221॥ (1769)

Trans.—219 Affliction of *jīvas* as a cause for an evil end is called *himsā*. That which has no such (end) has nothing like *himsā* even if cause is there. (1767)

टीका—ततस्तस्मात् यो जीवाबाधोऽश्रमपरिणामस्य हेतुः, अथवा, अश्रमपरिणामो हेतुः कारणं यस्यासावश्रमपरिणामहेतुर्जीवाबाधो जीवघातः, स एव “ हिंसा ” इति मतं तीर्थंकर-गणधराणाम् । यस्य तु जीवाबाधस्य सोऽश्रमपरिणामो न निमित्तं स जीवाबाधः सन्नपि तस्य साधोर्न हिंसेति ॥ २१९ ॥ (१७६७) ॥

D. C.—One who inflicts pain upon *jīvas* with an evil purpose is said to commit *himsā* but one who has no such purpose does not commit *himsā* even if he inflicts pain upon *jīvas*.

सद्वादो रहफला न वीयमोहस्त भावसुखीओ ।

जह, तह जीवाबाधो न सुद्धमणसो वि हिंसाए ॥२२०॥ (१७६८)

Saddādao rahphalā na vīyamohassa bhāvasuddhīo ।

Jaha, taha jīvābaho na suddhamanasso vi himsae ॥ 220 ॥ (1768)

[शब्दादयो रतिफला न वीतमोहस्य भावसुखेः ।

यथा, तथा जीवाबाधो न सुद्धमनसोऽपि हिंसायै ॥२२०॥ (१७६८)

Śabda-dayo ratiphala na vītamohasya bhāvasuddheḥ ।

Yatha tatha jīvābaho na suddhamanasso pi himsayai ॥ 220 ॥]

Trans.—220 Just as *śabda* etc do not become the objects of pleasure to a dispassionate saint on account of the purity of (his) mind affliction of *jīvas* too does not become the cause of *himsā* to a person having pure intention (1768)

टीका—यथेह वीतराग-द्वेष-मोहस्य भगवत इष्टाः शब्द-रूपस्यो भावविशुद्धितो न कदाचिद् रतिफला रतिजनकाः संपद्यन्ते, यथा येह सुद्धात्मनो रूपवत्यामपि मातरि न विषयामितायः संजायते; तथा सुद्ध परिणामस्य भूतवतः साधोः सम्बोधघातोऽपि न हिंसायै संपद्यते । ततोऽ-

शुभपरिणामजनकत्वे बाह्यं निमित्तमनैकान्तिकमेवेति । तस्माद् व्यक्त ! सन्ति पञ्चभूतानि, चेतनानि चाद्यानि चत्वारि, इत्येतत् प्रतीहीति स्थितम् । यच्च “स्वप्नोमयं वै सकलम्” इत्यादि । तत्रापि यस्तव चेतसि वर्तते नासावर्थः, किन्तु भवभयोद्विग्नानां भव्यसत्त्वानां धन-कनक-पुत्र-कलत्राद्यसारतामात्र-प्रतिपादनं तेन विधीयते, येन ते तदास्थां परित्यज्य मुक्तये प्रवर्तन्ते, न पुनस्तत्र भूताभावः प्रतिपाद्यते । इति मुञ्च संशयम्, प्रतिपद्यस्व भूतास्तित्वमिति ॥ २२० ॥ (१७६८)

D. C—To a dispassionate saint, *s'abda*, *rūpa*, *rasa* etc. do not become the attractive objects of pleasure because his mind is pure. A pure-minded man does never cherish desire for sensuous pleasure from a beautiful mother. In the same way, a self-restrained and persevering *munī* does never commit *himsā* even if he inflicts pain upon *jīvas* on account of his *s'uddha bhāvas*. It is clear, therefore, that *bāhya nimitta* is *anāskāntika* so far as *himsā* is concerned, and what is required is the intention pure and simple.

Hence *O Bhadra* ' accept the existence of the five *bhūtas* and know it for certain that the first four of them *viz*, *prithvī*, *jala*, *agni*, and *vāyu* are *sa-cetana*. Moreover, you have not understood the real meaning of the *Veda-padas* like “*Svano-pamam var sakalam*” etc. The main object of those sentences is to assert the fragility of wealth, wife, progeny etc before the high-minded people who have been distressed by the *bhavabhaya*, so that they might abandon their attachment to the worldly *visayas* and strive for the attainment of *moksa*. Leave, therefore, all your doubts aside, *O Saumya* ' and admit the existence of *bhūtas*.

छिन्नम्मि संसयम्मि जिणेण जरा-मरणविप्पमुक्केण ।

सो समणो पव्वइओ पंचहिं सह खंडियसएहिं ॥२२१॥ (१७६९)

Chinnammi samsayammi Jinena jarā-maranavippamukkenam ।

So samano pavvaio pancāhim saha khandiyasaehim ॥221॥ (1769)

[छिन्ने संशये जिनेन अरा मरणविप्रमुक्तेन ।

स भ्रमणः प्रव्रजितः पञ्चमिः सह सण्डिकद्वयैः ॥ २२१ ॥ (१७६९)

Ohinne samśaye Jinena jara-maravavipramuktena :

Sa śramaṇaḥ pravrajitaḥ pañcambahi saha khandikadvayaiḥ ॥221॥]

Trans.—221 When the doubt was removed by the *Tīrthan-kata*, who was entirely free from old age, and death the saint *Vyakta* accepted *dīkṣā* along with his five hundred pupils. (1769)

End of the Discussion with the Fourth Gaṇadhara



Chapter V



पञ्चमगणधरवक्तव्यता ।

Discussion with the Fifth Ganadhara.

ते पवइए सोउं सुहुम आगच्छइ जिणसगासं ।
वच्चामि ण वंदामी वंदित्ता पज्जुवासामि ॥ २२२ ॥ (१७७०)

Te pavvaie soum Suhuma āgacchai Jinasagāsam ।
Vaccāmi na vandāmi vandittā pajjuvāsāmi ॥ 222 ॥ (1770)

[तान् प्रव्रजितान् श्रुत्वा सुधर्म आगच्छति जिनसकाशम् ।
व्रजामि वन्दे वन्दित्वा पर्युपासे ॥ २२२ ॥ (१७७०)]

Tān pravrajitān śrutvā Sudharma āgacchatī Jinsakāśam ।
Vrajāmi vande vanditvā paryupāse ॥ 222 ॥ (1770)]

Trans —222 Having heard that they (*Vyakta* and others) had renounced the world, *Sudharman* comes before the *Tirthankara* (He thinks –) I may go, pay my homage, and worship him (1770)

आभट्ठो यं जिणेणं जाइ-जरा-मरणविप्पमुक्केणं ।
नामेण य गोत्तेण य सव्वण्णु सव्वदरिसी णं ॥ २२३ ॥ (१७७१)

Ābhattho ya Jinenam jāi-jarā-maranavippamukkenam ।
Nāmena ya gottena ya savvanu savvadarisī nam ॥ 223 ॥ (1771)

आभाषितश्च जिनेन जाति-जग-मरणविप्रमुक्तेन ।
नाम्ना च गोत्रेण च सर्वज्ञेन सर्वदर्शिना ॥ २२३ ॥ (१७७१)

Abhaṇitaśca Jinena jati-jara-maraṇavipramuktena ।

Namna ca gotreṇa ca sarvajñena sarvadarśinā ॥ 223 ॥ (1771)]

Trans—223 He was addressed by his name, and gotra (lineage) by the *Tīrthāṅkara* who was free from birth, old age, and death who was all-knowing and who had complete *darśana* (undifferentiated knowledge) (1771)

किं मन्ने जारिसो इहभवस्मि सो तारिसो परमवे वि ।

वेयपयाण य अत्थ न याणसी तेसिमो अत्थो ॥२२४॥ (१७७२)

Kim manne jāriso iha bhavammi so tāriso parabhave vi ।

Veya-payana ya attham na yānāsi tesimo attho ॥ 224 ॥ (1772)

[किं मन्यसे यादृश इहमवे स तादृश परमवेऽपि ।

वेदपदानां चार्थं न जानासि तेषामयमर्थः ॥ २२४ ॥ (१७७२)

Kim manyase yadrīśa iha bhave sa tadrīśaḥ parabhave pi ।

Veda-padanāṃ artham na jānāsi teṣāmayamarthaḥ ॥ 224 ॥ (1772)]

Trans—224 Is it your belief that human life even in the next world is the same as it is in this world ? But (*ca*) you do not know the (real) meaning of the sentences of *Vedas* Here is their (real) interpretation (1772)

टीका—त्वमेव मन्यसे—यो मनुष्यादिर्यादृश इहमवे स तादृशः परमवेऽपि । नन्वयमनुचितस्ते संश्रयः, यतोऽसौ विरुद्धवेदपदभ्रुतिनिबन्धनो वर्धते । तानि चामूनि वेदपदानि—“ पुरुषो वै पुरुषत्वमश्नुते, पञ्चषा पञ्चत्वम् ” इत्यादि, तथा, “ शृगालो वै यप जायते यः सपुत्रीपो दहते ” इत्यादि । एषां च वेदपदानाममुमर्थं मन्यसे त्वम्—“ पुरुषो मृतः सन् परमवे पुरुषत्वमेवेत्पादि, अमूनि किञ्च मयान्तरगतश्चन्तुसादृश्यप्रतिपादकानि; तथा, “ शृगालो वै ” इत्यादीनि तु वैसदृश्यरूपापकानि ” इति । अतस्त्वय संश्रयः । अयं चापुक्त एव, यतोऽमीषां वेदपदानां नायमर्थः, किन्तु वक्ष्यमाणलक्षण इति ॥ २२४ ॥ (१७७२) ॥

D O—O Sudhorman ! Do you entertain the belief that

human life in the next world is the same as it is here ? Sentences of *Vedas* having contradictory interpretations have given rise to this illusion of yours. The sentences are as follows —

(1) “ *Puruso vaṁ puruṣatvamas'nute, paś'avaḥ paśutvam* ”
etc and

(2) “ *Śrugālo vaṁ esa jāyate yaḥ sa-purīso dahyate* ” etc.

According to you, interpretations of these two sentences are respectively as follows —

(1) A man obtains nothing but manhood even after death, in the next world, and animals such as cow etc become animals after death. Thus, sentences like this suggest that the next life is the same as this

(2) But the sentences like “ *Śrugālo vaṁ* etc ” mean to assert that the next life is totally different from the present one

Such contradicting interpretations have given rise to the misguided belief of yours. Here is their real interpretation. Listen carefully

कारणसरिसं कज्जं बीयस्सेवङ्कुरो त्ति मण्णंतो ।

इहभवसरिसं सव्वं जमवेसि परे वि तमजुत्तं ॥२२५॥ (१७७३)

Kāranasarisaṁ kajjam biyasseevaṅkuro tti maṇṇanto ।

Ihahavasarisam savvam jamavesi pare vi tamajuttam ॥225॥ (1773)

[कारणसदृशं कार्यं बीजस्येवाङ्कुर इति मन्यमानः ।

इहभवसदृशं सर्वं यदवैषि परस्मिन्नपि तदयुक्तम् ॥ २२५ ॥ (१७७३)

Kāranasadrśam kāryam bijasyevāṅkura iti manyamānaḥ ।

Ihahavasadrśam sarvam yadavaiṣi parasminnapi tadayuktam ॥225॥]

Trans—225 Just as sprout is similar to seed, the effect is also similar to cause according to you (And hence), you

Abhasitaśca Jinena jati-jara-maraṇavipramuktena ।

Namna ca gotreṇa ca sarvajñena sarvadarśinā ॥ 223 ॥ (1771)]

Trans—223 He was addressed by his name, and gotra (lineage) by the *Tīrthankara* who was free from birth old age, and death, who was all-knowing and who had complete *darśana* (undifferentiated knowledge) (1771)

किं मझे जारिसो इहभवस्मि सो तारिसो परमवे वि ।

वेयपयाण य अस्थ न याणसी तेसिमो अत्थो ॥२२४॥ (१७७२)

Kim manne jāṇso iha bhavammi so tāṇiso parabhave vi ।

Veya-payana ya attham na yāṇasī tesimo attho ॥ 224 ॥ (1772)

[किं मन्यसे यादृश इहमवे स तादृशः परमवेऽपि ।

वेदपदानां चार्थं न जानासि तेषामयमर्थः ॥ २२४ ॥ (१७७२)

Kim manyase yadrūṣa iha bhave sa tadrūṣaḥ parabhave pi ।

Veda-padanāṃ cartham na jāṇasī teṣāmayamarthaḥ ॥ 224 ॥ (1772)]

Trans—224 Is it your belief that human life even in the next world is the same as it is in this world ? But (*ca*) you do not know the (real) meaning of the sentences of *Vedas* Here is their (real) interpretation (1772)

टीका—स्वमेवं मन्यसे—यो मनुष्यादिर्यादृश इहमवे स तादृशः परमवेऽपि । नन्वपमनुषितस्ते संशयः, यतोऽसौ विरुद्धवेदपदभुतिनिबन्धनो वर्तते । तानि चामूनि वेदपदानि—“ पुरुषो वै पुरुषत्वमश्नुते, पञ्चषा पञ्चत्वम् ” इत्यादि, तथा, “ शृगालो वै एष आयते यः सपुरीषो दहते ” इत्यादि । एषां च वेदपदानामयमर्थं मन्यसे त्वम्—“ पुरुषो मृतः सन् परमवे पुरुषत्वमेवेत्यादि, अमूनि किल भवान्तरगतञ्जन्तुसादृश्यप्रतिपादकानि; तथा, “ शृगालो वै ” इत्यादीनि तु वैसदृश्यरूपापकानि ” इति । अतस्त्वय संशयः । अयं चायुक्त एव, यतोऽस्मीषां वेदपदानां नायमर्थः, किन्तु वक्ष्यमाणलक्षण इति ॥ २२४ ॥ (१७७२) ॥

D O—O Sudharman ! Do you entertain the belief that

Iti vṛikṣāurvede yonividhāne ca viśadṛṣēbhyah ।

Dṛṣyate yasmājanma Sudharman ! tato nāyamekāntah ॥ 227 ॥]

Trans—226-227 The *śara* plant is produced from horn, earth-grass¹ is produced by the anointing of mustard,² and *dūrvā*³ is produced by the combination of *goloma*⁴ and *aviloma* plants. Similarly, in the treatise⁵ on (planting and cultivation of) trees, production is brought about by the combination of (a number of) dissimilar objects. The rule is, therefore, not exclusive, *O Sudharman !* (1774-1775)

टीका-ततः “कारणानुरूपं कार्यम्” इति सुधर्मन् ! नायमेकान्तः, यतः शृङ्गादपि शरो जायते, तस्मादेव च सर्पपानुलिप्ताद् भूतृणकः शण्यसंघातो जायते; तथा, गोलोमा-ऽविलोमाभ्यां दूर्वा प्रभवति, इत्येवं वृक्षायुर्वेदे विलक्षणानेकद्रव्यसंयोगजन्मानो वनस्पतयो दृश्यन्ते । तथा, योनिविधाने च । योनिप्राभृते विसदृशानेकद्रव्यसंयोगयोनयः सर्प-सिंहादिप्राणिनो मणयो हेमादयश्च पदार्था नानारूपाः समुपलभ्यन्ते । अतः केयं कार्यस्य कारणानुरूपता ? इति ॥ २२६-२२७ ॥ (१७७४-१७७५) ॥

D C.—The rule that *kārya* is similar to *kāraṇa* is not *ekāntika*. Because, the *ś'ara* is produced even by means of *ś'rnga*, by the unction of mustard-seeds the earth-grass is produced and by the combination of *goloma* and *aviloma* grasses, the *dūrvā* grass is produced.

Moreover, in the treatise on the planting and cultivation of trees, production of objects such as jewels, gold, etc is

1 *Bhūtrīṇaka* (earth-grass) = A kind of fragrant grass, the plant *Androhogon Schoenanthus*

2 *Sarsapa* = Mustard-seed, popularly known as *sarasava* in Western India, *Sinapis Dichotoma*

3 *Dūrvā* = Name of a bent grass, panic grass *Panicum Dactylon*,

4 *Goloma*, *Aviloma* = Two different kinds of bent grass

5 *Vṛikṣāyru* = Name of a short treatise by *Sūrpāla* on the planting and cultivation of trees

believe everything in the next world to be similar to everything in this world. (But) that is not correct (1773)

टीका—सुधर्माण प्रति भगवानुवाच—“ इह कारमानुरूपमेव कार्यं भवति, यथा यवपीजानुरूपो यवाङ्कुरः, इहमवकारण चान्यजन्म, ततस्तेनापीहमवदुष्टेन भवितव्यम् ” इत्येष मन्यमानस्त्व यदिहमवसदुष्टं सर्वं पुरुषादिकं परमघेऽप्यवैपि, तदयुक्तमेवेति ॥ २२५ ॥ (१७७३)

D C—Since *kāraṇa* is the same as *kārya* according to you, the past life being the *kāraṇa* of the present life becomes the same as the present life. That is why you are led to believe that everything in this life is similar to everything in the next one. But this apprehension of yours is not correct.

Because—

जाइ सरो सिंगाओ भूतणओ सासवाणुलिच्छाओ ।
सजायइ गोलोमाऽविलोमसजोगओ दुष्ठा ॥ २२६ ॥ (१७७४)
इति रुक्खायुवेदे ओणिविहाणे य विसरिसेहिंतो ।
दीसइ जम्हा जम्म सुहम्म ! तो नायमेगतो ॥ २२७ ॥ (१७७५)

Jāi saro singāo bhūtaṇao sāsavaṇulicchāo ।

Sanjāyai golomā vilomasanjogao duṣṭā ॥ 226 n (1774)

Iti rukkhāyuvvede oṇivihāṇe ya visarisehinto ।

Disai jamhā jammam Suhamma ! to nāyameganto ॥ 227 ॥ (1775)

[जायते सरः भूतान् भूतणः सर्पपानुलिप्तात् ।

संजायते गोलोमाऽविलोमसंयोगतो दुर्वा ॥ २२६ ॥ (१७७४)

इति रुक्खायुवेदे ओणिविहाणे च विसदृष्टम्यः ।

दृश्यते यस्माज्जन्म सुधर्मन् ! ततो नायमेकान्तः ॥ २२७ ॥ (१७७५)

Jāyate saras āringad bhūtripakāḥ sarṣapanuliptat ।

Sanjāyate golomā vilomasaṃyogato dūrva ॥ 226 ॥ (1774)]

Iti vṛkṣāurvede yonivibhāne ca viśadṛṣebhyaḥ ।

Dṛśyante yasmānjanma Sudharman¹ tato nāyamekāntaḥ ॥ 227 ॥]

Trans —226-227 The *śara* plant is produced from horn, earth-grass¹ is produced by the anointing of mustard,² and *dūrvā*³ is produced by the combination of *goloma*⁴ and *aviloma* plants Similarly, in the treatise⁵ on (planting and cultivation of) trees, production is brought about by the combination of (a number of) dissimilar objects The rule is, therefore, not exclusive, *O Sudharman !* (1774-1775)

टीका-ततः “ कारणानुरूपं कार्यम् ” इति सुधर्मन् ! नायमेकान्तः, यतः शृङ्गादपि शरो जायते, तस्मादेव च सर्पपानुलिप्ताद् भूतृणकः शण्यसंघातो जायते; तथा, गोलोमा-ऽविलोमाभ्यां दूर्वा प्रभवति, इत्येवं वृक्षायुर्वेदे विलक्षणानेकद्रव्यसंयोगजन्मानो वनस्पतयो दृश्यन्ते । तथा, योनिविधाने च । योनिप्राभृते विसदृशानेकद्रव्यसंयोगयोनयः सर्प-सिंहादिप्राणिनो मणयो हेमादयश्च पदार्था नानारूपाः समुपलभ्यन्ते । अतः केयं कार्यस्य कारणानुरूपता ? इति ॥ २२६-२२७ ॥ (१७७४-१७७५) ॥

D. C —The rule that *kārya* is similar to *kāraṇa* is not *ekāntika* Because, the *s'ara* is produced even by means of *s'rnga*, by the unction of mustard-seeds the earth-grass is produced and by the combination of *goloma* and *aviloma* grasses, the *dūrvā* grass is produced.

Moreover, in the treatise on the planting and cultivation of trees, production of objects such as jewels, gold, etc is

1 *Bhūtrīṇaka* (earth-grass) = A kind of fragrant grass, the plant *Androhogon Schoenanthus*

2 *Sar sapa* = Mustard-seed, popularly known as *sarasava* in Western India; *Sinapis Dichotoma*

3 *Dūrvā* = Name of a bent grass, panic grass *Panicum Dactylon*,

4 *Goloma*, *Aviloma* = Two different kinds of bent grass

5 *Vṛkṣāyu* = Name of a short treatise by *Sūrpāla* on the planting and cultivation of trees

shown as being brought about by the combination of various dissimilar objects. The rule of similarity between *kārya* and *kāraṇa* is therefore inapplicable in this case.

Or say the life of creatures in the next world is distinguished from their life in this world on account of similarity between *kārya* and *kāraṇa* in this way —

अहवा जउ चिय धीयाणुरूपजम्म मय तओ चेव ।
जीव गिण्ह भवाओ भवतरे चित्तपरिणाम ॥२२८॥ (१७७६)
जेण भवकुरधीय कम्म चित्त च त जओऽभिहित्य ।
हेउविचित्तत्तणओ भवकुरविचित्तया तेण ॥ २२९ ॥ (१७७७)
जइ पढिवन्न कम्म हेउविचित्तत्तओ विचित्त च ।
तो तत्फल वि चित्त पवज्ज ससारिणो सोम्म ! ॥२३०॥ (१७७८)

Ahavaṃ jau cciya biyānurūvajammam mayam tao ceva ।
Jivam ginha bhavaṃ bhavāntare cittaparīṇamam ॥ 228 ॥ (1776)
Jena bhavankurābhiyam kammam cittam ca tam jao'bhīhiyam ।
Heu vicittattāṇo bhavankuraviccittayā tena ॥ 229 ॥ (1777)
Jaḥ paḍivannam kammam heu vicittattāo vicittam ca ।
To tatphalam vi cittam pavajja samsārino somma ॥ 230 ॥ (1778)

[अथवा यत एव बीजानुरूपजन्म मत तत एव ।
जीव गृहाण भवाद् भवान्तरे चित्तपरिणामम् ॥ २२८ ॥ (१७७६)
येन भवाङ्कुरधीयं कर्म चित्तं तद् यतोऽभिहितम् ।
हेतुविचित्रत्वतो भवाङ्कुरविचित्रता तेन ॥ २२९ ॥ (१७७७)
यदि प्रतिपन्नं कर्म हेतुविचित्रत्वतो विचित्रं च ।
ततस्तत्फलमपि चित्तं प्रतिपद्यस्व संसारिणः सौम्य ! ॥२३०॥ (१७७८)

Athava yata eva bijānurūpajanma matam tata eva ।
Jivam grīhaṇa bhavad bhavāntare cittaparīṇamam ॥ 228 ॥ (1776)

Yena bhavaṅkurabījāṃ karma citram tad yato'bhīhitam ।

Hetuvicitratvato bhāvankuravicitrata tena ॥ 229 ॥ (1777)

Yadī pratipannam karma hetuvicitratvato vicitram ca ।

Tatastatphalamapī citram pratipadyasva saṃsārinah Saumya ! ॥230॥]

Trans.—228–229–230 Or, because the production (of *kārya*) is similar to the root-cause, according to you, take *jīva* in the next life to be a *parināma* distinct from this mundane world For, *karman* (which is) the seed of the sprout of life is itself distinct And, if the effect is established to be distinct because the cause is distinct, know it for certain *O Saumya* ! that the mundane Soul has also its *phala* distinct from it (1776–1777–1778)

टीका—व्याख्या—अथवा, यत एव बीजानुरूपं कारणानुगुणं कार्याणां जन्म मतम्, तत एवेह भवाद् भवान्तरे जीवं गृहाण प्रतिपद्यस्व । कथंभूतम् ? जाति-कुल-बलै-श्वर्य-रूपादिविचित्रपरिणामम् । यदि नाम बीजानुरूपं जन्म, तथापि कथं भवान्तरे विचित्रता जीवानाम् ? इत्याह—“ जेण भवं-कुरेत्यादि ” येन यस्माद् नारक-तिर्यगादिरूपेण भवनं भवः स एवाङ्कुर इवाङ्कुरस्तस्य बीजमिह कर्मैवावसेयम्, तच्च मिथ्यात्वा-ऽविरत्यादिहेतुवैचित्र्याद् विचित्रं यस्माद् मयाऽभिहितम्, तस्मात् तज्जन्यस्य भवाङ्कुरस्यापि जात्यादिभेदेन विचित्रता । ततो यदि त्वया कर्म प्रतिपन्नम्, हेतुवैचित्र्याच्च यदि तद्वैचित्र्यमभ्युपगतम्, ततः संसारिणो जीवस्य तत्फलमपि नारक-तिर्यङ्-मनुष्या-ऽमररूपेण भवनरूपं सौम्य ! विचित्ररूपं प्रतिपद्यस्वेति ॥ २२८–२२९–२३० (१७७६–१७७७–१७७८) ॥

D C—The production of various *kāryas* is similar to the corresponding *kāranas* according to you But the *jīva* in the next life is distinguished from this world on account of *jāti*, *kula*, *rūpa*, *bala*, *as'varya* etc Now if *Kārya* is taken to be similar to the *kāraṇa*, how will the *jīvas* be different in the next life ? The *vicitratā* of *jīva* in the next life is to be accounted for by means of *karman* For *karman* being the *hetu* of *saṃsāra*, renders the whole *saṃsāra*, *vicitra* by reason

shown as being brought about by the combination of various dissimilar objects. The rule of similarity between *kārya* and *karana*, is therefore inapplicable in this case.

Or say the life of creatures in the next world is distinguished from their life in this world on account of similarity between *kārya* and *kāraṇa* in this way —

अहवा जउ क्षिय धीयाणुरूपजम्म मय तओ चेव ।
जीव गिण्ह भवाओ भवतरे चित्तपरिणाम ॥२२८॥ (१७७६)
जेण भवकुरवीय कम्म चित्त च त जओऽभिहिय ।
हेउविचित्तत्तणओ भवकुरविचित्तया तेण ॥ २२९ ॥ (१७७७)
जइ पढिवन्न कम्म हेउविचित्तत्तओ विचित्त च ।
तो तत्फल वि चित्त पवज्ज ससारिणो सोम्म ! ॥२३०॥ (१७७८)

Ahavaṃ jau cciya biyānurūvajammam mayam tao ceva ।
Jivam gīha bhavaō bhavantare cittaparīṇamam ॥ 228 ॥ (1776)
Jena bhavankurabhiyam kammam cittam ca tam jao'bbhihiyam ।
Heuvicittattanaō bhavankuravicittayā tenam ॥ 229 ॥ (1777)
Jal peḍivannam kammam heuvicittattaō vicittam ca ।
To tatphalam vi cittam pavajja samsārino somma ! ॥230॥ (1778)

[अथवा यत् एव बीजानुरूपजन्म मत्तं तत् एव ।
जीव गृहाण भवाद् भवान्तरे चित्तपरिणामम् ॥ २२८ ॥ (१७७६)
येन भवाङ्कुरवीजं कर्म चित्तं तद् यतोऽभिहितम् ।
हेतुविचित्रत्वतो भवाङ्कुरविचित्रता तेन ॥ २२९ ॥ (१७७७)
यदि प्रतिपन्नं कर्म हेतुविचित्रत्वतो विचित्रं च ।
तत्तत्तत्फलमपि चित्रं प्रतिपद्यस्य संसारिणः सौम्य ! ॥२३०॥ (१७७८)

Athava yuta eva bijanurūpajannma nntam tata eva ।
Jivam grīhāṇa bhavad bhavantare ottaparīṇamam ॥ 228 ॥ (1776)

Now, in support of the variable nature of *Karman*, the author states —

चित्ता कम्मपरिणई पोग्गलपरिणामओ जहा वज्झा ।

कम्माण चित्तया पुण तद्धेउविचित्तभावाओ ॥२३२॥ (१७८०)

Cittā kammaparīṇai poggalaparīṇāmao jahā vajjhā ।

Kammāṇa cittayā puṇa taddheuvicittabhāvāo ॥ 232 ॥ (1780)

[चित्रा कर्मपरिणतिः पुद्गलपरिणामतो यथा बाह्या ।

कर्मणां चित्रता पुनस्तद्धेतुविचित्रभावात् ॥ २३२ ॥ (१७८०)

Citrā karmaparīṇatīḥ pudgalaparīṇāmato yathā bahyā ।

Karmanām citratā punastaddhetuvicitrabhāvat ॥ 232 ॥ (1780)]

Trans — 232 Just as the outward effect of actions is variable on account of its being the *parīṇāma* of earthly bodies, the variable nature of actions is also due to their *hetu* being variable (1780)

टीका—इह विचित्रा कर्मपरिणतिः, पुद्गलपरिणामात्मकत्वात्, इह यत्पुद्गलपरिणामात्मकं तद् विचित्रपरिणतिरूपं दृश्यते, यथा बाह्योऽभ्रादिविकारः, पृथिव्यादिविकारो वा, यत्तु विचित्रपरिणतिरूपं न भवति तत् पुद्गलपरिणामात्मकमपि न भवति, यथाऽऽकाशम्, या पुनः पुद्गलपरिणामसाम्येऽपि कर्मणामावरणादिभेदेन विशेषतो विचित्रता सा तद्धेतुवैचित्र्यादवगन्तव्या, विचित्राश्च मिथ्यात्वादयः—प्रद्वेष—निह्नवादयश्च कर्महेतव इति ॥ २३२ ॥ (१७८०) ॥

D C—Effect of *Karman* is varied in this world. Only that which is *pudgalaparīṇāmātmaka* is known as *vicitra* (as in the case of various transformations of cloud, earth etc). While that which is not the result of earthly *pudgalas*, is not recognized as a *vicitraparīṇatī* (as in the case of *ākāśa*) In case of *Karman* itself being variable, in addition to this *pudgalaparīṇāmatva*, *viciratā* is due to the variable nature of its motives like vanity, hostility, and wickedness etc by means of which those actions are actually inspired 232 (1780)

of its own self being *vicitra*. So, just as *karma* is *vicitra* by reason of its wrong belief and vowlessness etc its *Kārya* viz, *bhava* should also be taken as *vicitra* by reason of *jāti bala*, *rūpa bala* etc So if you admit *Karma* and if you believe that *Kārya* is distinguished from *kāraṇa* then O *Saṃnya* ! know it for certain that the mundane Soul has its *phala* in the form of *vicitrata* as hellish beings lower animals human beings or celestial beings

चित्त ससारित्त विचित्तकम्मफलभावओ हेऊ ।

इह चित्त चित्ताण कम्माण फल व लोगम्मि ॥२३१॥ (१७७९)

Cittam samsārittam vicittakammaphalabhavao heū ।

Iha cittam cittaṇam kammaṇa phalam va logammī #231# (1779)

[चित्रं संसारित्त विचित्रकर्मफलभावतो हेतोः ।

इह चित्रं चित्राणां कर्मणां फलमिव लोके ॥ २३१ ॥ (१७७९)

Citraṁ samsārittam vicitrakarmaphalabhavato hetoh ।

Iha citram citraṇam karmaṇa phalamiva loke #231# (1779)]

Trans—231 Like the variable result of variable actions (accomplished) in this world, worldliness is variable on account of the *hetu* that (it is also) the result of variable actions (1779)

टीका—चित्र संसारिजीवानां नारकादिरूपेण ससारित्वमिति प्रतिज्ञा । विचित्रस्य कर्मणां फलरूपत्वादिति हेतुः । इह यद् विविधहेतुक तद् विचित्रं सुपरुभ्यते, यथेह कृषि-वाणिज्यादिकर्मणां फलं लोक इति । तदेव कर्म वैचित्र्याद् भववैचित्र्ये प्रमाणमुक्तम् ॥ २३१ ॥ (१७७९) ॥

D C—Just as the results of various actions like ploughing trading etc are variable the *samsāritra* of the mundane animals is also varied as seen in their hellish experience etc on account of the fact that *samsāritra* is nothing but the result of their *vicitra* actions in the past.

इह तावद् मनुष्या नानागतिहेतुविचित्रक्रियानुष्ठायिनः सन्तीति प्रत्यक्षत
एव लक्ष्यन्ते । ततो यदि ते परलोके तत्तत्क्रियाफलभाज इष्यन्ते, ततो
यथेहत्यक्रियाणामसदृशता, तथा परलोकगतजन्तूनामपि सैव युक्ता, ननु
योऽत्र यादृशः स परत्रापि तादृश एव भवति ॥२३३-२३४॥ (१७८१-१७८२)

D C—If, according to you, next life is the prototype of this one, the *kāmaphala* in the next life will depend upon (one's) various good or bad actions in this life. Now, since various people do various deeds as a result of their various tendencies in this life, it should be noted that they enjoy fruits of their actions in the next life. So, inclination of one in the present life, depends upon his inclination in the past life also

Then, anticipating doubts in the opponent's mind, the author states —

अह इह सफलं कम्मं न परे तो सब्बहा न सरिसत्तं ।
अकयागम-कयनासा कम्माभावोऽहवा पत्तो ॥ २३५ ॥ (१७८३)
कम्माभावे य कओ भवंतरं, सरिसया व तदभावे ।
निक्कारणओ य भवो जइ ता नासो वि तह चेव ॥ २३६ ॥ (१७८४)

Aha iha saphalam kammam na pare to savvahā na sarisattam ।
Akayāgama-kayanāsā kammābhāvo'havā patto ॥ 235 ॥ (1783)

Kammābhāve ya kao bhavantaram, sarisayā va tadabhāve ।
Nikkāranao ya bhavo jai tā nāso vi taha ceva ॥ 236 ॥ (1784)

[अथेह सफलं कर्म न परस्मिस्ततः सर्वथा न सदृशत्वम् ।
अकृतागम-कृतनाशौ कर्माभावोऽथवा प्राप्तः ॥ २३५ ॥ (१७८३)
कर्माभावे च कुतो भवान्तरं, सदृशता वा तदभावे ।
निष्कारणकश्च भवो यदि ततो नाशोऽपि तथैव ॥ २३६ ॥ (१७८४)

अहवा इहभवसरिसो परलोगो वि जइ सम्मओ तेण ।
 कम्मफल पि इहभवसरिस पडिवज्ज परलोए ॥२३३॥ (१७८१)
 किं भणियमिह मणुया नाणागइकम्मकारिणो सति ।
 जइ ते तप्फलभाजो परे वि तो सरिसया जुत्ता ॥२३४॥ (१७८२)

Ahava ihabhavasarisō paralogo vi jaī sammao tenaṃ ।
 Kammaphalam pi ihabhavasarisam padivaḥḥa paralōe ॥233॥ (1781)
 Kim bhaṇiyamiha maṇuṃyā nāṇāgaikammakāriṇo santi ।
 Jai te tapphalabhājō pare vi to sarisayā juttā ॥ 234 ॥ (1782)

[अथवेहभवसदृशः परलोकोऽपि यदि संमतस्तेन ।
 कर्मफलमपीहभवसदृशं प्रतिपद्यस्व परलोके ॥ २३३ ॥ (१७८१)
 किं भणितमिह मनुष्या नानागतिकर्मकारिणः सन्ति ।
 यदि ते तत्फलभाजः परस्मिन्नपि ततः सदृशता युक्ता ॥२३४॥ (१७८२)

Athavehahavasadrīṣam paraloko pi yadi sammatasena ।
 Karmaaphalamapi ihabhavasadrīṣam pratipadyasva paraloko ॥ 233 ॥
 Kim bhaṇitamihā manuṣya nānāgatikarmakāriṇaḥ santi ।
 Yadi te tatphalabhājāḥ parasmīnnapi tataḥ sadrīṣatā yukta ॥234॥

Trans—233-234 Or if the other life is also taken as the same as this life, (you should) accept the *karma phala* in the other life to be the same as (that in) this life. Has it been said that there exist people in this world doing (various) deeds according to their various tendencies ? If they exist, there exist (people) in the next (world) to enjoy their fruits also. Sameness (of both) is therefore justified. (1781-1782)

टीका—अथाकृपा—अथवा, यदीहभवसदृशं परलोकोऽपि संमतो भवतः,
 “ तप ति ” ततः कर्मफलमपि परलोके इहभवसदृशमिहस्पृषिषित्रशुभा-
 ऽशुमक्रियानुरूपं विषित्रं प्रतिपद्यस्यति । एष सुकूलितं प्रतिपाद्यैतदप्य-
 भावयति—“ किं भणियमित्यादि ” किमतावता प्रतिपादितं भवति ? ।

D. C.—Sudharman —Actions (like ploughing etc.) which are connected with this life are alone fruitful, and those (like munificence etc) that are connected with the other life, are not fruitful This is the reason why there is no distinction between the lives of creatures in the two *bhavas*

Bhagavān —But *sādṛis'atā* can never exist without cause as *sādṛis'atā* itself is produced from *Karman*. Now, when you take *Karman* (like *dāna* etc) connected with the other life, to be fruitless, there is no scope for *sādṛis'atā* to exist

Sudharman—*Sādṛis'atā* of *jīvas* could be brought about even in absence of *Karman* as in the case of *ghata* produced from earth.

Bhagavān —If *sādṛis'ya* exists even in absence of *Karman* there will be *akṛitāgama* (i e., springing up of the unaccomplished object), as well as *kṛtanās'a* (i e. destruction of the accomplished object) Thus the existence of *Karman* itself is denied When there is no *Karman*, how can the *parabhava* exist ? And when the existence of *parabhava* is denied, the existence of *sādṛis'ya* between two *bhavas* will automatically be denied.

Sudharman —The existence of *bhavāntara* could be brought about even in absence of *Karman* as in the case of lifeless objects when *Kārya* and *kāraṇa* are the same.

Bhagavān —In that case, *O Sudharman* ' the production as well as the destruction of *bhavāntara* will also be *niskāraṇa* Consequently, the practice of austerities, munificence, and vows etc would be good-for-nothing, as *bhavāntara* will not depend upon those actions, and all people—whether doing good or bad deeds—will have the same prototype life Moreover, you should also take the *vaisādṛis'ya* or dissimilarity of various *jīvas* from each other to be *niskāraṇa* like *bhavāntara* For, like *bhavāntara*, there is *kāraṇābhāva* in case of *vaiśa-dṛis'ya* also

Atheha saphalam karma na parasminstatah sarvatha na sadṛśātvam ।
Akṛitagama-kṛitanaśau karmabhavo thava prāptaḥ ॥235॥ (1783)]

Karmabhavo ca kuto bhavāntaram sadṛśātvā va tadabhavo ।
Niṣkaraṇakāśa bhavo yadi tato naśo pi tathaiiva ॥ 236 ॥ (1784)]

Trans — 235-236 If (the opponent says that) *Karman* is successful here (only) (and) not in the next life, then there will be nothing like sameness at all. The unaccomplished object will crop up and the accomplished one will come to an end. Or there will be (complete) negation of *Karman* itself. In absence of *Karman*, how will the next life come into existence ? And in its absence, whence (will) the *sadṛśatā* (exist) ? And if the (next) life is (taken to have been) produced without any cause, then (its) end will also be so. (1783-1784)

टीका-अथैव म्रूये-इह सफलं कर्मेति-इहमवसंबन्धेन कृप्यादिक्रिया रूपं कर्म सफलम्, न तु पारमविक्रदानादिक्रियारूपं कर्म । ततश्च तत्फलाभावाद् न परलोके जन्तुष्वेवमवश्यम् । अत्रोत्तरमाह—“ ततो सबाहो न सरिसर्पेति ” तत एवं सति यत् त्वमिमेव तत् सर्वथा परमवे जीवानां सदृशत्व न स्यात् । तद्धि कर्मणा जन्यते, तच्च नास्ति, पारमविक्रियाणां त्वया निष्फलत्वाभ्युपगमात्, तन्निष्फलत्वे च कर्माभावात् । अथ कर्माभावेऽपि मवेत् सादृश्यम्, तर्हि कृतस्यैव तस्य निर्हेतुकस्याऽऽगमः प्राप्नोति, कृतस्य च दान-हिसादिक्रियाफलरूपस्य कर्मणो नाशः प्रसज्यति । अथवा, मूलत एव कर्मणामभावः प्राप्तः—दान-हिसादिक्रियाणां निष्फलत्वाभ्युपगमाद् मूलत एव कर्मणो चोऽपि न स्यादिति भावः । ततः किम् ? इत्याह-कर्माभावे च कारणाभावात् कृतो भवान्तरम्, तदभावे च दूरोत्सारितमेव सादृश्यम् । अथ कर्माभावेऽपि भव इष्यते, तर्हि निष्कारण एवासौ स्यात् । यदि वैभवाभ्युपगमयेत्, ततो नाशोऽपि तस्य भवस्य निष्कारण एव स्यात्, अतो व्यर्थस्तपो-नियमाद्यनुष्ठानप्रयासः । निष्कारणे च मवेऽभ्युपगम्यमानं वैसादृश्यमपि जीवानां निष्कारणं किं नेष्यते, विश्लेषणाभावात् ? इति ॥ २३५-२३६ ॥ (१७८३-१७८४) ॥

विकारदृष्टान्ते परिहीयते, अभ्रादिविकारस्य स्वकारणभूतपुद्गलद्रव्यादिति-
विलक्षणत्वादिति ॥ २३७ ॥ (१७८५) ॥

D C—Sudharman —Just as, it is by virtue of their *svabhāva* that objects like *ghata* etc. are produced as a natural result of their respective *kāranas* but without the help of *karman*, the *bhavāntara* is also produced by virtue of its own *svabhāva* even in absence of *Karman*

Bhagavān—Kāryas like *ghata*, *O Sudharman* ' could never be produced merely by virtue of their *svabhāva*, but they have to depend upon *karṭā* and *kāraṇa* also So, in the production of *Sarīra* also, *karṭā* and *kāraṇa* are of primary importance This leads us to believe that in the production of *bhavāntara*, *ātman* which is different from body, is the *karṭā*, and *Karman*, the *kāraṇa*, just as potter is the *karṭā* and *chakra* etc act as *kāranas*, when *ghata* is produced.

Sudharman —Since *kāryas* like *ghata* are directly apprehensible, potter and *chakra* etc may respectively be taken as their *karṭā* and *kāranas* But *kāryas* like *s'arīra* in *bhavāntara* are produced naturally like the multi-coloured changes in clouds etc It is not, therefore, possible to seek *Karman* as a *kāraṇa*, in the production of *bhavāntara*

Bhagavān —Your argument is totally unfounded *Kāryas* like *s'arīra* etc are not *svābhāvika* because they have a beginning, as well as, a definite *ākāra* like *ghata* You have taken the other life to be the same as this, because, according to you, *Kārya* is exactly similar to *karana* But this principle of *sadrś'atā* is not applicable in case of *abhrādivikāras*, as they are peculiarly different from the objects having definite *ākāra*

Moreover,

होज सहावो वत्थुं निकारणया व वत्थुधम्मो वा ? ।

जह वत्थुं णत्थि तओणुवल्लङ्गीओ खपुप्फं व ॥२३८॥(१७८६)

कम्माभावे वि मई को दोसो होज्ज जइ सभावोऽय ।

जह कारणाणुरूप घटाइ कज्ज सहावेण ॥ २३७ ॥ (१७८५)

Kammābhāve vi mai ko doso hojja jai sabhāvo'yam ।

Jaha kāraṇānurūpam ghaṭṭai kajja sahāvenam ॥ 237 ॥ (1785)

[कर्माभावेऽपि मतिः को दोषो भवेत् यदि स्वभावोऽयम् ।

यथा कारणानुरूप घटादि कार्य स्वभावेन ॥ २३७ ॥ (१७८५)

Karmābhāve pi matiḥ ko doṣo bhavet yadi svabhāvo'yam ।

Yatha kāraṇānurūpam ghaṭṭadi karyam svabhāvena ॥ 237 ॥ (1785)]

Trans—237 Again the opponent might believe that (the *kārya* could be brought about even in absence of *Karman*. What objection would arise if it were its very nature as in the case of *kāryas* like *ghata* etc., which bear natural resemblance with their *kāraṇas* ? (1785)

टीका—अथ परस्मैवभूता मतिः स्यात्; यदुक्त—कर्माभावेऽपि यदि भवसङ्गावरूपः स्वभाव एवाय भवेत् तर्हि को दोषः स्यात् ?—विनापि कर्म यदि स्वभावादेव भवः स्यात् तर्हि किं दूषण भवेत् ?—न किञ्चिदित्यर्थः । दृष्टान्तमाह—यथा कर्म विनापि मृत्पिण्डादिकारणानुरूप घटादि कार्य स्वस्वभावेनैषोत्पद्यमानं दृश्यते, तथा सदृशप्राणिबन्धनपरम्परारूपो भवोऽपि स्वभावादेव भविष्यति । अत्रोन्यते—ननु घटोऽपि न स्वभावतः एव जायते, कर्तुं—करणाद्यपेक्षित्वात् तस्य । तद्वद्भावि कर्तुरात्मनः पारमधिकस्य च शरीरादिकायस्य करणं संभाष्यते, तच्च कर्तुं—कार्याभ्यां भिन्न लोकेऽपि दृश्यते, कुलाल—घटाम्नां चक्रादिभत्, यथेहात्मनः शरीरादि कार्यं कुर्वतः करणं तत् कर्मेति प्रतिपद्यते । स्यादेतत्, घटादः प्रत्यक्षसिद्धत्वात् भवन्तु कुलालादयः कर्तारः, शरीरादि कार्यं स्वभादिविकारतः स्वभावतोऽपि भविष्यति, ततो न कर्मसिद्धिः । तदपुक्तम्, यतो न स्यामात्रिक शरीरादि, आदिमत्प्रतिनियताकाररत्वात्, घटवदिति । किञ्च “कारणानुरूपमेव कार्यम्” इत्येव यत् परमवे सादृश्यं स्वयाऽभ्युपगम्यते, तदपि स्वभावमादिनस्तथाभादि

The *hetu* that (works) in its existence, (works) in case of *Karman* also (Or) what objection (would arise), if *svabhāva* becomes a synonym of *Karman*, and what is the *hetu* (in believing) that *svabhāva* is always the same ? (1786-1787-1788)

टीका-एतद् गाथात्रयमपि प्रायः प्रागेव व्याख्यातार्थम्, नवरं “ निचं ” इत्यादि तृतीयगाथोत्तरार्धम् । इदमत्र हृदयम्-स स्वभावो नित्यं सदृश एव त्वयाऽभ्युपगन्तव्यः, भवान्तरे सदृश्यैव मनुष्यादिभवस्य जननात्, तस्य च स्वभावस्य नित्यं सदृशत्वे को हेतुः ? । न कश्चिदित्यभिप्रायः । स्वभावत एवायं स्वभावः सदृश इति चेत् । ननु भवविसदृशतायामप्येतद् वक्तुं शक्यत एवेति ॥ २३८-२३९-२४० ॥ (१७८६-१७८७-१७८८) ॥

D. C.—The point is that since you have taken *svabhāva* to be the same for ever as the same life is repeated in various *bhavas* you should state the reason for its *ntyasadrśa'tā* You might say that there is no *hetu* as such, as *ntyasadrśa* by virtue of its own self For, the same argument could be advanced in case of *vaśadrśa'ya* of the *bhavas* as well

And,

सो मुत्तोऽमुत्तो वा जइ मुत्तो तो न सव्वाहा सरिसो ।
परिणामओ पयं पिव न देहहेऊ जइ अमुत्तो ॥ २४१ ॥ (१७८९)
उवगरणाभावाओ न य हवइ सुहम्म ! सो अमुत्तो वि ।
कज्जस्स मुत्तिमत्ता सुहसंवित्तादिओ चेव ॥ २४२ ॥ (१७९०)

So mutto'mutto vā jai mutto to na savvahā sariso ।

Parināmao payam piva na dehaheū jai amutto ॥ 241 ॥ (1789)

Uvagarānābhāvāo na ya havai Suhamma ! so amutto vi ।

Kajjassa muttimattā suhasamvittādio ceva ॥ 242 ॥ (1790)

[स मूर्तोऽमूर्तो वा यदि मूर्तस्ततो न सर्वथा सदृशः ।

परिणामतः पय इव न देहहेतुर्यद्यमूर्तः ॥ २४१ ॥ (१७८९)

अद्यतमणुवलद्धो वि अह तओ अत्थि नत्थि किं कम्म ।

हेऊ व तदत्थिचे जो नणु कम्मस्स वि स एव ॥२३९॥ (१७८७)

कम्मस्स वामिहाण होज्ज सहावो चि होउ को दोसो ।

निच्च व सो सभावो सरिसो एत्थ च को हेऊ ? ॥२४०॥ (१७८८)

Hojja sahāvo vatthum nikkāranava va vatthudhammo va ?

Jaha vatthum natthi tao nuvaladdho khapuppham va ॥ 238 ॥

Accantamanuvaladdho vi aha tao atthi natthi kim kammam ।

Heū va tadattithe jo nanu kammassa vi sa eva ॥ 239 ॥ (1787)

Kammassa vābhihanam hojja sahāvo tti hou ko doso ।

Niccāva va so sabhāvo sariso ettham ca ko heū ? ॥ 240 ॥ (1788)

[मवेत् स्वभावो वस्तु निष्कारणता वा वस्तुषर्मो वा ? ।

यदि वस्तु नास्ति सकोऽनुपलब्धेः खपुष्पमिव ॥ २३८ ॥ (१७८६)

अत्यन्तमनुपलब्धोऽप्यय सकोऽस्ति नास्ति किं कर्म ।

हेतुर्वा तदस्तिरपि यो ननु कर्मणोऽपि स एव ॥ २३९ ॥ (१७८७)

कर्मणो वामिधानं मवेत् स्वभाव इति भवतु को दोषः ।

नित्य वा स स्वभावः सद्व्योज्य च को हेतुः ? ॥ २४० ॥ (१७८८)

Bhavaet svabhāvo vastu niṣkaranatā vā vastuṣarṃmā vā ? ।

Yadi vastu nāsti sako nupalabdhoh khapuspamiva ॥ 338 ॥ (1786)

Atyantamanupalabdhoh pyatha sako sti nāsti kim karma ।

Hetu r-va tadastitre yo nanu karmaṇo pi sa eva ॥ 239 ॥ (1787)

Karmaṇo vābhihānam bhavaet svabhāva iti bhavatu ko doṣaḥ ।

Nityam vā sa svabhāvaḥ sadvījya ca ko hetuḥ ? ॥ 240 ॥ (1788)

Trans—238-239-240 Is (that) *svabhāva* a (definite) object or causelessness (itself), or property of an object ? If it is (taken as) a (definite) object it is not (so) because it is non-perceptible like a *kha-puspa*. In spite of its being non-perceptible, if it exists why should not *Karman* exist ?

The *hetu* that (works) in its existence, (works) in case of *Karman* also (Or) what objection (would arise), if *svabhāva* becomes a synonym of *Karman*, and what is the *hetu* (in believing) that *svabhāva* is always the same ? (1786-1787-1788)

टीका-एतद् गाथात्रयमपि प्रायः प्रागेव व्याख्यातार्थम्, नवरं “ निचं ” इत्यादि तृतीयगाथोत्तरार्थम् । इदमत्र हृदयम्-स स्वभावो नित्यं सदृश एव त्वयाऽभ्युपगन्तव्यः, भवान्तरे सदृश्यैव मनुष्यादिभवस्य जननात्, तस्य च स्वभावस्य नित्यं सदृशत्वे को हेतुः ? । न कश्चिदित्यभिप्रायः । स्वभावत एवायं स्वभावः सदृश इति चेत् । ननु भवविसदृशतायामप्येतद् वक्तुं शक्यत एवेति ॥ २३८-२३९-२४० ॥ (१७८६-१७८७-१७८८) ॥

D C—The point is that since you have taken *svabhāva* to be the same for ever as the same life is repeated in various *bhavas* you should state the reason for its *niityasadrīś'atā* You might say that there is no *hetu* as such, as *niityasadrīś'a* by virtue of its own self For, the same argument could be advanced in case of *varsadrīś'ya* of the *bhavas* as well

And,

सो मुत्तोऽमुत्तो वा जइ मुत्तो तो न सब्वा सारिसो ।
परिणामओ पयं पिव न देहहेल्ल जइ अमुत्तो ॥ २४१ ॥ (१७८९)
उवगरणाभावाओ न य हवइ सुहम्म ! सो अमुत्तो वि ।
कज्जस्स मुत्तिमत्ता सुहसंवित्तादिओ चेव ॥ २४२ ॥ (१७९०)

So mutto'mutto vā jai mutto to na savvahā sariso ।
Parimāmao payam piva na dehaheū jai amutto ॥ 241 ॥ (1789)
Uvagaranābhāvāo na ya havai Suhamma ! so amutto vi ।
Kajjassa muttimattā suhasamvittādio ceva ॥ 242 ॥ (1790)

[स मूर्तोऽमूर्तो वा यदि मूर्तस्ततो न सर्वथा सदृशः ।
परिणामतः पय इव न देहहेतुर्यद्यमूर्तः ॥ २४१ ॥ (१७८९)

उपकरणाभावाद् न च भवति सुधर्मन् ' सोऽमूर्तोऽपि ।

कार्यस्य मूर्तिमत्त्वाद् सुखसंविष्यादितथैव ॥ २४२ ॥ (१७९०)

Sa mūrto mūrto va yadi mūrtastato na sarvathā sadṛśaḥ ।

Parīṇāmataḥ paya iva na dehaḥetu r-yadyamūrtaḥ ॥ 241 s (1789)

Upakaranabhavat na ca bhavati Sudharman ! so mūrto pi ।

Kāryasya mūrtimattvād sukhāsamvittiyaditathāiva ॥ 242 s (1790)]

Trans—241-242. Is that (*svabhāva*) *mūrta* or *a-mūrta* ? If *mūrta*, it is not at all *sadṛśa* on account of its (having a) *parīṇāma* as in the case of milk. And, if it is *a-mūrta*, O *Sudharman* ! even that *a-mūrta svabhāva* does not become the cause of body in absence of instruments as well as on account of the corporeal nature of *Kārya* (indicated) by the perception of happiness etc. (1789-1790)

टीका—व्याख्या—स स्वभावो मूर्तः, अमूर्तो वा ? । यदि मूर्तः, तर्हि कर्मणा सह तस्य को विशेषः ? संज्ञान्तरमात्रविशिष्टकर्मैवेत्यमुक्त स्यादिति । न चासौ सर्वदेव सहस्रो युज्यते, परिणामित्वात्, दुग्धादिवत् । अथवा, मूर्तत्वादेवात्रादिविकारवदिति । अथामूर्तोऽसौ स्वभावः, तर्हि नैव देहादीना मारम्भकः, अनुपकरणत्वात्, दण्डादिविकलकुलालवत्, अमूर्तत्वादेव वा, आकाशवत् । “ न य इषह सुहम्म ! सो अमुचो वि चि ” किञ्च, सुधर्मन् । इतोऽपि स स्वभावोऽमूर्तो न युक्तः, क्षरीरादेस्तत्कार्यस्य मूर्तिमत्त्वात् । न हामूर्तस्य नमस इव मूर्तं कायमुपजायते । तथा, सुख-संविष्यादेभ्य नान्यममूर्तः । इदमुक्तं भवति—कर्म तावद् भवता नेष्यते, स्वभाववादित्वात् । ततश्च क्षरीरादीनि, सुख-दुःखसंविष्यादीनि च स्वभावस्यैव कार्याण्येष्टव्यानि, तस्य चामूर्तस्य नैवान्युपपद्यन्ते । ततो यथा द्वितीयगणधरवादे कार्यस्य मूर्तत्वात्, सुखसंविष्यादेभ्य कर्मणो मूर्तत्वं साधितम्, तथैव स्वभावस्यापि तत् साधनीयम् । तथा च प्रागुक्तम् —

आह ननु मुचमेव मुचं चिय कजमुचिमचाओ ।

इह अह मुचचणओ धउस्स परमाणवो मुचा ॥ १ ॥

तह सुहसंवितीओ संवंधे वेयणुव्भवाओ य ।

वज्झवलाहाणाओ परिणामाओ य विण्णेयं ॥ २ ॥

इति ॥ २४१-२४२ ॥ (१७८९-१७९०) ॥

D C—Consider whether *svabhāva* is *mūrta* or *a-mūrta*. If it is *mūrta*, *svabhāva* will be nothing but a synonym of *Karman*. Moreover, the property of *sadṛśatā* will never be applied if *svabhāva* is *mūrta*, because—like milk, or like the *mūrta* clouds having a number of forms, *svabhāva* will also possess a number of *parināmas*.

If *svabhāva* is *a-mūrta*, then also, like *ākāśa* it does not become the *hetu* of *s'arīra* because of the absence of *upakarana*s. Secondly, an incorporeal *kāraṇa* can never produce a corporeal *kārya*. So, *svabhāva* should not be called *a-mūrta* when the *kāryas* of *svabhāva* such as the perception of *suḥha*, *duḥkha* etc are *mūrta* †

Now the second alternative viz that *svabhāva* is *niskāraṇatā* is discussed—

अहवाऽकारणउ च्चिय सभावओ तोवि सरिसया कत्तो ।

किमकारणओ न भवे विसरिसया किं व विच्छित्ती ॥ २४३ ॥ (१७९१)

Ahava'kāraṇau cciya sabhāvao tovi sarisayā katto ।

Kimakāraṇao na bhaved visarisayā kim va vicchittī ॥ 243 ॥ (1791)

[अथवाऽकारणत एव स्वभावतस्ततोऽपि सदृशता कुतः ।

किमकारणतो न भवेद् विसदृशता किं वा विच्छित्तिः ॥ २४३ ॥ (१७९१)

Athava'kāraṇata eva svabhāvatastatō'pi sadṛśatā kutah ।

Kimakāraṇato na bhaved visadṛśatā kim va vicchittih ? ॥ 243 ॥]

Trans—243 Or, if (*bhavāntara* is produced) by virtue of *svabhāva* (and) without any reason, whence is *sadṛśatā*

† Vide verses 1625, 1626

(to be found) ? (And) why (should) not dissimilarity take place without reason ? and why not destruction also ? (1791)

टीका—अथ स्वभावत एव भवोत्पत्तिरित्यत्र “ अकारणत एव ” इत्यपमर्शोऽभिप्रेतः, “ तो वि चि ” तथापि इन्त ! परममे सदृशता कृतः ! कोऽभिप्रायः ? इत्याह—यथाऽकारणतः सृष्ट्यता भवति, तथा किमित्स्व-कारणत एव विसृष्ट्यता न स्यात् ? । अकस्माच्चकारणतो भवविच्छिधिः कस्माद् न स्यात् ? । अकस्माच्च भवन् स्वरविषाणादिरपि भवेत् । शरीरादीनां चाकारणतो भवतामभादीनामिष प्रतिनियताकारत्वादिरूपता न स्यात् । वस्माद् नाकारणता स्वभाव इति ॥ २४३ ॥ (१७९१) ॥

D C—*Sadrśatā* of *bhavāntara* cannot be established even if you believe that it is produced without reason. For just as *sadrśatā* is taken to have been produced without reason *vi-sadrśatā* will also take place without reason. Similarly destruction of *bhava* will also take place without any reason and following the same procedure a non-existent object like *bhavarūpa* will also come into existence without any reason. Moreover objects like *śarīra* etc will lose their definite shape and such other characteristics on account of their resemblance with *abhava-vikāra* in as much as they are produced without reason. Hence it is not possible to believe *svabhāva* as *niskarāṇatā* itself.

Taking the third alternative *viz.* that *svabhāva* is *vastudharma* the author states —

अहव सहावो धम्मो वत्थुस्स, न सो वि सरिस्सओ निच्च ।
उप्पाय—ट्ठिह—भंगा चित्ता ज वत्थुपज्जाया ॥ २४४ ॥ (१७९२)

Ahava sahavo dhammo vatthussa, na so vi sarissao niccama.
Uppaya—ṭṭhi-bhaṅgā cittā jam vatthupajjāyā ॥ 244 ॥ (1792)

[अथवा स्वभावो धर्मो वस्तुनः, न सोऽपि सृष्ट्यको नित्यम् ।
उत्पाद-स्थिति-भङ्गाभिप्राया यद् वस्तुपर्यायाः ॥ २४४ ॥ (१७९२)

Athava svabhāvo dharmo vastunah na so'pi sadṛśako nityam ।
Utpāda-sṭhiti-bhaṅgāsoṭrā yad vastuparyāyah ॥ 244 ॥ (1792) ।

Trans—244 Or, if *svabhāva* is a property of an object that also will not be always the same Because, the *paryāyās* of production, retention and destruction of an object are distinct (from each other) (1792)

टीका—अथ वस्तुनो धर्मः स्वभावः, सोऽपि सर्वदैव सदृशो न घटते, इति कथं सर्वदैव शरीरादीनां सदृशतां जनयेत् । कथं पुनरस्य सदैव सदृशता न घटते ? इत्याह—“उत्पायेत्यादि” यद् यस्मादुत्पाद-स्थिति-भङ्गादयश्चिन्ना वस्तुपर्यायाः, न च ते सदैवाऽवस्थितसादृश्याः, नीलादीनां वस्तुधर्माणां प्रत्यक्षत एवान्यान्यरूपतया परिणतिदर्शनात् । किञ्च, वस्तुधर्मोऽसौ भव-त्स्वभाव आत्मधर्मो वा स्यात्, पुद्गलधर्मो वा ? । यद्यात्मधर्मः, तर्हि नासौ शरीरादीनां कारणम्, अमूर्तत्वात्, आकाशादिवत् । अथ पुद्गलधर्मः, तर्हि कर्मैवासौ, कर्मणोऽपि हि पुद्गलास्तिकायधर्मत्वेनास्माभिरभ्युपगतत्वादिति ॥ २४४ ॥ (१७९२) ॥

D C—*Svabhāva* will not be the same throughout even if you believe that it is a *vastudharma* Hence, it is not possible to maintain for ever the *sādṛś'ya* of *śarīra* etc also For, the three stages of production, existence and destruction are not always the same in case of a single object Distinction of properties in case of black objects is easily perceived

Secondly, is this *vastudharma*, a *dharma* of the *ātman* or a *dharma* of the *pudgala* ? If it is the property of *ātman* it can never become the cause of *śarīra* etc. For, it will be *a-mūṛta* like *ākāś'a* in that case On the other hand, if this *vastudharma* is the property of a *pudgala*, then it will become the *Karman* itself, as *Karman* is nothing but a *pudgaladharm* itself

कम्मस्स वि परिणामो सुहम्म ! धम्मो स पोग्गलमयस्स ।

हेऊ चित्तो जगओ होइ सहावो त्ति को दोसो ? ॥२४५॥ (१७९३)

Kammaṣa vi parināmo Suhamma! dhammo sa poggalamayassa!
Hetu citto jagao hōi sahavo tti ko doso? ॥ 245 ॥ (1793)

[कर्मणोऽपि परिणामः सुधर्मन् ! धर्म स पुद्गलमयस्य ।

हेतुचिन्तो जगतो भवति स्वभाव इति को दोषः ॥ २४५ ॥ (१७९३)

Karmaṇo pi parināmaḥ Sudharman! Dharma sa pudgalamayasya!
Hetuścitra jagato bhavati svabhāva itī ko doṣaḥ ॥ 245 ॥ (1793)]

Trans—245 O Sudharman! That (*svabhāva*) being the *parināma* of *Karman* composed of a definite body (becomes) its *dharma* also. (And) what is wrong if *svabhāva* is taken as the variable cause of the (entire mundane) world? (1793)

टीका—सुधर्मन् ! असौ वस्तुधर्मो भवत्स्वभावो धर्मो भवतु, को दोषः ?—न कश्चित्, युक्तियुक्तत्वात् । किं विधिष्टो धर्मः ? इत्याह—परिणामः । कस्य ? । कर्मणः । कथंभूतस्य ? । पुद्गलमयस्य । कथंभूतो यः कर्मपरिणामः ? । इत्याह—हेतुः । कस्य ? । जगतः—जगद्वैविध्यस्य । तदेव कर्मलक्षणस्य वस्तुनः कर्मपरिणामरूपो धर्मो भवति स्वभावः, नात्र काचिद् दोषापत्तिः । अस्माकमपि संमतोऽयमर्थः, केवल सर्वदा महश्चोऽसौ न भवति, किन्तु चित्रो मिथ्यात्वाद्वैतुवैविध्याद् विधिष्टो विविच स्वभावः । अतो न तस्मात् परमवे सादृश्यमेव, किन्तु विचित्ररूपतेति ॥ २४५ ॥ (१७९३) ॥

D O—O Sudharman! Since *svabhāva* has been taken as a *vastu-dharma* it may be taken as a *dharma* of the *pudgalamaya Karman* also. So there is no objection in admitting *svabhāva* as the *parināma* of *vastu karman* and hence as the *hetu* of universal *vastuāḥ* also.

In other words it is due to the nature of the *vastu Karman* that this world is full of varieties. The only point to remember in this case is that it is not always the same but it is full of varieties on account of various *hetus* such as vanity hostility etc

अहवा सवं वत्थुं पइवखणं चिय सुहम्म ! धम्मोहिं ।
 संभवइ वेह केहि वि केहि वि तदवत्थमच्चंतं ॥२४६॥ (१७९४)
 तं अप्पणो वि सरिसं न पुवधम्मोहिं पच्छिमिल्लाणं ।
 सयलस्स तिहुअणस्स च सरिसं सामणधम्मोहिं ॥२४७॥ (१७९५)

Ahavā savvam vatthum paikkhanam ciya Suhamma ! dhammehim ।
 Sambhavaī vaha kehi vi kehi vi tadavatthamaccantam ॥ 247 ॥

Tam appano vi sarisam na puvvadhammehim pacchimillānam ।
 Sayalassa tihuanassa ca sarisam sāmānadhāmmehim ॥247॥(1795)

[अथवा सर्वं वस्तु प्रतिक्षणमेव सुधर्मन् ! धर्मैः ।
 संभवति व्येति कैरपि कैरपि तदवस्थमत्यन्तम् ॥ २४६ ॥ (१७९४)
 तदात्मनोऽपि सदृशं न पूर्वधर्मैः पाश्चात्यानाम् ।
 सकलस्य त्रिभुवनस्य च सदृशं सामान्यधर्मैः ॥ २४७ ॥ (१७९५)

Athavā sarvam vastu pratiksanameva Sudharman ! dharmaih ।
 Sambhavati vyeti kairapi kairapi tadavasthamatyantam ॥ 246 ॥]

Tadātmano'pi sadṛśam na pūrvadharmaih pāścātyānam ।
 Sakalasya tribhuvanasya ca sadṛśam sāmānyadharmaih ॥ 247 ॥]

Trans—246-247 O Sudharman ! at every single moment, each and every object (of the Universe) is being produced, destroyed or retained by (virtue of) some property or the other So, none (of them) has its former properties similar to the latter ones On the other hand, by virtue of (certain) common properties, all the three worlds are similar (1794-1795)

टीका—व्याख्या—अथवा, सुधर्मन् ! किमेक एव परमवः?, सर्वमेव हि
 घट-पटादिकं भुवनान्तर्गतं वस्तु कैश्चित् पूर्वपर्यायैः समाना-ऽसमानपर्यायैः
 प्रतिक्षणमुत्पद्यते, कैश्चित् पुनरुत्तरपर्यायैः समाना-ऽसमानपर्यायैर्व्येति व्युप-
 रमति, कैश्चित् तदवस्थमेवास्ते । ततश्चैवं सति तद्वस्त्वात्मनोऽपि पूर्वपूर्वधर्मै-

रुक्षरोक्षरघर्माणि न सदृशम्, किं पुनरन्यवस्तूनाम् ? सामान्यधर्मस्तु
सर्वस्यापि त्रिमुषनस्य समानम्, किं पुनरेकस्यैव निजपूर्ववन्मनः ? इति ॥
२४६-२४७ ॥ (१७९४-१७९५) ॥

D C—Not only the *bhāvāntara* O *Sudharman* ! but each and every object (like *ghata* and *pata*) in this Universe is being produced destroyed or retained in its present state at every moment by virtue of a number of similar and dissimilar *paryāyas*. But on the other hand all the three worlds resemble each other also on account of certain common properties. Consequently a past life may also resemble the present life on account of some common properties contained in both.

को सर्वथेव सरिसो असरिसो वा इह भवे परमवे वा ? ।
सरिसासरिस सर्व निश्चानिश्चादिरूप च ॥ २४८ ॥ (१७९६)

Ko sarvaheva sariso asariso vā ihabhave parabhave vā ?
Sarisaasarisam sarvam niccānikkādirūpam ca ॥ 248 ॥ (1796)

[कः सर्वथैव सदृशोऽसदृशो वेह भवे परमवे वा ।
सदृशासदृश सर्व नित्यानित्यादिरूप च ॥ २४८ ॥ (१७९६)

Kaḥ sarvathaiḥ sadriṣo sadriṣo vebhabhave parabhave vā ?
Sadriṣasadriṣam sarvam nityānityādirūpam ca ॥ 248 ॥ (1796)

Trans—248 What (object) is (taken as) completely similar or dissimilar either in this life or in the next life ? Everything is similar as well as dissimilar having permanent as well as transitory forms. (1796)

टीका—को धर्मोऽर्थान्तरैरात्मना वा सद्वेह भवेऽपि सर्वथा सदृशोऽसदृशो वा, किं पुनः परमवे ? । तस्मात् सर्वमपि यस्तु सर्वेष्वपि सह समाना-
ऽसमानरूपमेवेह भवेऽपि, इति कुतः परमवे सादृश्यमेव प्रतिष्ठापये भवता ?
इति भावः । तथा, सर्वमपि नित्या-ऽनित्याद्यनन्तधर्मात्मकमिति ॥ २४८ ॥
(१७९६) ॥

D. C—It is not possible to find an object which is similar or dissimilar to other objects or even to itself even in this life, and much less in the other.

All objects are found to be similar as well as dissimilar to other objects even in this life. So, it is no use holding the view that they are the same in the other life also. Similarly, all objects have permanent as well as transitory forms.

This idea is illustrated by an example stated below—

जह नियएहिं वि सरिसो न जुवा भुवि बाल-वुद्धधम्मोहिं ।
जगओ वि समो सत्ताइएहिं तह परभवे जीवो ॥२४९॥ (१७९७)

Jaha nīyāehim vi sariso na juvā bhuvī bāla-vuddhadhammehim ।
Jagao vi samo sattāīehim taha parabhave jīvo ॥ 249 ॥ (1797)

[यथा निजकैरपि सदृशो न युवा भुवि बाल-वृद्धधर्मैः ।

जगतोऽपि समः सत्तादिकैस्तथा परभवे जीवः ॥ २४९ ॥ (१७९७)

Yathā nijakairapi sadṛśo na yuvā bhuvī bāla-vṛddhadharmaih ।
Jagato'pi samah sattādikaistathā parabhave jīvah ॥249॥ (1797)]

Trans—249 Just as a young man does not resemble his own past and future forms of childhood and old age respectively on (this) earth, but at the same time resembles the whole of earth on account of the property of existing etc, in the same way, *jīva*, too, becomes similar as well as dissimilar in the other life (1797)

टीका-यथेह युवा निजैरप्यतीता-ऽनागतैर्बाल-वृद्धादिपर्यायै-रात्म-
नोऽपि सर्वथा न समानः, सत्तादिभिस्तु सामान्यपर्यायैर्जगति न केनचिद्
न समानः, तथायमपि जीवः परलोकं गतः सर्वेणापि सह समाना-ऽसमान-
रूप एव, इति कुतः सर्वथा सादृश्यम्? इति ॥ २४९ ॥ (१७९७)

D C—Just as a young man does not resemble his own forms of childhood and old age, but at the same time resembles

कचरोचरधर्माणां न सदृशम्, किं पुनरन्यवस्तूनाम् ?; सामान्यधर्मस्तु सर्वस्यापि त्रिगुणस्य समानम्, किं पुनरेकस्यैव निजपूर्वव्ययमनः ? इति ॥ २४६-२४७ ॥ (१७९४-१७९५) ॥

D O—Not only the *bhavāntara* 'O Sudharman' but each and every object (like *ghata* and *pata*) in this Universe is being produced destroyed or retained in its present state at every moment by virtue of a number of similar and dissimilar *pariyāyas*. But on the other hand all the three worlds resemble each other also on account of certain common properties. Consequently a past life may also resemble the present life on account of some common properties contained in both.

को सद्यहेव सरिसो असरिसो वा इहमवे परमवे वा ? ।
सरिसासरिस सद्य निश्चानिश्चाइरूप च ॥ २४८ ॥ (१७९६)

Ko savyaheva sariso asariso vā ihabhave parabhave vā ? ।
Sarīsāsarisam savyam nīccanīccādirūpam ca ॥ 248 ॥ (1796)

[कः सर्वथैव सदृशोऽसदृशो वेहमवे परमवे वा ।
सदृशासदृशं सर्वं नित्यानित्यादिरूपं च ॥ २४८ ॥ (१७९६)

Kah sarvathaiva sadriśo asadriśo vehabhavo parabhave vā ? ।
Sadriśāsadriśam sarvām nityānityādirūpam ca ॥ 248 ॥ (1796)]

Trans—248 What (object) is (taken as) completely similar or dissimilar either in this life or in the next life ? Everything is similar as well as dissimilar having permanent as well as transitory forms. (1796)

टीका—को व्यर्थोऽर्थान्तरैरात्मना वा सद्येहमवेऽपि सर्वथा सदृशोऽदृशो वा, किं पुनः परमवे ? । तस्मात् सर्वमपि यस्तु सर्वेणापि सद्य समाना-
ऽवमानरूपमेवेहमवेऽपि, इति कुतः परमवे सादृश्यमेव प्रतिष्ठापये ममता ?
इति भावः । तथा, सर्वमपि नित्या-ऽनित्याद्यनन्तधर्मात्मकमिति ॥ २४८ ॥
(१७९६) ॥

like existence etc., but, at the same time, he is distinguished from the three worlds on account of his *devatva* etc. This shows that absolute *sadr̥ś'atā* is not acceptable but *visadr̥ś'atā* has also equal scope with it. Similarly, all objects are *ntya* on account of their *dravyatva*, and, at the same time, *a-ntya* because of their varied transformations.

Sudharman —I accept *sadr̥śatā* of objects on account of nothing but their relation to the same gender. That is, according to me, *purusa* turns out to be a *purusa* and animals remain as animals in the *bhavāntara*.

Bhagavān —Your argument, *O Sudharman* ' is fallacious. The next life is attained by virtue of actions accomplished in this life. These actions come into existence on account of various *hetus* such as *mithyātva* etc. Hence, *bhavāntara* which is produced by these actions should also be taken as *vicitrātā* on account of the *vicitrātā* of actions, but *sadr̥ś'atā* can never fit in by means of their relation to the *sadr̥ś'a* gender etc

For,

उक्करिसा—वक्करिसा न समाणाए वि जेण जाईए ।
सरिसग्गाहे जम्हा दाणाइफलं विहा तम्हा ॥ २५१ ॥ (१७९९)

Ukkarīsā—'vakkarīsā na samānāe vi jena jāīe ।
Sarisaggāhe jamhā dānāiphalam vihā tamhā ॥ 251 ॥ (1799)

[उत्कर्षा—स्पकर्षौ न समानायामपि येन जातौ ।
सदृशग्रहे यस्माद् दानादिफलं वृथा तस्मात् ॥ २५१ ॥ (१७९९)

Utkarṣā—'pakarsau na samānayāmpi yena jātau ।
Sadr̥śagrahe yasmād dānādiphalam vṛithā tasmāt ॥251॥ (1799)]

Trans—251 In (case of) (absolute) sameness, there will be no (scope for) elevation or degradation even in the

all other objects in this world on account of certain common properties like the quality of existing etc. in the same way *Jīvas* in the other life are not merely similar but dissimilar to other objects also.

Moreover

मणुओ देवीभूओ सरिसो सत्ताइयहिं जगओ वि ।

देवाइहिं विसरिसो निञ्चानिञ्चो वि एमेव ॥ २५० ॥ (१७९८)

Manuo devībhūo sariso sattālehim jagao vi ।

Devāihī visariso niccānicco vi emeva ॥ 250 ॥ (1798)

[मनुओ देवीभूतः सदृशः सत्तादिकैर्जगतोऽपि ।

देव(स्व)ादिर्मिविसदृशो नित्यानित्योऽप्येवमेव ॥ २५० ॥ (१७९८)

Manujo devībhūtah sadrūṣah sattadikair-jagato pi ।

Deva(tvī)dībhir-vīsadrūṣo nityānityo pyevameva ॥ 250 ॥ (1799)]

Trans—250 A divine man resembles the whole of mundane world on account of (properties like) existence etc. and is distinguished (from it) as well by means of (his) state of being a deity etc. In the same way (he) is permanent and at the same time transitory also. (1798)

टीका—मनुष्यो मृत्वा देवत्वापन्नो जगत्त्रयस्यापि सत्तादिभिः पर्यायैः सदृशः, देवत्वादिभिस्तु विसदृशः, इति नैकान्तेन कापि सदृशता । तथा, इन्द्रियतयाऽसौ नित्यः, पर्यायतया त्वनित्य इत्याद्यपि वक्तव्यम् । अत्राह—नन्वस्मादपि नैकान्तेन परमवे सादृश्यमभ्युपगम्यते, किन्तु समानत्वात्पन्वयमात्रमेवेष्ट्यते, पुरुषादिसृष्टः पुरुषादिरेव मवतीति । एतदभ्युक्तम्, कर्मबलितो हि परमव इति साधितम् । तत्र मिथ्यात्वादिविचित्रहेतुजन्यत्वाद् विचित्रमेवेति, अतस्तत्तन्वयः परमवो विचित्र एव युज्यते, न तु समानत्वात्पन्वयः सिध्यतीति ॥ २५० ॥ (१७९८) ॥

D C—A person who becomes *deva* after death resembles all the three worlds on account of the common characteristics

like existence etc., but, at the same time, he is distinguished from the three worlds on account of his *devatva* etc. This shows that absolute *sadrīś'atā* is not acceptable but *visadrīś'atā* has also equal scope with it. Similarly, all objects are *nitya* on account of their *dravyatva*, and, at the same time, *a-nitya* because of their varied transformations.

Sudharman.—I accept *sadrīśatā* of objects on account of nothing but their relation to the same gender. That is, according to me, *purusa* turns out to be a *purusa* and animals remain as animals in the *bhavāntara*.

Bhagavān —Your argument, *O Sudharman* ' is fallacious. The next life is attained by virtue of actions accomplished in this life. These actions come into existence on account of various *hetus* such as *mithyātva* etc. Hence, *bhavāntara* which is produced by these actions should also be taken as *vicīṭatā* on account of the *vicīṭatā* of actions, but *sadrīś'atā* can never fit in by means of their relation to the *sadrīś'a* gender etc.

For,

उक्करिसा—वक्करिसा न समाणाए वि जेण जाईए ।

सरिसग्गाहे जम्हा दाणाइफलं विहा तम्हा ॥ २५१ ॥ (१७९९)

Ukkarīsā—'vakkarīsā na samānāe vi jena jāie ।

Sarisaggāhe jamhā dānāḍiphalam vihā tamhā ॥ 251 ॥ (1799)

[उत्कर्षा—स्पर्षा न समानायामपि येन जातौ ।

सदृशग्रहे यस्माद् दानादिफलं वृथा तस्मात् ॥ २५१ ॥ (१७९९)

Utkarṣā—'pakarsau na samānāyāmpi yena jātau ।

Sadrīśagrahe yasmād dānādīphalam vṛithā tasmāt ॥251॥ (1799)]

Trans—251 In (case of) (absolute) sameness, there will be no (scope for) elevation or degradation even in the

same genesis (and) the fruits of munificence etc. will become futile (1799)

टीका—सदृशग्रहे समानभातीयसाग्रहे सति समानायामपि जातौ येन पस्मादीश्वर-दरिद्र-कुलीना ऽकुलीनादिरूपेभ्योत्कर्षा-ऽपकर्षौ न घटां प्राप्नुवतः । यो हि यादृश इहमवे, स यदि परमवेऽपि तादृश एव, तर्हि य इहमवे ईश्वरः स परमवेऽपि तादृश एव, एवं दरिद्रादिष्वपि वाच्यम् । ततमेहमवात् परमवे सर्वप्रकारैरप्युत्कर्षा-ऽपकर्षौ न स्याताम्, किन्त्वेषकान्तसदृशतैव भवेत् । “तम्ह चि” तस्माद् मोक्तव्योऽय सादृश्यग्रह इति प्रकृमाद् द्रष्टव्यम् । अयेत्यमाधक्षीयाः—मा भूतामुत्कर्षा-ऽपकर्षौ, का नो हानिः ? इत्याह— “अम्हा दाणादफलं विह चि” चकारस्य गम्यमानत्वाद् यसावेत्यं परभ्योत्कर्षा-ऽपकर्षयोरभावे दानादिकलं वृथा संपद्यते । लोको हि परत्र दानादिसमृद्धिं प्राप्स्याऽऽत्मन उत्कर्षार्थं दानादिप्रवृत्तिं विदधाति । यदि चोक्तयुक्त्योत्कर्षा मावाद् दरिद्रो दान-तपस्-तीर्थाविगाहनाद्यपि कृत्वाऽप्यत्र दरिद्र एव स्यात्, तर्हि क तद्वानादिकलम् ? इत्यपार्थिका दानादौ प्रवृत्तिः, तस्माद् न विधेयः सादृश्यग्रह इति ॥ २५१ ॥ (१७९९) ॥

D C—If you believe in absolute sameness there will be no scope either for elevation or for degradation even in the same genesis. One who is rich in this life will remain rich in the next life also in spite of his sinful actions and a poor man will remain poor in the next life even if he performs benevolent duties such as *dana tapas tirtha-snana* etc., according to your belief of absolute *śāśvata*. Thus there will be no reward of either good or evil actions but the same type of life will go on throughout all the *bhavas*. So if there is no *utkarṣa* or *apalarṣa* in the next life there will be no utility for various benevolent actions such as munificence austerities ablutions in holy waters etc., to be followed by people for the attainment of *Varatra* etc. To believe in absolute *śāśvata* is therefore not proper 251 (1799)

And the *Vedapadas* will also be wrong if absolute *śāśvata* is accepted—

जं च सिगालो वइ एस जायए वेयविहियमिच्चाइं ।
सग्गीयं जं च फलं तमसंबद्धं सरिसयाए ॥ २५२ ॥ (१८००)

Jam ca sigālo vai esa jāyae Veyavihiyamiccāim ।
Saggiyam jam ca phalam tamasanbaddham sarisayāe ॥252॥ (1800)

[यच्च शृगालो वै एष जायते वेदविहितमित्यादि ।
स्वर्गीयं यच्च फलं तदसंबद्धं सदृशतायाम् ॥ २५२ ॥ (१८००)

Yacca śrigālo vai esa jāyate Vedavihitamityādi ।
Svargiyam yacca phalam tadasambaddham sadṛśatāyām ॥ 252 ॥]

Trans—252 Statements of *Vedas* such as “*Śrigālo vai esa jāyate*” etc, as well as the reward of heaven laid down by *Vedas*, will prove inconsistent in (case of) *sadṛśatā* (being admitted) (1800)

टीका—यच्च “ शृगालो वै एष जायते यः सपुरीषो दह्यते ” इत्यादि वेदविहितं तदपि परभवसदृशताग्रहेऽसंबद्धमेव स्यात्, पुरुषादेरमुत्र शृगालतयानुपपत्तेः । तथा, यदपि “ अग्निहोत्रं जुहुयात् स्वर्गकामः ” तथा, “अग्निष्टोमेन यमराज्यमभिजयति” इत्यादिकं स्वर्गीयफलसूचकत्वात् स्वर्गीयं फलं तदप्यसंबद्धं भवेत्, मनुष्यस्य त्वदभिप्रायेण देवत्वानुपपत्तेरिति । “पुरुषो वै पुरुषत्वमश्नुते, पशवः पशुत्वम्” इत्यादीनां च वेदपदानामयमर्थः—कोऽपि पुरुषः खल्विह जन्मनि प्रकृत्या भद्रको विनीतः सानुक्रोशोऽमत्सरश्च मनुष्यनाम—गोत्रे कर्मणी बद्धा मृतः सन् पुरुषत्वमश्नुते, न तु नियमेन सर्व एव, अन्यस्यान्यकर्मवशगस्यान्यथाप्युत्पत्तेः । एवं पशवोऽपि केचिद् मायादिदोषवशात् पशुनाम—गोत्रे कर्मणी बद्ध्वा परभवे पशवो जायन्ते, न तु सर्वेऽपि, नियमेन कर्मापेक्षित्वाज्जीवगतेरिति । तदेवं तस्यापि चिह्नः संशयः ॥ २५२ ॥ (१८००) ॥

D C—If it is admitted, O blessed *Sudharman* ! that the next life is exactly similar to this life, the sentences of *Vedas* such as “*Śrigālo vai esa jāyate yah sa-purīṣo dahyate*” etc, which tell us that, one who is burnt along with foes becomes fox

in the next life will turn to be inconsistent. For according to you, man should become man only in the next life. Secondly sentences like "*agnihotrāṃ juhuyāt svargakāmāḥ* and *agnistomāṃ yamardjamabhyayaṃ*" which lay down the conditions for the attainment of *svarga*, will also become inconsistent because man does never become deity according to your theory of *sadrasā*.

The real interpretation of *puruṣo vaḥ puruṣatvamāśnate paśavaḥ paśutvam*" etc. is this:—A person who is pious cultured and self-less attains the genesis of man when he dies away after having attached his actions to the human name and lineage. But that does not mean that all *puruṣas* attain *puruṣatva* as a rule. By virtue of different types of actions people are liable to be born in an absolutely different genesis also. The same is the case with animals. On account of certain faults like illusion etc. certain animals remain as animals when they pass away in the next life having attached their actions to the name and lineage of animals. But all *pasus* do not attain *pasutva* as a rule because their movement from one *bhava* to another depends upon their actions.

Thus

छिन्नमि संसयमि जिणेण जरा—मरणविप्पमुक्केण ।

सो समणो पव्वइओ पचहिं सह खदियसयहिं ॥२५३॥ (१८०१)

Chinnammi samsayammi Jinena Jarā—maranavippamukkenam ।

So samano pavvaḥ paṇḍhīm saha khandiyasayhīm ॥253॥ (1801)

Trans—253 When the doubt was removed by the *Tīrthakara* who was entirely free from old age and death, that Saint (*Sadharman*) accepted *dīksā* along with his five hundred pupils. (1801)

End of the Discussion with the Fifth Gaṇadhara.



Chapter VI



षष्ठगणधरवक्तव्यता ।

Discussion with the Sixth Ganadhara

ते पवइए सोउं मंडिओ आगच्छइ जिणसगासं ।
वच्चांमि ण वंदामी वंदित्ता पज्जुवासामि ॥ २५४ ॥ (१८०२)

Te pavvaie so um Mandio āgacchai Jinasagāsam ।
Vaccāmi na vandāmi vandittā pajjuvāsāmi ॥ 254 ॥ (1802)

[तान् प्रव्रजितान् श्रुत्वा मण्डिक आगच्छति जिनसकाशम् ।
व्रजामि वन्दे वन्दित्वा पर्युपासे ॥ २५४ ॥ (१८०२)

Tān pravrajitān śrutvā Mandika āgacchatī Jinasakāśam ।
Vrajāmi vande vanditvā paryupāse ॥ 254 ॥ ((1802))

Trans—254 Having heard that they had renounced the world, *Mandika* comes before the *Tīrthankara* (He thinks) – I may go, pay my homage, and worship him (1802)

टीका—व्याख्या पूर्ववत् नवरं मण्डिको नाम षष्ठो द्विजोपाध्यायः
श्रीमज्जिनसकाशमागच्छतीति ॥ २५४ ॥ (१८०२)

D. C—Now the sixth *Ganadhara* named *Mandika*, comes before the *Tīrthankara* and starts discussion

आभट्ठो य जिणेणं जाइ—जरा—मरणविप्पमुक्केणं ।
नामेणं य गोत्रेण य सब्बणू सब्बरिसी णं ॥ २५५ ॥ (१८०२)

Ābhaṭṭho ya Jinenam jāi-jarā-marānavippamukkenam ।
Nāmenam ya gotrena ya savvaṇṇi savvadarisā nam ॥255॥ (1803)

[आमापितस्य जिनेन जाति-जरा-मरणविप्रमुक्तेन ।

नाम्ना च गोत्रेण च सर्वज्ञेन सर्वदर्शिना ॥ २५५ ॥ (१८०३)

Ābhaṭṭaṭṭha Jinena jāti-jarā-marānavippamukkena ।
Nāma ca gotreṇa ca sarvajñena sarvadarśina ॥ 255 ॥ (1803)]

Trans—255 He was addressed by his name and lineage by the *Tīrthāṅkara*, who was free from birth old age, and death, who was omniscient and who had complete *darśana* (undifferentiated knowledge) (1803)

The *Tīrthāṅkara* then said—

किं मन्ने बध-मोक्खा सति न सति चि ससओ तुज्झ ।
वेयपयाण य अत्थ न याणसी तेसिमो अत्थो ॥२५६॥ (१८०४)

Kim manne bandha-mokkhā santi na santi tti saṃsao tujjham ।
Veyapayāṇa ya attham na yāṇasī tesimo attho ॥ 256 ॥ (1804)

[किं मन्यसे बध-मोक्षौ स्तो न सति इति संशयस्तव ।

वेदपदानां चार्थे न जानासि तेषामयमर्थः ॥ २५६ ॥ (१८०४)

Kim manyaso bandha-mokṣau sto na sta iti saṃśayaṣṭava ।
Vedapadanam artham na jānasi teṣāmayamarthah ॥256॥(1804)]

Trans—256 What do you think about ? You entertain doubt as to whether *bandha* (worldly bondages) and *mokṣa* (Final Liberation) exist or not But (*ca*) you do not know the (real) meaning of the sentences of *Vedas* Their (real) interpretation is this (1804)

टीका-मण्डिक ! त्वमित्य मयसे-किं बध-मोक्षौ स्तो न या ? इति ।

अथ चानुचितस्तव संशयः, विरुद्धवेदपदभुतिनिबधनत्वात्, तथाहि—“ स एष विगुणो विमूर्ध पश्यते समरति वा, न दृश्यते मोक्षपति वा, न वा ण्य बाह्यमभ्यन्तरं वा वेद ” इत्यादीनि वेदपदानि, तथा, “ न इ वे सञ्चरीरस्य

प्रिया-ऽप्रिययोरपहतिरस्ति, अशरीरं वा वसन्तं प्रिया-ऽप्रिये न स्पृशतः ”
 इत्यादीनि च । एतेषां चार्थं त्वं न जानासि, यतोऽयमेतदर्थस्तव चेतसि
 वर्तते, तद्यथा-स एषः-अधिकृतो जन्तुः, विगुणः-सत्त्व-रजस्-तमोगुणर-
 हितः, विभुः-सर्वगतः, न बध्यते-पुण्य-पापाभ्यां न युज्यत इत्यर्थः,
 संसरति वा ‘न’ इत्यनुवर्तते, न मुच्यते-न कर्मणा विद्युज्यते, बन्धस्यैवा-
 भावात्; मोचयति वा नान्यम्, इत्यनेनाकर्तृकत्वमाह; न वा एष बाह्यम्-
 आत्मभिन्नं महदहङ्कारादि, अभ्यन्तरं-निजस्वरूपमेव, वेद-विजानाति,
 प्रकृतिधर्मत्वाज्ज्ञानस्य, प्रकृतेश्चाचेतनत्वात् । ततश्चामूनि किल बन्ध-मोक्षा-
 भावप्रतिपादकानि । तथा, न ह वै-नैवेत्यर्थः, अशरीरस्य प्रिया-ऽप्रिययो-
 रपहतिरस्तीति-बाह्या-ऽऽध्यात्मिकानादिशरीरसंतानयुक्तत्वात् सुख-दुःख-
 योरपहतिः संसारिणो नास्तीत्यर्थः, अशरीरं वा वसन्तं-अमूर्तमित्यर्थः,
 प्रिया-ऽप्रिये न स्पृशतः, तत्कारणभूतस्य कर्मणोऽभावादित्यर्थः । अमूनि
 च बन्ध-मोक्षाभिधायकानीति । अतः संशयः । तत्र “स एष विगुणो विभुः”
 इत्यादीनां नायमर्थः, किन्त्वयं बध्यमानलक्षण इति ॥ २५६ ॥ (१८०४)

D C—O Māṇḍikā ' You doubt the existence of *bandha* and *moksa*, because you have heard various *Vedapadas* having contradictory meanings

“ *Sa esa viguṇvo vibhu r-na badhyate samsarati vā na mucyate mocayati vā na vā esa bāhyamabhyantaram vā veda* ” etc as well as like,

“ *Na ha va sa-s'arīṇasya priyā-priyayorapahatir asti, as'arīṇam vā vasantam priyā-priye na spris'atah* ” etc

You have not grasped the real meaning of these sentences According to you, the interpretation of the first sentence is this —The all-pervading Soul, which being free from attributes like *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas*, is never bound by the clutches of *pāpa* and *punya*, nor does it proceed further Since there is absolute *bandhābhāva*, this (Soul) can neither be detached from *karma*, nor can it relieve the other from the *bandhas*

Ābhaṭṭho ya Jinenam jāl-jarū-maranaviṇṇamukkenam ।
Nāmenam ya gotrena ya savvamaṇi savvadarisi nam ॥255॥ (1803)

[आमापितव्यं जिनेन जाति-जरा-मरणविप्रमुक्तेन ।

नाम्ना च गोत्रेण च सर्वज्ञेन सर्वदर्शिना ॥ २५५ ॥ (१८०३)

Ābhaṭṭasōa Jīnena jāti-jarā-maraṇaviṇṇamukkena ।
Nāma ca gotreṇa ca sarvajñena sarvadarśina ॥ 255 ॥ (1803)]

Trans—255 He was addressed by his name, and lineage by the *Tirthankara* who was free from birth old age, and death, who was omniscient and who had complete *darśana* (undifferentiated knowledge) (1803)

The *Tirthankara* then said—

किं मन्ने बन्ध-मोक्खा सति न सति चि ससम्भो तुज्झ ।
वेयपयाण य अत्थ न याणसी तेसिमो अत्थो ॥२५६॥ (१८०४)

Kim manne bandha-mokkhā santi na santi tti samsao tujjham ।
Veyapayāṇa ya attham na yāṇasī tesimo attho ॥ 256 ॥ (1804)

[किं मन्यसे बन्ध-मोक्षौ स्तो न स्त इति संशयस्तव ।

वेदपदानां चार्थं न जानासि तेषामयमर्थः ॥ २५६ ॥ (१८०४)

Kim manyaso bandha-mokṣau sto na sta iti saṁśayaastava ।
Vedapadanam cartham na jānāsī teṣamayamarthah ॥256॥(1804)]

Trans—256 What do you think about ? You entertain doubt as to whether *bandha* (worldly bondages) and *moksa* (Final Liberation) exist or not. But (*ca*) you do not know the (real) meaning of the sentences of *Vedas* Their (real) interpretation is this. (1804)

टीका-मच्छिदक ! त्वमित्थं मन्यसे-किं बन्ध-मोक्षौ स्तो न वा ? इति ।

अयं चानुचितस्तव संशयः, विरुद्धवेदपदश्रुतिनिबन्धनत्वाद्, तथाहि—“ स
एव विगुणो विमुक्तं बन्धते संसरति वा, न मुच्यते मोक्षयति वा, न वा एव
ब्राह्ममभ्यन्तरं वा वेद ” इत्यादीनि वेदपदानि, तथा, “ न ह वै संशयीत्य

टीका—‘ वेद्यपयाण य ’ इत्यत्र चशब्दाद् युक्तिं च त्वं न जानासि ।
 कुतः ? यस्मादायुष्मन् मण्डिक ! त्वमेवं मन्यसे—जीवस्य बन्धो यदि कर्मणा
 समं सार्धं योगः संयोगोऽभिप्रेतः स खल्वादिमान् आदिरहितो वा ? ।
 यद्यादिमान्, ततः किं पूर्वं जीवः प्रसूयेत पश्चात् कर्म, पूर्वं वा कर्म पश्चाज्जीवः
 प्रसूयेत, समं वा युगपद् वा तौ द्वावपि प्रसूयेयाताम् ? इति पक्षत्रयमिति ॥
 २५७ ॥ (१८०५) ॥

D C—If, O long-lived *Mandika*, you believe that *bandha* means the contact of *jīva* with *Karma*, consider whether that contact is *ādimān* or *ādīrahita*. If it is *ādimān* there will be three alternatives (1) *Jīva* will be produced first and then *Karma* or (2) *Karma* will be produced first and then *jīva* or (3) both of them will be produced simultaneously.

Refuting the first alternative, the author states —

न हि पुव्वमहेऊओ खरसंगं वायसंभवो जुत्तो ।

निक्कारणजायस्स य निक्कारणउ च्चिय विणासो ॥२५८॥(१८०६)

Na hi puṇvamaheūo kharasangam vāyasambhavo jutto ।

Nikkāraṇajāyassa ya nikkāraṇau cciya viṇāso ॥ 258 ॥ (1806)

[न हि पूर्वमहेतोः खरशृङ्गमिवात्मसंभवो युक्तः ।

निष्कारणजातस्य च निष्कारणक एव विनाशः ॥ २५८ ॥ (१८०६)

Na hi pūrvamahetoh kharasṅgamivātmasambhavo yuktah ।

Niskāraṇajātasya ca niskāranaka eva vināśah ॥ 258 ॥ (1806)]

Trans—258 Like *kharaśṅga*, the production of Soul is not justified on account of the absence of *hetu*. And that which is born without any cause, has its end (also) without any cause (1806)

टीका—“ पूर्वं जीवः पश्चात्कर्म ” इत्येतदयुक्तम्, यतो न कर्मणः पूर्वं
 “ खरसंगं वायसंभवो जुत्तो ” खरशृङ्गस्येवात्मनः संभवो युक्तः, अहेतुकत्वात्,

It knows neither the external attributes like pride etc. nor does it recognize its own internal self on account of *jñāna* being the property of *prakṛti* which is *acetaṇa* here. So the statements such as stated above assert the absolute *abhāva* of *bandha* and *mokṣa* between *jīva* and *Karma*.

On the other hand, sentences such as *na ha vaṃ* etc., would mean quite the reverse (according to you) They assert that there is no *abhāva* of *prīya* and *a-prīya* to one having *saṁsāra* while the *a-saṁsāri dīman* is never touched by them. Since the external as well as internal *anādi saṁsāras* are *samīdanayukta* the *samādri jīvas* are not deprived of the experiences of *sukha* and *duḥkha* while the *a-saṁsāri dīman* is never touched by *sukha* and *duḥkha* on account of the absolute *abhāva* of its *Karṇa* the *Karman*. Thus these *Vedapadas* are inclined to assert the existence of *bandha* and *mokṣa*.

Such sentences have given rise to your doubt which is not at all proper. Your interpretation of the sentences is not correct. I, therefore give you their real interpretation. Please listen carefully—

त मन्नसि जइ बन्धो जोगो जीवस्स कम्मणा समय ।

पुव्व पच्छा जीवो कम्म व सम व ते होज्जा ? ॥२५७॥ (१८०५)

Tam mannasī jaḥ bandho jogo jīvassa kammāṇa samayaṃ ;
Pūvvaṃ pacchā jīvo kammam va samam va te hojjā ? 257a (1805)

[त्व मन्यसे यदि बन्धो योगो जीवस्य कर्मणा समकम् ।

पूर्व पश्चाज्जीवः कर्म वा सम वा ते भवेताम् ? ॥ २५७ ॥ (१८०५)

Tvam manyase yadi bandho yogo jīvasya karmāṇa samakam ।
Pūrvam paścājīvaḥ karma va samam va te bhavetaṃ ? 257 b]

Trans.—257 If you believe that *bandha* is the union of *jīva* with *Karma*, will the *jīva* be produced first and then *Karma*, or *Karma* be produced first and then *jīva* or both together ? (1805)

टीका—‘वेयपयाण य’ इत्यत्र चशब्दाद् युक्तिं च त्वं न जानासि ।
 कुतः ? यस्मादायुष्मन् मण्डिक ! त्वमेवं मन्यसे—जीवस्य बन्धो यदि कर्मणा
 समकं सार्धं योगः संयोगोऽभिप्रेतः स खल्वादिमान् आदिरहितो वा ? ।
 यद्यादिमान्, ततः किं पूर्वं जीवः प्रसूयेत पश्चात् कर्म, पूर्वं वा कर्म पश्चाज्जीवः
 प्रसूयेत, समं वा युगपद् वा तौ द्वावपि प्रसूयेयाताम् ? इति पक्षत्रयमिति ॥
 २५७ ॥ (१८०५) ॥

D C.—If, O long-lived *Mandika*, you believe that *bandha* means the contact of *jīva* with *Karma*, consider whether that contact is *ādīmān* or *ādīrahita*. If it is *ādīmān* there will be three alternatives (1) *Jīva* will be produced first and then *Karma* or (2) *Karma* will be produced first and then *jīva* or (3) both of them will be produced simultaneously.

Refuting the first alternative, the author states —

न हि पुव्वमहेऊओ खरसंगं वायसंभवो जुत्तो ।

निक्कारणजायस्स य निक्कारणउ च्चिय विणासो ॥२५८॥(१८०६)

Na hi puṇvamaheūo kharasangam vāyasambhavo jutto ।

Nikkāraṇajāyassa ya nikkāraṇau cciya vināso ॥ 258 ॥ (1806)

[न हि पूर्वमहेतोः खरशृङ्गमिवात्मसंभवो युक्तः ।

निष्कारणजातस्य च निष्कारणक एव विनाशः ॥ २५८ ॥ (१८०६)

Na hi pūrvamahetoḥ kharasṛṅgamivātmasambhavo yuktah ।

Niskāraṇajātasya ca niskāraṇaka eva vināśah ॥ 258 ॥ (1806)]

Trans—258 Like *kharaśṛṅga*, the production of Soul is not justified on account of the absence of *hetu*. And that which is born without any cause, has its end (also) without any cause (1806)

टीका—“पूर्वं जीवः पश्चात्कर्म” इत्येतदयुक्तम्, यतो न कर्मणः पूर्वं
 “खरसंगं वायसंभवो जुत्तो” खरशृङ्गस्येवात्मनः संभवो युक्तः, अहेतुकत्वात्,

इह यदहेतुकं तद् न जायते, यथा स्वरभृङ्गम्, यच्च जायते तद् निर्हेतुकमपि न भवति, यथा घटः, निष्कारणस्य च जातस्य निष्कारण एव विनाशः स्यादिति ॥ २५८ ॥ (१८०६) ॥

D. C.—According to the first alternative stated above *jīva* is born first and then *Karma*. Now since *Karma* is the *hetu* of *jīva* the production of *jīva* is totally unjustified like the production of *khara-sṛṅga* on account of its *a-hetuvā*. For that which has no *hetu* is never produced like *khara-sṛṅga* and that which has already been produced is never *an-hetuvā* as in case of *ghata*. Moreover that which is born without any cause has even to meet its end without any end.

Proceeding further the author argues—

अहवाऽणाइ चिय सो निक्कारणओ न कम्मजोगो से ।

अह निक्कारणओ सो, मुक्कस्स वि होहिइ स भुज्जो ॥ २५९ ॥

Ahavaṇāḷ cciya so nikkāraṇao na kammajogo so ।

Aha nikkāraṇao so, mukkaṣṣa vi hohiḷ sa bhuḷḷo ॥ 259 ॥ (1807)

[अथवाऽनादिरेष स निष्कारणको न कर्मयोगस्तस्य ।

अथ निष्कारणः सः, मुक्तस्यापि भविष्यति स भूयः ॥ २५९ ॥ (१८०७)

Athavaṇāḷireva sa nikkāraṇako na karmayogastasya ।

Atha nikkāraṇaḷ saḷ muktaṣṣyaḷi bhaviṣyati sa bhūyaḷ ॥ 259 ॥ (1807)]

Trans -259 Or that (soul) being *anādi* may be beyond any cause and (hence) have no connection with *Karma*. If it were beyond any cause it might have belonged to a *mukta* being also (1807)

टीका—अथ यत् कर्मणः पूर्वमात्माऽनादिकालसिद्ध एव, इति किं तस्य महेतुक-निर्हेतुकमित्या ? इति । अत्रोच्यते—“ निक्कारणओ इत्यादि ” यद्यप्यम्, ततः “ से ” तस्य जीवस्य कर्मयोगः कर्मण्यो न प्राप्नोति, अकारणत्वात्, नभम इह । अथ निष्कारणोऽप्यतो भवति, तर्हि मुक्तस्यापि

भूयः स भविष्यति, निष्कारणत्वाविशेषात्, ततश्च मुक्तावप्यनाश्वास इति
॥ २५९ ॥ (१८०७) ॥

D C—Mandika.—Existence of soul has already been established from times immemorial before *Karma* was produced. It is, therefore, useless to consider whether its production is *sa-hetuka* or *nir-hetuka*.

Bhagavān —In that case, *O Mandika* ' on account of its causelessness, *ātman* will have no bondage with *Karma* as it has no bondage with *ākāśa*.

Mandika —No, in spite of its causelessness, the soul is in contact with *Karma*.

Bhagavān —Then, it will be attached to a *mukta* (liberated) being also. Thus, one that has already been liberated from the worldly bondages, will again come into those bondages on account of the common property, *viz—niskāṇanātā* belonging to both of them. 259 (1807).

होज्ज स निच्चमुक्को बंधाभावम्मि को व से मोक्खो ? ।
न हि मुक्कववएसो बंधाभावे मओ नभसो ॥ २६० ॥ (१८०८)

Hojja sa nīccamukko bandhābhāvammi ko va se mokkho ? ।
Na hi mukkavvavaeso bandhābhāve mao nabhaso ॥ 260 ॥ (1808)

[भवेत् स नित्यमुक्तो बन्धाभावे को वा तस्य मोक्षः ? ।

न हि मुक्तव्यपदेशो बन्धाभावे मतो नभसः ॥ २६० ॥ (१८९८)

Bhavet sa nityamukto bandhābhāve ko vā tasya mokṣaḥ ? ।
Na hi muktavyapadeśo bandhābhāve mato nabhasaḥ ॥ 260 ॥ (1808)]

Trans —260 If it is ever liberated in absence of bondage, how will its *moksa* exist ? For, in absence of bondage, attribute of liberation could never be accepted as in the case of *ākāśa* (1808)

टीका—अथवा, कर्मयोगाभावाद् नित्यमुक्त एवासौ भवेत् । यदिवा,

पञ्चाभावे कः किल तस्य मोक्षव्यपदेशः ? । न क्षयद्वयस्य नभसः कस्यापि
मुक्तव्यपदेशो मतः, पञ्चपूर्वकत्वाद् मोक्षस्य । तस्माद् न “पूर्वं जीवः पश्चात्
कर्म” इति प्रथमविकल्प इति ॥ २६० ॥ (१८०८) ॥

D C—Mandika —On account of the *abhāva* of *Karmayoga*,
this *ātman* is also *nitya-mukta*.

Bhagavān :—If it is so *O Mandika* how will *mokṣa* be
attributed to it ? For one that is not susceptible to *bandha*
is never susceptible to *mokṣa* also as in the case of *ākāśa*.
Mokṣa can be attributed only to those that undergo *bandhas*.
The first alternative that *jīva* is produced first and then *Karma*
is therefore not acceptable 260 (1808).

Now the other two alternatives—viz. that *Karma* is produced
first and *jīva* afterwards or that both of them are produced
simultaneously—are refuted as follows —

न य कम्मस्स वि पुव्व कत्तुरभावे समुत्भवो जुत्तो ।
निक्कारणओ सो वि य तह जुगवुप्पत्तिभावे य ॥ २६१ ॥ (१८०९)
न हि कत्ता कज्ज सि य जुगवुप्पत्तीए जीव—कम्माण ।
जुत्तो ववएसोऽय जह लोए गोविसाणाण ॥ २६२ ॥ (१८१०)

Na ya kammassa vi puvvaṃ katturabhāve samubbhavo jutto ।
Nikkāraṇao so vi ya taha jugavuppattibhāve ya ॥ 261 ॥ (1809)

Na hi kattā kaḥḥam ti ya jugavuppattie jīva-kammaṇam ।
Jutto vavaeso yam jaha loe govissāṇaṇam ॥ 262 ॥ (1810)

[न य कर्मणोऽपि पूर्वं कर्तुरभावे समुद्भवो युक्तः ।
निष्कारणकः सोऽपि य तथा युगपदुत्पत्तिभावे य ॥ २६१ ॥ (१८०९)
न हि कर्ता कार्यमिति य युगपदुत्पत्तौ जीव—कर्मणोः ।
युक्तो व्यपदेशोऽयं यथा लोके गोविषाणयोः ॥ २६२ ॥ (१८१०)

Na ca karmano'pi pūrvam karturabhāve samudbhavo yuktaḥ ।
 Niskāraṇakah so'pi ca tathā yugapadūtpattibhāve ca ॥261॥ (1809)
 Na hi kartā kāryamiti ca yugapadutpattau jīva-karmanoh ।
 Yukto vyapadeśo'yam yathā loke govisanayoh ॥ 262 ॥ (1810)]

Trans—261-262 It is not appropriate (to believe) the production of *Karma* to be first in absence of *Kartā*, nor is it so even if it is *niskāraṇaka* In case of both being produced simultaneously, the same (difficulties) will arise Moreover, in (case of) simultaneous production of *jīva* and *Karma*, designation of *kartā* and *kārya* will not properly fit in as found in the popular example of the two horns of a cow (1809-1810)

टीका-न च जीवात् प्राक् कर्मणोऽपि समुद्भवो युक्तः, कर्तुर्जीवस्य तदानीमभावात्, अक्रियमाणस्य च कर्मत्वायोगात्, निष्कारणश्चेत्थमसौ कर्मसमुद्भवः स्यात्, ततोऽकारणजातस्याकारणत एव विनाशोऽपि स्यादिति । तथा, युगपदुत्पत्तिभावे च “ प्रत्येकपक्षोक्ता दोषाः वाच्याः ” इति शेषः—निर्हेतुकत्वात् प्रत्येकवदुभयस्यापि समुदितस्यानुत्पत्तिरित्यादि । न च युगपदुत्पन्नयोर्जीव-कर्मणोः कर्तृ-कर्मभावो युज्यत इत्येतदेवाह—“ न हीत्यादि ” न हि युगपदुत्पन्नयोर्जीव-कर्मणोः “ अयं जीवः कर्ता ” “ इदं वा ज्ञाना-वरणादिपुद्गलगलनिकुरम्बं कर्म ” इति व्यपदेशो युज्यते, यथा लोके सव्ये-त्तरगोविषाणयोरिति ॥ २६१-२६२ ॥ (१८०९-१८१०) ॥

D. C—It is not appropriate to accept that *Karma* is produced first and *jīva* afterwards For, the production of *Karma* is not possible without *jīva*, which is the *Kartā* at the same time And if that production of *Karma* is *niskāraṇaka*, its end will also be *niskāraṇaka*.

It is also not proper to say that *jīva* and *Karma* are produced simultaneously. Because, in that case also, both being *nir-hetuka*, the same difficulties will arise

Moreover, if *jīva* and *Karma* are produced together, they will no longer be taken as *kartā* and *kārya* but like the two

horns of a cow they will be taken as twins produced together
261-262 (1809-1810)

Now coming to the second alternative at the root, the author proceeds —

होज्जाणाईओ वा सवधो तह वि न घडए मोक्खो ।

जोऽणाई सोऽणतो जीव-नहाण व सवधो ॥ २६३ ॥ (१८११)

Hojjāṇāīo vā sambandho taha vi na ghadae makkho ।

Jonāī sonanto jīva-nahāṇam va sambandho n 263 n (1811)

[भवेदनादिको वा संबन्धस्तथापि न घटते मोक्षः ।

जोऽनादिः सोऽनन्तो जीव-नमसोरिव संबन्धः ॥ २६३ ॥ (१८११)

Bhavedanādiko vā sambandhastathāpi na ghaṭate mokṣaḥ ।

Yo nādiḥ so nanto jīva-nabhasoriva sambandhaḥ n 263 n (1811)]

Trans — 263 Or if the contact (of *jīva* with *Karma*) is (taken as) *anādi* (without any beginning) there will be nothing like *mokṣa* That which is *anādi* like the contact of *jīva* and *ākāśa* is *ananta* (endless) also. (1811)

टीका-सादेवह, अनादिरेव जीव-कर्मणोः संबन्धः संयोगः । ननु
तथापि मोक्षो न घटते, यस्माद् योऽनादिः संयोगः सोऽनन्तो दृष्टः, यथा
जीव-नमसोः । न ह्यकाशेन सह जीवस्य कदापिदपि संयोगो निर्वर्तते ।
एव कर्मणापि सदासौ न निवर्तते, तथा च सति सुखस्यमानप्रसङ्ग इति
॥ २६३ ॥ (१८११) ॥

D C—If the contact of *jīva* with *Karma* is *anādi* it should be even *ananta* like the contact of *jīva* with sky and in that case there will be no scope for *mokṣa* at all.

इय जुत्तीए न घटइ सुवइ य सुईसु वध-मोक्खा ति ।

तेण तुह ससओज्य न य कज्जोऽय जहा सुणसु ॥ २६४ ॥

Iya juttie na ghatai suvvai ya suisu bandha-mokkhā tti ।
Tena tuha samsao'yam na ya kajo'yam jahā sunasu ॥264॥ (1812)

[इति युक्त्या न घटते श्रूयते च श्रुतिषु बन्धमोक्षाविति ।

तेन तत्र संशयोऽयं न च कार्योऽयं यथा श्रुणु ॥ २६४ ॥ (१८१२)

Iti yuktyā na ghatate śrūyate ca śrutisu bandha-moksāviti ।
Tena tava samśayo'yam na ca kāryo'yam yathā śrīṇu ॥264॥ (1812)]

Trans—264 Thus by means of the above-mentioned argument, *bandha* and *moksa* do not fit in Still however, it is heard in the *Vedas* (that they exist) This doubt of yours—which, is (absolutely) improper—is due to that So, listen to me (now) (1812)

टीका—इत्येवं युक्तयुक्त्या बन्धो मोक्षश्च न घटते, श्रूयते च श्रुतिषु वेदवाक्येष्वसौ । ततस्तत्र संशयोऽयम् । यथा चायं न कार्यस्तथा श्रुणु सौम्य ! इति । उक्तः पूर्वपक्षः ॥ २६४ ॥ (१८१२) ॥

D C—The arguments advanced by you do not lead one to prove the existence of *bandha* and *moksa* as seen above. But, since it has already been found in *Vedas* that they exist, your doubt has come into existence, which is totally unworthy of you Now, listen to me 264 (1812)

संताणोऽणाईओ परोप्परं हेउ—हेउभावाओ ।

देहस्स य कम्मस्स य मंडिय ! बीयं—कुराणां व ॥२६५॥(१८१३)

Santāno'nāio paropparam heu—heubhāvāo ।

Dehassa ya kammassa ya Mandiya ! biyam—kurānām va ॥265॥(1813)

[संतानोऽनादिकः परस्परं हेतु—हेतुमद्भावात् ।

देहस्य च कर्मणश्च मण्डिक ! बीजा—ऽङ्कुरयोरिव ॥२६५॥ (१८१३)

Santāno'nadikah parasparam hetu—hetubhāvāt ।

Dehasya ca karmaṇaśca Maṇḍika ! bijā'ṅkurayoriva ॥265॥ (1813)]

Trans—265 Since body and *Karma* are mutually related

like seed and sprout as *heta* and *hetumat*, their expansion
O *Maṇḍika*, is *anādi*. (1813)

टीका-क्षीर-कर्मणोरनादिः संतान इति प्रतिष्ठा, परस्परं हेतु-हेतुम-
ज्ञात्वात्, बीजादुरपदिति । ततश्च “ किं पूर्वं जीवः यथात् कर्म ” ? इत्यादि
प्लवत एव, अनावित्त्वात् तत्संतानस्येति ॥ २६५ ॥ (१८१३) ॥

D C—The *santāna* of *santāna* and *Karma* is *anādi*
because both of them are related to each other as *hetu* and
hetumat like seed and sprout. On account of this *anāditya* of
santāna the argument that *jīva* is born first and *Karma* after
wards will automatically be null and void 265 (1813).

अस्ति स देहो जो कम्मकारण जो य कज्जमणस्स ।

कम्म च देहकारणमस्ति य ज कज्जमणस्स ॥ २६६ ॥ (१८१४)

Atthi sa deho jo kammakāraṇam jo ya kajjamamassa ।

Kammam ca dehakāraṇamatthi ya jam kajjamamassa ॥ 266 ॥ (1814)

[अस्ति स देहो यः कर्मकारणं यथा कार्यमन्यस्य ।

कर्म च देहकारणमस्ति य यत् कार्यमन्यस्य ॥ २६६ ॥ (१८१४)

Asti sa deho yah karmakāraṇam yathā karyamanyasya ।

Karma ca dehakāraṇamasti ca yat karyamanyasya ॥ 266 ॥ (1814)]

Trans—266 The body is such that it becomes the cause
of (one) *Karma* and effect of another while *Karma* is also the
cause of (one) body and the effect of another (1814)

टीका-अस्ति स कश्चिद्देहो योज्येतनस्य कर्मणः कारणम्, यथान्य
स्या सीतस्य कर्मणः कार्यम् । तथा, कर्मापि समस्ति । किं विशिष्टम् ? इत्याह-
यदप्रतनस्य देहस्य कारणम्, यथान्यास्यासीतस्य देहस्य कार्यमिति ।
एवमनादौ संसारं न कश्चिद् विश्राम्यति, अतोऽनादिदेह-रूपसंतान इति ।
आह-ननु यद्य-मोक्षायिह माषयितुं प्रस्तुतौ, ततः कर्मसंतानस्यानादित्वं
साधनमसंबद्धमिव लक्ष्यते । तदयुक्तम्, अभिप्रायापरिज्ञानात्, न सकृत्

कर्म संभवति “क्रियत इति कर्म” इति व्युत्पत्तेः, यच्च तस्य करणमसावेव बन्ध इति कथं न तत्सिद्धिः ? ॥ २६६ ॥ (१८१४) ॥

D. C—Some *deha* is such that it serves as the cause of some future actions, while it itself has already been the effect of some past actions. The *Karma* in turn also serves as the cause of some body to come, while it has itself been the effect of some other body in the past. Thus, in this *anādi samsāra* the *santāna* of *deha* and *Karma* is also *anādi* as it never stops to rest.

Mandika—But it is quite irrelevant to establish the *anāditva* of *Karma-santāna*. For, the point is to establish the existence of *bandha* and *mokṣa*.

Bhagavān—It is not so, O *Mandika* ! “*Kṛiyate iti Karma*” that which is accomplished is action. So, an unaccomplished action is never possible. In the accomplishment of *Karma*, its *kāraṇa* is nothing but *bandha*, and hence the significance of establishing the *anāditva* of *Karma-santāna*.

Mandika—If that which has been accomplished is *Karma*, who is the *kartā* of this *deha* ? 266 (1814).

The *Bhagavān* replies—

कर्त्ता जीवो कम्मस्स करणओ जह घडस्स घडकारो ।

एवं चिय देहस्स वि कम्मकरणसंभवाउ त्ति ॥ २६७ ॥ (१८१५)

Kartā jīvo kammaṣṣa karanao jaha ghaḍassa ghaḍakāro ।

Evam ciya dehaṣṣa vi kammakaranasambhavāu tti ॥ 267 ॥ (1815)

[कर्त्ता जीवः कर्मणः करणतो यथा घटस्य घटकारः ।

एवमेव देहस्यापि कर्मकरणसंभवादिति ॥ २६७ ॥ (१८१५)

Kartā jīvaḥ karmanah karanato yathā ghaṭasya ghaṭakarah ।

Evameva dehasyāpi karmakaranasambhavaditi ॥ 267 ॥ (1815.)]

like seed and sprout as *hetu* and *hetumat* their expansion,
O Maṇḍika is anādika. (1813)

टीका-शरीर-कर्मणोरनादिः संतान इति प्रतिज्ञा, परस्परं हेतु-हेतुम
 ज्ञानात्, बीजादुरपदिति । ततश्च “ किं पूर्वं जीवः पश्चात् कर्म ” ? इत्यादि
 प्लवत एव, अनादित्वात् तत्संतानस्येति ॥ २६५ ॥ (१८१३) ॥

D C—The *santāna* of *saṁsāra* and *Karma* is *anādi*
 because both of them are related to each other as *hetu* and
hetumat like seed and sprout. On account of this *anāditya* of
santāna the argument that *jīva* is born first and *Karma* after
 wards will automatically be null and void 265 (1813).

अस्ति स देहो जो कम्मकारण जो य कज्जमणस्स ।
 कम्म च देहकारणमस्ति य ज कज्जमणस्स ॥ २६६ ॥ (१८१४)

Atthi sa deho jo kammakāraṇam jo ya kajjamannassa ।
 Kammam ca dehakāraṇamasthi ya jām kajjamannassa ॥266॥ (1814)

[अस्ति स देहो यः कर्मकारण यच्च कार्यमन्यस्य ।

कर्म च देहकारणमस्ति य यत् कार्यमन्यस्य ॥ २६६ ॥ (१८१४)

Atthi sa deho yah karmakāraṇam yaśca karyamanyasya ।
 Karma ca dehakāraṇamasthi ca yat karyamanyasya ॥ 266 ॥ (1814)]

Trans—266 The body is such that it becomes the cause
 of (one) *Karma*, and effect of another while *Karma* is also the
 cause of (one) body and the effect of another (1814)

टीका-अस्ति स कश्चिद्देहो योज्जेतनस्य कर्मणः कारणम्, यच्चान्य
 स्या तीतस्य कर्मणः कार्यम् । तथा, कर्माणि समस्ति । किं विशिष्टम् ? इत्याह-
 यद्व्येतनस्य देहस्य कारणम्, यच्चान्यास्यातीतस्य देहस्य कार्यमिति ।
 एवमनादौ संसारे न कश्चिद् विश्राम्यति, अतोऽनादिर्देह-कर्मसंतान इति ।
 आह-ननु बन्ध-मोक्षादिह साधयितुं प्रस्तुतौ, ततः कर्मसंतानस्यानादिस्त्व
 साधनमसंबन्धमिव लक्ष्यते । तदयुक्तम्, अमिप्रायापरिज्ञानात्, न अकृतं

तत् । अथवा, विद्यमानकरणमेवात्मशरीरलक्षणं द्वयम्, कर्तृ-कार्यरूपत्वात्, कुलाल-घटादिवत् यच्च कर्तुरात्मनः शरीरमुत्पादयतः करणं तत् कर्मेति कथं न तत्सिद्धिः ? । तथा, फलवत्यो दानादिक्रियाः, चेतनारब्धक्रियारूपत्वात्, कृष्यादिक्रियावत्, यच्च तासां फलं तत् कर्म । इत्यग्निभूतिरिव त्वमपि प्रतिपद्यस्वेति ॥ २६८ ॥ (१८१६)

D C—Mandika —Since *karma* is *atīndriya* (beyond the perception of sense-organs) it can never be taken as *karana*

Bhagavān —It is not so Since *s'arīra* is susceptible to production like *ghata*, it must have some *karana* to bring its existence This *karana* is *Karma* itself Or, say, there must be some *karana* between *Kartā* like *ātman* and *Kārya* like *s'arīra* as in the case of *ghatakāra* and *ghata* And this can be nothing else but *Karma* This shows that *Karma* can be brought about even by the help of *Kāryas* like *s'arīra* Moreover, *Kāryas* like *dāna* etc which are inspired by fruit are also fruitful like *Kriyās* such as *kṛis* etc So, like *Agnibhūti*, you, too, O *Mandika* ' shall have to admit the existence of *Karma* 268 ॥ (1816) ॥

In reply to the assertion that a *bandha* which is *anādi* is *ananta* also the author states—

जं संताणोऽणार्हं तेणानंतोऽपि नायमेगंतो ।
दीसई संतो वि जओ कत्थइ बीयं—कुराईणं ॥२६९॥ (१८१७)

Jam santāno'nāi tenānanto'vi nāyameganto ।

Disai santo vi jao katthai biyam-kurāīnam ॥ 269 ॥ (1817)

[यत् संतानोऽनादिस्तेनानन्तोऽपि नायमेकान्तः ।

दृश्यते सन्नपि यतः कुत्रापि बीजा-ऽङ्कुरादीनाम् ॥२६९॥ (१८१७)

Yat santāno'nādīstenānanto'pi nāyamekāntah ।

Dṛśyate sannapi yatah kutrāpi bīja'-nkurādīnam ॥ 269 ॥ (1817)]

Trans—269 An expansion which has no beginning,

Trans.—267 Just as *jīva* happens to be the *kartā* of *karma* as potter (is) of *ghaṭa* by virtue of its instrumentality so also (it becomes the *kartā*) of *deha* by virtue of *karma* as (its) instrument (1815)

टीका—कर्ता चात्र कर्मणो जीवः, करणसमेतत्वात्, वण्डादिकरणमुक्त-
कुलालवद् घटस्य, करण चेह जीवस्य कर्म निर्वर्तयतः क्षरीरमवगन्तव्यम् ।
एव देहस्याप्यात्मैव कर्ता, कर्मरूप करणं कर्मकरणं तत्समत्वात्—तद्युक्त-
त्वात्, वण्डादिकरणसमेतकुलालवदिति ॥ २६७ ॥ (१८१५) ॥

D C—Just as potter is called the *kartā* of *ghaṭa* because he is accompanied by various *karana*s such as *daṇḍa* etc., the Soul will also be called the *kartā* of *deha* by reason of its being accompanied by *Karma* as the *karana* 267 (1815).

Here again the opponent's view is stated and refuted—

कम्म करणमसिद्धं वा ते माई कज्जओ तय सिद्धं ।
किरियाफलओ य पुणो पढिवज्ज तमग्गिभूइ व ॥२६८॥ (१८१६)

*Kammam karanamasiddham vā te mai kajjao tayam siddham ।
kiriya-phalao ya puno paḍivajja tamaggibhūi vā* 268a (1816)

[कर्म करणमसिद्धं वा ते माई कज्जओ तय सिद्धम् ।

किरियाफलतश्च पुनः प्रतिपद्यन्व तदग्निभूतिरिव ॥ २६८ ॥ (१८१६)]

*Karma karanamasiddham vā tayo maih karyatastat siddham ।
kriyaphalataśca punah pratipadyanta tadagnibhūtiriva* 268b (1816)]

Trans—268 Or (it may be) your belief that *Karma* cannot be proved as *karana* but it has been proved by (the help of) *kārya*. Moreover like *Agnibhūti* (you should) accept it by reason of *kriyāphala* also (1816)

टीका—स्यादेतत्, अतीन्द्रियत्वेनासिद्धत्वात् कर्मणः करणत्वमसिद्धम् ।
तद्युक्तम्, यतः कापंत कापद्वारणं तत् सिद्धमेव, तथाहि—विद्यमानकरण-
क्षरीरादि, कृत्वकत्वात्, घटादिषु, यथास्य करणं तत् कर्मव, तस्मादस्त्येव

तत् । अथवा, विद्यमानकरणमेवात्मशरीरलक्षणं द्वयम्, कर्तृ-कार्यरूपत्वात्, कुलाल-घटादिवत् यच्च कर्तुरात्मनः शरीरमुत्पादयतः करणं तत् कर्मेति कथं न तत्सिद्धिः ? । तथा, फलवत्यो दानादिक्रियाः, चेतनारब्धक्रियारूपत्वात्, कृष्यादिक्रियावत्, यच्च तासां फलं तत् कर्म । इत्यग्निभूतिरिव त्वमपि प्रतिपद्यस्वेति ॥ २६८ ॥ (१८१६)

D C—Mandika —Since *karma* is *atīndriya* (beyond the perception of sense-organs) it can never be taken as *karana*

Bhagavān —It is not so Since *s'arīra* is susceptible to production like *ghata*, it must have some *karana* to bring its existence This *karana* is *Karma* itself Or, say, there must be some *karana* between *Kartā* like *ātman* and *Kārya* like *s'arīra* as in the case of *ghatakāra* and *ghata* And this can be nothing else but *Karma* This shows that *Karma* can be brought about even by the help of *Kāryas* like *s'arīra* Moreover, *Kāryas* like *dāna* etc which are inspired by fruit are also fruitful like *Krīyās* such as *kṛis* etc So, like *Agnihūta*, you, too, O *Mandika* ' shall have to admit the existence of *Karma* 268 ॥ (1816) ॥

In reply to the assertion that a *bandha* which is *anādi* is *ananta* also the author states—

जं संतानोऽणार्हं तेणाणंतोऽपि नायमेगंतो ।
दीसई संतो वि जओ कत्थइ बीयं—कुराईणं ॥२६९॥ (१८१७)

Jam santāno'nāi tenānanto'vi nāyameganto ।

Disai santo vi jao katthai biyam—kurāīnam ॥ 269 ॥ (1817)

[यत् संतानोऽनादिस्तेनानन्तोऽपि नायमेकान्तः ।

दृश्यते सन्नपि यतः कुत्रापि बीजा-ऽङ्कुरादीनाम् ॥२६९॥ (१८१७)

Yat santāno'nādīstenānanto'pi nāyamekāntah ।

Dṛśyate sannapi yatah kutrapī bījā'-nkurādīnām ॥ 269 ॥ (1817)]

Trans—269 An expansion which has no beginning,

Trans—267 Just as *jīva* happens to be the *kartā* of *karma* as potter (is) of *ghata* by virtue of its instrumentality so also (it becomes the *kartā*) of *deha* by virtue of *karma* as (its) instrument. (1815)

टीका—कर्ता चात्र कर्मणो जीवः, करणममेतत्वात्, दण्डादिकरणयुक्त-
कुलालवद् घटस्य, करण वेह जीवस्य कर्म निर्वर्तयतः शरीरमवगन्तव्यम् ।
एव दहस्याप्यात्मैव कर्ता, कर्मरूप करण कर्मकरण तत्संभवात्—सद्युक्त
त्वात्, दण्डादिकरणसमेतकुलालवदिति ॥ २६७ ॥ (१८१५) ॥

D C—Just as potter is called the *kartā* of *ghata* because he is accompanied by various *karana*s such as *daṇḍa* etc., the Soul will also be called the *kartā* of *deha* by reason of its being accompanied by *Karma* as the *karana* 267 (1815).

Here, again the opponent's view is stated and refuted—

कस्म करणमसिद्ध व ते मई कज्जओ तय सिद्ध ।

किरियाफलओ य पुणो पडिवज्ज तमग्गिभूह व ॥२६८॥(१८१६)

*Kammam karanamasiddham va te mai kajjao tavaṃ siddham ।
kiriya-phalao ya puṇo paḍivajja tamaggibhūti va* 268 (1816)

[कर्म करणमसिद्ध वा तव मतिः कायवस्वत् सिद्धम् ।

क्रियाफलतश्च पुनः प्रतिपद्यस्व तदग्निभूतिरिव ॥ २६८ ॥ (१८१६)

*Kammam karanamasiddham vā tava matih karyatastat siddham ।
kriyaphalata-cā punah pratipadyasv tadagnibhūtiriva* 268 (1816)]

Trans—268 Or (it may be) your belief that *Karma* cannot be proved as *karana* but it has been proved by (the help of) *kārya* Moreover like *Agnibhūti* (you should) accept it by reason of *kriyāphala* also. (1816)

टीका—अप्यादत्तम्, अतीन्द्रियत्वेनामिद्वत्त्वात् कर्मणः करणत्वमसिद्धम् ।
तदयुक्तम्, यतः कायतः कायद्वारेण तत् सिद्धमव, तथादि-विद्यमानकरण
शरीरादि, कृत्तव्यत्वात्, पटादिवत्, यथास्य करण तत् कर्मव, तस्मादस्यव

तत् । अथवा, विद्यमानकरणमेवात्मशरीरलक्षणं द्वयम्, कर्तृ-कार्यरूपत्वात्, कुलाल-घटादिवत् यच्च कर्तुरात्मनः शरीरमुत्पादयतः करणं तत् कर्मेति कथं न तत्सिद्धिः ? । तथा, फलवत्यो दानादिक्रियाः, चेतनारब्धक्रियारूपत्वात्, कृष्यादिक्रियावत्, यच्च तासां फलं तत् कर्म । इत्यग्निभूतिरिव त्वमपि प्रतिपद्यस्वेति ॥ २६८ ॥ (१८१६)

D C — Mandika — Since *karma* is *atīndriya* (beyond the perception of sense-organs) it can never be taken as *karana*

Bhagavān — It is not so Since *s'arīra* is susceptible to production like *ghata*, it must have some *karana* to bring its existence This *karana* is *Karma* itself Or, say, there must be some *karana* between *Kartā* like *ātman* and *Kārya* like *s'arīra* as in the case of *ghatakāra* and *ghata* And this can be nothing else but *Karma* This shows that *Karma* can be brought about even by the help of *Kāryas* like *s'arīra* Moreover, *Kāryas* like *dāna* etc which are inspired by fruit are also fruitful like *Kṛiyās* such as *kṛisī* etc So, like *Agnibhūti*, you, too, *O Mandika* ' shall have to admit the existence of *Karma* 268 ॥ (1816) ॥

In reply to the assertion that a *bandha* which is *anādi* is *ananta* also the author states—

जं संताणोऽणार्ई तेणाणंतोऽवि णायमेगंतो ।
दीसई संतो वि जओ कत्थइ बीयं—कुराईणं ॥२६९॥ (१८१७)

Jam santāno'nāi tenānanto'vi nāyameganto ।

Disai santo vi jao katthai biyam—kurāīnam ॥ 269 ॥ (1817)

[यत् संतानोऽनादिस्तेनानन्तोऽपि नायमेकान्तः ।

दृश्यते सन्नपि यतः कुत्रापि बीजा—ऽङ्कुरादीनाम् ॥२६९॥ (१८१७)

Yat santāno'nādīstenānanto'pi nāyamekāntah ।

Drīśyate sannapi yatah kutrāpi bīja'-nkurādīnam ॥ 269 ॥ (1817)]

Trans —269 An expansion which has no beginning,

cannot exclusively be called endless also. For the expansions such as that of seed and sprout etc. though void of beginning are sometimes found (as having ends) also. (1817)

टीका—“ यद् यस्माज्जीव-कर्मसयोगसंतानोऽनादिस्तेन तस्मादनन्तोऽपि ” इति नायमेकान्तः, यतोऽनादिरपि संयुक्तयोर्वस्तुनोः संतानः सान्तोऽपि कश्चिद् दृश्यते, यथा बीजा-ऽङ्कुरादीनां संतान इति ॥ २६९ ॥ (१८१७)

D C—There can never be an exclusive rule that the *anādi santāna* of *jīva* and *Karma* combined together is *ananta* also For in some cases the *santāna* does come to an end inspite of its *anāditya* e g the *santāna* of seed and sprout.

Also

अणायरमणिवृत्तियकज्ज धीय-कुराण ज विहय ।

तस्य ह्यो सताणो कुक्कुडि-अढाहयाण च ॥२७०॥ (१८१८)

Annayaramanivvattiyakajjam bhiyam-kurāṇa jam vihayam ।
Tattha hāo santāno kukkuḍi-andāhāyaṇam ca ॥ 270 ॥ (1818)

[अन्यतरदनिर्वर्तितकार्यं बीजा-ऽङ्कुरयोर्वद् विहतम् ।

तत्र ह्यः संतानः कुक्कुट्य-ऽण्डादिकानां च ॥ २७० ॥ (१८१८)

Anyataradanirvartitakāryam bīja-āṅkurayoryad vihatam ।
Tatra hatah santānah kukkuṭya-ṇḍādikāṇām ca ॥ 270 ॥ (1818)]

जह वेह कचणो-वलसजोगोऽणाइसतइगओ वि ।

वोच्छिज्जइ सोवाय सह जोगो जीव-कम्माण ॥२७१॥ (१८१९)

Jaha vaha kancano-valasajogonāṇsantaigao vi ।
Vocchijjal soṇāyam taha jogo jīva-kammaṇam ॥ 271 ॥ (1819)

[यथा वेह कान्तनो-पलसंयोगोऽनादिसंततिगवोऽपि ।

व्यवच्छिद्यते सोपायं तथा योगो जीव-कर्मणोः ॥२७१॥ (१८१९)

Yatha vaha kancano-palasamyogo nadisantatigato pi ।
Vyavacchidyate sopāyam tatha yogo jīva-karmaṇoh ॥ 271 ॥ (1819)]

Trans—270-271 When either of seed and sprout is destroyed without having accomplished the (desired) effect, its *santāna* is also destroyed. The same is the case with a hen and its eggs also. Or, just as the contact of gold with stone though continued in succession through times immemorial, is cut off, in the same way, the contact of *jīva* with *Karma* (is also cut off) (1818-1819)

टीका-बीजा-ऽङ्कुरयोर्मध्येऽन्यतरदनिर्वर्तितकार्यमेव यद् विहतं व्यव-
च्छिन्नं तत्रानयोर्हतो व्यवच्छिन्नः संतानः । एवं कुक्कुट्य-ऽण्डकयोः पिता-
पुत्रयोरपि च वक्तव्यम् । यथा वा काञ्चनो-पलयोरनादिकालप्रवृत्तसंतान-
भावगतोऽपि संयोगोः सोपायमग्नितापाद्युपायाद् व्यवच्छिद्यते, तथा जीव-
कर्मणोरपि संयोगऽनादिसंतानगतोऽपि तपःसंयमाद्युपायाद् व्यवच्छिद्यते,
इति न मोक्षाभाव इति ॥ २७०-२७१ ॥ (१८१८-१८१९)

D C.—If either of *bīja* and *ankura* vanishes without accomplishing the desired effect, the same will be true in case of hen and its eggs as well as father and son also. Or, just as the contact between gold and stone could be removed by means of the heat of fire inspite of its *anāditya*, the contact between *jīva* and *Karma* could also be brought to an end by means of *tapas*, *samyama* etc, until ultimately the *mokṣa* is attained ॥ 270-271 (1818-1819) ॥

Anticipating the opponent's objection at this juncture, the author proceeds—

तो किं जीव-नहाण व अह जोगो कंचणो-वलाणं व ? ।
जीवस्स य कम्मस्स य भण्णइ दुविहो वि न विरुद्धो ॥ २७२ (१८२०)
पढमोऽभवाणं चिय भवाणं कंचणोऽवलाणं व ।
जीवत्ते सामण्णे भवोऽभवो त्ति को भेओ ? ॥ २७३ ॥ (१८२१)

To kim jīva-nahāna va aha joga kancano-valānam va ? ।
Jivassa ya kammassa ya bhannaṃ duviho vi na viruddho ॥ 272 ॥ (1820)

cannot exclusively be called endless also. For, the expansions such as that of seed and sprout etc. though void of beginning are sometimes found (as having ends) also. (1817)

टीका—“ यद् यस्मात्बीज-कर्मसंयोगसत्त्वानोज्जादिस्तत्र तस्मादनन्तोऽपि” इति नायमेकान्तः, यतोऽज्ञादिरपि संयुक्तयोर्षस्तुनोः संतानः सान्तोऽपि कश्चिद् दृश्यते, यथा बीजा-ऽङ्कुरादीनां संतान इति ॥ २६९ ॥ (१८१७)

D C—There can never be an exclusive rule that the *anādi santāna* of *jīva* and *Karma* combined together is *ananta* also. For in some cases the *santāna* does come to an end in spite of its *anāditya* e. g. the *santāna* of seed and sprout.

Also

अणयारमणिवृत्तियकञ्च बीज-कुराण ज विहय ।

तस्य ह्यो सताणो कुक्कुटि-अडाइयाण च ॥२७०॥ (१८१८)

Annayaramanivvattiyakajjam biyam-kurāṇa jam vihayam ।
Tattha hao santāno kukkuḍi-andāiyāṇam ca ॥ 270 ॥ (1818)

[अन्यतरदनिर्वर्तितकार्यं बीजा-ऽङ्कुरयोरेव विहतम् ।

तत्र हतः संतानः कुक्कुट्य-ऽण्डादिकानां च ॥ २७० ॥ (१८१८)

Anyataradanirvartitakāryam bīja-āṅkurayoryad vihatam ।
Tatra hatah santānah kukkuṭya -ṇḍadikāṇam ca ॥ 270 ॥ (1818)]

जह वेह कचणो-वलसजोगोऽणाइसतइगओ वि ।

वोच्छिज्जइ सोवाय तह जोगो जीव-कम्माण ॥२७१॥ (१८१९)

Jaha vaha kancano-valasanjogo ṇāisantalgaṇo vi ।
Vocchijjal sovāyam taha jogo jīva-kammaṇam ॥ 271 ॥ (1819)

[यथा वेह कञ्चनो-वलसंयोगोऽनादिसंततिगतोऽपि ।

व्यवच्छिद्यते सोपाय तथा योगो जीव-कर्मणोः ॥२७१॥ (१८१९)

Yathā vaha kancano-palasaṃyogo nādisantatigato pi ।
Vyavacchidyate sopāyam tathā yogo jīva-karmaṇoḥ ॥ 271 ॥ (1819)]

Trans—270-271 When either of seed and sprout is destroyed without having accomplished the (desired) effect its *santāna* is also destroyed. The same is the case with a hen and its eggs also. Or, just as the contact of gold with stone though continued in succession through times immemorial is cut off, in the same way, the contact of *jīva* with *Karma* (is also cut off) (1818-1819)

टीका-बीजा-ऽङ्कुरयोर्मध्येऽन्यतरदनिर्वर्तितकार्यमेव यद् विहतं व्यव-
च्छिन्नं तत्रानयोर्हतो व्यवच्छिन्नः संतानः । एवं कुक्कुट्य-ऽण्डकयोः पिता-
पुत्रयोरपि च वक्तव्यम् । यथा वा काञ्चनो-पलयोरनादिकालप्रवृत्तसंतान-
भावगतोऽपि संयोगोः सोपायमग्नितापाद्युपायाद् व्यवच्छिद्यते, तथा जीव-
कर्मणोरपि संयोगऽनादिसंतानगतोऽपि तपःसंयमाद्युपायाद् व्यवच्छिद्यते,
इति न मोक्षाभाव इति ॥ २७०-२७१ ॥ (१८१८-१८१९)

D C—If either of *bīja* and *aṅkura* vanishes without accomplishing the desired effect, the same will be true in case of hen and its eggs as well as father and son also. Or, just as the contact between gold and stone could be removed by means of the heat of fire in spite of its *anāditya*, the contact between *jīva* and *Karma* could also be brought to an end by means of *tapas*, *samyama* etc, until ultimately the *mokṣa* is attained ॥ 270-271 (1818-1819) ॥

Anticipating the opponent's objection at this juncture, the author proceeds—

तो किं जीव-नहाण व अहं जोगो कंचणो-वलाणं व ? ।
जीवस्स य कम्मस्स य भण्णइ दुविहो वि न विरुद्धो ॥ २७२ (१८२०)
पढमोऽभवाणं चिय भवाणं कंचणोऽवलाणं व ।
जीवत्ते सामण्णे भवोऽभवो त्ति को भेओ ? ॥ २७३ ॥ (१८२१)

To kim *jīva*-nahāna va aha jogo kancano-valānam va ? ।
Jivassa ya kammaṣṣa ya bhannaṁ dūvīho vi na viruddho ॥ 272 ॥ (1820)

cannot exclusively be called endless also. For, the expansions such as that of seed and sprout etc. though void of beginning are sometimes found (as having ends) also (1817)

टीका—“यद् यस्माजीव-कर्मसंयोगसंतानोऽनादिस्तेन सस्मादनन्तोऽपि” इति नायमेकान्तः, यतोऽनादिरपि संयुक्तयोर्वस्तुनोः संतानः सान्तोऽपि कश्चिद् दृश्यते, यथा बीजा-ऽङ्कुरादीनां संतान इति ॥ २६९ ॥ (१८१७)

D C—There can never be an exclusive rule that the *anādi santāna* of *jīva* and *Karma* combined together is *ananta* also. For in some cases the *santāna* does come to an end in spite of its *anāditya* e. g. the *santāna* of seed and sprout.

Also

अण्णयरमणिवत्तियकज्ज वीय-कुराण ज विहय ।

तस्य हसो संताणो कुक्कुटि-अण्डाइयाण च ॥२७०॥ (१८१८)

Amayaramanivvattiyakajjam viyam-kurāṇa jam vihayam ।
Tattha hao santāno kukkuḍi-andāiyanam ca ॥ 270 n (1818)

[अन्यतरदनिर्वर्तितकार्यं बीजा-ऽङ्कुरयोर्वद् विहतम् ।

तत्र हतः संतानः कुक्कुट्य-ऽण्डादिकानां च ॥ २७० ॥ (१८१८)

Anyataradanirvartitakaryam bīja-āṅkurayoryad vihatam ।
Tatra hatah santānah kukkutyā -ṇḍādikanam ca ॥ 270 ॥ (1818)]

जह वेह कचणो-वलसजोगोऽणाइसतइगओ वि ।

वोच्छिज्जइ सोवाय तह ओगो जीव-कम्माण ॥२७१॥ (१८१९)

Jaha vaha kaccano-valasajogonāṇasantalgaṇo vi ।
Vocchijjal sovāyam taha jogo jīva-kammaṇam ॥ 271 ॥ (1819)

[यथा वेह काचनो-पलसंयोगोऽनादिसंततिगतोऽपि ।

व्यवच्छिद्यते सोपाय तथा योगो जीव-कर्मणोः ॥२७१॥ (१८१९)

Yatha vaha kaccano-palasamyogo nādisantatigato pi ।
Vyavacchidyate sopayam tatha yogo jīva-karmaṇoh ॥ 271 ॥ (1819)]

Karma be taken as *ananta* like that between *jīva* and *nabhas* or as *sānta* like that between gold and stone ?

Bhagarān —It is possible in both ways. It is found as *anādi* and *ananta* in case of inauspicious objects, but in case of auspicious objects like gold and stone, it is found as *anādi* and *sānta*

Mandika —How could you distinguish between auspicious and inauspicious when the state of existence is the same everywhere ?

Moreover, it cannot be argued that just as the experiences of hen and animal life are different from each other even if the state of existence is the same in both, so, also, the distinction between *bhavya* and *a-bhavya* is possible, because, the *nāraka* experiences etc. are produced on account of *Karma* and are not *svābhāvika*

होउ जइ कम्मकओ न विरोहो नारगाइभेउ व ।

भणह य भवाऽभव्वा सभावओ तेण संदेहो ॥२७४॥ (१८२२)

Hōu jai kammakao na viroho nāragāibheu vva ।

Bhanaha ya bhavvā'bhavvā sabhāvao tena samdeho ॥274॥ (1822)

[भवतु यदि कर्मकृतो न विरोधो नारकादिभेद इव ।

मणथ च भव्या-ऽभव्यान् स्वभावतस्तेन संदेहः ॥२७४॥ (१८२२)

Bhavatu yadi karmakṛito na virodho nārakādibheda iva ।

Bhanatha ca bhavya'bhavyān svabhāvatastena samdehah ॥ 274 ॥

Trans —274 If the distinction is caused by *karma* as in the case of hellish experience etc, there is no objection. But when you say that they are auspicious and inauspicious by their (véry) nature, the doubt does arise (1822)

टीका—भवतु वा यदि कर्मकृतोऽयं भव्याऽ-भव्यत्वविशेषो जीवाना-
मिष्यते, नात्र कश्चिद् विरोधः, नारकादिभेदवत्, न चैतदस्ति, यतो “भव्याऽ-

Paḍhamo'bhavvānam ciya bhavvānam kaicano-valānam va ।
Jivatte sāmānne bhavvo'bhavvo tti ko bheo ? ॥ २७३ ॥ (१८२१)

[ततः किं जीव-नमसोरिवाय योगः काञ्चनो-पलयोरिव ? ।

जीवस्य च कर्मणश्च मण्यते द्विविधोऽपि न विरुद्धः ॥ २७३ ॥ (१८२०)

प्रथमोऽमभ्यानामेव मभ्यानां काञ्चनो-पलयोरिव ।

जीवत्वे सामान्ये मभ्योऽमभ्य इति को भेदः ? ॥ २७३ ॥ (१८२१)

Tatah kim jiva-nabhasorivatha yogah kaicano-palayoriva ?
Jivasya ca karmas'ca bhanyate dvī-vidho pi na viruddhah ॥ २७३ ॥

Prathamobhavyānameva bhavyānam kaicano-palayoriva ।
Jivatve sāmānye bhavyo'bhavya ti ko bhedah ॥ २७३ ॥ (१८२१)

Trans.—272-273 Then does the union of *jīva* and *karma* resemble the union of *jīvā* and *nabhas* ? Or is it similar to that between gold and stone ? “Union in both the ways will not be contrary The first belongs to the inauspicious only (contact) of the auspicious resembles (the one) between gold and stone. What is the distinction between auspicious and inauspicious when the state of existence is common ?” (1820-1821).

टीका-आह-जीवस्य कर्मणश्च योऽय परस्परं योगः सोऽनादिः सन् किं जीव-नमसोरिवानन्तः, अथ काञ्चनो-पलयोरिव सान्तोऽपि स्यात् ? तमयथापि दर्शनात् किमत्र प्रतिपद्यामहे ? । मण्यतेऽत्रोत्तरम-द्विधाऽप्यय मविरुद्धः, तत्र प्रथमोऽनाद्यनन्तरूपोऽमभ्यानां द्रष्टव्यः । यस्तु काञ्चनो-पलयोरिवानादिः सान्तोऽसौ मभ्यानां विधेयः । आह-ननु जीवस्वसाम्येऽपि “अयं मभ्यः” “अयं चामभ्यः” इति किंकृतोऽयं विधेयः ? । न च वक्तव्यम्-यथा जीवत्वे समानोऽपि नारक-तियगादयो विनोपास्तथा मभ्या-ऽमभ्य स्वविशेषोऽपि भविष्यतीति, यत् कर्मजनिता एष नारकादिविशेषाः, न तु स्वामाविकाः । मभ्या-ऽमभ्यस्वविशेषोऽपि यदि कर्मजनितस्तदा भवतु, को निवारयिता ?, न वैषमिति ॥ २७२-२७३ ॥ (१८२०-१८२१) ॥

D C.—Mandika.—Should the *anādi* contact of *jīva* with

Karma be taken as *ananta* like that between *jīva* and *nabhas* or as *sānta* like that between gold and stone ?

Bhagavān.—It is possible in both ways. It is found as *anādi* and *ananta* in case of inauspicious objects, but in case of auspicious objects like gold and stone, it is found as *anādi* and *sānta*

Mandika —How could you distinguish between auspicious and inauspicious when the state of existence is the same everywhere ?

Moreover, it cannot be argued that just as the experiences of hen and animal life are different from each other even if the state of existence is the same in both, so, also, the distinction between *bhavya* and *a-bhavya* is possible, because, the *nāraka* experiences etc are produced on account of *Karma* and are not *svābhāvika*

होउ जइ कम्मकओ न विरोहो नारगाइभेउ व ।

भणह य भवाऽभवा सभावओ तेण संदेहो ॥२७४॥ (१८२२)

Hōu jai kammakao na viroho nāragāibheu vva ।

Bhanaha ya bhavvā'bhavvā sabhāvao tena samdeho ॥274॥ (1822)

[भवतु यदि कर्मकृतो न विरोधो नारकादिभेद इव ।

मणथ च भव्या-ऽभव्यान् स्वभावतस्तेन संदेहः ॥२७४॥ (१८२२)

Bhavatu yadi karmakṛto na virodho narakadibheda iva ।

Bhanatha ca bhavya'bhavyān svabhāvatastena samdehah ॥ 274 ॥

Trans—274 If the distinction is caused by *karma* as in the case of hellish experience etc, there is no objection But when you say that they are auspicious and inauspicious by their (very) nature, the doubt does arise (1822)

टीका—भवतु वा यदि कर्मकृतोऽयं भव्याऽ-भव्यत्वविशेषो जीवाना-
मिष्यते, नात्र कश्चिद् विरोधः, नारकादिभेदवत्, न चैतदस्ति, यतो “भव्याऽ-

मम्याः स्वभावत एव जीवा न तु कर्मतः, " इति यूयं मणव, तेनास्माकं संदेह इति ॥ २७४ ॥ (१८२२) ॥

D O—Mandika —If you accept that the distinction between *bhavya* and *a-bhavya* is also *kaṃma-janita* (like that between hen and animal life) I have nothing to say but when you take their distinction to be *svabhāvika* I raise the doubt ॥ 274 (1822) ॥

Explaining the real cause between *bhavya* and *a-bhavya* the author replies —

दधाइत्ते तुल्ले जीव-नहाण सभावओ भेओ ।

जीवा-ऽजीवाइगओ जह, तह भवे-यरविसेसो ॥२७५॥ (१८२३)

Davvāṭṭe tulle jīva-nahāṇam sabhāvao bheo :

Jīvā jīvāigao jaha, taha bhavveyaraviseso ॥ 275 ॥ (1823)

[द्रव्यादिस्वे तुल्ये जीव-नमसोः स्वभावतो भेदः ।

जीवा-ऽजीवादिगतो यथा, तथा भवे-सरविशेषः ॥२७५॥ (१८२३)

Dravyaditve tulye jīva-nabhaso svabhāvato bhedah :

Jīva jīvādigato yatha tatha bhavyetara-viśeṣah ॥ 275 ॥ (1823)]

Trans—275 Just as in (case of) *jīva* and *nabhas* the natural distinction of living and lifeless does exist even in (the midst of) the common element of (their being) *dravya* etc., in the same way the distinction of auspicious and inauspicious is also natural. (1823)

टीका—यथा जीव-नमसोर्द्रव्यत्व-सत्त्व-प्रमेयत्व-श्रेयत्वादौ तुल्यऽपि जीवा-ऽजीवत्व-चेतना-चेतनत्वादित्वभावतो भेदः, तथा जीवानामपि जीवत्वमाम्येऽपि यदि भव्या-ऽमम्यकृतो विशेषः स्यात्, तर्हि को दोषः ? इति ॥ २७५ ॥ (१८२३)

D O—Although *jīva* and *akṣa* possess the common properties like *dravyatva* *sattva* (existence) *prameyatva*

(destructibility) *jñeyatva* (cognizability) etc , distinction such as that of *jīva* and *a-jīva* etc , does exist by its very nature Similarly, in case of *jīvas* also, even though *jīvatva* is common, the distinction of *bhavya* and *abhavya* remains there as a natural consequence ॥ 275 (1823) ॥

The pupil objects to this view thus—

एवं पि भवभावो जीवत्तं पिव सभावजाईओ ।

पावइ निच्चो तम्मि य तदवत्थे नत्थि निव्वाणं ॥२७६॥ (१८२४)

Evam pi bhavvabhāvo jīvattam piva sabhāvajāīo ।

Pāvai nicco tammi ya tadavatthe natthi nivvānam ॥276॥ (1824)

[एवमपि भव्यभावो जीवत्वमिव स्वभावजातीयः ।

प्राप्नोति नित्यस्तस्मिंश्च तदवस्थे नास्ति निर्वाणम् ॥२७६॥ (१८२४)

Evampi bhavyabhāvo jīvatvamiva svabhāvajātiyah ।

Prāpnoti nityastasmīnśca tadavasthe nāsti nirvānam ॥276॥ (1824)]

Trans—276 Even in that case, the quality of (being) auspicious being natural like *jīvatva*, will become everlasting, and if it is so, there will be no (scope for) final liberation (at all) (1824)

टीका—नन्वेवमपि भव्यभावो नित्योऽविनाशी प्राप्नोति, स्वभावजातीयत्वात्—स्वाभाविकत्वात् जीवत्ववत् । भवत्वेवमिति चेत् । तदयुक्तम्, यतस्तस्मिन् भव्यभावे तदवस्थे नित्यावस्थायिनि नास्ति निर्वाणम्, “सिद्धो न भव्यो नाप्य भव्यः” इति वचनादिति ॥ २७६ ॥ (१८२४)

D. C—If the quality of *bhavyatva* is *svābhāvika* as *jīvatva*, as said above, it will become everlasting like *jīvatva* also. Consequently, in the midst of everlasting *bhavyabhāva*, there will be no scope for *mokṣa* at all ॥ 276 (1824) ॥

The author refutes this argument as follows —

मम्याः स्वभावत एव जीवा न तु कर्मतः, " इति यूय मय्य, तेनास्माकं संदेह इति ॥ २७४ ॥ (१८२२) ॥

D C—Maṇḍika—If you accept that the distinction between *bhavya* and *a-bhavya* is also *karma-janata* (like that between hen and animal life) I have nothing to say but when you take their distinction to be *svabhāvika* I raise the doubt ॥ 274 (1822) ॥

Explaining the real cause between *bhavya* and *a-bhavya* the author replies:—

दद्याइत्ते तुल्ले जीव-नहाण सभावओ भेओ ।

जीवा-ऽजीवाइगओ जह, तह भवे-यरविसेसो ॥२७५॥ (१८२३)

Davvāitto tulḷe jīva-nahāṇam sabhāvao bheo :

Jīvā'jīvāigao jaha, taha bhavveyaraviseso ॥ 275 ॥ (1823)

[द्रव्यादित्ये तुल्ये जीव-नमसोः स्वभावतो भेदः ।

जीवा-ऽजीवादिगतो यथा, तथा मय्ये-यरविशेषः ॥२७५॥ (१८२३)

Dravyādित्यe tulye jīva-nabhaso svabhāvato bhedaḥ ।

Jīvā'jivādigato yatha tatha bhavyetara-viśeṣaḥ ॥ 275 ॥ (1823)]

Trans—275 Just as in (case of) *jīva* and *nabhas* the natural distinction of living and lifeless does exist even in (the midst of) the common element of (their being) *dravya* etc., in the same way the distinction of auspicious and inauspicious is also natural. (1823)

टीका-यथा जीव-नमसोर्द्रव्यत्व-सम्ब-प्रमयत्व-श्रेयस्वादी तुल्येऽपि जीवा-ऽजीवत्व-श्रेयना-श्रेयनरत्नादिस्वभावतो भेदः, तथा जीवानामपि जीवत्वमाम्येऽपि यदि मम्या-ऽमम्यद्वतो विज्ञप स्यात्, तर्हि को दोषः ? इति ॥ २७५ ॥ (१८२३)

D C—Although jīva and ātīva possess the common properties like dravyatva sūtra (existence), prameyatva

(destructibility) *jneyatva* (cognizibility) etc , distinction such as that of *jīva* and *a-jīva* etc , does exist by its very nature Similarly, in case of *jīvas* also, even though *jīvatva* is common, the distinction of *bhavya* and *abhavya* remains there as a natural consequence ॥ 275 (1823) ॥

The pupil objects to this view thus—

एवं पि भवभावो जीवत्तं पिव सभावजाईओ ।

पावइ निच्चो तम्मि य तदवत्थे नत्थि निव्वाणं ॥२७६॥ (१८२४)

Evam pi bhavvabhāvo jīvattam piva sabhāvajāīo ।

Pāvai nicco tammi ya tadavatthe natthi nivvānam ॥276॥ (1824)

[एवमपि भव्यभावो जीवत्वमिव स्वभावजातीयः ।

प्राप्नोति नित्यस्तस्मिंश्च तदवस्थे नास्ति निर्वाणम् ॥२७६॥ (१८२४)

Evampi bhavyabhāvo jīvatvamiva svabhāvajātiyah ।

Prāpnoti nityastasminśca tadavasthe nāsti nirvāṇam ॥276॥ (1824)]

Trans—276 Even in that case, the quality of (being) auspicious being natural like *jīvatva*, will become everlasting, and if it is so, there will be no (scope for) final liberation (at all) (1824)

टीका—नन्वेवमपि भव्यभावो नित्योऽविनाशी प्राप्नोति, स्वभावजातीयत्वात्—स्वाभाविकत्वात् जीवत्ववत् । भवत्वेवमिति चेत् । तदयुक्तम्, यतस्तस्मिन् भव्यभावे तदवस्थे नित्यावस्थायिनि नास्ति निर्वाणम्, “सिद्धो न भव्यो नाप्य भव्यः” इति वचनादिति ॥ २७६ ॥ (१८२४)

D. C—If the quality of *bhavyatva* is *svābhāvika* as *jīvatva*, as said above, it will become everlasting like *jīvatva* also. Consequently, in the midst of everlasting *bhavyabhāva*, there will be no scope for *mokṣa* at all ॥ 276 (1824) ॥

The author refutes this argument as follows —

जह घटपुष्पाभावोऽणाइसहावो वि सनिहणो एव ।

जई मवत्ताभावो भवेज्ज किरियाए को दोसो ? ॥२७७॥ (१८२५)

Jaha ghaḍapuvvābhāvo nāksahāvo vi sanihano evam ।

Jai bhavvattābhāvo bhavēja kiriyāe ko doṣo ? ॥ 277 ॥ (1825)

[यथा घटपूर्वाभावोऽनादिस्वभावोऽपि सनिघन एवम् ।

यदि भव्यत्वाभावो भवेत् क्रियया को दोषः ॥ २७७ ॥ (१८२५)

Yathā ghaṭapūrvābhāvo nādisvābhāvo pi sanighana evam ।

Yadi bhavyatvābhāvo bhavet kriyaya ko doṣah ॥ 277 ॥ (1825)]

Trans—277 What harm is there if the (previous) *abhāva* of auspiciousness is possessed of end, like the previous non-existence of *ghaṭa* inspite of its being *anādi* by nature ? (1825)

टीका—यथा घटस्य प्रागभावोऽनादिस्वभावजातीयोऽपि घटोत्पत्तौ सनिघनो विनश्वरो दृष्टः, एव यदि भव्यत्वस्यापि ध्वान्तपःसन्निवृत्तपरिणामोपायतोऽभावः स्यात्, तर्हि को दोषः संपद्यते ?—न कश्चिदिति ॥ २७७ ॥ (१८२५)

D O—The previous non existence of *ghaṭa* comes to an end when *ghaṭa* is actually produced. Similarly there is no harm if we assume that the *abhāva* of *bhavyatva* comes to an end when the *bhavyatva* is actually brought into existence by the process of perception ॥ 277 (1825) ॥

अणुदाहरणमभावो खरसंग पिब मई न त जम्हा ।

भावो छिय स विसिद्धो कुभाणुप्पत्तिमेत्तेण ॥२७८॥ (१८२६)

Anudāharanamābhāvo kharasangam piva mai na tam [amhā ।

Bhāvo cciya sa visiddho kumbhānuppattimettēṇam ॥278॥ (1826)

[अनुदाहरणभावः खरगृहमिव मतिर्न तद् यस्मात् ।

भाव एव स विनिर्दिष्टः कुम्भानुत्पत्तिमात्रेण ॥ २७८ ॥ (१८२६)

Anudāharanamābhāvaḥ kharagṛhamiva matirna tad yasmāt ।

Bhāva eva sa viśiṣṭhaḥ kumbhānūtpattimatropēṇa ॥ 278 ॥ (18 6)]

Trans—278 (You may believe that) like *kharasringa*, this is no (good) example But it is not so That is nothing but *bhāva* distinguished by the non-production of *ghata* (1826)

टीका—स्याद् मतिः परस्य—नन्वनुदाहरणमसौ प्रागभावः, अभावरूपतयैवावस्तुत्वात्, खरविषाणवत् । तन्न, यस्माद् भाव एवासौ घटप्रागभावः, तत्कारणभूतानादिकालप्रवृत्तपुद्गलसंघातरूपः, केवलं घटानुत्पत्तिमात्रेण विशिष्ट इति ॥ २७८ ॥ (१८२६)

D. C —Mandika —Like *kharasringa* previous non-existence cannot be taken as a right illustration, because like *kharasringa* it is non-existent on account of its *abhāvarūpatā*

Bhagavān —It is not so The previous *abhāva* of *ghata* is itself *bhāva* The only difference found in it is that, at this stage the production of *ghata* has not yet been brought about from the mass of earth, which has served as its *kanana* from times immorial ॥ 277 (1826) ॥

एवं भववुच्छेओ कोट्टागारस्स वा अवचउ त्ति ।

तं नानंतत्तणओऽणागयकालं—बराणं व ॥ २७९ ॥ (१८२७)

Evam bhavvuccheo kotthāgārassa vā avacau tti ।

Tam nānantattanao'nāgayakālam—barānam va ॥ 279 ॥ (1827)

[एवं भव्योच्छेदः कोट्टागारस्येवापचय इति ।

तद् नानन्तत्वतोऽनागतकाला—ऽम्बरयोरिव ॥ २७९ ॥ (१८२७)

Evam bhavyocchedah koṣṭāgārasyevāpacaya iti ।

Tad nānantatvato'nagatakālā—mbarayoriva ॥ 279 ॥ (1827)]

Trans—279 Similarly, it is not (correct) (to believe) the culmination of the auspicious to be similar to the diminution of granery on account of (its) endlessness like the time to come or sky (1827)

टीका—नन्वेवं सति भव्योच्छेदः—भव्यजीवैः संसारः शून्यः प्राप्नोति,

अपचयात् । कस्य यथा समुच्छेदः ? इत्याह—स्तोकस्तोकाकृष्यमाणधान्यस्य
धान्यमृतकोष्ठागारस्य । इदमुक्तं भवति—कालस्यानन्त्यात् पश्मासर्पयन्ते
चावश्यमेकस्य मध्यस्य जीवस्य सिद्धिगमनात् क्रमेणापचीयमानस्य धान्य
कोष्ठागारस्येव सर्वस्यापि मध्यराशेरुच्छेदः प्राप्नोतीति । अत्रोच्यते—तदेतद्
न, अनन्तत्वाद् मध्यराशेः, अनागतकाला—ऽऽकाशवदिति । इह यद् ब्रह्म
नन्तकेनानन्त, तत् स्तोक—स्तोकतयाऽपचीयमानमपि नोच्छिद्यते, यथा प्रति-
समयं वर्तमानं तापस्याऽपचीयमानोऽप्यनागतकालसमयराशिः, प्रतिसमयं
बुद्ध्या प्रदेष्टापहारणापचीयमानः सर्पनमाप्रदेष्टराशिर्वा । इति न मध्योच्छेदः
॥ २७९ ॥ (१८२७) ॥

D C—Mandika.—If the *uccheda* of *bhavya jivas* is accepted this world will gradually be deprived of them. Ultimately there will be no *bhavya jiva* existing in the world. For just as a granary of corn is being exhausted day by day by the gradual decrease of corn this world will also be losing one *bhavya jiva* at least at the end of say six months when he will be attaining *mokṣa* until ultimately the world will be void of *bhavya jivas*.

Bhagavān —Your argument is fallacious O *Mandika*. The number of *bhavya jivas* is as endless as the time to come or sky and hence its absolute *uccheda* should never be feared.

ज चातीताऽनागतकाला तुल्ला जओ य ससिद्धो ।
एको अणतभागो भवाणमईयकालेण ॥ २८० ॥ (१८२८)
एस्सेण तच्चित्तं धियं जुत्तो ज तो वि सव्वमवाण ।
जुत्तो न समुच्छेओ होज्ज मई कहमिणं सिद्ध ? ॥ २८१ ॥ (१८२९)
भवाणमणतत्तणमणतभागो व किह मुक्को सिं ।
कालादओ ष मइय ! मह वयणाओ ष पडिबज्ज ॥ २८२ ॥ (१८३०)

*Jam cātita āgaya kālā tulla jao ya samsiddho ।
Ekko anantabhāgo bhavānamāyaka kalam = 280 n (1828)*

Essenam tattiu cciya jutto jam to vi saṁvabhavvānam ।
 Jutto na samuccheo hojja maī kahaminam siddham ? ॥281॥(1829)
 Bhavvānamanantattanantabhāgo va kiha mukko sim ।
 Kālādao va Mandiya ! maha vayanāo va padivajja ॥ 282 ॥ (1830)

[यच्चातीता—स्नागतकालौ तुल्यौ यतश्च संसिद्धः ।

एकोऽनन्तभागो भव्यानामतीतकालेन ॥ २८० ॥ (१८२८)

एष्यता तावानेव युक्तो यत् ततोऽपि सर्वभव्यानाम् ।

युक्तो न समुच्छेदो भवेद् मतिः कथमिदं सिद्धम् ॥ २८१ ॥ (१८२९)

भव्यानामनन्तत्वमनन्तभागो वा कथं वा युक्त एषाम् ?

कालादय इव मण्डिक ! मम वचनाद् वा प्रतिपद्यस्व ॥ २८२ ॥ (१८३०)

Yaccatīta'nagatakālau tulyau yats'ca samsiddhah ।

Eko'nantabhāgo bhavyānamatītakālena ॥ 280 ॥ (1828)

Esyata tāvāneva yukto yat tato'pi sarvabhavyānam ।

Yukto na samucchedo bhaved matih kathamidam siddham ? ॥281॥

Bhavyānamanantatvamanantabhāgo vā katham vā mukta esam ?

Kāladaya iva Mandika ! mama vacanād vā pratipadyasva ॥282॥]

Trans—280-281-282 Since the times-past and future-are similar, an infinitesimal part of the auspicious which has already been liberated in the past will meet liberation in future also It is not proper therefore to believe in (complete) destination of all auspicious (creatures) (It may be asked) “ How is it proved ? Or, how is the endlessness or infinitesimal part of the auspicious (creatures) liberated ? ” “ Like *Kāla* etc Or, *O Mandika*, take it (for granted) on my word ” (1828-1829-1830)

टीका—व्याख्या—यस्माच्चातीता—स्नागतकालौ तुल्यावेव, यतश्चाती-
 तेनापि कालेनैक एव निगोदानन्ततमो भागोऽद्यापि भव्यानां सिद्धः,
 एष्यतापि भविष्यत्कालेन तावन्मात्र एव भव्यानन्तभागः सिद्धिं गच्छन्
 युक्तो घटमानकः, न हीनाधिकः भविष्यतोऽपि कालस्यातीततुल्यत्वात् ।

अपचयात् । कस्य यथा समुच्छेदः ? इत्याह—स्तोकस्तोकाकृष्यमाणघान्यस्य
 घान्यमृत्कोष्ठागारस्य । इदमुक्तं भवति—कालस्यानन्त्यात् षण्मासपर्यन्ते
 चावश्यमेकस्य मन्थस्य जीवस्य सिद्धिगमनात् क्रमेणापचीयमानस्य घान्य-
 कोष्ठागारस्येव सर्वस्यापि मन्थराशेरुच्छेदः प्राप्नोतीति । अत्रोधरमाह—तदेतद्
 न, अनन्तत्वाद् मन्थराशेः, अनागतकाला—ऽऽकाशपदिति । इह यद् ब्रह्म
 नन्तकेनानन्तं, तत् स्तोक—स्तोकतयाऽपचीयमानमपि नोच्छिद्यते, यथा प्रति-
 समयं वर्तमानं तापस्याऽपचीयमानोऽप्यनागतकालसमयराशिः, प्रतिसमये
 पुनरा प्रदेष्टापहारेणापचीयमानः सर्वनमाप्रदेष्टराशिर्वा । इति न मन्थोच्छेदः
 ॥ २७९ ॥ (१८२७) ॥

D C—Mandika.—If the *uccheda* of *bhavya jivas* is accepted this world will gradually be deprived of them. Ultimately there will be no *bhavya jiva* existing in the world. For just as a granary of corn is being exhausted day by day by the gradual decrease of corn this world will also be losing one *bhavya jiva* at least at the end of say six months when he will be attaining *moksha*, until ultimately the world will be void of *bhavya jivas*.

Bhagavān—Your argument is fallacious *O Mandika*. The number of *bhavya jivas* is as endless as the time to come or sky and hence its absolute *uccheda* should never be feared.

अ चातीताऽणागयकाला सुद्धा जओ य ससिद्धो ।
 यक्को अणतभागो भव्वाणमईयकालेण ॥ २८० ॥ (१८२८)
 यस्सेण तच्चिउ खिय जुत्तो अ तो वि सबभवाण ।
 जुत्तो न समुच्छेओ होज्ज मई कहमिण सिद्ध ? ॥ २८१ ॥ (१८२९)
 भव्वाणमणतत्तणमणतभागो व किह सुक्को सिं ।
 कालादओ व मइयि ! मह वयणाओ व पडिवज्ज ॥ २८२ ॥ (१८३०)

*Jam cātīta āṇāyakaṇā tullā jao ya samsiddho ।
 Ekko anantabhāgo bhavvānamāyakaḷenam ॥ 280 ॥ (1828)*

[सद्भूतमिदं गृहाण मद्वचनादवशेषवचनमिव ।

सर्वज्ञतादितो वा ज्ञायकमध्यस्थवचनमिव ॥ २८३ ॥ (१८३१)

मन्यसे कथं सर्वज्ञः सर्वेषां सर्वसंशयच्छेदात् ।

दृष्टान्ताभावेऽपि पृच्छतु यः संशयो यस्य ॥ २८४ ॥ (१८३२)

Sadbhūtamidaṁ grīhāṇa madvacanādavas'eshavacanamiva ।

Sarvajñatādito vā jñāyakamadyasthāvacanamiva ॥ 283 ॥ (1831)]

Manyase katham sarvajña sarvasaṁ sarvasaṁśayacchedat ।

Dṛṣṭāntābhāve'pi pṛicchatu yaḥ saṁśayo yasya ॥ 284 ॥ (1832)]

Trans—283-284 Like all other statements or like the statement of an impartial observer, take it as a fact from my word, because of my omniscience (If) you question “ How am I to be omniscient ? ” (The reply is that) I am Omniscient because I remove the doubts of all Even in absence of (proper) examples, one who entertains doubts may ask me (1831-1832)

टीका-व्याख्या-सद्भूतमिदमनन्तरोक्तं सर्वमपीति गृहाण त्वम्, मद्वचनत्वात्, यथा त्वत्संशयादिविषयमवशेष मद्वचनम्, सर्वज्ञत्वादित्यादिभ्यो वा हेतुभ्यः, आदिशब्दात् वीतरागत्वादिरिग्रहः, ज्ञायकमध्यस्थवचनवदित्ययमत्र दृष्टान्त इति । अथैवं मन्यसे-कथमिव सर्वज्ञस्त्वम् । अत्रोच्यते-सर्वेषां सर्वसंशयच्छेदात् । अन्यस्य सर्वसंशयच्छेत्तुः कस्याप्यदर्शनात् कोऽत्र दृष्टान्तः ?-न कश्चिदिति । अत्रोच्यते-किमत्र दृष्टान्तान्वेषणेन ? । तदभावेऽपि हि यो यस्य संशयः स तं सर्वमपि पृच्छतु, येन स्वप्रत्ययसिद्ध एव मयि सर्वज्ञत्वनिश्चयो भवतीति ॥ २८३-२८४ ॥ (१८३१-१८३२)

D C.—Bhagavān —Take everything that I speak to be authentic, because I am *sarvajña* and *vītarāga*.

Mandika —On what ground are you to be called *sarvajña* ?

Bhagavān —I am *sarvajña* because I remove the doubts of all Even though it is not necessary to cite an example in this connection, one who entertains doubts may put a question so that he may be convinced of my *sarvajñatva* 283-284(1831-1832)

तत एवमपि सति न सर्वमभ्यानामुच्छेदो युक्तः, सर्वेषां कालेन तदनन्त-
 मागस्यैव सिद्धिगमनसम्भवोपदर्शनात् । अयं परस्य मतिर्मवेत्-तत्कश्चिद-
 सिद्धं यदुत-मनन्ता मभ्या, तदनन्तमागश्च सर्वेषां कालेन सेत्स्यतीति ।।
 अत्रोच्यते-काला-ऽऽकाशादय इवानन्तास्तावद् मभ्या, तदनन्तमागस्य
 च मुक्तिगमनात्, काला-ऽऽकाशयोरिव न सर्वेषामुच्छेद इति प्रतिपद्यस्व,
 मद्रचनाद् वा मन्त्रिक ! सर्वमेतत् भवेद्दीप्तिः ॥ २८०-२८१-२८२ ॥
 (१८२८-१८२९-१८३०)

D C—As the time whether past or future is the same throughout, the infinite number of *bhavya jivas* or a portion of them attains *moksha* during past as well as future times in equal proportion. The *uccheda* of all *bhavya jivas* is therefore not acceptable.

Mandika.—But how is it proved that the *bhavyas* are *ananta* and their *anantabhāga* attains *moksha* at all times ?

Bhagavān.—They are *ananta* like *kāla* and *ākāśa*. Even if infinite number of *bhavyas* passes away to *moksha* they remain endless for ever like *kāla* and *ākāśa*. Rely upon my word *O Mandika* and accept it. u 280-282 (1828-1830) #

If it is asked "How could it be taken as true merely on your words ?" the answer is—

सब्भूयमिणं गिण्हसु मह वयणाओऽवसेसवयण व ।

सवण्णुताइओ वा जाणयमज्झरथवयण व ॥ २८३ ॥ (१८३१)

मण्णसि किह सवण्णू सवेसिं सवससयच्छेया ।

दिट्ठताभावमि वि पुच्छउ जो ससओ जस्स ॥ २८४ ॥ (१८३२)

*Sabbhūyaminam gīṇhasu mahā vayanāṃ āvasesavayanam va ।
 Savvaṇṇutaṃ vā jāṇayamaṃ jhāṇeyavayanam va* # 283 # (1831)

*Māṇasi kiṃ savaṇṇū savvesiṃ savvasasayaccheyā ।
 Diṭṭhantābhāvamī vi pucchau jo samsao jassa* # 284 # (1832)

[सद्भूतमिदं गृहाण मद्वचनादवशेषवचनमिव ।
 सर्वज्ञतादितो वा ज्ञायकमध्यस्थवचनमिव ॥ २८३ ॥ (१८३१)
 मन्यसे कथं सर्वज्ञः सर्वेषां सर्वसंशयच्छेदात् ।
 दृष्टान्ताभावेऽपि पृच्छतु यः संशयो यस्य ॥ २८४ ॥ (१८३२)

Sadbhūtamidaṁ grīhāṇa madvacanādvavas'ēsavacanamiva ।
 Sarvajnatādito vā jñāyakamadyasthavacanamiva ॥ 283 ॥ (1831)]
 Manyase katham sarvajnah sarvesāṁ sarvasaṁśayacchedāt ।
 Dṛistantābhavē'pi pṛicchatu yah saṁśayo yasya ॥ 284 ॥ (1832)]

Trans—283-284 Like all other statements or like the statement of an impartial observer, take it as a fact from my word, because of my omniscience (If) you question “ How am I to be omniscient ? ” (The reply is that) I am Omniscient because I remove the doubts of all Even in absence of (proper) examples, one who entertains doubts may ask me (1831-1832)

टीका—व्याख्या—सद्भूतमिदमनन्तरोक्तं सर्वमपीति गृहाण त्वम्,
 मद्वचनत्वात्, यथा त्वत्संशयादिविषयमवशेषं मद्वचनम्, सर्वज्ञत्वादित्या-
 दिभ्यो वा हेतुभ्यः, आदिशब्दात् वीतरागत्वादिरिग्रहः, ज्ञायकमध्यस्थ-
 वचनवदित्ययमत्र दृष्टान्त इति । अथैवं मन्यसे—कथमिव सर्वज्ञस्त्वम् । अत्रो-
 च्यते—सर्वेषां सर्वसंशयच्छेदात् । अन्यस्य सर्वसंशयच्छेत्तुः कस्याप्यदर्शनात्
 कोऽत्र दृष्टान्तः ?—न कश्चिदिति । अत्रोच्यते—किमत्र दृष्टान्तान्वेषणेन ? ।
 तदभावेऽपि हि यो यस्य संशयः स तं सर्वमपि पृच्छतु, येन स्वप्रत्ययसिद्ध
 एव मयि सर्वज्ञत्वनिश्चयो भवतीति ॥ २८३-२८४ ॥ (१८३१-१८३२)

D C.—Bhagavān —Take everything that I speak to be authentic, because I am *sarvajna* and *vītarāga*.

Mandika —On what ground are you to be called *sarvajna* ?

Bhagavān —I am *sarvajna* because I remove the doubts of all. Even though it is not necessary to cite an example in this connection, one who entertains doubts may put a question so that he may be convinced of my *sarvajnatva* 283-284(1831-1832)

Manduka then puts the question as follows —

भवा वि न सिज्झिस्सन्ति केइ कालेण जइ वि सव्वेण ।

नणु ते वि अभव्व च्छिय किंवा भव्वत्तण तेस्सि ? ॥२८५॥ (१८३३)

Bhavvā vi na sijjhissanti ke'ka kālēṇa ja'vi savvēṇa ।

Nanu te vi abhavva cchiya kimvā bhavvattanam tesim ? ॥285॥ (1833)

[भव्या अपि न सेस्स्यन्ति केअपि कालेन पद्यपि सर्वेण ।

ननु सेज्ज्यमव्या एव किंवा भव्यत्व तेषाम् ? ॥ २८५ ॥ (१८३३)

Bhavya api na setsyanti ke'pi kālēṇa yadyapi sarvēṇa ।

Nanu te'pyabhavya eva kimvā bhavyatvam tesam ? ॥285॥ (1833)]

Trans.—285 Some (of the creatures) though *bhavya*, do not attain *moksa* at any time As a matter of fact, they are also *a-bhavyas* If not so how is their *bhavyatva* accounted for ? (1833)

टीका—ननु भव्या अपि सन्तो यदि सर्वेषापि कालेन सर्वेऽपि न सेस्स्यन्ति, तर्हि तेषां सिद्धिर्न भविष्यति, अभव्या एव ते किं न व्यपदिश्यन्ते ? केन वा विज्ञेयेण तेषां भव्यत्वम् ? इति निवेद्यतामिति ॥२८५ (१८३३)॥

D O—Manduka:—If all those that are *bhavya* do not attain *moksa* at any time inspite of their *bhavyatva* why should they not be called *a-bhavya* ? Otherwise by what characteristics are they to be distinguished as *bhavya* ? ॥ 285 ॥ (1833)]

The reply is—

मण्णइ भव्वो जोग्गो न य जोग्गत्तेण सिज्झए सव्वो ।

जह्ज जोग्गस्मि वि दल्लिए सव्वस्मि न कीरए पडिमा ॥२८६॥ (१८३४)

Bhanna' bhavvo joggo na ya joggattēṇa sijjha' savvo ।

Jaha joggammi vi dalle savvammi na kira'e padimā ॥286॥ (1834)

[भव्यते भव्यो योग्यो न य योग्यत्वेन सिध्यति सर्वः ।

यथा योग्येऽपि दलितं सर्वस्मिन् न क्रियते प्रविमा ॥२८६॥ (१८३४)

Bhanyate bhavyo yogyo na ca योग्यत्वेना सिध्यति सर्वत्र ।
Yathā योग्ये'पि दलिके sarvasmin na kriyate pratimā ||286|| (1834)]

Trans—286 The *bhavya* is called worthy (of *moksa*), but all do not attain (*moksa*) by (virtue of) mere worthiness, just as image could not be produced merely by means of proper constituents (1834)

टीका-भण्यतेऽत्रोत्तरम् । किम् ? इत्याह-भव्योऽत्र सिद्धिगमनयोग्योऽभिप्रेतः, न तु यः सिद्धिगतिं यास्यत्येव, न च योग्यत्वमस्तीत्येतावतैव सर्वः सिध्यति, किन्तु सिद्धिगमनसामग्रीसंभवे सति । दृष्टान्तमाह-यथा हेम-मणि-पापाण-चन्दन-काष्ठादिके योग्येऽपि प्रतिमाहेऽपि दलिके न सर्वस्मिन् प्रतिमा विधीयते, किन्तु यत्रैव तन्निष्पत्तियोग्या सामग्री संभवति तत्रैवासौ क्रियते । न च तदसंभवमात्रेण प्रतिमाविषयेऽयोग्यता भवति । नियमश्चेह नैवं विधीयते यदुत-प्रतिमायोग्ये वस्तुनि प्रतिमा भवत्येवेति, किन्तु यदा तदा वा तद्योग्य एव सा भवति, नान्यत्रेति; एवमिहापि न “ भव्यः ” इत्येतावन्मात्रेणैव सर्वः सिध्यति, किन्तु सामग्रीसंपत्तौ, न च तदसंपत्तावपि तस्याभव्यता भवति, किन्तु यदा तदा वा भव्यस्यैव मुक्तिर्नाभव्यस्येति ॥२८६॥ (१८३४)

D C—*Bhavya* means worthy of attaining *moksa* and not exactly one who attains *moksa* Worthiness for *moksa* does not mean the attainment itself Even though substances like gold, jewels, stones, sandal wood etc are capable of producing an image, the image is not produced out of all but only out of certain suitable substances There is no such rule that the image is produced by means of certain suitable substances but only when suitable substances unite to produce an image.

Similarly, in case of *bhavyas* also, there is no rigid rule that one who is *bhavya* must necessarily attain *moksa* nor will *bhavya* be called *a-bhavya* if he does not attain *moksa* Sooner or later, *bhavya* alone attains *moksa* by virtue of its necessary characteristics, but *a-bhavya* will never be able to attain *moksa* ॥ 286 (1834) ॥

Mandika, then puts the question as follows—

भवा वि न सिञ्जिस्सति केइ कालेण जइ वि सब्बेण ।

नणु ते वि अभव्वं खिय किंवा भव्वत्तण तेस्सि ? ॥२८५॥ (१८३३)

Bhavvā vi na sijjiḥhassanti kei kālena ja vi savvena ।

Nanu te vi abhavva cciya kimvā bhavvattanam tesim ? ॥285॥ (1833)

[भव्या अपि न सेत्स्यन्ति केऽपि कालेन यद्यपि सर्वेण ।

ननु तेऽप्यभव्या एव किंवा भव्यत्व तेषाम् ? ॥ २८५ ॥ (१८३३)

Bhavya api na setsyanti ke pi kalena yadyapi sarveṇa ।

Nanu te pyabhavya eva kimvā bhavyatvam teṣāṃ ? ॥285॥ (1833)]

Trans.—285 Some (of the creatures) though *bhavya*, do not attain *moksa* at any time. As a matter of fact they are also *a-bhavyas* If not so how is their *bhavyatva* accounted for ? (1833)

टीका—ननु भव्या अपि सन्तो यदि सर्वेणापि कालेन सर्वेऽपि न सेत्स्यन्ति, तर्हि येषां सिद्धिर्न भविष्यति, अभव्या एव ते किं न व्यपदिश्यन्त ? केन वा विशेषेण तेषां भव्यत्वम् ? इति निषेधतामिति ॥२८५ (१८३३)॥

D C—*Mandika*:—If all those that are *bhavya* do not attain *moksa* at any time inspite of their *bhavyatva* why should they not be called *a-bhavya* ? Otherwise by what characteristics are they to be distinguished as *bhavya* ? ॥ 285 ॥ (1833)]

The reply is—

भण्णइ भव्वो जोग्गो न य जोग्गत्तेण सिञ्जए सब्बो ।

जइ जोग्गम्मि वि दल्लि ए सब्बम्मि न कीरण पडिमा ॥२८६॥ (१८३४)

Bhannaḥ bhavvo joggo na ya joggattena sijjaḥ savvo ।

Jaha joggammi vi dulle savvammi na kīraṇa padimā ॥286॥ (1834)

[भव्यत्वं भव्यो योग्यो न य योग्यत्वेन सिध्यति सर्वः ।

यथा योग्येऽपि दल्लि सर्वस्मिन् न क्रियते प्रतिमा ॥२८६॥ (१८३४)

Bhanyate bhavyo yogyo na ca yogyatvena sidhyati sarvah ।
Yathā yogye'pi dalike sarvasmīn na kriyate pratimā ॥286॥(1834)]

Trans—286 The *bhavya* is called worthy (of *moksa*), but all do not attain (*moksa*) by (virtue of) mere worthiness, just as image could not be produced merely by means of proper constituents (1834)

टीका-भण्यतेऽत्रोत्तरम् । किम् ? इत्याह-भव्योऽत्र सिद्धिगमनयोग्योऽभिप्रेतः, न तु यः सिद्धिगतिं यास्यत्येव, न च योग्यत्वमस्तीत्येतावतैव सर्वः सिध्यति, किन्तु सिद्धिगमनसामग्रीसंभवे मति । दृष्टान्तमाह-यथा हेम-मणि-पाषाण-चन्दन-काष्ठादिके योग्येऽपि प्रतिमार्हेऽपि दलिके न सर्वस्मिन् प्रतिमा विधीयते, किन्तु यत्रैव तन्निष्पत्तियोग्या सामग्री संभवति तत्रैवासौ क्रियते । न च तदसंभवमात्रेण प्रतिमाविषयेऽयोग्यता भवति । नियमश्चेह नैवं विधीयते यदुत-प्रतिमायोग्ये वस्तुनि प्रतिमा भवत्येवेति, किन्तु यदा तदा वा तद्योग्य एव सा भवति, नान्यत्रेति; एवमिहापि न “ भव्यः ” इत्येतावन्मात्रेणैव सर्वः सिध्यति, किन्तु सामग्रीसंपत्तौ, न च तदसंपत्तावपि तस्याभव्यता भवति, किन्तु यदा तदा वा भव्यस्यैव मुक्तिर्नाभव्यस्येति ॥२८६॥ (१८३४)

D. C—*Bhavya* means worthy of attaining *moksa* and not exactly one who attains *moksa* Worthiness for *moksa* does not mean the attainment itself Even though substances like gold, jewels, stones, sandal wood etc are capable of producing an image, the image is not produced out of all but only out of certain suitable substances There is no such rule that the image is produced by means of certain suitable substances but only when suitable substances unite to produce an image.

Similarly, in case of *bhavyas* also, there is no rigid rule that one who is *bhavya* must necessarily attain *moksa* nor will *bhavya* be called *a-bhavya* if he does not attain *moksa* Sooner or later, *bhavya* alone attains *moksa* by virtue of its necessary characteristics, but *a-bhavya* will never be able to attain *moksa* ॥ 286 (1834) ॥

Also

जह वा स एव पासाण—कणगजोगो विओगजोगो वि ।
 न विजुज्झइ सव्वो छिय स विजुज्झइ जस्स सपत्ती ॥२८७॥ (१८३५)
 किं पुण जा सपत्ती सा जोग्गस्सेव न उ अजोग्गस्स ।
 तह जो मोक्खो नियमा सो भव्वाण न इयरेसिं ॥२८८॥ (१८३६)

Jaha vā sa eva pāsāṇa-kanagaḷogo viogaḷoggo vi ।
 Na vijujjhai savvo cciya sa vijujjhai jassa sampattī ॥ 287 ॥ (1835)
 Kim puna jā sampattī sā joggaṣṣeva na u ajoggaṣṣa ।
 Taha jo mokkho nīyamā so bhavvāṇam na iyaresiṇi ॥ 288 ॥ (1836)

[यथा वा स एव पापाण—कनकयोगो वियोगयोग्योऽपि ।
 न वियुज्यते सर्व एव स वियुज्यते यस्य संप्राप्तिः ॥२८७॥ (१८३५)
 किं पुनर्या संप्राप्तिः सा योग्यस्यैव न स्वयोग्यस्य ।
 तथा यो मोक्षो नियमात् स भव्यानां नेतरेषाम् ॥२८८॥ (१८३६)]

Yatha vā sa eva pāṣāṇa-kanakayogo viyogayogyo pi ।
 Na viyujyate sarvam eva sa viyujyate yasya samprāptih ॥ 287 ॥ (1835)
 Kim punarya samprāptih sā yogyasyaiva na trayogyasya ।
 Tatha yo mokṣo nīyamāt sa bhavyānām netareṣām ॥ 288 ॥ (1836)

Trans—287-288 Just as the contact between stone and gold, though susceptible to separation is not separated, only those that have reached attainment are separated. Similarly *mokṣa* which is laid down as a rule belongs only to *bhavyas* and not to others. (1835-1836)

टीका—यथा वा स एव पूर्वोक्तः सुवर्णपापाण—कनकयोगो वियोग योग्यतान्वितोऽपि सर्वो न वियुज्यते, किन्तु स एव वियुज्यते, यस्य वियोगसामग्रीसंप्राप्तिरिति । किं पुनः ? एतद् सुखसुखिष्य भूमः—या वियोगसामग्रीसंप्राप्तिः सा वियोगयोग्यस्यैव सुवर्णोपलब्ध्य भवति, न तु तदयोग्यस्य, तथा तेनैव प्रकारेण वा सर्वकर्मफललक्ष्णो मोक्षः स नियमाद्

भव्यानामेव भवति, नेतरेषामभव्यानामिति भव्या-ऽभव्ययोर्विशेष इति
॥ २८७-२८८ ॥ (१८३५-१८३६) ॥

D C—Although the contact between gold and stone is susceptible to separation, it can never be applied to all as a general rule. Because, only that which secures necessary conditions for separation is separable.

Moreover, these necessary conditions which cause the separation, act only upon those that are worthy of separation and not upon others. The same is the case with *mokṣa*. The attainment of *mokṣa* is possible for *bhavyas* only, and not for *a-bhavyas* even if they possess necessary conditions. This is the distinctive feature between *bhavya* and *a-bhavya* ॥ 287-288 (1835-1836) ॥

कयगाइमत्तणाओ मोक्खो निच्चो न होइ कुंभो व ।
नो पद्धंसाभावो भुवि तद्धम्मा वि जं निच्चो ॥२८९॥ (१८३७)
अणुदाहरणमभावो एसो वि मई न तं जओ नियओ ।
कुंभविणासविसिट्ठो भावो च्चिय पोग्गलमओ य ॥२९०॥ (१८३८)

Kayagāimattanāo mokkho nicco na hōi kumbho vva ।
No paddhamsābhāvo bhuvī taddhammā vi jam nicco ॥289॥ (1837)
Anudāharanamabhāvo eso vi mai na tam jao niyao ।
Kumbhavināsavisittho bhāvo cciya poggalamao ya ॥290॥ (1838)

[कृतकादिमत्त्वाद् मोक्षो नित्यो न भवति कुम्भ इव ।
नो प्रध्वंसाभावो भुवि तद्धर्मापि यद् नित्यः ॥ २८९ ॥ (१८३७)
अणुदाहरणमभाव एषोऽपि मतिर्न तद् यतो नियतः ।
कुम्भविनाशविशिष्टो भाव एव पुद्गलमयश्च ॥ २९० ॥ (१८३८)

Kṛitakādimattvād mokṣo nityo na bhavati kumbha iva ।
No pradhvamsābhāvo bhuvī taddharmāpi yad nityah ॥289॥ (1837)

Apudāharapamābhava eṣo pi matirna tad yato niyataḥ ।

Kumbhavināśavānistō bhāya eva pudgalamayāśo ॥ 290 ॥ (1838)

Trans.—289-290 Like *kumbha mokṣa* is not *nitya* on account of its artificiality etc. " It is not so. Because, indestructibility is everlasting on this earth inspite of its (possessing) that property " (But) this negation is void of example also " That is not true. Destruction of *kumbha* is definite and (hence) (its) positiveness is distinguished by means of *pudgalas* (1837-1838)

टीका—अकारुपा—ननु मोक्षो नित्यो न भवति, किन्त्वनित्यो विनाशी, कृतकत्वात् ; आदिशब्दात् प्रयत्नानन्तरीयकत्वाऽऽदिमत्त्वादिपरिग्रहः । कुम्भमिति दृष्टान्तः । अत्रोन्यते—अनैकान्तिकता हेतूनाम्, विपक्षेऽपि गमनात्, यस्मादिह घटादिप्रपञ्चसामावः कृतकादिस्वभावोऽपि नित्य एव, तद्वनित्यत्वं घटादस्तदुपसर्गैवोन्मज्जनप्रसङ्गादिति । अथैव परस्य मतिः—न केवलं पूर्वोक्तः प्रागभावः किन्त्वयोऽपि प्रपञ्चसामावोऽभावत्वेनावस्तुत्वादनुदाहरणमेव । तदेतद् न, यतो यस्माद् नियतो निश्चितः कुम्भविनाशविशेषणविशिष्टः पुद्गलात्मको भाव एवायमपि प्रपञ्चसामावः । अतो युक्तमेतदुदाहरणमिति । एतच्च मोक्षस्य कृतकत्वमभ्युपगम्योक्तम् ॥ २८९-२९० ॥ ॥ (१८३७-१८३८) ॥

D O—*Mandika*—*Mokṣa* is not *nitya* but it is *a-nitya* like *ghata* as it is artificial and *ādhimān* in character like *ghata*.

Bhagavān—It is not so. The *hetu* advanced by you applies to the *vipakṣa* as well and hence it is *anaikāntika*. The *pradhvameśbhāva* in case of *ghata* for example is *nitya* inspite of its being *kṛtaka*. For if it were *a-nitya*, objects like *ghata* should have been born in the same form.

Mandika—But since *pradhvameśbhāva* is negative in character you will not be able to cite an example based on it.

Bhagavān—It is not negative *O Mandika* ! but positive in character. The definite forms of *pudgalas* found at the

destruction of *ghata* is nothing but *pradhvamsābhāva* The example cited is, therefore, quite proper to the occasion The same is the case with *mokṣa* also *Mokṣa* will never be called *a-nitya* even if it is believed to possess the properties like *kṛitakatva*. ॥ 289-290 (1837-1838) ॥

Or, say, *Mokṣa* is not *kṛitaka* at all on account of the following reason —

किं वेगंतेण कयं पोग्गलमेत्तविलयम्मि जीवस्स ।

किं निव्वत्तियमहिंयं नभसो घटमेत्तविलयम्मि ? ॥ २९१ ॥ (१४३९)

Kim vegantena kayam poggalamettavilayammi jīvassa ।

Kim nivvattiyamahiyam nabhaso ghadamettavilayammi ? ॥ 291 ॥

[किं वैकान्तेन कृतं पुद्गलमात्रविलये जीवस्य ।

किं निर्वर्तितमधिकं नभसो घटमात्रविलये ? ॥ २९१ ॥ (१८३९)

Kim vaikāntena kṛitam pudgalamātravilaye jīvasya ।

Kim nirvartitamadhikam nabhaso ghatamātravilaye ? ॥ 291 ॥ (1839)]

Trans—291 “ At the destruction of mere *pudagalas*, how is *jīva* alone to be affected ? ” “ At the destruction of mere *ghata*, how is sky affected all the more ? ” (1839)

टीका—किमिह पुद्गलमात्रविलये सति समस्तकर्मपुद्गलपरिशाटसमये जीवस्यात्मनः स्वतत्त्वे वृत्तिमादधत एकान्तेन कृतं विहितम्, येन कृतको मोक्षः स्यात् ? । एतदुक्तं भवति—इहात्म-कर्मपुद्गलवियोगो मोक्षोऽभिप्रेतः । तत्र तपःसंयमप्रभावतो जीवात् कर्मणि प्रथग् जायमाने किमात्मनः क्रियते, येन कृतकत्वादनित्यत्वं मोक्षस्य प्रतिपाद्यते ? । अथ स एवात्म-कर्मवियोगः क्रियमाणत्वात् कृतकः, ततोऽनित्य इत्याशङ्क्याह—“ किं निव्वत्तियमित्यादि ” मुद्गरादिना घटमात्रस्य विनाशे सति किं नाम नभसोऽभ्यधिकं निर्वर्तितम् ? न किञ्चिदित्यर्थः । एवमिहापि कर्ममात्रविनाशे सति किं जीवस्याधिकं कृतम्, येन तदेकाकिता रूपस्य मोक्षस्य कृतकत्वेनानित्यत्वं स्यात् ? । स एव कर्मणो विनाशो घटविनाशवत् क्रियमानत्वात् कृतकः, ततः सर्वकर्मक्षय—

लघुणो मोक्षोजनित्य इति चेत् । उदयुक्तम्, यदा यथाऽयमेव घटविनाशो
यः केवलाकाशसद्भावो न पुनस्तसौ विमिश्रोऽसौ, न चाकाशस्य किमप्यधिकं
क्रियते, तस्य सदावस्थितत्वेन नित्यत्वात्, एवमिहाप्ययमेव कर्मणो विनाशो
यः केवलात्मसद्भावः, न स्वात्मनो विमिश्रोऽसौ, न चात्मनः किञ्चिदधिकं
विधीयते, तस्यापि नमोवद् नित्यत्वात् । तस्माद् न मोक्षस्य कृतकत्वमनि-
त्यत्व वा । कश्चिन्नित्यत्वे सिद्धसाध्यतेव, द्रव्य-पर्यायोरन्यरूपतया सर्व-
स्यापि वस्तुनो नित्यानित्यरूपत्वादिति ॥ २९१ ॥ (१८३९) ॥

D C—Bhagavān —Since *Mokṣa* is nothing but the sepa-
ration of Soul from *Karma-pudgalas* it cannot be artificial
at all. When *Karma* is being separated from *jīva* how is
ātma to be affected to render the *Mokṣa* *a-nitya* ?

Mandukā —The separation of soul from *Karma* is *krutaka*
owing to its *kriyamānatva*. The *Mokṣa* is therefore *krutaka*
and *a-nitya* too

Bhagavān —When *ghata* is destroyed by means of hammer
etc the sky is not at all affected. In the same way when
Karma is destroyed *jīva* will also remain unaffected. It is not
therefore proper to believe that *Mokṣa* is *krutaka* and *a-nitya*.

Mandukā —*Karma* being destructible like *ghata*, like *ghata*
it is *krutaka* also. Now since *Mokṣa* is nothing but the
destruction of all *Karmas* it is also *krutaka* and hence *a-nitya* also

Bhagavān —Your argument is absolutely false. O *Mandukā* !
Existence of sky persists even if *ghata* is destroyed. The
destruction of *ghata* is not *bhinna* from *ākāśa* but at the
same time *ākāśa* is not affected by it also since it is everlasting.
Similarly in case of *Karma* also although the destruction of
Karmas is not different from the existence of Soul the Soul
is not affected by it on account of its being *nitya* like *ākāśa*.
The *Mokṣa* is therefore never *krutaka*. O *Mandukā* and never
a-nitya also even if it is *a-nitya* to the extent that all
objects are *a-nitya* as far as their *dravyatva* and *pariyayas*
are concerned.

Mandika —Since *Karma-pudgalas* abandoned by *jīva* in a worn-out condition, stay on in this world (even in that state) why should the Soul separated from *Karma*, be believed to unite with the worn-out *Karma*, so that, it may be bound by a fresh bondage again ?

Bhagavān —*Moksa* being *niitya*, O *Mandika*, will again be bound by a fresh bondage ॥ 291 (1839) ॥

The everlasting nature of *moksa* is apprehended as follows —

सोऽणवराहो व पुनो न बज्झए बंधकारणाभावा ।

जोगा य बंधहेऊ न य ते तस्सासरीरो त्ति ॥ २९२ ॥ (१८४०)

So'navarāho vva puno na bajjhae bandhakāranabhāvā ।

Jogā ya bandha-heū na ya te tassāsārīro tti ॥ 292 ॥ (1840)

[सोऽनपराध इव पुनर्न बध्यते बन्धकारणाभावात् ।

योगाश्च बन्धहेतवो न च ते तस्याशरीर इति ॥ २९२ ॥ (१८४०)

So'naparādha iva punarna badhyate bandhakāranabhāvāt ।

Yogaśca bandhahetavo na ca te tasyaśarīra iti ॥ 292 ॥ (1840)]

Trans—292 Like an innocent person, it (i e, Soul) can never be bound (by *bandhas*) as there is no cause for bondage On account of its formlessness, it has no cause for bondages (1840)

टीका—स मुक्तो जीवः पुनरपि न बध्यते, बन्धकारणाभावात्, अनपराधपुरुषवत्, मनो-वाक्-काययोगादयश्च बन्धहेतवोऽभिधीयन्ते, न च ते मुक्तस्य सन्ति, शरीराद्यभावात् । न च कर्मवर्गणागतपुद्गलमात्रसंयोगमात्ररूपोऽत्र बन्धोऽधिक्रियते, अतिप्रसङ्गादिदोषाघ्रातत्वात्, किन्तु मिथ्यात्वादितद्वेतुनिबन्धन इति ॥ २९२ ॥ (१८४०) ॥

D C—In absence of (any) cause for (its) *bandha*, like an innocent person, the Soul is free from *bandha* Unions of mind, speech and body etc are nothing but the causes for

(its) *bandha* But due to the *abhāva* of *ś'arīra* etc a free Soul is not able to contain them. So *bandha* does not take place in absence of *samyoga* of the multiplication of *karmas* but it depends upon the *hetus* such as *mūhyātra* etc

Maṇḍika —Like *bandhas* you doubt as to whether that free Soul appears in the next life or not. ॥ 292 (1840) ॥

Bhagavan replies —

न पुनो तस्स पसूई बीयाभावादिहकुरस्सेव ।
बीय च तस्स कम्म न य तस्स तय तओ निच्चो ॥ २९३ ॥ (१८४१)

Na puno tassa pasūī bīyābhāvādihankurasseva ।
Bīyam ca tassa kammam na ya tassa tayam tao nicco ॥ 293 ॥ (1841)

[न पुनस्तस्य प्रसूतिबीयाभावादिहकुरस्सेव ।
बीय च तस्य कम्म न च तस्य तत् ततो नित्यः ॥ २९३ ॥ (१८४१)

Na punastasya prasūtibīyābhāvādihankurasyeva ।
Bīyam ca tasya karma na ca tasya tat tato nityaḥ ॥ 293 ॥ (1841)

Trans —293 Like a sprout without seed it has no birth again since *Karma* is its seed. It no more belongs to that (*muktītmā*) which in that case, becomes everlasting (1841)

टीका—न तस्य मुक्तस्य पुनरपि मयप्रसूतिरुपजायते, बीयाभावात्कारणस्यासम्भवात्, यथाऽहुरस्य तद्भावात् न प्रसूतिः । बीयं चास्य कर्मणो गन्तव्यम् तच्च मुक्तस्य नास्ति, ततः पुनरावृत्त्यभावात् नित्योऽस्मापिति ॥ २९३ ॥ (१८४१) ॥

D C —Just as a sprout does not grow without seed the *muktatma* does not take any birth in absence of *Karma* which acts as its *bīya*. When *muktatma* is said to have no *janna* (birth), it goes without saying that he is *nitya* also ॥ 293 (1841)

Also

द्वामुत्तत्तणओ नहं व निच्चो मओ स दवतया ।

सवगयत्तावत्ती मइ त्ति तं नाणुमाणाओ ॥ २९४ ॥ (१८४२)

Davvāmuttattanao naham va nicco mao sa davvatayā ।

Savvgayattāvattī mai tti tam nānumānāo ॥ 294 ॥ (1842)

[द्रव्यामूर्तत्वतो नभ इव नित्यो मतः स द्रव्यतया ।

सर्वगतत्वापत्तिर्मतिरिति तद् नानुमानात् ॥ २९४ ॥ (१८४२)

Dravyāmūrtatvato nabha iva nityo matah sa dravyatayā ।

Sarvagatatvāpattir matiriti tad nānumānāt ॥ 294 ॥ (1842)]

Trans—294 By substantiality, it is considered as *ntya* like sky, on account of (both) substantiality, as well as, incorporeal nature The belief that it is all-pervading, is not (acceptable) on account of *anumāna* (1842)

टीका—स मुक्तात्मा नित्य इति प्रतिज्ञा । “ द्वामुत्तत्तणउ त्ति ” द्रव्यत्वे सत्यमूर्तत्वादिति हेतुः । “ दवतय त्ति ” यथा द्रव्यत्वे सत्यमूर्त नभ इति दृष्टान्तः । अथैवंभूता मति परस्य स्यात्—अनेन हेतुना सर्वगतत्वापत्तिरप्यात्मनः सिध्यति; तथाहि—सर्वगत आत्मा, द्रव्यत्वे सत्यमूर्तत्वात्, नभोवत् । ततश्च धर्मविशेषविपरीतसाधनाद् विरुद्धोऽयम् । तदेतद् न । कुतः ? । अनुमानात्—अनुमानबाधितत्वात् सर्वगतत्वस्येत्यर्थः; तथाहि—असर्वगत आत्मा, कर्तृत्वात्, कुलालवत् । न च कर्तृत्वमसिद्धम्, भोक्तृत्व-द्रष्टृत्वाद्यनुपपत्तेरिति ॥ २९४ ॥ (१८४२) ॥

D C—Like *ākāś'a*, *ātmā* is *ntya* on account of its *dravyatva* as well as *a-mūrtatva* But, it is not appropriate to believe that *ātmā* is all-pervading like *ākāś'a* The soul is *a-sarvagata* like potter, on account of its *kartritva* For, otherwise, it will lose several of its own characteristics like *bhoktritva*, *a-dristatva* etc ॥ 294 (1842) ॥

को वा निच्चग्गाहो सवं चिय वि भव-भंग—ट्टिइमइयं ।

पज्जायंतरमेत्तप्पणादनिच्चाइववणसो ॥ २९५ ॥ (१८४३)

(its) *bandha* But due to the *abhāva* of *s'aritra* etc a free Soul is not able to contain them. So *bandha* does not take place in absence of *samyoga* of the multiplication of *karmas* but it depends upon the *hetus* such as *mithyātra* etc

Mandila —Like *bandhas* you doubt as to whether that free Soul appears in the next life or not. ॥ 292 (1840) ॥

Bhagavan replies —

न पुनो तस्स पसूई वीयाभावादिहकुरस्सेव ।
वीय च तस्स कम्म न य तस्स तय तओ निच्चो ॥ २९३ ॥ (१८४१)

\\ puno tassa pasūi bīyābhāvādihankurasseva ।
Bivam ca tassa kammam na ya tassa taya tō nicco ॥ 293 ॥ (1841)

[न पुनस्तस्य प्रवृत्तिबीजामावादिहकुरस्येव ।
बीजं च तस्य कर्म न य तस्य तत् ततो नित्यः ॥ २९३ ॥ (१८४१)

Na punastasya pravṛtibījābhavādihankurasyeva ।
Bijam ca tasya karma na ca tasya tat tato nityah ॥ 293 ॥ (1841)

Trans.—293 Like a sprout without seed it has no birth again since *Karma* is its seed It no more belongs to that (*muklātma*) which in that case, becomes everlasting (1841)

टीका—न तस्य मूक्तस्य पुनरपि भवप्रवृत्तिरुपजायते, बीजामावात्कर्मणस्यामभावात्, यथाऽहुरस्य तदभावाद् न प्रवृत्तिः । बीजं चास्य कर्मबाधशान्त्यस्य च मूक्तस्य नास्त्येव, ततः पुनरावृत्त्यभावाद् निरपोऽसाविति ॥ २९३ ॥ (१८४१) ॥

D C—Just as a sprout does not grow without seed the *muklātma* does not take any birth in absence of *Karma* which acts as its *biya* When *muklātma* is said to have no *janma* (birth), it goes without saying that he is *nitya* also ॥ 293 (1841)

Also

and continues to be in that state on account of its *dravyatva*, *jīvatva* etc.

In this way, by means of different *pañyāyas*, the attributes like *a-nityatā*, are imposed

मुत्तस्स कोऽवगासो सोम्म ! तिलोगसिहरं, गई किह से ? ।
कम्मलहुया तहागइपरिणामाईहिं भणियमिदं ॥ २९६ ॥ (१८४४)

Muttassa ko'vagāso somma ! tilogasiḥaram, gaī kiha se ?
Kammalahuyā tahaḡaipaṛināmāiḥim bhaṇiyamidaṃ ॥ 296 ॥ (1844)

[मुक्तस्य कोऽवकाशः सौम्य ! त्रिलोकशिखरं, गतिः कथं तस्य ? ।
कर्मलघुता तथागतिपरिणामादिभिर्भणितमिदम् ॥ २९६ ॥ (१८४४)

Muktasya ko'vakāśah saumya ! trilokaśikharam, gatiḥ katham tasya ?
Karmalaghutā tathāgatipaṛināmādibhir bhaṇitamidaṃ ॥ 296 ॥ (1844)]

Trans—296 What is the resort of the free Soul ? It is the end of three worlds *O Saumya !* What is the rate of its movement ? It is said that the Soul attains *mokṣa* at one time by (virtue of) the want of a *Karma*, as well as, by (virtue of) the (natural) tendency of its movement etc (1844)

टीका—मुक्तस्य क्षीणसमस्तकर्मणो जीवस्य कोऽवकाशः कावस्थानम् ?, इति पृष्टे सत्याह—सौम्य ! त्रिलोकशिखरं, लोकान्त इत्यर्थः । ननु कथं 'से' तस्याकर्मणो जीवस्यैतावद् दूरमितो गतिः प्रवर्तते ? । कर्मनिवन्धना हि जीवानां सर्वापि चेष्टा, ततो विहायोगत्यादिकर्माभावेऽपि गतिचेष्टायामतिप्रसङ्गः प्राप्नोति । अत्रोच्यते—“ कम्मलहुय त्ति ” कर्मापगमे सति लाघवात् समयमेकं तद्गतिप्रवृत्तिरित्यर्थः, तथागतिपरिणामात्—कर्मक्षये सिद्धत्ववदपूर्वगतिपरिणामलाभादित्यर्थः, यथा हि समस्तकर्मक्षयादपूर्वं सिद्धत्वपरिणामं जीवः समासादयति, तथोर्ध्वगतिपरिणाममपीति भावः । आदिशब्दादपरमपि तद्गतिकारणं समयभणितमिदमवगन्तव्यम्, तद्यथा—लाउ य एरंडफले अग्गी धूमो य इसु धणुविमुक्को । गइ पुव्वपओणेणं एवं सिद्धाण वि गई उ ॥ १ ॥ २९६ ॥ (१८४४) ॥

Ko vā nīccaggāho sabbam cīya vī bhava-bhaṅga-tthīlīmayam ।
Pajjāyantaramettappanādanīccālvavaeso ॥ २९५ ॥ (१८४३)

[को वा नित्यग्रहः सर्वमेवापि भव-भङ्ग-स्थितिमयम् ।

पर्यायान्तरमात्रार्पणादनित्यादिव्यपदेशः ॥ २९५ ॥ (१८४३)

Ko vā nityagrabah sarvam evāpi bhava-bhaṅga-sthitimayam ।
Paryāyantaramāstrarpṇādanityādivyapadeśah ॥ २९५ ॥ (१८४३)]

Trāns—295 Or what (of) assuming *nityatā* ? Every thing is susceptible to the state of production destruction and existence. Only by the imposition of various methods, attributes like transitoriness etc. are designated (1843)

टीका—गतार्था, नवर पर्यायान्तरमात्रस्यार्पण प्रधानभावेन विवक्ष्यं
तस्मादनित्यादिव्यपदेशः, तथाहि—घटःपूर्वम् मृत्पिण्डपर्यायेण विनश्यति,
घटपर्यायतया पुनरुत्पद्यते, मृदूपतया स्ववतिष्ठते । तस्य यो विनष्टरूपतादि
पर्यायो यदार्पितः प्रधानभूतो विवक्ष्यते, तदा तेनानित्यत्वादिव्यपदेशः ।
एवमसावपि मुक्तः ससारितया विनष्टः, सिद्धतयोत्पन्नः, जीवत्व-सोपयोग
त्वादिमिस्त्ववतिष्ठते, तथा, प्रथमसमयसिद्धतया विनश्यति, द्विसमयसिद्धतयो-
त्पद्यते, द्रव्यत्व-जीवत्वादिमिस्त्ववतिष्ठते । ततोऽर्पितपर्यायेणानित्यत्वादि
व्यपदेश इति ॥ २९५ ॥ (१८४३) ॥

D C—It is useless to insist that a free soul is exclusi-
vely *nitya*. Attributes like *a-nityata* could be indicated by
means of various methods Before *ghata* comes into existence
its form as a lump of earth vanishes and comes into existence
as a particular shape of earth named *ghata* and continues to
exist in that state after its production also

The same is the case with *muktatva* The *muktatva* also
vanishes as a mundane comes into existence as *mukta* and
continues to be in that state by virtue of its life and utility
So it vanishes at the first time as it is established, comes into
existence by virtue of its being established at the second time

टीका-नन्वाकाश-कालादयोऽमूर्ता निष्क्रिया एव प्रसिद्धाः, तैत् किं नाम त्वयाऽरूपममूर्तं सद् वस्तु सक्रियं दृष्टं, येन मुक्तात्मनः सक्रिय-त्वमभ्युपगम्यते ?—ननु निष्क्रिय एव मुक्तात्मा प्राप्नोति, अमूर्तत्वात्, आकाशवदिति भावः । अत्रोच्यते-मण्डिक ! त्वमप्येतत् कथय,—भुवि किम-रूपं सद् वस्तु चेतनं वीक्षितम्, येन मुक्तात्मा चेतनोऽभ्युपगम्यते ?—अमूर्त-त्वादचेतन एवायं प्राप्नोति, आकाशवदिति । तस्माद् यथा “ से ” तस्य जीवस्यारूपेभ्यं आकाशादिभ्यस्तद्रूपत्वे समानेऽन्योऽपि चैतन्यलक्षणो विशेषधर्मः समस्ति, तथा क्रियापि मता,—सक्रियत्वमपि विशेषधर्मोऽस्तु को विरोधः ? इति भावः ॥ २९७ ॥ (१८४५) ॥

D. C — Mandika — The *a-mūrta* (objects like) *ākās'a* and *kāla* are wellknown as *niskriya* Then, how did you apprehend a formless object like *muktātmā* to be *sa-kriya* ? Since it is *a-mūtra* like *ākās'a*, it should also be *niskriya* like *ākās'a*

Bhagavān — What *a-mūrta* object have you seen to be *sacetana* in this world, in order to accept *muktātmā* as *sacetana* ? Just as *ākās'a* is *acetana* on account of its *amūrtatva*, the *muktātmā* should also be *acetana* as a rule But it is not so For, although *ātmā* resembles *ākās'a* in respect of *a-mūrtatva*, it possesses a distinct characteristic of *cetanā*, within which *kriyā* is also included So, *sa-kriyatva* or activeness becomes a distinct peculiarity of *muktātmā* There is no doubt about it ॥297॥ (1845)

Or, leaving that distinction of *mukta* and *a-mukta* aside, it could also be argued that—

कत्ताइत्तणओ वा सक्किरिओऽयं मओ कुलालो व ।

देहप्फंदणओ वा पच्चक्खं जंतपुरिसो व ॥ २९८ ॥ (१८४६)

Kattāittanao vā sakkirio'yam mao kulālo vva ।

Dehapphandanao vā paccakkham jantapuriso vva ॥298॥ (1846)

[कर्त्रादित्वतो वा सक्रियोऽयं मतः कुलाल इव ।

देहस्पन्दनतो वा प्रत्यक्षं यत्रपुरुष इव ॥ २९८ ॥ (१८४६)

D C—Maṇḍika—Where do the *Mukta* souls reside ?

Bhagavan.—They reside at the end of the three worlds
O *Saṁnya* !

Maṇḍika.—How do *jīvas* move to such a long distance even if they are unaccompanied by *Karmas* ? All sorts of movements of a *jīva* depend upon *Karma* and hence how will extensive movements such as moving in the sky etc. be possible at all ?

Bhagavan.—O Blessed *Maṇḍika* ! just as soul attains an unprecedented achievement when *karma* is destroyed in the same way the soul proceeds with the same movement and during the same period (of time).

Moreover just as gourd fruit of a castor plant fire smoke arrow wafted from a bow etc. make movements by means of previous impellations in the same way a *muktatma* is also able to make movement by means of previous impellations etc. § 296 (1844) n

किं सक्रियमरूपं मण्डिय ! भुवि चेयण च किमरूपं ? ।

जह से विसेशधम्मो चेयन्न तह मया किरिया ॥२९७॥ (१८४५)

Kim sakkriyamārūpam Maṇḍiya ! bhuvi ceyanam ca kimārūpam ? Jaha se viśeṣadhammo ceyannam taha mayā kiriyā §297s (1845)

[किं सक्रियमरूपं मण्डिक ! भुवि चेयन च किमरूपम् ? ।

यथा तस्य विशेषधर्मासपितन्यं तथा मता क्रिया ॥ २९७ ॥ (१८४५)

Kim sakkriyamārūpam Maṇḍika ! bhuvi ceyanam ca kimārūpam ? Yatha tasya viśeṣadharmanasopitanyam tatha mata kriyā §297s (1845)

Trans—297 What is movable (when it is formless) ? And, O *Maṇḍika* what is living (when it is formless) ? Like consciousness, movement is also the distinctive characteristic of Soul (1845)

टीका-नन्वाकाश-कालादयोऽमूर्ता निष्क्रिया एव प्रसिद्धाः, तैत् किं नाम त्वयाऽरूपममूर्तं सद् वस्तु सक्रियं दृष्टं, येन मुक्तात्मनः सक्रियत्वमभ्युपगम्यते ?—ननु निष्क्रिय एव मुक्तात्मा प्राप्नोति, अमूर्तत्वात्, आकाशवदिति भावः । अत्रोच्यते-मण्डिक ! त्वमप्येतत् कथय,—भुवि किमरूपं सद् वस्तु चेतनं वीक्षितम्, येन मुक्तात्मा चेतनोऽभ्युपगम्यते ?—अमूर्तत्वादचेतन एवायं प्राप्नोति, आकाशवदिति । तस्माद् यथा “ से ” तस्य जीवस्यारूपेभ्यं आकाशादिभ्यस्तद्रूपत्वे समानेऽन्योऽपि चैतन्यलक्षणो विशेषधर्मः समस्ति, तथा क्रियापि मता,—सक्रियत्वमपि विशेषधर्मोऽस्तु को विरोधः ? इति भावः ॥ २९७ ॥ (१८४५) ॥

D. C —Mandika —The a-mūṛta (objects like) ākāś'a and kāla are welknown as nīskriya Then, how did you apprehend a formless object like muktātmā to be sa-kriya ? Since it is a-mūtra like ākāś'a, it should also be nīskriya like ākāś'a

Bhagavān —What a-mūṛta object have you seen to be śacetana in this world, in order to accept muktātmā as śacetana ? Just as ākāś'a is acetana on account of its amūṛtatva, the muktātmā should also be acetana as a rule But it is not so For, although ātmā resembles ākāś'a in respect of a-mūṛtatva, it possesses a distinct characteristic of cetanā, within which kriyā is also included So, sa-kriyatva or activeness becomes a distinct peculiarity of muktātmā There is no doubt about it ॥297॥(1845)

Or, leaving that distinction of mukta and a-mukta aside, it could also be argued that—

कत्ताइत्तणओ वा सक्किरिओऽयं मओ कुलालो व ।

देहप्फंदणओ वा पच्चक्खं जंतपुरिसो व ॥ २९८ ॥ (१८४६)

Kattāittanao vā sakkirio'yam mao kulālo vva ।

Dehapphandanao vā paccakkham jantapuriso vva ॥298॥ (1846)

[कर्त्रादित्वतो वा सक्रियोऽयं मतः कुलाल इव ।

देहस्पन्दनतो वा प्रत्यक्षं यत्रप्ररूप इव ॥ २९८ ॥ (१८४६)

Kartrāditvato va sakriyo'yam mataḥ kulala iva ।

Dehaspandanato va pratyakṣam yantrapuruṣa iva ॥ 298 ॥ (1846)]

Trans—298 Like a potter It is believed as active on account of its being an agent etc or (it is active) like a mechanical person on account of the directly perceptible movement of (its) body (1846)

टीका—अथवा, सक्रियोऽयमात्मा, कर्तृत्वात्, कुलालवत् । आदिशब्दाद् “ मोक्षत्वात् ” इति शान्यम् । अथवा, सक्रिय आत्मा पश्यत्यथ एव देहपरिस्पन्ददर्शनात्, यन्त्रपुरुषवदिति ॥ २९८ ॥ (१८४६) ॥

D C—The Soul could be taken as *sakriya* as a potter on account of its *kartrūta* and *bhoktrūta*. Or it is *sakriya* like a *yantra-puruṣa* on account of the *pratyakṣa* movements of its body ॥ 298 ॥ (1846)]

देहत्पदणहेऊ होज्ज पयसो चि सो वि नाकिरिप् ।

होज्जादिट्ठो व मई तदरूयत्ते नणु समाण ॥ २९९ ॥ (१८४७)

रूवित्तम्मि स देहो वच्चो तप्फदणे पुणो हेऊ ।

पइनिययपरिप्फदणमच्चेयणाण न वि य जुत्त ॥३००॥(१८४८)

Dehapphandanaheū hojja payatto tti so vi nākirie ।

Hojjādīṭṭho va mai tadarūvatte nanu samāṇam ॥ 299 ॥ (1847)

Rūvittammi sa deho vaccho tapphandane puṇo heū ।

Pahnīyayaparippbandanamaceyanāṇam na vi ya juttam ॥ 300 ॥

[देहस्पन्दनहेतुर्भवेत् प्रयत्न इति सोऽपि नाक्रिये ।

भवेददृष्टो वा मतिस्तदरूपत्वे ननु समानम् ॥ २९९ ॥ (१८४७)

रूपित्वे स देहो बाध्यस्तस्पन्दने पुनर्हेतुः ।

प्रतिनियतपरिस्पन्दनमचेतनानां नापि युक्तम् ॥ ३०० ॥ (१८४८)

Dehaspandanahetur bhavet prayatna itī so pi nakriyo ।

Bhavedadrīṣṭo va matistadarūpatro nanu samāṇam ॥ 299 ॥ (1847)

Rūpitve sa deho vācyastatspandano punar hetuh ।
Pratinīyataparispandanamacetanānām nāpi yuktam ॥300॥(1848)]

Trans—299-300 It may be (your opinion) that the effort (on the part of Soul) may be the cause of bodily movements (But) even that is not (possible) in case of motionless (Soul) Or, (it may be believed that) the *hetu* is invisible and resembles it in formlessness (If it is said that) by reason of form it is called *deha*, there should certainly be (some) reason behind (its) movement But the regular movement of lifeless (objects) is not justified (1847-1848)

टीका-अथैवं रूपे-देहपरिस्पन्दहेतुरात्मनः प्रयत्नो न तु क्रिया, अतो नात्मनः सक्रियत्वसिद्धिरित्यभिप्रायः । अत्रोत्तरमाह-सोऽपि प्रयत्नो न भसीवाक्रिय आत्मनि न संभवति, अतः सक्रिय एवासौ । अमूर्तस्य च प्रयत्नस्य देहपरिस्पन्दहेतुत्वे कोऽन्यो हेतुरिति वाच्यम् ? । अन्यहेतु निरपेक्षः स्वत एवायं परिस्पन्दहेतुरिति चेत् । यद्येवम्, आत्मापि तद्वेतुर्म-विष्यति, किमन्तर्गडुना प्रयत्नेन ? । अथादृष्टः कोऽपि देहपरिस्पन्दहेतुः, न त्वात्मा, निष्क्रियत्वात् । ननु सोऽप्यदृष्टः किं मूर्तः, अमूर्तो वा ? । यद्य-मूर्तः, तर्ह्यात्मापि देहपरिस्पन्दहेतुः किं नेष्यते, अमूर्तत्वाविशेषात् ? । अथ-मूर्तिमानदृष्टः, तर्हि स कर्मणशरीरलक्षणो देह एव, नान्यः संभवति । तस्यापि च बहिर्दृश्यदेहपरिस्पन्दहेतुतया व्याप्रियमाणस्य परिस्पन्दो द्रष्टव्यः, तस्य चान्यो हेतुर्वाच्यः, तस्यापि चान्यः, तस्यापि चान्यः, तस्यापि चान्य इत्यनवस्था । अथ स्वभावादेवादृष्टस्य कर्मणदेहस्य परिस्पन्दः प्रवर्तते, तर्हि बहिर्दृश्यस्यापि देहस्य तत एव तत्प्रवृत्तिर्भविष्यति, किमदृष्टकर्मणदेहपरि-कल्पनेन ? । अस्त्वेवमिति चेत् । तदयुक्तम्, अचेतनानामेवंभूतप्रतिनियत-विशिष्टपरिस्पन्दनस्य स्वाभाविकत्वानुपपत्तेः, “ नित्यं सच्चमसत्त्वं वा हेतो-रन्यानपेक्षणात् ” इत्यादिदोषप्रसङ्गात् । तस्मात् कर्मविशिष्ट आत्मैव प्रतिनिय-तदेहपरिस्पन्दनहेतुत्वेन व्याप्रियत इति सक्रियोऽसाविति ॥ २९९-३०० ॥
(१८४७-१८४८) ॥

D. C —Mandaka —The *hetu* for movements of a body is the

Kartrāditrato va sakriyo'yam mataḥ kulala iva ।

Dehaspandanato va pratyakṣam yantrapuruṣa iva ॥ 298 ॥ (1846)]

Trans—298 Like a potter it is believed as active on account of its being an agent etc or (it is active) like a mechanical person on account of the directly perceptible movement of (its) body (1846)

टीका—अथवा, सक्रियोऽपमात्मा, कर्तृत्वात्, कुलालवत् । आदिष्व
ब्दाद् “ मोक्तृत्वात् ” इति वान्यम् । अथवा, सक्रिय आत्मा पश्यत
एव देहपरिस्पन्ददर्शनात्, यन्त्रपुरुषवदिति ॥ २९८ ॥ (१८४६) ॥

D C—The Soul could be taken as *sakriya* as a potter
on account of its *kartrtva* and *bhoktrtva*. Or it is *sakriya* like
a *yantra-puruṣa* on account of the *pratyakṣa* movements of
its body ॥ 298 ॥ (1846)]

देहपफदणहेऊ होज्ज पयत्तो सि सो वि नाकिरिण् ।

होज्जादिट्ठो व मई तदक्खत्ते नणु समाण ॥ २९९ ॥ (१८४७)

रूपिचम्मि स देहो वक्खो तप्फदणे पुणो हेऊ ।

पइनिययपरिप्फदणमचेयणाणं न वि य जुत्त ॥३००॥(१८४८)

Dehapphandanaheū hojja payatto ti so vi nākiriṇi ।

Hojjādīttho va mai tadarūvalte nanu samāṇam ॥ 299 ॥ (1847)

Rūpittammī sa deho vacco tapphandane puṇo heū ।

Painiyayaparippbandanamaceyanāṇam na vi ya juttam ॥ 300 ॥

[देहस्पन्दनहेतुर्मवेत् प्रयत्न इति सोऽपि नाक्रिये ।

मवेददृष्टो वा मतिस्त्वरूपत्वे ननु समानम् ॥ २९९ ॥ (१८४७)

रूपित्वे स देहो वाच्यस्तस्पन्दने पुनर्हेतुः ।

प्रतिनियतपरिस्पन्दनमचेतनानां नापि युक्तम् ॥ ३०० ॥ (१८४८)

Dehaspandanahetur bhavot prayatna tu so pi nakriye ।

Bhavedadrīṣṭo va matatadarūpatve nanu samāṇam ॥299॥ (1847)

Rūpitve sa deho vācyastatspandane punar hetuḥ ।
Pratītyataparispandanamacetanānām nāpi yuktam ॥300॥(1848)]

Trans.—299-300 It may be (your opinion) that the effort (on the part of Soul) may be the cause of bodily movements (But) even that is not (possible) in case of motionless (Soul) Or, (it may be believed that) the *hetu* is invisible and resembles it in formlessness (If it is said that) by reason of form it is called *deha*, there should certainly be (some) reason behind (its) movement But the regular movement of lifeless (objects) is not justified (1847-1848)

टीका—अथैवं द्रुपे—देहपरिस्पन्दहेतुरात्मनः प्रयत्नो न तु क्रिया, अतो नात्मनः सक्रियत्वसिद्धिरित्यभिप्रायः । अत्रोत्तरमाह—सोऽपि प्रयत्नो नभसीवाक्रिय आत्मनि न संभवति, अतः सक्रिय एवासौ । अमूर्तस्य च प्रयत्नस्य देहपरिस्पन्दहेतुत्वे कोऽन्यो हेतुरिति वाच्यम् ? । अन्यहेतु निरपेक्षः स्वत एवायं परिस्पन्दहेतुरिति चेत् । यद्येवम्, आत्मापि तद्वेतुर्भविष्यति, किमन्तर्गडुना प्रयत्नेन ? । अथादृष्टः कोऽपि देहपरिस्पन्दहेतुः, न त्वात्मा, निष्क्रियत्वात् । ननु सोऽप्यदृष्टः किं मूर्तः, अमूर्तो वा ? । यद्यमूर्तः, तर्ह्यात्मापि देहपरिस्पन्दहेतुः किं नेष्यते, अमूर्तत्वाविशेषात् ? । अथमूर्तिमानदृष्टः, तर्हि स कर्मणशरीरलक्षणो देह एव, नान्यः संभवति । तस्यापि च बहिर्दृश्यदेहपरिस्पन्दहेतुतया व्याप्रियमाणस्य परिस्पन्दो द्रष्टव्यः, तस्य चान्यो हेतुर्वाच्यः, तस्यापि चान्यः, तस्यापि चान्यः, तस्यापि चान्य इत्यनवस्था । अथ स्वभावादेवादृष्टस्य कर्मणदेहस्य परिस्पन्दः प्रवर्तते, तर्हि बहिर्दृश्यस्यापि देहस्य तत एव तत्प्रवृत्तिर्भविष्यति, किमदृष्टकर्मणदेहपरिकल्पनेन ? । अस्तुवेवमिति चेत् । तदयुक्तम्, अचेतनानामेवंभूतप्रतिनियतविशिष्टपरिस्पन्दनस्य स्वाभाविकत्वानुपपत्तेः, “ नित्यं सत्त्वमसत्त्वं वा हेतोरन्यानपेक्षणात् ” इत्यादिदोषप्रसङ्गात् । तस्मात् कर्मविशिष्ट आत्मैव प्रतिनियतदेहपरिस्पन्दनहेतुत्वेन व्याप्रियत इति सक्रियोऽसाविति ॥ २९९-३०० ॥ (१८४७-१८४८) ॥

D. C — *Maṇḍika* — The *hetu* for movements of a body is the

effort (on the part) of Soul and not the *kriya*. It is therefore not proper to take *atma* to be *sakriya*.

Bhagavān.—If the *atmā* is *niskriya*, the effort cannot exist into it and hence it is undoubtedly *sakriya*. What other *hetu* is to be understood in accepting the *a-mūrta* effort as a *hetu* for bodily movements ? If it is said that without the *apekṣa* of another *hetu* this effort itself becomes the *hetu* in the *deha-spaṇḍa* the Soul will also be called the *hetu* of these bodily movements. What is the use of intervening *prayatna* in such a case ?

Mandūkya.—There is some invisible *hetu* in the movements of *deha* but *atma* being *niskriya* cannot act as *hetu* in those movements.

Bhagavān.—Is that invisible (*hetu*) *mūrta* or *a-mūrta* ? If *a-mūrta* why not take *atmā* as *hetu* in the *deha parispanda* since it is also *a-mūrta* ? And if that *a-dṛiṣṭa* is *mūrta* it is nothing but *kārmāṇa sārīra*. Now if that *kārmāṇa sārīra* is used as the *hetu* of *bāhya sārīra* there must be some other *hetu* for the *parispandana* of the above-mentioned *kārmāṇa sārīra*. This in turn will have a third *hetu* for its *parispanda* and that a fourth one and so on until ultimately there is complete disorder. Again if it is argued at this stage that the movement of an *adrīṣṭa kārmāṇa sārīra* is caused by no other *hetu* than its own *svabhāva* so that there may not be any sort of *anavasthā* then *parispanda* of *bāhya sārīras* will also be caused by *svabhāva* so that there may not be any sense in assuming the *adrīṣṭa kārmāṇa sārīra*.

Mandūkya.—I don't mind if the *parispanda* is taken to have been caused by *svabhāva*.

Bhagavān.—But it is not reasonable to believe like that. The definite type of the *parispanda* like this is never possible in case of *acētana* objects because that which is independent of any other *hetu* is either everlasting or absolutely transitory.

The only alternative to accept, therefore, is that *ātmā* which is distinguished by *karma* is the *hetu* of *dehāparispanda* and hence *sakṛitya* also. || 299-300 || (1847-1848)]

होउ किरिया भवत्थस्स कम्मरहियस्स किंनिमित्ता सा ? ।

नणु तग्गइपरिणामा जह सिद्धत्तं तहा सा वि ॥३०१॥ (१८४९)

Hou kiriyā bhavaṭṭhassa kammarahiyassa kimnimitṭā sā ? ।

Nanu taggaiparināmā jaha siddhattam taha sā vi ॥301॥ (1849)

[भवतु क्रिया भवस्थस्य कर्मरहितस्य किंनिमित्ता सा ?

ननु तद्वृत्तिपरिणामाद् यथा सिद्धत्वं तथा सापि ॥ ३०१ ॥ (१८४९)

Bhavatu kriyā bhavasthasya karmarahitasya kimnimitṭā sā ?

Nanu tadgatiparināmad yathā siddhatvam tathā sāpi ॥301॥ (1849)]

Trans—301 Alright ! “ How is the action of the *mundane* (Soul) separated from *Karma* to be accounted for ? ” “ Certainly from their *parināma* Just as perfection is attributed to it, in the same way, activity is also attributed to it ” (1849)

किं सिद्धालयपरओ न गई, धम्मत्थिकायविरहाओ ।

सो गइउवग्गहकरो लोगम्मि जमत्थि नालोए ॥३०२॥ (१८५०)

Kim siddhālayaparao na gai, dhammatthikāyavirahāo ।

So gauvaggahakaro logammi jamatthi nālōe ॥ 302 ॥ (1850)

[किं सिद्धालयपरतो न गतिः, धर्मास्तिकायविरहाद् ।

स गत्युपग्रहकारो लोके यदस्ति नालोके ॥ ३०२ ॥ (१८५०)

Kim siddhālayaparato na gatiḥ, dharmastikāyavirahāt ।

Sa gatyupagrahakāro loke yadasti nāloke ॥ 302 ॥ (1850)]

Trans—302 Why not the movement (of Soul) (to extend) beyond *Siddhālaya* ? Because, of the absence of the predicament of *dharmāstikāya* That being the impeller of motion resides in this world, and not in the spiritual world (1850)

effort (on the part) of Soul and not the *līya*. It is therefore not proper to take *atma* to be *sakriya*.

Bhagavān.—If the *atmā* is *niskriya*, the effort cannot exist into it and hence it is undoubtedly *sakriya*. What other *hetu* is to be understood in accepting the *a-mūṛta* effort as a *hetu* for bodily movements? If it is said that without the *apeksa* of another *hetu* this effort itself becomes the *hetu* in the *deha-spanda* the Soul will also be called the *hetu* of these bodily movements. What is the use of intervening *prayatna* in such a case?

Maṇḍika.—There is some invisible *hetu* in the movements of *deha* but *atma* being *niskriya* cannot act as *hetu* in those movements.

Bhagavān.—Is that invisible (*hetu*) *mūṛta* or *a-mūṛta*? If *a-mūṛta* why not take *atma* as *hetu* in the *deha-parispanda* since it is also *a-mūṛta*? And if that *a-dṛṣṭa* is *mūṛta* it is nothing but *lāṁṁana-sarīra*. Now if that *kārmāṇa-sarīra* is used as the *hetu* of *bāhya-sarīra* there must be some other *hetu* for the *parispandana* of the above-mentioned *lāṁṁana-sarīra*. This in turn will have a third *hetu* for its *parispanda* and that a fourth one and so on until ultimately there is complete disorder. Again if it is argued at this stage that the movement of an *adrīṣṭa-lāṁṁana-sarīra* is caused by no other *hetu* than its own *svabhāva* so that there may not be any sort of *anavastha* then *parispanda* of *bāhya-sarīras* will also be caused by *svabhāva* so that there may not be any sense in assuming the *adrīṣṭa-lāṁṁana-sarīra*.

Maṇḍika.—I don't mind if the *parispanda* is taken to have been caused by *svabhāva*.

Bhagavān.—But it is not reasonable to believe like that. The definite type of the *parispanda* like this is never possible in case of *acētana* objects because that which is independent of any other *hetu* is either everlasting or absolutely transitory

Trans—303 As *ghata* has *a-ghata* (as its opposite) *loka* also has its opposite, because of its etymological distinction. The view that it is nothing but *ghata* etc, is (also) not (acceptable) (For), by means of negation (something) of its own kind (is understood) (1851)

टीका—अस्ति लोकस्य विपक्षः, व्युत्पत्तिमच्छुद्धपदाभिधेयत्वात्, इह यद् व्युत्पत्तिमत्ता शुद्धपदेनाभिधीयते तस्य विपक्षो दृष्टः, यथा घटस्या-घटः, यश्च लोकस्य विपक्षः सोऽलोकः । अथ स्यान्मतिः—“ न लोकोऽलोकः ” इति यो लोकस्य विपक्षः स घटादिपदार्थानामन्यतम एव भविष्यति, किमिह वस्त्वन्तरपरिकल्पनया ? । तदेतद् न, पर्युदासनवा निषेधात् निषेध्यस्यैवानुरूपोऽत्र विपक्षोऽन्यवेषणीयः, “ न लोकोऽलोकः ” इत्यत्र लोको निषेध्यः, स चाकाशविषयः, अतोऽलोकेनाऽपि तदनुरूपेण भवितव्यम्, यथा “ इहापण्डितः ”, इत्युक्ते विशिष्टज्ञानविकलश्चेतन एव पुरुषविशेषो गम्यते, नाचेतनो घटादिः, एवमिहापि लोकानुरूप एवालोको मन्तव्यः । उक्तं च—

“ नञ्युक्तमिवयुक्तं वा यद्धि कार्यं विधीयते ।

तुल्याधिकरणेऽन्यस्मिंल्लोकेऽप्यर्थगतिस्तथा ॥ १ ॥

“ नञ्-इवयुक्तमन्यसदृशाधिकरणे तथा ह्यर्थगति । ” तस्माल्लोकविपक्षत्वाद-स्त्यलोक इति ॥ ३०३ ॥ (१८५१)

D C—From the point of view of etymology, just as *ghata* has its opposite (word) *a-ghata*, *loka* must also have its opposite word *a-loka*. It is not justifiable to assume that *a-loka* is also the opposite of *ghata*, *pata* etc. By means of *niśedha* something of its own kind is understood. Just as by the word *a-pandita* a living person having no scholarship is meant but not the inanimate objects like *ghata* and *pata*, so here also, by the *niśedha* of *loka*, nothing but *a-loka* should be understood. And it has also been said that.

Nanyuktamiva yuktam vā yaddhi karyam vidhiyate ।

Tulyādhikarane' nyasminlloke'pyarthagatis tathā

टीका—यद्युक्तन्यायेन मुक्तस्य गतिक्रियया सक्रियत्वमियप्ते, तर्हि सिद्धा-
लयात् सिद्धावस्थितिश्चेत्तात् परतोऽल्लोकेऽपि किमिति तस्य गतिर्न प्रवर्तते ? ।
अत्रोच्यते—परतो धर्मास्तिकायविरहात् । तद्विरहोऽपि कुतः ? इत्याह—यव
यस्मादसौ धर्मास्तिकाया लोके एव समस्ति, नालोके । मा भूदसावल्लोके,
किं तेन प्रस्तुतानुपयोगिना कर्तव्यम्, तद्विरहोऽपि मबहु मुक्तस्य तत्र गतिः,
नियमामावात् ? । तदयुक्तम्, यतो जीधानां पुद्गलानां च मतेर्गमनस्योपग्रह
उपष्टम्भस्तत्कारी स एव धर्मास्तिकायो नान्यः, तवस्तस्याल्लोकेऽभावात्
कथं लाक्षात् परतोऽल्लोकेऽपि मुक्तात्मनां गतिः प्रवर्तते ? इति ॥ ३०२ ॥ (१८५०)

D O—Mandika —If *muktatma* were *sakriya* by virtue of
its movement why should it not move beyond *Siddhalaya* also ?

Bhagavan —It cannot move beyond *Siddhalaya* because
// *anastilaya* or the predicament of motion does not exist in
the *a-lola*

Mandika —What of that ? Even if *dharmastikaya* does
not exist in the *aloka multama* can succeed to it without
dharmastikāya.

Bhagavān —That is not possible *O Mandika* It is the
predicament of motion that impels *muktatma* to move Hence
if *dharmastikaya* does not exist in the *aloka multatma* is
unable to move towards it § 302 (1850)

लोगस्स त्थि विवक्खो सुद्धत्तणओ घढस्स अघढो व ।
स घढाहं खिय मई न निसेहाओ तदणुरूपो ॥ ३०३ ॥ (१८५१)

Logassa tthi vivakkho suddhattanao ghadassa a-ghaḍo vva ।
Sa ghaḍā cciya maī na nisehāo tadanurūpo § 303 § (1851)

[लोकास्यास्ति विपक्षः भूदस्वतो षटस्याषट इव ।

स षटादिरेव मतिर्न निषेधात् तदनु रूपः ॥ ३०३ ॥ (१८५१)

Lokasyāsti vipakṣaḥ śuddhatvato ṣaṭasyaṣṭa iva ।
Sa ṣaṭadireva matir na nīśedhat tadanurūpaḥ § 303 § (1851)]

विशेषः स्यात् ? । तस्माद् यत्र क्षेत्रे धर्मा-धर्मास्तिकायौ वर्तेते, तल्लोकः, शेषं त्वलोक इति लोका-लोकव्यवस्थाकारिणौ धर्मा-धर्मास्तिकायौ विद्येते इति । “ लोकेत्यादि ” यदि हि धर्मा-धर्माभ्यां लोकविभागो न स्यात्, ततो लोकविभागाभावेऽविशिष्ट एव सर्वस्मिन्नप्याकाशे गति-परिणतानां जीवानां पुद्गलानां च प्रतिघाताभावेन् तद्रत्यवस्थानाभावा-दलोकेऽपि गमनात्, तस्य चानन्तत्वात् तेषां परस्परं संवन्धो न स्यात् । ततश्चौदारिकादिकार्षणवर्गणापर्यन्तपुद्गलकृतो जीवानां बन्ध-मोक्ष-सुख-दुःख-भवसंस्तरणादिव्यवहारो न स्यात् । जीवस्य च जीवेन सहान्योन्यमी-लनाभावात् तत्कृतोऽनुपग्रहो-पघातादिव्यवहारो न स्यादिति ॥३०४-३०५॥ (१८५२-१८५३) ॥

D C—When the existence of *a-loka* is accepted, the existence of the predicaments of motion and rest are also accepted to exist. Otherwise, *ākāśa* being common everywhere *loka* and *a-loka* will not be distinguished from each other. Thus, wherever the predicaments of *dharma* and *a-dharma* exist there is *loka*, and the rest is called *a-loka*. If there were no distinction between *loka* and *a-loka* by means of *dharma* and *a-dharma*, *pratighāta* of various *jīvas* and *puḍgalas* in this world, will not be possible. Consequently, there will be no scope for *gati* and *avasthāna* to lead them to *a-loka*. *Jīvas* and *puḍgalas* will then become *ananta*, there will be nothing like mutual relation between them, and the attributes of *bandha* and *mokṣa* will also be no longer existing between them ॥ 304-305 ॥ (1852-1853)]

निरणुगहत्तणाओ न गई परओ जलादिव झसस्स ।

जो गमणाणुगहिया सो धम्मो लोगपरिमाणो ॥३०६॥ (१८५४)

Niranuggahattanāo na gai parao jalādiva jhasassa ।

Jo gamanānuggahiyā so dhammo logaparimāno ॥ 306 ॥ (1854)

[निरनुग्रहत्वाद् न गतिः परतो जलादिव झपस्य ।

यो गमनानुग्रहीता स धर्मो लोकपरिमाणः ॥ ३०६ ॥ (१८५४)

So, a-loka alone is the vipāka of loka # 303 # (1851)

तम्हा धम्मा-ऽधम्मा लोयपरिच्छेयकारिणो जुत्ता ।

इहरागासे तुल्ले लोगोऽलोगो ति को भेओ ? ॥ ३०४ ॥ (१८५२)

लोगविभागामावे पढिघायाभावओऽणवस्थाओ ।

सववहाराभावो संबधामावओ होज्जा ॥ ३०५ ॥ (१८५३)

Tambā dhammā dhammā loyapariccheyakārino juttā ।

Iharāgāse tulle logo logo ti ko bheo ? # 304 # (1852)

Logavibhāgābhāve padighāyābhāvao navatthāo ।

Samvavahārābhāvo sambandhābhāvao hojjā # 305 # (1853)

[तस्माद् धर्मा-धर्मा लोकापरिच्छेदकारिणौ युक्तौ ।

इतरथाकाशे तुल्ये लोकोऽलोक इति को भेदः ? ॥ ३०४ ॥ (१८५२)

लोकाविभागामावे प्रतिघाताभावतोऽनवस्थातः ।

संन्यवहाराभावः संबधामावतो भवेत् ॥ ३०५ ॥ (१८५३)

Tasmad dharma-dharmau lokapariccheda karinau yuktau ।

Itarathakāśe tulye lokoloka it ko bhedaḥ ! # 304 # (1852)

Lokavibhāgābhāve pratighatābhāvato navasthataḥ ।

Samvavahārābhāvaḥ sambandhābhāvato bhavet #305#(1853)]

Trans — 304-305 Thus (predicaments of) motion and rest are employed as the causes of destruction of loka. Otherwise, when the sky is common (everywhere) how are loka and a-loka, (to be) distinguished ? In absence of the divisions of loka there will be no reaction and hence no (scope for) stability- so also there will be scope for mutual relation as there will be no connection (between them (1852-1853)

टीका-यस्मादुक्तप्रकारेणास्त्यलोका, तस्मादलोकास्तित्वादेवावश्यं
लोकापरिच्छेदकारिण्यां धर्मा-धर्मास्तिकायाम्यां भवितव्यम्; अन्यथाऽऽ
काशे सामान्ये सति “ अयं लोकः ” “ अयं चालोकः ” इति किञ्चित्तोऽयं

विशेषः स्यात् ? । तस्माद् यत्र क्षेत्रे धर्मा-ऽधर्मास्तिकायौ वर्तेते, तल्लोकः, शेषं त्वलोक इति लोका-ऽलोकव्यवस्थाकारिणौ धर्मा-ऽधर्मास्तिकायौ विद्येते इति । “ लोकेत्यादि ” यदि हि धर्मा-ऽधर्माभ्यां लोकविभागो न स्यात्, ततो लोकविभागाभावेऽविशिष्ट एव सर्वस्मिन्नप्याकाशे गति-परिणतानां जीवानां पुद्गलानां च प्रतिघाताभावेन् तद्गत्यवस्थानाभावा-दलोकेऽपि गमनात्, तस्य चानन्तत्वात् तेषां परस्परं संबन्धो न स्यात् । ततश्चौदारिकादिकार्मणवर्गणार्थन्तपुद्गलकृतो जीवानां बन्ध-मोक्ष-सुख-दुःख-भवसंसरणादिव्यवहारो न स्यात् । जीवस्य च जीवेन सहान्योन्यमी-लनाभावात् तत्कृतोऽनुपग्रहो-पघातादिव्यवहारो न स्यादिति ॥ ३०४-३०५ ॥ (१८५२-१८५३) ॥

D C—When the existence of *a-loka* is accepted, the existence of the predicaments of motion and rest are also accepted to exist. Otherwise, *ākāśa* being common everywhere *loka* and *a-loka* will not be distinguished from each other. Thus, wherever the predicaments of *dharma* and *a-dharma* exist there is *loka*, and the rest is called *a-loka*. If there were no distinction between *loka* and *a-loka* by means of *dharma* and *a-dharma*, *pratighāta* of various *jīvas* and *pudgalas* in this world, will not be possible. Consequently, there will be no scope for *gati* and *avasthāna* to lead them to *a-loka*. *Jīvas* and *pudgalas* will then become *ananta*, there will be nothing like mutual relation between them, and the attributes of *bandha* and *mokṣa* will also be no longer existing between them ॥ 304-305 ॥ (1852-1853)]

निरणुगहत्तणाओ न गई परओ जलादिव झसस्स ।

जो गमणाणुगहिआ सो धम्मो लोगपरिमाणो ॥ ३०६ ॥ (१८५४)

Niranuggahattanāo na gāi parao jalādiva jhasassa ।

Jo gamanānuggahiyā so dhammo logaparimāno ॥ 306 ॥ (1854)

[निरनुग्रहत्वाद् न गतिः परतो जलादिव झषस्य ।

यो गमनानुग्रहीता स धर्मो लोकपरिमाणः ॥ ३०६ ॥ (१८५४)

Niranugrahatvad na gatiḥ parato jalādīva jhāmya ।

Yo gamānanugrahitā an dharmo loka-parimāṇah ॥306॥ (1854)]

Trans—306 Just as the activity of fish does not extend beyond water (their) movement also does not extend beyond (*loka*) The predicament of *dharmūstikāya* which is favourable to (their) movement becomes the only measuring unit of *loka*. (1854).

टीका—उतो लोकात् परतोऽलोके जीव-पुद्गलानां न गतिः, निरनुग्रहात्—उत्र गत्यनुग्रहकर्तृभावादित्यर्थः, यथा जलात् परतो जलस्य मत्स्यस्य गतिर्न भवति, उपग्राहकाभावादिति । यथात्र जीव-पुद्गलगतेषु ग्रहकर्ता स लोकपरिमाणो धर्मास्त्विकाय इति ॥ ३०६ ॥ (१८५४) ॥

D O—Just as fish cannot move out of water as there will be no *upagrāhaka* of their movement so also *jīvas* and *pudgals* will have no access to the *a-loka* as *a-loka* is not favourable to their movement. It is predicament of *dharmūstikāya* which acts as the *upagrāhaka* of the movements of *jīvas* and *pudgals* that measures the worth of *loka* ॥ 306 ॥ (1854)]

अस्थि परिमाणकारी लोगस्त प्रमेयभावोऽवस्त ।

नाण पिव नेयस्तालोगस्थिते य सोऽवस्त ॥ ३०७ ॥ (१८५५)

Atthi parimāṇakārī logassa pameyabhāvo vassam ।

Nānam piva neyassālogtthitte ya so vassam ॥ 307 ॥ (1855)

[अस्ति परिमाणकारी लोकस्य प्रमेयभावोऽवश्यम् ।

ज्ञानमिव नेयस्यालोकस्थिते य सोऽवश्यम् ॥ ३०७ ॥ (१८५५)

Asti parimāṇakārī lokasya prameyabhāvato vāśyam ।

Jñānamiva jneyasyālokaśtithre ca so vāśyam ॥ 307 ॥ (1855)]

Trans—307 Just as *jñāna* measures the *jñeya* similarly in the midst of (the existence of) *a-loka* it (i.e. *dharmūstikāya*) also act* undoubtedly as the measuring unit of *loka* on account of its finiteness (1855)

टीका—अस्ति लोकस्य परिमाणकारी, प्रमेयत्वात्, ज्ञानमिव ज्ञेयस्य । अथवा, जीवाः पुद्गलाश्च लोकोऽभिधीयते, ततोऽस्ति तत्परिमाणकारी, प्रमेयत्वात्, यथा शाल्यादीनां प्रस्थः, यश्चेह परिमाता स धर्मास्तिकायः, स चावश्यमलोकस्यास्तित्व एव युज्यते, नान्यथा, आकाशस्य सर्वत्राविशिष्टत्वात् । तस्माल्लोकाग्रे सिद्धस्यावस्थानमिति प्रस्तुतम् ॥ ३०७ ॥ (१८५५)

D C—Since *loka* is susceptible to measure, it must have some sort of measuring unit like *jñāna*, which is the measuring unit of the *jñeya*. The measuring unit of *loka* is *dharmaśatikāya* or the predicament of motion which exists only if *loka* exists, and not otherwise. So, in the midst of *loka*, the *avasthāna* of *Siddha* or *muktātma* must necessarily be accepted ॥307॥ (1855)]

पयणं पसत्तमेवं थाणाओ तं च नो जओ छट्ठी ।

इह कत्तिलक्खणेयं कत्तुरणत्थंतरं थाणं ॥ ३०८ ॥ (१८५६)

Payanam pasattamevam thānāo tam ca no jao chatthī ।

Iha kattilakkaneyam katuranatthantaram thānam ॥ 308 ॥ (1856)

[पतनं प्रसक्तमेवं स्थानात् तच्च नो यतः पष्ठी ।

इह कर्त्तलक्षणेयं कर्त्तरनर्थान्तरं स्थानम् ॥ ३०८ ॥ (१८५६)

Patanam prasaktamevam sthānat tacca no yatah sasthī ।

Iha karṭṭilaksaneyam karturanarthāntaram sthānam ॥308॥(1856)]

Trans—308 “ Falling from (a fixed) position is thus attributed (to it) ” It is not so on account of the genitive case which is here used in the sense of Nominative Location is not different from subject in this case ” (1856)

टीका—ननु “ स्थीयतेऽस्मिन्निति स्थानम् ” इत्यधिकरणसाधनोऽयं शब्दः । ततश्च सिद्धस्य स्थानं सिद्धस्थानमिति समासः । ततश्चैवं सति सिद्धस्य पतनं प्रसक्तम्, स्थानात्, पर्वत-पादपाद्यग्रस्थितदेवदत्तस्येव, फलस्येव वा । यस्य किल क्वापि पर्वतादाववस्थानं, तस्य कदाचित् कस्यापि पतनमपि दृश्यते; अतः सिद्धस्यापि तत् कदाचित् प्राप्नोतीति भावः । तच्च न, यतः

Niranugrahatvad na gatih parato jaladiva jhasasya ।

Yo gamananugrahitā sa dharmo loka-parimāṇah ॥306॥ (1854)]

Trans—306 Just as the activity of fish does not extend beyond water (their) movement also does not extend beyond (*loka*) The predicament of *dharmāstikāya* which is favourable to (their) movement becomes the only measuring unit of *loka*. (1854)

टीका—तस्यो लोकात् परतोऽलोके जीव-पुद्गलानां न गतिः, निरु-
ग्रहत्वात्—तत्र गत्यनुग्रहकर्तुरभावादित्यर्थः, यथा जलात् परतो जलस्य
मत्स्यस्य गतिर्न भवति, उपग्राहकाभावादिति । यस्मात् जीव-पुद्गलगतस्तु
ग्रहकर्ता स लोकपरिमाणो धर्मास्तिकाय इति ॥ ३०६ ॥ (१८५४) ॥

D C—Just as fish cannot move out of water as there
will be no *upagrāhaka* of their movement so also *jīvas* and
*pudgala*s will have no access to the *a-loka* as *a-loka* is not
favourable to their movement. It is predicament of *dharmāstikāya*
which acts as the *upagrāhaka* of the movements of *jīvas* and
*pudgala*s that measures the worth of *loka* ॥ 306 ॥ (1854)]

अस्ति परिमाणकारी लोगस्त प्रमेयभावोऽवस्त ।

नाण पिव नेयस्तालोगस्थिते य सोऽवस्त ॥ ३०७ ॥ (१८५५)

Atthi parimāṇakārī logassa pameyabhāvo vassam ।

Nāṇam piva neyassālogatthitte ya so vassam ॥ 307 ॥ (1855)

[अस्ति परिमाणकारी लोकस्य प्रमेयभावोऽवश्यम् ।

ज्ञानमिव ज्ञेयस्यालोकस्थिते च सोऽवश्यम् ॥ ३०७ ॥ (१८५५)

Atthi parimāṇakārī lokasya pameyabhāvato vāṇyam ।

Jñānamiva jñeyasyālokatthitte ca so vāṇyam ॥ 307 ॥ (1855)]

Trans—307 Just as *jñāna* measures the *jñeya* similarly
in the midst of (the existence of) *a loka* ॥ (*i e dharmāstikāya*)
also acts undoubtedly as the measuring unit of *loka* on account
of its finiteness (1855)

टीका—अस्ति लोकस्य परिमाणकारी, प्रमेयत्वात्, ज्ञानमिव ज्ञेयस्य । अथवा, जीवाः पुद्गलाश्च लोकोऽभिधीयते, ततोऽस्ति तत्परिमाणकारी, प्रमेयत्वात्, यथा शाल्यादीनां प्रस्थः, यश्चेह परिमाता स धर्मास्तिकायः, स चावश्यमलोकस्यास्तित्व एव युज्यते, नान्यथा, आकाशस्य सर्वत्राविशिष्टत्वात् । तस्माल्लोकाग्रे सिद्धस्यावस्थानमिति प्रस्तुतम् ॥ ३०७ ॥ (१८५५)

D. C—Since *loka* is susceptible to measure, it must have some sort of measuring unit like *jñāna*, which is the measuring unit of the *jñeya*. The measuring unit of *loka* is *dharmaśtikāya* or the predicament of motion which exists only if *loka* exists, and not otherwise. So, in the midst of *loka*, the *avasthāna* of *Siddha* or *muktātmā* must necessarily be accepted ॥307॥ (1855)

पयणं पसत्तमेवं थाणाओ तं च नो जओ छट्ठी ।

इह कत्तिलक्खणेयं कत्तुरणत्थंतं थाणं ॥ ३०८ ॥ (१८५६)

Payanam pasattamevam thānāo taṁ ca no jao chatthī ।

Iha kattilakkaneyam katturanatthantaram thānam ॥ 308 ॥ (1856)

[पतनं प्रसक्तमेवं स्थानात् तच्च नो यतः षष्ठी ।

इह कर्त्तृलक्षणेयं कर्त्तरनर्थान्तरं स्थानम् ॥ ३०८ ॥ (१८५६)

Patanam prasaktamevam sthānāt tacca no yataḥ sasthī ।

Iha kartṛlaksaneyam karturanarthantaram sthānam ॥308॥(1856)]

Trans—308 “ Falling from (a fixed) position is thus attributed (to it) ” It is not so on account of the genitive case which is here used in the sense of Nominative Location is not different from subject in this case ” (1856)

टीका—ननु “ स्थीयतेऽस्मिन्निति स्थानम् ” इत्यधिकरणसाधनोऽयं शब्दः । ततश्च सिद्धस्य स्थानं सिद्धस्थानमिति समासः । ततश्चैवं सति सिद्धस्य पतनं प्रसक्तम्, स्थानात्, पर्वत-पादपाद्यग्रस्थितदेवदत्तस्येव, फलस्येव वा । यस्य किल क्वापि पर्वतादाववस्थानं, तस्य कदाचित् कस्यापि पतनमपि दृश्यते; अतः सिद्धस्यापि तत् कदाचित् प्राप्नोतीति भावः । तच्च न, यतः

“सिद्धस्य स्थानम्” इतीयं कर्तरिपठि । तत्र “सिद्धस्य स्थानम्” इति कोऽर्थः ?—सिद्धस्तिष्ठति, न तु तदयान्तरभूतस्थानमस्तीति ॥ ३०८ ॥ (१८५६) ॥

D C—Mandika.—*Sthāna* means place of location. So when the place of location of a *siddha* being is accepted as existing the characteristic of falling from that place should also be attributed to it as in the case of *Devadatta* or a fruit falling from the summit of a mountain or tree as the case may be. Everything is bound to fall from the place of its location and *siddha* is no exception to it.

Bhagavān.—It is not so. The phrase “*Siddhasya sthānam*” shows that the word “*Siddha*” is in the Genitive case used in the Nominative sense “*Siddhasya sthānam*” means, therefore the place where *Siddha* resides but it is not different from *Siddha* ॥ 308 ॥ (1856)

Or

नहनिच्चत्तणओ वा थाणविणासपयाण न जुत्त से ।
तह कम्मभावाओ पुणक्कियाभावओ वा वि ॥ ३०९ ॥ (१८५७)

Nahaniccatthāno vā thānavināsapayāṇam na juttam se ।
Taha kammābhāvo puṇakkīyābhāvo vā vi ॥ 309 ॥ (1857)

[नमोनित्यस्वतो वा स्थानविनाशपतनं न युक्तं तस्य ।

तथा कर्माभावात् पुनः क्रियामागतो वापि ॥ ३०९ ॥ (१८५७)

Nabbonityatvato vā sthānavināsapatanam na yuktam tasya ।
Tathā karmābhavat puṇah kriyābhavato vāpi ॥ 309 ॥ (1857)]

Trans.—309 Neither destruction nor its falling from the place of its location is possible on account of its being *nitya* like *ākāśa*, as well as, due to the absence of *kriyā* or even for want of *Karma*. (1857)

टीका—अयान्तरत्वेऽपि स्थानस्य न पतनं सिद्धस्य, यतोऽप्ययान्तरं

स्थानं नभ एव, तस्य च नित्यत्वाद् विनाशो न युक्तः, तदभावे च कुतः पतनं मुक्तस्य ? । कर्म चात्मनः पतनादिक्रियाकारणम्, मुक्तस्य च कर्माभावात् कुतः पतनक्रिया ? । या च समयमेकमस्याप्यूर्ध्वं गतिक्रिया, तस्याः कारणं “लाउ य एरंडफले” इत्यादिना दर्शितमेव । पुनःक्रिया च मुक्तस्य नास्ति, कारणाभावात् । निजप्रयत्न-प्रेरणा-सर्पण-विकर्षण-गुरुत्वादयो हि पतनकारणम्, तत्संभवश्च मुक्तस्य नास्ति, हेतोरभावात्, इति कुतोऽस्य पतनम् ? । इति ॥ ३०९ ॥ (१८५७) ॥

D C—Even if *sthāna* were taken to be distinct from *siddha* it is not proper to believe that *siddha* falls from the *sthāna*, which itself is destructible. Since *sthāna* is *niitya* like *ākāśa*, it would never meet destruction. In the process of falling, *Karma* is the essential factor. Now, since *muktātma* is free from *Karma*, the process of falling cannot come into existence for want of *Karma*. Moreover, impulsion by ones' own efforts, attraction, repulsion and weightiness etc are also important causes of—the *patana kṛiyā*, but since all of them are absent in *muktātma*, the *patana* of *muktātma* from its *sthāna* is not possible from that view point also ॥ 309 ॥ (1857) !

Besides,

निच्चथाणाओ वा वोमाईणंपडणं पसज्जेजा ।

अह न मयमणेगंतो थाणाओऽवस्स पडणं ति ॥३१०॥(१८५८)

Niccathānāo vā vomāīṇampadanam pasajjejja ।

Aha na mayamaneganto thānāo'vassa padanam ti ॥ 310 ॥ (1858)

[नित्यस्थानाद् वा व्योमादीनां पतनं प्रसज्येत ।

अथ न मतमनेकान्तः स्थानादवश्यं पतनमिति ॥ ३१० ॥ (१८५८)

Nityasthānād vā vyomādīnām patanam prasajyeta ।

Atha na matamanekāntah sthānādavaśyam patanamiti ॥310(1858)]

Trans—310 Or, if the fall from permanent abode (is admitted) the fall of sky will also be caused And, if that is

not admitted, the statement that ' Falling from the place of location is inevitable ' becomes uncertain (1858)

टीका-ननु च " स्थानात् पतनम् " इति स्वप्नचनविरुद्धमिदम्, अवस्थानादेव पतनस्य युज्यमानत्वात् । अथ स्थानादपि पतनमिष्यते, तर्हि नित्यमेव स्थानाद् व्योमादीनां प्रतनं प्रसज्यत । अथ न तत् तेषां मतम्, तर्हि " स्थानात् पतनम् " इत्यनैकान्तिकमेवेति ॥ ३१० ॥ (१८५८)

D C—The statement that everything has to fall from its *sthāna* is self-contradicting. For the action of falling takes place from the *avasthāna* or the abode and not from the *sthāna*. If falling from *sthāna* were believed the *natya* objects like *akāśa* will also have to meet *patana* from their *natya sthāna*.

On the other hand if it is not accepted that falling from the place of location is inevitable will be *anavasthika* ॥310॥ (1858)]

भवओ सिद्धो ति मई तेणाइमसिद्धसभवो जुत्तो ।

कालाणाइत्तणओ पढमसरिर व तदजुत्त ॥ ३११ ॥ (१८५९)

Bhavao siddho tti mai tenāmasiddhasambhavo jutto ।

Kalānāttanao padhamasariram va tādajuttam ॥ 311 ॥ (1859)

[भवतः सिद्ध इति मतिस्तेनादिमसिद्धसंभवो युक्तः ।

कालानादित्यतः प्रथमक्षरीरमिव तदयुक्तम् ॥ ३११ ॥ (१८५९)

Bhavatah siddha iti matistenasiddhasambhavo yuktah ।

Kalanaditvatah prathamakṣarirameva tadayuktam ॥311॥ (1859)]

Trans.—311 It may be argued that the *siddha* (is born) from the *mundane* world and hence the production of the first *siddha* is acceptable. But like the first *śarīra*, that is not possible on account of the endlessness of times.

टीका-अथ स्याद् मतिः परस्य-यतो भवात् संसारात् सर्वोऽपि दृक्का-
स्या सिद्धस्तेन ततः सर्वेषामपि सिद्धानामादिमत्त्वादवश्यमेव केनाप्यादि
सिद्धेन भवितव्यम् । तदयुक्तम्, यतो यथा सर्वाण्यपि क्षरीरमिव, अक्षराभ्यानि

च सर्वाण्यादियुक्तान्येव, अथ च कालस्यानादित्वाद् नाद्यशरीरम्, आद्या-
होरात्रं वा किमपि ज्ञायते, तथा कालस्यानादित्वात् सिद्धोऽपि नाद्यः
प्रतीयत इति ॥ ३११ ॥ (१८५९) ॥

D C—Mandaka—It has already been proved that all *muktāmās* are born of this *samsāra*. Hence, there ought to exist some *siddha* who might be called the first of all the *muktātmas*

Bhagavān—Your assumption is groundless For like bodies, nights, and days, the *muktātma* is also *ādymān*, but owing to the endlessness of *Kāla*, it is not possible to know as to who was the first *siddha* ॥ 311 ॥ (1859)]

परिमियदेसेऽणंता किह माया मुत्तिविरहियत्ताओ ।

नियम्मि व नाणाई दिट्ठीओ वेगरूवम्मि ॥ ३१२ ॥ (१८६०)

Parimiyadese'nantā kiha māyā muttivirahiyattāo ।

Niyammi va nānāi dīthīo vega-rūvammi ॥ 312 ॥ (1860)

• [परिमितदेशेऽनन्ताः कथं माता मूर्तिविरहितत्वात् ।

निजके वा ज्ञानादयो दृष्टयो वैकरूपे ॥ ३१२ ॥ (१८६०)

Parimitadese'nantāḥ katham mātā mūrtivirahitatvat ।

Nijake vā jñānadayo drīṣṭayo vaikarūpe ॥ 312 ॥ (1860)]

Trans—312 (Then) how are the numerous (*siddhas*) contained in limited space ? ” On account of their formlessness, or like one's own apprehensions, etc, or like (numerous) eyes on one form ” (1860)

टीका—आह—परिमितदेशमेव सिद्धक्षेत्रम्, तत्र कथमनादिकालवर्ति-
नोऽनन्ताः सिद्धा मान्ति ? । अत्रोत्तरमाह—अमूर्तत्वात् सिद्धाः परिमितेऽपि
क्षेत्रेऽनन्तास्तिष्ठन्ति, यथा प्रतिद्रव्यमेवानन्तानि सिद्धानां संबन्धीनि केवल-
ज्ञान-केवलदर्शनानि संपतन्ति, दृष्टयो वा यथैकस्यामपि नर्तक्यां सहस्रशः
प्रपतन्ति, परिमितेऽपि वाऽऽपचरकादिक्षेत्रे बह्व्योऽपि प्रदीपप्रभा मान्ति;
एवमिहामूर्ताः सिद्धा कथं परिमितक्षेत्रेऽनन्ता न मास्यन्ति; मूर्तानामपि

not admitted, the statement that "Falling from the place of location is inevitable" becomes uncertain. (1858)

टीका—ननु च "स्थानात् पतनम्" इति स्ववचनविरुद्धमिदम्, अस्थानादेश पतनस्य युज्यमानत्वात् । अथ स्थानादपि पतनमिष्यते, तर्हि नित्यमेष स्थानाद् व्योमादीनां प्रतन प्रमज्येत । अथ न तत् तेषां मतम्, तर्हि "स्थानात् पतनम्" इत्यनैकान्तिकमेवेति ॥ ३१० ॥ (१८५८)

D C—The statement that everything has to fall from its *sthāna* is self-contradicting. For the action of falling takes place from the *avasthāna* or the abode and not from the *sthāna*. If falling from *sthāna* were believed the *niitya* objects like *ākāśa* will also have to meet *patana* from their *niitya sthānas*.

On the other hand if it is not accepted that falling from a place of location is inevitable will be *anaiāntika* ॥310॥ (1858)]

भवओ सिद्धो चि मई तेणाइमसिद्धसभवो जुत्तो ।

कालाणाइत्तणओ पढमसरीर व तदजुत्त ॥ ३११ ॥ (१८५९)

Bhavao siddho tti mai tenāmasiddhasambhavo jutto ।

Kalānāittanao padhamasarīram va tādajuttam ॥ 311 ॥ (1859)

[भवतः सिद्ध इति मतिस्तेनादिमसिद्धसंभवो युक्तः ।

कालानादिस्वतः प्रथमशरीरमिव तदयुक्तम् ॥ ३११ ॥ (१८५९)

Bhavatah siddha iti matistenaadimasiddhasambhavo yuktah ।

Kalanaditvatah prathamasarīramiva tadayuktam ॥311॥ (1859)]

Trans—311 It may be argued that the *siddha* (is born) from the *mundane* world and hence the production of the first *siddha* is acceptable. But like the first *śarīra* that is not possible on account of the endlessness of times.

टीका—अथ स्याद् मतिः परस्य—पतो मयात् संमारात् गर्भोऽपि मुक्ता-
त्मा सिद्धस्त्वन ततः सर्वेषामपि सिद्धानामादिमत्त्वाद्ब्रह्मण्येष कनाप्पादि
सिद्धेन मवितव्यम् । तदयुक्तम्, पतो यथा गर्भाण्यपि क्षरीराणि, अक्षरात्राणि

Tava bandhe mokse ca, sā ca na kāryā yataḥ sphuta eva ।
Sa-śarīre-tarabhāvo nanu yah sa bandho moksa iti ॥314॥(1862)]

Trans—313-314 Really speaking, you have not understood the real meaning of the sentences of the *Vedas* such as “*Na ha vai sa-śarīrasya priyā-priyayorapahati*” etc, and hence your doubt as regards *bandha* and *moksa* (has arisen) That doubt should no longer be entertained For, *bandha* and *moksa* are nothing but the qualities of having a form and formlessness (respectively) (1861-1862)

टीका-व्याख्या-“ न हि वै सशरीरस्य प्रिया-ऽप्रिययोरपहतिरस्ति, अशरीरं वा वसन्तं वा प्रिया-ऽप्रिये न स्पृशतः ” इत्यादीनां च वेदपदानां सदर्थं त्वं न मुणसि । ततो बन्धे मोक्षे च तव सौम्य ! शङ्का, सा च न कार्या, यतो ननु यः सशरीरे-तरभावः स्फुट एव बन्धो मोक्षश्चेति कथं शङ्का युज्यते ? । एतदुक्तं भवति-“ स शरीरस्य ” इत्यनेन बाह्या-ऽऽध्यात्मिकानादिशरीरसंतानस्वरूपो बन्धः प्रोक्तः, तथा, “ अशरीरं वा वसन्तम् ” इत्यनेन त्वशेषशरीरापगमस्वभावो मोक्षः प्रतिपादितः । तथा “स एव विगुणो विभुर्न बध्यते ” इत्यादीन्यपि पदानि संसारिजीवस्य बन्धमोक्षाभावप्रतिपादकानि त्वं मन्यसे । तच्चायुक्तम्, मुक्तजीवविषयत्वात् तेषाम् । मुक्तस्य च बन्धाद्यभावेऽविप्रतिपत्तिरेवेति । तदेवं भगवता छिन्नस्तस्य संशयः ॥ ३१३-३१४ ॥ (१८६१-१८६२) ॥

D C—You have not grasped the real meaning of the *Vedapadas* such as —“ *Na ha vai sa-śarīrasya priya-priyayorapahati*,” “*Aśarīram vā vasantam priyā-priye na spris'atah*” And that is why, O *Saumya* ' you have raised the doubt as regards *bandha* and *moksa* But, this sort of doubt should not be entertained by you For, it is clear that *bandha* and *moksa* are nothing but the qualities of *sa-śarīratva* and *a-śarīratva* respectively

By the words *sa-śarīrasya* etc *bandha* which is nothing but the *santāna* of the external, as well as, internal *anādi*

प्रदीपप्रमादीनां बहूनामेकप्रावस्थान दृश्यते, किमुताऽमूर्तानाम् ? इति
मावः ॥ ३१२ ॥ (१८६०) ॥

D C—Mandika —The 'abode of *siddhas* is limited in space How could the numberless *siddhas* be accomodated in it ?

Bhagavān —*Siddhas* are accomodated even in that limited space on account of their *a-mūrtatva* just as a number of apprehensions are made upon one object, or just as a number of eyes fall upon one dancer or just as light of numerous lamps is accumulated in one room of limited space the *a-mūrta siddhas* are also contained in their limited *ketra*. When the accumulation of a number of *mūrta* splendours of lamps in a limited space is possible why not the collection of *a-mūrta siddhas* be not possible in the *a-mūrta* space ?
॥ ३१२ ॥ (१८६०)]

न ह वइ सशरीरस्त पिया-ऽपियावहतिरेवमाईण ।
वेयपयाण च तुम न सदत्थ मुणसि तो सका ॥३१३॥(१८६१)
तुह वधे मोक्खम्मि य, सा य न कज्जा जमो फुटो चेव ।
ससरिरे-यरभावो नणु जो सो वध मोक्खो त्ति ॥३१४॥(१८६२)

Na ha vaī sa-sarīrasya ppiyā- ppiyāvahatirevamāīṇam ।
Veyapayanam ca tumam na sadattham muṇasi to sankā ॥ ३१३ ॥
Tuha bandhe mōkhammi ya sā ya na kajjā jao phudo ceva ।
Sa-sarīre-yarabhāvo nānu jo so bandha mōkko tti ॥३१४॥(१८६२)

[न ह वै सशरीरस्य प्रिया-ऽप्रिययोरपहतिरेवमादीनाम् ।
वेदपदानां च त्वं न सदर्थं मुणसि ततः शङ्का ॥ ३१३ ॥ (१८६१)
तव बधे मोक्षे य, सा य न कर्पा पतः स्फुट एव ।
सशरीरे-तरभावो ननु यः स बन्धो मोक्ष इति ॥ ३१४ ॥ (१८६२)

Na ha vai sa-sarīrasya priyā- priyayorapahatirevamādīnām ।
Vedapadanam ca tvam na sadartham muṇasi tatah śaṅkā ॥३१३॥(१८६१)]

Tava bandhe mokse ca, sū ca na kāryā yataḥ sphuta eva ।
Sa-śarīre-tarabhavo nanu yah sa bandho moksa iti ॥314॥(1862)]

Trans—313-314 Really speaking, you have not understood the real meaning of the sentences of the *Vedas* such as “*Na ha vai sa-śarīrasya priyā-priyayorapahatī*” etc, and hence your doubt as regards *bandha* and *moksa* (has arisen) That doubt should no longer be entertained For, *bandha* and *moksa* are nothing but the qualities of having a form and formlessness (respectively) (1861-1862)

टीका-व्याख्या-“ न हि वै सशरीरस्य प्रिया-ऽप्रिययोरपहतिरस्ति, अशरीरं वा वसन्तं वा प्रिया-ऽप्रिये न स्पृशतः ” इत्यादीनां च वेदपदानां सदर्थं त्वं न गृणसि । ततो बन्धे मोक्षे च तव सौम्य ! शङ्का, सा च न कार्या, यतो ननु यः सशरीरे-तरभावः स्फुट एव बन्धो मोक्षश्चेति कथं शङ्का युज्यते ? । एतदुक्तं भवति-“ स शरीरस्य ” इत्यनेन बाह्या-ऽऽध्यात्मिकानादिशरीरसंतानस्वरूपो बन्धः प्रोक्तः, तथा, “ अशरीरं वा वसन्तम् ” इत्यनेन त्वशेषशरीरापगमस्वभावो मोक्षः प्रतिपादितः । तथा “ स एव विगुणो विभुर्न बध्यते ” इत्यादीन्यपि पदानि संसारिजीवस्य बन्धमोक्षाभावप्रतिपादकानि त्वं मन्यसे । तच्चायुक्तम्, मुक्तजीवविषयत्वात् तेषाम् । मुक्तस्य च बन्धाद्यभावेऽविप्रतिपत्तिरेवेति । तदेवं भगवता छिन्नस्तस्य संशयः ॥ ३१३-३१४ ॥ (१८६१-१८६२) ॥

D C—You have not grasped the real meaning of the *Vedapadas* such as —“ *Na ha vai sa-śarīrasya priya-priyayorapahatī*,” “ *Aśarīram vā vasantam priyā-priye na spris'atah* ” And that is why, O *Saumya* ' you have raised the doubt as regards *bandha* and *moksa* But, this sort of doubt should not be entertained by you For, it is clear that *bandha* and *moksa* are nothing but the qualities of *sa-śarīratva* and *a-s'arīratva* respectively

By the words *sas'arīrasya* etc *bandha* which is nothing but the *santāna* of the external, as well as, internal *anādī*

sarira is meant while by means of "*a-sariram vā*" etc *mokṣa* characterized by the removal of entire *sarira* is laid down

Finally you have apprehended sentences such as *sa eṣa viguno vibhurna bhakhyate* etc. to support the *abhāva* of *bandha-mokṣa* to the *mundane* soul. But that is not correct. Those sentences are referring to the free soul. *Attributes* such as "*It is never bound*" etc are directed to nothing but the *mukṛdāma*.

Thus the doubts are removed from the mind of *Mandika*.
 || 313-314 || (1861-1863)]

छिन्नमि ससयम्मी जिणेण जर-मरणाविप्पमुक्केण ।

सो समणो पव्वइओ अद्धुट्ठिहि सह खडियसणहि ॥३१५॥ (१८६३)

Chinnammi samsayammi jinena jara marana vipparamukkenam ;
 So samano pavvaḍa addhuttḥhihi saha khandiya saḥim ||315|| (1863)

[छिन्ने संशये जिनेन जरा-मरणविप्रमुक्तन ।

स समणः प्रवविषोऽर्धपतुर्यैः सह खण्डिकशतैः ॥ ३१५ ॥ (१८५३)

Chinne samāye jinena jara-marana vipramuktana ;
 Sa śramaṇaḥ pravrajīto rdha caturthaiḥ saha khaudikāśataih ||315||

Trans—315 When the doubt was removed by the *Tirthankara* who was entirely free from old age and death, that saint accepted the *Dīkṣā* along with his four hundred and fifty followers. (1863)

End of the Discussion with the Sixth Ganadhara.



Chapter VII



सप्तमगणधरवक्तव्यता ।

Discussion with the Seventh Ganadhara

ते पवइए सोउं मोरिओ आगच्छई जिणसगासं ।
वच्चामि ण वंदामी वंदित्ता पज्जुवासामि ॥ ३१६ ॥ (१८६४)
आभट्ठो य जिणेणं जाइ--जरा--मरणविप्पमुक्केणं ।
नामेण य गोत्तेण य सव्वणू सव्वदरिसी णं ॥ ३१७ ॥ (१८६५)

Te pavvaie sōum Morio āgacchai jīnasagāsam ।
Vaccāmi na vandāmī vandittā pajjuvāsāmi ॥ 316 ॥ (1864)
Ābhatṭho ya Jīnenam jāi-jarā-marana vippamukkenam ।
Nāmena ya gottēna ya savvanū savvadarisī nam ॥ 317 ॥ (1865)

[तान् प्रव्रजितान् श्रुत्वा मौर्य आगच्छति जिनसकाशम् ।
व्रजामि वन्दे वन्दित्वा पर्युपासे ॥ ३१६ ॥ (१८६४)
आभाषितश्च जिनेन जाति-जरा-मरणविप्रमुक्तेन ।
नाम्ना च गोत्रेण च सर्वज्ञेन सर्वदर्शिना ॥ ३१७ ॥ (१८६५)

Tān pravrajitān śrutva maurya agaccati jīnsakaśam ।
Vrajāmi vande vanditva paryupāse ॥ 316 ॥ (1864)]
Ābhāsitaśca Jīnena jāti-jarā-marana vipramuktena ।
Nāmnā ca gotrena ca sarvajñena sarva darśinā ॥ 317 ॥ (1865)]

Trans—316-317 Having heard that they had renounced the world, *Maurya*, comes before the *Tīrthankara* (He

thinks —) I may go pay my homages and worship him. He was addressed by his name and lineage by the *Tirthankara* who was free from birth old age and death who was omniscient and who had complete *darśana* (undifferentiated knowledge. (1864-1865)

किं मण्णे अत्थि देवा उयाहु नत्थि त्ति ससओ तुज्झ ।
वेयपयाण य अत्थ न याणसी तेसिमो अत्थो ॥३१८॥ (१८६६)

Kim manne atthi devā uyāhu natthi tti samsao tujjha ।
Veyapayāṇa ya attham na yāṇasī tesimo attho ॥ 318 ॥ (1866)

[किं मन्यसे सन्ति देवा उवाहो न सन्तीति संशयस्तव ।
वेदपदानां चार्थं न जानासि सपामयमर्थः ॥ ३१८ ॥ (१८६६)

Kim manyase santi deva utaho na santīti samśayaṣṭava ।
Vedapadanam cartham na janāsi sapamayamarthaḥ ॥ 318 ॥ (1866)]

Trans—318 What are you thinking about ? You entertain the doubt as to whether gods exist or not. But (*ca*) you do not know the real interpretation of the sentences of the *Vedas*. Here is their (real) interpretation (1866)

टीका—हे आयुष्मान् मौर्य ! त्वमेव मन्यसे—किं देवा सन्ति नवेति, उभय-
यापि वेदपदध्वजात् ? । उवाहि—“ स एष यज्ञायुषी यजमानोऽञ्जसा
स्वर्गलोकं गच्छति ” इत्यादि; तथा, “ अपाम सोमं अमृता अभूम अगमन्
ज्योतिरविदाम देवान्, किं नूनमस्मात् वृषवदरातिः किमु मूर्धिममृतमर्त्यस्य ”
इत्यादि; तथा “ को जानाति मायोपमान् गीर्वाणानिन्द्र-यम-वरुण-कुबेरा
दीन् ” इत्यादि । एतेषां च वेदपदानामयमर्थस्त्वव बुद्धौ प्रतिमामते, यथा—
एष पञ्च एव दुरितवारणध्वजत्वादायुष प्रहरण यस्यस्तौ यज्ञायुषी, यजमानो-
ऽञ्जसा प्रगुणेन न्यायेन, स्वर्गलोकं गच्छति, इति देवसत्ताप्रतिपत्तिः । तथा,
अपाम-पीतवन्तः, सोम लतारसम्, अमृताः—अमरजघर्माणि, अभूम-भूताः
स्मः अगमन्-गताः, ज्योतिः—स्वर्गम्, अविदाम देवान्—द्वयत्वं प्राप्ताः स्मः,
किं नूनमस्मादृषं वृषवत् करिष्यति; कोऽसौ ? इत्याह—अरातिः—भ्याधि;

तथा, किमु प्रश्ने, मूर्ति-जराम्, अमृतमर्त्यस्येति-अमृतत्वं प्राप्तस्य मर्त्यस्य पुरुषस्येत्यर्थः, अमरणधर्मिणो मनुष्यस्य किं करिष्यन्ति जरा-व्याधयः ? इति भावः । अत्रापि देवसत्ताप्रतिपत्तिः । “ को जानाति मायोपमान् ” इत्यादीनि तु देवाभावप्रतिपादकानि । अतस्तत्र संशयः । अयुक्ताश्चायम्, यतोऽमीषां वेदपदानामर्थं त्वं न जानासि, चशब्दाद् युक्तिं च न वेत्सि । एतेषां हि वेदपदानां नायमर्थो यस्तवाभिप्रेतः, किन्त्वयम्-वक्ष्यमाणलक्षण इति ॥ ३१८ ॥ (१८६६)

D C—O long-lived *Maurya* ' your doubt about the existence of gods is due to your hearing various sentences of *Vedas*

The sentences are such as—

- (1) “ *Sa esa yajuāyudhī yajamāno'njasā svargalokam gacchati* ” etc.
- (2) “ *Apāma somam amṛitā abhūma agaman jyotiravidāma devān kim nūnamasmāt tṛṇavadaratīḥ kimu murti-mamritamartyasya* ” etc.
As well as,
- (3) “ *Ko jānāti māyopamān gīrvāṇa-nindra-Yama-Varuna Kuberādīn ?* ” etc

According to you, interpretations of these sentences would be as follows —

- (1) This host armed with the weapon of sacrifice reaches the region of heaven immediately (This leads to prove the existence of gods)
- (2) By drinking *soma*, they became gods, went to heaven, and attained the divine status. These divinities will banish maladies and mortality by virtue of their *amritatava* (These sentences are also used in support of the existence of divinities.)

- (3) Who knows the illusive gods like *Indra Yama Varuna* and *Kubera* etc? (Sentences like this would deny the existence of gods on the other side)

So your doubt has sprung up from the sentences such as mentioned above. But that is not justifiable as you have not understood their real meaning. Here I explain the real interpretation || 318 || (1866)]

Now the author explains the whole proposition in details

त मन्नसि नेरइया परतता दुक्खसपउत्ता य ।

न तरतीहागतु सञ्जेया सुवमाणा वि ॥ ३१९ ॥ (१८६७)

सच्छदयारिणो पुण देवा दिव्वप्पभावजुत्ता य ।

ज न कयाइ वि दरिसणमुवेत्ति तो ससओ तेसु ॥ ३२० ॥ (१८६८)

Tam mannasī neralyā paratantā dukkhasampauttā ya ।

Na tarantihāgantum saddheyā suvamanā vi || 319 || (1867)

Sacchandayārīno puna devā divvappabhāvajuttā ya ।

Jam na kayāi vi darisanamuventi to samsao tesu || 320 || (1868)

[त्वं मन्यसे नैरयिकाः परतन्त्रा दुःखसम्प्रयुक्ताश्च ।

न त्रस्तुषन्तीहाऽऽगन्तु भवेयाः भूयमाणा अपि ॥ ३१९ ॥ (१८६७)

स्वच्छन्दचारिणः पुनर्देवा दिव्यप्रभावयुक्ताश्च ।

यन्न कदाचिदपि दर्शनमुपयन्ति ततः संशयस्तेषु ॥ ३२० ॥ (१८६८)

Tvam manyaso nairayikah paratantri dukkhasamprayuktāśca ।

Na śaknuvantīhā gantum āraddeyāh ābūyamanā api || 319 || (1867)

Svacchandacarīṇaḥ punar-deva divyaprabhāyuktāśca ।

Yanna kadacidapi darśanamupayanti tataḥ saṁśayasteṣu || 320 || (1868)]

Trans—319-320 You think that the denizens of hell (being) subservient and miserable are not able to come into this world. (So) they are to be trusted (as existing) even

if (they are merely) heard (to be so) But the gods, on the other hand, are free to move and are invested with the celestial splendour also Still, however, they do not come into the range of (our) sight, and hence, the doubt about them (1867-1868)

टीका-मौर्य ! त्वमेवं मन्यसे-नारकाः स्वकृतपापनरकपालादिपरतन्त्राः, पराधीनवृत्तयोऽतीवदुःखसंघातविह्वलाश्च न शक्नुवन्त्यत्रागन्तुम्, अतः प्रत्यक्षीकरणोपायाभावात् श्रूयमाणा अपि श्रद्धेया भवन्तु । देवास्तु स्वच्छन्दचारिणो दिव्यप्रभावयुक्ताश्च, तथापि यस्माद् न कदाचिद् दर्शनपथमवतरन्ति, श्रूयन्ते च श्रुति-स्मृत्यादिषु, अतस्तेषु शङ्केति ॥ ३१९-३२० ॥ (१८६७-१८६८)

D C—O Maurya ' according to you, the inability of the *Nāraka*-beings to come to this world, is due to their being subservient to their own sins, as well as, due to their miserable condition So, they might be trusted upon as existing merely by hearing (some thing about) them

But, the case with gods is different. For, even though they possess free movements and celestial splendour, they would never like to come within the range of our sight

So, because they are heard of in the *Vedas* and *Smritis* etc you have raised this doubt ॥ 319-320 ॥ (1867-1868)

मा कुरु संसयमेष्ट सुदूरमणुयाइभिन्नजाईष्ट ।

पेच्छसु पच्चक्खं चियं चउविहे देवसंघाए ॥३२१॥ (१८६९)

Mā kuru samsayamēé sudūramanuyāibhinnaajāīe ।

Pecchasu paccakkham ciya cauvihe devasanghāe ॥321॥ (1869)

[मा कुरु संशयमेतान् सुदूरमनुजादिभिन्नजातीयान् ।

प्रेक्षस्व प्रत्यक्षमेव चतुर्विधान् देवसङ्घातान् ॥ ३२१ ॥ (१८६९)

Mā kuru samśayametan sudūramanujādibhinnaajāīyān ।

Preksasva pratyaksameva caturvidhān devasanghatān ॥ 321 ॥

Trans.—321 Do not entertain doubt Look at the four-fold multitudes of gods before your eyes (which are extremely different from the human beings (1869)

टीका—मौर्यपुत्र ! देवेषु मा सस्य कार्पीस्त्वम्, एतानेव हि सुहृमन्मनुष्यादिभ्यो भिन्नजातीयान् दिव्यामरुत-विलेपन-वसन-सुमनोमालालङ्कृतमवनपति-व्यन्तर-ज्योतिष्क-वैमानिक लक्षणांश्चतुर्विधदेवसंघातान् मयन्दनार्थमिहैव समवसरणागतान् प्रत्यक्ष एव पश्यति ॥ ३२१ ॥ (१८६९)

D O—You should not entertain any doubt about the existence of gods *O Mauryaputra* ! just look at these gods of all the four types—*vis-bhavanapatis vyantara jyotiska and vaumanika*—distinguished from the human beings by virtue of (their) celestial ornaments and garlands etc coming to this *sumavasarana* to pay their homages to me. ॥ 321 ॥ (1869)

पुष पि न सदेहो जुष्टो ज जोइसा सपच्चक्ख ।

दीसति तक्कया वि य उवघाया—ऽणुग्गहा जगओ ॥३२२॥१८७०

Puvvam pi na samdeho jutto jam joisa sapaccakkham :

Disanti takkayā vi ya uvaghāyā-nuggahā jagao ॥322॥ (1870)

[पूर्वमपि न संदेहो युक्तो यज् ज्योतिष्काः स्वप्रत्यक्षम् ।

दृश्यन्ते तत्कृता अपि उपघाता—ऽनुग्रहा जगताः ॥३२२॥ (१८७०)

Pūrvamapi na samdeho yukto yaj jyotiskah svapratyakham :

Drīṣyante tatkṛtā api upaghata-nugraha jagatah ॥322॥ (1870)

Trans—322 The doubt is not justified even before (their appearance) since luminaries are self-perceptible Moreover injuries or betterments caused by them to the world are also apprehended. (1870)

टीका—इह ममवसरणागतदेवदर्शनात् पूर्वमपि तथान्येषां च संशयो न युक्तः, यद् यस्माच्चन्द्रा ऽऽदित्यादिज्योतिष्कास्तत्रया मर्येणापि च लोकेन स्व प्रत्यक्षत एव मर्यया दृश्यन्ते । अतो दृश्यतः प्रत्यक्षत्वात् कथं ममन्तामरास्ति

त्वशङ्का ? । किञ्च, सन्येव देवाः, लोकस्य तत्कृतानुग्रहो-पघातदर्शनात् ।
तथाहि-दृश्यन्ते क्वचित् केचित् त्रिदशाः, कस्यापि किञ्चिद्विभवप्रदानादिना-
ऽनुग्रहम्, तत्प्रहरणादिना चोपघातं कुर्वन्तः । ततो राजादिवत् कथमेते न
सन्ति इति ॥ ३२२ ॥ (१८७०)

D C—Even before they appear at this *Samavasāna*, your doubt about their existence is not justified For, luminaries like Sun, Moon etc are self-perceptible to you, as well as, to the whole world So, it is not appriate to doubt their existence.

Moreover, *anugraha* and *upaghāta* caused by gods to this world are also evident to all Several gods confer their favours upon some people by granting their objects of pleasure etc while others inflict injuries, like a king, by means of weapons etc This shows, for certain, that gods do exist ॥ 322 ॥ (1870)

Besides,

आलयमेत्तं च मई पुरं व तवासिणो तह वि सिद्धा ।

जे ते देवत्ति मया न य निलया निच्चपरिसुण्णा ॥३२३॥(१८७१)

Ālayamettam ca maī puram va tavvāsino taha vi siddhā ।

Je te deva tti mayā na ya nilayā nīccaparisunnā ॥ 323 ॥ (1871)

[आलयमात्रं च मतिः पुरमिव तद्वासिनस्तथापि सिद्धाः ।

ये ते देवा इति मता न च निलया नित्यपरिशून्याः ॥३२३॥ (१८७१)

Ālayamastram ca matih puramiva tadvāsinastathāpi siddhah ।

Ye te devā iti matā na ca nilayā nityapariśunyah ॥323 (1871)]

Trans—323 The view may be that (luminaries) are mere abodes Still however, like a city, they, too, have their inhabitants, who are accepted as (none but) gods For, places of residence cannot be vacant for ever (1871)

टीका-अथैवंभूता मतिः परस्य भवेत्-आलया एवाल्यमात्रं चन्द्रादि-
विमानानि, न तु देवाः, तत् कथं ज्योतिष्कदेवानां प्रत्यक्षत्वमभिधीयते ? ।

किं त्वं यथाऽऽलयमात्रम् ? इत्याह—“ पुरं सि ” यथा पुरं भून्व लोकाणामा
लयमात्रं स्थानमात्रं, न तु तत्र लोकाः सन्ति, एव चन्द्राद्विमानान्यप्यालय
मात्रमेव, न तु तत्र देवाः केचित् तिष्ठन्ति, अतः कथं तेषां प्रत्यक्षत्वम् ? ।
अत्रोचरमाह—तथापि तद्भासिन आलयवासिनः सामर्थ्याद् यं सिद्धास्ते देवा
इति मताः संमताः । यो ह्यालयः स सर्वोऽपि तन्निवासिनाऽधिष्ठितो दृष्टः, यथा
प्रत्यक्षोपलभ्यमाना देवदत्ताधिष्ठिता वसन्तपुराद्यालयाः, आलयाच्च न्योति
ष्कविमानानि, अत आलयत्वान्यथानुपपत्तेर्ये तन्निवासिनः सिद्धास्ते देवा इति
मताः । आह—ननु कथं ते देवाः सिध्यन्ति ? । यादृक्षा हि प्रत्यक्षेण देवदत्ता
दयो दृश्यन्ते तेऽपि तादृक्षा एव स्युरिति । तदप्युक्तम्, विधिष्टा हि देवदत्ता-
द्यालयेभ्यश्चन्द्राद्यालया इति । अतस्तन्निवासिनोऽपि विधिष्टाः सिध्यन्ति, ते
च देवदत्तादिविलक्षणा देवा इति । अपरस्त्वाह—ननु “ आलयत्वात् ”
इत्ययं हेतुस्तन्निवासिजनसाधनेऽनैकान्तिकः, भून्पालयैर्भ्यमिचारात् । अत्रो
चरमाह—“ न यं निलयेत्यादि ” न च निलया—आलया नित्यमेव भून्पा
मवन्ति । अयमभिप्रायः—ये केचिदालयास्ते ग्रामाः, इदानीं, एष्यति वा काले
ऽवश्यमेव तन्निवासिमिरधिष्ठिता एव भवन्ति न तु नित्यमेव परिभून्पाः ।
ततो यदा तदा वा चन्द्राद्यालयनिवासिनो देवाः सिध्यन्तीति ॥ ३२३ ॥
(१८७१)

D C—Maurya—Luminaries like Sun and Moon mentioned by you are only the abodes and not the gods themselves. It could not be said therefore that the luminary deities are directly perceptible just as in case of an empty town the houses are mere places of residence for people but people do not actually reside into them so also luminaries like moon etc should be taken as absolutely empty bodies and nothing like gods is expected to reside into them.

Bhagavatān.—It is not so *O Maurya* ! Existence of the place of residence proves the existence of its residents also. So these luminaries are not mere *ālayas* but they have their inhabitants also. For that which is called an *ālaya* or a house is always occupied by its residents. Like houses in a town

occupied by persons like *Devadatta*, these luminaries are also undoubtedly occupied by devinities

Maurya —Like *Devadatta* etc residing in the houses of a city, the gods who are the residents of the luminary bodies should also be perceptible

Bhagavān —It is not proper to advance such an argument Because the places of residence are absolutely different from the houses in a city So, their residents *viz* gods are also characteristically different from *Devadatta* etc. Although they are not apprehended by the *indriyas*, their existence is admitted without doubt

Maurya —You cannot assert exclusively that every place of residence is always occupied by a resident For, nobody would reside in a barren house (It is forbidden to reside in such a house) From the existence of abode, therefore, you cannot infer the existence of the occupant

Bhagavān —A residing place is never *śūnya* It must have been occupied by some person or the other, either in the past or in future or at present In case of luminary places of resort, gods like moon etc must have occupied the places at some time in the past, present, or future ॥ 323 ॥ (1871)

को जाणइ व किमेयं ति होज्ज निस्संसयं विमाणाइं ।

रयणमयनभोगमणादिह जइ विज्जाहराईणं ॥ ३२४ ॥ (१८७२)

Ko jānaī va kimeyam ti hojja nissamsayam vimānāim ।

Rayanamayanaabhogamanādiha jaha vijjāharāīṇam ॥ 324 ॥ (1872)

[को जानाति वा किमेतदिति भवेद् निस्संशयं विमानानि ।

रत्नमयनभोगमनादिह यथा विद्याधरादीनाम् ॥ ३२४ ॥ (१८७२)

Ko jānati vā kimetaditi bhaved nissamśayam vimānāni ।

Ratnamayanabhogamanādiha yatha vidyādharaīṇam ॥ 324 ॥ (1872)]

Trans—324 “ Or, who knows what it is ? ” They are

certainly palaces like those of *Vidyādhara*s etc., as they are decked with jewels and they fly in the sky (1872)

टीका—यदिषा, एवभूता मतिः परस्य भवेत् पदुत—चन्द्राद्यालयत्वेन यद् गीयते भवन्निस्तदिदं को जानाति किञ्चिद् भवेत्, किं सूर्योऽग्निमयो गोलः, चन्द्रस्त्वम्बुमयः स्वभाषतः स्वच्छः, आहोस्विदेवभूता एवैते मास्वर रत्नमया गोलका ज्योतिष्कविमानानि ?, अतः कथमेतेषामालयत्वसिद्धिः ?। अत्र प्रतिविधानमाह—निःसंशय विमानान्येतानि, रत्नमयत्वे सति नमोगमनात् पुष्पकादिविद्याधरतपः सिद्धविमानवदिति । अत्रविकार—यवनादिष्वप्येदार्थं रत्नमयत्वविशेषमिति ॥ ३२४ ॥ (१८७२)

D C—Maurya.—Or who knows what these luminaries like Sun and Moon mentioned by you are like ? One that appears as Sun may be a ball of fire and that which appears as Moon may be a transparent ball of water Or it may be that these luminaries be some such bright balls So it is not appropriate to believe that they are the abodes of luminary gods.

Bhagavān.—Since they are decked with jewels and they are moving in the sky there is no doubt that they are actual *vimānas* like *pūṣpaka* etc. attained by *vidyādhara*s by means of austerities etc. So take it for certain that these *vimānas* are also the residing places of the various luminary gods. n 324 n (1872) n

Or

होज्ज मई मायय तहा वि तक्कारिणो सुरा जे ते ।
न य मायाइविगारा पुर व निच्चोवलम्भाओ ॥३२५॥ (१८७३)

Hojja mai māyay tahā vi takkāriṇo surā je te ।
Na ya māyāivigārā puram va niccovālabhāo n 325 n (1873)

[भवेद् मतिमयिष्य तथापि तत्कारिणः सुरा ये ते ।
न च मायादिविकाराः पुरमिव नित्योपलम्भाद् ॥ ३२५ ॥ (१८७३)

Bhaved matir mayeyam tathāpi tatkarinaḥ surā ye te ।
Na ca māyādivikārah puramiva nityopalambhāt ॥ 325 ॥ (1873)]

Trans—325 It may be argued that this is (all) illusion
But, its creators are gods, and not the perturbations like
illusion etc on account of their being obtained like a town
for ever (1873)

टीका—अथ परस्य मतिर्भवेत्—नैते चन्द्रादिविमानान्यालयाः, किन्तु
मायेयं मायाविना केनापि प्रयुक्ता । अत्रोच्यते—मायात्वममीषामसिद्धम्,
वाङ्मात्रेणैव भवताऽभिधानात्; तथाप्यभ्युपगम्योच्यते—ये तत्कारिणस्तथा-
विधमायाप्रयोक्तारस्ते सुराः सिद्धा एव, मनुष्यादीनां तथाविधवैक्रिय-
करणादर्शनात् । अभ्युपगम्य च मायात्वममीषामभिहितम् । न चैते मायादि-
विकाराः, नित्योपलम्भात्, सर्वेण सर्वदा दृश्यमानत्वादित्यर्थः, प्रसिद्ध-
पाटलीपुत्रादिपुरवदिति । मायेन्द्रजालकृतानि हि वस्तूनि न नित्यमुप-
लभ्यन्त इति नित्यविशेषणोपादानमिति ॥ ३२५ ॥ (१८७३)

D C—You might argue that *vimānas* like *candra* etc
are not actual *ālayas*, but they are mere illusions created by
some magician. But the illusionariness of such *vimānas* cannot
be admitted by means of mere words Still, however, if they
are assumed as *māyika*, their creators are not magicians or
human beings but the gods themselves This is said only
on the assumption that they are *māyika vikāras* But really
speaking, they are not *māyika* as they are ever obtained like
towns etc So, these *vimānas* are nothing but the abodes of
luminary gods ॥ 325 ॥ (1873)

जइ नारगा पवन्ना पगिट्ठपावफलभोइणो तेणं ।

सुबहुगपुण्णफलभुजो पवज्जियवा सुरगणा वि ॥३२६॥(१८७४)

Jai nārgā pavannā pagitthapāvaphalabhōmo tenam ।

Subahugapunnaphalabhujō pavajjiyavvā sura-gaṇā vi ॥326॥(1874)

[यदि नारकाः प्रपन्नाः प्रकृष्टपापफलमोगिनस्तेन ।

सुबहुकपुण्यफलसुखः प्रपत्तव्याः सुरगणा अपि ॥ ३२६ ॥ (१८७४)

Yadi narakah prapannah prakṛṣṭapāpaphalabhoginastena ।
Subahukapūṇyaphalabhujah prapattavyah suragaṇa api ॥ 326 ॥]

Trans—326 If the denizens of hell are admitted as the sufferers of the rewards of great sins, gods should be accepted as the enjoyers of the fruits of many good deeds. (1874)

टीका—इह स्वकृतप्रकृष्टपापफलमोगिनस्वावत् कश्चिद् नारकाः प्रतिपत्तव्यास्ते च यदि प्रपन्नाः, “तेषां ति” तर्हि तेनैव प्रकारेण स्वोपाश्रित-सुष्ठुबहुकपुण्यफलसुखः सुरगणा अपि प्रतिपत्तव्याः । अत्राह—नन्विहैवातिदुःखितनरास्तिर्यथातिदुःखिताः प्रकृष्टपापफलसुखो भविष्यन्ति, तथा, मनुष्या एवातिसुखिताः प्रकृष्टपुण्यफलसुखो भविष्यन्ति, किमष्टनारक-देव परिकल्पनया ! इति । तदयुक्तम्, प्रकृष्टपापफलसुखां सर्वप्रकारेणापि दुःखेन भवितव्यम्, न चातिदुःखितानामपि नर-तिरसां सर्वप्रकारं दुःखं दृश्यते सुखवपवनाऽऽसोकादिसुखस्य सर्वेषामपि दर्शनात् । प्रकृष्टपुण्यफलसुखामपि सर्वप्रकारेणापि सुखेन भवितव्यम्, न चेहातिसुखितानामपि नराणां सर्वप्रकारं सुखमवलोक्यते, पूतिदेहोद्गस्य रोग-ज्वरादिप्रमदस्य च दुःखस्य तेषामपि सद्भावात् । तस्मात् प्रकृष्टपापनिबन्धनसर्वप्रकारदुःखभेदिनो नारकाः, प्रकृष्टपुण्यहेतुकसर्वप्रकारसुखमोगिनो देवाधाम्युपगन्तव्या एवेति ॥ ३२६ ॥ (१८७४)

D C—*Bhagavad* —When you believe that *Nārakas* are the sufferers of the rewards of great sins you should also believe that gods are the enjoyers of the fruits of exalted good deeds and thus they are existing

Māurya —*Tiryaks* who are excessively miserable are the sufferers of the reward of great sins and excessively happy human beings are enjoyers of the fruits of exalted good deeds. So it is not necessary to assume the existence of devas and *Narakas* at all.

Bhagavān —Existence of *devas* and *Nārakas* cannot be denied by saying so. Enjoyers of the rewards of great *pūnyas* and *pāpas* are exclusively happy or exclusively miserable, as the case may be. The *manusyas* and *trīyāncas* cannot be called exclusively happy and exclusively miserable respectively. For, even the happiest human beings are susceptible to the affliction of diseases, old age, etc. while even extremely miserable *trīyāncas*, experience the happy touch of cold breeze etc. So, *manusyas* and *trīyāncas* can never be taken as exclusively happy or exclusively miserable beings, while *Nārakas* who suffer the consequences of *pāpas*, and *devas* who enjoy the fruits of *pūnyas*, can be easily admitted respectively as the exclusively miserable and exclusively happy beings ||326|| (1874)

Now, in reply to the question that “Why gods do not visit this world if at all they are existing?” the author states —

संकंतदिवपिम्मा विसयपसत्ताऽसमत्तकत्तवा ।

अणहीणमणुयकज्जा नरभवमसुभं न एंति सुरा॥३२७॥(१८७५)

Sankantadivvapimmā viṣayapasattā'samattakattavvā ।

Anahīnamanuyakajjā narabhavamasubham na eṇti surā ॥ 327 ॥

[संक्रान्तदिव्यप्रेमाणो विषयप्रसक्ता असमाप्तकर्तव्याः ।

अनधीनमनुजकार्या नरभवमशुभं नागच्छन्ति सुराः ॥३२७॥(१८७५)

Sankrāntadivya-premaṇo viṣayaprasaktā asaṁāptakartavyāḥ ।

Anadhīnamanujakāryā narabhavamaśubham nāgacchanti surāḥ||327||

Trans —327 Invested with celestial love and attached to the objects of pleasure, with their duties un-finished, and their deeds independent of human beings, divinities do not come into this inauspicious world (1875)

टीका—नागच्छन्तीह सदैव सुरगणाः, संक्रान्तदिव्यप्रेमत्वात्, विषय-प्रसक्तत्वात्, प्रकृष्टरूपादिगुणकामिनीप्रसक्तरम्यदेशान्तरगतपुरुषवत्; तथा, असमाप्तकर्तव्यत्वात्, बहुकर्तव्यताप्रसाधननियुक्तविनीतपुरुषवत् । तथा,

अनघीन मनुजानां कार्ये येषां तेऽनघीनमनुजकार्याः, तद्भाषस्तत्त्वं तस्माद्
नेहागच्छन्ति सुराः, अनमिमतगेहादौ निःसङ्गपतिवदिति । तथा, अद्भुत
त्वाद् नरमवस्य तद्गन्धासहिष्णुतया नेहागच्छन्ति देवाः, स्वपरित्यक्त
कष्टेवस्यदिति ॥ ३२७ ॥ (१८७५) ॥

D C—Divinities do not come to this world because they are invested with celestial love and attached to the various objects of pleasure like a person attached to a beautiful woman possessing high qualities of extreme beauty etc. Secondly like a great man entrusted with manifold work, these gods have also to perform manifold duties and hence their duties are never over. Thirdly all their deeds are independent of human beings. So just as a dispassionate ascetic never comes to an unholy house these gods also usually abstain themselves from coming to the inauspicious human world as they would not stand even the smell of it. ॥ 327 ॥ (1875)

But this does not mean that they always keep themselves away from this world

For,

नवरि जिणजम्म—दिक्खा—केवल—निवाणमहनिओगेण ।
भत्तीए सोम्म ! ससयविच्छेयस्य व एज्जहण्हा ॥३२८॥ (१८७६)
पुद्वाणुरागओ वा समयनिबधा तवोगुणाओ वा ।
नरगणपीढा—ऽणुग्गह—कदप्पाईहिं वा केइ ॥ ३२९ ॥ (१८७७)

Navari jñajamma-dikkhā-kevala-nivvāna maha neogenam ।
Bhattiē Somma ! samsayaviccheyattham va ejjahanhā ॥328॥ (1876)

Puvvānurāgao vā samayanibandhā tavogunāo vā ।
Naraganapīḍā-nuggaha-kandappāḥim vā kei ॥ 329 ॥ (1877)

[नवरं जिनजन्म—दीक्षा—केवल—निर्वाणमहनियोगेन ।
भक्त्या सौम्य ! संशयविच्छेदार्थं वैयुरिहाहाय ॥ ३२८ ॥ (१८७६)

पूर्वानुरागतो वा समयनिबन्धात् तपोगुणाद् वा ।

नरगणपीडा-नुग्रह-कन्दर्पादिभिर्वा केचित् ॥ ३२९ ॥ (१८७७)

Navaram janajanma-dīksā-kevala-nirvānamahānīyogena ।

Bhaktiā Saumya ! samsāyavicchedārtham vaiyurihāhnāya ॥328॥

Pūrvānūrāgato vā samayanibandhāt tapogunād vā ।

Naragaṇapīḍā-'nugraha-kandarpādibhirvā kecit ॥ 329 ॥ (1877)]

Trans —328-329 Some have to visit this world merely by (way of) duty, at the occasion of birth, *dīksā*, acceptance of absolute apprehension, or final emancipation of some saint, while others (would come) by reason of devotion, *O Saumya !* or in order to remove (their) doubts, or on account of previous attachment Some (would do so) following the conventional rule, some by virtue of austerities, some to afflict the human beings, some to favour them, or some (would come) out of passion etc (1876-1877)

टीका-नवरं जिनजन्म-दीक्षा-केवल-निर्वाणमहोत्सवनियोगेन तत्क-
र्तव्यतानियमेनेह देवा आगच्छेयुः । तत्र सौम्य ! केचिदिन्द्रादयो निजभक्त्या
समागच्छन्ति, केचित् तु तदनुवृत्त्या, अन्ये संशयव्यवच्छेदार्थम्, अपरे तु
पूर्वभक्तिपुत्र-मित्राद्यनुरागात् । समयनिबन्धः-प्रतिबोधादिनिमित्तः संकेत-
निश्चयः, तस्माच्च केचिद् देवा इहागच्छन्ति । अन्ये तु महासत्त्वसाध्वादि-
तपोगुणसमाकृष्टाः, केचित्तु पूर्ववैरिकनरगणपीडार्थम्, अपरे तु पूर्वसुहृत्-
पुत्राद्यनुग्रहार्थम्, केचित् देवाः कन्दर्पादिभिरिहागच्छन्ति आदिशब्दात्
साध्वादिपरीक्षाहेतोरिति द्रष्टव्यमिति । तदेवं निरूपितं देवानामत्रागमन
कारणम्, अनागमनकारणं च ॥ ३२८-३२९ ॥ (१८७६-१८७७)

D C —Various deities visit this world on various purposes
Some have to attend the occasions of *janma*, *dīksā*, *kevala-ṣṇāna*
prāpti and *nirvāna* of a saint Some like *Indra* are drawn to
this world by means of devotion, some to remove their doubts
Several others descend upon this world on account of their
previous attachment to relatives like son, friend etc. or by
following the previous conventions or by virtue of previous
austerities also, some gods come to the human world for the

purpose of afflicting human beings in order to take revenge upon them while others would be attracted to this world out of passion or in order to test the saints of this world also.

Thus there are various causes for their visit to this world while others stated before are the causes of their staying away from this world also. ॥ 328-329 ॥ (1876-1877)

जाइस्सरकहणाओ कासइ पच्चस्वदरिसणाओ य ।

विज्ञा-मतो-वायणसिद्धीओ गहविगाराओ ॥ ३३० ॥ (१८७८)

उक्किट्ठपुण्णसचयफलमावाओ ऽमिहाणसिद्धीओ ।

सद्वागमसिद्धीउ य सति देव त्ति सद्धेय ॥ ३३१ ॥ (१८७९)

Jāissarakahanāo kāsai paccakkhadarisanāo ya ।

Vijā-manto-vāyanasiddhīo gahavīgārāo ॥ 330 ॥ (1878)

Ukkithapunnasamcayaphalabhāvāo ʾbhīhānasiddhīo ।

Savvāgamasiddhīu ya santi deva tti saddheyam ॥ 331 ॥ (1879)

[जातिस्मरणकथनात् कस्यचित् प्रत्यक्षदर्शनाच्च ।

विद्या-मन्त्रोपयाचनसिद्धेर्ग्रहविकारात् ॥ ३३० ॥ (१८७८)

उत्कृष्टपुण्यसंचयफलमावादमिधानसिद्धेः ।

सर्वागमसिद्धेश्च सन्ति देवा इति श्रद्धेयम् ॥ ३३१ ॥ (१८७९)

Jātsmaranākathanat kasyacit pratyakṣadarśanācca ।

Vidyā-mantropayācānasiddhergrahavikarat ॥ 330 ॥ (1878)

Utkṛṣṭapūṇyasaṃcayaphalabhavadabhidhānasiddheh ।

Sarvāgamasiddheṣu santi deva itī śraddheyam ॥ 331 ॥ (1879)]

Trans—330-331 By the statement of some (who are) reminded of (the former) existence by means of direct apprehension, by (virtue of) reciting the chantings of (various) lores, by the movement of planets due to the existence of the fruition of the accumulation of highly meritorious deeds, by (virtue of) (their) names and by (the help of) all *āgamas* it should be trusted that gods are existing (1878-1879)

टीका—“ सन्ति देवा इत्येतत् श्रद्धेयम् ” इति प्रतिज्ञा, जातिस्मरण-प्रत्ययितपुरुषेण कथनात्, नानादेशविचारिप्रत्ययित पुरुषावलोकितकथित-विचित्रवृहदेवकुलादिवस्तुवत्; तथा, कस्यापि तपः प्रभृतिगुणयुक्तस्य प्रत्यक्ष-दर्शनप्रवृत्तेश्च—केनचित् प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणेनोपलम्भादित्यर्थः, दूरविप्रकृष्टनगरादि-वत्; तथा, विद्या—मन्त्रोपयाचनेभ्यः कार्यसिद्धेः, प्रसादफलानुमितराजादिवत्; तथा, ‘ गहविगारात् त्ति ’ अत्र प्रयोगः—ग्रहाधिष्ठितपुरुषदेहो जीवव्यतिरि-क्तादृश्यवस्त्वधिष्ठातृकः, पुरुषासंभाव्यविकारवत्क्रियादर्शनात्, संचरिष्णुयत्र-व्यतिरिक्तमध्यप्रविष्टादृश्यमानपुरुषाधिष्ठितयत्रवत्; तथा तपो—दानादिक्रिया-समुपाजितोत्कृष्टपुण्यसंभारफलसद्भावात्, उत्कृष्टपापप्राग्भारफलसद्भावनिश्चि-तनारकवत्, एतच्च प्रागेव भावितम्। तथा, “देवाः” इति तदभिधानं ततोऽपि च देवानां सिद्धिः। एतच्चानन्तरगाथायां व्यक्तीकरिष्यते। तथा, सर्वे च त आगमाश्च सर्वागमास्तेष्वविप्रतिपत्त्या सिद्धत्वाच्च सन्ति देवा इति ॥ ३३०—३३१ ॥ (१८७८—१८७९)

D. C.—Existence of gods could be established in various ways.—

- (1) On the recollection of former existence, a person would relate the story of the great family of gods witnessed and believed by him as certain.
- (2) Some persons attain directly the *dars'ana* of gods by virtue of their qualities like austerity etc
- (3) Some people attain the accomplishment of their objects by soliciting the favour of gods by means of prayers, and chantings of prescribed *mantras*
- (4) A person in charge of planets is absolutely different from the *jīvas*, because of the *karṇās* that are found as a result of changes in the planets which are never to be found in human beings
- (5) Just as we have accepted the existence of *Nārakas* due to the fruition of great sins, the existence of

gods should also be admitted on account of the *phala* of the accumulation of highly meritorious deeds like *tapas dāna* etc

(6) The existence of gods is established by their very name *vis-“devaḥ”* (This will be explained in the following verse)

(7) All the *āgamas* admit the existence of gods.
 || 330-331 (1878-1879) ||

The epithet “ *devaḥ* ” is then explained as follows.—

देव ति सत्यमिदं सुद्धत्तणमो घटाभिहाण व ।

अहं व मई मणुजं चियं देवो गुणरिद्धिसंपन्नो ॥ ३३२ ॥ (१८८०)

न न जउ तच्चस्थे सिद्धे उपचारमो मया सिद्धी ।

तच्चस्थसीह सिद्धे माणवसीहोपचारो व ॥ ३३३ ॥ (१८८१)

Deva ti satthayanidam suddhattanao ghaṭābhikāṇam va :

Aha va mai manuu cciya devo guna riddhi sampanno || 332 || (1880)

Tam na jau tacca siddhe upayāro mayā siddhi :

Taccatthasīha siddhe mānavasīhupayāro vva || 333 || (1881)

[देवा इति सार्थकमिदं ब्रुदत्वतो घटाभिधानमिव ।

अथवा मत्विर्मानुज एव देवो गुण-रिद्धिसंपन्नः ॥ ३३२ ॥ (१८८०)

तच्च न यतस्तत्पर्ये सिद्ध उपचारतो मया सिद्धिः ।

तत्पर्येसिद्धे सिद्ध माणवमिहोपचार इव ॥ ३३३ ॥ (१८८१)

Deva iti sārthakamidaṁ brūdatvato ghaṭābhikāṇamiva :

Athava matvirmanuja eva devogunariddhisampannaḥ || 332 || (1880)

Tad na yatastatthartho siddha upacārato mata siddhi :

Tattharthasimho siddhe mānavasīhupacāra eva || 333 || (1881)

Trans.—332-333 Since the epithet “ *deva* ” is clear like “ *ghata* ” it is significant. Or it might be believed that man

himself (when) accompanied by the prosperity of merits is god (But) that is not (correct) (Because) the accomplishment (of the secondary meaning) by means of usage could be brought about (only) when the primary meaning is established, just as the epithet “*sinha*” or lion could be attributed to *Mānavaka* by means of usage only, if the primary sense of the word “*sinha*” is accepted (1889-1881)

टीका—“ देवाः ” इत्येतत् पदं सार्थकं व्युत्पत्तिमच्छुद्धपदत्वात्, घटादिवत् । तत्र दीव्यन्तीति देवा इति व्युत्पत्तिमन्वम्, समासतद्धितरहितत्वेन च शुद्धत्वम् । भावना चात्र प्रागुक्तैव । अथ परस्य मतिर्भवेत्—ननु मनुष्य एवेह दृश्यमानो देवो भविष्यति, किमदृष्टदेवकल्पनया ? । किं सर्वोऽपि मनुष्यो देवः ? इति । न, इत्याह—गुणसंपन्नो गणधरादिः, ऋद्धि-संपन्नश्चक्रवर्त्यादिः । अत्रोच्यते—तदेतद् न, यस्मात् तथ्ये मुख्ये वस्तुनि क्वचित् सिद्धे सत्यन्यत्रोपचारतस्तत्सिद्धिर्मता, यथा मुख्ये यथार्थे सिंहेऽन्यत्र सिद्धे ततो माणवके सिंहोपचारः सिध्यति, एवमिहापि यदि मुख्या देवाः क्वचित् सिद्धा भवेयुः, तदा राजादेर्देवोपचारो युज्यते, नान्यथेति ॥ ३३२-३३३ ॥ (१८८०-१८८१)

D C—Since the word “*devāh*” is void of compound and prefixes, and is explained as *tatra divyanti devāh* (those that shine there, are deities), it is philologically *siddha*, like other padas such as *ghata* etc

Maurya —The man himself seen before our very eyes is God Why to imagine an invisible form for that ? All men are not gods But those accompanied by high merits and religious prosperity could easily be taken as gods.

Bhagavān —That is not correct. Unless and until the principal meaning of a word is not accomplished, it could never be attributed to any other object by means of *upacāra*. The epithet of lion could easily be attributed to *mānavaka* only if the primary sense of the word *sinha* is accomplished

Similarly, here also the epithet “*devāh*” could be attributed

to king etc only if the existence of gods is accepted, and not otherwise ॥ 332-333 (1880-1881) ॥

Now in case of existence of gods being denied, the uselessness of the rites like *agnihotra* etc. is shown:—

देवामावे विफल जमग्निहोत्ताइयाण किरियाण ।

सग्गीय जग्गाण य दाणाइफल च तदजुत्त ॥ ३३४ ॥ (१८८२)

Devābhāve viphalam jamaggihotthāyāṇa kiriyāṇam ।

Saggiyam jannāna ya dāṇāiphalam ca tadjuttam ॥ 334 ॥ (1882)

[देवामावे विफल यदग्निहोत्रादिकानां क्रियाणाम् ।

स्वर्गीयं यज्जानां च दानादिफलं च तदयुक्तम् ॥ ३३४ ॥ (१८८२)

Devābhāve viphalam yadagnihotradikāṇaṁ kriyāṇam ।

~ saggiyam yajñāṇaṁ ca dāṇādīphalam ca tadayuktam ॥ 334 ॥ (1882)]

Trans—334 In (case of) non-existence of gods (award of) heaven laid down (as a result) of (the accomplishment of) the rites like *agnihotra* etc. as well as, the fruition of munificence etc. would be null and void. (1882)

टीका—‘ वा ’ इत्यथवा, इदं दूषणम्—देवामावेऽभ्युपगम्यमाने यदग्निहोत्रादिक्रियाणाम् “ अग्निहोत्रं जुहुयात् स्वर्गकाम ” इत्यादिना स्वर्गीयफलमुक्तम्, तथा, यज्जानां च यत् फलमभिहितं, दानादिफलं च यत् समस्तलोकप्रसिद्धम्, तत् सर्वमयुक्तं प्राप्नोति । स्वर्गो ह्येतेषां फलमुक्तम्, स्वर्गीयामावे कृतः स्वर्गः ? इति । “ स एष यज्ञायुधी ” इत्यादीनि च वेदवाक्यानि देवास्त्वित्प्रतिपादनपराणि वर्तन्ते । अतः किं तान् न प्रतिपद्यसे ? । यद्यपि “ को ज्ञानाति मायोपमान् गीर्वाणानिन्द्र-यम-वरुण-कुबेरादीन् ” इत्यादिवाक्यम्, तदपि न देवास्त्वित्त्वामिषायकम्, किन्तु सुराणामपि मायोपमस्वामिषानेन क्षेपद्विसमुदायानां सुतरामनित्यत्वप्रतिपादकं बोद्धव्यम्; अन्यथा हि देवास्त्वित्प्रतिपादकवाक्यानि, भुविमन्त्रपदैरिन्द्रादीनामाह्वानं चानर्थकं स्यात् ॥ ३३४ ॥ (१८८२)

D C—There will be one more difficulty in case of denying the existence of gods Because in that case the award of

heaven laid down as a result of the rites like *agnihotra* etc in the sentences such as “ *Agnihotram juhuyāt svargalāmah* ” etc. as well as, the fruition of sacrifices and meritorious deeds like *dāna* etc prescribed in deeds like *dāna* etc prescribed in this world, would become absolutely futile. Thus, in absence of *svargin*—the inhabitant of *svarga*—how is *svarga* to exist ?

Hence *O Maurya* ' take it for certain that sentences such as “ *Sa esa yajñāyudhî* ” etc. are laid down to establish the existence of gods, while the sentence “ *Ko jānāti māyopamān gīrvānānndra-Yama-Varuna-Kuberādīn* ” etc does not lead to deny the existence of gods, but it only means to assert the *a-nityatā* of the prosperity of gods and the rest. Otherwise, the sentences which establish the existence of gods, as well as, the invocation of gods like *Indra* by means of reciting the prescribed *mantras*, would be of no avail ॥ 334 ॥ (1882)

Moreover,

जम-सोम-सूर-सुरगुरु-सारजाईणि जयइ जण्णेहिं ।

मन्तावाहणमेव य इन्दाईणं विहा सव्वं ॥३३५॥ (१८८३)

Jama-Soma-Sūra-Suraguru-sārajjāṇi jayai jannehim ।

Mantāvāhanameva ya Indāṇam vihā savvam ॥ 335 ॥ (1883)

[यम-सोम-सूर-सुरगुरु-स्वाराज्यादीनि जयति यज्ञैः ।

मन्त्राह्वानमेव चेन्द्रादीनां वृथा सर्वम् ॥ ३३५ ॥ (१८८३)

Yama-Soma-Sūra-Suraguru-svārājyādīni jayati yajñaiḥ ।

Mantrāhvānameva cendrādīnām vṛitha sarvam ॥ 335 ॥ (1883)]

Trans—335 (The statement that) one conquers the regions of (the gods of) Death, Moon, Sun, and *Bṛhaspati* etc, and the invocation of *Indra* etc by reciting the prescribed *mantras* would be absolutely null and void (1883)

टीका—“ जमित्यादि ” पूर्वार्धस्यायमर्थः—उक्थपोडशिग्रभृतिक्रतुमि-
र्यथाश्रुति “ यम-सोम-सूर्य-सुरगुरु-स्वाराज्यानि जयति ” इत्यादीनि
देवास्तित्वसूचकानि वेदाक्यानि देवाभावे वृथैव स्युः । इह चोक्थपोडशि

प्रसूतयो यज्ञविशेषा मन्त्रव्याः । सयूपो यज्ञ एव हि ऋतुरुच्यते, पपरहितस्त-
दानादिक्रियायुक्तो यज्ञ इति । स्वः-स्वर्गः, तत्र सान्यानि । जयति-
उपार्जयतीत्यर्थ इति । तथा, मन्त्रैरिन्द्रादीनामाह्वानं देवास्तित्व एवोप-
पद्यते, अन्यथा वृथैव स्यात् । इन्द्रादीनां मन्त्रपदैराह्वानमेवमवगन्तव्यम्-
“इन्द्र ! आगच्छ मेधासिधे मेघवपुष्य ” इत्यादि । तस्माद् युक्तितो वेदवाक्ये
म्यत्र “ सन्ति देवा ” इति स्थितम् । तद्वत् छिन्नो मौर्यपुत्रस्य भगवता
संशयः ॥ ३३५ ॥ (१८८३)

D O—It has been laid down in the *Sastras* that—

“ *Uktha sodas's prabhṛti kratubhir gathās'ruti Yama-Soma-
Surya-Saraguru-sātrayāna jayati* etc. Sentences like this
lead to prove the existence of gods. But they would prove
themselves good-for-nothing if the existence of gods is denied.

Similarly, the invocation of gods such as *Indra* etc. by
means of *mantras* which indicate the existence of gods would
also become futile if there were *devabhāva*. The sentences of
the *Vedas* establish the existence of gods in one way or the other
॥ 335 a (1883).

The doubt of *Mauryaputra* is thus removed by the preceptor

छिन्नस्मि ससयम्मी जिणेण जर-मरणविप्पमुक्केण ।

सो समणो पवइओ अणुट्ठेहि सह खडियसएहि ॥३३६॥ (१८८४)

*Chinnammi samsayammi Jinena jara-maranavippamukkenam ।
So samano pavvaio addhutthehim saha khandiyasachim* ॥336a

[छिन्ने संशये जिनेन जरा-मरणविप्रमुक्तेन ।

स भगवतः प्रव्रजितोऽर्धचतुर्थैः सह सान्धिककृतैः ॥ ३३६ ॥ (१८८४)

Ohinno samāyo Jinena jara-marānavippamuktens ।

So āramapah pavvajito rdha caturthah saha khandikakutah ॥336a

Trans.—336 When the doubt was removed by the *Uṭṭhan*
kara who was entirely free from old age and death, that saint
accepted *āṭṭhā* along with his three hundred and fifty pupils. (1884)
End of the Discussion with the Seventh Gaṇadhara.



Chapter VIII



अष्टमगणधरवक्तव्यता

Discussion with the Eighth Ganadhara

ते पव्वइए सोउं अकंपिओ आगच्छइ जिणसगासं ।
वच्चासि ण वंदामी वंदित्ता पज्जुवासामि ॥ ३३७ ॥ (१८८५)

Te pavvaie soum Akampio āgacchī Jinasagāsam ।
Vaccāmi na vandāmi vandittā pajjuvāsāmi ॥ 337 ॥ (1885)

[तान् प्रव्रजितान् श्रुत्वाऽकम्पित आगच्छति जिनसकाशम् ।
व्रजामि वन्दे वन्दित्वा पर्युपासे ॥ ३३७ ॥ (१८८५)

Tān pravrajitān śrutvā'kampita āgacchatī Jinasakāśam ।
Vrajāmi vande vandittā paryupāse ॥ 337 ॥ (1885)]

Trans—337 Having heard that they (i. e. *Mauryputra* and others) had renounced the world, *Akampita* comes before the *Tirthankara* (He thinks —) I may go, pay my homage and worship him (1885)

आभट्ठो य जिणेणं जाइ-जरा-मरणविप्पमुक्केणं ।
नामेण य गोत्तेण य सव्वण्णू सव्वदरिसी णं ॥ ३३८ ॥ (१८८६)

Ābhattho ya Jinenam jāi-jarā-marana vippamukkenam ।
Nāmena ya gottēna ya savvannū savvadarisī nam ॥338॥ (1886)

[आभाषितश्च जिनेन जाति-जरा-मरणविप्रमुक्तेन ।

नाम्ना च गोत्रेण च सर्वज्ञेन सर्वदर्शिना ॥ ३३८ ॥ (१८८६)

प्रसृतयो यज्ञविशेषा मन्त्रव्याः । सयूपो यज्ञ एव हि कर्तुं न्यते, यपरहितस्तु
 दानादिक्रियायुक्तो यज्ञ इति । स्वा-स्वर्गः, तत्र रान्यानि । जयति-
 उपार्जयतीत्यर्थ इति । तथा, मन्त्रैरिन्द्रादीनामाह्वान देवास्तिष्ठ एवोप-
 षते, अन्यथा वृथैव स्यात् । इन्द्रादीनां मन्त्रपदैराह्वानमेवमवगन्तव्यम्-
 “इन्द्र ! मामच्छ मेघातिथे मेघवृषण ” इत्यादि । तस्माद् युक्तिवो वेदवाक्ये
 म्यत्र “ सन्ति देवा ” इति स्थितम् । तदेवं छिन्नो मौर्यपुत्रस्य भगवता
 संशयः ॥ ३३५ ॥ (१८८३)

D O—It has been laid down in the *Sastras* that—

“ *Uktha goda's prabhrits kratubhir yajhā'srutis Yama-Soma-
 Surya-Svaraguru-śatrayāni jayati* ' etc. Sentences like this
 lead to prove the existence of gods. But they would prove
 themselves good-for-nothing if the existence of gods is denied.

Similarly, the invocation of gods such as *Indra* etc. by
 means of *mantras* which indicate the existence of gods would
 also become futile if there were *devabhāva*. The sentences of
 the *Vedas* establish the existence of gods in one way or the other
 ॥ 385 A (1889).

The doubt of *Mauryaputra* is thus removed by the preceptor

छिन्नन्मि ससयम्मी जिणेण जर-मरणविप्पमुक्केण ।

सो समणो पव्वइओ अद्धुट्ठेहि सह खडियसपहिं ॥३३६॥ (१८८४)

*Chinnammi samsayammi Jinena jara-marānavippamukkenam ।
 So samano pavvaḍa addhuttḥehim saha khandiyasapheim* ॥336॥

[छिन्ने संशये जिनेन जरा-मरणविप्रमुक्केन ।

स समणः पव्वडितोऽर्धचतुर्थैः सह खडिकश्चतैः ॥ ३३६ ॥ (१८८४)

Ohinne samāyo Jinena jara-marānavipramukkena ।

Sa samapah pavvajito rdha catvarthaiḥ saha khandikāntaiḥ ॥336॥

Trans—336 When the doubt was removed by the *Tīrthā-
 kara* who was entirely free from old age, and death that saint
 accepted *dīksū* along with his three hundred and fifty pupils. (1884)
 End of the Discussion with the Seventh Gaṇadhara



Chapter VIII



अष्टमगणधरवक्तव्यता

Discussion with the Eighth Ganadhara

ते पव्वइए सोउं अकंपिओ आगच्छइ जिणसगासं ।
वच्चांमि ण वंदामी वंदित्ता पज्जुवासामि ॥ ३३७ ॥ (१८८५)

Te pavvare sōum Akampio āgacchhi Jinasagāsam ।
Vaccāmi na vandāmi vandittā pajjuvāsāmi ॥ 337 ॥ (1885)

[तान् प्रव्रजितान् श्रुत्वाऽकम्पित आगच्छति जिनसकाशम् ।
व्रजामि वन्दे वन्दित्वा पर्युपासे ॥ ३३७ ॥ (१८८५)

Tān pravrajitān śrutvā'kampita āgacchati Jinasakāśam ।
Vrajāmi vande vandittā paryupāse ॥ 337 ॥ (1885)]

Trans—337 Having heard that they (i e *Mauryputra* and others) had renounced the world, *Akampita* comes before the *Tirthankara* (He thinks —) I may go, pay my homage and worship him (1885)

आभट्ठो य जिणेणं जाइ-जरा-मरणविप्पमुक्केणं ।
नामेण य गोत्तेण य सव्वण्णू सव्वदरिसी णं ॥ ३३८ ॥ (१८८६)

Ābhattho ya Jinenam jāi-jarā-marana vippamukkenam ।
Nāmena ya gottena ya savvannū savvadarisī nam ॥ 338 ॥ (1886)

[आभाषितश्च जिनेन जाति-जरा-मरणविप्रमुक्तेन ।

नाम्ना च गोत्रेण च सर्वज्ञेन सर्वदर्शिना ॥ ३३८ ॥ (१८८६)

Ābhaṣaṭṭa Jinena jati-jarā-marapavipramuktena ।

Namna ca gotreṇa ca sarvajhena sarvadarśina ॥ 338 ॥ (1886)]

Trans—338 He was then addressed by his name and lineage by the *Tirthankara*, who was entirely free from birth, old age, and death, who was omniscient and who had complete *darśana* (undifferentiated knowledge). (1886)

The *Tirthankara*, then says—

किं मण्णे नेरहया अत्थि नत्थि त्ति ससओ तुज्झ ।

वेयपयाण य अत्थ न याणसी तेसिमो अत्थो ॥ ३३९ ॥ (१८८७)

Kim manne nerahyā atthi natthi tti samsao tujjham ।

Veyapayāna ya attham na yānasi tesimo attho ॥ 339 ॥ (1887)

[किं मन्यसे नैरयिकाः सन्ति न सन्तीति संशयस्तव ।

वेदपदानां चार्थे न जानासि तेषामयमर्थः ॥ ३३९ ॥ (१८८७)

Kim manyase nairayikāḥ santi na santīti saṁśayastava ।

Vedapadanam cārtham na jānāsi tesamayamarthaḥ ॥ 339 ॥ (1887)]

Trans—339 What are you thinking about ? You entertain the doubt as to whether the denizens of hell exist or not. (But) you have not understood the real meaning of the sentences of *Vedas*. Here is their (real) interpretation. (1887)

टीका—किं नारकाः सन्ति न वा ? इति त्वं मन्यसे । अयं च तव संशयो बिरुद्धवेदपदमवर्णननिषेधनः, तथाहि—“ नारको वै एष जायते यः ब्रूद्राभमभाति ” इत्यादि—एष बाह्वणो नारको जायते यः ब्रूद्राभमभातीत्यर्थः, इत्यादीनि वाक्यानि नारकसत्ताप्रतिपादकानि, “ न इ वै प्रेत्य नारकाः सन्ति ” इत्यादीनि तु नारकामावप्रतिपादकानि । तत्रैषां वेदपदानामर्थे, च श्रुत्याद् युक्तिद्वयं च त्वं न जानासि, यत एतेषामर्थं यत्प्रमाणोऽर्थ इति ॥ ३३९ ॥ (१८८७)

D C—What are you thinking about ? your doubt about the existence of *narnas* is based upon your hearing the

various *Veda-padas* having contradictory senses The *Veda-padas* are as follows —

(1) “ *Nārako vaṁ esa jāyate yaḥ s’ūdrānnamas’nātī* ” etc

(2) “ *Na ha vaṁ pretya nārakāḥ santi* ” etc.

According to you, the interpretation of these sentences is this—

(1) “ A *brāhmaṇa* who eats the food of *s’udras* becomes a *nāraka* ” (This proves the existence of hellish denizens)

(2) “ In fact, there is nothing like *nārakas* in the next world ”

This refutes the existence of *nārakas* But you have not grasped the real import of those *Veda-padas* ॥339॥(1887)

Here I give their full significance--

तं मन्नसि पञ्चवखा देवा चंदादओ तहन्ने वि ।

विजा-मंतोवायणफलाइसिद्धीए गम्मंति ॥ ३४० ॥ (१८८८)

जे पुण सुइमेत्तफला नेरइय त्ति किह ते गहेयव्वा ।

सक्खमणुमाणओ वाऽणुवलंभा भिन्नजाईया? ॥३४१॥ (१८८९)

Tam mannasī paccakkhā devā candādao tahananē vi ।

Vijjā-mantovāyanaphalāisiddhīe gammantī ॥ 340 ॥ (1888)

Je puna suimettaphalā neraiya tti kiha te gaheyavvā ।

Sakkhamanumāṇao vā’nuvalambhā bhinnajāyā? ॥ 341 ॥ (1889)

[त्वं मन्यसे प्रत्यक्षा देवाश्चन्दादयस्तथान्येऽपि ।

विद्या-मन्त्रोपायनफलादिसिद्धिर्गम्यन्ते ॥ ३४० ॥ (१८८८)

ये पुनः श्रुतिमात्रफला नैरयिक्ता इति कथं ते ग्रहीतव्याः ।

साक्षादनुमानतो वाऽनुपलम्भाद् भिन्नजातीयाः ? ॥ ३४१ ॥ (१८८९)

Tram manyase pratyakṣa devāścandradayastathānye pi |
Vidyā-māntropayanaphalādisiddher gamyante || 340 || (1888)
Ye punah śrutimatraphala nairayikā itī katham te grahitavyāḥ |
Sakṣadanumanato va'nupalambhād bhinnajatyāḥ ! || 341 || (1889)

Trans.—340-341 You believe that deities like moon etc., are (directly) perceptible, so also are others perceptible as a result of religious prayers etc. But how are those denizens of hell that are known merely by hearing, and that belong to a distinct species, to be apprehended either directly or by inference, when they are (absolutely) non-perceptible ? (1888-1889)

टीका—हे आयुष्मन्कर्मित ! त्वमेव मन्यसे—देवास्तावन्नादयः प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणसिद्धा एव, अन्ये त्वप्रत्यक्षा अपि विद्यामन्त्रोपयाधितकाविक्रम सिद्धाऽनुमानतो गम्यन्ते; ये पुनः “ नारकाः ” इत्यभिधानमात्ररूपा भूतिरेव फलं येषां, न पुनस्त्वमिषायकश्चक्षुर्म्यतिरिक्तोऽर्थः, ते साक्षाद्, अनुमानतो वाऽनुपलम्ब्यमानत्वेन तिर्यग्-नरा-ऽमरेभ्यः सर्वेषां भिन्नत्वा तीया कथं “ सन्ति ” इति गृहीतव्याः, स्वरविषाणवत् ? इति ॥ ३४०-३४१ ॥ (१८८८-१८८९)

D C—Alampita.—Deities like moon etc are apprehended by concrete authenticities and others which are imperceptible are apprehended by means of inference as a result of religious prayers etc. But how are *narakas* that are quite different from gods *atyantas* and human beings and whose existence is recognized only by hearing to be accepted as existing when it is not apprehended by direct perception or even by inference ! || 340-341 (1888-1889) ||

The reply is—

मह पञ्चक्वत्तणओ जीवाई य व नारए गिणह ।
 किं ज सपञ्चक्व त पञ्चक्व नवरि इक्क ? ॥ ३४२ ॥ (१८९०)
 ज कासइ पञ्चक्व पञ्चक्व त पि वेप्पइ लोए ।
 जह सीहाइदरिसण सिद्ध न य सवपञ्चक्व ॥ ३४३ ॥ (१८९१)

Maha paccakkhattanao jīvāi ya vva nārae ginha ।
 Kim jam sapaccakkham tam paccakkham navari ikkam ॥ 342 ॥
 Jam kāsa paccakkham paccakkham tam pi gheppai loe ।
 Jaha sihādarisanam siddham na ya savvapaccakkham ॥ 343 ॥

[मम प्रत्यक्षत्वतो जीवादींश्चैव नारकान् गृहाण ।

किं यत् स्वप्रत्यक्षं तत् प्रत्यक्षं नवरमेकम् ? ॥ ३४२ ॥ (१८९०)

यत् कस्यचित्प्रत्यक्षं प्रत्यक्षं तदपि गृह्यते लोके ।

यथा सिंहादिदर्शनं सिद्धं न च सर्वप्रत्यक्षम् ॥ ३४३ ॥ (१८९१)

Mama pratyaksatvato jīvādīnśceva nārakān grihaṇa ।
 Kim yat sva-pratyaksam tat pratyaksam navaramekam ? ॥342॥(1890)
 Yat kasyacitpratyaksam pratyksam tadapi grihyate loke ।
 Yathā sihādīdarśanam siddham na ca sarvapratyaksam ॥343॥(1891)]

Trans—342-343 Accept the *Nārakas* (as existing) like *jīva* etc on account of (their) being *pratyaksa* to me Is it that only that which is *pratyaksa* to one's own self (could be known as) *pratyaksa* and not anything else ? That which has been *pratyaksa* to any (person) in the world, is accepted as *pratyaksa* by the (whole) world Just the appearance of *sinha* etc though not *pratyaksa* to all, is accepted (by all as existing) (1890-1891)

टीका—हे आयुष्मन्नकम्पित ! “ साक्षादनुपलभ्यमानत्वात् ” इत्यसिद्धो हेतुः, यतोऽहं केवलप्रत्यक्षेण साक्षादेव पश्यामि नारकान्, ततो मत्प्रत्यक्षत्वात् “ सन्ति ” इति गृहाण प्रतिपद्यस्व नारकान्, जीवा-ऽजीवादि-पदार्थवत् । अथैवं मन्यसे—ममाप्रत्यक्षत्वात् कथमेतान् गृह्णामि ? । ननु दुरभिप्रायोज्यम्, यतः किं यत् स्वस्यात्मनः प्रत्यक्षं तदेवैकं नवरं प्रत्यक्षमुच्यते ? इति काका नेयम् । ननु यदपि कस्यचित् प्रत्ययितपुरुषस्यान्यस्य प्रत्यक्षं तदपि “ प्रत्यक्षम् ” इति गृह्यते व्यवह्रियते लोके; तथाहि—सिंह-सरभ-हंसादिदर्शनं सिद्धं प्रसिद्धं लोके, न च सिंहादयः सर्वजनप्रत्यक्षाः,

Tvam manyase pratyakṣa devāścandradayaastathānye pi |

Vidyā-mantropayanaphalādimddher gamyante n 340 n (1888)

Ye punah śrutimatraphala nairayika itī katham te grahitavyah |
Sakṣadanumanato va nupalambhād bhinnajattyah ? ||341|| (1889)]

Trans—340-341 You believe that deities like moon etc., are (directly) perceptible, so also are others perceptible as a result of religious prayers etc. But how are those denizens of hell that are known merely by hearing and that belong to a distinct species to be apprehended either directly or by inference, when they are (absolutely) non-perceptible ? (1888-1889)

टीका—हे आपुष्मककम्पित ! त्वमेव मन्यसे—देवास्तावच्चन्द्रादयः प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणसिद्धा एव, अन्ये त्वग्रस्यक्षा अपि विद्यामन्त्रोपयाधितकादिकल-सिद्धाऽनुमानतो मम्यन्ते; ये पुनः “ नारकाः ” इत्यभिधानमात्ररूपा भूतिरेव फलं येषां, न पुनस्तदभिधायकशब्दव्यतिरिक्तोऽर्थः, ते साक्षात्, अनुमानतो वाऽनुपलभ्यमानत्वेन तिर्यग्-नरा-ऽमरेभ्यः सर्वथा भिन्नजातीयाः कथं “ सन्ति ” इति ग्रहीतव्याः, स्वरविषाणवत् ? इति ॥ ३४०-३४१ ॥ (१८८८-१८८९)

D C—Alampita—Deities like moon etc are apprehended by concrete authenticities and others which are imperceptible are apprehended by means of inference as a result of religious prayers etc. But how are *narakas* that are quite different from gods *tryancas* and human beings and whose existence is recognized only by hearing to be accepted as existing when it is not apprehended by direct perception or even by inference ? n 340-341 (1888-1889) n

The reply is—

मह पञ्चक्खत्तणओ जीवाइं य व नारए गिण्ह ।

किं ज सपञ्चक्ख त पञ्चक्ख नवरि इक्क ? ॥ ३४२ ॥ (१८९०)

ज कासइ पञ्चक्ख पञ्चक्ख त पि घेप्पइ लोए ।

जह सीहाइदरिसण सिद्ध न य सबपञ्चक्ख ॥३४३॥ (१८९१)

Athavā yadindriyānām pratyaksam kim tadeva pratyaksam ? |
Upacāramātratastat pratyaksamanindriyam tathyam ||344|| (1892)]

Trans—344 Or, is it that what is perceptible to senses is alone *pratyaksa* ? It is *pratyaksa* by virtue of (mere) usage The real *pratyaksa* is beyond (the perception of) senses (1892)

टीका—अथवा, किं यदिन्द्रियाणां प्रत्यक्षं तदेव प्रत्यक्षमिष्यते भवता, मदीयं तु प्रत्यक्षं नाभ्युपगम्यते, अतीन्द्रियत्वात् ? । ननु महानयं विपर्यासः, यस्मादुपचारमात्रत एव तदिन्द्रियप्रत्यक्षं प्रत्यक्ष-तया व्यवह्रियते—यथाऽनुमाने बाह्यधूमादिलिङ्गद्वारेण बाह्यमग्नादिवस्तु ज्ञायते, नवमत्र, तत् उपचारात् प्रत्यक्षमिव प्रत्यक्षमुच्यते । परमार्थतस्तु—इदमपि परोक्षमेव, यतोऽक्षो जीवः, स चानुमानवदत्रापि वस्तु साक्षाद् न पश्यति, किन्त्विन्द्रियद्वारेणैव, ततोऽतीन्द्रियमेव तद्व्यं प्रत्यक्षमवगन्तव्यम्, तत्र जीवेन साक्षादेव वस्तुन उपलम्भादिति ॥ ३४४ ॥ (१८९२)

D C.—Since, that which is perceived, is beyond the, perception of senses, you do not admit it, as according to you only, that which is *indriya pratyaksa* is *pratyaksa* This is a great folly *Indriya-pratyaksa* is recognized as *pratyaksa* by means of *upacāra*, similar to the case of *anumāna*, when objects like fire etc are apprehended by means of external indications of smoke etc But the *pratyaksa* in my case is different from this. By means of mere *upacāra*, it is called *pratyaksa*, but really speaking, it is *parokṣa* as the *akṣa* (i-e *jīva*) does not apprehend the object directly as in the case of *anumāna*

The *atīndriya* or that which is beyond perception by (means of) sense-organs, should alone be accepted as *pratyaksa* as in that case, *jīva* directly perceives the object

Akampa —Although in case of *indriya-pratyaksa*, *jīva* does not apprehend an object directly, *indriyas* are undoubtedly able to recognize the object directly. In such a case, why should we not consider *indriya-pratyaksa* to be the *pratyaksa* itself ? || 344 (1892) ||

देख-काल-ग्राम-नगर-सरित्-समुद्रादयश्च न सर्वेऽपि मयः प्रत्यक्षाः, अप्यन्यस्यापि प्रत्यक्षास्ते प्रत्यक्षतया व्यवहियमाणा दृश्यन्ते। अतो मत्प्रत्यक्षानारक्षा किमिति प्रत्यक्षतया न व्यवहियन्ते ? इति ॥ ३४२-३४३ ॥
(१८९०-१८९१)

D C—Bhagavān —O long-lived *Akampa* ! your objection that *Nārakas* do not exist because they have not been apprehended by you is unfounded. I have perceived those *Nārakas* personally. Accept them therefore as existing on account of their being *pratyakṣa* to me like all other objects animate and inanimate

Secondly it is not appropriate to hold the obstinate view that nothing can be said to be *pratyakṣa* in this world unless and until it has not been witnessed by you. Usually that which has been witnessed by a trustworthy or respectable person is accepted as existing in this world. Existence of lion bear and swan etc is universally accepted by all even though those animals have not been *pratyakṣa* to each and every person in the world. You have not witnessed all countries rivers towns oceans and times still however you do not doubt their existence because they have already been *pratyakṣa* to other respectable persons

Similarly you shall have to accept the existence of *Nārakas* when they have already been *pratyakṣa* to me ॥ 342-343 (1890-1891) ॥

अहवा जमिन्दियाण पच्चक्ख किं तदेव पच्चक्खं ? ।

उवयारमेत्तओ त पच्चक्खमणिंदिय तरथ ॥ ३४४ ॥ (१८९२)

Ahava jamiṇḍiyāṇaṃ paṇṇakkhaṃ kiṃ tadeva paṇṇakkhaṃ ?
Uvayāramettao taṃ paṇṇakkhamaniṇḍiyaṃ tatthaṃ ॥ 344 ॥ (1892)

[अथवा यदिन्द्रियाणां प्रत्यक्षं किं तदेव प्रत्यक्षम् ? ।

उपचारमात्रतस्तत् प्रत्यक्षमनिन्द्रिय तस्यम् ॥ ३४४ ॥ (१८९२)

Athava yadīndriyaṇaṁ pratyakṣaṁ kim tadeva pratyakṣaṁ ? |
Upacāramatratastat pratyakṣamanīndriyaṁ tathyaṁ ||344|| (1892)]

Trans—344 Or, is it that what is perceptible to senses is alone *pratyakṣa*? It is *pratyakṣa* by virtue of (mere) usage. The real *pratyakṣa* is beyond (the perception of) senses (1892)

टीका—अथवा, किं यदिन्द्रियाणां प्रत्यक्षं तदेव प्रत्यक्षमिष्यते भवता, मदीयं तु प्रत्यक्षं नाभ्युपगम्यते, अतीन्द्रियत्वात् ? । ननु महानयं विपर्यासः, यस्मादुपचारमात्रत एव तदिन्द्रियप्रत्यक्षं प्रत्यक्ष-तया व्यवह्रियते—यथाऽनुमाने बाह्यधूमादिलिङ्गद्वारेण बाह्यमग्नादिवस्तु ज्ञायते, नवमत्र, तत उपचारात् प्रत्यक्षमिव प्रत्यक्षमुच्यते । परमार्थतस्तु—इदमपि परोक्षमेव, यतोऽक्षो जीवः, स चानुमानवदत्रापि वस्तु साक्षाद् न पश्यति, किन्त्विन्द्रियद्वारेणैव, ततोऽतीन्द्रियमेव तथ्यं प्रत्यक्षमवगन्तव्यम्, तत्र जीवेन साक्षादेव वस्तुन उपलम्भादिति ॥ ३४४ ॥ (१८९२)

D C.—Since, that which is perceived, is beyond the, perception of senses, you do not admit it, as according to you only, that which is *īndriya pratyakṣa* is *pratyakṣa*. This is a great folly. *Indriya-pratyakṣa* is recognized as *pratyakṣa* by means of *upacāra*, similar to the case of *anumāna*, when objects like fire etc are apprehended by means of external indications of smoke etc. But the *pratyakṣa* in my case is different from this. By means of mere *upacāra*, it is called *pratyakṣa*, but really speaking, it is *parokṣa* as the *ākṣa* (i-e *jīva*) does not apprehend the object directly as in the case of *anumāna*.

The *atīndriya* or that which is beyond perception by (means of) sense-organs, should alone be accepted as *pratyakṣa* as in that case, *jīva* directly perceives the object.

Akampita —Although in case of *īndriya-pratyakṣa*, *jīva* does not apprehend an object directly, *īndriyas* are undoubtedly able to recognize the object directly. In such a case, why should we not consider *īndriya-pratyakṣa* to be the *pratyakṣa* itself ? || 344 (1892) ||

मुत्ताइभावओ नोवलद्धिमतिंदियाइ कुमो व ।

उवलम्भदाराणि ताइ जीवो तदुवलद्धा ॥ ३४५ ॥ (१८९३)

Muttāibhāvaō novaladdhīmantīndiyāī kumbho vva ।

Uvalambhaddārāṇi tāī jīvo taduvaladdhā ॥ 345 ॥ (1893)

[मूर्तादिभावतो नोपलब्धिमन्तीन्द्रियाणि कुम्भ इव ।

उपलम्भदाराणि तानि जीवस्तदुपलब्धा ॥ ३४५ ॥ (१८९३)

Mūrtadibhāvato nopalabdhīmantīndriyāṇi kumbha iva ।

Upalambhadvārāṇi tāni jīvastadupalabdhā ॥ 345 ॥ (1893)]

Trans—Sense-organs have no power of perception on account of (their being) *mūṛta* etc, like *ghaṭa*. They are mere mediums of perception. *Jīva* is their (real) agent of perception (1893)

टीका—नोपलब्धिमन्तीन्द्रियाणि—न वस्तुज्ञायकानीत्यर्थः, पुद्गलसंघात रूपत्वेन मूर्तत्वात्, आदिशब्दादचेतनत्वात्, कुम्भवत् । नवरसुपलम्भस्य भोगादिज्ञानस्य द्वाराणि भवन्त्यमूनि, गवाक्षवत्, तत्सापेक्षस्यैव खोपपद्मस्य प्रयोषात् । जीव एष च तदुपलब्धा वस्तुपलम्भा ॥ ३४५ ॥ (१८९३)

D C—Since *indriyas* are *mūṛta* and *a-cetana* like *ghaṭa* they are not able to apprehend objects. They are only mediums of apprehension like a window. The real agent of perception is *Ātma* which is altogether different from *indriya* in this way ॥ 345 (1893) ॥

Besides

तदुवरमे वि सरणओ तद्वावारे वि नोवलभावो ।

इदियमिन्नो नाया पचगवक्खोवलद्धा वा ॥ ३४६ ॥ (१८९४)

Taduvarame vi saranaō tadvāvāre vi novalambhāō ।

Indiyabhinno nāyā paṇṇagavakkhōvaladdhā vā ॥ 346 ॥ (1894)

[तदुपरमेऽपि स्मरन्वत्स्वइयापारेऽपि नोपलम्भात् ।

इन्द्रियमिन्नो ज्ञाता पञ्चगवाक्षोपलम्भेव ॥ ३४६ ॥ (१८९४)

Tāduparame'pi smaranatastadvyāpāre'pi nopalambhāt ।
Indriyabhinno jñātā pancagavāksopalaabdheva ॥ 346 ॥ (1894)]

Trans—346 By virtue of recollection, even (when the the sense-organs) are pacified, and on account of non-perception, even (when the sense-organs) are at work, the agent of perception is (recognized) as different from sense-organs, like an observer from the five windows (1894)

टीका—इन्द्रियेभ्यो भिन्नो “ नाय त्ति ” ज्ञाता जीवः तदुपरमेऽपि इन्द्रियोपरमेऽपि तद् द्वारोपलब्धार्थानुस्मरणात्, तद्व्यापारेऽपिन्द्रियव्यापारेऽप्यन्यमनस्कतायामनुपलम्भात्; यथा पञ्चभिर्गवाक्षैरुपलब्धा वस्तूपलम्भकस्तेभ्यो भिन्न इति ॥ ३४६ ॥ (१८९४)

D C—Just as a person looking from the five windows, is different from those five windows, the Soul which is the agent of perception is different from the sense-organs Because even when *indriyas* are not at work, the Soul is able to perceive an object by means of recollection, and if the Soul is absent-minded, the object is not at all perceived inspite of *indriyas* being at work. ॥ 346 (1894) ॥

Moreover,

जो पुण अणिंदितु च्चिय जीवो सबवप्पिहाणविगमाओ ।

सो सुबहुयं वियाणइ अवणीयघरो जहा दट्ठा ॥३४७॥ (१८९५)

Jo puna anindiu cciya jīvo savvappihāna vigamāo ।

So subahuyam viyānai avanīyagharo jahā datṭhā ॥ 347 ॥ (1895)

[यः पुनरनिन्द्रिय एव जीवः सर्वपिधानविगमात् ।

स सुबहुकं विजानात्यपनीतगृहो यथा द्रष्टा ॥ ३४७ ॥ (१८९५)

Yah punaranindriya eva jīvah sarvapīdhanavigamāt ।

Sa subahukam vijānatyapanītagriho yathā drastā ॥347॥ (1895)]

Trans—347 The Soul, like an observer who is away from the house, being void of sense-organs, apprehends much more on account of all the obstructions (being) removed (1895)

टीका-य पुनरनिन्द्रिय एव केवलज्ञानसंपन्नो जीवः स इन्द्रियज्ञानवतो जीवात् सुबहु विद्वानातीति प्रतिज्ञा, सर्वविधानविगमात् सर्वावरण क्षयादि-
त्यर्थः, यथा पञ्चगवाक्षगृहस्थितपुरुषात् सर्वथाऽपनीतगृहः सर्वत एवाऽऽका-
शीकृतप्रदेशे स्थितो द्रष्टा पुरुष इति ॥ ३४७ ॥ (१८९५)

D C—Just as a person looking from the open space apprehends much more than a person looking from the five windows the soul possessing absolute knowledge apprehends much more than anything that apprehends through *indriyas*. ॥ 347 (1895) ॥

And the *jñāna* obtained by *indriyas* in this way is not *pratyakṣa*—

न हि पञ्चक्ख धम्मंतरेण तद्धम्ममेत्तगहणाओ ।

कयगततो व सिद्धी कुभाणिच्चत्तमेत्तस्त ॥ ३४८ ॥ (१८९६)

*Na hi pañcakkham dhammantarena taddhammamettagahaṇāo ।
Kayagattao va siddhi kumbhāṇiccatamettassa ॥ 348 ॥ (1896)*

[न हि प्रत्यक्ष धर्मान्तरेण तद्धर्ममात्रग्रहणात् ।

कृतकत्वात् इव सिद्धिः कुम्भानित्यत्रमात्रस्य ॥ ३४८ ॥ (१८९६)

*Na hi pratyakṣam dharmantareṇa taddharmamastragrahapāt ।
Kṛtakatvata iva siddhi kumbhāṇityatramāstrasya ॥ 348 ॥ (1896)*

Trans—348 Like the establishment of mere transitoriness of *ghata* on account of its being facititious the *indriya-pratyakṣa* is not *pratyakṣa* (also) on account of its characteristics being accepted by another characteristic. (1896)

टीका-न भवति प्रत्यक्षम् " इन्द्रियैर्ज्ञानम् " इति प्रक्रमास्तुभ्यते ।
पञ्चरादीन्द्रियस्य रूपादिपरिच्छेदव्यक्तिविशेषरूपेण धर्मान्तरेण हेतुभूतेन
तस्यानन्तधर्मात्मकस्य वस्तुनो यद् रूपादिकमक धर्ममात्रं तस्य ग्रहणादिति
हेतुः । किं तद् यथा न प्रत्यक्षम् ? इत्याह-यथा कृतकत्वाद् घटानित्यस्य
मात्रसिद्धिलक्षणमनुमानमित्येष दृष्टान्तः । इदं च यथा परस्मात् साध्यसिद्धौ

नानुमानं प्रत्यक्षम्, तथेन्द्रियजमपि विज्ञानमित्येतावान् भावार्थ इति
॥ ३४८ ॥ (१८९६)

D. C—Just as *anumāna* capable of attaining the accomplishment of a desired object by means of another object, cannot be called *pratyakṣa jñāna*, so also apprehension by means of *indriyas*, could not be called *pratyakṣa*. Like an inference establishing the *a-nityatā* of *ghata* by means of its *kṛitakatva*, cognizance attained by *indriyas* is not *pratyakṣa*. *Indriya-pratyakṣa-jñāna* is limited to the apprehension of only *rūpa* etc. by means of eye etc ॥ 348 (1896) ॥

Besides,

पुव्वोवलद्धसंबन्धसरणओ वानलो व धूमाओ ।

अहव निमित्तन्तरओ निमित्तमक्खस्स करणाई ॥३४९॥(१८९७)

Puvvovaladdhasambandhasarāṇo vāṇalo vva dhūmāo ।

Ahava nimittāntarao nimittamakkhassa karanāim ॥ 349 ॥ (1897)

[पूर्वोपलब्धसंबन्धस्मरणतो वाऽनल इव धूमात् ।

अथवा निमित्तान्तरतो निमित्तमक्षस्य करणानि ॥ ३४९ ॥ (१८९७)

Pūrvopalabdhasambandhasmaranato vā'nala iva dhūmāt ।

Athavā nimittāntarato nimittamaksasya karanāni ॥ 349 ॥ (1897)]

Trans—349 Or, like the inference of fire from smoke, on account of the recollection by means of (its) relations of the past or on account of any (other) reason, the sense-organs serve as the instrumental cause to the Soul (1897)

टीका—“ वा ” इत्यथवा, न प्रत्यक्षमिन्द्रियजं ज्ञानमिति सैव प्रतिज्ञा, पूर्वोपलब्धश्चासौ संबन्धश्च पूर्वोपलब्धसंबन्धस्तत्स्मरणोज्जायमानत्वात् धूमा-
दनलज्ञानवत्; तथाहि—“घटोऽयं, पूर्वसंकेतकाल एवभूत एव पदार्थे प्रत्ययि-
ताभिज्ञपुरुषाद् घटसंकेतस्य मया गृहीतत्वात्” इति पूर्वोपलब्धसंबन्धस्मरणादेव
सर्वस्यापि घटादिग्राहकमिन्द्रियज्ञानमुपजायते; अन्यथा नालिकेरद्वीपाद्या-

टीका-य पुनरनिन्द्रिय एव केवलज्ञानसंपन्नो जीवात् इन्द्रियज्ञानवतो जीवात् सुबहु विद्वानासीति प्रतिज्ञा, सर्वविधानविगमात् सर्वावरण क्षयादि-
त्यर्थः, यथा पञ्चगवाक्षगृहस्थितपुरुषात् सर्वथाऽपनीतगृहः सर्वत्र एवाऽऽका-
शीकृतप्रवेशे स्थितो द्रष्टा पुरुष इति ॥ ३४७ ॥ (१८९५)

D C—Just as a person looking from the open space apprehends much more than a person looking from the fire windows the soul possessing absolute knowledge apprehends much more than anything that apprehends through *indriyas*.
॥ 347 (1895) ॥

And the *jñāna* obtained by *indriyas* in this way is not *pratyakṣa*—

न हि पञ्चक्ख धम्मंतरेण तद्धम्ममेत्तगहणाओ ।

कयगत्तओ व सिद्धी कुभाणिच्चत्तमेत्तस्स ॥ ३४८ ॥ (१८९६)

*Na hi paccakkham dhammantarena taddhammamettagahanāo ।
Kayagattao va siddhi kumbhāniccattamettassa ॥ 348 ॥ (1896)*

[न हि प्रत्यक्ष धर्मान्तरेण तद्धर्ममात्रग्रहणात् ।

कृतकत्वत इव सिद्धिः कुम्भानित्यत्वमात्रस्य ॥ ३४८ ॥ (१८९६)

*Na hi pratyakṣam dharmantareṇa taddharmamātragrahapāt ।
Kṛtakatvata iva siddhiḥ kumbhānityatvamātrasya ॥ 348 ॥ (1898)*

Trans—348 Like the establishment of mere transitoriness of *ghāta* on account of its being facilitious the *indriya-pratyakṣa*, is not *pratyakṣa* (also) on account of its characteristics being accepted by another characteristic. (1896)

टीका-न भवति प्रत्यक्षम् “ इन्द्रियज्ञानम् ” इति प्रकृमास्त्यप्येते ।
असुरादीन्द्रियस्य रूपादिपरिच्छेदशक्तिविशेषरूपेण धर्मान्तरेण हेतुभूतेन
तत्त्वानन्तधर्मात्मकस्य वस्तुनो यद् रूपादिकमकं धर्ममात्रं तस्य ग्रहणादिति
हेतुः । किं तद् यथा न प्रत्यक्षम् ? इत्याह-यथा कृतकत्वाद् पटानित्यत्व
मात्रसिद्धित्वमनुमानमित्येष दृष्टान्तः । इह च यथा परस्मात् साध्यसिद्धौ

obtained by the Soul from any external *namitta*. All sorts of *jñāna* except the above-mentioned three, are mere *anumānas* as they apprehend objects indirectly. In case of *jñānas* like *Avadhī* etc, since the Soul apprehends the object directly, the knowledge is called *pratyakṣa*

केवल-मणो-हिरहियस्स सवमणुमाणमेत्तयं जम्हा ।

नारगसब्भावम्मि य तदत्थि जं तेण ते संति ॥३५०॥ (१८९८)

Kevala-Maṇo-hirahiyassa savvamanumānamettayam jamhā ।
Nāragasabbhāvammi ya tadatthi jam tena te santi ॥350॥ (1898)

[केवल-मनो-स्वधिरहितस्य सर्वमनुमानमात्रकं यस्मात् ।

नरकसद्भावे च तदस्ति यत् तेन ते सन्ति ॥ ३५० ॥ (१८९८)

Kevala-Mano-'vadhīrahitasya sarvamanumāna mātṛakam yasmād ।
Naraksadbhāve ca tadasti yat tena te santi ॥ 350 ॥ (1898)]

Trans—350 Since everything pertaining to that which is void of *Kevala*, *Manah-paryāya* and *Avadhī* (sorts of *jñāna*) is mere inference, it is (present) in case of (establishing) the existence of hellish denizens. By (virtue of) that (*anumāna*), the *Nārakas* are existing (1898)

टीका-केवल-मनःपर्याया-स्वधिज्ञानरहितस्य प्रमातुः संवन्धि सर्व-
मपि ज्ञानं यस्मादनुमानमात्रमेव, परोक्षार्थविषयत्वात् । केवलादिज्ञानत्रयं
तु वस्तुसाक्षात्कारित्वात् प्रत्यक्षम् । तदेवमनुमानं प्रत्यक्षं च यस्माद् नारक-
सद्भावे साध्ये विद्यत एव, तेन ते नारका सन्तीति प्रतिपद्यस्व । तत्र प्रत्यक्षं
मदीयमेव केवलज्ञानम् ॥ ३५० ॥ (१८९८)

D C—Every sort of knowledge excepting *Avadhī*-*Manah-paryāya* and *Kevala* is mere *anumāna* on account of its being based on the indirect perception of an object. *Jñānas* like *Kevala* etc apprehend the object directly and hence they are called *pratyakṣa*. Since the *anumāna* pertaining to *Nārakas*,

यातस्याप्यविश्लेषेणैतत् स्यात् । अस्यास-पाटवादिभ्यश्चातुकारितयेन्द्रियज्ञान-
प्रवृत्तेः सर्वत्रैतद् न लक्ष्यत इति । अथवा, प्रत्यक्षमिन्द्रियज्ञानम्, पूर्वप्रतिपा-
दितभ्युत्पत्त्याऽयस्य जीवस्य स्वव्यतिरिक्तनिमित्तविश्लेषाज्जायमानत्वाद्,
धूमादग्निज्ञानवत् । स्वव्यतिरिक्तानि च निमित्तान्यस्य जीवस्य कस्या
नीन्द्रियाणि मन्तव्यानि । यच्च प्रत्यक्षं न तर्हीवस्य निमित्तान्तराज्जायते
किन्तु जीवस्तत्र साक्षादेव श्रेय पश्यति, यथाऽवधि-मनः पर्याय-केवल
ज्ञानेऽपि ॥ ३४९ ॥ (१८९७)

D C—Like the perception of fire from smoke the perception due to sense-organs is also produced from the recollection of the connections of the past. So it is not *pratyakṣa*. Take the example of *ghaṭa*. The name *ghaṭa* was given to it in the past. We recognize it as *ghaṭa* on the basis of its *purvakaḥ saṅketa*. Hence the knowledge about *ghaṭa* is apprehended by means of *indriyas* from the recollection of its past relations. If it were not so a person coming from a distant island who has neither heard nor seen anything about *ghaṭa* would at once be able to recognize it as *ghaṭa*. This sort of *indriya-jñāna* is produced very quickly from recollection etc. due to constant practice and cleverness and hence it is not marked everywhere.

Moreover just as one apprehends *agni* from *dharma*, which is absolutely different from himself, the apprehension in this case is also attained by Soul from the *indriyas*, which are absolutely different from the Soul, showing thereby that the knowledge thus obtained is not *pratyakṣa* but *parokṣa*.

Pratyakṣa jñāna is acceptable to Soul directly like the ¹*Avadhī*, ²*Manah-paryaya* and ³*Kevala-jñāna*s and it is never

1. The first stage of perception when the attention is concentrated.
2. The state of mental perception which precedes the attainment of perfect knowledge.
3. Absolute Perception.

obtained by the Soul from any external *nimitta*. All sorts of *jñāna* except the above-mentioned three, are mere *anumānas* as they apprehend objects indirectly. In case of *jñānas* like *Avadhī* etc, since the Soul apprehends the object directly, the knowledge is called *pratyakṣa*.

केवल-मणो-हिरहियस्स सबमणुमाणमेत्तयं जम्हा ।
नारगसब्भावम्मि य तदत्थि जं तेण ते संति ॥३५०॥ (१८९८)

Kevala-Maṇo-hirahiyassa savvamanumānamettayam jamhā ।
Nāragasabbhāvammi ya tadatthi jam tena te santi ॥350॥ (1898)

[केवल-मनो-स्वधिरहितस्य सर्वमनुमानमात्रकं यस्मात् ।
नारकसद्भावे च तदस्ति यत् तेन ते सन्ति ॥ ३५० ॥ (१८९८)

Kevala-Mano-'vadhīrahitasya sarvamanumāna mātrakam yasmād ।
Nāraksadbhāve ca tadasti yat tena te santi ॥ 350 ॥ (1898)]

Trans—350 Since everything pertaining to that which is void of *Kevala*, *Manah-paryāya* and *Avadhī* (sorts of *jñāna*) is mere inference, it is (present) in case of (establishing) the existence of hellish denizens. By (virtue of) that (*anumāna*), the *Nārakas* are existing (1898)

टीका-केवल-मनःपर्याया-स्वधिज्ञानरहितस्य प्रमातुः संबन्धि सर्व-
मपि ज्ञानं यस्मादनुमानमात्रमेव, परोक्षार्थविषयत्वात् । केवलादिज्ञानत्रयं
तु वस्तुसाक्षात्कारित्वात् प्रत्यक्षम् । तदेवमनुमानं प्रत्यक्षं च यस्माद् नारक-
सद्भावे साध्ये विद्यत एव, तेन ते नारका सन्तीति प्रतिपद्यस्व । तत्र प्रत्यक्षं
मदीयमेव केवलज्ञानम् ॥ ३५० ॥ (१८९८)

D C—Every sort of knowledge excepting *Avadhī-Manah-paryāya* and *Kevala* is mere *anumāna* on account of its being based on the indirect perception of an object. *Jñānas* like *Kevala* etc apprehend the object directly and hence they are called *pratyakṣa*. Since the *anumāna* pertaining to *Nārakas*,

is *pratyakṣa* the existence of *Nārakas* is established without doubt. The *pratyakṣa jñāna* in this case is my own *Kevala-jñāna* ॥ 350 (1898) ॥

पापफलस्स पगिट्ठस्स भोइणो कम्मओऽवसेस व्व ।
सन्ति धुव तेऽभिमया नेरइया, अह मई होज्जा ॥३५१॥ (१८९९)
अच्चत्थदुक्खिया जे तिरिय-नरा-नारग ति तेऽभिमया ।
त न जओ सुरसोक्खप्पगरिससरिस न त दुक्खं ॥३५२॥ (१९००)

Pāvaphalassa pagiṭṭhassa bhōino kammaovasesa vva ।
Santi dhuvam te'bhimayā neraiyā, aha mai hojjā ॥ 351 ॥ (1899)

Accatthadukkhīyā je tiriya-narā-nāraga ti te'bhimayā ।
Tam na jao surasokkhappagarisasarisam na tam dukkham ॥352॥

[पापफलस्य प्रकृष्टस्य भोगिनः कर्मतोऽवशेष इव ।
सन्ति ध्रुवं तेऽभिमता नैरयिकाः, अथ मतिर्मवेत् ॥ ३५१ ॥ (१८९९)
अत्यर्थदुःखिता ये तिर्यग्-नरा-नारका इति तेऽभिमताः ।
तद् न यतः सुरसौख्यप्रकर्षसदृशं न तद् दुःखम् ॥३५२॥ (१९००)

Pāpaphalassa prakṛṣṭhasya bhogināḥ karmato vāśeṣa eva ।
Santi dhruvam te'bhimata nairayikāḥ atha matir-bhavet ॥351॥ (1899)

Atyarthadukkhita ye tiryag-narā-nāraka iti te'bhimataḥ ।
Tad na yataḥ surasaukhyaprakṛṣṣasadrśam na tad duḥkham ॥352॥

Trans —351-352 Like (the enjoyers of) the rest of *Kāmas*, there are (certainly) some who (have to suffer) the result of great sins. They are really known as the denizens of hell. Here it is not appropriate to assert that extremely miserable *tiryancas* and human beings are the denizens of hell. Because, (their) miseries are not as extreme as the happiness of gods. (1899-1900)

टीका-प्रकृष्टस्य पापफलस्य भोगिनः केषिन् ध्रुवं सन्ति “कम्मत्ति”

कर्मफलत्वात् तस्येत्यर्थः, अवशेषवदिति—यथा जघन्यमध्यमपापफलभोगिनः शेषास्तिर्यङ्—नरा विद्यन्त इत्यर्थः दृष्टान्तः । “ तेऽभिमया नेरइय त्ति ” ये प्रकृष्टपापफलभोगिनस्ते “ नारकाः ” इत्यभिमताः । अथ परस्यैवंभूता मतिर्भवेत्—अत्यर्थं दुःखिता ये तिर्यग्—मनुष्यास्त एवोत्कृष्टपापफलभोगित्वाद् नारकव्यपदेशभाजो भविष्यन्ति, किमदृष्टनारककल्पनया ? इति । तदेतद् न, यतोऽतिदुःखितानामपि तिर्यग्—मनुष्याणां यद् दुःखं तदमरसौख्यप्रकर्षसदृश-प्रकर्षवद् न भवति । इदमुक्तं भवति—येषामुत्कृष्टपापफलभोगस्तेषां संभवद्भिः सर्वैरपि प्रकारैर्दुःखेन भवितव्यम्, न चैवमतिदुःखितानामपि तिर्यगादीनां दृश्यते, आलोक—तरुच्छाया—शीतपवन—सरित्—सरः—कूपजलादिसुखस्याति दुःखितेष्वपि तेषु दर्शनात्—छेदन—भेदन—पाचन—दहन—दम्भन—वज्र—कण्टक—शिलास्फालनादिभिश्च नरकप्रसिद्धैः प्रकारैर्दुःखस्यादर्शनात्, इत्यादि प्रागुक्तानुसारेण स्वयमेवाभ्यूह्य वाच्यमिति । आगमार्थश्चायमवगन्तव्य इति ।

सततमनुबद्धमुक्तं दुःखं नरकेषु तीव्रपरिणामम् ।

तिर्यक्षूष्ण—भय—क्षुब्ध—वृडादिदुःखं सुख चाल्पम् ॥ १ ॥

सुख—दुःखे मनुजानां मनःशरीराश्रये बहुविकल्पे ।

सुखमेव तु देवानामल्पं दुःखं तु मनसि भवम् ॥ २ ॥

इति ॥ ३५१—३५२ ॥ (१८९९—१९००) ॥

D C —Bhagavān —Just as, there are *tryancas* and *manusyas* to enjoy the fruits of moderate sins, there do exist some who have to suffer the consequences of great sins. And take it for certain that they are none but *Nārahas*

Akampaṭa —Since the excessively miserable *tryancas* and *manusyas* have to undergo the consequences of great sins, why not to take them as *Nārahas* ?

Bhagavān —It is not so Sufferers of the consequences of great sins ought to be miserable in all respects

Tryancas and *manusyas* cannot be said to be miserable in all respects as required in case of *Nārahas* They are

Is *pratyakṣa* the existence of *Nārakas* is established without doubt. The *pratyakṣa jñāna* in this case is my own *Kevala-jñāna* || 350 (1898) ||

पापफलस्स पगिट्ठस्स भोइणो कम्मओऽवसेस व ।
सन्ति धुव तेऽभिमया नेरइया, अह मई होज्जा ॥३५१॥ (१८९९)
अत्थस्यदुक्खिया जे तिरिय—नरा—नारग ति तेऽभिमया ।
त न जओ सुरसोक्खप्पगरिससरिस न त दुक्ख ॥३५२॥ (१९००)

Pāvaphalassa pagittṭhassa bhōino kammaovasesa vva ।
Santi dhuvam te'bhimayā neralyā, aha mai hojjā || 351 || (1899)
Accatthadukkhivā je tiriya-narā-nāraga tti te'bhimayā ।
Tam na jao surasokkhappagarisesarisam na tam dukkham || 352 ||

[पापफलस्य प्रकटस्य भोगिनः कर्मतोऽवशेष इव ।
सन्ति ध्रुव तेऽभिमता नैरयिकाः, अथ मतिर्मवेत् ॥ ३५१ ॥ (१८९९)
अत्यर्थदुःखिता ये तिर्यग्—नरा—नारका इति तेऽभिमताः ।
तद् न यतः सुरसौख्यप्रकर्षसदृशं न तद् दुःखम् ॥३५२॥ (१९००)

Pāpaphalasya prakṛṣṭhasya bhoginah karmato vāśesa iva ।
Santi dhruvam te bhimata nairayikāḥ atha matir-bhavot || 351 || (1899)
Atyarthadukkhita ye tiryag-nara-nāraka ita te'bhimataḥ ।
Tad na yataḥ surasaukhyaprakṛṣasadrśam na tad duḥkham || 352 ||

Trans—351-352 Like (the enjoyers of) the rest of *Karmas*, there are (certainly) some who (have to suffer) the result of great sins. They are really known as the denizens of hell. Here it is not appropriate to assert that extremely miserable *tiryancas* and human beings are the denizens of hell. Because, (their) miseries are not as extreme as the happiness of gods. (1899-1900)

टीका—प्रकटस्य पापफलस्य भोगिनः केषिद् ध्रुवं सन्ति “कम्मउ ति”

टीका—“ नारकाः सन्ति ” इति सत्यमकम्पित ! इदम्, मद्बचनात्, यथाऽवशेषं त्वत्संशयादिविषयं मद्बचनम् । अथवा, “ सर्वज्ञवचनत्वात् ” इत्येवं हेतुर्वक्तव्यः, त्वदनुमतमनु-जैमिन्यादिसर्वज्ञवचनवदिति ॥३५३॥ (१९०१)

D C—Accept the statement that *Nāraḥas* exist as true *O Akampita* ! either because it is my statement, or, because it is as real as the other statements like those regarding your doubts etc, or, because it is the statement of an omniscient as great as your high-esteemed *Manu*, *Jaiminî* etc ॥ 353 (1901) ॥

भय-राग-दोस-मोहाभावाओ सच्चमणइवाइं च ।

सच्चं चिय मे वयणं जाणयमज्झत्थवयणं व ॥३५४॥ (१९०२)

Bhaya-rāga-dosa-mohābhāvāo saccamanaivāim ca ।

Saccam eiya me vaynam jānaya majjhattha vayanam va ॥354॥

[भय-राग-द्वेष-मोहाभावात् सत्यमनतिपाति च ।

सत्यमेव मे वचनं ज्ञायकमध्यस्थवचनमिव ॥ ३५४ ॥ (१९०२)

Bhaya-rāga-dvesa-mohābhāvāt satyamanatipati ca ।

Satyameva me vacanam jñāyakamadhyasthavacanainiva ॥354॥(1902)।

Trans—354 Everything that I say is certainly true and free from faults like words of an intelligent and impartial person, on account of the (complete) absence of fear, attachment, aversion and infatuation (in me) (1902)†

किह सवण्णु त्ति मई पच्चक्खं सव्वसंसयच्छेया ।

भय-राग-दोसरहिओ तल्लिङ्गाभावओ सोम्म ! ॥३५५॥(१९०३)

Kiha savvanṇu tti mai paccakkham savvasamsayaccheyā ।

Bhaya-rāga-dosarahio talliṅgābhāvaō Somma ! ॥ 355 ॥ (1903)

[कथं सर्वज्ञ इति मतिः प्रत्यक्षं सर्वसंशयच्छेदात् ।

भय-राग-दोषरहितस्तल्लिङ्गाभावतः सौम्य ! ॥ ३५५ ॥ (१९०३)

entitled to various means of pleasure like light, shades of tree cool-breeze river and stream etc. On the other hand various horrors of hell such as those of being killed, pierced, cooked burnt, pressed, and dashed against stone-slabs are not experienced by *tiryanakas* or *manuṣyas*. Only *Narakas* are doomed to undergo such afflictions.

It should be noted in the *āgamas* also that—

Satātamanubādhamuktam duḥkham narakeṣu tīrpaṇṇam
Tīraksāṇa-bhaya-kaut-tridāduḥkham sukham oalpam || 1 ||

Sukh-duḥkha manuṣyam manāḥ-karīṣa īrayo bahuvikalpe |

Sukhameva tu deva nāmalpam duḥkham tu māṇsi bhavam || 2 ||

[*Narakas* have always to undergo the afflictions of excessive effects. *Tīryanakas* have greater proportion of affliction like heat fear hunger and thirst etc and smaller proportion of happiness. *manuṣyas* have pleasures and pains (almost in equal proportion) pertaining to body and mind while gods have absolute happiness and very little misery] || 351-352 || (1899-1900)]

सच्च चेदमकम्पिय । मह वयणाओऽवसेसवयण व ।

सवण्णुत्तणओ वा अणुमयसवण्णुवयण व ॥ ३५३ ॥ (१९०१)

Saccam cedamakampiya ! maha vayanāṇo vasesavayanam va |
Savannuttanao vā anumayasavannuvasayanam va || 353 || (1901)

[सत्य चेदमकम्पित ! मम वचनादवसेषवचनमिव ।

सर्वज्ञत्वतो वाऽनुमतसर्वज्ञवचनमिव ॥ ३५३ ॥ (१९०१)

Satyam cedamakampita ! mama vacanadavaseṣavacanamiṣa |
Sarvajñatvato va nunatasarvajñavacanamiṣa || 353 || (1901)]

Trans.—353 This is true. O *Akampiṭa* ! because it is my statement. Or (it is true) like other statements. Or by virtue of (my) all knowing faculty (it is true) like the statement of an authorized omniscient. (1901)

टीका—“ नारकाः सन्ति ” इति सत्यमकम्पित ! इदम्, मद्बचनात्, यथाऽवशेषं त्वत्संशयादिविषयं मद्बचनम् । अथवा, “ सर्वज्ञवचनत्वात् ” इत्येवं हेतुर्वक्तव्यः, त्वदनुमतमनु-जैमिन्यादिसर्वज्ञवचनवदिति ॥३५३॥ (१९०१)

D C—Accept the statement that *Nārakas* exist as true *O Akampita* ! either because it is my statement, or, because it is as real as the other statements like those regarding your doubts etc, or, because it is the statement of an omniscient as great as your high-esteemed *Manu*, *Jaiminî* etc ॥ 353 (1901) ॥

भय-राग-दोस-मोहाभावाओ सच्चमणइवाइं च ।

सच्चं चिय मे वयणं जाणयमज्झत्थवयणं व ॥३५४॥ (१९०२)

Bhaya-rāga-dosa-mohābhāvāo saccamanaivāim ca ।

Saccam eiya me vaynam jānaya majjhattha vayanam va ॥354॥

[भय-राग-द्वेष-मोहाभावात् सत्यमनतिपाति च ।

सत्यमेव मे वचनं ज्ञायकमध्यस्थवचनमिव ॥ ३५४ ॥ (१९०२)

Bhaya-rāga-dvesa-mohābhavāt satyamanatīpatī ca ।

Satyameva me vacanam jñayakamadhyasthavacanamiva ॥354॥(1902)]

Trans—354 Everything that I say is certainly true and free from faults like words of an intelligent and impartial person, on account of the (complete) absence of fear, attachment, aversion and infatuation (in me) (1902)†

किह सवण्णु त्ति मई पच्चक्खं सवसंसयच्छेया ।

भय-राग-दोसरहिओ तल्लिङ्गाभावओ सोम्म ! ॥३५५॥(१९०३)

Kiha savvanu tti mai paccakkham savvasamsayaccheyā ।

Bhaya-rāga-dosarahio talliṅgābhāvao Somma ! ॥ 355 ॥ (1903)

([कथं सर्वज्ञ इति मतिः प्रत्यक्षं सर्वसंशयच्छेदात् ।

भय-राग-दोपरहितस्तल्लिङ्गाभावतः सौम्य ! ॥ ३५५ ॥ (१९०३)

Katham sarvajña itī matīḥ pratyakṣam sarvasamāyācchedat |
Bhaya-rāga-dosa-rāhitastallīṅga-bhāvataḥ Saumya # 355 # (1903)]

Trans—355 You might ask “How are you to be (accepted as) omniscient? “Evidently because I remove all doubts and and because I am free from even the symptoms of the faults such as fear attachment etc. (1903)

टीका-इयमपि व्याख्यातार्या । यदपि “ न ह वै प्रेत्य नारकाः सन्ति ” इत्यादौ नारकामावः सङ्गृह्यते भवता, तदप्युक्तम्, यतोऽयमत्राभिप्रायो मन्तव्यः-न खलु प्रेत्य परलोके मेवादिबन्धनाश्रयाः केचनाप्यवस्थिता नारकाः सन्ति, किन्तु य इहोक्तं पापमर्त्यपति, स इतो गत्वा प्रेत्य नारको भवति, अतः केनापि तत्पाप न विधेयं यन प्रेत्य नारकैर्भूयते । तदेवं छिन्नस्तत्संशयो भगवता ॥ ३५५ ॥ (१९०३)

D C—If you doubt about my *sarvajñata*, O *Saumya*! you are not justified. For since I have removed all your doubts and am prepared to remove them at present if you entertain any I am *sarvajña*

Moreover in the sentences such as *Na ha vaḥ pretya nārakāḥ santi*” etc you have suspected the existence of *Nārakas*. But it is not so The import of those sentences is that there are no *Nārakas* everlasting like *Meru* etc. in the other world, but those who commit great sins in this world would become *Nārakas* in the next world. The sentences therefore mean to assert that no body should commit such sins lest they might become the denizens of hell after death.

The *Bhagavān* thus removed his doubts # 355 (1903) #

So

छिन्नस्मि ससयस्मी जिणेण जर-मरणविष्यमुक्केणं ।

सो समणो पव्वड्ढो तिहि ओ सह खड्दियसयहिं ॥३५६॥(१९०४)

Chinnamī saṁsayammi Jinena jara-maraṇavippamukkenam |

So samano pavvaḷo tīhi o saha khaṇḍiyasaehim # 356 # (1904)

[छिन्ने संशये जिनेन जरा-मरणविप्रमुक्तेन ।

स श्रमणः प्रव्रजितस्त्रिभिस्तु सह खण्डिकशतैः ॥ ३५६ ॥ (१९०४)

Chinne saṁśaye Jinena jarā-maranaṇavipramuktena ।

Sa śramanaḥ pravrajitaśtribhistu saha khandikaśataih ॥356॥(1904)]

Trans—356 When the doubt was removed by the *Tīrthankara*, who was entirely free from old age and death, that saint accepted the *Dīksā* along with his three hundred pupils (1904)

End of the Discussion with the Eighth Gaṇadhara.

Chapter IX

नवमगणधरवक्त्रपता ।

Discussion with the Ninth Ganadhara

ते पव्वहए सोउ अयलभाया आगच्छई जिणसगास ।

वव्वामि ण वदामी वदिता पज्जुवासामि ॥ ३५७ ॥ (१९०५)

To pavvāle sōum Ayalabhāyā āgacchāi Jinasagāsam ।

Vaccāmi na vandāmi vanditā pajjувāsāmi ॥ 357 ॥ (1905)

[तान् प्रव्रजितान् सुत्वाऽपठन्नाताऽगच्छति त्रिनसकाशम् ।

व्रजामि वन्दे वन्दिता पर्युपासे ॥ ३५७ ॥ (१९०५)

Tan pravrajītan śrutva calabhrāta gacchati Trinaskāsam ।

Vrajāmi vande vanditva paryupase ॥ 357 ॥ (1905)]

Trans—357 Having heard that they had renounced the world, *Acalabhrūta* comes before the *Tirthankara*. (He thinks -) I may go, pay my homage, and worship him. (1905)

आमट्ठो य जिणेण जाइ-जरा-मरणविप्पमुक्केण ।

नामेण य गोत्तेण य सव्वण्णु सव्वदरिस्सी ण ॥ ३५८ ॥ (१९०६)

Ābhaṭṭho ya Jīṇenam jāi-jarā-marānavippamukkenam ।

Nāmena ya gottēṇa ya savaṇṇū savaḍaḍarissī ṇa ॥ 358 ॥ (1906)

[आमापितथ जिनेन जाति-जरा-मरणविप्रमुक्तेन ।

नाम्ना च गोत्रेण च सर्वज्ञेन सर्वदर्शिना ॥ ३५८ ॥ (१९०६)

Ābhāṭṭhaṇ Jīṇena jati-jarā-marānavipramukkena ।

Nāmnā ca gotreṇa ca sarvajñeṇa sarvaḍarśinā ॥ 358 ॥ ()]

Trans—358 He was, then, addressed by his name and lineage by the *Tīrthankara*, who was entirely free from birth, old age, and death, who was omniscient, and who had complete *darśana* (undifferentiated knowledge) (1906)

The *Tīrthankara* then said —

किं मण्णे पुण्ण-पावं अत्थि नत्थि त्ति संसओ तुज्झ ।
वेयपयाण य अत्थं न याणसी तेसिमो अत्थो ॥३५९॥ (१९०७)

Kim manne punna-pāvam atthi natthi tti samsao tujjha ।
Veyapayāna ya attham na yānāsī tesimo attho ॥ 359 ॥ (1907)

[किं मन्यसे पुण्य-पापे स्तो न स्त इति संशयस्तव ।

वेदपदानां चार्थं न जानासि तेषामयमर्थः ॥ ३५९ ॥ (१९०७)

Kim manyase punya-pāpe sto na sta iti samśayastava ।
Vedapadānām cārtham na jānāsī tesamayamarthah ॥359॥(1907)]

Trans—359 What are you thinking about ? You entertain the doubt as to whether *punya* and *pāpa* exist or not But, (ca) you do not understand the (real) meaning of the sentences of the *Vedas* Here is their (real) interpretation (1907)

टीका—हे आयुष्मन्त्रचलभ्रातः ! त्वमेवं मन्यसे—किं पुण्य-पापे स्तो न वा ? इति । अयं चानुचितः संशयः, यस्माद् विरुद्धवेदपदनिबन्धनो विरुद्धदर्शनश्रुतिनिबन्धनश्च तव वर्तते । तत्र वेदपदानि तावत्—“पुरुष एवेदं गिन सर्वम् ”—इत्यादि यथा द्वितीयगणधरे तथा वाच्यानि । तेषां चार्थं त्वं न जानासीत्याद्यपि तथैव व्याख्येयमिति ॥ ३५९ ॥ (१९०७)

D C—Your doubt about the existence of *punya* and *pāpa* is not justified It is based on your hearing the sentences of *Vedas* bearing contradictory senses. The sentences are such as “ *Purusa evedam gnum sarvam* ” etc which have already been mentioned in the Second *Ganadharavāda* You have not grasped the real interpretation of those sentences I, therefore, give their real interpretation as under — ॥ 359 (1907) ॥

Chapter IX

नवमगमपरवक्तव्यता ।

Discussion with the Ninth Ganadhara

ते पव्वइय सोउ अयलभाया आगच्छई जिणसगास ।
वञ्चामि ण वदामी वदिता पज्जुवासामि ॥ ३५७ ॥ (१९०५)

Te pavvao sōum Ayalabhāyā āgacchai Jinasagāsam ।
Vaccāmi na vandāmi vanditā pajjuvāsāmi ॥ 357 ॥ (1905)

[तान् प्रव्रजितान् श्रुत्वाऽऽलभ्राताऽऽगच्छति विनसकाक्षम् ।
व्रजामि वन्दे वन्दित्वा पर्युपासे ॥ ३५७ ॥ (१९०५)]

Tan pravrajītan śrutva ālabhrāta āgacchati Jinasaśakāṣam ।
Vrajāmi vando vanditva paryupase ॥ 357 ॥ (1905)]

Trans—357 Having heard that they had renounced the world, *Acalabhrātā* comes before the *Tirthankara*. (He thinks -) I may go, pay my homage, and worship him. (1905)

आभट्ठो य जिणेणं जाइ—जरा—मरणविप्पमुक्केणं ।
नामेण य गोत्तेण य सव्वण्णू सव्वदरिसी ण ॥ ३५८ ॥ (१९०६)

Ābhaṭṭho ya Jinenam [āi-]arā-maravippamukkeṇam ।
Nāmena ya gottena ya savvaṇṇū savvadarisī nam ॥ 358 ॥ (1906)

[आभाषितश्च जिनेन जाति-जरा-मरणविप्रमुक्तेन ।

नाम्ना च गोत्रेण च सर्वज्ञेन सर्वदर्शिना ॥ ३५८ ॥ (१९०६)]

Ābhāṣitaśca Jinena jati-jara-maravipramuktena ।
Nāma ca gotreṇa ca sarvajñena sarvadarśinā ॥ 358 ॥ (1906)]

- (4) *Punya* and *pāpa* are absolutely independent of each other
- (5) There is nothing like *Karma* at all The expansion of this mundane world is not due to *Karma*, but it is natural

Now, since you have listened to all the above-mentioned five views, you are wavering between the five and raising the doubt about *punya* and *pāpa* ॥ 360 ॥ (1908)

Each of the above-mentioned views is explained as follows —

पुण्णुक्करिस्से सुभया तरतमजोगावगरिसओ हाणी ।
तस्सेव खए मोक्खो पत्थाहारोवमाणाओ ॥ ३६१ ॥ (१९०९)

Punnukkarisse subhayā taratamajogāvagarisao hānī ।
Tasseva khae mokkho patthāhārovamānāo ॥ 361 ॥ (1909)

[पुण्योत्कर्षे शुभता तरतमयोगापकर्षतो हानिः ।
तस्यैव क्षये मोक्षः पथ्याहारोपमानात् ॥ ३६१ ॥ (१९०९)

Punyoatkarse śubhata taratamayogāpakarsato hāniḥ ।
Tasyaiva ksaye mokṣaḥ pathyāhāropamānāt ॥ 361 ॥ (1909)]

Trans—361 With the (gradual) rise in *punyas*, welfare (is obtained) With the gradual diminution, there is destruction Being similar to the wholesome diet, when it is absolutely destroyed there is (complete) liberation (1909)

टीका—पुनातीति पुण्यं तस्योत्कर्षलेशतो लेशतश्च वृद्धौ शुभता भवति, सुखस्यापि क्रमशो वृद्धिर्भवति तावत्, यावदुत्कृष्टं स्वर्गसुखमित्यर्थः । तस्यैव पुण्यस्य तर-तमयोगापकर्षतो हानिः सुखस्य-दुःखं भवति । इद-मुक्तं भवति—यथा यथा पुण्यमपचीयते तथा तथा जीवानां क्रमेण दुःख-मुत्पद्यते, यावत् सर्वप्रकर्षप्राप्तं नरकदुःखम् । तस्यैव च पुण्यस्य सर्वथा क्षये मोक्ष इति । एतच्च सर्वं पथ्याहारोपमानाद् भावनीयम्; तथाहि—यथा

मण्णासि पुण्ण पाव साहारणमहव दो वि भिन्नाइ ।

होज्ज न वा कम्म चिय सभावओ भवपवचोऽय ॥ ३६० ॥ (१९०८)

Mammasi punnam pāvam sāhāraṇamahava do vi bhinnāhi ।

Hojja na vā kammam ciya sabhāvaṃ bhavapavanco'yaṃ ॥360॥

[मन्यसे पुण्य पापं साधारणमवया द्वे अपि भिन्ने ।

भवेद् न वा कर्मैव स्वभावतो भवप्रपञ्चोऽयम् ॥ ३६० ॥ (१९०८)

Manyase puṇyam pāpam sādharmaṇamathava dve api bhinne ।

Bhaved na vā karmaiva svabhāvato bhavaprapañco'yaṃ ॥360॥ (1908)

Trans—360 Do you think *puṇya* alone or *pāpa* alone to exist? Or (do you think them to be) common, or even different? Or is it that *Karma* itself be absent and the expansion of the whole of mundane world be natural? (1908)

टीका—इह केपाञ्चित् तीर्थिकानामयं प्रवादः—“ पुण्यमेवैकमस्ति न पापम् ” । अन्ये त्वाहुः—“ पापमेवैकमस्ति न तु पुण्यम् ” अपरं तु वदन्ति—
‘ उभयमप्यन्योन्यानुविरुद्धस्वरूप मेषकमधिकृत्यं संमिश्रमुख—दुःखाख्यफल हेतुः साधारण पुण्यपापाख्यमेक वस्तु ” इति । अन्ये तु प्रतिपादयन्ति—स्वतन्त्रं भूयं विविक्तमुख—दुःखकारणं “ होज्ज सि ” भवदिति । अन्ये पुनराहुः—
“ मूलतः कर्मैव नास्ति, स्वभावसिद्धः सर्वोऽप्ययं जगत्प्रपञ्चः ” । अतस्त्वमप्येतान् पञ्चविकल्पान् मन्यसे । एतेषां च विकल्पानां परस्परविरुद्धत्वात् सत्ययदोषामाहोजसि स्वमिति ॥ ३६० ॥ (१९०८)

D C—There are five different theories about the existence of *puṇya* and *pāpa* as stated below —

- (1) There exists *puṇya* alone and there is nothing like *pāpa*.
- (2) There exists *pāpa* alone and there is nothing like *puṇya*.
- (3) *Punya* and *pāpa* which happen to be the causes of *sukha* and *duḥkha* respectively exist in a combined state like a dark-blue jewel.

- (4) *Punya* and *pāpa* are absolutely independent of each other
- (5) There is nothing like *Karma* at all The expansion of this mundane world is not due to *Karma*, but it is natural

Now, since you have listened to all the above-mentioned five views, you are wavering between the five and raising the doubt about *punya* and *pāpa* ॥ 360 ॥ (1908)

Each of the above-mentioned views is explained as follows —

पुण्णुक्करिस्से सुभया तरतमजोगावगरिसओ हाणी ।
तस्सेव खए मोक्खो पत्थाहारोवमाणाओ ॥ ३६१ ॥ (१९०९)

Punnukkarisse subhayā taratamajogāvagarisao hānī ।
Tasseva khae mokkho patthāhārovamānāo ॥ 361 ॥ (1909)

[पुण्योत्कर्षे शुभता तरतमयोगापकर्षतो हानिः ।
तस्यैव क्षये मोक्षः पथ्याहारोपमानात् ॥ ३६१ ॥ (१९०९)

Punyotkarse śubhata taratamayogāpakarsato hanīh ।
Tasyaiva ksaye moksaḥ pathyāharopamānāt ॥ 361 ॥ (1909)]

Trans—361 With the (gradual) rise in *punyas*, welfare (is obtained) With the gradual diminution, there is destruction Being similar to the wholesome diet, when it is absolutely destroyed there is (complete) liberation (1909)

टीका—पुनातीति पुण्यं तस्योत्कर्षलेशतो लेशतश्च वृद्धौ शुभता भवति, सुखस्यापि क्रमशो वृद्धिर्भवति तावत्, यावदुत्कृष्टं स्वर्गसुखमित्यर्थः । तस्यैव पुण्यस्य तर-तमयोगापकर्षतो हानिः सुखस्य-दुःखं भवति । इद-मुक्तं भवति-यथा यथा पुण्यमपचीयते तथा तथा जीवानां क्रमेण दुःख-मुत्पद्यते, यावत् सर्वप्रकर्षप्राप्तं नरकदुःखम् । तस्यैव च पुण्यस्य सर्वथा क्षये मोक्ष इति । एतच्च सर्वं पथ्याहारोपमानाद् भावनीयम्; तथाहि-यथा

पण्याहारस्य क्रमेण बुद्धावारोग्यबुद्धिस्तथा पुण्यवृद्धौ सुखबुद्धिः, यथा च
पण्याहारस्य क्रमेण परिहारे सरोगता ममति, एवं पुण्यापचये दुःखोत्पत्तिः;
सर्वथा पण्याहारपरिहारे च मरणवत् पुण्यक्षये मोक्ष इति ॥३६१॥ (१९०९)

D C—The first case—*one* that *punya* alone exists and there is nothing like *pāpa*—is discussed as follows —

That which purifies is called *punya*. With the gradual increase in *punya* there is a gradual rise in happiness also leading ultimately to Salvation which is the highest happiness. On the other hand when there is a gradual decrease in *punya* happiness also decreases and gradually begins to turn into misery leading ultimately to the agony of hell. Finally when there is entire diminution of *punya* *Jīva* attains complete liberation i. e. it dies. This resembles the case of wholesome diet.

Just as by the gradual increase in wholesome diet, one becomes more and more healthy so also by the gradual eminence of *punya*s there is a gradual rise in happiness also. On the other hand just as when the wholesome diet is abandoned the disease re-enters the body and one becomes ill, so also when there is gradual diminution of *punya*s there is gradual diminution in happiness and re-generation of misery. Ultimately by abandoning the wholesome diet entirely one dies away. In the same way by the entire destruction of *punya*s *jīva* attains complete liberation from this world. § 361 n (1909)

Taking the second theory of *pāpa*s the author explains —

पावुक्करिसेऽहमया तरतमजोगावगरिसओ सुभया ।

तस्सेव खए मोक्खो अपत्थभत्तोवमाणाओ ॥ ३६२ ॥ (१९१०)

Pāvukkariṣe'hamaya taratamajogāvagariṣao subhayaḥ ।

Tasseva khac mokkho apatthabhattovamāṇāo § 362 n (1910)

[पापोत्कर्षेऽधमता तरतमयोगापकर्षतः शुभता ।

तस्यैव क्षये मोक्षोऽपथ्यभक्तोपमानात् ॥ ३६२ ॥ (१९१०)

Papotkarse'dhamatā taratamayogāpakarsatah śubhatā ।

Tasyaiva ksaye mokso'pathyabhaktopamanāt ॥ 362 ॥ (1910)]

Trans—362 In (case of) the increase in *pāpa*, there is vileness, with gradual diminution (of it), (there is) welfare, and as in the case of the unwholesome diet, there is (complete) liberation (of the *jīva*) when it is absolutely destroyed (1910)

टीका—इहापथ्याहारोपमानाद् वैपरीत्येन भावना कार्या । तथाहि—यथा क्रमेणापथ्यवृद्धौ रोगवृद्धिः, तथा पांशयत्यात्मानं मलिनयतीति पापं, तस्य वृद्धौ सुखवृद्धिरूपाऽधमता मन्तव्या—क्रमेण दुःखं वर्धते, यावदुत्कृष्टं नारकदुःखम् । यथा चापथ्यत्यागात् क्रमेणारोग्यवृद्धिः, तथा क्रमेण पापस्यापकर्षात् सुखस्य वृद्धिः, यावदुत्कृष्टं सुरसौख्यम् । यथा चापथ्याहारस्य सर्वथा परित्यागात् परमारोग्यमुपजायते, एवं सर्वपापक्षये मोक्ष इति ॥ ३६२ ॥ (१९१०)

D C—Those, who believe that there exists *pāpa* alone, and nothing like *punya*, put forward the same argument but in a reverse manner According to them, just as disease develops with the increase in unwholesome diet, vileness in the form of miseries etc, also increases with the eminence of sins, leading ultimately to the agony of hell On the other hand, when the unwholesome food is being gradually given up, there is a gradual recovery of health

Similarly by the gradual diminution of sins there is a gradual re-generation of happiness leading ultimately to Salvation. Lastly, just as complete health is regained at the complete abandonment of the unwholesome food, there is complete attainment of *moksa* when the sins are completely removed ॥ 362 ॥ (1910).

Now, a third belief that *punya* and *pāpa* exist as *sādhāraṇa*, is explained —

पुण्याहारस्य क्रमेण वृद्धावारोग्यवृद्धिस्तथा पुण्यवृद्धौ सुखवृद्धिः, यथा च पुण्याहारस्य क्रमेण परिहारे सारोगता भवति, एव पुण्यापचये दुःखोत्पत्तिः; सर्वथा पुण्याहारपरिहारे च मरणवत् पुण्यक्षये मोक्ष इति ॥३६१॥ (१९०९)

D C—The first case—is that *punya* alone exists and there is nothing like *pāpa*—is discussed as follows —

That which purifies is called *punya*. With the gradual increase in *punya* there is a gradual rise in happiness also leading ultimately to Salvation which is the highest happiness. On the other hand when there is a gradual decrease in *punya* happiness also decreases and gradually begins to turn into misery leading ultimately to the agony of hell. Finally when there is entire diminution of *punya* *Jiva* attains complete liberation i.e it dies. This resembles the case of wholesome diet.

Just as by the gradual increase in wholesome diet one becomes more and more healthy so also by the gradual eminence of *punya*s there is a gradual rise in happiness also. On the other hand just as when the wholesome diet is abandoned the disease re-enters the body and one becomes ill, so also when there is gradual diminution of *punya* there is gradual diminution in happiness and re-generation of misery. Ultimately by abandoning the wholesome diet entirely one dies away. In the same way by the entire destruction of *punya* *jiva* attains complete liberation from this world. #361 n (1909)

Taking the second theory of *pāpa*, the author explains —

पावुक्करिसेऽहमया तरतमजोगावगरिसओ सुभया ।
तस्सेव खए मोक्खो अपस्थमत्तोवमाणाओ ॥ ३६२ ॥ (१९१०)

*Pāvukkarise'hamayā taratamajogāvagarisao subhayā ।
Tasseva khac mokkho apatthabhattovamāṇāo* # 362 n (1910)

punya-pāpa is also a mixed entity. Here, if some one raises the doubt that if it is one single entity, why is it known by two names—*pāpa* and *punya* ? The answer laid down by them is this —On account of the increase in the constituent *punya* of the *punya-pāpa* entity, the name *punya* is given, while with the diminution of the constituent *punya*, the entity is called *pāpa*.

Similarly, when there is predominance of the element of *pāpa* it is called *pāpa* and vice versa. So, *punya-pāpa* is one and only one entity and does not exist separately ॥363॥ (1911)

Now, with regard to the remaining two theories, it has been laid down as follows —

एवं चिय दो भिन्नाइं होज्ज, होज्ज व सभावओ चेव ।
भवसंभूई, भण्णइ न सभावाओ जओऽभिमओ ॥३६४॥ (१९१२)
होज्ज सहावो वत्थुं निक्कारणया व वत्थुधम्मो वा ? ।
जइ वत्थुं णत्थि तओऽणुवलद्धीओ खपुप्फं व ॥३६५॥ (१९१३)

Evam ciya do bhinnāim hojja, hojja va sabhāvaō ceva ।
Bhavasambhūī, bhannaī na sabhāvāō jao'bhimaō ॥ 364 ॥ (1912)

Hojja sahāvo vatthum nikkāranayā va vatthudhammo vā ? ।
Jai vatthum natthi tao'nuvaladdhīō khapuppham va ॥365॥ (1913)

[एवमेव द्वे भिन्ने भवेतां, भवेद् वा स्वभावत एव ।

भवसंभूतिः, भण्यते न स्वभावाद् यतोऽभिमतः ॥ ३६४ ॥ (१९१२)

भवेत् स्वभावो वस्तु निष्कारणता वा वस्तुधर्मो वा ? ।

यदि वस्तु नास्ति सकोऽनुपलब्धेः खपुष्पमिव ॥ ३६५ ॥ (१९१३)

Evameva dve bhinne bhavetaṃ, bhaved vā svabhāvata eva ।
Bhavasambhūtiḥ, bhanyate na svabhāvaḥ yato'bhimataḥ ॥ 364 ॥

Bhaved svabhāvo vastu nīkāranatā vā vastudharmo vā ? ।

Yadi vastu nāsti sako'nupalabdheḥ khapuspaṃmiva ॥365॥ (1913)]

साधारणवर्णादि व अह साधारणमहेगमत्ताए ।

उक्करिसा-वगरिसओ सस्सेव य पुण्णपावक्खा ॥३६३॥ (१९११)

Sāhāranavannādi va aha sāhāranamahegamattāe ।

Ukkarissā-vagarissao tasseva ya punnapāvakkhā ॥ 363 ॥ (1911)

[साधारणवर्णादीषाव साधारणमयैकमात्रया ।

उत्कर्षा-उपकर्षतस्तस्यैव च पुण्यपापाख्या ॥ ३६३ ॥ (१९११)

Sādharaṇavarṇādivratha sādharanamatthāikamatraya ।

Utkarṣa-pakarṣatastasyaiva ca puṇyapapākhyā ॥ 363 ॥ (1911)]

Trans—363 Like joint-syllables etc, (*puṇya* and *pāpa*) are combined with each other as one. And, by reason of eminence or diminution of it it is known as *puṇya* or *pāpa* (respectively). (1911)

टीका—“ अह साधारणमिति ” अथ साधारण संकीर्णपुण्यपापाख्यं वस्तु माभ्यत इत्यर्थः । कथंभूतं पुनरिदमवगन्तव्यम् ? इत्याह—“ साधारण वर्णादि व ति ” यथा साधारण तुल्य इरिणालगुलिकादीनामन्यतरन्मीलितं वर्षकद्वयम् ; आदिषब्दाद् यथामेषकमणिः, नरसिंहादिर्वा, तत्रेदमपि पुण्य पापाख्यं संकीर्णमेकं वस्त्वित्यर्थः । ननु यद्येक वस्त्वित्यम्, तर्हि पुण्य पापं चेति परस्परविरोधिबस्तुविषयमाख्याद्वयं कथं लभते ? इत्याह—“ अहेग मत्ताए इत्यादि ” अथ तस्यैवैकस्य संकीर्णपुण्यपापाख्यस्य वस्तुन एकया पुण्यमात्रया—एकेन पुण्यांशेनेत्यर्थः, उत्कर्षतो बृद्धौ सत्यां पुण्याख्या प्रवर्तते; एकया तु पापमात्रया—एकेन पापांशेनत्यर्थः, उत्कर्षतो बृद्धौ सत्यां पापाख्या प्रवर्तते । उपकर्षेऽपि पुण्यांशस्य पापाख्या प्रवर्तते, पापांशस्य स्वपकर्षे पुण्याख्या प्रवर्तत इति ॥३६३॥ (१९११)

D C—The theory is that *pāpa* and *puṇya* are not separate entities but they are infused with each other as one like the two syllables joined together as one Like a base metal of *haradā* or *indigo* wherein there is always one object mixed with two colours or like the *Aśoka* jewel or *Narasimha* etc

punya-pāpa is also a mixed entity Here, if some one raises the doubt that if it is one single entity, why is it known by two names—*pāpa* and *punya* ? The answer laid down by them is this —On account of the increase in the constituent *punya* of the *punya-pāpa* entity, the name *punya* is given, while with the diminution of the constituent *punya*, the entity is called *pāpa*

Similarly, when there is predominance of the element of *pāpa* it is called *pāpa* and vice versa So, *punya-pāpa* is one and only one entity and does not exist separately. ॥363॥ (1911)

Now, with regard to the remaining two theories, it has been laid down as follows —

एवं चिय दो भिन्नाइं होज्ज, होज्ज व सभावओ चेव ।

भवसंभूई, भण्णइ न सभावाओ जओऽभिमओ ॥३६४॥ (१९१२)

होज्ज सहावो वत्थुं निक्कारणया व वत्थुधम्मो वा ? ।

जइ वत्थुं णत्थि तओऽणुवलद्धीओ खपुप्फं व ॥३६५॥ (१९१३)

Evam ciya do bhinnāim hojja, hojja va sabhāvaō ceva ।

Bhavasambhūī, bhannaī na sabhāvāō jao'bhimao ॥ 364 ॥ (1912)

Hojja sahāvo vatthum nikkāranayā va vatthudhammo vā ? ।

Jai vatthum natthi tao'nuvaladdhio khapuppham va ॥365॥ (1913)

[एवमेव द्वे भिन्ने भवेतां, भवेद् वा स्वभावत एव ।

भवसंभूतिः, भण्यते न स्वभावाद् यतोऽभिमतः ॥ ३६४ ॥ (१९१२)

भवेत् स्वभावो वस्तु निष्कारणता वा वस्तुधर्मो वा ? ।

यदि वस्तु नास्ति सकोऽनुपलब्धेः खपुष्पमिव ॥ ३६५ ॥ (१९१३)

Evameva dve bhinne bhavetaṃ, bhaved vā svabhāvata eva ।

Bhavasambhūtiḥ, bhanyate na svabhāvaḍ yato'bhimataḥ ॥ 364 ॥

Bhavet svabhāvo vastu nikkāranata vā vastudharmo vā ? ।

Yadi vastu nāsti sako'nupalabdheḥ khapuspaṃmiva ॥365॥ (1913)]

Trans—364-365 Similarly (some would believe that both are different (from each other) or that the production of the mundane world would be due to (nothing else but its *svabhāva* only (In reply to that) it is said that (the production of the mundane world) by virtue of (its) *svabhāva*, is not believable. And is that *svabhāva* a (definite) object? or causelessness (itself)? or the property of an object? If (it is taken as) an object, it is not (an object), because it is non-apprehensible like a *kha-puṣpa* (1912-1913)

टीका-एवमेव केपाश्विद् मतेन द्वे अपि मिमे स्वतन्त्र स्यातां पुण्य-पापे, तत्कार्यभूतयोः सुख-दुःखयोर्योगपद्येनानुमत्तामाधात् । अतोऽनेनैव मिमं कार्यदर्शनेन तत्कारणभूतयोः पुण्य-पापयोर्मिमतताऽनुमीयत इति । “ होञ्च वेत्यादि ” अथवा स्वभावत एव विनापि पुण्य-पापाम्पां भवसंभूतिः-भव वैशिष्ट्यस्य संभवः कैमिदिष्यते । तदेव दर्शिता पञ्चापि पुण्य-पापविषया विकल्पा । एतैश्च प्रमितमनोमि सद्यो न कर्तव्य, एकस्यैव चतुर्थविकल्प म्यावयत्वात्, शेषाणां धानादेयत्वात् । अत एव प्रत्यासत्तिन्यायमङ्गीकृत्य पञ्चमविकल्प तावद् दूषयितुमाह-“ मण्यईत्यादि ” मण्यतेऽत्रोत्तरम्-न स्वभावतो भवसंभूति, यतः स्वभावो वस्तुरूपो वामिमतो मवेदिति द्वितीय गाथायां संबन्धः, निष्कारयता वा, वस्तुधर्मो वा स्वभावोऽमिमतो मवेत् ? इति त्रयो विकल्पाः । तत्र यदि वस्तुरूपोऽयमिति प्रथमो विकल्पा तर्हि ततोऽसौ स्वभावो नास्ति, अनुपलम्भात्, स्वपुण्यवदिति ॥ ३६४-३६५ ॥ (१९१२-१९१३)

D C—According to some *puṇya* and *pāpa* are independent of each other because *sukha* and *duḥkha* which are their respective *kāryas* or consequences are not experienced at one and the same time. So when *kāryas* are found to be independent of each other their respective causes should also be independent of each other by *anumāna*.

Finally there is one more theory that the expansion of this mundane world is not due to *Karmas* known as *pāpa* and

punya but on account of its own *svabhāva* According to this theory, there is nothing like *Karma*

Your doubt has sprung up from five different opinions stated above But that is not justifiable. For, out of those five theories, none except the fourth one is acceptable. The expansion of *bhava* by means of its *svabhāva* as laid down in the fifth theory, is also not acceptable Because, in that case, *svabhāva* should either be a definite object (*vastu*) or causelessness (*niskān anatā*), or the property of a definite object (*vastu-dharma*). Since *svabhāva* is absolutely imperceptible like a *kha-puspa*, it can never exist as a definite object ॥ 364-365 ॥ (1912-1913)

Then,

अचंतमणुवलद्धो वि अह तओ अत्थि नत्थि किं कम्मं ? ।
हेऊ व तदत्थित्ते जो नणु कम्मस्स वि स एव ॥३६६॥ (१९१४)
कम्मस्स वाभिहाणं होज्ज सभावो त्ति होउ को दोसो ? ।
पइनिययागाराओ न य सो कत्ता घडस्सेव ॥३६७॥ (१९१५)
मुत्तो अमुत्तो व तओ जइ मुत्तो तोऽभिहाणओ भिन्नो ।
कम्मत्ति सहावो त्ति य जइ वाऽमुत्तो न कत्ता तो ॥३६८॥ (१९१६)
देहाणं वोमं पिव, जुत्ता कज्जाइओ य मुत्तिमया ।
अह सो निक्कारणया तो खरसिंगादओ होंतु ॥ ३६९ ॥ (१९१७)
अह वत्थुणो स धम्मो परिणामो तो स कम्म-जीवाणं ।
पुत्ते-ज्यराभिहाणो कारण-कज्जाणुमेओ सो ॥ ३७० ॥ (१९१८)
किरियाणं कारणओ देहाईणं च कज्जभावाओ ।
कम्मं मदभिहियं ति य पडिवज्ज तमग्गिभूइ व ॥३७१॥ (१९१९)

त थिय देहाईण किरियाण पिय सुभा-सुभत्ताओ ।

पडिवज्ज पुण्णपाव सहावओ भिन्नजाईय ॥ ३७२ ॥ (१९२०)

Accantamanuvaladdho vi aha tao atthi natthi kim kammam ?
Heū va tadatthitte jo namu kammassa vi sa eva ॥ 366 ॥ (1914)

Kammassa vābhānam hojja sabhāvo tti hōu ko doso ।
Painiyayāgārāo na va so kattā ghaḍasseva ॥ 367 ॥ (1915)

Mutto amutto va tao jai mutto to'bhānao bhinno ।
Kamma tti sahāvo tti ya jai vā mutto na kattā to ॥ 368 ॥ (1916)

Dehānam vomam piva, juttā kajjālo ya muttimayā ।
Aha so nikkāranayā to kharasingādao bontu ॥ 369 ॥ (1917)

Aha vatthuno sa dhammo parināmo to sa kamma-jivānam ।
Punne-yarābhānao kāraṇa-kajjānumeo so ॥ 370 ॥ (1918)

Kiriyaṇam kāraṇao dehānam ca kajjabhāvāo ।
kammam madabhihiyam ti ya padivajja tamaggibhi vva ॥ 371 ॥

Tam cya dehānam kiriyaṇam pi ya subhā-subhattāo ।
Padivajja punnapāvam sahāvao bhinnajālyam ॥ 372 ॥ (1920)

[अत्यन्तमनुपलब्धोऽप्यथ सकोऽस्ति नास्ति किं कर्म ।

देतुर्वा तदस्त्वित्त्वे यो ननु कर्मणोऽपि स एष ॥ ३६६ ॥ (१९१४)

कर्मणो वामिषानं भवेत् स्वभाव इति भवतु को दोषः ।

प्रतिनियताकाराद् न च स कर्ता घटस्येव ॥ ३६७ ॥ (१९१५)

मूर्तोऽमूर्तो वा सक्रो यदि मूर्तस्ततोऽमिषानतो मिषः ।

कर्मैति स्वभाव इति च यदि वाऽमूर्तो न कर्ता ततः ॥ ३६८ ॥ (१९१६)

देहानां व्योमेव, युक्ता कार्यादितथ मूर्तिमया ।

अथ स निष्कारणता ततः सरगृह्यादयो भवन्तु ॥ ३६९ ॥ (१९१७)

अथ यस्तुनः स धर्मः परिणामस्ततः स कर्म-जीवयोः ।

पुण्ये-तरामिषानः कारण-कार्यानुमेयः सः ॥ ३७० ॥ (१९१८)

क्रियाणां कारणतो देहादीनां च कार्यभावात् ।

कर्म मदभिहितमिति च प्रतिपद्यस्व त्वमग्निभूतिरिव ॥३७१॥ (१९१९)

तदेव देहादीनां क्रियाणामपि च शुभा-ऽशुभत्वात् ।

प्रतिपद्यस्व पुण्य-पापे स्वभावतो भिन्नजातीये ॥ ३७२ ॥ (१९२०)

Atyantamanupalabdho'pyatha sako'sti nāsti kim karma ।

Hetur-vā tadastitve yo nanu karmano'pi sa eva ॥ 366 ॥ (1914)

Karmano vābhīdhanam bhavet svabhāva iti bhavatu ko dosah ? ।

Pratinīyatakārād na ca sa kartā ghatasyeva ॥ 367 ॥ (1915)

Mūrto'mūrto vā sako yadī mūrtastato'bhīdhanato bhinnah ।

Karmeti svabhāva iti ca yadī vā'mūrto na kartā tatah ॥368॥ (1916)

Dehānam vyomeva, yukta kāryāditaśca mūrtimattā ।

Atha sa nīskaranātā tatah kharaśringādayo bhavantu ॥369॥ (1917)

Atha vastunah sa dharmah pariṇamastataḥ sa karma-jīvayoh ।

Punya-tarābhīdhanah kāraṇa kāryānumeyah sa ॥ 370 ॥ (1918)

Kriyānam kāranato dehadīnam ca kāryabhāvāt ।

Karma madabhihitamiti ca pratipadyasva tvamagnibhūtiriva ॥371॥

Tadeva dehadīnam kriyānamapi ca śubhā'-śubhatvāt ।

Pratipadyasva puṇya-pāpe svabhāvato bhinnajātiye ॥372॥ (1920)]

Trans—366-372 If it is extremely non-perceptible, why is it called *svabhāva* and not *Karma*? The *hetu* that works in the existence of *svabhāva*, works in case of *Karma* also Or, what harm is there in taking *svabhāva* as the synonym of *karma*? And since it has a definite shape like *ghata*, it cannot be a doer just as sky is not (the doer of) bodies. (For), the corporeal nature is justified on account of (its) being *kārya* etc Now, if that (*svabhāva*) were causelessness (itself), non-existent (objects like) *kharaśringa* etc, would come into existence If it is (taken as) the property of a (definite) object, then it would turn out to be the effect of *Karma* and *jīva*, and would be inferred as *punya* and *pāpa* by

त चिय देहाईण किरियाण पि य सुभा—ऽसुभत्ताओ ।

पडिवज्ज पुण्णपाव सहावओ भिन्नजाईय ॥ ३७२ ॥ (१९२०)

Accantamanuvaladdho vi aha tao atthi natthi kim kammam ?
Heū va tadatthitte jo nanu kammassa vi sa eva ॥ 366 ॥ (1914)

Kammassa vābhihānam hojja sabhāvo tti hōu ko doso ।
Painiyayāgārāo na va so kattā ghaḍasseva ॥ 367 ॥ (1915)

Mutto amutto va tao jai mutto to'bbhihānao bhīno ।
Kamma tti sahāvo tti ya jai vā mutto na kattā to ॥ 368 ॥ (1916)

Dehānam vomam piva juttā kajjālo ya muttimayā ।
Aha so nikkāranayā to kharasingādao hontu ॥ 369 ॥ (1917)

Aha vatthuno sa dhammo parhāmo to sa kamma-jīvanam ।
Punne-yarābhihāno kāraṇa-kajjānumeo so ॥ 370 ॥ (1918)

Kiriyanam kāraṇao dehānam ca kajjabhāvāo ।
Kammam madabhihiyam ti ya padivajja tamaggibhūti vva ॥ 371 ॥

Sam uya dehānam kiriyanam pi ya subhā-subhattāo ।
Padivajja pumapāvam sahāvao bhīnajakāyam ॥ 372 ॥ (1920)

[अस्यन्तमनुपलब्धोऽप्यथ सकोऽस्ति नास्ति किं कर्म ।

हेतुर्वा तदस्तित्वे यो ननु कर्मणोऽपि स एव ॥ ३६६ ॥ (१९१४)

कर्मणो वामिषान भवेत् स्वभाव इति भवतु को दोषः ? ।

प्रतिनियसाकाराद् न च स कर्ता षट्स्येव ॥ ३६७ ॥ (१९१५)

मूर्तोऽमूर्तो वा सको यदि मूर्तस्ततोऽमिषानतो मिषः ।

कमेति स्वभाव इति च यदि वाऽमूर्तो न कर्ता ततः ॥ ३६८ ॥ (१९१६)

देहानां व्योमेव, युक्ता कार्यादितश्च मूर्तिमत्ता ।

अथ स निष्कारणता ततः स्वस्मृङ्गादयो भवन्तु ॥ ३६९ ॥ (१९१७)

अथ वस्तुनः स धर्मः परिणामस्ततः स कर्म-धीययोः ।

पुण्ये-सराभिधानः कारण-कार्यानुमेयः सः ॥ ३७० ॥ (१९१८)

D C—These verses have already been explained in details in the Second *Ganadhara—vāda* † The only point to remember in this connection is that *punya* and *pāpa*, the *pariṇāma* of *Jīva* and *Karma*, could be inferred from *kāraṇa* and *kārya*.

These two inferences are explained as follows —

(1) *Kāraṇānumāna* —Just as in case of working of agriculture, rice, barley, and wheat etc. are reaped as crops (*Kāryas*) at the end, *punya* and *pāpa* are also reaped as the *pariṇāmas* of *Jīva* and *Karma* with actions like munificence etc or violence etc as their respective causes

It is, therefore, said that—

“ Samāsu tulyam viśamāsu tulyam satīśvasaccāpyasatīsu sācca |
Phalam kriyāsvityatha yannimittam tad dehīnām so'stinuko'pi
dharmah || ”

(2) *Kāryānumāna* —Just as a potter accompanied by the materials such as earth, stick, wheel etc. happens to be the *Kāraṇa* of *ghata*, so also in case of *Kāryas* like *s'arīra* etc there is some cause or the other The cause in this case, is nothing but *punya* and *pāpa* in the form of good and bad deeds. In the production of *kāryas* like *s'arīra* etc, parents are no doubt visible causes, but along with them there are invisible causes in the form of good or bad deeds also. Otherwise, ugliness or fairness in various forms—in spite of their *dṛṣṭa hetu*, viz, parents being the same—would never be accounted for. The *karma* therefore has two types.—*Punya* and *pāpa*. Good forms are the results of *punya* and ugly ones are the results of *pāpa* Hence it is said.—

“ Iha dṛṣṭahetvasambhaviṇīkāryaviśeṣāt kulālayatna iva |

Hetvantaramanumeyam tat Karma śubhā'-śubham kartuh || ”

So, like *Agnībhūti*, you, too, shall have to accept the existence of *Karma* putting faith into the words of me—the

† Vide pp 86 to 137

means of *kārya* and *kāraṇa*. So, like *Agnibhūll* you too (shall have to) accept (the existence of) *Karma* on account of actions as well as *Kāryas* (in the form of *deha* etc.,) and since *Karma* itself is the cause of good or bad (in case of *deha* etc.) as well as other performances, admit *puṇya* and *pāpa* as belonging to different species by their very *svabhāva* (1914-1920)

टीका-एतावद्वा गाथाः प्रायोऽग्निभूतिगणधरवादे व्याख्याता एव, सुगमम् । नवरं “कारण-कृत्वापुमेजो सो षि” स च जीव-कर्मणोः पुण्य-पापामिधानः परिणामः कारणेन कार्येण चाऽनुमीयते-कारणानुमानात् कार्यानुमानाच्च गम्यत इत्यर्थः । एतदेवानुमानद्वयमाह-“किरियार्ण कारणञ्चो इत्यादि” दानादिक्रियाणां हिंसादिक्रियाणां च कारणत्वात् कारणरूपत्वादस्ति तत्फलभूतस्वत्कार्यरूपपुण्य-पापात्मको जीव-कर्मपरिणामः, यथा कृष्यादिक्रियाणां छालि-यव-गोधूमादिकम्; उक्तं च-

“समाप्तुं तुल्यं विपमास्तु तुल्यं सतीप्ससद्याप्ससतीप्सु सच ।

फलक्रियास्वित्ययं यमिमिच तद्देहिनां सोऽस्ति नु कोऽपि धर्मः ॥१॥”

एतत् कारणानुमानम् । “देहादीनिमित्त्वादि” देहादीनां कारणमस्ति, कार्यरूपत्वात् तेषाम्, यथा घटस्य मृद्-दण्ड-घट्ट-चीवरादिसामग्रीकलितः कृत्वाः । न च वक्ष्यम्-दृष्ट एव माता-पित्रादिकृतेषां हेतुः, दृष्टहेतुसाम्येऽपि सुरुपे-वरादिमाघेन देहादीनां वैविध्यदर्शनात्, तस्य चादृष्ट कर्मास्त्वहेतुमन्तरेणामाभात् । अत एव पुण्य-पापमेवेन कर्मणो वैविध्यम्, छमदेहादीनां पुण्यकार्यत्वात्, इतरेषां तु पापफलत्वात्; उक्तं च

“इह दृष्टहेत्वसंभविर्कार्यविशेषात् कृत्वाऽन्यमन इव ।

हेत्वन्तरमनुमेयं तत् कर्म छमा-ऽश्रुम कर्तुः ॥ १ ॥”

एतत् कार्यानुमानम् । तथा, मदमिहितमिति च कृत्वाऽग्निभूतिवत् त्वमपि कर्म प्रतिपद्यस्व, सर्वज्ञबचनप्रामाण्यादित्यर्थः । तदपि पुण्य-पाप विभागेन विभक्तं प्रतिपद्यस्व, देहादीनां तत्कार्याणां क्रियाणां च तत्कारणभूतानां छमा-ऽश्रुमत्वेन तद्देविष्यदर्शनादिति ॥ २६६-२७२ ॥ (१९१४-१९२०)

D C—These verses have already been explained in details in the Second *Ganadhara*—*vāda* † The only point to remember in this connection is that *punya* and *pāpa*, the *parinama* of *Jīva* and *Karma*, could be inferred from *kāna* and *kārya*

These two inferences are explained as follows —

(1) *Kāranānumāna* —Just as in case of working of agriculture, rice, barley, and wheat etc. are reaped as crops (*Kāryas*) at the end, *punya* and *pāpa* are also reaped as the *parināmas* of *Jīva* and *Karma* with actions like munificence etc or violence etc as their respective causes.

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“ Samāsu tulyam viśamāsu tulyam satīśvasaccāpyasatīsu sacca |
Phalam kriyāsvityatha yannimittam tad dehīnām so'stinuko'pi
dharmah || ”

(2) *Kāryānumāna* —Just as a potter accompanied by the materials such as earth, stick, wheel etc. happens to be the *Kāraṇa* of *ghata*, so also in case of *Kāryas* like *s'arīra* etc there is some cause or the other The cause in this case, is nothing but *punya* and *pāpa* in the form of good and bad deeds. In the production of *kāryas* like *s'arīra* etc, parents are no doubt visible causes, but along with them there are invisible causes in the form of good or bad deeds also. Otherwise, ugliness or fairness in various forms—in spite of their *dr̥ṣṭa* *hetu*, viz, parents being the same—would never be accounted for The *karma* therefore has two types:—*Punya* and *pāpa*. Good forms are the results of *punya* and ugly ones are the results of *pāpa* Hence it is said —

“ Iha dṛṣṭahetvasambhaviḥkāryaviśeṣat kulālayatna iva |

Hetvantaramanumeyam tat Karma śubhā'-śubham kartuh || ”

So, like *Agnībhūti*, you, too, shall have to accept the existence of *Karma* putting faith into the words of me—the

† Vide pp 86 to 137

omniscient You shall also have to take it for certain that *Karma* is divided as *punya* and *papa* causing a variety of forms in *deha* etc. ॥ 366-372 ॥ (1914-1920)

The existence of *punya* and *papa* could be established in a different way. —

सुह-दुःखाण कारणमणुरूप कज्जमावओऽवस्स ।

परमाणवो घटस्स व कारणमिह पुण्ण-पावाइ ॥ ३७३ ॥ (१९२१)

Suha-dukkhāṇam kāraṇamanurūpam kaḍḍhabhāvao vassam ।

Paramāṇavo ghaḍassa va kāraṇamīha punṇa-pāvāim ॥ 373 ॥ (1921)

[सुख-दुःखयोः कारणमनुरूपं कार्यमावतोऽवश्यम् ।

परमाणवो घटस्यैव कारणमिह पुण्यपापे ॥ ३७३ ॥ (१९२१)

Sukha-dukkhayoh kāraṇamanurūpam karyabhavato vāśyam ।

Paramāṇavo ghaṭasāyeva kāraṇamīha puṇya-pāpe ॥ 373 ॥ (1921)]

Trans—373 Just as molecules (which act as) the cause of *ghata* resemble *ghata*, in the same way happiness and misery the *Kāryas* have also their *kāraṇa* viz, *punya* and *pāpa*, similar to them. (1921)

टीका-अस्त्यवश्यं सुख-दुःखयोरनुरूप कारणम्, कार्यत्वात् तयोः, पक्षेह कार्यं तस्यानुरूप कारणं भवत्येव, यथा घटस्य परमाणवः, तथा तयोरिष्टानुरूपं कारणं, सुखस्य पुण्यं, दुःखस्य तु पापमिति ॥ ३७३ ॥ (१९२१)

D O.—Since *karana* is similar to *Kārya*, the small particles of earth which make *ghaṭa* resemble *ghata* and *punya* and *pāpa* which are the *karana* of *sukha* and *dukkha* would resemble *sukha* and *dukkha* ॥ 373 ॥ (1921)

The opponent may now raise the objection as follows —

सुह-दुःखकारणं जइ कम्म कज्जस्स तदणुरूपं व ।

पचमरूपं तं पि इह अहं रुक्खिं नाणुरूपं तो ॥ ३७४ ॥ (१९२२)

Suha-dukkhakāraṇam jaī kammam kajjassa tadanurūvam ca ।
Pattamarūvam tam pi hu aha rūvīm nānurūvam to ॥374॥ (1922)

[सुख-दुःखकारणं यदि कर्म कार्यस्य तदनुरूपं च ।

प्राप्तमरूपं तदपि खल्वथ रूपि नानुरूपं ततः ॥ ३७४ ॥ (१९२२)

Sukha-dukkhakāraṇam yađi karma kāryasya tadanurūvam ca ।
Prāptamarūvam tadapi khalvatha rūpi nānurūvam tatah ॥374॥]

Trans—374 If *karma* (were known as) the cause of happiness and misery, and if *Kārya* (were taken as) similar to it, then, that (*i e karma*) also would certainly become formless, and if corporeal, it would not resemble (the *Kārya*) (1922)

टीका-ननु यदि सुख-दुःखयोः पुण्य-पापात्मकं कर्म कारणम्, तच्च यदि कार्यस्य सुख-दुःखरूपस्यानुरूपं सदृशमिष्यते, तर्हि सुख-दुःखयोरात्मपरिणामत्वेनारूपत्वात् तदपि पुण्य-पापात्मकं कर्म तदनुरूपतयाऽरूपं प्राप्नोति । अथ रूपवत्, तर्हि नानुरूपं तत्, मूर्तत्वेन विलक्षणत्वादिति ॥ ३७४ ॥ (१९२२)

D C—If *Karma* composed of *punya* and *pāpa* is accepted as the *Kāraṇa* of *sukha* and *dukkha*, and if *sukha* and *dukkha* are taken as similar to the *Karma*, *Kārya*, which in fact is corporeal, would become formless like *sukha* and *dukkha*.

On the other hand, if it is taken as corporeal, it will not resemble its *kārya*, viz, *sukha* and *dukkha* which are incorporeal ॥ 374 ॥ (1922)

Then, the *Tīrthankara Bhagavān* replies —

न हि सवहाणुरूपं भिन्नं वा कारणं, अहं मयं ते ।

किं कज्ज-कारणत्तणमहं वा वत्थुत्तणं तस्स ? ॥३७५॥ (१९२३)

Na hi savvahanurūvam bhinnam, vā kāraṇam, aha mayam te ।
Kim kajja-kāraṇattana mahavā vatthuttanaṃ tassa ? ॥375॥ (1923)

[न हि सर्वथानुरूप मित्र वा कारण, अथ मत ते ।

किं कार्य-कारणत्वमयवा वस्तुत्वं तस्य ? ॥ ३७५ ॥ (१९२३)

Na hi sarvathanurūpam bhinnam va kāraṇam atha matam te ।
Kim karmya-kāraṇatvamathava vastutvam tasya ? ॥ 375 ॥ (1923)]

Trans—375 The *kāraṇa* is neither similar nor dissimilar (to the *kārya*) in all respects. Then you might contend that "How is its being a *kārya*, *kāraṇa* or a (definite) object (justified) ? (1923)

टीका—न हि सर्वथा कार्यानुरूप कारणमिष्यते, येन सुख-दुःखवत् कर्मणोऽप्यरूपत्वं प्रेष्यते । नाप्येकान्तेन सर्वधर्मैः कारणं कार्यादभिन्नमेष्टव्यम् । " अहं मय ते सि " अथ ते तवैतद् मतम्—एकान्तेन सर्वैरपि धर्मैः कारणं कार्यानुरूपमेव, मित्र वाऽनुरूपमेवेति; तर्हि सर्वथाऽनुरूपत्वं एकस्य कारण-त्वेऽपरस्यापि कारणत्वात्, एकस्य च कार्यत्वेऽन्यस्यापि कार्यत्वात् किं तयोः कार्य-कारणत्वम् ? न किञ्चित्, द्वयोरपि कारणत्वात्, कार्यत्वाद् वेति । अवैकान्तमेवोऽभ्युपगम्यमाने कार्यस्य वस्तुत्वे किं नाम तस्य कारणस्य वस्तुत्वम् ? न किञ्चित्, द्वयोरपि वस्तुत्वे सर्वथा मेदहानिप्रसङ्गादिति । तस्माद् नैकान्तेनानुरूपता, अनुरूपता वा कार्य-कारणयोः ॥ ३७५ ॥ (१९२३)

D G—*Karana* is neither absolutely similar nor absolutely dissimilar to the *Karyas*. So *Karana* cannot be called formless like its *Kārya* the *sukha* and *duḥkha*.

Your doubt is based on your assumption that *kāraṇa* is exclusively similar or dissimilar to the *kārya*. But you are not justified in your assumption. For if *Karana* were absolutely similar to *Kārya* it would turn out to be the *karana* of some other *Kārya* also.

Similarly a *kārya* taken as similar to a *kāraṇa* in all respects would also become the *Kārya* of another *kāraṇa*. Consequently there will be no distinction between *Kārya* and *karana* and both would either become *karana* or *kārya*.

Since there is no difference between *kārya* being a definite

object and a *kāraṇa* being a definite object, the exclusive difference between the two would also be out of place. Hence, *Kārya* and *kāraṇa* are neither absolutely similar nor absolutely dissimilar to each other, but comparatively equal or unequal to each other ॥ 375 ॥ (1923)

The author states in objection to this and to its reply.—

सर्वं तुल्यतुल्यं जइ तो कज्जाणुरूवया केयं ? ।

जं सोम्म ! सपज्जाओ कज्जं परपज्जाओ सेसो ॥ ३७६ ॥ (१९२४)

Savvam tullātullam jai to kajjānurūvayā keyam ? ।

Jam Somma ! sapajjāo kajjam parapajjao seso ॥ 376 ॥ (1924)

[सर्वं तुल्या-स्तुल्यं यदि ततः कार्यानुरूपता केयम् ? ।

यत् सौम्य ! स्वपर्यायः कार्यं परपर्यायः शेषः ॥ ३७६ ॥ (१९२४)

Sarvam tulyā'-tulyam yadi tataḥ kāryānurūpatā keyam ? ।

Yat Saumya ! svaparyāyah kāryam paraparyayah śesah ॥ 376 ॥ (1924)

Trans—376 “If everything is comparatively equal or unequal, then, in what way is *Kārya* similar (to *kāraṇa*) ?” For, O *Saumya* ! *Kārya* is the synonym and the rest autonym (1924)

टीका—न केवलं कार्य-कारणे एव तुल्या-स्तुल्यरूपे, किन्तु सकल-मपि त्रिभुवनान्तर्गतं वस्तु परस्परं तुल्या-स्तुल्यरूपमेव, न पुनः किञ्चित् कस्याप्येकान्तेन तुल्यमतुल्यं वा । लब्धावकाशः परः ग्राह—“ जईत्यादि ” यद्येवम्, ततः केयं कार्यानुरूपता कारणस्य विशेषतोऽन्विष्यते, येनोच्यते—“ सुह-दुक्खाणं कारणमणुरूवं ” इत्यादि ? । यदि हि किञ्चिदेकान्तेनानुरूपं स्यात् तदेतत् वक्तुं युज्यते, यदा त्वेकान्ततो न किञ्चिदनुरूपम्, नाप्यनुरूपम्; किन्तु सर्वं सर्वेण तुल्या-स्तुल्यरूपमेव, तदा किमनेन विशेषेण ? । अत्रोच्यते—“ जमित्यादि ” सौम्य ! तुल्या-स्तुल्यत्वे सर्व-गतेऽपि यद् यस्माद् कारणस्य कार्यं स्वपर्यायः, तस्मात् कारणं कार्यस्येहानुरूपमुच्यते, शेषस्त्वकार्यरूपः सर्वोऽपि पदार्थः कारणस्य परपर्यायः, इति

[न हि सर्वथानुरूपं भिन्नं वा कारणं, अथ मतं ते ।

किं कार्य-कारणत्वमप्यथा वस्तुत्वं तस्य ? ॥ ३७५ ॥ (१९२३)

Na hi sarvathanurūpam bhinnam vā kāraṇam atha matam te ।
Kim karmya-kāraṇatvamapyathava vāstutvam tasya ? ॥ 375 ॥ (1923)

Trans—375 The *kāraṇa* is neither similar nor dissimilar (to the *kārya*) in all respects. Then you might contend that "How is its being a *kārya*, *kāraṇa* or a (definite) object (justified) ? (1923)

टीका-न हि सर्वथा कार्यानुरूपं कारणमिष्यते, येन सुख-दुःखवत् कर्मजोऽप्यरूपत्वं प्रेर्यते । नाप्येकान्तेन सर्वधर्मैः कारणं कार्यावृत्तिभेदमप्यम् ।
“अहं मयं ते चि” अथ ते तथैतद्वत् मतम्-एकान्तेन सर्वैरपि धर्मैः कारणं कार्यानुरूपमेव, भिन्नं वाऽनुरूपमेवेति; तर्हि सर्वथाऽनुरूपत्वं एकस्य कारणं त्वेऽपरस्यापि कारणत्वात्, एकस्य च कार्यत्वेऽन्यस्यापि कार्यत्वात् किं तयोः कार्य-कारणत्वम् ? न किञ्चित्, द्वयोरपि कारणत्वात्, कार्यत्वाद् वेति । अथैकान्तमेवोऽभ्युपगम्यमाने कार्यस्य वस्तुत्वे किं नाम तस्य कारणस्य वस्तुत्वम् ? न किञ्चित्, द्वयोरपि वस्तुत्वे सर्वथा भेदहानिप्रसङ्गादिति । तस्माद् नैकान्तेनानुरूपता, अनुरूपता वा कार्य-कारणयोः ॥ ३७५ ॥ (१९२३)

D C—*Karana* is neither absolutely similar nor absolutely dissimilar to the *Karyas*. So *Karana* cannot be called formless like its *Kārya* viz *sukha* and *duḥkha*.

Your doubt is based on your assumption that *kāraṇa* is exclusively similar or dissimilar to the *kārya*. But you are not justified in your assumption. For if *kāraṇa* were absolutely similar to *Kārya* it would turn out to be the *kāraṇa* of some other *Kārya* also.

Similarly a *kārya* taken as similar to a *kāraṇa* in all respects would also become the *Kārya* of another *kāraṇa*. Consequently there will be no distinction between *Kārya* and *kāraṇa*, and both would either become *kāraṇa* or *kārya*.

Since there is no difference between *kārya* being a definite

object and a *kāraṇa* being a definite object, the exclusive difference between the two would also be out of place. Hence, *Kārya* and *kāraṇa* are neither absolutely similar nor absolutely dissimilar to each other, but comparatively equal or unequal to each other ॥ 375 ॥ (1923)

The author states in objection to this and to its reply —

सर्वं तुल्यतुल्यं जइ तो कज्जाणुरूवया केयं ? ।
जं सोम्म ! सपज्जाओ कज्जं परपज्जाओ सेसो ॥ ३७६ ॥ (१९२४)

Savvam tullātullam jai to kajjānurūvayā keyam ? ।

Jam Somma ! sapajjāo kajjam parapajjao seso ॥ 376 ॥ (1924)

[सर्वं तुल्या-स्तुल्यं यदि ततः कार्यानुरूपता केयम् ? ।

यत् सौम्य ! स्वपर्यायः कार्यं परपर्यायः शेषः ॥ ३७६ ॥ (१९२४)

Sarvam tulyā'-tulyam yadi tatah kāryānurūpatā keyam ? ।

Yat Saumya ! svaparyāyah kāryam paraparyāyah śesah ॥ 376 ॥ (1924)

Trans — 376 “If everything is comparatively equal or unequal, then, in what way is *Kārya* similar (to *kāraṇa*) ? ” For, O *Saumya* ! *Kārya* is the synonym and the rest autonym (1924)

टीका-न केवलं कार्य-कारणे एव तुल्या-स्तुल्यरूपे, किन्तु सकल-
मपि त्रिभुवनान्तर्गतं वस्तु परस्परं तुल्या-स्तुल्यरूपमेव, न पुनः किञ्चित्
कस्याप्येकान्तेन तुल्यमतुल्यं वा । लब्धावकाशः परः प्राह-“ जईत्यादि ”
यद्येवम्, ततः केयं कार्यानुरूपता कारणस्य विशेषतोऽन्विष्यते, येनोच्यते-
“ सुह-दुस्त्राणं कारणमणुरूवं ” इत्यादि ? । यदि हि किञ्चिदेकान्तेनानु-
रूपं स्यात् तदेतत् वक्तुं शुज्यते, यदा त्वेकान्ततो न किञ्चिदनुरूपम्,
नाप्यनुरूपम्; किन्तु सर्वं सर्वेण तुल्या-स्तुल्यरूपमेव, तदा किमनेन
विशेषेण ? । अत्रोच्यते-“ जमित्यादि ” सौम्य ! तुल्या-स्तुल्यत्वे सर्व-
गतेऽपि यद् यस्माद् कारणस्य कार्यं स्वपर्यायः, तस्मात् कारणं कार्यस्येहा-
नुरूपमुच्यते, शेषस्त्वकार्यरूपः सर्वोऽपि पदार्थः कारणस्य परपर्यायः, इति

तं प्रति विवक्षित कारणमसमानरूपमभिधीयत । आह—ननु क्व प्रस्तुते सुख-
दुःखे कारणस्य स्वपर्यायः ? । उच्यते—जीव-पुण्यसंयोगः सुखस्य कारणम्,
तस्य च सुख पर्याय एव, दुःखस्यापि जीव-पापसंयोगः कारणम्, अतस्त
स्यापि दुःख पर्याय एव, यथा च सुखं शुभं, कल्याण, शिवमित्यादीन् व्यप-
देशोक्तमते तथा तत्कारणभूत पुण्यस्कन्धद्रव्यमपि; यथा च दुःखमशुभम्,
अकल्याणम्, अशिवमित्यादिसङ्घाः प्राप्नोति तथा तत्कारणभूतं पापद्रव्यमपि,
इति विक्षेपतोऽत्र पुण्य-पापे-सुख-दुःखयोरनु रूपकारणस्वेनोक्ते इति ॥३७६॥
(१९२४)

D C—Bhagavān —Not only *karya* and *karana* but all
objects of the Universe are relatively equal and unequal and
no object is absolutely equal or absolutely unequal.

Acalabhrata —If it is so then why do you try to establish
particularly the similarity between *karana* and *karya* by saying
that *sukha* and *duḥkha* are similar to *karana* etc ? Still
however if some object is absolutely similar to another it may
be justified to say so. But when nothing is similar or dis-
similar in all respects and everything is relatively equal or
unequal according to you then, how could it be said that
Karana was similar to *karya* !

Bhagavan —In spite of all objects being relatively equal
or unequal *karya* resembles *karana* because it is the synonym
of *karana* while other objects which are the antonyms of
karana are dissimilar to it.

Hence in the present case, *sukha* and *duḥkha* are the
synonyms of *Karma* the *karana*. The combination of *jiiva*
and *punya* is the cause of *sukha* and that of *jiiva* and *pāpa*
is the cause of *duḥkha* just as *jiiva kalyāṇa* *sukha* etc are the
synonyms for *sukha* the same are the synonyms for the
punya-karmas also.

Similarly *duḥkha* and its cause the *pāpa-karmas* have
the same synonyms as *a-sukha* *a-kalyāṇa* and *a-sukha* etc

It is in this way, *O Saumya* ' that *punya* and *pāpa* are known as the *kāraṇas* resembling their *kāryas* viz *sukha* and *duḥkha* ॥ 376 ॥ (1924)

The opponent may here ask as follows —

किं जह मुत्तममुत्तस्स कारणं तह सुहाईणं कम्मं ।
दिट्ठं सुहाइकारणमन्नाइ जहेह तह कम्मं ? ॥३७७॥ (१९२५)

Kim jaha muttamamuttassa kāraṇam taha suhāīṇam kammam ।
Dittham suhāīkāraṇamannāi jaheha taha kammam ? ॥377॥(1925)

[किं यथा मूर्तममूर्तस्य कारणं तथा सुखादीनां कर्म ।
दृष्टं सुखादिकारणमन्नादि यथेह तथा कर्म ? ॥ ३७७ ॥ (१९२५)

Kim yathā mūrtamamūrtasya kāraṇam tathā sukhādinām karma ।
Dṛṣṭam sukhādikāraṇamannādi yatheha tathā karma ? ॥ 377 ॥

Trans—377 Is *Karma* the cause of *sukha* etc, as *mūrta* is the cause of *amūrta* ? (And) is *Karma* apprehended (as the cause) in the same way as food etc, are apprehended as the cause of happiness etc ? (1925)

टीका—किं यथा मूर्तं नीलादिकममूर्तस्य स्वप्रतिभासिज्ञानस्य कारणं हेतुस्तथा सुख-दुःखयोः पुण्य-पापात्मकं कर्मापि मूर्तमेव सत् कारणम्, यथा प्रत्यक्षत एव दृष्टमन्नादिकम्; आदिशब्दात् सक्-चन्दना-ऽङ्गना-ऽहि-विष-कण्टकादिकमिह सुख-दुःखयोर्मूर्तं तत् कारणं तद्वत् कर्मापि तयोरिति भावार्थः ? ॥ ३७७ ॥ (१९२५)

D C—Just as a gem, garland, sandal-paste, woman, serpent, or a poisonous sting becomes the *mūrta* cause of the *a-mūrta* *sukha* and *duḥkha*, should we accept *Karma* also whether good or bad—to be the *mūrta* and *pratyakṣa* cause like food etc ? ॥ 377 ॥ (1925)

The answer is—

होउ तय चिय किं कम्मणा, न ज तुल्लसाहणाण पि ।

फलभेदओ सोऽवस्स सकारणो कारण कम्म ॥३७८॥ (१९२६)

Hōu tayam ciya kim kammanā, na j am tullasāhanāṇam pi ।
Phalabhedao so vassam sakāraṇo kāraṇam kammam ॥378॥ (1926)

[भवतु तदेव किं कर्मणा, न यत् तुल्यसाधनानामपि ।

फलभेदतः सोऽवश्य सकारणः कारणं कर्म ॥ ३७८ ॥ (१९२६)

Bhavatu tadeva kim karmṇa na yat tulyasādhanaṇāmapi ।
Phalabhedatah so vasyam sa-kāraṇaḥ kāraṇam karma ॥378॥ (1926)]

Trans—378 (The opponent may argue further that) " Let that (*i. e.*, food etc.) be the cause of happiness etc. but what (is the use) of *Karma* ? That is proper In spite of there being equal materials the difference in results has certainly (some) reason which is (nothing but *Karma*.) (1926)

टीका-ननु तदेव दृष्टमन्नादिकं वस्तु तर्हि सुखादेः कारणमस्तु, किम
दृष्टेन तेन कर्मणा परिकल्पितेन, अविप्रसङ्गात् ? । तदेतच्च न, यच्च यस्मात्
तुल्यान्यन्नादीनि साधनानि येषां ते तुल्यसाधनाः पुरुषास्तेषामपि फले सुख-
दुःखलक्षणे कार्यभेदः फलभेदो महान् दृश्यते, तुल्येऽप्यन्नादिने अर्कं
कस्याप्याह्लादः, अन्यस्य तु रोगाद्युत्पत्तिर्दृश्यत इत्यर्थः । यथेत्य तुल्यान्नादि
साधनानामपि फलभेदः, सोऽवश्यमेव सकारणः, निष्कारणत्वे नित्य सत्त्वा-
ऽसत्त्वप्रसङ्गात् । यच्च तत्कारणं तददृष्टं कर्म, इति न तत्कल्पनाऽऽनर्ह्यमिति
॥ ३७८ ॥ (१९२६)

D O—Acalabhrata—Since food etc are directly apprehen-
ded they could be taken as the causes of *sukha* *duḥkha* but
what is the purpose of assuming *Karma* which is absolutely
imperceptible to be the cause ?

Bhagavan.—Persons having the same *sādhana*s like *anna*
etc are found to enjoy different *phalas* like *sukha* and *duḥkha*
In spite of their taking the same food, some people look glad

while others appear gloomy This sort of *phala bheda* is significant and is due to good or bad *karma* ॥ 378 ॥ (1926)

The *mūrtatā* of *Karma* is now explained as follows —

एतो चिय तं मुत्तं मुत्तवलाहाणओ जहा कुंभो ।
देहाइकज्जमुत्ताइओ व भणिए पुणो भणइ ॥ ३७९ ॥ (१९२७)

Etto cciya tam muttam muttabalāhānao jahā kumbho ।
Dehāikajjamuttāio vva bhanie puno bhanai ॥ 379 ॥ (1927)

[एतस्मादेव तद् मूर्त्तं मूर्त्तवलाधानतो यथा कुम्भः ।
देहादिकार्यमूर्त्तादित इव भणिते पुनर्भणति ॥ ३७९ ॥ (१९२७)

Etasmādeva tad mūrtam mūrtabalādhānato yathā kumbhah ।
Dehādikāryamūrtādita iva bhanite punarbhanaṭi ॥379॥ (1927)]

Trans—379 On account of that reason, it is *mūrta* like *ghata*, on account of its (capacity of) strengthening the body, or on account of the *kāryas* like *deha* etc being *mūrta* When thus told, he speaks again (9127)

टीका—यत एव तुल्यसाधनानां कर्मनिबन्धनः फलभेदः, अत एवोच्यते—मूर्त्तं कर्म, मूर्त्तस्य देहादेर्वलाधानकारित्वात्, कुम्भवत्, यथा निमित्तमात्रभावेन घटो देहादीनां बलमाधत्ते एवं कर्मापि, अतो मूर्त्तमित्यर्थः । अथवा, मूर्त्तं कर्म, मूर्त्तेन स्रक्-चन्दना-ऽङ्गनादिना तस्योपचयलक्षणस्य बलस्याधीयमानत्वात्, कुम्भवत्-यथा मूर्त्तत्वेन तैलादिना बलस्याधीयमानत्वात् कुम्भो मूर्त्तः, एवं स्रक्-चन्दनादिनोपचीयमानत्वात् कर्माति मूर्त्तमिति भावः । यदिवा, मूर्त्तं कर्म, देहादेस्तत्कार्यस्य मूर्त्तत्वात्, परमाणुवत्-यथा घटादेस्तत्कार्यस्य मूर्त्तस्य दर्शनात् परमाणवो मूर्त्ताः, एव देहादेस्तत्कार्यस्य मूर्त्तस्य दर्शनात् कर्मापि मूर्त्तमित्यर्थः । एवं भणिते पुनर्भणति परः ॥३७९॥ (१९२७)

D C—The *mūrtatva* of *Karmas* is explained in various ways—

- 1 Since the difference in *phalas* in case of those having the same *sādhana*s is due to *Karma*, the *karma* should be taken as *mūrta*

होउ तय चिय किं कम्मणा, न ज तुल्लसाहणाण पि ।

फलभेदो सोऽवस्स सकारणो कारण कम्म ॥३७८॥ (१९२६)

Hōu tayam ciya kim kammanā, na j tullaśāhanāṇam pi ।

Phalabhedao so vassam sakāraṇo kāraṇam kammam ॥378॥ (1926)

[भवतु तदेव किं कर्मणा, न यत् तुल्यसाधनानामपि ।

फलभेदः सोऽवश्य सकारणः कारण कर्म ॥ ३७८ ॥ (१९२६)

Bhavatu tadeva kim karmāṇa na yat tulyasādhanaṇāmapi ।

Phalabhedatahso vaśyam sa-kāraṇaḥ kāraṇam karma ॥378॥ (1926)]

Trans—378 (The opponent may argue further that) “ Let that (*i. e.*, food etc.) be the cause of happiness etc. but what (is the use) of *Karma* ? That is proper In spite of there being equal materials, the difference in results has certainly (some) reason which is (nothing but *Karma.*) (1926)

टीका—ननु तदेव दूष्टमन्नादिकं भस्त्वु तर्हि सुखादेः कारणमस्तु, किं दूष्टं तेन कर्मणा परिकल्पितेन, अतिप्रसङ्गात् ? । तदेतद् न, यद् यस्मात् तुल्या यन्मादीनि साधनानि येषां ते तुल्यसाधनाः पुरुषास्तेषामपि फले सुख-दुःखलक्षणे कार्यभेदः फलभेदो महान् दृश्यते, तुल्येऽप्यन्नादिने भुक्ते कस्याप्याह्लादः, अन्यस्य तु रोगाद्युत्पत्तिर्वृश्यत इत्यर्थः । यद्येत्य तुल्यान्नादि साधनानामपि फलभेदः, सोऽवश्यमेव सकारणः, निष्कारणत्वे नित्यं सत्त्वा-ऽसत्त्वप्रसङ्गात् । यच्च सत्कारणं तददृष्टं कर्म, इति न तत्स्वरूपनाऽऽनर्थ्यमिति ॥ ३७८ ॥ (१९२६)

D C—Acalabhrata—Since food etc are directly apprehended they could be taken as the causes of *sukha dukkha* but what is the purpose of assuming *Karma* which is absolutely imperceptible to be the cause ?

Bhagavan.—Persons having the same *sādhana*s like *anna* etc are found to enjoy different *phalas* like *sukha* and *dukkha* In spite of their taking the same food some people look glad

while others appear gloomy This sort of *phala bheda* is significant and is due to good or bad *karma* ॥ 378 ॥ (1926)

The *mūrtatā* of *Karma* is now explained as follows —

एतो चिय तं मुत्तं मुत्तवलाहाणओ जहा कुम्भो ।

देहाइकज्जमुत्ताइओ व भणिए पुणो भणइ ॥ ३७९ ॥ (१९२७)

Etto cciya tam muttam muttabalāhānao jahā kumbho ।

Dehāikajjamuttāio vva bhanie puno bhanai ॥ 379 ॥ (1927)

[एतस्मादेव तद् मूर्तं मूर्तवलाधानतो यथा कुम्भः ।

देहादिकार्यमूर्तादित इव भणिते पुनर्भणति ॥ ३७९ ॥ (१९२७)

Etasmādeva tad mūrtam mūrtabalādhānato yathā kumbhah ।

Dehādīkāryamūrtādita iva bhanite punarbhānati ॥ 379 ॥ (1927)]

Trans—379 On account of that reason, it is *mūrta* like *ghata*, on account of its (capacity of) strengthening the body, or on account of the *kāryas* like *deha* etc being *mūrta* When thus told, he speaks again (9127)

टीका—यत एव तुल्यसाधनानां कर्मनिबन्धनः फलभेदः, अत एवोच्यते—मूर्तं कर्म, मूर्तस्य देहादेर्वलाधानकारित्वात्, कुम्भवत्, यथा निमित्तमात्रभावित्वेन घटो देहादीनां बलमाधत्ते एवं कर्मापि, अतो मूर्तमित्यर्थः । अथवा, मूर्तं कर्म, मूर्तेन स्रक्-चन्दना-ऽङ्गनादिना तस्योपचयलक्षणस्य बलस्याधीयमानत्वात्, कुम्भवत्-यथा मूर्तत्वेन तैलादिना बलस्याधीयमानत्वात् कुम्भो मूर्तः, एवं स्रक्-चन्दनादिनोपचीयमानत्वात् कर्माति मूर्तमिति भावः । यदिवा, मूर्तं कर्म, देहादेस्तत्कार्यस्य मूर्तत्वात्, परमाणुवत्-यथा घटादेस्तत्कार्यस्य मूर्तस्य दर्शनात् परमाणवो मूर्ताः, एव देहादेस्तत्कार्यस्य मूर्तस्य दर्शनात् कर्मापि मूर्तमित्यर्थः । एवं भणिते पुनर्भणति परः ॥ ३७९ ॥ (१९२७)

D C—The *mūrtatva* of *Karmas* is explained in various ways—

- 1 Since the difference in *phalus* in case of those having the same *sādhana*s is due to *Karma*, the *karma* should be taken as *mūrta*.

- 2 *Karma* is *mūṛta* because like *ghata* it strengthens the *karyas* like body etc
- 3 Just as *ghata* is *mūṛta* because it is strengthened by the *mūṛta* objects like oil etc *Karma* is also *mūṛta* because it is also nourished by the objects like flower-garlands and sandal-paste etc
4. Just as the *pariṇāmas* of *ghata* are *mūṛta* because *ghata* is *mūṛta* the *karma* is also *mūṛta* because its *karyas* like *saṁsāra* etc are *mūṛta*. p 379 n (1927)

When thus answered by the *Tīrthankara* the opponent argues again—

तो किं देहादिण मुत्तत्तणओ तय हवइ मुत्तं ।

अह सुह—दुक्खादिण कारणभावादरूपं ति ? ॥ ३८० ॥ (१९२८)

To kim dehādinam muttattanao tayaṁ haviṁ muttam ।

Aha suha-dukkhādinam kāraṇabhāvadārūpam ti ? n 380 n (1928)

[ततः किं देहादीनां मूर्तत्वतस्तद् भवति मूर्तम् ।

अथ सुख—दुःखादीनां कारणभावाद्रूपमिति ? ॥ ३८० ॥ (१९२८)

Tataḥ kim dehādinam mūrtatvatastad bhavati mūrtam ।

Atha sukha-duḥkhādinam kāraṇabhāvadārūpam ti ? n 380 n (1928)]

Trans—380 Then does it become *mūṛta* because of the corporeal nature *deha* etc ? Or is it incorporeal because of *sukha-duḥkha* etc, (being incorporeal) ? (1928)

टीका—ततः किं देहादीनां कर्मकार्याणां मूर्तानां दर्शनात् तत् कर्म मूर्तं भवतु, आहोस्त्वित् सुख—दुःख—क्रोध—मानादीनां जीवपरिणाममूर्तानां तत्कार्याणाममूर्तानां दर्शनात् तत् कारणभावेनामूर्तमस्तु कर्म ? इत्यथ मूर्तत्वा—मूर्तत्वाभ्यामुभयत्रापि तत्कार्यदर्शनात् किं मूर्तम्, अमूर्तं वा कर्म भवतु ? इति निवेद्यतामिति ॥ ३८० ॥ (१९२८)

D C—By accepting your argument *Karma* will become

mūrta as well as *a-mūrta* It will be *mūrta* because its *kāryas* like *deha* etc are *mūrta* At the same time, it will be called *a-mūrta* also, because its *kāryas* and the *jīva-pariṇāmas* such as *sukha*, *duḥkha*, *krodha*, *māna* etc are *a-mūrta* In such a case, should we take *Karma* as *mūrta* or *a-mūrta* ? ||380|| (1928)

Bhagavān replies.—

न सुहार्दणं हेऊ कम्मं चिय किन्तु ताण जीवो वि ।
होइ समवाइकारणमियरं कम्मं ति को दोसो ? ||३८१|| (१९२९)

Na sahāṇam heū kammam ciya kintu tāṇa jīvo vi ।
Hōi samavāikāranamiyaram kammam ti ko doso ? ||381|| (1929)

[न सुखादीनां हेतुः कर्मैव किन्तु तेषां जीवोऽपि ।

भवति समवायिकारणमितरत् कर्मेति को दोषः ? ||३८१|| (१९२९)

Na sukhadīnām hetuh karmaiva kintu tesām jīvo'pi ।
Bhavati samavāyikāranamitarat karme'ti ko doṣah ? ||381|| (1929)]

Trans—381 *Karma* is not the only cause of happiness etc, but *jīva* is also their intimate cause *Karma* is the opposite one What difficulty will arise (in such a case) ? (1929)

टीका—सुखादीनां कर्मैव केवलं कारणं न भवति, किन्तु जीवोऽपि तेषां समवायिकारणं भवति, कर्म पुनरितरदसमवायिकारणं भवतीति को दोषः ? । इदमुक्तं भवति—सुखादेरमूर्तत्वेन समवायिकारणस्य जीवस्यामूर्तत्वमस्यैव, असमवायिकारणस्य तु कर्मणः सुखाद्यमूर्तत्वेनामूर्तत्वं न भवतीत्यपीति न दोष इति ॥ ३८१ ॥ (१९२९)

D. C—*Karma* is not the only cause of *sukha*, *duḥkha* etc. Really speaking, *Jīva* is the intimate cause of *sukha* etc and *Karma* is merely an accidental cause Hence, on account of the *a-mūrta* tva of the *kāryas*, viz *sukh*, *duḥkha* etc their intimate cause viz *jīva* does become *a-mūrta* but *Kāma* being merely an accidental cause does not become *a-mūrta* So, there will be no difficulty as regards *karma* being accepted as *mūrta* ||381|| (1929)

2. *Karma* is *mūṛta* because like *ghata* it strengthens the *karyas* like body etc
3. Just as *ghata* is *mūṛta*, because it is strengthened by the *mūṛta* objects like oil etc *Karma* is also *mūṛta* because it is also nourished by the objects like flower-garlands and sandal-paste etc
4. Just as the *parināmas* of *ghata* are *mūṛta* because *ghata* is *mūṛta* the *karma* is also *mūṛta*, because its *karyas* like *saṁsāra* etc are *mūṛta*. ¶ 379 ¶ (1927)

When thus answered by the *Tīrthankara* the opponent argues again—

तो किं देहादिण मुत्तत्तणओ तय हवइ मुत्त ।

अह सुह—दुःखादिण कारणभावादरूपं ति ? ॥ ३८० ॥ (१९२८)

To kim dehādinam muttattanao tayam havai muttam ।

Aha suha-duḥkhādinam kāraṇabhāvadārūpam ti ? ¶ 380 ¶ (1928)

[ततः किं देहादीनां मूर्तत्ववस्तु मयति मूर्तम् ।

अथ सुख-दुःखादीनां कारणभावावरूपमिति ? ॥ ३८० ॥ (१९२८)

Tataḥ kim dehādinam mūrtatvavastu bhavati mūrtam ।

Atha sukha-duḥkhādinam kāraṇabhāvadārūpamiti ? ¶ 380 ¶ (1928)]

Trans—380 Then does it become *mūṛta* because of the corporeal nature, *deha* etc ? Or is it incorporeal because of *sukha-duḥkha* etc, (being incorporeal) ? (1928)

टीका—ततः किं देहादीनां कमकार्याणां मूर्तानां दर्शनात् तत् कर्म मूर्तं भवतु, आहोस्मिन् सुख-दुःख-क्रोध-मानादीनां जीवपरिणाममूतानां तत्कार्याणाममूर्तानां दर्शनात् तत् कारणभावेनामूर्तमस्तु कर्म ? इत्येव मूर्तत्वा-ऽमूर्तत्वाभ्यामुभयथापि तत्कार्यदर्शनात् किं मूर्तम्, अमूर्तं वा कर्म भवतु ? इति निषेधतामिति ॥ ३८० ॥ (१९२८)

D C—By accepting your argument, *Karma* will become

mūrta as well as *a-mūrta* It will be *mūrta* because its *kāryas* like *deha* etc are *mūrta* At the same time, it will be called *a-mūrta* also, because its *kāryas* and the *jīva-parināmas* such as *sukha*, *duhkha*, *krodha*, *māna* etc are *a-mūrta* In such a case, should we take *Karma* as *mūrta* or *a-mūrta* ? ||380|| (1928)

Bhagavān replies —

न सुहाईणं हेऊ कम्मं चिय किन्तु ताण जीवो वि ।
होइ समवाइकारणमियरं कम्मं ति को दोसो ? ||३८१|| (१९२९)

Na sahāīnam heū kammam ciya kintu tāna jīvo vi ।
Hōi samavāīkāranamiyaram kammam ti ko doso ? ||381|| (1929)

[न सुखादीनां हेतुः कर्मैव किन्तु तेषां जीवोऽपि ।

भवति समवायिकारणमितरत् कर्मैति को दोषः ? ||३८१|| (१९२९)

Na sukhādīnām hetuh karmaiva kintu tesām jīvo'pi ।
Bhavati samavāyīkāranamitarat karme'ti ko dosah ? ||381|| (1929)]

Trans—381 *Karma* is not the only cause of happiness etc, but *jīva* is also their intimate cause *Karma* is the opposite one What difficulty will arise (in such a case) ? (1929)

टीका—सुखादीनां कर्मैव केवलं कारणं न भवति, किन्तु जीवोऽपि तेषां समवायिकारणं भवति, कर्म पुनरितरदसमवायिकारणं भवतीति को दोषः ? । इदमुक्तं भवति—सुखादेरमूर्तत्वेन समवायिकारणस्य जीवस्यामूर्तत्वमस्त्येव, असमवायिकारणस्य तु कर्मणः सुखाद्यमूर्तत्वेनामूर्तत्वं न भवतीत्यपीति न दोष इति ॥ ३८१ ॥ (१९२९)

D. C—*Karma* is not the only cause of *sukha*, *duhkha* etc. Really speaking, *Jīva* is the intimate cause of *sukha* etc and *Karma* is merely an accidental cause Hence, on account of the *a-mūrtatva* of the *kāryas*, viz *sukh*, *duhkha* etc their intimate cause viz *jīva* does become *a-mūrta* but *Kāma* being merely an accidental cause does not become *a-mūrta* So, there will be no difficulty as regards *ka rma* being accepted as *mūrta* ||381|| (1929)

Now refuting the first assertion that the abundance of miseries is due to the diminution of *punya*, the author states—

इय रूषित्ते सुह—दुक्खकारणत्ते य कम्मणो सिद्धे ।

पुण्णावगारिसमेत्तेण दुक्खबहुलत्तणमजुत्त ॥ ३८२ ॥ (१९३०)

Iya rūpitte suha-dukkha kāraṇatthe ya kammuno siddhe ।

Punnāvagarisamettena dukkhabahulattanaṃajuttam ॥382॥ (1930)

[इति रूपित्वे सुख-दुःखकारणत्वे च कर्मण सिद्धे ।

पुण्यापकर्ममात्रेण दुःखबहुलत्वमयुक्तम् ॥ ३८२ ॥ (१९३०)

Iti rūpitve sukha-dukkhakarapatve ca karmaph siddhe ।

Punyaṣpakarmamatreṇa dukkhabahulatvamayuktam ॥382॥ (1930)]

Trans—382 When *Karma* is proved to be *mūṛta* and (at the same time) established as the cause of *sukha-dukkha* (the theory that) the abundance of miseries is due to the diminution of virtuous actions will fail (1930)

टीका—इत्थं पञ्चविकल्पोपन्यस्तस्वभावानिरासेन पुण्य-पापस्य कस्य कर्मणः सुख-दुःखकारणत्वे रूपित्वे च सिद्धे पुण्यापकर्ममात्रेण यद् दुःखबहुलत्वं प्रथमविकल्पोपन्यासे प्रोक्तं तदयुक्तमिति ॥ ३८२ ॥ (१९३०)

D C—Now that the theory of *svabhāva* has been refuted and the existence of a *mūṛta karma* as the cause of *sukha* and *dukkha* has been established we can easily refute the theory that the abundance of miseries is caused by the diminution of *punya*s ॥ 382 ॥ (1930)

कम्मप्यगारिसजणिय तदवस्स पगरिसाणुभूईओ ।

सोक्खप्पगारिसभूई जह पुण्णप्यगारिसप्पमवा ॥३८३॥ (१९३१)

Kammappagarisajanīyam tadavassam pagarisāṇubhūto ।

Sokkhappagarisabhū jaha punṇappagarisappabhavā ॥383॥ (1931)

[कर्मप्रकर्षवन्ति तदवश्यं प्रकर्षानुभूतेः ।

सौख्यप्रकर्षभूतिर्यथा पुण्यप्रकर्षप्रमवा ॥ ३८३ ॥ (१९३१)

Karmaprakarsajanitam tadavaśyam prakarsanubhūteh ।
 Saukhyaprakarsabhūtiriyathā punyaprakarsaprabhavā ॥ 383 ॥

Trans—383 Just as the experience of the abundance of happiness is caused by the abundance of virtuous actions, the experience of the abundance of miseries is also produced by the abundance of sinful actions (1931)

टीका—तद् दुःखबहुलत्वं पुण्यापकर्षजनितं न भवति, किन्तु स्वानु-
 रूपकर्मप्रकर्षजनितम्, प्रकर्षानुभूतित्वात्—वेदनाप्रकर्षानुभवरूपत्वादिति हेतुः,
 यथा सौख्यप्रकर्षानुभूतिः स्वानुरूपकर्मप्रकर्षप्रभवेति दृष्टान्तः ॥ ३८३ ॥
 (१९३१)

D. C—Abundance of miseries is not due to the want of virtuous actions but it is due to the abundance of sinful actions, just as abundance of happiness is due to abundance of virtuous deeds, and not due to the diminution of sinful deeds ॥ 383 ॥ (1931)

Moreover,

तह बज्जसाहणप्पगरिसंगभावादिहण्णहा न तयं ।
 विवरीयबज्जसाहणबलप्पगरिसं अवेक्खेज्जा ॥ ३८४ ॥ (१९३२)

Taha bajjhasāhanappagarisangabhāvādihannahā na tayam ।
 Vivariyabajjhasāhanabalappagarisam avekkhejjā ॥ 384 ॥ (1932)

[तथा बाह्यसाधनप्रकर्षाङ्गभावादिहान्यथा न तत् ।

विपरीतबाह्यसाधनबलप्रकर्षमपेक्षेत ॥ ३८४ ॥ (१९३२)

Tatha bāhyasāadhanaprakarsaṅgabhāvādihānyathā na tat ।
 Viparītabāhyasāadhanabalaprakarsamapekseta ॥ 384 ॥ (1932)]

Trans—384 It is so on account of the abundance of external elements also (For), otherwise, it would not require the excessive force of the external (as well as) opposite elements (1932)

टीका-‘ तथा ’ इत्युपपत्त्यन्तरार्यः । इह देहिनां दुःस्वप्नदुल्लव केवल पुण्यापकर्षमात्रजनित न भवति । कुतः ? इत्यत्र हेतुमाह-बाह्यानि यान्यनिष्ठा हारादीनि साधनानि तेषां यस्तदनु रूपः प्रकर्षस्तस्याङ्गमात्रात् कारणमात्रादिति । विपर्यये बाधकमाह-‘ इहेत्यादि ’ तद् दुःस्वप्नमन्यथा यदि पुण्यापकर्षमात्रजन्य मवेत् तदा पुण्यसंपाद्येष्टाहारापचयमात्रादेव मवेत्, न तु पापोचयसंपाद्या निष्ठाहारादिरूपविपरीतबाधसाधनानां यद् बल सामर्थ्यं तस्य स्वातन्त्र्यो यः प्रकर्षस्तमपेक्षेत् । इदमत्र हृदयम्-यदि पुण्यापकर्षमात्रजन्य दुःस्वप्न मवेत्, तदा पुण्योदयप्राप्तेष्टाहारादिसाधनापकर्षमात्रादेव मवेत्, न चैतदस्ति, इह विपरीतानिष्ठाहारादिसाधनप्रकर्षसामर्थ्यादिषु तज्ज्ञावादिति ॥३८४॥ (१९३२)

D C—Abundance of miseries to the various beings in this world is not merely caused by the diminution of *punya-karmas* but by the abundant force of various external elements like forbidden food also. If it were not so it would have been caused only by the diminution of prescribed food etc (to be attained by *punya-karmas*) and would never have depended on the abundant force of the external but opposite elements like forbidden food etc (to be attained by *pāpa-karmas*)

The main purport of the above argument is this—If *dehata* were to be generated by means of the diminution of *punya-karmas* only it would have been produced only on account of the lack of external materials like *apāhāra* etc. But it is not so as it is produced by the increasing force of the external but opposite materials like *anustāhāra* as well. n 384 ॥ (1932)

And

देहो नावचयकमो पुण्णुकरित्ते व मुत्तिमत्तामो ।
होज्ज व स हीणतरमो कहमसुभयरो महल्लो य ? ॥३८५॥ (१९३३)

Deho nāvachayakao punṇukkaritṭe va muttimattāo :
Hojja va sa hinatarao kahamasubhayaro mahallo ya ? ॥385॥ (1933)

[देहो नापचयकृतः पुण्योत्कर्ष इव मूर्तिमच्चात् ।

भवेद् वा स हीनतरकः कथमशुभतरो महान्श्च ? ॥ ३८५ ॥ (१९३३)

Deho nāpacayakṛtaḥ punyotkarsa iva mūrtimattvāt ।

Bhaved vā sa hīnatarakaḥ kathamaśubhataro mahānśca ? ॥385॥

Trans—385 Since body is corporeal like the abundant *punya karmas*, it is not produced by (means of) diminution (of *punya karmas*) Or, if it is so, it should be small (For) how is a huge and (at the same time) splendid (body available) ? (1933)

टीका—दुःखितहस्त्यादिदेहः केवलपुण्यापयमात्रकृतो न भवति, मूर्तिमच्चात्, यथा पुण्योत्कर्षे तज्जन्योऽनुत्तरसुर-चक्रवर्त्यादिदेहः, यश्च पुण्यापचयमात्रजन्यः स मूर्तिमानपि न भवति, यथा न कोऽपि, यदि च पुण्यापचयमात्रेण देहो जन्येत, तदा हीनतरः शुभ एव च स्यात्, कथं महान्, अशुभतरश्च भवेत्, महतो महापुण्योपचयजन्यत्वात्, अशुभस्य चाशुभकर्म-निर्वर्त्यत्वात् ? । पुण्येन पुनरणीयसापि शुभ एव देहो जन्येत, न तु दुःखितः । अणीयसापि हि सुवर्णलवेनाणीयानपि सौवर्ण एव घटो भवति न तु मार्तिकः, ताम्रादिर्वेति ॥ ३८५ ॥ (१९३३)

D C—Since the bodies of *anuttara* gods including the Supreme Ruler of the World are *mūrta*, they are not produced by the diminution of *punya karmas* In the same way, bodies like that of a miserable elephant etc are also not produced by the diminution of *punya karmas* only as they are *mūrta* For, that which has been produced by the diminution can never be *mūrta*

Still however, if a body is ever produced by diminution of *punya*s, it must be exquisitely feeble and auspicious Because a body which is huge and at the same time auspicious, is produced by the accumulation of *punya*s, while that which is huge but in-auspicious is produced by the accumulation of *pāpas* Hence, a body produced even by a small quantity of *punya*s must necessarily be happy and never unhappy Just

as from a small lump of gold a small but golden pot is made but not an earthen or a copper one similarly, a body produced even from a small accumulation of *pūnyas* is always happy though small in form. § 385 a (1938)

Refuting the second and third theories the author states—

एव चिय विवरीय जोएज्जा सव्वपावपक्खे वि ।

न य साहारणरूव कम्म तत्कारणाभावा ॥ ३८६ ॥ (१९३४)

Evam ciya vivariyam jōejjā savvapāvapakke vi ।

Na ya sāhāranarūvam kammam takkāranābhāvā ॥ 386 a (1934)

[एवमेव विपरीत योजयेत् सर्वपापपक्षेऽपि ।

न च साधारणरूप कर्म तत्कारणामावात् ॥ ३८६ ॥ (१९३४)

Evameva viparitam yojayet sarvapāpapakṣe pi ।

Na ca sādharanarūpam karma tatkāranābhavat ॥ 386 a (1934)

Trans.—386 The same (argument) should also be applied to the theory of exclusive *pāpas* (but) in a reverse manner And (there is) nothing like a common *karma* (containing *punya* and *pāpa* together) because of the absence of its cause. (1934)

टीका—“ सर्वं पापमेवास्ति, न तु पुण्यम्, पापापचयमात्रजन्यत्वात् सुखस्य ” इत्येतस्मिन्नपि पक्षे एवमेव—केवलपुण्यवादोक्तद्वयात् विपरीत गत्या सर्वं योजयेत् ; पक्षया—पापापकर्ममात्रजनितं सुखं न भवति, पापास्या स्वीयसोऽपि दुःस्वप्नजन्यत्वात् । न ह्यस्वीयानपि विपरीतः स्वास्त्यहेतुर्भवति । तस्मात् पुण्यजनितमेवास्त्वपि सुखमित्यादि स्वपुण्याभ्युदयं चाप्यम् । इति पृथग् दुःखयोः कारणभूते स्वतन्त्र पुण्य-पाप एष्टव्ये । अत एव साधारणे अपि संकीर्णे पुण्य-पापे नैष्टव्ये । कुतः ? इत्याह—‘ न मेत्यादि ’ न च साधारणरूप संकीर्णस्वभाव पुण्य-पापकर्मैकं कमास्ति, तस्यैवभूतस्य कर्मणः कारणाभावात् । अत्र प्रयोगः—नास्ति संकीर्णोभयरूप कर्म, असंभाव्यमनैवविचकारणत्वात्, न भ्यामुन्नवदिति ॥ ३८६ ॥ (१९३४)

D. C—In case of the theory that everything is *pāpa* and there is nothing like *punya* and that *sukha* is also produced by the diminution of *pāpa*, the same argument stated above should be applied but in a reverse manner in this way:— Since even a small portion of *pāpa* produces *duḥkha* like a small particle of poison, it could never be said that *sukha* is produced by the diminution of *pāpa*. Even a fraction of happiness is produced by *punya* and never by *pāpa* and so on. These arguments clearly indicate that *punya* and *pāpa* are absolutely separate entities producing *sukha* and *duḥkha* respectively.

So, both could never be taken as one combined entity as laid down in the third theory. Such a combined *Karma* has no *hetu* whatsoever. And hence, like a son to a barren woman it is entirely impossible ॥ 386 ॥ (1934)

In support of the argument, the author continues—

कम्मं जोगनिमित्तं सुभो-ऽसुभो वा स एगसमयम्मि ।

होज्ज न उ उभयरूवो कम्मं पि तओ तयणुरूवं ॥३८७॥(१९३५)

Kammam joganimittam subho'subho vā sa egasamayammī ।

Hojja na u ubhayarūvo kammam pi tao tayanurūvam ॥387॥(1935)

[कर्म योगनिमित्तं शुभोऽशुभो वा स एकसमये ।

भवेद् न तूभयरूपः कर्माऽपि ततस्तदनुरूपम् ॥ ३८७ ॥ (१९३५)

Karma yoganimittam śubho'śubho vā sa ekasamaye ।

Bhaved na tūbhayarūpaḥ karmā'pi tatastadanurūpam ॥387॥ (1935)]

Trans—387 *Karma* is caused by contact which is either auspicious or inauspicious at one time, but never in both the forms. So, *Karma* is also similar to it (1935)

टीका—मिथ्यात्वा-ऽविरति-प्रमाद-कषाय-योगा बन्धहेतव इति पर्यन्ते योगाभिधानात् सर्वत्र कर्मबन्धहेतुत्वस्य योगाविनाभावाद् योगानामेव बन्धहेतुत्वमिति कर्म योगनिमित्तमुच्यते । स च मनो-वाक्-कायात्मको

as from a small lump of gold a small but golden pot is made but not an earthen or a copper one similarly, a body produced even from a small accumulation of *pūnyas* is always happy though small in form. # 385 # (1933)

Refuting the second and third theories the author states—

एव चिय विवरीय जोय्ज्जा सव्वपावपक्खे वि ।

न य साधारणरूप कम्म तत्कारणाभावा ॥ ३८६ ॥ (१९३४)

Evam cīya vivariyam jōjjā savvapāvapakke vi ।

Na ya sāhāranarūpam kammam takkāranābhāvā ॥ 386 # (1934)

[एवमेव विपरीत योजयेत् सर्वपापपक्षेऽपि ।

न च साधारणरूप कर्म तत्कारणाभावात् ॥ ३८६ ॥ (१९३४)

Evameva viparītam yojayet sarvapāpapakṣe pi ।

Na ca sādharanarūpam karma tatkāranābhāvat # 386 # (1934)

Trans—386 The same (argument) should also be applied to the theory of exclusive *pāpas*, (but) in a reverse manner And (there is) nothing like a common *karma* (containing *punya* and *pāpa* together) because of the absence of its cause. (1934)

टीका—“ सर्वे पापमेवास्ति, न तु पुण्यम्, पापापचपमात्रजन्यत्वात् सुखस्य ” इत्येतस्मिन्नपि पक्षे एवमेव-कवलपुण्यवादोक्तदूषणात् विपरीत गत्या सर्वे योजयेत्; यद्यथा-पापापकर्षमात्रजन्यं सुखं न भवति, पापास्या स्वीयसोऽपि दुःस्वप्नकत्वात् । न क्षणीयानपि विपलवः स्वास्थ्यहेतुर्भवति । तस्मात् पुण्यजनितमेवाल्पमपि सुखमित्यादि स्वबुद्धयाऽभ्यूह बान्यम् । इति पृथग् दुःखयोः कारणभूते स्वतन्त्र पुण्य-पापे एष्टव्ये । अत एव साधारणे अपि संकीर्णं पुण्य-पापे नैष्टव्ये । कुतः ? इत्याह-‘ न येत्यादि ’ न च साधारणरूपं संकीर्णस्वभावं पुण्य-पापस्मकमेकं कर्मास्ति, तस्यैवंभूतस्य कर्मणः कारणाभावात् । अत्र प्रयोगः-नास्ति संकीर्णोभयरूप कर्म, असंभाव्यमानैवंविधकारणत्वात्, बाध्यापुत्रवदिति ॥ ३८६ ॥ (१९३४)

Trans—388 “Even *śubha* and *a-śubha* contacts pertaining to mind speech and body are perceived at (the same) time ”
 “The state of mixture would be (possible) in (case of) abstract (ones) ” (1936)

टीका-ननु मनो-वाक्-काययोगाः शुभाशुभाश्च मिश्रा इत्यर्थः, एकस्मिन् समये दृश्यन्ते, तत् कथमुच्यते-“शुभोऽशुभो वा स एगसमयस्मि” इति ? तथाहि-किञ्चिदविधिना दानादिवितरणं चिन्तयतः शुभाशुभो मनो-योगः, तथा, किमप्यविधिनैव दानादिधर्ममुपदिशतः शुभाशुभो वाग्योगः, तथा, किमप्यविधिनैव जिनपूजा-वन्दनकादिकायचेष्टां कुर्वतः शुभाशुभ-काययोग इति । तदेतदयुक्तम् । कुतः ? इत्याह-“द्वम्मीत्यादि” इदमुक्तं भवति-इह द्विविधो योगः-द्रव्यतः, भावतश्च । तत्र मनो-वाक्-काययोग-प्रवर्तकानि द्रव्याणि, मनो-वाक्-कायपरिस्पन्दात्मको योगश्च द्रव्ययोगः; यस्त्वेतदुभयरूपयोगहेतुरध्यवसायः स भावयोगः । तत्र शुभाशुभरूपाणां यथोक्तचिन्ता-देशना-कायचेष्टानां प्रवर्तके द्विविधेऽपि द्रव्ययोगे व्यवहार-नयदर्शनविवक्षामात्रेण भवेदपि शुभाशुभत्वलक्षणो मिश्रभावः, न तु मनो-वाक्-काययोगनिबन्धनाध्यवसायरूपे भावकरणे भावात्मके योगे । अयमभि-प्रायः-द्रव्ययोगो व्यवहारनयदर्शनेन शुभाशुभरूपोऽपीष्यते, निश्चयनयेन तु सोऽपि शुभोऽशुभो वा केवलः समस्ति, यथोक्तचिन्ता-देशनादिप्रवर्तक-द्रव्ययोगाणामपि शुभाशुभरूपमिश्राणां तन्मतेनाभावात्; मनो-वाक्-काय-द्रव्ययोगनिबन्धनाध्यवसायरूपे तु भावकरणे भावयोगे शुभाशुभरूपो मिश्र-भावो नास्ति, निश्चयनयदर्शनस्यैवागमेऽत्र विवक्षितत्वात् । न हि शुभान्य-शुभानि वाऽध्यवसायस्थानानि मुक्त्वा शुभाशुभाध्यवसायस्थानरूपस्त्वृतीयो राशिरागमे कचिदपीष्यते, येनाध्यवसायरूपे भावयोगे शुभाशुभत्वं स्यादिति भावः । तस्माद् भावयोग एकस्मिन् समये शुभोऽशुभो वा भवति न तु मिश्रः । ततः कर्मापि तत्प्रत्ययं पृथक् पुण्यरूपं पापरूपं वा बध्यते, न तु मिश्ररूप-मिति स्थितम् ॥ ३८८ ॥ (१९३६)

D C—*Acalabhrātā*—The combined state of *śubha* and *a-śubha* contact of mind, takes place when one thinks of offering munificence etc, but not according to the prescribed

योग एकस्मिन् समये शुभोऽशुभो वा भवेत्, न त्वमयरूपः, अतः कारणा-
नुरूपत्वात् कार्यस्य कर्मापि तदनुरूपं शुभं पुण्यरूपं वक्ष्यते, अशुभं वा
पापरूपं वक्ष्यते, न तु संकीर्णस्वभावमुभयरूपमेकं देव वक्ष्यत इति ॥३८॥
(१९३५)

D C—Perversion (*mithyatva*) Incontinence (*a-vrata*)
stupidity (*kaṣāya*) idleness (*pramada*) and contact (*yoga*)
are the various causes of *karma-bandha*. Out of these, *yoga*
or contact with the outer world is the principal cause. This
contact is divided as 1. Bodily contact 2 Mental contact and
3 the Contact of Actions. It is either *subha* or *a-subha* at one
time but never in a combined state of *śubhāśubha* at the
same time

Now since this *yoga* is the *larana* and *karma* the *karya*,
the latter shoul be similar to the former. Hence there cannot
exist a *larana* containing *punya* and *pāpa* combined together.
When there pervades *a-subha yoga* the *subha Karma*—in the
form of virtuous deeds—is produced and when there is *a-subha*
the *a-subha karma* of sinful deeds is produced

But *Karma* could never exist in a combined state of
subhasubha as *yoga* never exists in a combined state ॥३८॥(1935)

Now the author states an objection and its reply—

ननु मण-वद्-काओगा सुभासुभा वि समयम्मि दीसति ।
दव्वम्मि मीसभावो भवेज्ज न उ भावकरणम्मि ॥३८८॥(१९३६)

Nanu maṇa-vai-kāogā subhāsubhā vi samayammi dīsanti ।
Davvammi mīsabhāvo bhavēja na u bhāvakaranaṃmi ॥388॥(1936)

[ननु मनो-वाक्-काययोगाः शुभाशुभा अपि समये दृश्यन्ते ।
द्रव्ये मिथभावो भवेद् न तु भावकरणे ॥ ३८८ ॥ (१९३६)

Nanu mano vak-kāyayogāḥ śubhāśubhā api samaye dṛśyante ।
Dravye mīśabhāvo bhaved na tu bhāvakarane ॥ 388 ॥ (1936)]

Trans—388 “Even *śubha* and *a-śubha* contacts pertaining to mind speech and body are perceived at (the same) time ”
 “The state of mixture would be (possible) in (case of) abstract (ones) ” (1936)

टीका-ननु मनो-वाक्-काययोगाः शुभाशुभाश्च मिश्रा इत्यर्थः, एकस्मिन् समये दृश्यन्ते, तत् कथमुच्यते-“सुभोऽसुभो वा स एगसमयम्” इति ? तथाहि-किञ्चिद्विधिना दानादिवितरणं चिन्तयतः शुभाशुभो मनो-योगः, तथा, किमप्यविधिनैव दानादिधर्ममुपदिशतः शुभाशुभो वाग्योगः, तथा, किमप्यविधिनैव जिनपूजा-वन्दनकादिकायचेष्टां कुर्वतः शुभाशुभ-काययोग इति । तदेतदयुक्तम् । कुतः ? इत्याह-“ द्रव्यमीत्यादि ” इदमुक्तं भवति-इह द्विविधो योगः-द्रव्यतः, भावतश्च । तत्र मनो-वाक्-काययोग-प्रवर्तकानि द्रव्याणि, मनो-वाक्-कायपरिस्पन्दात्मको योगश्च द्रव्ययोगः; यस्त्वेतद्भययरूपयोगहेतुरध्यवसायः स भावयोगः । तत्र शुभाशुभरूपाणां यथोक्तचिन्ता-देशना-कायचेष्टानां प्रवर्तके द्विविधेऽपि द्रव्ययोगे व्यवहार-नयदर्शनविवक्षामात्रेण भवेदपि शुभाशुभत्वलक्षणो मिश्रभावः, न तु मनो-वाक्-काययोगनिबन्धनाध्यवसायरूपे भावकरणे भावात्मके योगे । अयमभि-प्रायः-द्रव्ययोगो व्यवहारनयदर्शनेन शुभाशुभरूपोऽपीष्यते, निश्चयनयेन तु सोऽपि शुभोऽसुभो वा केवलः समस्ति, यथोक्तचिन्ता-देशनादिप्रवर्तक-द्रव्ययोगाणामपि शुभाशुभरूपमिश्राणां तन्मतेनाभावात्; मनो-वाक्-काय-द्रव्ययोगनिबन्धनाध्यवसायरूपे तु भावकरणे भावयोगे शुभाशुभरूपो मिश्र-भावो नास्ति, निश्चयनयदर्शनस्यैवागमेऽत्र विवक्षितत्वात् । न हि शुभान्य-शुभानि वाऽध्यवसायस्थानानि मुक्त्वा शुभाशुभाध्यवसायस्थानरूपस्त्वृतीयो राशिरागमे क्वचिदपीष्यते, येनाध्यवसायरूपे भावयोगे शुभाशुभत्वं स्यादिति भावः । तस्माद् भावयोग एकस्मिन् समये शुभोऽसुभो वा भवति न तु मिश्रः । ततः कर्मापि तत्प्रत्ययं पृथक् पुण्यरूपं पापरूपं वा बध्यते, न तु मिश्ररूप-मिति स्थितम् ॥ ३८८ ॥ (१९३६)

D C—*Acalabhrātā*—The combined state of *s'ubha* and *a-s'ubha* contact of mind, takes place when one thinks of offering munificence etc, but not according to the prescribed

rules. That belonging to speech takes place when the observances of deeds like munificence etc are advised but against the proper rules.

The *misrabhāva* of the bodily contact is apprehended when a person actually performs the ceremony of worship and bowing down etc to the *Tīrthankaras* without following the prescribed customs.

In this way it is quite easy to apprehend the three types of *yogas* in a mixed state of *śubha* and *a-śubha* at the same time.

Bhagavān.—Your assumption is wrongly based. *Yoga* comes into existence in two ways—(1) By virtue of the contact with concrete substance and (2) by means of contact with abstract (objects). The concrete substances that come into contact with mind speech and body and the process of arousing mind, speech and body form the *dravya-yoga*; while the mental effort which acts as the cause of contact on the part of both—*a* substance as well the process—is known as the *bhava-yoga*.

The composite state of *śubha* and *a-śubha* taken together is possible in case of *dravya-yoga* of all the three varieties belonging respectively to mind speech, and body—from the practical point of view. But it is never possible in case of *bhava-yoga*. It is important to note therefore that from the practical point of view the *misrabhāva* of *śubha* and *a-śubha* combined together may be admitted in case of *dravya-yoga*, but it is never possible in case of *dravya-yoga* of definite assertion.

In case of *bhava-yoga* the *misrabhāva* is neither possible from the practical point of view nor with regard to definite assertion.

Moreover in *āgamas* also there is no mention of the composite state of *śubhaśubha-yoga* as a third variety coming after *śubha* and *a-śubha* varieties of mental effort. Hence in case of *bhava-yoga*, there cannot exist a mixed entity of

s'ubhā's'ubha-yoga but either a *s'ubha-yoga* or *a-s'ubha-yoga* is possible. On account of the same reasons, *Karma* is also formed of *s'ubha* or *a-s'ubha* deeds separately, but never of *s'ubha* and *a-s'ubha* combined together ॥ 388 ॥ (1936)

And,

ज्ञाणं सुभमसुभं वा न उ मीसं जं च ज्ञाणविरमे वि ।
लेसा सुभाऽसुभा वा सुभमसुभं वा तओ कम्मं ॥३८९॥(१९३७)

Jhānam subhamasubham vā na u mīsam jam ca jhānavirame vi ।
Lesā subhā'subhā vā subhamasubham vā tao kammam ॥389॥(1937)

[ध्यानं शुभमशुभं वा न तु मिश्रं यच्च ध्यानविरमेऽपि ।

लेस्या शुभाऽशुभा वा शुभमशुभं वा ततः कर्म ॥ ३८९ ॥ (१९३७)

Dhyānam śubhamaśubham vā na tu mīśram yacca dhyānavirame'pi ।
Leśyā śubhā'subhā vā śubhamaśubham vā tatah karma ॥ 389 ॥

Trans—389 Meditation is either auspicious or in-auspicious but never composite (of both) For, even at the end of meditation, the conflict is either *śubha* or *a-śubha* Hence, *karma* is also either (of) virtuous (type) or (of) evil (type) (1937)

टीका—ध्यानं यस्मादागमे एकदा धर्म-शुक्लध्यानात्मकं शुभम्, आर्त-रौद्रात्मकमशुभं वा निर्दिष्टम्, न तु शुभाशुभरूपम्, यस्माच्च ध्यानोपरमेऽपि लेस्या तैजसीप्रभृतिका शुभा, कापोतीप्रमुखा वाऽशुभैकदा प्रोक्ता, न तु शुभाशुभरूपाः; ध्यानलेस्यात्मकाश्च भावयोगाः, ततस्तेप्येकदा शुभा अशुभा वा भवन्ति न तु मिश्राः । ततो भावयोगनिमित्तं कर्माप्येकदा पुण्यात्मकं शुभं वध्यते, पापात्मकमशुभं वा वध्यते, न तु मिश्रमिति ॥ ३८९ ॥ (१९३७)

D C—It has been laid down in the *āgamas* that *dhyāna* is either *s'ubha* i.e. inspired by a religious or guileless motive or *a-s'ubha* i.e. inspired by vile or dreadful motive at one time, but it could never be inspired by both the motives at the

same time Even at the end of *dhyāna* the conflict at work is spoken of either as *subha* (i. e. dominated by lustrous and such other characteristics) or as *a-subha* (i. e. dominated by ill-ominous elements) but it could never be known as *subhā'-s'ubha*.

The *bhava-yogas* are composed of meditations as well as the conflicts So *bhava-yogas* are also either *subha* or *a-subha* separately but never *mīśra*. Consequently, *Karma* should also be taken either as *subha* or *a-subha* taken separately and never as *subhasubha* taken together #389# (1937)

Moreover

पुव्वगहिय च कम्म परिणामवसेण मीसय नेज्जा ।

इयरेयरभाव वा सम्मा-मिच्छाह न उ गहणे ॥३९०॥ (१९३८)

Purvagahiyam ca kammam parinānavasena mīsayam nejjā ।
Iyareyarabhāvam vā sammā-micchāim na u gahane #390# (1938)

[पूर्वगृहीत च कर्म परिणामवसेन मिश्रतां नयेत् ।

इतरेतरभाव वा सम्यक्-मिथ्यात्वे न तु ग्रहणे ॥ ३९० ॥ (१९३८)

Pūrvaggrīhitam ca karma parinānavasēna mīśratām nayet ।
Itaretarabhāvam vā samyāk-mithyātve na tu grahaṇe #390# (1938)

Trans.—390 A pre-apprehended *karma* may attain the composite state, on account of fruition or may alternately turn itself true or false. But (that is) not (so) at the time of (new) apprehension (1939)

टीका—‘वा’ इत्ययमा, एतदपि संभाव्यते यत्—पूर्वं गृहीतं पूर्वं बद्धं मिथ्यात्वसंशय कर्म परिणामवशात् पुञ्जत्रय कूर्चन् मिश्रतां सम्यक्-मिथ्यात्वपुञ्जरूपतां प्रापयेदिति; इतरेतरभावं वा नयेत् सम्यक्त्वं मिथ्यात्वं चेति । इदमुक्तं भवति—पूर्वबद्धान् मिथ्यात्वपुद्गलान् पिशुदपरिणामः सन् क्षोभयित्वा सम्यक्स्वरूपतां नयेत्, अविशुद्धपरिणामस्तु रमहृत्कार्यं नीत्वा सम्यक्स्वरूपपुद्गलान् मिथ्यात्वपुञ्जे सममप्य मिथ्यात्वरूपतां नयेत्, इति पूर्वगृहीतस्य

सत्तावर्तिनः कर्मण इदं कुर्यात् । ग्रहणकाले पुनर्न मिश्रं पुण्यपापरूपतया
संकीर्णस्वभावं कर्म ब्रूयाति, नापीतरदितररूपतां नयतीति ॥३९०॥ (१९३८)

D C—The composite state of *Karma* could be explained in this way also—A *Karma* which is apprehended previously may attain *s'ubha*, *a-s'ubha* or *mis'ra* condition or it may also turn itself better or worse. The later pure *parināmas* would purify the previous evil *pudgalas* and turn them right, while on the other hand, impure *parināmas* would spoil the previous virtuous *pudgalas* by means of excessive heights of sentiments etc and turn them guile. Thirdly, the *parināmas* which are half-way between purity and impurity, would turn the *Karma* into a composite state of virtue and vice.

In this way, with regard to *Karma* of former existence, three states—viz *s'ubha*, *a-s'ubha* and *s'ubhās'ubha*—are possible. But, at the time of new apprehension of *Karma*, the *parināma* is not able to form a composite *Karma* of *punya* and *pāpa* combined together and hence there are only two states ॥ 390 ॥ (1938)

Now, the process of changing virtue into vice, and vice versa referred to above, is explained as follows—

मोक्षूण आउयं खलु दंसणमोहं चरित्तमोहं च ।

सेसाणं पगईणं उत्तरविहिसंकमो भज्जो ॥ ३९१ ॥ (१९३९)

Mottūna āuyam khalu damsana-moham carittamoham ca ।

Sesānam pagāīnam uttaravihi-samkamo bhajjo ॥ 391 ॥ (1939)

[मुक्त्वाऽऽयुष्कं खलु दर्शनमोहं चारित्रमोहं च ।

शेषाणां प्रकृतीनामुत्तरविधिसंक्रमो भज्यः ॥ ३९१ ॥ (१९३९)

Muktvā ayuskam khalu darśanamoham cāritra moham ca ।

Sesānam prakṛitīnām uttaravidhi-samkramo bhājyah ॥ 391 ॥ (1939)]

Trans—391 Excepting the (constituents belonging to)

same time. Even at the end of *dhyāna* the conflict at work is spoken of either as *subha* (i.e. dominated by lustrous and such other characteristics) or as *a-subha* (i.e. dominated by ill-ominous elements) but it could never be known as *subha-s-subha*.

The *bhāra-yogas* are composed of meditations as well as the conflicts. So *bhāra-yogas* are also either *subha* or *a-subha* separately but never *misra*. Consequently, *Karma* should also be taken either as *subha* or *a-subha* taken separately and never as *subhasubha* taken together #389# (1937)

Moreover

पुव्वगहिय च कम्म परिणामवसेण मीसय नेज्जा ।

इयरेयरभाव वा सम्मा-मिच्छाइ न उ गहणे ॥३९०॥ (१९३८)

Puvvagahiyam ca kammam parināmanavasena misayam nejjā ।
Ivareyarabhāvam vā sammā-micchāim na u gahane #390# (1938)

[पूर्वगृहीत च कर्म परिणामवसेन मिश्रतां नयेत् ।

इतरतरभाव वा सम्यक्-मिथ्यात्वे न तु ग्रहणे ॥ ३९० ॥ (१९३८)

Purvagrāhitam ca karma paripāmanavasena mīśratām nayet ।
Itaretarabhāvam vā samyak-mithyātve na tu grahaṇe #390# (1938)

Trans—390 A pre apprehended *Karma* may attain the composite state on account of fruition or may alternately turn itself true or false. But (that is) not (so) at the time of (new) apprehension. (1939)

टीका—‘वा’ इत्ययत्र, एतदपि संमाख्यत यन्-पूर्व गृहीतं पूर्वं बद्धं मिथ्यात्वलक्षणं कर्म परिणामवशात् पुनश्च यं कर्तुं मिश्रतां सम्पत्-मिथ्या ररपुत्ररूपतां प्रापयति; इतरतरभाव वा नयन् सम्यक्त्व मिथ्यात्वं वति । इदमुक्तं भवति-पूर्ववद्वा न मिथ्यात्वरपुद्गतान् विशुद्धपरिणामः गन् दापयित्वा सम्यक्त्वरूपतां नयन्, अविशुद्धपरिणामस्तु रमसुद्ध्यं नीत्वा सम्यक्तर पुद्गतान् मिथ्यात्वरपुत्रे संक्रम्य मिथ्यात्वरूपतां नयन्, इति पूर्वगृहीतस्य

सत्तावर्तिनः कर्मण इदं कुर्यात् । ग्रहणकाले पुनर्न मिश्रं पुण्यपापरूपतया संकीर्णस्वभावं कर्म वध्नाति, नापीतरदितररूपतां नयतीति ॥३९०॥ (१९३८)

D C.—The composite state of *Karma* could be explained in this way also —A *Karma* which is apprehended previously may attain *s'ubha*, *a-s'ubha* or *mis'ra* condition or it may also turn itself better or worse. The later pure *parimāmas* would purify the previous evil *pudgalas* and turn them right, while on the other hand, impure *parimāmas* would spoil the previous virtuous *pudgalas* by means of excessive heights of sentiments etc and turn them guile. Thirdly, the *parimāmas* which are half-way between purity and impurity, would turn the *Karma* into a composite state of virtue and vice.

In this way, with regard to *Karma* of former existence, three states—viz *s'ubha*, *a-s'ubha* and *s'ubhās'ubha*—are possible. But, at the time of new apprehension of *Karma*, the *parimāma* is not able to form a composite *Karma* of *punya* and *pāpa* combined together and hence there are only two states ॥ 390 ॥ (1938)

Now, the process of changing virtue into vice, and vice versa referred to above, is explained as follows —

मोत्तूण आउयं खलु दंसणमोहं चरित्तमोहं च ।
सेसाणं पगईणं उत्तरविहिसंकमो भज्जो ॥ ३९१ ॥ (१९३९)

Mottūna āuyam khalu damsana-moham carittamoham ca ।
Sesānam pagaīnam uttaravihi-samkamo bhajjo ॥ 391 ॥ (1939)

[मुक्त्वाऽऽयुष्कं खलु दर्शनमोहं चारित्रमोहं च ।

शेषाणां प्रकृतीनामुत्तरविधिसंक्रमो भाज्यः ॥ ३९१ ॥ (१९३९)

Muktvā ayuskam khalu darśanamoham cāritra moham ca ।
Śesānam prakṛitīnām uttaravidhisamkramo bhājyah ॥ 391 ॥ (1939)]

Trans—391 Excepting the (constituents belonging to)

dyah,† infatuation of *darśana*, (undifferentiated knowledge) and infatuation of *cāritra* (right conduct) transformations of the latter parts of the remaining characteristics should be accepted. (1939)

टीका-इह ज्ञानावरणादिमूलप्रकृतीनामन्योन्य संक्रमः कदापि न भवत्येष, उत्तरप्रकृतीनां तु निजनिजमूलप्रकृत्यभिन्नानां परस्परं भवतीति । तत्र चायं विधिः-“मोक्षं आरभ्य” इति आतिप्रधानो निर्वेद्य इति बहुवचनमत्र द्रष्टव्यम्-वस्तुव्याप्यं भुक्त्वेति । एकस्या आधुर्लक्षणाया निजमूलप्रकृतेरभिन्नानामपि चतुर्णामाधुपामन्योय संक्रमो न भवतीति तद्वर्जनम् । यथा, दर्शनमोहचारित्रमोह च भुक्त्वा; एकस्या मोहनीयलक्षणायाः स्वमूलप्रकृतेरभिन्नयोरपि दर्शनमोह-चारित्रमोहयोरन्योन्य संक्रमो न भवतीत्यर्थः । उक्तशेषाणां तु प्रकृतीनाम्, कथंभूतानाम् ? इत्याह-“उत्तरविहिं चि” विषयो मेदाः, उत्तरे च ते विषयमोक्षरेविषय उत्तरमेदास्तद्भूतानामुत्तरप्रकृतिरूपाणामिति तात्पर्यम् । किम् ? इत्याह-संक्रमो मान्यो मज्जनीयः ।

मयना चैव द्रष्टव्या-याः किल ज्ञानावरणपञ्चक-दर्शनावरणपञ्चक-कपायवोदलक-मिथ्यात्व मय-सुगुप्ता-तैजस-कार्मण-वर्णादिचतुष्का-ज्जुलघु-पद्मात-निर्माणा-ज्ज्तरायपञ्चकलक्षणाः सप्तचत्वारिंशद् भुवन्विन्त्य उत्तरप्रकृतयः, तासां निजैकमूलप्रकृत्यभिन्नानामन्योन्य संक्रमः सदैव भवति; यथा ज्ञानावरणपञ्चकान्तर्वर्तिनि मतिज्ञानावरणे भूतज्ञानावरणादीनि, तेष्वपि मतिज्ञानावरण संक्रामतीत्यादि । यास्तु क्षेपा अभुवन्विन्त्यस्तासां निजैकमूलप्रकृत्यमेदवर्तिनीनामपि वक्ष्यमानायामवक्ष्यमाना संक्रामति, न त्ववक्ष्यमानायां वक्ष्यमाना; यथा साते वक्ष्यमानेऽसातमवक्ष्यमान संक्रामति, न तु वक्ष्यमानमवक्ष्यमाने; इत्यादि वाच्यमिति । एष प्रकृतिसंक्रमे विधिः । शेषस्तु पदेष्टादिसंक्रमविधिः “मूलप्रकृत्यभिन्नासु वक्ष्यमानासु संक्रमः भवति” इत्यादिना स्थानान्तरादवसेय इत्यलं प्रसङ्गेनेति ॥ ३९१ ॥ १९३९ ॥

D C—The process of *prakṛte samkrama* (mutual transformation of various characteristics) is explained as follows.—

† *Ayuk Karma*.

- (1) *Prakṛiti-samkīrama* is not possible in case of original *prakṛitis* like *jñānāvarāṇa* etc. But in case of characteristics which are acquired later on, mutual transition does take place even though they are not different from their respective original characteristics
- (2) Four varieties of the characteristics of *āyuh*, and the infatuations of *daś'ana* and *cārīta* (right conduct) are *exceptions* to the above rule. In spite of these *prakṛitis* being *a-bhinna* from their respective original *prakṛitis*, they do not undergo mutual transition
- (3) There are 47 *uttara-prakṛitis*, which undergo mutual transition. They are enumerated as follows—5 types of *jñānāvarāṇas*, 9 types of *daś'anāvarāṇas*, 16 types of dullness, perversion, fear, contempt, the characteristic of lustre, the *kāmana* characteristic, 4 characteristics of colour etc, one that is neither too long nor too short, characteristics of destruction and construction, and 5 types of obstruction (*antarāya*)

All these 47 *uttara-prakṛitis* of definite *bandha*, always undergo mutual transition *e g*, out of five types of *jñānāvarāṇas* noted above, the *s'ṛuṭi-jñānāvarāṇa* could be transformed into *matī-jñānāvarāṇa* and vice versa

In case of other *prakṛitis* that have not been actually bound up, one that has no proper *bandha* may be transformed into one having proper *bandha*, but the process does not work vice versa, i. e. a *prakṛiti* of proper *bandha* does not change into a *prakṛiti* without *bandha*.

This is the process of *prakṛiti-samkīrama*. The process of transition in case of other *prades'as* etc is understood from the sentence —

“ *Mūla prakṛityabhinnaṣu vedyamānāsu samkīramah bhavati* ”
etc implying that when they are known to be similar to the original *prakṛitis* they undergo transformation || 391 || (1939)

The separate characteristics of *punya* and *pāpa* are now explained—

सोहणवण्णाइगुण सुमाणुभाव च ज तय पुण्ण ।

विवरीयमओ पाव न बायर नाइसुहुम च ॥ ३९२ ॥ (१९४०)

Sohanavannāḷgunam subhānubhāvam ca jam tayam punnam ।

Vivariyamao pāvam na bāyaram nāisuhumam ca ॥ 392 ॥ (1940)

[शोमनवर्णादिगुणं शुमानुभावं च यत् तत् पुण्यम् ।

विपरीतमतः पापं न बादरं नातिसूक्ष्म च ॥ ३९२ ॥ (१९४०)

Śobhanavarṇadigunam subhānubhāvam ca yat tat puṇyam ।

Viparitamataḥ pāpam na bādaram nāisukṣmam ca ॥ 392 ॥ (1940)]

Trans—392 (*A karma*) possessed of properties like bright colour etc and good fruition is called *punya*. *Pāpa* is (exactly) opposite to it. (Both of them are) neither too huge nor too subtle. (1940)

टीका—शोमना शुभा वर्णादयो वर्ण-गन्ध-रस-स्पर्शलक्षणा गुणा यस्य तच्छोमनवर्णादिगुणम्, तथा यच्छुमानुभावं शुभविपाकमित्यर्थः, तत् पुण्यमभिधीयते । यत् पुनरतः पुण्याद् विपरीतलक्षणम्—अशुभवर्णादिगुणम्, अशुभविपाकं चेत्यर्थः, तत् पापमुच्यते । एतच्छोमयमपि कथं भूतम् ? इत्याह—न मेर्वादिभावेन परिवर्तस्त्वनवदतिबादरम्, सूक्ष्मेण कर्मवर्गणाद्रभ्येव निष्पन्नत्वात् ; नापि परमाब्बादिवदतिसूक्ष्ममिति ॥ ३९२ ॥ १९४० ॥

D O—A *Karma* having splendid colours odour taste and touch is known as *punya*. *Pāpa* is opposite to *punya*. So its colour etc. are dull and has no good fruition. Both of them are neither too huge like *Meru* etc nor too minute like *paramanu* because they are produced by the multiplication of various *karmas*. ॥ 392 n 1940)

गिण्हइ तउजोग चिय रेणु पुरिसो जहा कयळमगो ।

एगक्खेसोगाढ जीयो सव्वप्पसेहि ॥ ३९३ ॥ (१९४१)

Ginhai tājogam cīya renum puriso jahā kayabbhango,
Egakkhettogādham jīvo savvappaesehim ॥ 393 ॥ (1941)

[गृह्णाति तद्योग्यमेव रेणुं पुरुषो यथा कृताभ्यङ्गः ।
एकक्षेत्रावगाढं जीवः सर्वप्रदेशैः ॥ ३९३ ॥ (१९४१)

Grinhāti tadyogyameva renum puruso yathā kṛitabhyangah ।
Ekakṣetrāvagādham jīvah sarva-pradeśaih ॥ 393 ॥ (1941)]

Trans—393 Just as a person besmeared with oil, catches dust from the same region, the Soul also catches (a substance) which is worthy of that (*Karma*), and situated in the same region, by means of all (its) regions (1941)

टीका—तस्य पुण्य-पापात्मकस्य कर्मणो योग्यमेव कर्मवर्गणागतं द्रव्यं जीवो गृह्णाति, न तु परमाण्वादिकम्, औदारिकादिवर्गणागतं वाऽयोग्यमित्यर्थः । तदप्येकक्षेत्रावगाढमेव गृह्णाति, न तु स्वावगाढप्रदेशेभ्यो भिन्नप्रदेशावगाढमित्यर्थः । तच्च यथा तैलादिकृताभ्यङ्गः पुरुषो रेणुं गृह्णाति तथा राग-द्वेषक्लिन्नस्वरूपो जीवोऽपि गृह्णाति, न तु निर्हेतुकमिति भावः । इदं च सर्वैरपि स्वप्रदेशैर्जीवो गृह्णाति, न तु कैश्चिदित्यर्थः । उक्तं च—

एगपएसोगाढं सवपएसेहिं कम्मणो जोग्गं ।

बंधइ जहुत्तहेउ साइयमणाइयं वावि ॥ १ ॥

उपशमश्रेणैः प्रतिपतितो मोहनीयादिकं कर्म सादि वध्नाति, शेषस्त्वनवाप्तोपशमश्रेणिर्जीवोऽनाद्येव वध्नातीत्यर्थ इति ॥ ३९३ ॥ (१९४१)

D C—The Soul catches only that substance which suits multitudes of *pāpa-karmas* and *punya-karmas* So, it does not apprehend those like *paramānus* and *audārika* etc which are absolutely unfit Secondly, the Soul accepts those substances only, if they are situated in the same region as that of the Soul and none else So, just as a person besmeared with oil etc catches dust, the Soul also being affected by *rāga-dvesa* etc, catches purposely a proper substance by the help of all its regions

The separate characteristics of *punya* and *pāpa* are now explained—

सोहणवण्णाइगुण सुमाणुभाव च ज तय पुण्ण ।

विवरीयमओ पाव न बायर नाइसुहुम च ॥ ३९२ ॥ (१९४०)

Sohanavannāigunam subhānubhāvam ca jam tayam punnam ।
Vivariyamao pāvam na bāyaram nāisuhumam ca ॥ 392 ॥ (1940)

[शोमनवर्णादिगुणं शुमानुभाव च यत् तत् पुण्यम् ।

विपरीतमतः पाप न बादरं नातिसूक्ष्म च ॥ ३९२ ॥ (१९४०)

Sobhanavarṇadiguṇam ॥ subhānubhāvam ca yat tat puṇyam ।
Viparītamataḥ pāpam na badaram nātisukṣmam ca ॥ 392 ॥ (1940)]

Trans—392 (*A karma*) possessed of properties like bright colour etc and good fruition is called *punya*. *Pāpa* is (exactly) opposite to it (Both of them are) neither too huge nor too subtle. (1940)

टीका—शोमना शुभा वर्णादयो वर्ण-गन्ध-रस-स्पर्शलक्षणा गुणा यस्य तच्छोमनवर्णादिगुणम्, तथा यच्छुमानुभाव शुभविपाकमित्यर्थः, तत् पुण्यमभिधीयते । यत् पुनरतः पुण्याद् विपरीतलक्षणम्-अशुभवर्णादिगुणम्, अशुभविपाकं चेत्यर्थः, तत् पापमुच्यते । एतच्चोभयमपि कथं भूतम् ? इत्याह—न सेर्वादिभावेन परिणतस्कन्धवदतिषादरम्, सूक्ष्मेण कर्मवर्गमात्रेण निष्पन्नत्वात्; नापि परमाण्वादिवदतिसूक्ष्ममिति ॥ ३९२ ॥ १९४० ॥

D C—A *Karma* having splendid colours odour taste and touch is known as *punya*. *Pāpa* is opposite to *punya*. So its colour etc. are dull and has no good fruition. Both of them are neither too huge like *Meru* etc nor too minute like *paramanu* because they are produced by the multiplication of various *karmas*. ॥ 392 ॥ 1940)

गिण्हइ तज्जोग चिय रेणु पुरिसो जहा कयम्मगो ।

एगक्खेत्तोगाढ जीवो सवप्पयसेहि ॥ ३९३ ॥ (१९४१)

Griṇhai tājogam ciya renum puriso jahā kayabbhango,
Egakkhettogādham jīvo savvappaesehim ॥ 393 ॥ (1941)

[गृह्णाति तद्योग्यमेव रेणुं पुरुषो यथा कृताभ्यङ्गः ।
एकक्षेत्रावगाढं जीवः सर्वप्रदेशैः ॥ ३९३ ॥ (१९४१)

Griṇhati tadyogyameva renum puruso yathā kṛitābhyangah ।
Ekakṣetrāvagādham jīvaḥ sarva-pradeśaiḥ ॥ 393 ॥ (1941)]

Trans—393 Just as a person besmeared with oil, catches dust from the same region, the Soul also catches (a substance) which is worthy of that (*Karma*), and situated in the same region, by means of all (its) regions (1941)

टीका—तस्य पुण्य-पापात्मकस्य कर्मणो योग्यमेव कर्मवर्गणागतं द्रव्यं जीवो गृह्णाति, न तु परमाण्वादिकम्, औदारिकादिवर्गणागतं वाऽयोग्यमित्यर्थः । तदप्येकक्षेत्रावगाढमेव गृह्णाति, न तु स्वावगाढप्रदेशेभ्यो भिन्नप्रदेशावगाढमित्यर्थः । तच्च यथा तैलादिकृताभ्यङ्गः पुरुषो रेणुं गृह्णाति तथा राग-द्वेषक्लिन्नस्वरूपो जीवोऽपि गृह्णाति, न तु निर्हेतुकमिति भावः । इदं च सर्वैरपि स्वप्रदेशैर्जीवो गृह्णाति, न तु कैश्चिदित्यर्थः । उक्तं च—

एगएसोगाढं सवपएसेहिं कम्मणो जोगं ।

बंधं जहुत्तहेउं साइयमणाइयं वावि ॥ १ ॥

उपशमश्रेणेः प्रतिपतितो मोहनीयादिकं कर्म सादि बध्नाति, शेषस्त्व-
नवासोपशमश्रेणिर्जीवोऽनाद्येव बध्नातीत्यर्थ इति ॥ ३९३ ॥ (१९४१)

D C—The Soul catches only that substance which suits multitudes of *pāpa-karmas* and *punya-karmas* So, it does not apprehend those like *paramānus* and *audārīka* etc which are absolutely unfit Secondly, the Soul accepts those substances only, if they are situated in the same region as that of the Soul and none else So, just as a person besmeared with oil etc catches dust, the Soul also being affected by *rāga-dvesa* etc, catches purposely a proper substance by the help of all its regions

It has therefore been said that—

“Egapaesogādhani sarvapaesohi kammuno joggam ।
Bandhau jahuttahesuṃ saiyamaṇayam vavi ॥

[Ekapradeśavagādhani sarvapradeśaiḥ karmāṇaṃ योग्यम् ।
Badhnaṭi yathoktāhetuṃ sadikamanādikam vapi] ॥ 393 ॥ (1941)

At this stage the opponent raises an objection—

अविसिद्धपोगलघणे लोप यूणतणुकम्मपविभागो ।
जुज्जेज्ज, गहणकाले सुमा-ऽसुमविवेयण कत्तो ? ॥ ३९४ ॥ (१९४२)

Avisiṭṭhapoggalaghane lōe thūnatānukammavibhāgo ।
Jujjēja gahanakāle subhā subhaviveyanam katto ? ॥ 394 ॥ (1942)

[अविसिद्धपुद्गलघने लोके स्थूलतनुकर्मप्रविभागः ।
युज्येत, ग्रहणकाले शुभा-ऽशुभाविवेचनं कुतः ? ॥ ३९४ ॥ (१९४२)]

Avisiṭṭhapudgalaghane lōke sthūlatanukarmapravibhāgaḥ ।
Yujyeta grahanakāle śubhā śubhavivecanam kutaḥ ? ॥ 394 ॥ (1942)]

Trans—394 In (the midst of) the world which is crowded with common *pudgalas* divisions of coarse (*sthūla*) and subtle (*śūkṣma*) *karmas* would be justified (but) at the time of apprehension how would the distinction of auspicious and inauspicious be justified. (1942).

टीका-नन्वविसिद्धैः प्रत्याकाशप्रदुल्लमनन्तानन्तैः शुभा-ऽशुभादि
भेदेनाप्यवस्थितैः पुद्गलैर्धनो निरन्तरं व्याप्तोऽयं लोकः । ततश्च ग्रहणकाले
गृह्यतो जीवस्य स्थूल-सूक्ष्मकर्मप्रविभागो युज्येत; ततो “न चायं नाहमुद्भूत
च ” इति विशेषणमुपपन्नम्, एतद्विशेषणविक्षिप्यादन्यस्य स्वभावत एव जीवे
रग्रहणात् । यत्तु शुभाशुभाविवेचनं तत् समयमात्ररूपे कर्मग्रहणकाले तत्क्षण
एव गृह्यतो जीवस्य कुतः संमाप्यते ?-न कुतश्चिदिति परस्परमिप्रायः ।
ततश्च “सोहणवज्जाइयुण ” इत्यादि विशेषणं न युज्यत इति प्रेरकाकृत
मिति ॥ ३९४ ॥ (१९४२)

D. C—This world is entirely filled with multitudes of common *pudgalas* scattered in all etherial regions without any distinction of *s'ubha* and *a-s'ubha*. When *jīva* apprehends these *pudgalas* it is able to recognize them as neither too *sthūla*, nor too *sūkṣma*, as *jīva* is not able to recognize *sthūla* and *sūkṣma pudgalas*.

In such a case, it is possible that *jīva* is able to understand the distinction of *sthūla* and *sūkṣma*. But how is the distinction of *s'ubha* and *a-s'ubha* justified when *jīva* tries to apprehend the *Karma-pudgalas*? ॥ 394 ॥ (1942)

The reply is—

अविसिद्धं चियं तं सो परिणामा—ऽऽसयसभावओ खिप्पं ।
कुरुते सुभमसुभं वा ग्रहणे जीवो जहाहारं ॥३९५॥ (१९४३)

Avisittham ciya tam so parināmā—"sayasabhāvaō khippam ।
Kurute subhamasubham vā gahane jīvo jahāhāram ॥395॥ (1943)

[अविशिष्टमेव तत् स परिणामा—ऽऽश्रयस्वभावतः क्षिप्रम् ।

कुरुते शुभमशुभं वा ग्रहणे जीवो यथाऽऽहारम् ॥ ३९५ ॥ (१९४३)

Avisiṣṭameva tat sa parināmā"—śrayasvabhāvataḥ kṣipram ।
Kurute śubhamasubham vā grahane jīvo yathā"—hāram ॥395॥(1943)]

Trans—395 It is common no doubt (But) at the time of apprehension, the Soul turns it into *śubha* or *a-śubha* immediately, by virtue of its nature of resort and fruition as in case of food. (1943)

टीका—स जीवस्तत्कर्म ग्रहणे ग्रहणकाले शुभा-ऽशुभादिविशेषणा-विशिष्टमपि गृह्णन् क्षिप्रं तत्क्षणमेव शुभमशुभं वा कुरुते-शुभा-ऽशुभविभागेन व्यवस्थापयतीत्यर्थः । कुतः ? इत्याह—“परिणामाऽऽसयसभावोऽस्ति ” इहाश्रयो द्विविधकर्मणो जीव आश्रयः, कर्म तु शुभाशुभत्वस्य तस्य द्विविधस्याप्याश्रयस्य स्वभाव आश्रयस्वभावः, परिणामाश्चाश्रयस्वभावश्च परिणामा-

It has therefore been said that—

Egapaesogadham sarvapaesohim kanunupo joggam :
Bandha jahuttaheumi saiyamañaiyam vavi :

[Ekapradosaṅgadhāma sarvapradosaṅg karmāno योग्याम ।
Badhnatī yathoktāhetu sadikamañadikam vapi] ॥ ३९३ ॥ (1941)

At this stage the opponent raises an objection—

अविसिद्धपोग्गलघणे लोपं धूणतणुकम्मपविभागो ।

जुज्जेज्ज, गहणकाले सुमा-ऽसुमविवेयणं कत्तो ? ॥ ३९४ ॥ (१९४२)

Avisiḍḍhapoggalaghāṇo lōe thūnatānukammāpavibhāgo ।
Jujjēja gahaṇakāle subhā subhāviveyaṇam katto ? ॥ ३९४ ॥ (1942)

[अविशिष्टपुद्गलघने लोके स्पूलतनुकर्मप्रविभागः ।

युज्येत, ग्रहणकाले सुमा-ऽसुमविवेचनं कुतः ? ॥ ३९४ ॥ (१९४२)

Avisiṣṭapudgalaghāṇo loka sthūlatanukarmāpravibhāgaḥ ।
Yujyeta grahaṇakāle subhā subhāvivecānam kutah ? ॥ ३९४ ॥ (1943)

Trans —394 In (the midst of) the world which is crowded with common *pudgalas* divisions of coarse (*sthūla*) and subtle (*sūkṣma*) *karmas* would be justified (but) at the time of apprehension how would the distinction of auspicious and inauspicious be justified. (1942)

टीका-नन्वविशिष्टैः प्रत्याकाशप्रदक्षमनन्तानन्तैः सुमा-ऽसुमादि भेदेनाभ्यवस्थितैः पुद्गलैर्धनो निरन्तरं व्याप्तोऽयं लोकः । ततश्च ग्रहणकाले गृह्यतो जीवस्य स्पूल-सूक्ष्मकर्मप्रविभागो युज्येत; ततो “न वापरं नाहसुहृमं च ” इति विक्षेपमप्युपपन्नम्, एतद्विक्षेपविशिष्टादन्यस्य स्वभावात् एव जीवे ग्रहणात् । यस्तु सुमासुमविवेचनं तत् समयमात्ररूपे कर्मग्रहणकाले तत्क्षणे एव गृह्यतो जीवस्य कुतः संभाष्यते ?-न कुतश्चिदिति परस्याभिप्रायः । ततश्च “ सोऽहमव्याहृणं ” इत्यादि विक्षेपश्च न युज्यत इति प्रेरकाकृतमिति ॥ ३९४ ॥ (१९४२)

the *karma-pudgalas* also immediately undergo change in their original nature in the present condition and the future consequences. In the same way, small or big portions of various regions of *Karma-pudgalas* also undergo immediate changes.

It has therefore been laid down that —

“Gahanasamayamū jīva uppāci guṇo sa-paccayo ।

Survajjānantagūṇo kammappaesesu savvesu ॥ 1 ॥

Āyuyabhāgo thovo nāme goe samo tao ahigo ।

Āvaranamantarāe sariso ahigo ya mohevi ॥ 2 ॥

Savvuvāri Veyanīe bhāgo ahigo in kāranam kintu ।

Suha-dukkhakāranattā tūhi viśesena sesāsu ॥ 3 ॥

[Gahanasamaye jīva utpādayati guṇān svapratyayatah ।

Survajjānantagūṇān karma pradeśesu sarvesu ॥ 1 ॥

Āyuskabhāgah stoko nāmnī gotre samastato'dhikah ।

Āvarane'ntarāye sadṛśo'dhikaśca mohe'pi ॥ 2 ॥

Sarvopari Vedanīye bhāgo'dhikastu kāranam kintu ।

Sukha-dukkha kāranatvāt sthītiḥ viśesena sesāsu ॥3॥395 (1943)]

The example of *āhāra* stated above is explained in details as follows —

परिणामा—ऽऽसयवसओ धेणूए जहा पओ विसमहिस्स ।

तुल्लो वि तदाहारो तह पुण्णा—ऽपुण्णपरिणामो ॥३९६॥ (१९४४)

Parināmā—"sayavasao dhenūe jahā pao visamahissa ।

Tullo vi tadāhāro taha punnā-'punna parināmo ॥ 396 ॥ (1944)

[परिणामा—ऽऽश्रयवसतो धेन्वा यथा पयो विषमहेः ।

तुल्योऽपि तदाहारस्तथा पुण्या—ऽपुण्यपरिणामः ॥ ३९६ ॥ (१९४४)

Parināmā—"śrayavaśato dhenvā yathā payo viśamaheh ।

Tulyo'pi tadāharastathā punya-'punyaparināmah ॥ 396 ॥ (1944)]

Trans—396 By virtue of fruition and (the object of) resort, just as the food of cow and serpent although same

ऽध्ययस्वभावौ, ताभ्यामेतत् कुरुते जीव । इदमुक्तं भवति-जीवस्य याः
 क्षुमोऽक्षुमो वा परिणामोऽभ्यवसायस्तद्वशात् ग्रहणसमय एव कर्मणः क्षुम-
 त्वमक्षुमत्वं वा अनयति; तथा जीवस्यापि कर्माभ्यभूतस्य स कोऽपि स्वभावो
 ऽस्ति येन क्षुमा-ऽक्षुमत्वेन परिणमयमेव कर्म गृह्णाति; तथा, कर्मणोऽपि
 क्षुमा-ऽक्षुमत्वावाधाभ्यस्य स स्वभावः-स कश्चिद् योग्यताविशेषोऽस्ति,
 येन क्षुमा-ऽक्षुमपरिणामान्वितजीवेन गृह्यमाणमेवैतद्रूपतया परिणमति ।
 उपलक्षणं धेतुः; प्रकृति-स्थित्य-ऽनुमागवैविध्यम्, प्रदेष्टानामत्य-बहु
 मागवैविध्यं च जीवः कर्मणो ग्रहणसमय एव सर्वं करोतीति ।

उक्तं च—

ग्रहणसमयमि जीवो तप्पाएह गुणे सपञ्चयओ

सञ्चयियाणसगुणे कम्मपपसेसु सञ्चसु ॥ १ ॥

आत्तयमागो चोवो नामे गोए समो तओ अहिगो ।

आवरणमतराए सरिसो अहिगो य मोहे वि ॥ २ ॥

सञ्चुवरि वेयणीए मागो अहिगो उ कारणं किंतु ।

सुह-दुक्खकारणत्ता ठिई विसेसेण सेसासु ॥ ३ ॥ इति ॥

॥ ३९५ ॥ (१९४३)

D C.—Although these multitudes of *Karmas* are not distinguished as *subha* or *a-subha* originally at the time of apprehension *jīva* immediately turns them *śubha* or *a-śubha* on account of *parināma* as well as *āśaya*. *Jīva* is the *āśaya* of *Karma* which again is the *āśaya* of *śubhātva* and *a-śubhātva*. By the help of this *āśaya śubhātva* as well as the *parināma jīva* apprehends *Karma*. So at the time of apprehension *śubhātva* or *a-śubhātva* of *Karmas* depends upon *subha* or *a-subha parināma* produced by *jīva*.

Jīva apprehends *karma* as *subha* or *a-subha* by virtue of its *āśaya-śubhātva*. So when *Karma* is apprehended by *jīva* accompanied by *śubha* or *a-śubha parināma* it is recognized either as *subha* or *a-śubha Karma*. As in the case of *ākāra*

the *kāma-pudgalas* also immediately undergo change in their original nature in the present condition and the future consequences. In the same way, small or big portions of various regions of *Kāma-pudgalas* also undergo immediate changes.

It has therefore been laid down that —

“Gahanasamayamū jīva uppāci guṇo sa-paccayao ।

Sarvajjānantagūṇo kammāpāsesu savvesu ॥ 1 ॥

Āyuyabhāgo thovo nāme goe samo tao ahigo ।

Āvaranamantarāe sariso ahigo ya mohevi ॥ 2 ॥

Savvuvāri Veyanīe bhāgo ahigo in kāranam kintu ।

Suha-dukkhakāranattā thiṃ viśesena sesāsu ॥ 3 ॥

[Gahanasamaye jīva utpādayati guṇān svapratyayatah ।

Sarvajjānantagūṇān karma pradeśesu sarvesu ॥ 1 ॥

Āyuskabhāgaḥ stoko nāmnī gotre samastato'dhikah ।

Āvarane'ntarāye sadṛśo'dhikaśca mohe'pi ॥ 2 ॥

Sarvopari Vedanīye bhāgo'dhikastu kāranam kintu ।

Sukha-duhkha kāranatvāt sthītir viśesena sesāsu ॥3॥395 (1943)]

The example of *āhāra* stated above is explained in details as follows —

परिणामा—ऽऽसयवसओ धेणूए जहा पओ विसमहिस्स ।

तुल्लो वि तदाहारो तह पुण्णा—ऽपुण्णपरिणामो ॥३९६॥ (१९४४)

Parināmā—"sayavasao dhenūe jahā pao visamahissa ।

Tullo vi tadāhāro taha punnā-'punna parināmo ॥ 396 ॥ (1944)

[परिणामा—ऽऽश्रयवशतो धेन्वा यथा पयो विषमहेः ।

तुल्योऽपि तदाहारस्तथा पुण्या—ऽपुण्यपरिणामः ॥ ३९६ ॥ (१९४४)

Parināmā—"śrayavaśato dhenvā yathā payo viśamaheh ।

Tulyo'pi tadāhārastathā punya-'punyaparināmah ॥ 396 ॥ (1944)]

Trans —396 By virtue of fruition and (the object of) resort, just as the food of cow and serpent although same

ऽऽभयस्वभावौ, ताभ्यामेतत् कुरुते जीवः । इदमुक्तं भवति—जीवस्य वा श्रुमोऽश्रुमो वा परिणामोऽभ्यवसायस्तद्वशाद् ग्रहणसमय एव कर्मण श्रुम स्वमश्रुमत्व वा जनयति; तथा जीवस्यापि कर्माभयभूतस्य स कोऽपि स्वभावो ऽस्ति येन श्रुमा-ऽश्रुमत्वेन परिणमयन्नेव कर्म गृह्णाति; तथा, कर्मणोऽपि श्रुमा-ऽश्रुममावाद्याभयस्य स स्वभावः—स कश्चिद् योग्यताविशेषोऽस्ति, येन श्रुमा-ऽश्रुमपरिणामान्वितजीवेन गृह्यमाणमेवैतदूपतया परिणमति । उपलक्षणं चैतत्; प्रकृति-स्थित्य-ऽनुमागवैचित्र्यम्, प्रदेक्षानामस्य-बहु मागवैचित्र्यं च जीवः कर्मणो ग्रहणसमय एव सर्वं करोतीति ।

उक्तं च—

ग्रहणसमयमि जीवो उप्पाएइ गुणे सपण्यओ

सवजियाभतगुणे कम्मपणसेसु सवेसु ॥ १ ॥

आउयमागो घोवो नामे गोए समो तओ अहिगो ।

आवरणमताराए सरिसो अहिगो य मोहे वि ॥ २ ॥

सम्भुवरि वेयणीए मागो अहिगो उ कारण किंतु ।

सुह-इक्खकारणचा ठिई विसेसेण सेसासु ॥ ३ ॥ इति ॥

॥ ३९५ ॥ (१९४३)

D C—Although these multitudes of *Karmas* are not distinguished as *sūbha* or *a-sūbha* originally at the time of apprehension *jīva* immediately turns them *s'ūbha* or *a-s'ūbha* on account of *pariṇāma* as well as *āśraya*. *Jīva* is the *āśraya* of *Karma* which again is the *āśraya* of *s'ūbhātva* and *a-s'ūbhātva*. By the help of this *āśraya s'ūbhātva* as well as the *pariṇāma*, *jīva* apprehends *Karma*. So at the time of apprehension *s'ūbhātva* or *a-s'ūbhātva* of *Karmas* depends upon *sūbha* or *a-sūbha pariṇāma* produced by *jīva*.

Jīva apprehends *karma* as *sūbha* or *a-sūbha* by virtue of its *āśraya-s'ūbhātva*. So when *Karma* is apprehended by *jīva* accompanied by *s'ūbha* or *a-s'ūbha pariṇāma* it is recognized either as *sūbha* or *a-s'ūbha karma*. As in the case of *dharma*

the *karma-pudgalas* also immediately undergo change in their original nature in the present condition and the future consequences. In the same way, small or big portions of various regions of *Karma-pudgalas* also undergo immediate changes.

It has therefore been laid down that —

“Gahanasamayammi jīva uppāci gūṇe sa-paccayao ।

Sarvajjānantagūṇo kammapāsesu savvesu ॥ 1 ॥

Āyuyabhāgo thovo nāme gūṇe samo tva ahigo ।

Āvaranamantarāe sariso ahigo ya mohevi ॥ 2 ॥

Savvuvāri Veyanīe bhāgo ahigo in kāranam kintu ।

Suha-dukkhakāranattā tvaṃ viśesena sesāsu ॥ 3 ॥

[Gahanasamaye jīva utpādayati gūṇān svapratyayatah ।

Sarvajjānantagūṇān karma pradeśesu sarvesu ॥ 1 ॥

Āyuskabhāgaḥ stoka nāmaṃ gotre samastato'dhikah ।

Āvaraṇe'ntarāye sadṛśo'dhikaśca mohe'pi ॥ 2 ॥

Sarvopari Vedanīye bhāgo'dhikastu kāranam kintu ।

Sukha-dukkha kāranatvāt sthitiḥ viśesena sesāsu ॥3॥395 (1943)]

The example of *āhāra* stated above is explained in details as follows.—

परिणामा—ऽऽस्यवसओ धेणूए जहा पओ विसमहिस्स ।

तुल्लो वि तदाहारो तह पुण्णा—ऽपुण्णपरिणामो ॥३९६॥ (१९४४)

Parināmā—“sayavasao dhenūe jahā pao visamahissa ।

Tullo vi tadāhāro taha punnā—'punna parināmo ॥ 396 ॥ (1944)

[परिणामा—ऽऽश्रयवसतो धेन्वा यथा पयो विषमहेः ।

तुल्योऽपि तदाहारस्तथा पुण्या—ऽपुण्यपरिणामः ॥ ३९६ ॥ (१९४४)

Parināmā—“śrayavaśato dhenva yathā payo viśamaheh ।

Tulyo'pi tadāharastathā puṇya—'punyaparināmah ॥ 396 ॥ (1944)]

Trans—396 By virtue of fruition and (the object of) resort, just as the food of cow and serpent although same

results as milk (in case of cow) and as poison (in case of serpent) so also the result (in case) of *puṇya* and *pāpa* is (different) (1944)

टीका—“तदाहारो वि” तयोरहि-धेन्वोराहारस्तदाहारः स तुस्योऽपि दुग्धादिको गृहीतः परिणामा-ऽऽभयवशाद् यथा धेन्वाः पयो दुग्धं भवति, अहेस्तु स एष विष-विषरूपतया परिणमति, तथा तेनैव प्रकारेण पुण्या-ऽपुण्यपरिणामः । इदमुक्तं भवति-अस्ति स कश्चित् तस्याऽऽहारस्य परिणामो येन तुस्योऽपि सन्नाभयवैचित्र्याद् विचित्रतया परिणमति; आभयस्याप्यहि-धनुलघ्नस्पास्ति तद्यद् निजमामर्ष्यम्, येन तुस्योऽपि गृहीत आहारस्तद्वृषतया परिणमते; तथा पुण्यपापयोरुपनययोजना कृतैवेति ॥३९६॥ (१९४४)

D C—Although the food of cow and serpent is the same that of cow results as milk while the same results as poison in case of serpent on account of the distinction of *pariṇāma* and *asraya*. So in spite of *āhāras* being the same the result is not the same in both cases because their *asrayas*—Cow and serpent—are different. Take *śubhā-śubha asraya* it also depends upon *śubhā-śubha pariṇāma* ॥ 396 ॥ (1944)

Or it can be explained in this way also.—

जह वेगसरीरम्मि वि सारा-ऽसारपरिणामयामेइ ।

अविसिट्ठो वाहागे तह कम्मसुभा ऽसुभविभागो ॥३९७॥ (१९४५)

Jaha vegasariṇammi vi sārā-śārapariṇāmayāmei ।

Avisittho vāhāro taha kammāsuhā-śubhavibhāgo ॥397॥ (1945)

[यथा वैकल्परीरेऽपि सारा-ऽसारपरिणामयामेति ।

अविशिष्ट इवाहारस्तथा कर्मसुभा-सुभविभागः ॥ ३९७ ॥ (१९४५)

Yatha vaikalparīre pi sara śārapariṇāmatameti ।

Avidiṣṭa ivahāratathā karmāsuhā-śubhavibhāgaḥ ॥397॥ (1945)]

Trans—397 Just as the same food results in a substantial or perverted form even in the same body the distinction of *Karma* as *śubha* and *a-śubha* would also take place. (1945)

टीका-धेनु-विषधरयोर्मिन्ने शरीर आहारस्य परिणामवैचित्र्यं दर्शितम्।
 ' वा ' इत्यथवा, यथैकस्मिन्नपि पुरुषादिशरीरेऽविशिष्टेऽप्येकरूपोऽप्याहारो
 गृहीतस्तत्क्षण एव सारा-ऽसारपरिणामतामेति-रसा-ऽसृग्-मांसादिरस-
 परिणामं मूत्र-पुरीषरूपमलपरिणामं च युगपदागच्छतीत्यर्थः, तथा कर्मणो-
 ऽप्यविशिष्टस्य गृहीतस्य परिणामा-ऽऽश्रयवशात् शुभा-ऽशुभविभागो द्रष्टव्य
 इति ॥ ३९७ ॥ (१९४५)

D C—Even in case of one and the same body and the same food, the food results either in substantial forms like bile chyle, blood and flesh etc or in worthless forms like urine, faeces etc immediately after it has been consumed.

In the same way, *s'ubha* and *a-s'ubha* divisions in case of *Karma*, should also be recognized by reason of distinction of *parināma* and *ās'āya* ॥ 397 ॥ (1945)

The author now, illustrates the distinction of *punya* and *pāpa*, and establishes their existence by means of *āgamas*—

सायं सम्मं हासं पुरिस-रइ-सुभाउ-नाम-गोत्ताइं ।
 पुण्णं, सेसं पावं नेयं सविवागमविवागं ॥ ३९८ ॥ (१९४६)

Sāyam sammam hāsam purisa-rai-subhāu-nāma-gottāim ।
Punnam, sesam pāvam neyam sa-vivāgamavivāgam ॥398॥ (1946)

[सातं सम्यक्त्वं हास्यं पुरुष-रति-शुभायु-नाम-गोत्राणि ।

पुण्यं, शेषं पापं ज्ञेयं सविपाकमविपाकम् ॥ ३९८ ॥ (१९४६)

Satam samyaktvam hāsyam purusa-rati-śubhāyurnāma-gotrāni
Punyam, sesam pāpam jñeyam sa-vipākamavipākam ॥398॥ (1946)]

Trans—398 Comfort, right belief (*samyaktva*), mirth, masculine form love, and virtuous life, name and lineage—all these are known as *punya* (*prakritis*) The rest should be known as *pāpa* (*prakritis*) (Both of them may be) with or without fruition (1940)

results as milk (in case of cow) and as polson (in case of serpent) so also, the result (in case) of *panya* and *pāpa* is (different) (1944)

टीका—“तदाहारो सि” तयोरहि-वेन्मोराहारस्तदाहारः स तुत्योऽपि दुग्धादिको गृहीतः परिणामा-ऽऽभयवशाद् यथा वेन्वाः पयो दुग्धं भवति, भवेस्तु स एव विषं-विषरूपतया परिणमति, तथा तेनैव प्रकारेण पुण्या-ऽपुण्यपरिणामः । इदमुक्तं भवति-अस्ति स कश्चित् तस्याऽऽहारस्य परिणामो येन तुत्योऽपि सभाभयवैचित्र्याद् विचित्रतया परिणमति; आभयस्याप्याहि-भेनुलक्षणस्यास्ति तच्चद् निश्चसामर्प्यम्, येन तुत्योऽपि गृहीत आहारस्तत्तद्रूपतया परिणमते; तथा पुण्यपापयोरुपनययोजना कुतैवेति ॥३९६॥ (१९४४)

D O—Although the food of oow and serpent is the same that of oow results as milk while the same results as polson in case of serpent on account of the distinction of *pariṇāma* and *asraya*. So in spite of *āhāras* being the same the result is not the same in both cases because their *asrayas*—Oow and serpent—are different. Like *s'ubhā-s'ubhā asraya* it also depends upon *s'ubhā-s'ubhā pariṇāma* n 396 n (1944)

Or it can be explained in this way also—

अह वेगसररीरम्मि वि सारा-ऽसारपरिणामयामेइ ।

अविसिद्धो वाहारो तह कम्मसुभा ऽसुभविभागो ॥३९७॥ (१९४५)

Jaha vegasārīrammi vi sārā-sāraparināmayāmei ।

Avisittho vāhāro taha kamma-subhā-subhavibhāgo n397n (1945)

[यथा वैकश्यरीरेऽपि सारा-ऽसारपरिणामयामेति ।

अविसिद्ध इवाहारस्तथा कम्मसुभा-सुभविभागः ॥ ३९७ ॥ (१९४५)

Yathā vaikāśarīre pi sārā-sāraparināmatameti ।

Aviśiṣṭa ivāharastatha kamma-subhā-subhavibhāgaḥ n397n (1945)]

Trans.—397 Just as the same food results in a substantial or perverted form even in the same body the distinction of *Karma* as *subhā* and *a-subhā* would also take place. (1945)

कार्यस्य प्रमाणतोऽल्प-बहुत्वं विहाय स्वरूपतो मेदो युज्यते । न हि मेचक-
कारणप्रभवं कार्यमन्यतमवर्णोत्कटं घटते । तस्मात् सुखातिशयस्यान्यद्
निमित्तम्, अन्यच्च दुःखातिशयस्येति । न च सर्वथैकरूपस्य संकीर्णपुण्यपाप-
लक्षणस्य हेतोः सुखातिशयनिबन्धनं पुण्यांशवृद्धिर्दुःखातिशयकारणपापांश-
हान्या सुखातिशयप्रभावाय कल्पयितुं न्याय्या, पुण्यांश-पापांशयोर्भेद
प्रसङ्गात्; तथाहि-यद् वृद्धावपि यद् न वर्धते तत् ततो भिन्नम्; यथा देवदत्त-
वृद्धावप्यवर्धमानो यज्ञदत्तः, न वर्धते च पुण्यांशवृद्धौ पापांशः, तस्मात् ततो
भिन्नोऽसाविति । तस्माद् न सर्वथैकरूपता पुण्य-पापांशयोर्घटते । कर्मसामा-
न्यरूपतया तु यद्यसौ तयोरिष्यते तदा सिद्धसाध्यता, सात-यशः-कीर्त्यादेः
पुण्यस्य, असाता-ऽयशः-ऽकीर्त्यादिस्तु पापस्यास्माभिरपि कर्मत्वेनैकताया
अभ्युपगमात् । तस्मात् पुण्य-पापरूपतया विविक्ते एव पुण्य-पापे स्त इति ।
ततः सुख-दुःखवैचित्र्यनिबन्धनयोः पुण्य-पापयोर्यथोक्तनीत्या साधितत्वाद्
न कर्तव्यस्तत्संशयः ॥ ३९८ (१९४६)

D. C—(1) There are 46 characteristics which are *s'ubha* and are hence known as *punya-prakritis* They are enumerated as follows —

Bestowing of gift, propriety of conduct etc purged of all impurities, mirth, masculine form, affection, the three types of *āyus* (union or connection with body *viz*—divine, human, and *trayanca*,) thirty-seven *prakritis* of *Nāma Karma* (including birth as a *Tīrthankara*) and the noble lineage.

(2) According to others, there are 42 *prakritis* under the category of *punya* They insist that *samyaktva*, *purusaveda*, *hāsya* and *rati* are *pāpa-prakritis* when they are contrary to the nature of *jīva* Excepting these four *prakritis*, the remaining 42 *prakritis* are laid down by them as under—

Sāyam uccāgoyam nara-tīr-devaūyām taha nāme ।

Devadugam manuyadugam paninda-jāi ya tanupanagam ॥ 1 ॥

Angovangāna tīgam padhamam sanghayanameva santhanam ।

Subhavannaicaukkamagurulahū taha ya paraghāyam ॥ 2 ॥

टीका—सातवेदनीयम्, श्लोचितमिध्यात्वपुद्गलरूपं सम्यक्त्वम्, हास्यम्, पुरुषवेदः, रति, श्रुमायुः, नाम—गोत्राणि चेत्येतत् सर्वं पुण्यमभिधीयते । तत्र नारकायुर्वर्जं श्रेयमायुस्त्रयं श्रुमम्, देवद्विक-यज्ञः—कीर्ति-तीर्थकर नामाद्याः सप्तत्रिंशत् प्रकृतयो नामकमणि श्रुमाः, गोत्रे पुनरुचैर्योत्रं श्रुमम् । एताः पदचत्वारिंशत् प्रकृतयः किल श्रुमत्वात् पुण्यम् । अन्ये तु मोहनीय मेदान् सर्वानपि बीषस्य विषयौसहेतुत्वात् पापमेष मन्यन्ते । तत्र सम्यक्त्व-हास्य-पुरुषवेद-रतिवर्जा द्विचत्वारिंशदेव प्रकृतयः पुण्यम्; तद्यथा—

साय उच्चागोयं नर-तिरि-देवाउयाई सह नामे ।
 देवदुर्गं मधुपदुग पर्णिदजाई य तणुपणगं ॥ १ ॥
 अंगोषगाण तिग पढमं संचयममेष सठाण ।
 सुमवण्णाइषउकं अगुरुलहू सह य परषाय ॥ २ ॥
 ऊसासं आयाव उज्जोय विहगगाई वि य पसत्था ।
 तस-बायर-पल्लत पचेय थिरं सुमं सुमग ॥ ३ ॥
 सुस्तर आपळ असं निम्मिण तिस्थयरमेव एयाओ ।
 बायाल पगाईओ पुण्णं सि जिण्णेहिं मणिजाओ ॥ ४ ॥

मणितशेषास्तु या अस्तीतिप्रकृतयस्तत् सर्वमश्रुमत्वात् पार्यं विद्वेयम् । सम्यक्त्व कथमश्रुमम्—कथं तत् पापम् ? इति चेत् । उच्यते—रुचिरूपमेव हि सम्यक्त्वं श्रुमं तच्चेह न विचार्यते, किन्तु श्लोचितमिध्यात्वपुद्गलरूपम्, तच्च लज्जायनर्हेहेतुत्वादश्रुममेव, अश्रुमत्वाच्च पापम् । सम्यक्त्वेभातिशये नानाबागकल्पादुपचारमात्र एवेह सम्यक्त्वमुच्यते, परमार्थतस्तु मिध्यात्वमेवैतत् । इत्यर्थं प्रसङ्गेन । इदं च पुण्य-पापलक्षणमश्रुमयमपि सविपाकमविपाकं च मन्तव्यम्—यथा यद् तच्चेव विपाकतः किञ्चिद् वेद्यते, किञ्चित् मन्दरसं नीरसं वा कृत्वा प्रदेष्टोदयेनाविपाकं वेद्यत इत्यर्थः । तदेव पुण्यं पार्यं च मेदेन व्यवस्थाप्य निरस्तः संकीर्णपुण्य-पापपक्षः ।

इतथायमयुक्तः—सर्वस्यापि सन्निभसुख-दुःखाकृपकार्यप्रसङ्गात्; न चैतदस्ति, देवादीनां केवलसुखाधिक्यदर्शनात्, नारकादीनां केवलदुःखाप्रत्युत्पन्निर्भयात् । न च सर्वथा समिभैकरूपस्य हेतोरन्य-बहुत्वमेवेति

कार्यस्य प्रमाणतोऽल्प-बहुत्वं विहाय स्वरूपतो भेदो युज्यते । न हि मेचक-
कारणप्रभवं कार्यमन्यतमवर्णोत्कटं घटते । तस्मात् सुखातिशयस्यान्यद्
निमित्तम्, अन्यच्च दुःखातिशयस्येति । न च सर्वथैकरूपस्य संकीर्णपुण्यपाप-
लक्षणस्य हेतोः सुखातिशयनिबन्धनं पुण्यांशवृद्धिर्दुःखातिशयकारणपापांश-
हान्या सुखातिशयप्रभावाय कल्पयितुं न्याय्या, पुण्यांश-पापांशयोर्भेद
प्रसङ्गात् ; तथाहि-यद् वृद्धावपि यद् न वर्धते तत् ततो भिन्नम् ; यथा देवदत्त-
वृद्धावप्यवर्धमानो यज्ञदत्तः, न वर्धते च पुण्यांशवृद्धौ पापांशः, तस्मात् ततो
भिन्नोऽसाविति । तस्माद् न सर्वथैकरूपता पुण्य-पापांशयोर्घटते । कर्मसामा-
न्यरूपतया तु यद्यसौ तयोरिष्यते तदा सिद्धसाध्यता, सात-यशः-कीर्त्यादेः
पुण्यस्य, असाता-ऽयशः-ऽकीर्त्यादिस्तु पापस्यास्माभिरपि कर्मत्वेनैकताया
अभ्युपगमात् । तस्मात् पुण्य-पापरूपतया विविक्ते एव पुण्य-पापे स्त इति ।
ततः सुख-दुःखवैचित्र्यनिबन्धनयोः पुण्य-पापयोर्यथोक्तनीत्या साधितत्वाद्
न कर्तव्यस्तत्संशयः ॥ ३९८ (१९४६)

D. C — (1) There are 46 characteristics which are *s'ubha* and are hence known as *punya-prakritis*. They are enumerated as follows —

Bestowing of gift, propriety of conduct etc purged of all impurities, mirth, masculine form, affection, the three types of *āyus* (union or connection with body *viz*—divine, human, and *tiṛyanca*,) thirty-seven *prakritis* of *Nāma Karma* (including birth as a *Tiṇthankara*) and the noble lineage.

(2) According to others, there are 42 *prakritis* under the category of *punya*. They insist that *samyaktva*, *purusaveda*, *hāsyā* and *ratī* are *pāpa-prakritis* when they are contrary to the nature of *jīva*. Excepting these four *prakritis*, the remaining 42 *prakritis* are laid down by them as under—

Sāyam uccāgoyam nara-tiṛi-devāuyām taha nāme |

Devadugam manuyadugam paṇinda-jāi ya tanupanagam || 1 ||

Angovangāna tīgam padhamam sanghayanameva santhānam |

Subhavanāicaukkamagurulahū taha ya paraghāyam || 2 ||

टीका-सातवेदनीयम्, शोधितमिष्यात्वपुद्गलरूप सम्यक्त्वम्, हास्यम्, पुरुषवेदः, रतिः, श्रुमायुः, नाम-गोत्राणि चेत्येतत् सर्वं पुण्यमभिधीयते । तत्र नारकायुर्वचं श्रेयमायुश्च यं श्रुमम्, देवद्विक-यज्ञः-कीर्ति-तीर्थकर नामाद्याः सप्तत्रिंशत् प्रकृतयो नामकर्मणि श्रुमा, गोत्रे पुनरुचैर्गोत्रं श्रुमम् । एताः पदचत्वारिंशत् प्रकृतयः किल श्रुमत्वात् पुण्यम् । अन्ये तु मोहनीय मेदान् सर्वानपि बीबस्य विपयांसहेतुत्वात् पापमेव मन्यन्ते । ततः सम्यक्त्व-हास्य-पुरुषवेद-रतिवर्चा द्विचत्वारिंशदेव प्रकृतयः पुण्यम्; तद्यथा-

साय उच्चागोर्यं नर-तिरि-देवाउयाई तह नामे ।
 देवदुग मणुयदुग पर्णिदचाई य सणुपणग ॥ १ ॥
 अंगोबगाण तिग पढमं संभयणमेष संठायं ।
 सुमबण्णाइचउक्क अगुरुलहू तह य परचाय ॥ २ ॥
 ऊसासं आयाव उज्जोय विहगगई वि य पसत्था ।
 तस-भायर-पञ्जच पत्तेय धिरं सुमं सुमग ॥ ३ ॥
 सुस्सर आप्पज्ज जसं निम्मिण तित्थयरमेव एयाओ ।
 बायालं पगईओ पुण्णं ति म्मिणोहि मणिआओ ॥ ४ ॥

भणितशेषास्तु या अस्तीतिप्रकृतयस्तत् सर्वमश्रुमत्वात् पाप विज्ञेयम् । सम्यक्त्व कथमश्रुमम्-कथं तत् पापम् ? इति चेत् । उच्यते-रुचिरूपमेव हि सम्यक्त्वं श्रुम तच्चेह न विचार्यते, किन्तु शोधितमिष्यात्वपुद्गलरूपम्, तच्च सङ्गायनर्यहेतुत्वादश्रुममेव, अश्रुमत्वाच्च पापम् । सम्यक्त्वेष्वतिशये नानावारकत्वादुपचारमात्र एवेदं सम्यक्त्वमुच्यते, परमार्थतस्तु मिष्यात्वमेवैतत् । इत्यलं प्रसङ्गेन । इदं च पुण्य-पापलक्षणश्रुमयमपि सविपाकमविपाकं च मन्तव्यम्-यथा बद्धं तथैव विपाकतः किञ्चिद् वेद्यते, किञ्चित् मन्तरसं नीरसं वा कृत्वा प्रदेक्षोदयेनाविपाकं वेद्यत इत्यर्थः । तदेवं पुण्यं पापं च मेदेन व्यवस्थाप्य निरस्तः संकीर्णपुण्य-पापपक्षः ।

इदभाष्यमयुक्तः-सर्वस्यापि सन्निभसुख-दुःखास्यकार्यप्रसङ्गात्; न चैतदस्ति, देवादीनां केवलसुखाधिक्यदर्शनात्, नारकादीनां केवलदुःख प्राप्तिर्निर्णयात् । न च सर्वथा सन्निभैकरूपस्य हेतोरस्य-बहुत्वमेदं अपि

कार्यस्य प्रमाणतोऽल्प-बहुत्वं विहाय स्वरूपतो भेदो युज्यते । न हि मेचक-
कारणप्रभवं कार्यमन्यतमवर्णोत्कटं घटते । तस्मात् सुखातिशयस्यान्यद्
निमित्तम्, अन्यच्च दुःखातिशयस्येति । न च सर्वथैकरूपस्य संकीर्णपुण्यपाप-
लक्षणस्य हेतोः सुखातिशयनिवन्धनं पुण्यांशवृद्धिर्दुःखातिशयकारणपापांश-
हान्या सुखातिशयप्रभावाय कल्पयितुं न्याय्या, पुण्यांश-पापांशयोर्भेद
प्रसङ्गात् ; तथाहि-यद् वृद्धावपि यद् न वर्धते तत् ततो भिन्नम् ; यथा देवदत्त-
वृद्धावप्यवर्धमानो यज्ञदत्तः, न वर्धते च पुण्यांशवृद्धौ पापांशः, तस्मात् ततो
भिन्नोऽसाविति । तस्माद् न सर्वथैकरूपता पुण्य-पापांशयोर्घटते । कर्मसामा-
न्यरूपतया तु यद्यसौ तयोरिष्यते तदा सिद्धसाध्यता, सात-यशः-कीर्त्यादेः
पुण्यस्य, असाता-ऽयशः-ऽकीर्त्यादिस्तु पापस्यास्माभिरपि कर्मत्वेनैकताया
अभ्युपगमात् । तस्मात् पुण्य-पापरूपतया विविक्ते एव पुण्य-पापे स्त इति ।
ततः सुख-दुःखवैचित्र्यनिवन्धनयोः पुण्य-पापयोर्यथोक्तनीत्या साधितत्वाद्
न कर्तव्यस्तत्संग्रहः ॥ ३९८ (१९४६)

D. C—(1) There are 46 characteristics which are *s'ubha* and are hence known as *punya-prakritis*. They are enumerated as follows —

Bestowing of gift, propriety of conduct etc purged of all impurities, mirth, masculine form, affection, the three types of *āyus* (union or connection with body *viz*—divine, human, and *tryanca*,) thirty-seven *prakritis* of *Nāma Karma* (including birth as a *Tirthankara*) and the noble lineage.

(2) According to others, there are 42 *prakritis* under the category of *punya*. They insist that *samyaktva*, *purusaveda*, *hāsyā* and *ratī* are *pāpa-prakritis* when they are contrary to the nature of *jīva*. Excepting these four *prakritis*, the remaining 42 *prakritis* are laid down by them as under—

Sāyam uccāgoyam nara-tiri-devāyūyam taha name |

Devadugam manuyadugam paninda-jai ya tanupanagam ॥ 1 ॥

Angovangāna tigam padhamam sanghayanameva santhanam |

Subhavannaicaukkamagurulabū taha ya paraghāyam ॥ 2 ॥

टीका—सातवेदनीयम्, श्लोचितमिध्यात्वपुद्गलरूपं सम्यक्त्वम्, हास्यम्, पुरुषवेदः, रतिः, शुमायुः, नाम—गोत्राणि चेत्येतत् सर्वं पुण्यमभिधीयते । तत्र नारकायुर्वर्धं शेषमायुश्च शुभम्, देवद्विक—यश्च—कीर्ति—तीर्थकर नामाद्याः सप्तत्रिंशत् प्रकृतयो नामकर्मणि शुभाः, गोत्रे पुनरुचैर्गोत्रं शुभम् । एताः पदचत्वारिंशत् प्रकृतयः किल शुभत्वात् पुण्यम् । अन्ये तु मोहनीय मेदान् सर्वानपि जीवस्य विपर्यासहेतुत्वात् पापमेव मन्यन्ते । ततः सम्यक्त्व—हास्य—पुरुषवेद—रतिवर्जा द्विचत्वारिंशदेव प्रकृतयः पुण्यम्; तद्यथा—

सार्यं उच्चागोयं नर—तिरि—देवाउयाई तह नामे ।

देवदुग मण्डुयदुगं पमिदचाई य तणुपणग ॥ १ ॥

अंगोवगाण तिगं पढर्म संभयणमेव संउर्यं ।

सुमवण्णाइषठक्क अगुरुल्लहू तह य परभाय ॥ २ ॥

ऊसासं आयाव उज्जोय विहगगई वि य पसरथा ।

तस—भायर—पञ्चपं पत्तेय धिरं सुम सुमग ॥ ३ ॥

सुस्सर आएल्ल जस निम्मिण तिस्थयरमेव एयाओ ।

बायालं पगईओ पुण्णं सि धिण्णेहि मणिआओ ॥ ४ ॥

मणितशेषास्तु या अशीतिप्रकृतयस्तत् सर्वमशुभमत्वात् पापं विज्ञेयम् । सम्यक्त्व कथमशुभम्—कथं तत् पापम् ? इति चेत् । उच्यते—रुषिरूपमेव हि सम्यक्त्वं शुभं तच्चेह न विचार्यते, किन्तु श्लोचितमिध्यात्वपुद्गलरूपम्, तच्च श्रद्धाद्यनर्थहेतुत्वादशुभमेव, अशुभत्वाच्च पापम् । सम्यक्त्वैवाविश्रये नानावारकत्वादुपचारमात्रं ष्वेदं सम्यक्त्वमुच्यते, परमार्थतस्तु मिध्यात्वमेवैतत् । इत्यलं प्रसङ्गेन । इदं च पुण्य—पापलक्षणमुभयमपि सविपाकमविपाकं च मन्तव्यम्—यथा यद्दृष्टवैव विपाकतः किञ्चिद् घेद्यते, किञ्चिद् मन्दरसं नीरसं वा कृत्वा प्रदेष्टोदयेनाविपाकं घेद्यत इत्यर्थः । तदेवं पुण्यं पापं च मेदेन व्यपस्याप्य निरस्तः संकीर्णपुण्य—पापपक्षः ।

इतथायमयुक्तः—सर्वस्यापि सन्मिथसुख—दुःखाख्यकार्यप्रसङ्गात् ; न चैतदस्ति, दवादीनां केवलसुखाधिक्यदर्शनात्, नारकादीनां केवलदुःखप्राचुर्यनिर्णयात् । न च सर्वथा सन्मिथैकरूपस्य हेतोरस्य—बहुत्वमदेऽपि

(4) The view that *punya* and *pāpa* exist in a combined state, is absolutely unfounded. Secondly, if *Karma* which acts as the cause of happiness and misery, was taken to exist in a composite state, all the living beings would undergo happiness as well as misery at the same time. But it does not happen so in reality. For, gods have almost everything of happiness and *nāraṅkas* are always buried in absolute misery. It is clear, therefore, that the reasons of abundant happiness and abundant misery are different from each other. Thirdly, if there is one composite entity of *punya* and *pāpa*, the theory that increase of *punya* causes abundance of happiness or that abundance of happiness is produced by the absolute removal of *pāpa*, would become null and void. Because, that which does not increase with the increase in another, is different from another. *Yagnadatta* who does not grow fat with the growth of *Devadatta* is different from *Devadatta*. The uniform oneness of *punya* and *pāpa* is, therefore, not at all proper. If their oneness is believed on the assumption of *Karma* being common in both, there would be no difficulty.

But so far as an individual is concerned, know it for certain that *punya* and *pāpa* are separate from each other as proved above, and hence *O Bhadra* ' it is not worthy of you to raise any doubt about it ॥ 398 ॥ (1946)

Referring to the commandments of *Vedas*, the author states—

असइ बहि पुन्न-पावे जमग्गिहोत्ताइं सग्गकामस्स ।

तदसंबद्धं सर्वं दाणाइफलं च लोअम्मि ॥ ३९९ ॥ (१९४७)

Asai bahi punna-pāve jamaggihoṭṭāim saggakāmassa ।

Tadasambaddham savvam dānāphalam ca lōammi ॥ 399 ॥ (1947)

[असतोर्बहिः पुण्य-पापयोरग्निहोत्रादि स्वर्गकामस्य ।

तदसंबद्धं सर्वं दानादिफलं च लोके ॥ ३९९ ॥ (१९४७)

Asatorbahih punya-pāpayoragnihotrādi svargakāmasya ।

Tadasambaddham sarvam dānādīphalam ca loke ॥ 399 ॥ (1947)]

Uśāsam ayāvam ujjoya vihaḡagaḡ vi ya paśattha ।
 Tasa-bāyara-pajjattam patteya thuram subham subhagam ॥ 3 ॥
 Sussara sējja jassam nūmuna tūthayaramova oyāo ।
 Bāyslam pagāto punnam ti Jinohim bhanāso ॥ 4 ॥
 [Sātamuccair-gotram nara-tīryag-devayuskani tathā nānūi ।
 Devadvikam manujadvikam paucendriyajātis oś tanupanōkam ॥ 1 ॥
 Aḡopāḡḡnām trikam prathamam sanhananāmonva sanathanam ।
 Śubhavārpadi cātuskamagurulaghu tathācā parāḡhātam ॥ 2 ॥
 Uoohvāsa sīāpa uddyoto vihaḡyogaturapi prasastā ।
 Traśa-bādara-paryāptam pratyekam sthūram śubham subhagam ॥ 3 ॥
 Suśvaramadeyam yāso nīrmanam tairthakaramovalatāḡ ।
 Dvicitvarimśat prakṡitayāḡ puḡyamitī Jinairbhanitāḡ ॥ 4 ॥]

The remaining 82 *prākṡits* are recognized by them as *pāpa-prākṡits*

If someone raises a question at this point that how would *samyakṡra* be called *pāpa-prākṡit*? The answer would be this—The virtuous *samyakṡra* whose natural inclination is undoubtedly *subhā* is not referred to in this case. The *prākṡits* that are classed under *samyakṡra* though purged of all evil perversions are *a-subhā* because of the evil elements like *duḡha* etc. being present in them. So they come under the category of *pāpa*.

The purified *pudgala*s do not very much obstruct the nature of *samyakṡra*. But they are classed under *samyakṡra* merely by means of *upacāra* and really speaking they belong to the category of *mūḡhāṡra*.

(3) Both-*puḡya* and *pāpa*-should either have fruition or no fruition. Hence some *Karmas* are recognized in their original form on account of their *vipāka*s while others have either scanty juice (*rasa*) or no juice at all and hence have very little *vipāka*. So *pāpa* and *puḡya* are recognized by virtue of their various regions of *prīṡanam* and are distinguished from each other on account of their mutually opposite qualities.

(4) The view that *punya* and *pāpa* exist in a combined state, is absolutely unfounded. Secondly, if *Karma* which acts as the cause of happiness and misery, was taken to exist in a composite state, all the living beings would undergo happiness as well as misery at the same time. But it does not happen so in reality. For, gods have almost everything of happiness and *nāraṇas* are always buried in absolute misery. It is clear, therefore, that the reasons of abundant happiness and abundant misery are different from each other. Thirdly, if there is one composite entity of *punya* and *pāpa*, the theory that increase of *punya* causes abundance of happiness or that abundance of happiness is produced by the absolute removal of *pāpa*, would become null and void. Because, that which does not increase with the increase in another, is different from another. *Yajnadatta* who does not grow fat with the growth of *Devadatta* is different from *Devadatta*. The uniform oneness of *punya* and *pāpa* is, therefore, not at all proper. If their oneness is believed on the assumption of *Karma* being common in both, there would be no difficulty.

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तदसंबद्धं सव्वं दाणाइफलं च लोअम्मि ॥ ३९९ ॥ (१९४७)

Asaī bahi punna-pāve jamagghihottāim saggakāmassa ।
Tadasambaddham savvam dāṇāṭṭhalaṃ ca lōammi ॥ 399 ॥ (1947)

[असतोर्बहिः पुण्य-पापयोरग्निहोत्रादि स्वर्गकामस्य ।
तदसंबद्धं सर्वं दानादिफलं च लोके ॥ ३९९ ॥ (१९४७)]

Asatorbahih punya-pāpayoragnihotrādi svargakāmasya ।
Tadasambaddham sarvam dānādīṭṭhalaṃ ca loke ॥ 399 ॥ (1947)]

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तदसंबद्धं सर्वं दाणाइफलं च लोअम्मि ॥ ३९९ ॥ (१९४७)

Asai bahi punna-pāve jamaggirottāim saggakāmassa ।

Tadasambaddham savvam dānāiphalam ca lōammi ॥ 399 ॥ (1947)

[असतोर्बहिः पुण्य-पापयोरग्निहोत्रादि स्वर्गकामस्य ।

तदसंबद्धं सर्वं दानादिफलं च लोके ॥ ३९९ ॥ (१९४७)

Asatorbahih punya-pāpayoragnihotrādi svargakāmasya ।

Tadasambaddham sarvam dānādiphalam ca loke ॥399॥ (1947)]

Trans—399 In (case of) *punya* and *pāpa* being absent the commandment of the performance of the sacrifice etc. (prescribed) for one who aspires for Salvation would become useless. Moreover all sorts of fruition (of the good turn) like munificence etc, (welknown) in the world would also become null and void. (1947)

टीका-पुण्य-पापयोरसत्त्वे यदेतद् बहिरभिहोत्राद्यनुष्ठान स्वर्गकामस्य, यच्च दान-हिंसादिफल पुण्य-पापात्मक लोके प्रसिद्धं, तत् सर्वमसंबद्धं स्यात्, स्वर्गस्यापि पुण्यफलत्वात्, पुण्य-पापयोश्च मन्त्रमिप्रायेणासत्त्वात्, तस्माद् न्युपगन्तव्ये एव पुण्य-पापे । तदेव वेदवचनप्रामाण्यात्, युक्तित्वं चिन्मस्तस्य संशय इति ॥ ३९९ ॥ (१९४७)

D C—If there were no *punya*-*pāpa* in this world the commandment of the *Vedas* that one who aspires for Salvation should perform *agnihotra* etc would be of no value. Moreover the results of actions like *dāna* and *ahiṃsā* in the forms of *punya* and *pāpa* respectively which are welknown in this world would all be futile Hence take it for granted that *punya* and *pāpa* are existing and leave off all your doubts ॥399॥ (1947)

Thus

छिन्नमि ससयम्मी जिणेण जर-मरणविप्पमुक्केण ।

सो समणो पव्वइओ तिहि ओ सहखण्डियसएहिं ॥४००॥ (१९४८)

Chinnammi samsayammi Jinena jara-maranavippamukkenam ।

So samano pavvaio tihl o saha khandiyasahim ॥ 400 ॥ (1948)

[छिन्ने संशये बिनेन बरा-मरणविप्रमुक्तेन ।

स भ्रमण प्रवर्धितस्त्रिमिस्तु सह सखिकस्येः ॥ ४०० ॥ (१९४८)

Chinne samāyo Jinena jara maranavipramuktena ।

Sāramapah pravrajitasribhista saha khandikasastaih ॥400॥ (1948)]

Trans—400 When the doubt was removed by the *Tirthan-kara* who was entirely free from old age and death that saint accepted the *Diksā* along with his three hundred pupils (1948)

End of the Discussion with the Ninth Ganadhara.

Chapter X



दशमगणधरवक्तव्यता ।

Discussion with the Tenth Ganadhara

ते पव्वइए सोउं मेअज्जो आगच्छई जिणसयासं ।
वच्चामि य वंदामी वंदित्ता पज्जुवासामि ॥ ४०१ ॥ (१९४९)

Te pavvaie söum Meajjo āgacchai Jinasayāsam ।
Vaccāmi ya vandāmi vandittā pajjuvāsāmi ॥ 401 ॥ (1949)

[तान् प्रव्रजितान् श्रुत्वा मेतार्य आगच्छति जिनसकाशम् ।
व्रजामि वन्दे वन्दित्वा पर्युपासे ॥ ४०१ ॥ (१९४९)

Tān pravrajitān śrutvā Metārya āgacchatī Jinasakāśam ।
Vrajāmi vande vanditvā paryupāse ॥ 401 ॥ (1949)]

Trans—401 Having heard that they have renounced the world, *Metārya*, comes before the *Tīrthankara* (He thinks—) I may go, pay my homages, and worship him (1949)

आभट्ठो य जिणेणं जाइ-जरा-मरणविप्पमुक्केणं ।
नामेण य गोत्तेण य सव्वण्णू सव्वदरिसी णं ॥४०२॥ (१९५०)

Ābhaṭṭho ya Jinenam jāi-jarā-maranavippamukkenam ।
Nāmena ya gottēna ya savvaṇṇū savvadarisī nam ॥402॥ (1950)

[आभाषितश्च जिनेन जाति-जरा-मरणविप्रमुक्तेन ।
नाम्ना च गोत्रेण च सर्वज्ञेन सर्वदर्शिना ॥ ४०२ ॥ (१९५०)

Abhāṣitaśca Jinena jata-jarā-maraṇavipramukṭena ।

Namna ca gotrena ca sarvajñena sarvadarśinā ॥ 402 ॥ (1950)]

Trans—402 He was addressed by his name and lineage by the *Tīrthanīkara* who was entirely free from birth old age and death who was omniscient and who had (attained) complete *darśana* (Undifferentiated knowledge.) (1950)

The *Tīrthanīkara* then said—

किं मन्ने परलोको अस्ति नस्ति त्ति ससओ तुज्झ ।
वेयपयाण य अत्थ न याणासि तेसिमो अत्थो ॥ ४०३ ॥ (१९५१)

Kim manne paralōo atthi natthi tti saṁsao tujjaḥ ।

Veyapayāna ya attham na yānasi tesimo attho ॥ 403 ॥ (1951)

[किं मन्यसे परलोकोऽस्ति नास्तीति संशयस्तव ।

वेदपदानां चार्थं न जानासि तेषामयमर्थः ॥ ४०३ ॥ (१९५१)

Kim manyase paraloko'sti na'stīti saṁśaya'stava ।

Veda-padanam cārtham na janasi tepamayamarthaḥ ॥ 403 ॥ (1951)]

Trans—403 What are you thinking about? You entertain the doubt as to whether the next world exists or not. But (a) you have not understood the (real) meaning of the sentences of *Vedas*. Here is their (real) interpretation (1951)

टीका—आयुष्मन् मेतार्य ! त्वमेवं मन्यसे—किं भवान्तर गमनलक्षणः परलोकोऽस्ति, नास्ति वा ? इति । अयं च संशयस्तव विरुद्धवेदपदभ्रुति-निबन्धनो वर्तते । तानि च “ विज्ञानघन एवैतेभ्यो भूतेभ्यः ” इत्यादीनि प्रथमगणधरोक्तानि द्रष्टव्यानि । “ तेषां चार्थं न जानासि ” इत्यादि तथैवेति ॥ ४०३ ॥ (१९५१)

D U—O long-lived *Metarya*! your doubt about the existence of *para-loka* has arisen from your hearing various *Veda-padas* bearing contradictory senses.

These *Veda-padas* are “*Vyākāṅghana evaitebhyo bhūtebhyo*”

etc. which have already been discussed in the First *Ganadhara-vāda* ॥ 403 ॥ (1951)

The author now states the arguments advanced by the student as follows—

मन्नसि जइ चेयणं मज्जंगमउ व भूयधम्मो त्ति ।
तो नत्थि परलोगो तन्नासे जेण तन्नासो ॥ ४०४ ॥ (१९५२)

Mannasi jai ceyannam majjangamau vva bhūyadhammo tti ।
To natthi paralogo tannāse jena tannāso ॥ 404 ॥ (1952)

[मन्यसे यदि चैतन्यं मद्याङ्गमद इव भूतधर्म इति ।
ततो नास्ति परलोकस्तन्नाशे येन तन्नाशः ॥ ४०४ ॥ (१९५२)

Manyase yadi caitanyam madyāṅgamada iva bhūtadharma iti ।
Tato nāsti paralokastannāśe yena tannāśah ॥ 404 ॥ (1952)]

Trans—404 If you believe consciousness to be the property of *bhūtas*, just as intoxication is that of the constituents of wine, the destruction of consciousness being consequent at the destruction of the *bhūtas*, the other world will not exist (1952)

टीका—सौम्य ! त्वमेवं मन्यसे—यदि तावच्चैतन्यं पृथिव्यादिभूतधर्मः—
भूतेभ्योऽनर्थान्तरभूतमित्यर्थः, यथा गुड-घातक्यादिमद्याङ्गेभ्योऽनर्थान्तरं
मदधर्मः, तर्हि नास्त्यवान्तरगमनलक्षणः परलोकः, येन तन्नाशे भूतनाशे
तस्यापि चैतन्यस्य नाशो ध्वंसो जायते । यो हि यदनर्थान्तरभूतो धर्मः स
तद्विनाशे नश्यत्येव, यथा पटादिधर्मः शुक्लत्वादिः । ततो भूतैरेव सह प्रागेव
नष्टस्य चैतन्यस्य कुतो भवान्तरगमनम् ? इति ॥ ४०४ ॥ (१९५२)

D C—When you take *caitanya* as the property of a *bhūta* like *prithvī*, it will not be separate from *bhūtas*, just as the constituents of wine such as jaggery and *dhātaka puspa* etc are not different from their property of intoxication. Consequently, when *bhūtas* meet destruction, their property *viz caitanya* will also meet destruction, just as whiteness of cloth

Abhasitaśca Jinena jati-jara-narapavipramuktaśca ।

Nama ca gotraṇa ca sarvajñena sarvadarśina ॥ 402 ॥ (1950)

Trans—402 He was addressed by his name and lineage by the *Tirthankara* who was entirely free from birth old age and death who was omniscient, and who had (attained) complete *darśana* (Undifferentiated knowledge.) (1950)

The *Tirthankara* then said—

किं मत्ते परलोको अत्थि नत्थि त्ति ससमो तुज्झ ।

वेयपयाण य अत्थ न याणसि तेसिमो अत्थो ॥ ४०३ ॥ (१९५१)

Kim manne paraloko atthi natthi tti samsao tujjha ।

Veyapayāṇa ya attham na yāṇasi tesimo attho ॥ 403 ॥ (1951)

[किं मन्यसे परलोकोऽस्ति नास्तीति संशयस्तव ।

वेदपदानां चार्थं न जानासि तेषामयमर्थः ॥ ४०३ ॥ (१९५१)]

Kim manyase paraloko sti nastiti samśayaśtava ।

Veda-padaṇām cartham na janāsi teṣāmayamarthaḥ ॥ 403 ॥ (1951)]

Trans—403 What are you thinking about? You entertain the doubt as to whether the next world exists or not. But (a) you have not understood the (real) meaning of the sentences of *Vedas*. Here is their (real) interpretation. (1951)

टीका—आयुष्मन् मेतार्य ! त्वमेव मन्यसे—किं मयान्तर गमनलघुजः परलोकोऽस्ति, नास्ति वा ? इति । अयं च संशयस्तव विद्वद्भेदपदभ्रुति निबन्धनो वर्तते । तानि च “ विज्ञानघन एवैतेभ्यो भूतेभ्यः ” इत्यादीनि प्रथमगणधरोक्तानि द्रष्टव्यानि । “ तेषां चार्थं न जानासि ” इत्यादि तथैवेति ॥ ४०३ ॥ (१९५१)

D O—O long-lived *Mekūrya*! your doubt about the existence of *para-loka* has arisen from your hearing various *Veda-padas* bearing contradictory senses.

These *Veda-padas* are “*Vijñānaghana evaitebhyo bhūtebhyo*”

etc. which have already been discussed in the First *Ganadhara-vāda* ॥ 403 ॥ (1951)

The author now states the arguments advanced by the student as follows—

मन्नसि जइ चेयणं मज्जंगमउ व भूयधम्मो त्ति ।
तो नत्थि परलोगो तन्नासे जेण तन्नासो ॥ ४०४ ॥ (१९५२)

Mannasi jai ceyannam majjangamau vva bhūyadhammo tti ।
To natthi paralogo tannāse jena tannāso ॥ 404 ॥ (1952)

[मन्यसे यदि चैतन्यं मद्याङ्गमद इव भूतधर्म इति ।
ततो नास्ति परलोकस्तन्नाशे येन तन्नाशः ॥ ४०४ ॥ (१९५२)

Manyase yadī caitanyam madyaṅgamada iva bhūtadharma iti ।
Tato nāsti paralokastannāśe yena tannāśah ॥ 404 ॥ (1952)]

Trans—404 If you believe consciousness to be the property of *bhūtas*, just as intoxication is that of the constituents of wine, the destruction of consciousness being consequent at the destruction of the *bhūtas*, the other world will not exist (1952)

टीका—सौम्य ! त्वमेवं मन्यसे—यदि तावच्चैतन्यं पृथिव्यादिभूतधर्मः—
भूतेभ्योऽनर्थान्तरभूतमित्यर्थः, यथा गुड-घातक्यादिमद्याङ्गेभ्योऽनर्थान्तरं
मदधर्मः, तर्हि नास्त्यवान्तरगमनलक्षणः परलोकः, येन तन्नाशे भूतनाशे
तस्यापि चैतन्यस्य नाशो ध्वंसो जायते । यो हि यदनर्थान्तरभूतो धर्मः स
तद्विनाशे नश्यत्येव, यथा पटादिधर्मः शुक्लत्वादिः । ततो भूतैरेव सह प्रागेव
नष्टस्य चैतन्यस्य कुतो भवान्तरगमनम् ? इति ॥ ४०४ ॥ (१९५२)

D C—When you take *caitanya* as the property of a *bhūta* like *mithū*, it will not be separate from *bhūtas*, just as the constituents of wine such as jaggery and *dhātaka pūspa* etc are not different from their property of intoxication. Consequently, when *bhūtas* meet destruction, their property *viz* *caitanya* will also meet destruction, just as whiteness of cloth

disappears with the cloth. So when *caitanya* vanishes with the *bhūtas* how is it to go to the other world ? ॥404॥ (1952)

Even by taking *caitanya* as different from *bhūtas* the existence of *para-loka* will not be established—

अहं वि तदस्थतरया न य निवृत्तणमओ वि तदवत्थ ।
अनलस्स वाऽरणीओ भिन्नस्स विणासधम्मस्स ॥४०५॥ (१९५३)

Aha vi tadatthantarayā na ya nivṛttanamao vi tadavattham ।
Analassa vāraṇīo bhinnassa viṇāśadhammassa ॥ 405 ॥ (1953)

[अथापि तदर्थान्तरता न च नित्यत्वमतोऽपि तदवस्थम् ।
अनलस्वेवाऽरणीतो भिन्नस्य विनाशधर्मजः ॥ ४०५ ॥ (१९५३)

Athapi tadarthāntarata na ca nityatvamato pi tadavastham ।
Analasyeva raṇīto bhinnasya vināśadharmaṇah ॥ 405 ॥ (1953)]

Trans—405 And even if it is different, its perpetuality is not (established) Hence, like fire which is transitory and which is different from *araṇī*, it is transitory (1953)

टीका—अथापि तदर्थान्तरता भूतेभ्योऽर्थान्तरता चैतन्यस्याभ्युपगम्यते, नन्वतोऽपि तदवस्थं भवान्तरगामिस्त्वामाबलक्षणं रूपजम् ; च शब्दोपस्मादर्थे, यथाऽर्थान्तरभूतस्यापि चैतन्यस्य न नित्यत्वम् । कथंभूतस्योत्पत्तिमत्त्वेन विनाशधर्मकस्य । कस्य यथाऽनित्यत्वम् ? इत्याह—अनलस्य । कथंभूतस्य ? भिन्नस्य । कस्य ? । अरणीतोऽरणोः । इदमुक्तं भवति—भूतेभ्योऽर्थान्तरत्वेऽप्यनित्यं चैतन्यम्, उत्पत्तिधर्मकत्वात्, अरभिकाटोत्पन्नतन्निष्ठानलवदिति, यथानित्यं तत् किमपि कालं स्थित्वाऽनलवदत्रापि भवति, इति न तस्य भवान्तरयापित्वम्, अत इत्थमपि न परलोकसिद्धिरिति ।

अथ प्रतिषिद्धं भिन्नानि भूतधर्मरूपाणि बहूनि चैतन्यानि नेप्सन्ते, किन्त्वेक एव समस्तचैतन्याश्रयः सर्वत्रिगुणनगतो निष्क्रियधारमाऽभ्युपगम्यते; यत उक्तम्—

“ एक एव हि भूतात्मा भूते भूते व्यवस्थितः ।
एकधा बहुधा चैव दृश्यते जलचन्द्रवत् ॥ १ ॥ ”

॥ ४०५ ॥ (१९५३)

D. C—Even if *cartanya* were taken to be different from *bhūtas*, it would not be able to go to the other world For, like fire which is different from *aram*, *cartanya* is *a-mitya*, as it dies away after living for sometime.

The existence of *para-loka* is not established from this point of view also

Some might not admit the existence of plenty of *cartanyas* related to each and every *bhūta*, and might admit the existence of one all-pervading *niskriya* soul as said below—

Eka eva hi bhūtātma bhūte bhūte vyavasthitah ।

Ekadhā bahudhā caiva dṛśyate jalacandravat ॥

[There exists only one soul pervading each and every *bhūta* Like moon (reflected in) water, it appears as one, and at the same time in many forms] ॥ 405 ॥ (1953)

But even in such a case, there is no scope for *para-loka*,

अह एगो सवगओ निक्किरिओ तहवि नत्थि परलोओ ।

संसरणाभावाओ वोमस्स व सवपिण्डेसु ॥ ४०६ ॥ (१९५४)

Aha ego savvagao nikkirio tahavi natthi paraloo ।

Samsaranābhāvāo vomassa va savvapindesu ॥ 406 ॥ (1954)

[अथैकः सर्वगतो निष्क्रियस्तथापि नास्ति परलोकः ।

संसरणाभावाद् व्योम्न इव सर्वपिण्डेषु ॥ ४०६ ॥ (१९५४)

Athaikah sarvagato niskriyastathāpi nāsti paralokah ।

Samsaranābhavād vyomna iva sarvapindesu ॥ 406 ॥ (1954)]

Trans—406 If there exists one, all-pervading, inactive (soul), then also, there would be nothing like *para-loka* because

of the lack of movement (on its part) to all beings (in spite of its being all-pervading) like *ākāśa*. (1954)

टीका-अथैकः सर्वगतो निष्क्रियश्चात्माऽम्बुपगम्पते, ननु तथापि न परलोकगमनसिद्धिः, सत्पात्मनः सर्वेषु गो-मनुष्यादिपिण्डेषु सर्वगतत्वेन निष्क्रियत्वेन च संसरणामावात्, व्योमवदिति ॥ ४०६ ॥ (१९५४)

D C—Even when the existence of one all-pervading inactive soul is accepted the existence of *para-loka* will not be established. For like *ākāśa* it is *niṣkriya* in spite of its being spread over all living beings ॥ 406 ॥ (1954)

The existence of *para-loka* can be doubted in this manner also—

इहलोगाओ व परो सुराइलोगो न सो वि पच्चक्खो ।

एव पि न परलोगो सुवइ य सुईसु तो सका ॥४०७॥ (१९५५)

ihalogāo va paro surāilogo na so vi paccakkho ।

Evam pi na paralogo suvvai ya sulisu to sankā ॥ 407 ॥ (1955)

[इहलोकाद् वा परः सुरादिलोको न सोऽपि प्रत्यक्षः ।

एवमपि न परलोकः भ्रूयते च भ्रुविषु ततः शङ्का ॥४०७॥ (१९५५)

ihak kad । irah suradiloko na so pi pratyakṣah ।

Evamapi na paralokah brūyato ca brutisu tataḥ śankā ॥ 407 ॥ (1955)

Trans.—407 Or it there is a world like that of gods etc. other than this world that is also not directly perceived. So *para-loka* does not exist even in that way. On the other hand it has been heard (about *para-loka*) in the *Sāstras*. Consequently the doubt (about *para-loka*) has arisen. (1955)

टीका-अथवा, इहलोकापेक्षया सुर-नारकादिमवा परलोक उच्यते, स च न प्रत्यक्षो दृश्यते, अत एवमपि न परलोकः सिध्यति, भ्रूयते वासौ भ्रुविषु शङ्केषु, ततस्तच्छङ्का-किमस्ति नास्ति वा ? । इति दर्शितः पूर्वपक्षः ॥ ४०७ ॥ (१९५५)

D. C.—If the existence of some world like that of divine beings or hellish beings, is accepted since they, too, are not *pratyakṣa*, their existence is also not acceptable

On the other hand, the *S'āstras* refer to them and tell a lot of things about them. Your doubt about the existence of *para-loka* is based upon such mutually contradictory facts
॥ 407 ॥ (1955)

Here ends the *pūrva-pakṣa* The author now refutes the arguments of *pūrva-pakṣa* one after another—

भूइंदियाइरित्तस्स चेयणा सो य दव्वओ निच्चो ।
जाइस्सरणाईहिं पडिवज्जसु वाउभूइ व ॥ ४०८ ॥ (१९५६)

Bhūndiyārittassa ceyanā so ya davvao nicco ।
Jāissaranāiḥim padivajjasu Vāubhūi vva ॥ 408 ॥ (1956)

[भूतेन्द्रियातिरिक्तस्य चेतना स च द्रव्यतो नित्यः ।
जातिस्मरणादिभिः प्रतिपद्यस्व वायुभूतिरिव ॥ ४०८ ॥ (१९५६)

Bhūtendriyātiriktasya cetanā sa ca dravyato nityah ।
Jātismaranādibhiḥ pratipadyasva Vāyubhūtiriva ॥ 408 ॥ (1956)]

Trans—408 Consciousness belongs to (the soul) which is distinguished from elements, as well as, sense-organs Like *Vāyubhūti*, know it for certain, therefore, that it is more perpetual than *dravya* by virtue of its (power of) remembering the former birth etc (1956)

टीका—इह भूतेन्द्रियातिरिक्तस्य पूर्वाभिहितानुमानादिप्रमाणसिद्धस्यात्मन एव संबन्धिनी चेतना मन्तव्या, न भूतधर्मः । स चात्मा जातिस्मरणादिहेतुर्द्रव्यतो नित्य इति वायुभूतिरिव प्रतिपद्यस्व । अतो नैकान्तानित्यत्वपक्षोक्तौ दोषः, पर्यायत एवाऽस्यानित्यत्वादिति भावः ॥४०८॥ (१९५६)

D. C.—*Cetanā* is not the property of *bhūtas*, but it is the property of Soul, which is different from *bhūtas*, as well as,

indriyas and the existence of which has already been established by means of *anumānas* and other evidences. This soul has already been accepted by *Vāyubhūti*† as more *nitya* than *dravya* on account of its power of remembering its (previous) existence etc. You too shall have to accept its *nityatva* so that the fault of exclusive *nityatva* alleged by you does not arise n 408 ■ (1956)

And,

न य एगो सव्वगओ निक्किरिओ लक्खणाइमेआओ ।

कुम्भादउ व बहवो पडिवज्ज तमिंदमूइ व ॥ ४०९ ॥ (१९५७)

Na ya ego savvagao nikkirio lakkhanāibheāo ।

Kumbhādaū vva bahavo padivaḷḷa tamindabhūi vva ■ 409 ■ (1957)

[न चैकः सर्वगतो निष्क्रियो लक्षणदिभेदात् ।

कुम्भादय इव बहव प्रतिपद्यस्व तदिन्द्रभूतिरिव ॥ ४०९ ॥ (१९५७)

Na caikah sarvagato niskriyo lakṣaṇadibhedat ।

■ 409 ■ Kumbhādaya iva bahavaḥ pratipadyasva tadindrabhūtiriva ■ 409 ■

/ s—409 It is neither one, nor all-pervading nor in the *Indrabhūti*, believe it as many (in number) like *ghat* : reason of various characteristics. (1957)

टीका—न चास्माभिरक आत्मेप्पते, किन्तु बहवः—अनन्ता । कुतः ? । लक्षणमदात् । उपयोगलक्षणा हि जीवः, स चोपयोगोऽराग—इष—कपाय—विषयाभ्यवभाषायादिभिर्मिथमान उपाधिमदादानन्त्यं प्रतिपद्यत इत्यनन्ता जीवाः, लक्षणमदात्, घटादिबदिति । तथा, न सर्वगत आत्मा, किन्तु शरीर मात्रभ्यापका, तत्रैव सद्गुणोपलब्धेरित्यादिशब्दोपात्ता हतुः, स्पर्शनबदिति दृष्टान्तम् । एव न निष्क्रिय आत्मा, मोक्षत्वात्, दवदचबदिति । उदेतदिन्द्र भूतिप्रथमगणभरवत् प्रतिपद्यस्वेति ॥ ४०९ ॥ (१९५७)

D C—According to us Soul is not one but infinite in

number, by virtue of its different characteristics. Like *ghata*, *pata* etc, the Soul has various forms on account of various *lakṣanas* such as *rāga*, *dveṣa*, *kaṣāya* etc Secondly, Soul is not all-pervading, but it pervades the body alone Thirdly, because it is the enjoyer like *Devadatta*, it is not *niskriya*. Thus, like *Indrabhūti*,† you, too, shall have to admit «409» (1957)

In reply to the argument that the existence of *para-loka* is denied because of the divine and hellish beings being *a-pratyakṣa*, the author states—

इहलोगाओ य परो सोम्म ! सुरा नारगा य परलोओ ।
पडिवज्ज मोरिआ-ऽकंपिउ व विहियप्पमाणाओ ॥४१०॥ (१९५८)

Ihalogāo ya paro Somma ! surā nāragā ya paralōo ।
Padivajja Moriā-kampiū vva vihiyappamānāo ॥ 410 ॥ (1958)

[इहलोकाच्च परः सौम्य ! सुरा नारकाश्च परलोकः ।
प्रतिपद्यस्व मौर्या-ऽकम्पिताविव विहितप्रमाणात् ॥४१०॥ (१९५८)

Ihalokācca parah Saumya ! surā narakāśca paralokah ।
Pratipadyasva Maurya'kampitāviva vihitapramānāt ॥410॥(1958)†

Trans—410 Believe the world other than this, *O Saumya* ! to be that of gods and *Nārakas* on account of evidences that have been advanced (in case) of *Maurya* and *Akampita* * (1958)

The opponent will argue at this point that—

जीवो विण्णाणमओ तं चाणिच्चं ति तो न परलोगो ।
अह विण्णाणादण्णो तो अणभिण्णो जहागासं ॥४११॥(१९५९)
इत्तो च्चिय न स कत्ता भोत्ता य अओ वि नत्थि परलोगो ।
जं च न संसारी सो अण्णाणा-ऽमुत्तिओ खं व ॥४१२॥(१९६०)

† Vide Chapter I

* Vide chapters VII and VIII

Jīvo vinnānamāo tam cāniccam ti to na paralogo ।

Aha vinnānādammo to anabhinno jahāgāsam ॥ 411 ॥ (1959)

Itto celya na sa kattā bhottā ya ao vi natthi paralogo ।

Jam ca na samsārī so annānā-muttiko kham va ॥ 412 ॥ (1960)

[जीवो विज्ञानमयस्तच्चानित्यमिति ततो न परलोकः ।

अथ विज्ञानादन्यस्ततोऽनमिद्धो पथाऽऽकाशम् ॥ ४११ ॥ (१९५९)

इत एव न स कर्ता मोक्षा चातोऽपि नास्ति परलोकः ।

यच्च न संसारी सोऽज्ञाना-ऽमूर्तित्वमिव ॥ ४१२ ॥ (१९६०)

Jīvo vijñānamayastacchānityamiti tato na paralokah ।

Atha vijñānadanyastato nabhijho yatha-kāsam ॥ 411 ॥ (1959)]

Ita eva na sa kartā bhoktā cato pi nāsti paralokah ।

Yacca na samsārī so jñānā-murtitah khamiva ॥ 412 ॥ (1960)]

Trans—411-412 Jīva is (said to be) vijñānamaya and vijñāna is a-nūtya. So, there cannot be paraloka. If it is (said to be) different from vijñāna then also, jīva being ignorant like sky it will neither be a doer nor an enjoyer and then also there will be no paraloka. (For) that which is ignorant and incorporeal like ākāśa, cannot belong to the mundane world (1959-1960)

टीका-व्याख्या-जीवो विज्ञानमयस्तावद् युष्मामिरिष्यते विज्ञानाद
मिथ इत्यर्थः । तच्च विज्ञानमनित्यं विनश्वरम्, अतस्तद् मिथस्य जीवस्यापि
विनश्वरत्वाद् न भवान्तरगमनलक्षणः परलोकः । अथ विज्ञानादन्यो जीवस्त
तोऽनित्ये विज्ञाने जीवाद् मिथे सति स्वयं नित्योऽसाविति न परलोकामात्रः ।
यथेवम्, तर्हि अनमिद्धो जीवः, विज्ञानादन्यत्वात्, आकाशवत्, काष्ठादिष्व
वा । अत एव च नित्यत्वादेवासौ जीवो न कर्ता, नापि मोक्षा । नित्यस्य
कर्तृत्वाद्यभ्युपगमे हि सर्वदेव उद्भाषप्रसङ्गः, तस्य सदेवैकरूपत्वाद् । कर्तृत्वा
मात्रे च न परलोकः, अकृतस्य तस्याभ्युपगमे सिद्धानामपि तत्प्रसङ्गात् ।
मोक्षत्वाभावेऽपि न परलोकः, अमोक्षतुः परलोकेऽतुभूतकर्ममोगायोगात् ।
इतोऽपि च न परलोकः । कुतः ? इत्याह—“ अं येत्यादि ” यस्माच्च नासौ

सारी, नास्य ज्ञानाद् भिन्नस्य जीवस्य भवाद् भवान्तरगमनलक्षणं संसरण-
स्तीत्यर्थः । कुतः ? इत्याह—स्वयमज्ञानत्वात्, काष्ठखण्डवत् । तथा,
अमूर्तत्वात्, आकाशवदिति ॥ ४११-४१२ ॥ (१९५९-१९६०)

D. C — *Metārya* — You believe *jīva* to be *vyñānamaya*.
Now, since *vyñāna* is *a-nitya*, *jīva* will also be *a-nitya*.
Consequently, there will be no possibility of going to the other
world and there will be no *para-loka* also. On the other
hand, if you take *jīva* to be different from *vyñāna*, *jīva* will
not be *a-nitya*, but being different from *vyñāna*, it will be
ignorant, or dull like sky or wood. Consequently, the soul
will neither be *karitū* (doer) nor *bhoktā* (enjoyer) In absence
of *karitritva*, existence of *para-loka* will be denied. For, if
para-loka is taken as existing even in absence of *karitritva*,
the *Siddha* beings that have already attained absolute Libera-
tion will attain *para-loka*. In absence of *bhoktiritva* also, there
will be no *para-loka*, because the soul which is *nitya* but not
bhoktā, will not be able to attain *para-loka* in absence of
Karma, which acts as the cause of passing to the other world.
This *jīva*, therefore, being distinguished from *jīvana* does not
belong to the mundane world, as it has no passage to the
other world on account of its ignorance like that of wood, and
a-mūrtatva like that of *ākāśa* ॥ 411-412 ॥ (1959-1960)

The reply is—

मन्नसि विणासि चेओ उप्पत्तिमदादिओ जहा कुंभो ।
नणु एयं चिय साहणमविणासित्ते वि से सोम्म ! ॥४१३॥ (१९६१)

Mannasī vināsī ceo uppattimadādīo jahā kumbho ।

Nanu eyam ciya sāhanavināsītte vi se Somma ! ॥ 413 ॥ (1961)

[मन्यसे विनाशि चेत उत्पत्तिमदादितो यथा कुम्भः ।

नन्वेतदेव साधनमविनाशित्वेऽपि तस्य सौम्य ! ॥ ४१३ ॥ (१९६१)

Manyase vināsī ceta utpattimadādito yathā kumbhah ।

Nanvetadeva sadhanamavināśītte'pi tasya Saumya ! ॥413॥(1961)]

Trans—413 You take consciousness to be destructible like *ghata* on account of its (having) production etc. (Because) In (case of) its indestructibility also the same is the cause, O *Saumya* ! (1961)

टीका—ननु “ जीवो विष्णुश्चमयो त चाणिषं ” इति श्रुत्याऽनू-
त्त्वमेव मन्यसे—विनाशि विनश्यं चेतमेवना चैतन्य विज्ञानमिति यावत् ।
उत्पत्तिमत्त्वाविति हेतुः । यथा कुम्भ इति वृष्टान्तः । आदिशब्दात् “ पर्याय
त्वात् ” इत्यादिकोऽपि हेतुर्लक्ष्यः । यो हि पर्यायः स सर्वोऽप्यनित्यः, यथा
स्तम्भादीनां नव-पुराणादिपर्यायः । तद्व्याप्त्या चैतन्यादमिषत्वे जीवस्या
प्यनित्यत्वात् परलोकामाव इति त्वामिप्रायः । न चायं युक्तः, यतो हन्त !
नैकान्तेन विज्ञानमनित्यम्, यतोऽविनाशित्वेऽपि “ से ” तस्य विज्ञानस्यै-
तदेव सौम्य ! त्वदुक्तं साधनं प्रमाणं वर्तते । ततोऽनैकान्तिकस्त्वदुक्तो
हेतुरिति भावः । इदमुक्तं भवति—उत्पाद-व्यय-धौव्यात्मकं वस्तु । ततश्च
यद्योत्पत्तिमत्त्वाद् विनाशित्वं सिध्यति तथा धौव्यात्मकत्वाद् अस्तुनः
कश्चित् नित्यत्वमपि सिध्यति । ततश्चेदमपि शक्यते वस्तुम्—नित्यं विज्ञा-
नम्, उत्पत्तिमत्त्वात्, भवत् । ततश्च कश्चित्चित्त्वाद् विज्ञानादमिषस्य
जीवस्य नित्यत्वाद् न परलोकामाव इति ॥ ४१३ ॥ (१९६१)

/ —Since *caitanya* is susceptible to production and exists in various forms due to various specific characteristics you have a right to take it to be *a-nitya*. That which exists in various forms due to various *pariyāyas* is *a-nitya* like *pariyāyas* as in the case of old and new *pariyāyas* of pillar etc. Thus the Soul which is *abhinna* from the *a-nitya caitanya* is taken as *a-nitya* by you who have denied the existence of *para-lāla*. But that is not correct. *Caitanya-vyākāna* is not exclusively *a-nitya* but any how it is *nitya* to a certain extent also.

Every object is susceptible to three conditions—production, destruction and perpetuality. So just as *a-nityatā* is established by you on account of *utpatti*, *nityatā* could also be established by means of the condition of perpetuality. It could easily be stated therefore that *vyākāna* is *nitya* like *ghata* and on

account of the *nityatva* of *jīva*, there is no *a-bhāva* of *para-loka*
 || 413 || (1961)

Or,

अहवा वत्थुत्तणओ विणासि चेओ न होइ कुंभो व ।
 उत्पत्तिमदादित्ते कहमविणासी घटो, बुद्धी ? || ४१४ || (१९६२)

Ahavā vatthuttanao vināsi ceo na hōi kumbho vva ।
 Uppattimadādित्ते khamavināsi ghato, buddhī ? || 414 || (1962)

[अथवा वस्तुत्वतो विनाशि चेतो न भवति कुम्भ इव ।
 उत्पत्तिमदादित्वे कथमविनाशी घटो, बुद्धिः ? || ४१४ || (१९६२)

Athavā vastutvato vināśi ceto na bhavati kumbha iva ।
 Utpattimadādित्वे kathamavināśi ghato, buddhiḥ ? || 414 || (1962)]

Trans—414 Or, consciousness does not become destructible like *ghata* on account of its being a (definite) object (The question may be that) “ How could *ghata* be indestructible when it is susceptible to production etc ? ” (1962)

टीका—एकान्तेन विनाशि विनश्वरं चेतो विज्ञानं न भवति, वस्तुत्वात्, कुम्भवत् । ततोऽस्य प्रत्युत्पत्तिरनुमानस्योपस्थापनाद् विरुद्धाव्यभिचार्यप्युत्पत्तिमच्चलक्षणो हेतुः । यदुक्तम्—“ ननु एयं चिय साहणमविणासित्ते वि ” इत्यादि, तत्र परस्येवं बुद्धिः स्यात् । कथंभूता बुद्धिः ? इत्याह—कथमुत्पत्तिमत्त्वाद् दृष्टान्तत्वेनापन्यस्तो घटोऽविनाशी सिध्यति ?—न कथञ्चित्, घटस्य विनाशित्वेन सुप्रतीतत्वात् । ततश्च दृष्टान्तेऽविनाशित्वस्यासिद्धेर्दार्ष्टान्तिके विज्ञाने तद् न सिध्यतीति परस्याभिप्राय इति || ४१४ || (१९६२)

D C—Consciousness is never destructible exclusively on account of its being a definite *vastu* like *ghata*

Metārya—When *ghata* is susceptible to production etc, how should it be considered indestructible ? It is recognized as destructible by all . Thus when indestructibility of *ghata* is

not proved in the illustration stated above indestructibility (in case) of *vijnana* also will not be proved. # 414 # (1962)

Bhagavān replies—

रूप-रस-गन्ध-फासा सत्त्वा सटाण-दध-सत्तीओ ।

कुम्भो ति जओ ताओ पसूइ विच्छित्ति धुवधम्मा ॥४१५॥ (१९६३)

Rūpa-rasa-gandha-phāsa samkhā santhāna-davva-sattlo ।

Kumbho ti jao tao pasūi-vicchitti-dhuvadhammā # 415 # (1963)

[रूप-रस-गन्ध-स्पर्शाः संख्या संस्थान-द्रव्य-शक्तयः ।

कुम्भ इति यतस्ताः प्रवृत्ति-व्यवच्छित्ति-ध्रुवधर्माणः ॥४१५॥ (१९६३)

Rūpa-rasa-gandha-sparśah samkha samsthana-dravya-śaktayah ।

Kumbha iti yatastah pravṛtti-vyavacchitta-dhruvadharmāḥ # 415 #

Trans—415 Form, taste, odour touch number configuration matter and energy form *kumbha*. For all of them possess the characteristics of production destructibility and perpetuality (1963)

टीका-इह रूप-रस-गन्ध-स्पर्शलक्षणो गुणसमुदायः, एकलक्षणा मस्या पृथुभोदरापाकारलक्षण संस्थानम्, सुद्रव्यम्, जलाहराणादि शक्तिभयतान समुदितानि यतः कुम्भ इत्युच्यते, ताव रूप-रस-गन्ध-स्पर्श-संख्या-संस्थान-द्रव्य-शक्तयः प्रवृत्ति-विच्छित्ति-ध्रौव्यधर्मिण्य उत्पा दव्यय-ध्रौव्यस्वरूपाः, तत उत्पत्तिमत्त्वादविनाश्यपि षटः सिध्यति ॥४१५॥ (१९६३)

D O—A group of properties such as form taste odour and touch, the number one etc. configuration like that of broad portion from the middle etc; matter (in the form) of earth and capacity for holding water all these properties combine together and form *ghata*. Each one of these properties is again perceptible to production destructibility and perpetuality *Ghata* is therefore *nitya* in spite of its being *utpattimāt*. # 415 # (1963)

Explaining the same in details the author proceeds—

इह पिण्डो पिण्डागार—सत्तिपज्जायविलयसमकालं ।
उप्पज्जइ कुंभागार—सत्तिपज्जायरूवेण ॥ ४१६ ॥ (१९६४)
रूपाइं दवयाए न जाइ न य वेइ तेण सो निच्चो ।
एवं उप्पाय—वय—धुवस्सहावं मयं सवं ॥ ४१७ ॥ (१९६५)

Iha pindo pindāgāra-sattipajjāyavilayasamakālam ।
Uppajjai kumbhāgāra-sattipajjāyarūvena ॥ 416 ॥ (1964)
Rūvāim davvayāe na jāi na ya vei tena so nicco ।
Evam uppāya-vvaya-dhuvassahāvam mayam savvam ॥417॥ (1965)

[इह पिण्डः पिण्डाकार—शक्तिपर्यायविलयसमकालम् ।
उत्पद्यते कुम्भाकार—शक्तिपर्यायरूपेण ॥ ४१६ ॥ (१९६४)
रूपादिद्रव्यतया न जायते न च व्येति तेन स नित्यः ।
एवमुत्पाद—व्यय—ध्रौव्यस्वभावं मतं सर्वम् ॥ ४१७ ॥ (१९६५)

Iha pindah pindākāra-śaktiparyāyavilayasamakālam ।
Utpadyate kumbhākāra-śakti paryāya rūpena ॥ 416 ॥ (1964)]
Rūpādi dravyatayā na jāyate na ca vyeti tena sa nityah ।
Evamutpāda-vyaya-dhrauvyasvabhāvam matam sarvam ॥417॥(1965)]

Trans—416-417 The lump (of earth) in this case, is produced in the specific characteristics of the shape and capacity of *kambha* at the same time when it is destroyed in the specific characteristics of its (own) shape and capacity It is produced and destroyed neither by (virtue of) its form etc nor by (virtue of) its matter It is, therefore, (called) *nitya* Everything is thus believed to possess the conditions of (being susceptible to) production, destructibility and perpetuality (1964-1965)

टीका—इह मृत्पिण्डः कर्ता । योऽयं वृत्तसंस्थानरूपः स्वकीयो मृत्पि-

घटाकार', अकिञ्च या कानिदात्मीया, एतदुभयलक्षणो य पर्यायस्तस्व यो विलयो विनाशस्तस्मिन्कालमेवासाधुत्पद्यते मृत्पिण्डः । केन ? इत्याह-
 पृथुपुष्पोदरादिको यः कुम्भाकारः, तच्छक्तिश्च या जलाहरणादिष्वपि,
 एतदुभयलक्षणो यः पर्यायस्तेनोत्पद्यते । रूप-रस-गन्ध-स्पर्शरूपतया
 मृदद्रव्यरूपतया चासौ मृत्पिण्डो न जायते, नापि व्येति विनश्यति । तत्
 स्तद्रूपतया नित्योऽयमुच्यते, तेन रूपेण तस्य सदैवावस्थितत्वात् । तदेव
 मृत्पिण्डो निजाकारस्वच्छकिरूपतया विनश्यति, घटाकार-तच्छक्तिरूपतयोत्प
 द्यत, रूपादिभावेन मृदद्रव्यरूपतया चावतिष्ठत, इत्युत्पाद-व्यय-घ्नौघ्यस्व
 भावोऽयमुच्यते । एव घटोऽपि पूर्वपर्यायेण विनश्यति, घटाकारतया तत्पद्यते,
 रूपादित्वेन मृदद्रव्यरूपतया चावतिष्ठत इत्यसावप्युत्पाद-व्यय-घ्नौघ्यस्व
 भावमेवामिमत् तीर्थकृतम् । तत्र च यद्योत्पत्तिमत्त्वाद् विनाशित्वं घटे सिध्यति
 तथाऽविनाशित्वमपि । तथा च सति साध्यधर्मिणि चैतन्येऽपि तत्सिद्धिरिति ।
 तदेव चैतन्यादव्यतिरिक्तोऽपि जीवः कथञ्चिद् नित्य एव ॥ ४१६-४१७ ॥
 (१९६४-१९६५)

D C—Properties like the shape and capacity of the lump
 of earth vanish and at the same time *ghata*-having its pecu-
 liarity and its capacity of holding water-is produced. The
 earth is neither produced nor destroyed in the form
 of *gandha-sparsa* or *dravya*. It continues to exist
 in these forms. Thus the lump of earth vanishes
 in the form of its former shape and capacity of *ghata* and exists
 for ever in the form of *rūpa-rasa-gandha-sparsa* and *dravya*.
 Similarly *ghata* also vanishes in the form of its former
pariyāyas and comes into existence with new *pariyāyas* of
ghatākāra and lasts for ever in the form of *pariyāyas* of *rūpa*
 etc. as well as *dravya*. Consequently [it has also the *śābha* of
utpatti-vyaya and *akṛatvya*. Such is not the case with
ghata only but it is the nature of each and every object of
 the Universe. So like destructibility in-destructibility of *ghata*
 is also due to the *akṛatv* like *utpattimattva* etc. Consequently
 in case of *caustanya* and *atmā* also the *utpatti* should be
 admitted. # 416-417 # (1964-1965)

Indicating the existence of *para-loka* thereby, the author states—

घडचेयणया नासो पडचेयणया समुब्भवो समयं ।
संताणेणावत्था तहेह—परलोअ—जीवाणं ॥ ४१८ ॥ (१९६६)
मणुएहलोगनासो सुराइपरलोगसंभवो समयं ।
जीवतयाऽवत्थाणं नेहभवो नेय परलोओ ॥ ४१९ ॥ (१९६७)

Ghadaceyanayā nāso padaceyanayā samubbhavo samayam ।
Santānenāvatthā taheha—paralōa—jīvānam ॥ 418 ॥ (1966)

Manuehaloganāso surāiparaloga sambhavo samayam ।
Jīvatayā'vatthānam nehabhavo neya paraloo ॥ 419 ॥ (1967)

[घटचेतनया नाशः पटचेतनया समुद्भवः समकम् ।
संतानेनावस्था तथेह—परलोक—जीवानाम् ॥ ४१८ ॥ (१९६६)
मनुजेहलोकनाशः सुरादिपरलोकसंभवः समकम् ।
जीवतयाऽवस्थानं नेहभवो नैव परलोकः ॥ ४१९ ॥ (१९६७)

Ghatacetanayā nāśah patacetanayā samadbhavah samakam ।
Santānenāvasthā tatheha—paraloka—jīvānam ॥ 418 ॥ (1966)
Manujehalokanāśah surādi-paralokasambhavah samakam ।
Jīvatayā'vasthānam nehabhavo naiva paralokah ॥ 419 ॥ (1967)]

Trans—418-419 Destruction of the cognizance of *ghata*, production of the cognizance of *pata*, and retention of their continuous range, are (apprehended) all at a time The same is the case with this world, the other world, and the *jīva* Vanishing of this human world and coming into existence of the world like that of divine beings are simultaneous Retention in (the state of) *jīva* is neither this world nor the other world (1966-1967)

टीका—घटविषयं विज्ञानं घटचेतनोच्यते, पटविषयं तु विज्ञानं पटचेतना ।

यदा च षटविज्ञानानन्तरं षटविज्ञानमुपजायते जीवस्य, तदा षटचेतनया षटविज्ञानरूपेण तस्य नाश उच्यते, षटचेतनया तु षटविज्ञानरूपेण "समय" युगपदेव समुद्भूय उत्पादः, अनादिकालप्रवृत्तेन तु चेतनासंततानेन निर्विशेषधेन जीवस्वमात्रेणावस्थानमिति । एव च यदेहमयेऽपि तिष्ठतो जीवस्योत्पाद-व्यय-ध्रौव्यस्वभावप्रथं दर्शितम् ; तथा परलोक गता जीवाः परलोकजीवा-स्तेषामप्येतत् स्वभावप्रथं दृष्टव्यम् ; तथा—यदा मनुष्यो मृत्वा सुरलोकादा पुन्यघटं तदा मनुष्यरूप इहलोको मनुष्येहलोक्तस्तस्य नाशः, तत्समकालमेव च सुरादिपरलोकस्य संभव उत्पादः, जीवतया त्ववस्थानम् । तस्यां च जीवत्वावस्थायां विषयितायां नेहमयो विवक्ष्यते, नापि सुरादिपरलोको विवक्ष्यते, किन्तु निष्पर्यायं जीव-द्रव्यमात्रमेव विवक्ष्यते । तदेवमुत्पाद-व्यय-ध्रौव्यस्वभावस्य जीवस्य न परलोकमाव इति ॥ ४१८-४१९ ॥ (१९६६-१९६७)

D O—Cognition about *ghata* is called *ghata cetana* and that about *pata* is called *pata-cetana*. When *jiva* acquires the cognition of *pata* after that of *ghata* vanishing of *ghata* production in the form of *pata* and retention in the form of *jiva* are simultaneous.

vyaya and *dhrauvya* are therefore the three characteristics of *jiva* as well as of those who have passed to the other world.

When a *jiva* is born in *deva-loka* after death he undergoes the state of destruction as regards this world production as regards *deva-loka* and permanent *avasthana* as regards *jiva*. When a person is said to exist in the state of *jivata* it is neither said to exist in this world nor in the other world like that of gods etc. *Jiva* is called mere *dravya* without any sort of *paradya*. Thus since *jiva* has the tendency of undergoing *utpada vyaya* and *dhrauvya* there is no *abhadra* of the other world ॥ 418-419 ॥ (1966-1967)

In reply to the question whether all objects possess all the three characteristics the author states—

असओ नत्थि पसूई, होज्ज व जइ, होउ खरविसाणस्स ।
 न य सव्वहा विणासो सव्वुच्छेयप्पसंगाओ ॥ ४२० ॥ (१९६८)
 तोज्ज्वत्थियस्स केणवि विलओ धम्मणेण भवणमन्नेण ।
 सव्वुच्छेओ न मओ संववहारोवरोहाओ ॥ ४२१ ॥ (१९६९)

Asao natthi pasūī, hojja va jai, hòu kharavisānassa ।
 Na ya savvahā vināso savvuccheyappasangāo ॥ 420 ॥ (1968)

To'vatthiyassa kenavi vilao dhammena bhavanamannena ।
 Savvuccheo na mao samvavahārovarohāo ॥ 421 ॥ (1969)

[असतो नास्ति प्रसूतिः, भवेद् वा यदि, भवतु खरविषाणस्य ।
 न च सर्वथा विनाशः सर्वोच्छेदप्रसङ्गात् ॥ ४२० ॥ (१९६८)
 ततोऽवस्थितस्य केनापि विलयो धर्मेण भवनमन्येन ।
 सर्वोच्छेदो न मतः संव्यवहारोपरोधात् ॥ ४२१ ॥ (१९६९)

Asato nāsti prasūtiḥ, bhaved va yadi, bhavatu khara-viśānasya ।
 Na ca sarvathā vināśah sarvocchedaprasaṅgāt ॥ 420 ॥ (1968)

Tato'vasthitasya kenāpi vilayo dharmena bhavanamanyena ।
 Sarvocchedo na mataḥ samvyavahāroparodhāt ॥ 421 ॥ (1969)]

Trans—420-421 The non-existent has no production If it has, there would be production of the horn of an ass (also) Nor, is there exclusive destruction (For), it would result in destruction of all Consequently, there would be destruction of all Consequently, there would be destruction of an object existing in a perpetual range by one means and production (of the same) by other means For fear of obstruction to the mutual usage, exclusive destruction (of everything) is not acceptable (1968-1969)

टीका—इहैकान्तेन सर्वथाऽमतो वस्तुनः प्रसूतिरुत्पत्तिर्नास्ति न घटते ।
 अथ भवति, तर्हि खरविषाणस्यापि भवतु, असत्त्वाविशेषात् । तस्मात् केनापि
 रूपेण सदेवोत्पद्यते । न च सतः सर्वथा विनाशः, क्रमशः सर्वस्यापि

नारक-तिर्यगादेरुच्छेदप्रसङ्गात् । ततस्तस्मात् तस्यावस्थितस्य श्रीवादेरस्ति केनापि मनुष्यत्वादिवर्मेण विलयो विनाशः, अन्येन तु मुरादिरूपेण भवन-मुत्पादाः, सर्वोच्छेदस्तु न मतस्तीर्यकताम्, संध्यवहारोपरोधात्-अन्यथा व्यवहारोच्छेदप्रसङ्गादित्यर्थः; तथाहि-राजपुत्र्याःक्रीडादेतुभूतं सौवर्णकलशक मरुत्वा राजतनपस्य क्रीडार्यमेव कन्दुको घटितः; ततो राजपुत्र्याः श्लोकः, कुमारस्य तु हर्षः, सुवर्णस्वामिनश्च नरपतेरौदासीन्यम्, सुवर्णस्योभयावस्था यामप्यविनष्टत्वात्, इत्यादिको योजनौ लोकव्यवहारस्तस्य सर्वस्याप्युत्पाद-व्यय-घ्नौष्यात्मकवस्त्वनभ्युपगमे समुच्छेदः स्यात् । तस्मात् कश्चिदवस्थि तस्ये जीवस्य न परलोकाभाव इति ॥ ४२०-४२१ ॥ (१९६८-१९६९)

D C—An object which is absolutely *a-vidyamāna* can never undergo production. For if the production of an *a-vidyamāna* object is admitted non-existent objects like *khara-viṣṭa* will also come into existence which is utterly impossible. It is only a *vidyamāna* object that undergoes production. Secondly there is no exclusive destruction of a *vidyamāna* object. If there were absolute destruction of every thing even *narakt* and *śryana* beings would be absolutely destroyed. *Jīva* etc. which are always *avasthita* undergo production by means of characteristics such as that of *manuṣyatva* etc. On the other hand, they undergo production by means of characteristics like that of divine beings etc. But exclusive destruction of it is never possible for fear of the violation of usual *vyavahara*. Take an example to understand it more clearly—Having broken a golden jar belonging to a princess a ball was made of gold for a prince. On account of that sorrow on the part of the princess joy on the part of the prince and gold being retained in the same quantity in the form of ball as well as jar indifference on the part of king who is the owner of gold constitute *loka-vyavahara*. If we do not accept *utpada*, *vyaya* and *dhrauvya* in case of all objects violation of this *loka-vyavahara* will undoubtedly take place. In case of *jīva* being *avasthita* there is no *para-lokabhava*.
p 420-421 ■ (1968-1969)

And,

असइ व परम्मि लोए जमग्गिहोत्ताइं सग्गकामस्स ।
तदसंबद्धं सर्वं दाणाइफलं च लोअम्मि ॥ ४२२ ॥ (१९७०)

Asaī va parammi loe jamaggihoṭṭāim saggakāmassa ।
Tadasambaddham savvam dānāphalam ca lōammi ॥422॥ (1970)

[असति वा परस्मिंल्लोके यदग्निहोत्रादि स्वर्गकामस्य ।
तदसंबद्ध सर्वं दानादिफलं च लोके ॥ ४२२ ॥ (१९७०)

Asati vā parasuṃlloke yadagnihoṭṭrādī svargakāmasya ।
Tadasambaddham sarvaṃ dānādīphalam ca lōke ॥ 422 ॥ (1970)]

Trans—422 In case of the other world being absent (the commendment of the performance of) sacrifice etc for a person aspiring for Salvation, would be useless Moreover, the fruition of (goon turns like) munificence etc (wellknown) in this world, would also be null and void (1970)

छिन्नम्मि संशयम्मी जिणेण जर-मरणविप्पमुक्केण ।
सो समणो पवइओ तिहि ओ सह खण्डियसएहिं ॥४२३॥(१९७१)

Chinnammi samsayammī Jinena jara-marānavippamukkenam ।
So samano pavvaio tihi o saha khandiyasaehim ॥ 423 ॥ (1971)

[छिन्ने संशये जिनेन जरा-मरणविप्रमुक्तेन ।

स श्रमणः प्रव्रजितस्त्रिभिस्तु सह खण्डिकशतैः ॥ ४२३ ॥ (१९७१)

Chinne saṃśaye Jinena jarā-marāna vipramukkena ।
Sa śramanaḥ pravrajitaśtribhistu saha khandikaśataih ॥423॥(1971)]

Trans—423 When the doubt was removed by the *Tirthankara*, who was entirely free from old age and death, that saint accepted the *Diksā* along with his three hundred pupils (1971)

End of the Discussion with the Tenth Ganadhara,



Chapter XI



एकादशगणधरसकम्पता

Discussion with the Eleventh Ganadhara

ते पव्वइए सोउ पहासो आगच्छई जिणसयास ।
वव्वामि ण वदामी वदिता पज्जुवासामि ॥ ४२४ ॥ (१९७२)

Te pavvaie sōum Pahāso āgacchaḥ Jinasayāsam ।
Vaccāmi na vandāmi vanditā pajjuvāsāmi ॥ 424 a (1972)

[तान् प्रव्रजितान् श्रुत्वा प्रमाम आगच्छति जिनसकाशम् ।
वज्जामि वन्दे वन्दिता पर्युपासे ॥ ४२४ ॥ (१९७२)

Te | | | śrutvā Prabhāsa āgacchati Jinasakaśam ।
Vrajāmi v | | | vanditā paryupāse ॥ 424 ॥ (1972)]

Trans—424 Having heard that they had renounced the world *Prabhāsa*, comes before the *Tirthankara*. (He thinks—) I shall go, pay my homages, and worship him. (1972)

Then

आभट्ठो य जिणेण जाइ—जरा—मरणविप्पमुक्केण ।
नामेण य गोत्तेण य सव्वण्णू सव्वदरिसी ण ॥४२५॥ (१९७३)

Abhaṭṭho ya Jīṇenam jāḥ jarā-maraṇavippamukkenam ।
Nāmena ya gōtṭeṇa ya savvaṇṇū savvadarisī nam ॥425a (1973)

[आभाषितश्च जिनेन जाति-जरा-मरणविप्रमुक्तेन ।

नाम्ना च गोत्रेण च सर्वज्ञेन सर्वदर्शिना ॥ ४२५ ॥ (१९७३)

Ābhāṣitaśca Jinena jāti-jarā-marana-vipramuktena ।

Namna ca gotrena ca sarvajñena sarvadarśinā ॥ 425 ॥ (1973)]

Trans—425 He was addressed by his name and lineage by the *Tirthankara*, who was entirely free from birth old age and death, who was omniscient, and who had complete *darśana* (undifferentiated knowledge) (1973)

Having thus addressed him, the *Bhagavān* said—

किं मन्ने निव्वाणं अत्थि नत्थि त्ति संसओ तुज्झ ।

वेयपयाण य अत्थं न याणसी तेसिमो अत्थो ॥४२६॥(१९७४)

Kim manne nivvānam aṭṭhi natthi tti samsao tujjha ।

Veyapayāna ya attham na yānasī tesimo attho ॥ 426 ॥ (1974)

[किं मन्यसे निर्वाणमस्ति नास्तीति संशयस्तव ।

वेदापदानां चार्थं न जानासि तेषामयमर्थः ॥ ४२६ ॥ (१९७४)

Kim manyase nirvānamasti nāstīti saṁśaya-stava ।

Veda-padānām cārtham na jānāsī tesāmayamarthah ॥426॥ (1974)]

Trans—426 What are you thinking about ? You entertain the doubt as to whether *nirvāna* (final emancipation) exists or not But (*ca*) you have not understood the (real) meaning of the sentences of *Vedas* Here is their (real) interpretation (1974)

टीका—हे आयुष्मन् ! प्रभास ! त्वमेव मन्यसे—किं निर्वाणमस्ति न वा ? इति । अयं च संशयस्तव विरुद्धवेदपदश्रवणनिबन्धनः । तानि चामूनि वेदपदानि—“ जरामर्यं वैतत् सर्वं यदग्निहोत्रम् ” । तथा, “ सैषा गुहा दुरवगाहा ” । तथा, “ द्वे ब्रह्मणी परमपरं च, तत्र परं सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तरं ब्रह्म ” इति । एतेषां चायमर्थस्तवचेतसि वर्तते—यदेतदग्निहोत्रं तज्जरामर्यमेव

यावज्जीवं कर्तव्यमिति । अग्निहोत्रक्रिया च भूतवचदेतुत्वाच्छब्दरूपा । सा च स्वर्गफलैव स्याद् नापवर्गफला । “ यावज्जीवम् ” इति चोक्ते कालान्तरं नास्ति यत्रापवर्गहेतुभूतक्रियान्तरारम्भः स्यात् । तस्मात् साधनामापाद् मोक्षाभावः । तत्तद्वेत्यादिकानि किल मोक्षाभावप्रतिपादकानि । श्रूयानि तु तदस्ति-त्वव्यवधानानि, यतो गुहाश्च मुक्तिरूपा, सा च संसारामिनन्दिनां दुरवगाहा, दुष्प्रवेद्यात् । तथा, परं ब्रह्म सत्यं मोक्षा, अनन्तरं तु ब्रह्म ज्ञानमिति । ततो मोक्षास्तित्व नास्तित्वं च वेदपदप्रतिपादितमवगम्य तत्र संशयः । तत्रैषां वेदपदानामप्येव न जानासि, यतस्तेषामयमर्थो वक्ष्यमाणलक्ष्य इति ॥ ४२६ ॥ (१९७४)

D C—O long-lived *Prabhava*! your doubt about the existence of *moksha* is based upon your hearing various *Veda-padas* of contradictory senses. These *Veda-padas* are as follows—

- (1) “ *Jarā-maryam vastat sarvam yadagnihotram.*
- (2) *Saua guha duravagaha*
- (3) “ *Deo brahmanā paramaparam oṁ itra param satyam jnanamantaram brahma* etc

|| se *Veda-padas* are interpreted by you as follows.—

- (1) *Yagnihotra* should be practised as long as life persists.

The performance of *agnihotra* constitutes the sacrifice of animals which would turn it *subha* or *a-subha*. But that would award the attainment of *svarga* alone and not *moksha*. Since by this commandment, performance of *agnihotra* is advised to be practised throughout life there would be no other period of time during which some other performance for the attainment of *moksha* could be advised. In absence of *sadhana* therefore the *sadhya* (viz *moksha*) does not exist. In this way this sentence proves the absence of *moksha*.

The other two *padas* try to establish the existence of *moksha* in this way—

(2) The cave of *mokṣa* is difficult to be entered by the *samsārīs*.

(3) There are two types of *Brahma* —

- 1 The *Param Brahma* or principal *Brahma* is *mokṣa* and *a-param* or subordinate *Brahma* is *jñāna*

Your doubt has sprung up from these *Veda-padas* which bear contradictory senses But you have not grasped their real interpretation Here, I give their correct interpretation. Please listen carefully || 426 || (1974)

Bhagavān now states the opponent's view and refutes it,

मन्नसि किं दीवस्स व नासो निव्वाणमस्स जीवस्स ? ।

दुक्खक्खयाइरूवा किं होज्ज व से सओऽवत्था ? || ४२७ || (१९७५)

Mannasi kim divassa va nāso nivvānamassa jīvassa ?

Dukkhakkhayāirūvā kim hojja va se sa'o'vatthā ? || 427 || (1975)

[मन्यसे किं दीपस्येव नाशो निर्वाणमस्य जीवस्य ?

दुःखक्षयादिरूपा किं भवेद् वा तस्य सतोऽवस्था ? || ४२७ || (१९७५)

Manyase kim dīpasyeva nāšo nirvānamasya jīvasya ?

Dukkhaksayādirūpā kim bhaved vā tasya sato'vasthā ? || 427 || (1975)]

Trans—427 Do you think the *nirvana* (extinction of life) to be similar to the extinction of lamp ? Or, would the positive existence of soul in the form of diminution of miseries etc be its extinction ? (1975)

टीका-आयुष्मन् ! प्रमास ! त्वमेवं मन्यसे-किं दीपस्येवास्य जीवस्य
नाशो ध्वंस एव निर्वाणम् ? यथाऽऽहुः सौगतविशेषाः केचित्, तद्यथा—

दीपो यथा निर्वृतिमभ्युपेतो नैवावनिं गच्छति नान्तरिक्षम् ।

दिशं न काश्चिद् विदिशं न काश्चित् स्नेहक्षयात् केवलमेति शान्तिम् ॥ १ ॥

जीवस्तथा निर्वृतिमभ्युपेतो नैयावर्णि गच्छति नान्तरिक्षम् ।

दिष्टं न काञ्चित् विदिष्टं न काञ्चित् क्लेशघयात् कथमेति श्रान्तिम् ॥२॥

इति । किं वा यथा जैनाः प्राहुस्तथा निर्वाण भवेत् । किं तत् ?

इत्याह—सतो विद्यमानस्य जीवस्य विशिष्टा काचिदवस्था । कथंभूता ? राग-
द्वेष-मद-मोह-जन्म-मरा-रोगादिदुःखस्यरूपा । उक्तं च—

केवलसंघिदु-वर्धनरूपाः सर्वातिदुःखपरिमृक्ताः ।

मोदन्ते मुक्तिगता जीवाः क्षीणान्तरारिगणाः ॥ १ ॥

इति ॥ ४२७ ॥ (१९७५)

D C—Like the *Buddhists* do you believe *moksha* to be nothing but the extinction of *jīva* like that of a lamp ? For the *Buddhists* assert that:—

'Dipo yatha nirvṛtimabhyupeto naivavanim gacchati nāntarikam ।
Dīpam na kañcid vidīṣam na kañcit snehakeṇyat kevalameti śāntim ॥

Jivastatha nirvṛtimabhyupeto naivavanim gacchati nāntarikam ।
Dīpam na kañcid vidīṣam na kañcit kleśakeṇyat kevalameti śāntim ॥

(Or do you accept *moḥa*, like *Jains* who believe the state of final emancipation) as a peculiar state of the existence constituting the removal of *raga*, *dveṣa*, *mada*, *moha*, *jara*, *roga*, and *duḥkha* etc ?

It has been laid down by them that—

"Kovalasamvid-darśanarūpaḥ sarvartiduhkha parimuktah ।
Modante muktigata jivah kṣāntantararūpaḥ " ॥१॥ 427 (1975)]

Also

अहवाणाइत्तणओ खस्स व किं कम्म—जीवजोगस्स ।

अविओगाओ न भवे ससारामाव एव सि ? ॥४२८॥(१९७६)

Ahavaññāttanao khaṣsa va kiṃ kamma-jīvaḥjogassa ।

Aviogaṇo na bhava samsārābhāva eva tti ? ॥ 428 * (1976)

[अथवाऽनादित्वतः स्वस्येव किं कर्म-जीवयोगस्य ।

अवियोगाद् न भवेत् संसाराभाव एवेति ? ॥ ४२८ (१९७६)

Athava'nāditvataḥ kṛasyeva kiṃ karma-jīva-yogasya ।

Aviyogād na bhavet saṃsārābhāva eveti ? ॥ 428 ॥ (1976)]

Trans.—428 Or, is it because *Karma* and *jīva* (which are) united together eternally do not undergo separation like *ākāśa*, that there is absence of mundane world ? (1976)

टीका-अथवा, त्वमेवं मन्यसे-नूनं संसाराभाव एव न भवेत् ।
कृतः ? । अवियोगात्-वियोगायोगात् । कस्य ? । कर्म-जीवयोः संयोगस्य ।
कृतः ? । अनादित्वात् ; स्वस्येव । इह ययोरनादिः संयोगस्तयोर्वियोगो
नास्ति, यथा जीवा-ऽऽकाशयोः, अनादिश्च जीवकर्मणोः संयोगः, ततो
वियोगानुपपत्तिः, ततश्च न संसाराभावः ; तथा च सति कुतो मोक्षः ? इति
॥ ४२८ ॥ (१९७६)

D. C.—There is another ground also, upon which your doubt is based Objects that are united with each other from time immemorial, could never undergo separation Just as *jīva* and *ākāśa* are never separable from each other on account of their *anādi samyoga*, *jīva* and *karma* will also never undergo separation on account of their *anādi samyoga* When *Karma* is not separated, *samsāra* will also never be separable On account of the absence of separation from *samsāra*, the absence of *mokṣa* will also be established ॥ 428 ॥ (1976)

But,

पडिवज्ज मण्डिओ इव वियोगमिह कम्म-जीवजोगस्स ।

तमणाइणो वि कंचण-धाऊण व णाण-किरियाहिं ॥४२९॥(१९७७)

Paḍivaḍḍa Maṇḍiyo iva viyogamiha kamma-jīva-jogassa ।

Tamaṇāmo vi kancana-dhāūna va nāna-kiriyaḥim ॥429॥ (1977)

[प्रतिपद्यस्व मण्डिक इव वियोगमिह कर्म-जीवयोगस्य ।

त्वमनादेरपि काञ्चन-धात्वोरिव ज्ञान-क्रियाभ्याम् ॥४२९॥ (१९७७)

Pratipadyasva Maṇḍika ita viyogamiha karma-jīva yogasya ।
Tvamanaderapi kancana-dhātvoriva jhāna-kriyābhyām ॥429॥1977॥

Trans—429 In this case, you (shall have to) admit the separation of *Karma* and *jīva*, in spite of their eternal union on account of cognizance and action as in the case of gold and metal. (1977)

टीका—“अथाहणो वि चि” अनादेरपि जीव-कर्मसंयोगस्य ‘तं’ इति स्वं प्रतिपद्यस्व वियोगम्, वन्य-मोक्षवादे मण्डिकवत् । कपोरिव यो वियोगः ? । काञ्चन-धातुपापाणयोरिव । किं निर्हेतुक एव जीव-कर्मयोर्वियोगः ? । न, इत्याह-ज्ञान-क्रियाम्याम् । इदमुक्तं भवति-नायमेकान्तो यदनादिसंयोगो न मिथ्यते, यतः काञ्चन-धातुपापाणयोरनादिरपि संयोगोऽन्यादिसंपर्केण विघट्यत एव, तद्वज्जीव-कर्मसंयोगस्यापि सम्यग्ज्ञान-क्रियाम्यां वियोगं मण्डिकवत् त्वमपीह प्रतिपद्यस्वेति ॥ ४२९ ॥ (१९७७)

D C—Even the strongest affinity between gold and metal is broken by the help of heating etc. The same is the case with that between *Karma* and *jīva* also Separation of *Karma* and *jīva* is accomplished by means of *jāṇa* and *kriyā* in spite of their eternal union It is not true therefore to think that the separation of objects joined together by *anādi* union is not possible Like *Maṇḍika* you too shall have to admit that *Karma* and *jīva* are separable from each other in spite of their eternal union ॥429॥ (1977)

Also

ज नारगाह्मावो ससारो नारगाह्मिणो य ।
को जीवो त मन्नसि तन्नासे जीवनासो चि ॥४३०॥ (१९७८)

Jam nāragābhāvo samsāro nāragābhāno ya ।
Ko jīvo tam mannasī tannāse jīvanāso tti ॥430॥ (1978)

[यद् नारकादिमाषः संसारो नारकादिमिषय ।

को जीपस्त्व मन्यसे तन्नासे जीवनास इति ॥ ४३० ॥ (१९७८)

Yad narakādibhāvah samsāro narakādibhinnasca ।

Ko jivastvam manyase tannāse jīvanāśa iti ॥ 430 ॥ (1978)]

Trans—430 Since *samsāra* includes hellish denizens etc. what *jīva* do you mean to be different, from hellish denizens etc ? With their destruction, (there will be) destruction of *jīva* also (1978)

टीका—यद् यस्माद् नारक-तिर्यग्-नरा-ऽमरभाव एव नारकादित्वमेव संसार उच्यते नान्यः, नारकादिपर्यायभिन्नश्च कोऽन्यो जीवः ? । न कोऽपीत्यर्थः, नारकादिभावादन्यत्वेन कदाचिदपि जीवस्यानुपलम्भादिति भावः । ततस्तन्नाशे नारकादिभावरूपसंसारनाशे जीवस्य स्वस्वरूपनाशात् सर्वथा नाश एव भवति; ततः कस्यासौ मौक्षः ? । इति त्वं मन्यसे ॥४३०॥ (१९७८)

D C—Since *samsāra* consists of *nāra*, *tryan*, *ca*, human and divine beings, *jīva* cannot exist as different from any one of them So, when *samsāra* of *nāra* and others, vanishes, *jīva* will also vanish as it is contained in *samsāra*. Thus, when *jīva* vanishes, who would attain *moksa* ? ॥430॥ (1978)

This belief is refuted in this way—

न हि नारगाइपज्जायमेत्तनासम्मि सब्वा नासो ।

जीवद्वस्स मओ मुद्धानासे व हेमस्स ॥ ४३१ ॥ (१९७९)

कम्मकओ संसारो तन्नासे तस्स जुज्जे नासो ।

जीवत्तमकम्मकयं तन्नासे तस्स को नासो ? ॥४३२॥ (१९८०)

Na hi nāragāpajjāyamettanāsammi savvahā nāso ।

Jivaddavvassa mao muddānāse va hemassa ॥ 431 ॥ (1979)

Kammakao samsāro tannāse tassa jujjae nāso ।

Jivattamakammakayam tannāse tasya ko nāso ? ॥ 432 ॥ (1980)

[न हि नारकादिपर्यायमात्रनाशे सर्वथा नाशः ।

जीवद्रव्यस्य मतो मुद्धानाश इव हेमः ॥ ४३१ ॥ (१९७९)

कर्मकृतः संसारस्तन्नाशे तस्य युज्यत नाशः ।

जीवत्वमकर्मकृत तन्नाशे तस्य को नाशः ? ॥ ४३२ ॥ (१९८०)

Na hi narakadīparayāmatrānāśe sarvathā nāśah ।

Jivadravyasya mato mudranāśa iva heṃnah ॥ 431 ॥ (1979)

Karmakṛitah saṃsārastannāśe tasya yujyate nāśah ।

Jivatvamaṣakarmakṛitam tannāśe tasya ko nāśah ? ॥ 432 ॥ (1980)

Trans—431-432 Like gold at the destruction of a ring, the substance of *jiva* is not believed to vanish entirely at the destruction of *nārakas* and other *Samsāra* is based on *Karma*. Hence, its destruction with *Karma* is justified. (But) *Jivatva* is not based on *Karma*. Hence, how could it vanish with *Karma*? (1979-1980)

टीका-नारक-तियगादिरूपेण यो मावः स जीवस्य पर्याय एव । न च पर्यायमात्रनाशे पर्यायिणो जीवद्रव्यस्यापि सर्वथा नाशो भवति, कश्चिद् भवत्यपि । न हि मूद्रापर्यायमात्रनाशे इन्द्रः सुवर्णस्य सर्वथा नाशो दृष्टः । ततो नारकादिसंसारपर्यायनिवृत्तौ मुक्तिपर्यायान्तरोत्पत्तिर्जीवस्य, मूद्रापर्याय निवृत्तौ कर्णपूरपर्यायान्तरोत्पत्तिरिव सुवर्णस्य, न किञ्चिद् विरुध्यत इति । नन यथा कर्मणो नाशे संसारो नश्यति तथा तन्नाशे जीवत्वस्यापि नाशाद् मा नाशो भविष्यति । एतदप्यसारम् । कृतः ? इत्याह—“कम्मकजो इत्यादि” कर्मकृतः कम्मनिन संसारः, ततस्तन्नाशे कर्मनाशे तस्य संसारस्य नाशो युज्यत एव, कारणाभावे कार्याभावस्य सुप्रतीतत्वात् । जीवस्य पुनरनादि कालप्रवृत्तत्वात् कर्मकृत न भवति, अतस्तन्नाशे कर्मनाशे तस्य जीवस्य को नाशः ?—न कश्चित् ; कारण-व्यापकयोरेव कार्य-व्याप्यनिवर्तकत्वात् ; कर्म तु जीवस्य न कारणं नापि व्यापकमिति भावः ॥ ४३१-४३२ ॥ (१९७९-१९८०)

D C—Existence of *jiva* as *nārakas* or *tiryakas* is merely one of the forms of *jiva*. So when these *pariyayas* of *jiva* vanish the substance of *jiva* or *jivatva* does not vanish entirely but only partially just as gold as a *dravya* does not

entirely vanish when ring etc, are destroyed When the *nāraka paryāyas* of *samsāra* are destroyed, *jīva* vanishes as a *samsāri* and comes into existence as the *paryāya* of *mokṣa* e g in case of gold, when one *paryāya*, say ring, is destroyed, another *paryāya*, say ear-ring, is produced

Prabhāsa —But like *samsāra*, *jīva* will also have to vanish with *Karma*, and hence, there will be nothing like *mokṣa*

Bhagavān —It is not so *Samsāra* is generated by means of *Karma*, and hence it would vanish with *Karma* But, *jīvatva* being at work from times immemorial, cannot be called *Karmajanya* So, *jīva* will not vanish with *Karma*, since *Karma* is neither the cause of *jīvatva* nor is it invariably concomitant with *jīvatva* ॥ 431-432 ॥ (1979-1980)

न विगाराणुवलंभादागासं पिव विणासधम्मो सो ।

इह नासिणो विगारो दीसइ कुंभस्स वाऽवयवा ॥४३३॥ (१९८१)

Na vigārāṇuvalambhādāgāsam piva vināsadhammo so ।

Iha nāsino vigāro dīsaḥ kumbhassa vā'vayavā ॥ 433 ॥ (1981)

[न विकारानुपलम्भादाकाशमिव विनाशधर्मा सः ।

इह नाशिनो विकारो दृश्यते कुम्भस्येवावयवाः ॥ ४३३ ॥ (१९८१)

Na vīkarānupalambhādākāśamiva vināśadhammā sah ।

Iha nāśino vīkāro dṛśyate kumbhasyevāvayavāḥ ॥433॥ (1981)]

Trans —433 It (*i e jīva*) is immortal like sky on account of the non-apprehension of changes In case of a destructive (object), a change is visible like the (various) parts of *ghata* (1981)

टीका—न विनाशधर्मा जीव इति प्रतिज्ञा । विकारानुपलम्भादिति हेतुः । इह यो विनाशी तस्य विकारो दृश्यते, यथा मुद्गरादिध्वस्तस्य कुम्भस्य कपाललक्षणा अवयवाः; यस्त्वविनाशी न तस्य विकारदर्शनम्, यथाऽऽ-

काश्रस्मेति । ततो मुक्तस्य जीवस्य निश्चत्वाद् निश्चो मोक्ष इति ॥ ४३३ ॥
(१९८१)

D C—The Soul is immortal like *akāśa* because it does not undergo any *vikāra*. That which is destructible has undoubtedly to undergo *vikāras* like the different parts of *ghata*. *Ātman* being thus immutable *mokṣa* is also immutable ॥433॥ (1981)

Also

कालतरनासी वा घटो व कथगाइओ मई होजा ।
नो पद्धसाभावो भुवि तद्धम्मा वि ज निच्चो ॥ ४३४ ॥ (१९८२)

Kālantaranāśī vā ghato vva kayagāio mai hojā ।
No paddhamābhāvo bhuvi taddhammā vi jan nicco ॥434॥ (1982)

[कालान्तरनाशी वा घट इव कृतकदितो मतिर्भवेत् ।
नो प्रध्वंसभावो भुवि तद्धर्मापि यद् नित्यः ॥ ४३४ ॥ (१९८२)

Kalantaranāśī vā ghata iva kṛitakadito matirbhavet ।
No pradhvamsābhāvo bhuvi taddharmapiyad nityaḥ ॥434॥ (1982)]

Trans—434 Or the belief may be that it is destructible ((1) certain) period of time like *ghata* on account of its (2) destructibility etc. (But) it is not so. Indestructibility is everlasting in this earth in spite of (its) having (destructible) character ॥ (1982)

The author then states the opponent's view and its reply—

अणुदाहरणमभावो खरसंग पिब मई न त जम्हा ।
कुम्भविणासविसिद्धो भावो च्चिय पोग्गलमओ सो ॥ ४३५ ॥ (१९८३)

Anudāharanamābhāvo kharasangam piva mai na tam jamhā ।
kumbhavināsavisittho bhāvo cciyya poggalamao so ॥435॥ (1983)

[अनुदाहरणमभावः खरगुग्ममिव मतिर्न तद् यस्मात् ।
कुम्भविनाशविसिद्धो भाव एव पुद्गलमयः सः ॥ ४३५ ॥ (१९८३)

Anudāharanamabhāvaḥ kharasṛṅgamiva matir na tad yasmāt ।
Kumbhavinūśaviśisto bhāva ova pudgalamayah sah ॥435॥ (1983)]

Trans.—435 (The opponent might say that) “ It has no illustration *Abhāva* is non-existent like *kharasṛṅga* ” (But) it is not so The quality of *pudgala* characterized by the destruction of *ghata*, is itself (indestructibility) (1983)

Or,

किं वेगंतेण कयं पोग्गलमेत्तविलयम्मि जीवस्स ? ।

किं निवत्तियमहियं नभसो घटमेत्तविलयम्मि ? ॥४३६॥ (१९८४)

Kim vegantena kayam poggalamettavilayammi jivassa ? ।
Kim nivattiyamahiyam nabhaso ghadamettavilayammi ? ॥ 436 ॥

[किं वैकान्तेन कृतं पुद्गलमात्रविलये जीवस्य ? ।

किं निर्वर्तितमधिकं नभसो घटमात्रविलये ? ॥ ४३६ (१९८४)

Kim vaikāntena kṛitam pudgalamātravilaye jivasya ? ।
Kim nirvartitamadhikam nabhaso ghatamātravilaye ? ॥436॥ (1984)]

Trans.—436 Or, at the destruction of mere *pudgalas*, how is *jīva* to be affected ? At the destruction of *ghata*, how is sky affected all the more ?† (1984)

The author proves immortality of *muktātmā* by another inference also,

दवामुत्तत्तणओ मुत्तो निच्चो नभं व दवतया ।

नणु विभुयाइपसंगो एवं सइ, नाणुमाणाओ ॥४३७॥ (१९८५)

Davvāmuttattanao mutto nicco nabham va davvatayā ।
Nanu vibhuyāipasangō evaṃ sai, nānumānāo ॥ 437 ॥ (1985)

[द्रव्यामूर्तत्वतो मुक्तो नित्यो नभ इव द्रव्यतया ।

ननु विभुतादिप्रसङ्ग एव सति, नानुमानात् ॥ ४३७ ॥ (१९८५)

Dravyamūrtvato mukto nityo nabha iva dravyataya ।

Nanu vibhutadiprasaṅga evam sati nānumanāt n 487 n (1985)]

Trans—437 The free (soul) is everlasting like sky on account of the incorporeal nature of (its) substance. (The opponent might object here that) “in that case, there would be all-pervading characteristic etc as well.” (But) it is not so, because of (an opposite inference). (1985)

टीका-नित्यो मुक्तात्मा, द्रव्यत्वे सत्यमूर्तत्वात्; “द्वयं च” यथा द्रव्यत्वे सत्यमूर्तत्वाद् नित्यं नमः । आह-नन्वनेन दृष्टान्तेन व्यापकत्वाद्यपि सिध्यति जीवस्य; तथाहि-विमुच्यार्थकः सर्वगतो जीवः, द्रव्यत्वे सत्यमूर्तत्वात्, यथा नमः । तदेतद् न । कुतः ? । सर्वगतत्वबाधकाशु मानसज्ज्ञात्वात्; तथाहि-स्वपर्यन्तदेहमात्रव्यापको जीवः, तत्रैव तद्गुणोपलब्धेः, स्पर्शनवत्, इत्यनुमानाद् बाधते सर्वगतत्व जीवस्य । एवं “न बध्यते नापि मुच्यते जीवः द्रव्यत्वे सत्यमूर्तत्वात्, नमोवत्” इत्याद्यपि इवम्, “बध्यते पुण्य-पापकर्मणा जीवः, दान-हिंसादि क्रियाणां सफलत्वात्, कृप्यादिक्रियावत्, तथा, विषटते सम्यगुपायात् कोऽपि जीव-कर्मसंयोगः, संयोगत्वात्, काश्चन-धातुपायायसंयोगवत्” इत्याद्यनुमानात् परिहर्तव्यमिति ॥ ४३७ ॥ (१९८५)

1) (—Like ākāśa dravya jīva dravya of a free soul is also it / be sure it is a-mūrtā as a dravya

Prabhāsa —As you proved *nityatva* (in case) of *mukta* by the help of the example of sky the example will lead to prove other characteristics of sky in *mukta*, say for example like sky *mukta* is all pervading due to its *a-mūrtatva*. Similarly it can also be said that *jīva dravya* has neither *bandha* nor *mokṣa* just as *ākāśa dravya* has none due to *a-mūrtatva*.

Bhagavan—It is not proper to establish other characteristics such as *vibhūta* etc in *mukta* by the help of the example of sky Because there is another inference opposite

to it which contradicts the existence of those characteristics. Say, for example, *jīva* is pervading only upto the skin of body like the sense of touch, because the *jīvatva* is found only in body

This *anumāna* refutes the all-pervading nature of *jīva*. Similarly, the *anumānas* that *jīvas* are formed by means of *punya* and *pāpa*, and that the combination of *jīva* and *Karma* could any how be brought about like the combination of gold and stone, refute the assertion that *jīva* has neither *bandha* nor *mokṣa* due to the *a-mūrtatva* of its *dṛavya* like *ākāśa* ॥ 437 ॥ (1985)

Or,

को वा निच्चग्गाहो सव्वं चिय वि भव-भङ्ग-ठिइमइयं ।
पज्जायंतरमेत्तप्पणादनिच्चाइववएसो ॥ ४३८ ॥ (१९८६)

Ko vā niccaggāho savvam ciya vibhava-bhanga-thūmayam ।
Pajjantaramettappanādiniccāivavaeso ॥ 438 ॥ (1986)

[को वा नित्यग्रहः सर्वमेवापि भव-भङ्ग-स्थितिमयम् ।
पर्यायान्तरमात्रार्पणादनित्यादिव्यपदेशः ॥ ४३८ ॥ (१९८६)

Ko vā nityagrahah sarvamevāpi bhava-bhanga-sthitimayam ।
Paryāyāntaramātrārpanādanityādivyapadeśah ॥ 438 ॥ (1986)]

Trans—438 Or, why insist upon immutability (at all) ? Everything is susceptible to the state of production-break-and retention. Only by (means of) imposition of various methods, attributes like mutability etc, are designated † (1986)

टीका-अथ कथञ्चिदनित्यत्वेऽपि मोक्षस्य न किञ्चिद् नः क्षूयत इति भावः । इह “ कालतरनासी वा षडो व ” इत्यादिगाथाः प्रागपि षष्ठगणधरे बन्ध-मोक्षविचारे व्याख्याता एव । ततो यदिह न व्याख्यातं तत् ततोऽव-गन्तव्यमिति ॥ ४३८ ॥ (१९८६)

D C—It is no use insisting exclusively upon *anityatā* of *multitā*. Its *a-nityatā* could also be admitted to a certain extent by means of various methods. But, really speaking all objects are susceptible to *utpada-vyaya* and *dhrauvya* ॥ 438 ॥ (1986)

For a detailed discussion of *bandha* and *moksa*, see Chap VI.

Now in reply to the assertion that the extinction of soul resembles that of lamp etc the author states—

न य सव्वहा विणासोऽणलस्स परिणामओ पयस्सेव ।
कुम्भस्स कवालान व तहाविगारोवलम्भाओ ॥४३९॥ (१९८७)

Na ya savvaha vināso naḷassa parināmao payasseva ।
Kumbhassa kavālāna va tahāvigārovalambhāo ॥ 439 ॥ (1987)

[न च सर्वथा विनासोऽणलस्य परिणामतः पयस इव ।
कुम्भस्य कपालानामिव तथाविकारोपलम्भात् ॥ ४३९ ॥ (१९८७)

Na sarvathā vināso naḷasya parināmataḥ payasa iva ।
Kumbhasya kapalanāmiva tathavikāropalambhāt ॥ 439 ॥ (1987)

It is 439 Fire being mutable like milk does not vanish entirely. It is like the apprehension of changes like those (in case) of the pieces of *ghata*. (1987)

टीका—न प्रदीपानलस्य सर्वप्रकारैर्विनाशः, परिणामत्वात्, पयसो दुग्धस्येव; अथवा, यथा मुद्रराषाहतस्य कपालतया परिणतस्य घटस्य, यथा वा क्षीकृतानां कपालानाम् । कुतो न सर्वथा विनाशः ? । इत्याह—तथा तेन रूपान्तरप्रकारेण विकारस्य प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणोपलम्भादिति ॥ ४३९ ॥ (१९८७)

D C—When a lamp is extinguished, its fire does not entirely vanish. It is only *mutable* like milk. So, like milk turning into curds or like *ghata* changing into various pieces

by means of a stick etc light changes into darkness, but it does not vanish absolutely. ॥ 439 ॥ (1987)

Again, there is an objection and its reply—

जइ सवहा न नासोऽणलस्स किं दीसए न सो सक्खं ? ।
परिणामसुहुमयाओ जलयविगारंजणरउ व ॥ ४४० ॥ (१९८८)

Jai savvahā na nāso'nalassa kim disae na so sakkham ? ।
Parināmasuhumayāo jalayavigārañjanarau vva ॥ 440 ॥ (1988)

[यदि सर्वथा न नाशोऽनलस्य किं दृश्यते न स साक्षात् ? ।
परिणामसूक्ष्मतातो जलदविकारोऽञ्जनरज इव ॥ ४४० ॥ (१९८८)

Yadi sarvathā na nāśo'nulasya kim dṛśyate na sa sāksāt ।
Parinamasūkṣmatāto jaladavikāro'njanaraja iva ॥ 440 ॥ (1988)]

Trans—440 “ If there is no absolute extinction of light, why it is not seen before our eyes ? ” “ Because of the subtlety of fruition as in the case of a change in cloud or dust particle (1988)

टीका—यदि सर्वथाऽनलस्य न नाशः, तर्हि विध्यातानन्तरं किमित्यसौ साक्षाद् न दृश्यते ? । अत्रोत्तरमाह—“ परिणामेत्यादि ” विध्याते प्रदीपेऽनन्तरमेव ताममपुद्गलरूपो विकारः समुपलभ्यत एव, चिर चासौ पुरस्ताद् यद् नोपलभ्यते, तत् सूक्ष्म-सूक्ष्मतरपरिणामभावात् । तथाहि—विशीर्यमाणस्य जलदस्यापि यः कृष्णाभ्रपुद्गलविकारः स परिणामसौक्ष्म्याद् नोपलभ्यते । तथा, अञ्जनस्यापि पवनेन द्वियमाणस्य यदुत्कृष्टरज उद्दीयते तदपि परिणाम-सौक्ष्म्याद् नोपलभ्यते, न पुनरसत्त्वादिति ॥ ४४० ॥ (१९८८)

D C—Prabhāsa—If there were no absolute extinction of fire, why is it not perceived before our eyes ?

Bhagavān—The *vikāra* of the light extinguished viz darkness—is not directly perceptible, because its *parināma* is very subtle in form Changes in a black cloud at the time of dissolution of a cloud, are not perceived because of their very

subtle *parināma* and the pollen of a collyrium also blown away by wind is not directly perceived because it is very minute. But in no way it means that it does not exist. So the *vibhā* of darkness in case of light is also non-apprehensible not because it is non-existent but because its *parināma* is *sukṣma* ॥ 440 ॥ (1988)

Also

होऊण इदियतरगज्झा पुणरिदियतरगहण ।

स्वभा एति न एति य पोग्गलपरिणामया चित्ता ॥४४१॥ (१९८९)

Hoṭṭha indiyantaragajjha punarindiyantaraggahanam ।

Khandhā eṭṭi na eṭṭi ya poggalaparināmayā citta ॥ 441 ॥ (1989)

[भूत्वेन्द्रियान्तरग्राह्याः पुनरिन्द्रियान्तरग्रहणम् ।

स्कन्धा यान्ति न यान्ति च पुद्गलपरिणामता चित्ता ॥४४१॥ (१९८९)

Bhūtvēndriyantaragrahyāḥ punarindriyantaragrahṇam ।

Skandha yanti na yanti ca pudgalaparipamata citta ॥ 441 ॥ (1989)]

Trans—441 (Some) objects apprehensible by (one group of) sense organs, are again apprehended by (another set of) sense-organs, while others are not apprehended (by the other set of sense-organs) Manifold is the nature of them ॥ (1989)

टीका- * मरणपत्र-लवण-सुष्ठी-हरीतकी-चित्रक-गुडादयः स्कन्धाः पूर्वमिन्द्रियान्तरग्राह्यामसुरादीन्द्रियविषया भूत्वा पुनर्द्रव्य-क्षेत्र-कालादि सामान्यन्तरं प्राप्य पुद्गलपरिणामवेचिभ्यादिन्द्रियान्तरग्रहणं स्पर्शन-रसनादीन्द्रियग्राह्यतामायान्ति; तथाहि-सुवर्णं पत्रीकृतं चक्षुर्ग्राह्यं भूत्वा श्रोत्रनार्धमग्नौ प्रक्षिप्तं मस्मना मिलितं सत् स्पर्शनन्द्रियग्राह्यतामिति, पुनः प्रयोगेण मस्मना पृथक्कृतं चक्षुर्विषयतामुपगच्छति । सपण-सुष्ठी-हरीतकी-चित्रक-गुडादयोऽपि प्राक् चक्षुरिन्द्रियग्राह्या भूत्वा पश्चात् रूपाद्यन्ते बह्वीषमसूदाये च काय-चूणा-ऽषलहादि परिणामान्तरमापन्नाः सन्तो रसनेन्द्रिय संवेद्या भवन्ति । कपूर-कस्तुरिकादीनामपि पुद्गलामसूर्ग्राह्या अपि बाधुना

द्रुष्यनीता घ्राणसंवेद्या भवन्ति । योजननवकात् परतो गतास्तथाविधं
कञ्चित् सूक्ष्मपरिणाममापन्ना नैकस्यापीन्द्रियस्य विषयतां प्रतिपद्यन्त इति ।
अनया दिशाऽन्यापि पुद्गलपरिणामता चित्रा भावनीयेति ॥४४१॥ (१९८९)

D C—The manifold nature of *pudgala-parimāmas* is explained by means of the following example. Substances such as a sheet of gold, salt, ginger, *harītakī* (yellow myrobalans), *citrakavala*, jaggery etc.—are first apprehended by sense-organs like eye etc, and then they undergo apprehension by means of other sense-organs such as that of touch, taste etc, when accompanied by different substances, fields, and times etc. A sheet of gold is first apprehended by eyes, but when passed through fire and mixed with ashes for purification, it is apprehended by the sense of touch as well. Afterwards when it is separated from it, again it becomes apprehensible by eyes. The same is the case with objects like salt, ginger, green vegetables, jaggery etc. They are also *caksurgrāhya* at the first instance, but when mixed with ashes or other groups of medicines or when turned into liquid, powder or paste, they are perceived by the sense of touch. *Pudgalas* like camphor and musk although perceptible by eyes at first, undergo perception by the sense of smell when carried by wind to a long distance.

On the other hand, some *pudgalas* when carried to a distance longer than nine *yojanas*† do not undergo perception by means of any sense-organ on account of their subtle changes. In all these cases, variegated nature of the changes of *pudgalas*, is the main cause ॥ 441 ॥ (1989)

Besides,

एगेर्गेदियगज्ज्ञा जह वायवादओ तहगेया ।

होउं चक्खुगज्ज्ञा घाणिदियगज्ज्ञयामेंति ॥ ४४२ ॥ (१९९०)

† One *Yojana*=Four *Kos's* or 9 miles (approximately)

Egegendiyagajjhā jaha vāyavvādao tahaggeyā ।

Hōum cakkhuggajjhā ghānindiyagnjjhayāmentī ॥ 442 ॥ (1990)

[एकैकेन्द्रियग्राह्या यथा वायव्यादयस्तथाऽग्नेयाः ।

भूत्वा चक्षुर्ग्राह्या ग्राह्येन्द्रियग्राह्यतां यान्ति ॥ ४४२ ॥ (१९९०)

Ekaikendriyagrahya yathā vāyavyadayaastathā gñeyah ।

Bhūtvā cakṣurgrāhya ghrāṇendriyagrahyatam yanti ॥ 442 ॥ (1990)]

Trans—442 Just as (the particles of) wind etc, are perceptible by each single sense-organ (one by one) (those) of fire also undergo perception by means of the sense of smell after being perceptible by eyes (1990)

टीका—वायुः स्पर्शेन्द्रियस्यैव ग्राह्यः, रसो रसनस्यैव, गन्धो घ्राणस्यैव, रूपं चक्षुष एव, शब्दस्तु श्रोत्रस्यैव ग्राह्यः । तदेव यथा वायव्यादयः पुद्गला एकैकस्य प्रतिनियतस्येन्द्रियस्य ग्राह्या भूत्वा पश्चात् परिणामान्तरं किमप्यापक्ता इन्द्रियान्तरग्राह्या अपि भवन्तीति स्वयमेव गम्यते, तथा प्रस्तुता अपि प्रदीपगता आग्नेयाः पुद्गलाश्चक्षुर्ग्राह्या भूत्वा पश्चात् विध्याते तस्मिन् प्रदीपे त एव तामसीमृताः सन्तो ग्राह्येन्द्रियग्राह्यतामुपयान्ति, तत् । तस्मिन्—“ किं दीपस्य न सो सक्तः ” इति ? । ननु ग्राह्येन्द्रियेणोपलभ्यत एव विध्यानप्रदीपविकार इति ॥ ४४२ ॥ (१९९०)

D (—Wind is perceptible by the sense of touch, juice by that of taste and no odour by that of smell alone, form by that of eyes alone and sound by that of ears alone. The particles of *vāyu* are thus apprehended by one particular sense only. Still however these *pudgalas* are apprehended by other sense-organs also when they undergo changes.

In case of light particles of flame are perceptible by eyes. When light is extinguished these particles change into darkness and are perceived by the sense of smell. Light therefore does not turn into nothingness but its change into darkness is apprehended. ॥ 443 ॥ (1990)

जह दीवो निव्वाणो परिणामन्तरमिओ तहा जीवो ।
भण्णइ परिनिव्वाणो पत्तोऽणावाहपरिणामं ॥ ४४३ ॥ (१९९१)

Jaha dīvo nivvāno parināmantaramio tahā jīvo ।
Bhannaṃ parinivvāno patto'nābāhaparināmam ॥ 443 ॥ (1991)

[यथा दीपो निर्वाणः परिणामान्तरमितस्तथा जीवः ।
मप्यते परिनिर्वाणः प्राप्तोऽनावाधपरिणामम् ॥ ४४३ ॥ (१९९१)

Yathā dīpo nirvāṇaḥ pariṇāmantaramitastathā jīvaḥ ।
Bhanyate parinirvāṇaḥ prāpto'nābādhaparināmam ॥443॥ (1991)]

Trans—443 Just as light changed into another form, is said to have attained *nirvāṇa* (final extinction) the Soul also, is said to have attained *nirvāṇa* (final liberation) when it has turned into a faultless form (1991)

टीका—यथोक्तस्वरूपपरिणामान्तरं प्राप्तः प्रदीपो “ निर्वाणः ”
इत्युच्यते तथा जीवोऽपि कर्मविरहितकेवलामूर्तजीवस्वरूपभावलक्षणमवाधं
परिणामान्तरं प्राप्तो निर्वाणो निर्वृतिं प्राप्त उच्यते । तस्माद् दुःखादिक्षयरूपा
सतोऽवस्था निर्वाणमिति स्थितम् ॥ ४४३ ॥ (१९९१)

D C—Just as light is said to have attained *nirvāṇa* when it changes into darkness, the Soul is also said to have attained *nirvāṇa* when it has changed into a form which is void of *Karma*, and which possesses absolutely *a-mūṛta* characteristics of the form and nature of the Soul This shows that *mokṣa* is nothing but the pure eternal positive condition of *jīva* when miseries etc are exterminated.

Prabhāsa —If *mokṣa* is nothing but the pure eternal positive condition of *jīva*, at the removal of miseries etc, then, in absence of objects of pleasure like *s'ābda* etc, the free Soul will have no happiness ॥ 443 ॥ (1991)

Bhagavān replies —

मुत्तस्स पर सोक्ख णाणाणावाहओ जहा मुणिणो ।

तद्धम्मा पुण विरहादावरणा-ऽऽवाहहेऊण ॥ ४४४ ॥ (१९९२)

Muttassa param sokkham nānānābāhao jahā munino ।

Taddhammā puna virahādāvaranā-”bāhaheūnam u 444 (1992)

[मुक्तस्य परं सौख्यं ज्ञानानावाधतो यथा मुने ।

तद्धर्मा पुनर्विरहादावरणा-ऽऽवाहहेतूनाम् ॥ ४४४ ॥ (१९९२)

Muktasya param saukhyam jñānānābādhatō yathā muneh ।

Taddharma punarvirahādāvaranā-”bādhaheṭūnām 444 (1992)]

Trans—444 Like a sage the free soul (enjoys) perfect happiness by (virtue of) its (high) knowledge, in absence of (all) obstructions In absence of interruptions and obstructions, it (enjoys) (all) its qualities. (1992)

टीका-मुक्तस्य अन्तोःपरं प्रकृतमकृत्रिममभिध्यामिमानञ्च स्वामाधिकं सुखमिति प्रतिज्ञा । “ नाणाणावाहउ चि ” ज्ञानप्रकर्षे मति जन्म-जरा-भ्यानि-मरणे-द्वियोगा-ऽरति-शोक-सुत-पिपासा-श्रीतो-ष्य-काम-क्रोध मठ-छात्र-वृष्णा-राग-द्वेष-चिन्तौत्सुक्यादिनिः श्रेयावाधविरहितत्वादिति न्त । तथा विषमप्रकृतमुनेरिव । ययोक्तावाधरहितानि काष्ठादीन्यपि वर्तन्ते, परं तथा ज्ञानावाधाद् न सुखम्; अतस्तद्वचनच्छेदार्थं ज्ञानग्रहणम् । कथं पुनरर्मा प्रकृतज्ञानवान्, आवाधरहितश्च ? इत्याह-“ तद्धर्मेत्यादि ” तद्धर्मा-प्रकृतज्ञाना नावाधवान् मुक्तास्मा । कुतः ? । विरहात्-अवाधात् । केनाम् ? । आवरणहेतूनाम्, आवाधहेतूनां च । एतदुक्तं भवति-क्षीयन्ति श्रेयावरणत्वात् प्रकृतज्ञानवानसौ, वेदनीयकर्मदीनो च सर्वेषामप्या वाधहेतूनां सर्वेषाऽपगमात् मर्वाऽऽवाधरहितोऽयमिति । प्रयोगः-स्वामाधिकेन स्वेन प्रकाशेन प्रकाशवान् मुक्तास्मा, ममस्तप्रकाशावरणरहितत्वात्, तुहिनांशुवत् । तथा चाह—

स्थितः क्षीतांशुवशीव प्रकृत्या भावशुद्धया ।

चन्द्रिकापथ विज्ञानं तदावरणमध्वत् ॥ १ ॥

इति । तथा, अनावाधमुक्तो मुक्तास्मा, ममस्तावाधहेतुरहितत्वात्, ज्वराद्यपगमे स्वच्छाऽऽतुरवत् । तथा शोकम्—

स व्यावाधाभावात् सर्वज्ञत्वाच्च भवति परमसुखी ।

व्यावाधाभावोऽत्र स्वच्छस्य ज्ञस्य परमसुखम् ॥ १ ॥

इति ॥ ४४४ ॥ (१९९२)

D C—*Muktātmā* enjoys a perfect but natural happiness When there is no *āvaraṇa*, it attains high cognizance and when there is absolute *abhāva* of *Karma*, which is nothing but a cause of un-happiness, it is free from all sorts of miseries So, like a sage, *muktātmā* enjoys the delight of high cognizance It enjoys perfect happiness as it is free from the miseries of birth, old age, disease, death, separation from the beloved, absence of love, sorrow, hunger, thirst, cold, heat, desire, anger, pride, passion, hatred, anguish, wickedness, and eagerness etc Lik the Sun, the free soul shines by its own lustre

It has therefore been said that—

Sthitah śītānśuvajjivah prakṛityā bhāvaśuddhaya ।

Candrikāvacca vijnām tadāvaranamabhravat ॥ 1 ॥

With reference to the unobstructed happiness, it has also been said—

Sa vyābādhābhāvat sarvajñatvācca bhavati paramasukhī ।

Vyābādhābhāvo'tra svacchasya jñasya paramasukham ॥2॥444(1992)]

The opponent, then, asks and *Bhagavān* replies—

मुक्तो करणाभावादण्णाणी खं व, नणु विरुद्धोऽयं ।

जमजीवया वि पावइ एत्तो च्चिय भणइ तन्नाम ॥४४५॥(१९९३)

Mutto karanābhāvādannāni kham va, nanu viruddho'yam ।

Jamajivayā vi pāvai etto cciya bhaṇai tannāma ॥ 445 ॥ (1993)

[मुक्तः करणाभावाद्ज्ञानी खमिव, ननु विरुद्धोऽयम् ।

यदजीवतापि प्राप्नोत्येतस्मादेव भणति तन्नाम ॥ ४४५ ॥ (१९९३)

Muktaḥ karanābhāvādajñāni khamiva, nanu viruddho'yam ।

Yadajivatāpi prāpnotyetasmasādeva bhaṇati tannāma ॥445॥ (1993)]

Trans—445 “A free (soul) is ignorant like the sky in absence of senses” “This is really fallacious. Because, in that case, it would attain lifelessness as well.” “Let it (attain lifelessness.) (1993)

टीका—नन्वज्ञानी मुक्तात्मा, करणामावात्, आकाशवत् । अत्राचार्यः प्राह—ननु धर्मिस्वरूपविपरीतसाधनाद् विरुद्धोऽयं हेतुः । तथाहि—अनेनै तदपि सिध्यति—अजीबो मुक्तात्मा, करणामावात्, आकाशवत् । अत्र परा सोत्कर्षं मणति—“तन्नाम चि” ‘नाम’ इत्यभ्यनुज्ञापाम्—अस्त्वैतत्, न नः किमपि क्षूयते । न हि मुक्तात्मनामजीबत्वेऽस्माकं किञ्चिद् नश्यति, येन हेतोर्विरुद्धता प्रेर्यमाणा शोभेत । अत्राह कश्चित्—ननु मुक्तस्याजीबत्वमार्हं तानामप्यनिष्टमयः तत्त्वैतद् रूपमभाचार्येणापि परिहर्तव्यमेव, यथात्मनोऽपि रूपेण समापद्यति तत् कथं परस्परैकस्योद्भाष्यत ? । सत्यमेतत्, किन्तु परलक्ष्मिपरीक्षार्थं प्रेर्यमाचार्यं कृतवान्, कदाचित् क्षोमाद् विमलितप्रतिमां परोऽपि प्रसिद्धिधाने स्मलितवत्स्पर्शीं विदध्यात् । परमार्थतस्तु जीवस्या जीवत्वं कदाचिदपि न भवत्येव ॥ ४४५ ॥ (१९९३)

D O—Prabhāsa—When a *muktatma* is free from sense- it will be called ignorant like *ākāśa*.

I / / m—It is not so. The argument advanced by you pr v ntrary *pariyaya* of soul. It will prove *muktatma* to be lifeless. sense of *indriyas*

Prabhāsa—W ॥ what is wrong if *muktatma* is taken as lifeless ? ॥ 445 ॥ (1993)

Bhagavadān replies—

दद्या—ऽमुत्तच्च सहावजाइओ तस्स दूराविवरीय ।

न हि जघत्तरगमण जुत्त नमसो ष जीवत्त ॥ ४४६ ॥ (१९९४)

Davvā—*muttatta sahāvajāko tassa dūravivariyam* ।

Na hi jaccantaragamanam juttam nabhaso vva jivattam ॥ 446 ॥ (1994)

[द्रव्यामूर्तत्ववत् स्वभावजातितस्तस्य दूरविपरीतम् ।

न हि जात्यन्तरगमनं युक्तं नभस इव जीवत्वम् ॥ ४४६ ॥ (१९९४)

Dravya'mūrtatvavat svabhāvajātītatastasya dūraviparītam ।

Na hijātyantaragamanam yuktam nabhasa iva jīvativam ॥ 446 ॥ (1994)]

Trans—446 By virtue of its natural genesis like *dravyatva* and *a-mūrtatva*, it is far the most fallacious Like life to sky, its transgression to the other genesis, is not proper (1994)

टीका—तस्य मुक्तात्मनो हि यस्मात् कारणाद् न युक्तमिति संबन्धः । किं तद् न युक्तम् ? इत्याह—एकस्या जीवत्वलक्षणाया जातेर्यदजीवत्वलक्षणं जात्यन्तरं तत्र गमनं जात्यन्तरगमनम्, तन्न युक्तम् । कथंभूतं जात्यन्तरम् ? इत्याह—दूरमत्यर्थं विपरीतं दूरविपरीतम् । कस्या दूरविपरीतम् ? इत्याह—“ सहावजाडु त्ति ” जीवत्वलक्षणा या स्वाभाविकी स्वभावभूता जातिः स्वभावजातिस्तस्याः । किंवद् या स्वभावजातिः ? इत्याह—उपमानप्रधानत्वाद् निर्देशस्य, द्रव्या-मूर्तत्ववदिति द्रव्यत्ववदमूर्तत्ववच्चेत्यर्थः । स्वभावजातेर्दूरविपरीतं सत् कस्य यथा किं न युक्तम् ? इत्याह—नभस इव जीवत्वम् । इदमत्र हृदयम्—द्रव्यत्वम्, अमूर्तत्वं च जीवस्य तावत् स्वभावभूता जातिः, तस्याश्च यद् दूरविपरीतं जात्यन्तरमद्रव्यत्वम्, अमूर्तत्वं च, तत्र गमनं तस्य कस्यामप्यवस्थायां न भवति । एवं जीवत्वमपि जीवस्य स्वभावभूतैव जातिः, ततस्तस्या अपि स्वभावजातेर्यद् दूरविपरीतमजीवत्वलक्षणं जात्यन्तरं तत्र गमनं मुक्तावस्थायामपि तस्य न युज्यते । न ह्यजीवस्य सतो नभसः कदाचिदपि जीवत्वाप्राप्तिर्भवति । तस्माद् मुक्तो जीवो यथाऽद्रव्यं मूर्तश्च न भवति, तद्विपक्षस्वभावत्वात् ; एवं जीवस्वाभाव्याद् जीवोऽप्यसौ कदाचिदपि न भवति ; अन्यथा नभः—परमाण्वादीनामपि स्वस्वभावत्यागेन वैपरीत्यापत्त्याऽतिप्रसङ्गादिति ।

अत्राह—यद्येवम्, तर्हि यद् भवतैवोक्तम्—“अजीवो मुक्तात्मा, कारणाभावात्, आकाशवत्” इति, तत् कथं नेतव्यम् ? । अत्रोच्यते—परस्य प्रसङ्गापादनमेव तदस्माभिः कृतम्, तत्करणे च कारणमुक्तमेव, न पुनरनेन हेतुना मुक्तस्याजीवत्वं सिध्यति, प्रतिबन्धाभावात् ; तथाहि—यदि करणैर्जीवत्वं

कृत मवेत्, यथा दहनेन धूमः, व्यापकानि वा जीवत्वस्य करणानि यदि मवयुः, यथा शिथलाया वृक्षस्यम्, तदा करणनिवृत्तौ मवेत्जीवत्वनिवृत्तिः, यथाग्नि-वृक्षत्वनिवृत्तौ धूम-शिथलात्वयोः; न चैतदस्ति, जीवत्वस्थानादि पारिणामिकमावरूपत्वेनाकृतकत्वात् । व्याप्य-व्यापकमाधोऽपीन्द्रियाणां क्षरीरेणैव सह युज्यते, उभयस्यापि पौद्गलिकत्वात्, न तु जीवत्वेन, जीवस्यामूर्तत्वेनात्यन्त तद्विलक्षणत्वात् । तस्मात् करणनिवृत्तावप्यनिवृत्तमेव मुक्तस्य जीवत्वमिति ॥ ४४६ (१९९४) ॥

D C—Bhagavān —Your statement is absolutely fallacious. Just as *dravyatva* and *a-mūrtatva* are the innate characteristics of a soul and just as that genesis of *jīva* never exists in any condition in a genesis having contrary characteristics like *a-dravyatva* and *a-mūrtatva* *jīvatva* is also the innate and natural characteristic of *jīva* and that genesis of *jīva* never exists in a genesis having opposite characteristics. Consequently in the state of *multātma* *jīva* does never become *a-jīva*.

Just as a free soul never attains the condition of *a-dravyatva* and *mūrtatva* it never reaches a life-less state leaving its own innate living characteristics. For if it leaves its own characteristics, the sky and molecules will also leave their characteristics and accept the unnatural tendency.

Dravya —If it is so how do you explain your statement that *multātma* *jīva* like *ākāśa*, on account of the *abhāva* of sense-organs

Bhagavān —The statement was made by me only to refute the opponents view. In doing so the reason has already been explained but this argument does not lead to prove *multātma* to be lifeless as there is no *pratybandha* for it. For if *jīvatva* is established by the existence of *indriyas* it goes without saying that in absence of sense-organs *jīva* will also be absent, as in the cases of fire and smoke and *Asoka* and *tripatva*. But it does not happen actually. The sense-organs

are connected with body by the relation of part and whole, but they are not connected with *jīva* because of its *a-mūrtatva*. It is not correct, therefore, to say that with the *abhāva* of *indriyas*, there is *abhāva* of *jīvatva* in *muktātma*.

Prabhāsa —But, even in that case, how will you answer my contention that *muktātma* is ignorant like sky in absence of sense-organs ?

The reply is—

मुत्ताइभावओ नोवलद्धिमंतिंदियाइं कुंभो व ।

उवलंभद्वाराणि उ ताइं जीवो तदुवलद्धा ॥ ४४७ ॥ (१९९५)

तदुवरमे वि सरणओ तद्वावारे वि नोवलंभाओ ।

इंदियभिन्नो आया पंचगवक्खोवलद्धा वा ॥ ४४८ ॥ (१९९६)

Muttāibhāvao novaladdhimantindiyāim kumbho vva ।

Uvalambhaddārāṇi u tāim jīvo taduvaladdhā ॥ 447 ॥ (1995)

Taduvarame vi saranao tadvāvāre vi novalambhāo ।

Indiyabhinnō āyā paṇcagavakkhovaladdhā vā ॥ 448 ॥ (1996)

[मूर्तादिभावतो नोपलब्धिमन्तीन्द्रियाणि कुम्भ इव ।

उपलम्भद्वाराणि तु तानि जीवस्तदुपलब्धा ॥ ४४७ ॥ (१९९५)

तदुपरमेऽपि स्मरणतस्तद्व्यापारेऽपि नोपलम्भात् ।

इन्द्रियमिन्न आत्मा पञ्चगवाक्षोपलब्धेव ॥ ४४८ ॥ (१९९६)

Mūrtadibhāvato nopalabdhimantīndriyaṇi kumbha iva ।

Upalambhadvārāṇi tu tāni jīvastdupalabdha ॥ 447 ॥ (1995)

Taduparame'pi smaranastadvyāpare'pi nopalambhāt ।

Indriyabhinnā ātmā paṇcagavaksopalabdheva ॥ 448 ॥ (1996)]

Trans —447-448 On account of their (qualities like) *mūrtatva* etc like *ghata*, sense-organs do not attain apprehension, but they are mere mediums of apprehension Their

कृत मवेत्, यथा दहनेन धूमः, व्यापकानि वा जीवत्वस्य करणानि यदि मवेयुः, यथा शिक्षया इक्ष्वस्वम्, तदा करणनिवृत्तौ मवेत्जीवत्वनिवृत्तिः, यथाऽग्नि-इक्ष्वत्तनिवृत्तौ धूम-शिक्षयात्वयोः; न चैतदस्ति, जीवत्वस्यानादि पारिणामिकमावरूपत्वेनाकृतकत्वात् । व्याप्य-व्यापकभावोऽपीन्द्रियाणां घरीरेणैव सह युज्यते, उभयस्यापि पौद्गलिकत्वात्, न तु जीवत्वेन, जीवस्यामूर्तत्वेनात्यन्त तद्विलक्षणत्वात् । तस्मात् करणनिवृत्तावप्यनिवृत्तमेव मुक्तस्य जीवत्वमिति ॥ ४४६ (१९९४) ॥

D C—Bhagavān —Your statement is absolutely fallacious. Just as *dravyatva* and *a-mūrtatva* are the innate characteristics of a soul and just as that genesis of *jīva* never exists in any condition in a genesis having contrary characteristics like *a-dravyatva* and *a-mūrtatva* *jīvatva* is also the innate and natural characteristic of *jīva* and that genesis of *jīva* never exists in a genesis having opposite characteristics. Consequently in the state of *muktatma* *jīva* does never become *a-jīva*.

Just as a free soul never attains the condition of *a-dravyatva* and *mūrtatva* it never reaches a life-less state leaving its own innate living characteristics. For if it leaves *abhava*, the sky and molecules will also leave their characteristics and accept the unnatural tendency.

I t —If it is so how do you explain your statement that *muktatma* *jīva* like *akāśa*, on account of the *abhava* of sense-organs.

Bhagavān —The statement was made by me only to refute the opponent's view. In doing so the reason has already been explained but this argument does not lead to prove *muktatma* to be lifeless, as there is no *pratibandha* for it. For if *jīvatva* is established by the existence of *indriyas* it goes without saying that in absence of sense-organs *jīva* will also be absent, as in the cases of fire and smoke and *Aśoka* and *trihata*. But it does not happen actually. The sense-organs

are connected with body by the relation of part and whole, but they are not connected with *jīva* because of its *a-mūrtatva*. It is not correct, therefore, to say that with the *abhāva* of *indriyas*, there is *abhāva* of *jīvatva* in *muktātma*.

Prabhāsa —But, even in that case, how will you answer my contention that *muktātma* is ignorant like sky in absence of sense-organs ?

The reply is—

मुत्ताइभावओ नोवलद्धिमंतिंदियाइं कुंभो व ।
उवलंभहाराणि उ ताइं जीवो तदुवलद्धा ॥ ४४७ ॥ (१९९५)
तदुवरमे वि सरणओ तवावारे वि नोवलंभाओ ।
इंदियभिन्नो आया पंचगवक्खोवलद्धा वा ॥ ४४८ ॥ (१९९६)

Muttāibhāvao novaladdhimantindiyāim kumbho vva ।
Uvalambhaddārāṇi u tāim jīvo taduvaladdhā ॥ 447 ॥ (1995)
Taduvarame vi saranao tavvāvāre vi novalambhāo ।
Indiyabhinno āyā pancagavakkhovaladdhā vā ॥ 448 ॥ (1996)

[मूर्तादिभावतो नोपलब्धिमन्तीन्द्रियाणि कुम्भ इव ।
उपलम्भद्वाराणि तु तानि जीवस्तदुपलब्धा ॥ ४४७ ॥ (१९९५)
तदुपरमेऽपि स्मरणतस्तद्व्यापारेऽपि नोपलम्भात् ।
इन्द्रियमिन्न आत्मा पञ्चगवाक्षोपलब्धेव ॥ ४४८ ॥ (१९९६)

Mūrtādibhāvato nopalabdhimantīndriyāṇi kumbha iva ।
Upalambhadvārāṇi tu tāni jīvastdupalabdha ॥ 447 ॥ (1995)
Taduparame'pi smaranastadvyāpāre'pi nopalambhat ।
Indriyabhinna atma pancagavaksopalabdheva ॥ 448 ॥ (1996)]

Trans—447-448 On account of their (qualities like) *mūrtatva* etc like *ghata*, sense-organs do not attain apprehension, but they are mere mediums of apprehension Their

(real) agent of apprehension is *jīva*. Because of (its power of) recollection even when they cease to work and for want of apprehension even when they are working the soul is distinguished from sense-organs like an observer from the five windows (1995-1996)

टीका-अनयोर्भास्या पूर्ववत् । केवलं प्रस्तुते भावार्थ उच्यते-यदीन्द्रियाण्युपलब्धिमन्ति मवेयुस्तदा तन्निष्ठायाप्युपलब्धिनिष्ठिर्मवेत्, न चैतदस्ति, अन्वय-व्यतिरेकाभ्यां जीवस्योपलब्धिमन्निष्ठायादिति ॥ ४४७-४४८ ॥ (१९९५-१९९६) ॥

D C—If the *indriyas* were the real agents of apprehension there would have been no perception when they ceased to work. But it does not happen so. On the other hand when they worked perception should positively take place but due to the absent-mindedness of the observer it does not happen so. The power of *jīva* is thus established from the positive as well as negative point of view ॥447-448॥ (1995-1996)

Indicating that *jñāna* would not vanish with *indriyas* but it is the very innate nature of *jīva* the author states—

नाणरहिओ न जीवो स्वरूपतोऽणुरिव मूर्तिभावेण ।

जनण विम्वदमिदं अस्ति य सो नाणरहिओ य ॥४४९॥ (१९९७)

Nānarahi na jiṇaḥ svarūpatatoṇuriva mūrtibhāvenam ।

Jam tena viruddhamidam atthi ya so nānarahio ya ॥449॥ (1997)

[ज्ञानरहितो न जीवः स्वरूपतोऽणुरिव मूर्तिभावेन ।

यत् जन विम्वदमिदमस्ति य सो ज्ञानरहितश्च ॥ ४४९ ॥ (१९९७)

Jñānarahito na jiṇaḥ svarūpatatoṇuriva mūrtibhāvena ।

Yat tena viruddhamidamasti ca sa jñānarahitaśca ॥449॥ (1997)]

Trans—449 Like an atom, *jīva* as such is not void of cognizance, because of its corporeal nature. Hence the statement that it is void of cognizance is incorrect. (1997)

टीका—यद् यस्माज्ज्ञानरहितो जीवः कदाचिदपि न भवति, ज्ञानस्य तत्स्वरूपत्वात्, यथा मूर्तिभावेन रहितोऽणुर्न भवति, तेन तस्माद् कारणाद् विरुद्धमेतत्—“ अस्ति चासौ मुक्तो जीवः, अथ च स ज्ञानरहितः ” इति । न हि स्वरूपस्याभावे स्वरूपवतोऽवस्थानं युज्यते, तद्व्यतिरिक्तस्य तस्यासत्त्वात्, तथा चानन्तरमेवोक्तम्—“ न हि जञ्चंतरगमणं जुत्तं नभसो व जीवत्तं ” इति ॥ ४४९ (१९९७) ॥

D C—Just as an atom cannot exist without a finite form, *jīva* could also never exist without cognizance, as cognizance is the very nature of *jīva*. Since a corporeal body cannot exist without a finite form, your statement that *muktātmā* is void of *gnāna*, is absolutely incorrect. ॥ 449 ॥ (1997)

Again there is a question and its reply—

किह सो नाणसरूवो नणु पच्चक्खाणुभूओ नियए ।
परदेहम्मि वि गज्झो स पवित्ति-निवित्तिलिंगाओ ॥४५०॥ (१९९८)

*Kiha so nānasarūvo nanu paccakkhānubhūo niyae ।
Paradehammi vi gajjho sa pavitti-nivittilingāo ॥ 450 ॥ (1998)*

[कथं स ज्ञानस्वरूपो ननु प्रत्यक्षानुभूतितो निजके ।
परदेहेऽपि ग्राह्यः स प्रवृत्ति-निवृत्तिलिङ्गात् ॥ ४५० ॥ (१९९८)

*Katham sa jñanasvarūpo nanu pratyakṣānubhūtito nijake ।
Paradehe'pi grāhyah sa pravritti-nivrittilingāt ॥ 450 ॥ (1998)]*

Trans—450 “ How does it exist in the form of cognizance ? ” “ By direct apprehension, it is cognizable in case of its own body, and in the capacity of engagement and retirement in case of another's body ” (1998)

टीका—ननु कथमसौ जीवो ज्ञानस्वरूप इति निश्चीयते ? । अत्रोत्तर-माह—‘ ननु ’ इत्यक्षमायाम्, ननु निजे देहे तावत् प्रत्यक्षानुभवादेव ज्ञानस्वरूपो जीव इति विज्ञायते, इन्द्रियव्यापारोपरमेऽपि तद्व्यापारोपलब्धार्थानुस्मरणात्, तद्व्यापारेऽपि चान्यमनस्कतायामनुपलम्भात्,

(real) agent of apprehension is *jīva*. Because of (its power of) recollection even when they cease to work and for want of apprehension even when they are working the soul is distinguished from sense-organs like an observer from the five windows (1995-1996)

टीका-अनयोर्ग्यास्या पूर्ववत् । केवल प्रस्तुते मावार्थ उच्यते-वदीन्द्रियाण्युपलम्बिमन्ति मवेयुस्तदा तन्निष्ठावप्युपलम्बिनिष्ठमिदमेतत्, न चैतदस्ति, अन्वय-व्यतिरेकाभ्यां जीवस्योपलम्बिमावनिबध्यादिति ॥ ४४७-४४८ ॥ (१९९५-१९९६) ॥

D C—If the *indriyas* were the real agents of apprehension there would have been no perception when they ceased to work. But it does not happen so. On the other hand when they worked perception should positively take place but due to the absent-mindedness of the observer it does not happen so. The power of *jīva* is thus established from the positive as well as negative point of view ॥447-448॥ (1995-1996)

Indicating that *jñāna* would not vanish with *indriyas* but it is the very innate nature of *jīva* the author states—

नाणरहिओ न जीवो सरूवओऽणु व मुत्तिभावेण ।

ज नण विरुद्धमिदं अस्मि य सो नाणरहिओ य ॥४४९॥ (१९९७)

Nānarahio n n jīvo sarūvaonu vva muttibhāvenam ।

Jam tena viruddhamidam aṭṭhi ya so nānarahio ya ॥449॥ (1997)

[ज्ञानरहितो न जीवः स्वरूपतोऽणुरिव मूर्तिभावेन ।

यत् तेन विरुद्धमिदमस्ति च स ज्ञानरहितश्च ॥ ४४९ ॥ (१९९७)

Jñānarahito na jīvaḥ svarūpato ṇuriva mūrtibhāvena ।

Yat tena viruddhamidamasti ca sa jñānarahitaśca ॥449॥ (1997)]

Trans—449 Like an atom, *jīva* as such is not void of cognizance, because of its corporeal nature. Hence the statement that it is void of cognizance is incorrect. (1997)

टीका—सेन्द्रियो जन्तुर्देशतोऽप्यावरणक्षये तावत् तारतम्येन ज्ञानयुक्त एव भवति, यस्य त्वनिन्द्रियस्य सर्वमप्यावरणं क्षीणम्, स निःशेषावरणापगमे शुद्धतर एव भवति—संपूर्णज्ञानप्रकाशयुक्त एव भवतीत्यर्थः; यथा समस्ता-
 आवरणापगमे संपूर्णप्रकाशमयः सूर्यः । ततस्तन्मयभावस्य प्रकाशमयत्वस्य
 करणाभावेनाभावाद् हेतोः “ से ” तस्य मुक्तस्य यदज्ञानित्वं प्रेर्यते भवता,
 तद् न युक्तम्, आवारकाभावे तस्यैव प्रकर्षवतो ज्ञानप्रकाशस्य सद्भावादिति
 ॥ ४५१ ॥ (१९९९) ॥

D C —Muktātmā possesses the power of complete cogni-
 zance. A soul having sense-organs is cognizant but to a more or
 less extent on account of its *āvaranas* being removed partially
 Since all the *āvaranas* are removed in case of a *muktātmā*, it
 is completely cognizant

Just as the Sun becomes completely resplendent with
 lustre when all the *āvaranas* like clouds etc are removed, the
muktātmā is also completely resplendent with the lustre of
 cognizance when all *āvaranas* of *indriyas* have been removed
 ॥ 451 ॥ (1999)

एवं पगासमइओ जीवो छिद्वावभासयत्ताओ ।

किंचिन्मेत्तं भासइ छिद्वावरणपईवो व ॥ ४५२ ॥ (२०००)

सुबहुयरं वियाणइ मुत्तो सवप्पिहाणाविगमाओ ।

अवणीयघरो व नरो विगयावरणप्पईवो व ॥ ४५३ ॥ (२००१)

Evam pagāsamaio jīvo chiddāvabhāsayattāo ।

Kincimmettam bhāsaī chiddāvaranapaīvo vva ॥ 452 ॥ (2000)

Subahuyaram viyānai mutto savvappihānavigamāo ।

Avaniyagharo vva naro vigayāvaranappaīvo vva ॥ 453 ॥ (2001)

[एवं प्रकाशमयो जीवश्छिद्वावभासकत्वात् ।

किञ्चिन्मात्रं भासते छिद्वावरणप्रदीप इव ॥ ४५२ ॥ (२०००)

अदृष्टा-ऽभुतानामपि चार्थानां तथाविषययोपश्रमपाटवात् कदाचिद् व्याख्या
नाशस्यायां चेतसि स्फुरणात् । एतच्च स्वसंवेदनसिद्धमपि भवतः प्रष्टव्यतां
गतम् । तथा, स सन्तुः परदेहेऽपि ज्ञानस्वरूप एवेति ग्राह्यः । कुतः ? । तस्मात्
विषयप्रवृत्ति-निवृत्तिलिङ्गादिति ॥ ४५० ॥ (१९९८) ॥

D C—Prabhāsa—With what authority can you say that
Jīva is *jñānasvarūpa* ?

Bhagavān—That *jīva* exists as cognizance in its own
body is seen by means of direct apprehension. Even when
sense-organs cease to work the object perceived by sense-
organs is recollected, while sometimes the object is not
apprehended even when the sense-organs are working because
of absent-mindedness—sometimes perception crops up in the
mind due to the relaxation of their destruction at the time of
explanation

In case of another's body also *jīva* is known to be
jñānasvarūpa on account of its inclination (to the desirable
objects) and aversion (from the undesirable ones). §450n(1998)]

And

सद्वावर्णावगमे सो सुद्धयरो भवेज्ज सूरौ व ।

तस्मयभावाभावादण्णाणित्तं न युक्तं ते ॥ ४५१ ॥ (१९९९)

Savvāvaranā 1. me so suddhayaro bhavēja sūro vva ।

Tammayabhavābhavadanñāṇittam na yuttam se § 451 ■ (1999)

[सर्वावरणापममं स सुद्धतरो भवेत् सूरौ व ।

तन्मयभावभावादण्णानित्तं न युक्तं तस्य ॥ ४५१ ॥ (१९९९)

Sarvavarāṇāpāpamam sa suddhataro bhavot sūra vva ।

Tannmayabhavābhavadanñāṇittam na yuttam tasya §451a (1999)]

Trans—451 At the removal of all interruptions that
(*mukṣātmā*) would be purer like the Sun. It is not therefore,
proper to attribute ignorance to it (1999)

टीका—सेन्द्रियो जन्तुर्देशतोऽप्यावरणक्षये तावत् तारतम्येन ज्ञानयुक्त एव भवति, यस्य त्वनिन्द्रियस्य सर्वमप्यावरणं क्षीणम्, स निःशेषावरणापगमे शुद्धतर एव भवति—संपूर्णज्ञानप्रकाशयुक्त एव भवतीत्यर्थः; यथा समस्ता-
 आवरणापगमे संपूर्णप्रकाशमयः सूर्यः । ततस्तन्मयभावस्य प्रकाशमयत्वस्य
 करणामावेनाभावाद् हेतोः “ से ” तस्य मुक्तस्य यदज्ञानित्वं प्रेर्यते भवता,
 तद् न युक्तम्, आवारकाभावे तस्यैव प्रकर्षवतो ज्ञानप्रकाशस्य सद्भावादिति
 ॥ ४५१ ॥ (१९९९) ॥

D C —Muktātmā possesses the power of complete cogni-
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 cognizance when all *āvaranas* of *indriyas* have been removed
 ॥ 451 ॥ (1999)

एवं पगासमइओ जीवो छिद्वावभासयत्ताओ ।

किञ्चिन्मेत्तं भासइ छिद्वावरणपईवो व ॥ ४५२ ॥ (२०००)

सुबहुयरं वियाणइ मुत्तो सबप्पिहाणविगमाओ ।

अवणीयघरो व नरो विगयावरणप्पईवो व ॥ ४५३ ॥ (२००१)

Evam pagāsamaio jīvo chiddāvabhāsayattāo ।

Kiñcimmettam bhāsa chiddāvaranapaīvo vva ॥ 452 ॥ (2000)

Subahuyaram viyānai mutto savvappihānavigamāo ।

Avanīyagharo vva naro vigayāvaranappaīvo vva ॥ 453 ॥ (2001)

[एवं प्रकाशमयो जीवश्छिद्वावभासकत्वात् ।

किञ्चिन्मात्रं भासते छिद्वावरणप्रदीप इव ॥ ४५२ ॥ (२०००)

सुबहुतरं विज्ञानाति मुक्तः सर्वपिधानविगमात् ।

अपनीतगृह इव नरो विगतावरणप्रदीप इव ॥ ४५३ ॥ (२००१)

Evam prakāśamayo jīvaśchidravabhaśakatvat ।

Kincinmātram bhāṣate obhadravarāṇapradīpa iva ॥453॥ (2000)]

Subahutaram vijñānati muktaḥ sarvapīdhanavigamat ।

Apantāgriha iva naro vigatavarāṇapradīpa iva ॥ 453 ॥ (2001)]

Trans—452-453 The soul is thus lustrous. It shines only a little, like a lamp (shining) under a porous obstruction on account of its shining through holes. (But) like a person relieved from home or like a lamp shining without obstructions the *mukta* perceives completely when all its interruptions have been removed. (2000-2001)

टीका—तदेव सति सर्वदा प्रकाशमयः प्रकाशस्वभाव एव जीवः, केवलं संसार्यवस्थायां छद्यस्यः किञ्चिन्मात्रमवशमयति, शीघ्राः शीघ्रावरणच्छिन्नैरिन्द्रियच्छिन्नैर्भावमासनात्, सच्छिद्रकट-कुम्भाद्यन्तरितप्रदीपवदिति । मुक्तस्तु मुक्तावस्थायां प्राप्तो जीवः सुबहुतरं विज्ञानाति—यदस्ति तत् सर्वं प्रकाशयतीत्यर्थः, सर्वपिधानविगमात्—सर्वावरणक्षयादित्यर्थः, अपनीतसमस्तगृह पुर्य इव, विगतसमस्तकट-कुम्भाद्यावरणप्रदीप इव वेति । यो हि मच्छिद्रावरणान्तरितः स्तोक प्रकाशयति स निःशेषावरणापगमे सुबहुतं प्रकाशयति । न त तस्य सर्वथा प्रकाशभाव इति भावः । तस्मात् “मुचस्स परं सोक्खं णाणा-णासाहजो” इत्यादि स्मृतम् ॥ ४५२-४५३ ॥ (२०००-२००१)

D C—*Jīva* is thus shown as lustrous with complete perception. In the mundane life *jīva* is obstructed by various *avarāṇas* and hence it will be able to perceive through the holes of indriyas to a certain extent like a lamp shining through a porous wall.

But in the *mukta* state the free soul illumines everything perfectly with its power of cognizance like a lamp shining

without any obstruction or like a man relieved of all household worries.

This proves, therefore, the assertion that a free soul enjoys perfect happiness by means of perfect perception, when all its obstructions have been removed ॥ 452-453 ॥ (2000-2001)]

Then doubting the existence of happiness to a free soul, the opponent argues—

पुण्या-ऽपुण्यकयाइं जं सुह-दुक्खाइं तेण तन्नासे ।

तन्नासाओ मुत्तो निस्सुह-दुक्खो जहागासं ॥ ४५४ ॥ (२००२)

अहवा निस्सुह-दुक्खो नभं व देहे-दियादभावाओ ।

आधारो देहो चिय जं सुह-दुक्खोवलद्धीणं ॥ ४५५ ॥ (२००३)

Punnā-'punnakayāim jam suha-dukkhāim tena tannāse ।

Tannāsāo mutto nissuha-dukkho jahāgāsam ॥ 454 ॥ (2002)

Ahavā nissuha-dukkho nabham va dehe'ndiyāi bhāvāo ।

Ādhāro deho cciya jam suha-dukkhohavaladdhīnam ॥ 455 ॥ (2003)

[पुण्या-ऽपुण्यकृते यत् सुख-दुःखे तेन तन्नासे ।

तन्नाशाद् मुक्तो निःसुख-दुःखो यथाकाशम् ॥ ४५४ ॥ (२००२)

अथवा निःसुख-दुःखो नभ इव देहे-न्द्रियाद्यभावात् ।

आधारो देह एव यत् सुख-दुःखोपलब्धीनाम् ॥ ४५५ ॥ (२००३)

Punya-'punyakṛite yat sukha-duḥkhe tena tannāse ।

Tannāsād mukto nīhsukha-duḥkho yathakāśam ॥ 454 ॥ (2002)

Athavā nīhsukh-duḥkho nabha iva dehe-ndriyādyabhāvat ।

Ādhāro deha eva yat sukha-duḥkhopalabdhīnam ॥ 455 ॥ (2003)]

Trans.—454-455 Since happiness and misery are the products of *punya* and *pāpa* (respectively), the *mukta* (soul) will be free from *punya* and *pāpa* like *ākāśa*, because it vanishes with them Or, since body (itself) is the means of

सुषुप्तं विज्ञानाति मुक्तः सर्वविधानविगमात् ।

अपनीतगृह इव नरो विगतावरणप्रदीप इव ॥ ४५३ ॥ (२००१)

Evam prakāśamayo jivāśchidravabhāśakatvat ।

Kincinmatram bhāśate obhāvaranapradīpa iva ॥452a (2000)]

Subahutaram vijānāti muktaḥ sarvapīdhanavigamat ।

Apantīgnha iva naro vigatāvaranapradīpa iva ॥453 a (2001)]

Trans—452-453 The soul is thus lustrous It shines only a little, like a lamp (shining) under a porous obstruction on account of its shining through holes. (But) like a person relieved from home or like a lamp shining without obstructions, the *muktmān* perceives completely when all its interruptions have been removed (2000-2001)

टीका—सदेवं सति सर्वदा प्रकाशमयः प्रकाशस्वभाव एव जीवः, केवल संसार्यवस्थायां छद्मस्यः किञ्चिन्मात्रमवमासयति, क्षीणाञ्जीवावरणच्छिन्नैरिन्द्रियच्छिन्नैर्भावमासनात्, मच्छिन्नकुट-कुम्भाघातनिरितप्रदीपवदिति । मुक्तस्तु मुक्तावस्थायां प्राप्तो जीवः सुषुप्तं विज्ञानाति—यदस्ति तत् सर्वं प्रकाशयतीत्यर्थः, सर्वविधानविगमात्—सर्ववरणक्षयादित्यर्थः, अपनीतगमनगृह पृथक् इव, विगतसमस्तकुट-कुम्भाघातनिरितप्रदीप इव वेति । यो हि मच्छिन्नावरणान्तरितः स्तोक प्रकाशयति स निःक्षेपावरणापगमे सुषुप्तेव प्रकाशयति । न तु तस्य सर्वदा प्रकाशमाय इति भावः । तस्मात् “मुक्तस्त परं मोक्षं पाणा-पावाहजो” इत्यादि स्थितम् ॥ ४५२-४५३ ॥ (२०००-२००१)

D C—*Jīva* is thus shown as lustrous with complete perception In the mundane life *jīva* is obstructed by various *avaranas* and hence it will be able to perceive through the holes of indriyas to a certain extent like a lamp shining through a porous wall

But in the *mukta* state the free soul illumines everything perfectly with its power of cognizance like a lamp shining

Punyaphalam duhkhameva karmodayataḥ phalamiva pāpasya ।
Nanu pāpaphale'pī samam pratyaksavirodhitaḥ caiva. ॥456॥(2004)]

Trans —456 “ On account of (the rise of) *Karma*, the fruition of virtuous deeds is even distressful like the fruition of sins. The same is really the case with the fruition of sins also ” And it is (nothing but) clear contradiction (2004)

टीका—चक्रवर्तिपदलाभादिकं पुण्यफलं निश्चयतो दुःखमेव, कर्मोदय-
जन्यत्वात्, नरकत्वादिपापफलवत् । परः प्राह—ननु पापफलेऽपि समानमिदम्,
तथाहि—अत्रापि वक्तुं शक्यत एतत्—उक्तं पापफलं दुःखत्वेनाभिमतं परमार्थतः
सुखमेव, कर्मोदयजन्यत्वात्, पुण्यफलवत् । एव च वदतां प्रत्यक्षविरोधिता,
स्वसंवेद्यसुख-दुःखयोर्वैपरीत्येन संवित्यभावादिति ॥ ४५६ ॥ (२००४)

D C —*Bhagavān* —Like *pāpa phalas*, the *punya phalas* like that of attaining *cakṛavartī pāda* (sovereignty of the world) etc, are also distressful on account of their being produced by *Karma*

Prabhāsa —The same could be said of *pāpa-phalas* as well The *pāpa-phalas* although known as distressful are in reality happy, on account of their being produced by *Karma*

Bhagavān —Since you have not understood the real sense of *sukha-duḥkha*, you have said so. But it is really contradicting ॥ 436 ॥ (2004)

जत्तो च्चिय पच्चक्खं सोम्म ! सुहं नत्थि दुक्खमेवेदं ।
तप्पडियारविभत्तं तो पुण्णफलं ति दुक्खं ति ॥४५७॥(२००५)

Jatto cciya paccakkham Somma ! suham natthi dukkhamevedam
Tappadiyāravibhattam to punnaphalam ti dukkham ti ॥457॥ (2005)

[यत एव प्रत्यक्षं सौम्य ! सुखं नास्ति दुःखमेवेदम् ।

तत्प्रतीकारविभक्तं ततः पुण्यफलमिति दुःखमिति ॥४५७॥ (२००५)

apprehension of happiness and misery it is free from happiness and misery like the sky in absence of body as well as sense-organs (2002-2003)

टीका-पुण्यात् सुखमुपजायत, पापाच्च दुःखम्, इति मवतामपि संमतम्, तेन तस्मात् तयोः पुण्य-पापयोः कारणभूतयोर्नाशं सुख-दुःखयोः कार्यरूपयोर्नाशाद् निःसुख-दुःख एव मुक्तात्मा प्राप्नोति, तत्कारणमावात् आकाशवदिति । अथवा, निःसुख-दुःखोऽसौ, दहे-न्द्रियामावात्, तमोवत्, यद् यस्माद् दह एव, तथेन्द्रियाणि च सुख-दुःखोपलम्बीनामाचारो दृश्यते, न पुनर्देहमावे सुख-दुःखे दृश्यते, नापीन्द्रियामावे ज्ञान काप्युपलभ्यते । ततः सिद्धस्य कथं तदमावात् तानि भद्दीयन्ते ? इति ॥ ४५४-४५५ ॥ (२००२-२००३)

D C —Prabhāsa —That happiness is born of *punya* and misery of *pāpa* has already been accepted by you. Now when *punya* and *pāpa* vanish happiness and misery being their *karyas* will naturally vanish Hence like the sky *muktatma* will be free from *sukha-dukkha*. Or it will be free from *sukha-dukkha* in absence of *deha* and *indriyas*.

Since *deha* is an active means of apprehending *sukha* — there will be no apprehension of *sukha-dukkha* in its absence. In absence of *indriyas* there will be no apprehension. Frequently a *mukta* (being) can never experience happiness and misery.
 ॥ 454-455 ॥ (2002-2003)

Bhagavata

पुण्यफल दुःखं चियं कम्मोदयओ फलं व पावस्स ।

नणु पावफले वि समं पच्चक्खविरोहिआ चेव ॥४५६॥ (२००४)

*Punnaphalam dukkham cīya kammodayao phalam va pāvassa ।
Nanu pāvaphale vi samam paccakkhavirohīā ceva ॥ 456 ॥ (2004)*

[पुण्यफल दुःखमिव कर्मोदयतः फलमिव पापस्य ।

ननु पापफलमपि मम प्रत्यक्षविरोधिता चेत् ॥ ४५६ ॥ (२००४)

Punyaphalam duḥkhameva karmodayataḥ phalamiva pāpasya ।
Nanu pāpaphalo'pi samam pratyakṣavirodhita eva ॥456॥(2004)]

Trans—456 “ On account of (the rise of) *Karma*, the fruition of virtuous deeds is even distressful like the fruition of sins. The same is really the case with the fruition of sins also ” And it is (nothing but) clear contradiction. (2004)

टीका—चक्रवर्तिपदलाभादिकं पुण्यफलं निश्चयतो दुःखमेव, कर्मोदय-
जन्यत्वात्, नरकत्वादिपापफलवत् । परः प्राह—ननु पापफलेऽपि ममानमिदम्,
तथाहि—अत्रापि वक्तुं शक्यत एतत्—उक्तं पापफलं दुःखत्वेनाभिमतं परमार्थतः
सुखमेव, कर्मोदयजन्यत्वात्, पुण्यफलवत् । एवं च वदतां प्रत्यक्षविरोधिता,
स्वसंवेद्यसुख-दुःखयोर्वैपरीत्येन संविन्यभावादिति ॥ ४५६ ॥ (२००४)

D C—*Bhagavān*—Like *pāpa phalas*, the *punya phalas* like that of attaining *cakravartī pāda* (sovereignty of the world) etc, are also distressful on account of their being produced by *Karma*

Prabhāsa—The same could be said of *pāpa-phalas* as well The *pāpa-phalas* although known as distressful are in reality happy, on account of their being produced by *Karma*

Bhagavān.—Since you have not understood the real sense of *sukha-duḥkha*, you have said so. But it is really contradicting ॥ 436 ॥ (2004)

जत्तोच्चिय पच्चक्खं सोम्म ! सुहं नत्थि दुक्खमेवेदं ।
तप्पडियारविभत्तं तो पुण्णफलं ति दुक्खं ति ॥४५७॥(२००५)

Jatto cciya paccakkham Somma ! suham natthi dukkhamevedam
Tappadiyāravibhattam to punnaphalam ti dukkham ti ॥457॥ (2005)

[यत एव प्रत्यक्षं सौम्य ! सुखं नास्ति दुःखमेवेदम् ।

तत्प्रतीकारविभक्तं ततः पुण्यफलमिति दुःखमिति ॥४५७॥ (२००५)

Yata eva pratyakṣam Saumya ! sukham nāsti duḥkhamavedam ।
Tatpratīkaravibhaktam tataḥ puṇyaphalamiti duḥkhamiti ॥457॥]

Trans.—457 That which is directly perceived as happiness is not happiness, O Saumya ! but it is only misery. It has been distinguished (from *duḥkha*) only as its resistance. The fruition of virtuous deeds is, therefore, (nothing but) *duḥkha*. (2005)

टीका—सौम्य ! प्रभास ! यत् एष दुःखेऽनुभूयमानः कस्याप्यविषयं
स्वमतेः सुखं प्रत्यक्षं नास्ति, सुखानुभवः स्वसंविदितो न विद्यते, अतः
एवास्मादिरूप्यते—“ दुःखमेवेदं ” इति, यत् किमप्यत्र संसारचक्रे सङ्ग-
चन्दना—ऽङ्गनासंमोगादिसमुत्पन्नमपि विद्यते तत् सर्वं दुःखमेवेत्यर्थः, क्वचि-
तस्याङ्गनासंमोगादिष्वप्यौत्सुक्यजनितवारति रूपस्य दुःखस्य प्रतीकारोऽङ्गना-
संमोगादिकस्तत्प्रतीकारस्तेन तत्प्रतीकारेण दुःखमपि सर्वं विभक्तं भूयैर्मेदेन
व्यवस्थापितम्—तत्प्रतीकाररूपं कामिनीसंमोगादिकं पामाकण्डूयनादिष्व-
सुखमभ्यवसितम्, शूलारोपण-शूल-शिरोबाधादिभ्यामपि—बन्ध-वधादिजनित-
तु दुःखमिति । रमणीसंमोग-चक्रवर्तिपदलाभादिसुखं स्वसंविदितं “दुःखम्”
इति पदतां प्रत्यक्षविरोध इति चेत् । तदयुक्तम्, मोहमूढप्रत्यक्षत्वात् तस्य,
तद्गामौत्सुक्यजनितवारतिरूपदुःखप्रतीकाररूपत्वाद् दुःखेऽपि तत्र सुखाप्य-
वसाय पामाकण्डूयना—ऽपभ्याहारपरिमोगादिष्व- तथा चोक्तम्—

नम्रं प्रत इवाविष्टं कथन्तीमुपगृह्यताम् ।

गाढायामितमर्वाङ्गः स सुखी रमते किल ॥ १ ॥

औत्सुक्यमाश्रम्यसादयति प्रतिष्ठां कृत्वाति उन्मथपरिपालनवृत्तिरेव ।

नातिभ्रमापगमनाय यथा भ्रमाय रान्य स्वहस्तगतदण्डमिवातपत्रम् ॥ २ ॥

मुक्ताः भ्रियः सकलकामदुष्पास्ततः किं संप्रीणिताः प्रणयिनः स्वधनैस्ततः किम् ?
दत्तं पदं शिरसि विद्विषतां ततः किं कल्पं दित्तं तनुमृतां तनुमिस्ततः किम् ॥ ३ ॥

इत्थं न किञ्चिदपि साधन-साध्यत्वात् स्वप्नेन्द्रजातसदृशं परमार्थभूतम् ।

अत्यन्तनिर्द्वितीकरं यदपेक्षार्थं तद् मम बाध्यत आनाः । यदि चेत्तनास्ति ॥४॥

इत्यादिना । “ पुण्यफलं ति दुःखं ति ” यत एवमुक्तप्रकारेण
दुःखेऽपि सुखाभिमानः, तस्मात् पुण्यफलमपि सर्वं तत्त्वतो दुःखमेवेति
॥ ४५७ ॥ (२००५)

D C—Bhagavān—Pleasure afforded by objects like garlands, sandal-wood, and woman etc is, in reality, nothing but misery in this world This *sukha* has been distinguished from *dukkha* (in the form) of passions generated from the eagerness to enjoy sexual pleasures with woman etc Only ignorant people call it happiness

But really speaking, such sorts of happiness are only temporarily pleasant like the scratching of herpes.

While, putting to the gallows, aching in the stomach, headache, and the fetters of imprisonment etc, are known as miseries

Prabhāsa—It is evidently contradictory to say that, *sukha* of the enjoyment with woman etc and of the attainment of the sovereignty etc, are *dukkha*

Bhagavān—It is not contradictory to say so. It is perceived as *sukha* only to those who are disillusioned by ignorance. There will be establishment of *sukha* similar to the scratching of herpes or enjoying the forbidden food even in misery as they act as resistance against the distress of passions produced by eagerness to attain pleasure

So, it has been said—

Nagnah preta ivāvistah kvaṇantīmupgrihya tām ।

Gadhāyasitasarvāṅgah sa sukhī ramate kila ॥ 1 ॥

Autsukyamātramavasādayatī pratisthā kṣīṇatī labdhā

paripālanavrittireva ।

Natīśramāpagamanāya yathā śramāya rājyam svahastagata

daṇḍamivatapatram ॥ 2 ॥

Bhuktah śriyah sakalakamadudhātataḥ kim sampriyatāḥ
 pranayinah svadhanaistataḥ kim !
 Dattam padam śirasā vidvīṣatam tataḥ kim kalpam sthitam
 tanubhritam tanubhiṣtataḥ kim ! ॥ 3 ॥
 Ittham na kinoidapi sadhana-sadhya-jatam svapnendrajala
 sadrīṣam paramārthasūnyam ।
 Atyantanuvṛtikaram yadapotsadham tad Brahma vāñchata janah ।
 yadī cetanāsti ॥ 4 ॥

The *punya phalas* awarding the attainment of *viśaya sukhā* are thus proved as nothing but *duḥkhamāya* in reality
 ॥ 457 ॥ (2005)

वित्तयसुह दुक्ख चिय दुक्खपडियारओ तिगिच्छ व ।
 त सुहमुवयाराओ न उवयारो विणा सच्च ॥ ४५८ ॥ (२००६)

Viśayasuham dukkham ciya dukkhapadiyārao tigiccha vva ।
 Tam suhamuvayārāo na uvayāro viṇā taccam ॥ 458 ॥ (2006)

[विषयसुखं दुःखमेव दुःखप्रतीकारतयिकित्सेव ।

तत् सुखमुपचारात् नोपचारो विना सध्यम् ॥ ४५८ ॥ (२००६)

Viśayasukham duḥkhameva duḥkhpratīkaratayikitsēva ।
 t t khamupacārād nopacāro viṇā tathyam ॥ 458 ॥ (2006)]

It is —458 The sensuous pleasure is distressful like medicine in account of its being a resistance against distress. It is (known to be) happiness by (virtue of) usage (only). And there is no usage without fact (2006)

टीका—विषयसुखं तत्त्वतो दुःखमेव, दुःखप्रतीकाररूपत्वात्, कुष्ठ-
 मण्डाश्वरोग-कायपान-प्लेदन-दम्भनादिविकित्सावत् । यद्य लोके तत्र
 सुखमप्यपेक्षः प्रवर्तते स उपचारात् । न उपचारस्त्वर्प्यं पारमार्थिकं विना
 कापि प्रवर्तते, माणवकादौ सिंहाद्युपचारमदिति ॥ ४५८ ॥ (२००६)

D C—Since *viśaya sukhā* is after all a resistance against *duḥkha* it is nothing but *duḥkha*. For the removal of diseases like leprosy boil or piles just as a dose of decoction and

cutting off or burning some rotten part, are considered as pleasant inspite of their causing pain, the *visaya sukhā* are also considered as *dukkhamaya* inspite of their affording pleasure

The *visaya sukha* is known as *sukha* by means of *upacāra* only This *upacāra* is not reality but its existence is based on real objects Without the existence of a real lion, the attribute of lion could never be given to *mānavaka*. ॥ 458 ॥ (2006)

तम्हा जं मुत्तसुहं तं तच्चं दुक्खसंखएऽवस्सं ।

मुणिणोऽणावाहस्स व णिप्पडियारप्पसूईओ ॥ ४५९ ॥ (२००७)

Tamhā jam muttasuham tam taccam dukkhasamkhae'vassam ।
Munino'nābhassa va nippadiyārappasūio ॥ 459 ॥ (2007)

[तस्माद् यद् मुक्तसुखं तत् तथ्यं दुःखसंक्षयेऽवश्यम् ।

मुनेरनावाधस्येव निष्प्रतीकारप्रसूतेः ॥ ४५९ ॥ (२००७)

Tasmād yad muktasukham tat tathyam duḥkhasamksaye'vaśyam ।
Muneranābhādhasyeva nispratīkārāprasūteh ॥ 459 ॥ (2007)]

Trans—459 Hence, at the removal of (all) miseries, happiness of a free (soul) being produced unresisted and unobstructed like a sage, is undoubtedly a real (happiness) (2007)

टीका—तस्माद् यद् मुक्तस्य संबन्धि तदेव सुखं तथ्यं निरुपचरितम् ।
कुतः ? । स्वाभाविकत्वेन निष्प्रतीकाररूपस्य तस्य प्रसूतेरुत्पत्तेः । कथम् ? ।
अवश्यम् । क्व सति ? । दुःखसंक्षये । सांसारिकं हि सर्वं पुण्यफलमपि
दुःखरूपतया समर्थितम्, ततः पापफलम्, इतरच्च सर्वं दुःखमेवेहास्ति
नान्यत्, तच्च मुक्तस्य क्षीणम् ; अतस्तत्संक्षयेऽवश्यंतया यत् तस्य निष्प्रतीकारं
स्वाभाविकं निरुपमं सुखमुत्पद्यते तदेव तथ्यम् । कस्येव ? । विशिष्टज्ञानवतो
ऽनावाधस्य मुनेरिव उक्तं च—

“ निर्जितमद—मदनानां वाक्—काय—मनोविकाररहितानाम् ।

निवृत्तपराशानामिहैव मोक्षः सुविहितानाम् ॥ १ ॥

Bhuktāḥ śriyāḥ sakalakamadudbhāstataḥ kim samprinitāḥ
pranayināḥ svadhanaistataḥ kim ? !

Dattam padam śiraśi vidvīṣatam tataḥ kim kalpam sthitam
tanubhūtam tanubhīstataḥ kim ? ॥ ४४८ ॥

Ittham na kinoidapi sadhana-sādhyastam svapnendrajala
sadriśam paramārthaśūnyam ।

Atyantamīrvrttikeraṁ yadapetaśādhām tad Brahma vācchata janāḥ ।
yadi cetanasti ॥ ४४९ ॥

The *puṇya phalas* awarding the attainment of *viśaya sukhā* are thus proved as nothing but *duḥkhamaya* in reality
॥ ४४७ ॥ (३००५)

विसयसुह दुक्ख चिय दुक्खपडियारओ तिगिच्छ व ।

त सुहमुवयाराओ न उवयारो विणा तच्च ॥ ४५८ ॥ (२००६)

Viśayasuham dukkham ciya dukkhapadhiyārao tigiccha vva ।

Tam suhamuvayārāo na uvayāro viṇā taccam ॥ ४५८ ॥ (२००६)

[विषयसुखं दुःखमेव दुःखप्रतीकारव्यक्तिस्त्वैव ।

एतत् सुखमुपचाराद् नोपचारो विना तथ्यम् ॥ ४५८ ॥ (२००६)

Viśayasukham duḥkhameva duḥkhopratikarataśenkitseva ।

[It is dukhamupacārād nopacāro vinas tathyam ॥ ४५८ ॥ (२००६)]

It is -458 The sensuous pleasure is distressful like
medicine in account of its being a resistance against distress.
It is (known as) happiness by (virtue of) usage (only).
And there is no usage without fact (२००६)

टीका-विषयसुखं तत्त्वतो दुःखमेव, दुःखप्रतीकाररूपत्वात्, कुष्ठ-
गण्डाज्वररोग-कायपान-ज्वेदन-दम्पनादिव्यक्तिस्त्वावत् । यद्यसौके तत्र
सुखमप्यपदेशः प्रवर्तते स उपचारात् । न उपचारस्तथ्यं पारमार्थिकं विना
कापि प्रवर्तते, माष्यकादौ सिंहाद्युपचारमदिति ॥ ४५८ ॥ (२००६)

D O—Since *viśaya sukhā* is after all a resistance against
duḥkha it is nothing but *duḥkha*. For the removal of diseases
like leprosy boil or piles just as a dose of decoction and

Trans—460-461 Or, just as since this soul is full of knowledge, (any sort of) interruption is an obstacle to (the apprehension of) knowledge, sense-organs are helpful (to it) (and just as), at the destruction of all interruptions, (there is) pure (cognizance), the soul is full of happiness. Sinful deed is (its) obstruction, a virtuous deed is (the) helpful (element) and at the destruction of all deeds, there is perfect (apprehension of) happiness (2008-2009)

टीका—व्याख्या—यथा चाऽनन्तज्ञानमयोऽसौ स्वरूपेण जीवः। तदीय-
ज्ञानस्य च मत्यावरणादिकमावरणमुपघातकं मन्तव्यम्। करणानि त्विन्द्रियाणि
तज्ज्ञानस्य, सूर्यातपस्य तदावारकमेघपटलच्छिद्राणीवोपकारकाणि। सर्वा-
वरणक्षये तु ज्ञानशुद्धिर्निर्मलता सर्वथावशामकत्वलक्षणा भवति। प्रकृतयो-
जनामाह—तथा तेनैव प्रकारेण स्वरूपतः स्वाभाविकानन्तसौख्यमयो जीवः,
तस्य च सुखस्यैवोपघातकारकं पापकर्म विज्ञेयम्। पुण्यं त्वनुत्तरस्वरूप्यन्त-
सुखफलतस्य स्वाभाविक सुखस्यानुग्रहकारकम्। ततः सर्वावरणापगमे
प्रकृष्टज्ञानमिव ममस्तपुण्यपापक्षये सकलं परिपूर्णं निरुपचरितं निरुपमं
स्वाभाविकमनन्तं सुखं भवति सिद्धस्येति ॥४६०-४६१॥ (२००८-२००९)

D C—The soul is full of infinite knowledge of which *Matā-jñāna* etc are the obstructions, and sense-organs are the supporting agents like the holes in a cluster of clouds covering the sun-shine. When all the obstructions are removed, there is absolute apprehension of pure cognizance

Similarly, the soul possesses infinite happiness of which *pāpa* is the obstructive element, and *punya* the helping element. When all sorts of *pāpa* and *punya* are removed, the *muktātma* attains perfect happiness which has neither obstructions nor *upacāras* ॥ 460-461 ॥ (2008-2009)

Or,

जह वा कम्मक्खयओ सो सिद्धत्ताइपरिणइं लभइ ।
तह संसाराईयं पावइ तत्तो चिय सुहं ति ॥ ४६२ ॥ (२०१०)

इति ॥ ४५९ ॥ (२००७)

D C—Happiness enjoyed by a *mukta* being is real and is not based upon *upacara* because it is naturally generated without any resistance. Like that of a learned sage having no obstacle in his way this *sukha* is free from all sorts of miseries found in the mundane world.

It has been said therefore that

Nirjitamada-nādanānam vāk-kāya-manovikārahitānam ।
Vinivṛttaparāśanāmiḥalva mokṣaḥ suvhitānam ॥ 459 ॥ (2007)]

Also

अहं वा नाणमओऽय जीवो नाणोवघाइ चावरण ।
करणमणुग्गहकारिं सव्वावरणक्खए सुद्धी ॥ ४६० ॥ (२००८)
तहं सोक्खमओ जीवो पाव तस्सोवघाइय नेय ।
पुण्णमणुग्गहकारिं सोक्ख सव्वक्खए सयल ॥ ४६१ ॥ (२००९)

Jaha vā nānamao yam jīvo nānovagghāi cāvaranam ।
Karanamanuggahakārim savvāvaranakkhae suddhī ॥ 460 ॥ (2008)
Taha saukhyamao jīvah pāvam tassovagghāiyam neyam ।
Puṇṇamanugrahakārim sokkham savvakhae sayalam ॥ 461 ॥ (2009)

[यथा वा ज्ञानमयोऽयं जीवो ज्ञानोपपाति चावरणम् ।
करणमनुग्रहकारिं सर्वावरणक्षये शुद्धिः ॥ ४६० ॥ (२००८)
तथा सौख्यमयो जीवः पापं तस्योपपातिकं क्षेपम् ।
पुण्यमनुग्रहकारिं सौख्यं सर्वक्षये सकलम् ॥ ४६१ ॥ (२००९)

Yatha vā jñānamayo yam jīvo jñānopaghati cavarāṇam ।
Karanamanugrahakāri sarvavarāṇakṣaye śuddhiḥ ॥ 460 ॥ (2008)
Tatha saukhyamayo jīvah pāpam tasyopaghatikam kṣepam ।
Pūṇyamanugrahakāri saukhyam sarvakṣaye sakalam ॥ 461 ॥ (2009)]

Trans—460-461 Or, just as since this soul is full of knowledge, (any sort of) interruption is an obstacle to (the apprehension of) knowledge, sense-organs are helpful (to it) (and just as), at the destruction of all interruptions, (there is) pure (cognizance), the soul is full of happiness. Sinful deed is (its) obstruction, a virtuous deed is (the) helpful (element) and at the destruction of all deeds, there is perfect (apprehension of) happiness (2008-2009)

टीका—व्याख्या—यथा वाऽनन्तज्ञानमयोऽसौ स्वरूपेण जीवः। तदीय-ज्ञानस्य च मत्यावरणादिकमावरणमुपघातकं मन्तव्यम्। करणानि त्विन्द्रियाणि तज्ज्ञानस्य, सूर्यातपस्य तदावारकमेघपटलच्छिद्राणीवोपकारकाणि। सर्वावरणक्षये तु ज्ञानशुद्धिर्निर्मलता सर्वथावभामकत्वलक्षणा भवति। प्रकृतयोजनामाह—तथा तेनैव प्रकारेण स्वरूपतः स्वाभाविकानन्तसौख्यमयो जीवः, तस्य च सुखस्यैवोपघातकारकं पापकर्म विज्ञेयम्। पुण्यं त्वनुत्तरस्रपर्यन्त-सुखफलंतस्य स्वाभाविक सुखस्यानुग्रहकारकम्। ततः सर्वावरणापगमे प्रकृतज्ञानमिव समस्तपुण्यपापक्षये सकलं परिपूर्णं निरुपचरितं निरुपमं स्वाभाविकमनन्तं सुखं भवति सिद्धस्येति ॥४६०-४६१॥ (२००८-२००९)

D C—The soul is full of infinite knowledge of which *Mān-jñāna* etc are the obstructions, and sense-organs are the supporting agents like the holes in a cluster of clouds covering the sun-shine. When all the obstructions are removed, there is absolute apprehension of pure cognizance

Similarly, the soul possesses infinite happiness of which *pāpa* is the obstructive element, and *punya* the helping element. When all sorts of *pāpa* and *punya* are removed, the *muktātmā* attains perfect happiness which has neither obstructions nor *upacāras* ॥ 460-461 ॥ (2008-2009)

Or,

जह वा कम्मक्खयओ सो सिद्धत्ताइपरिणइं लभइ ।

तह संसाराईयं पावइ तत्तो चिय सुहं ति ॥ ४६२ ॥ (२०१०)

Jaha vā kammakkhayao so siddhattāṭṭhāparināṃ labhaṃ ।
Taha saṃsārāyāṃ pāvaṃ tatta cciya suhaṃ ti ॥ 462 ॥ (1020)

[यथा वा कर्मक्षयतः स सिद्धत्वादिपरिणतिं लभते ।

तथा संसारातीतं प्राप्नोति तत एव सुखमिति ॥ ४६२ ॥ (२०१०)

Yathā va karmakṣayatāḥ sa siddhatvadiparīṇatam labhate ।
Tatha saṃsārātītam prāpnoti tata eva sukhamiti ॥ 462 ॥ (2010)]

Trans—462 Just as it attains the form of *siddhatva* etc, on account of the destruction of *Karma*, it attains the celestial happiness also, due to the same reason (2010)

टीका—यथा वा सकलकर्मक्षयादसौ मुक्तात्मा सिद्धत्वादिपरिणतिं लभते, तत एव सकलकर्मक्षयात् संसारातीतं वैयर्थिकसुखाद् विलक्षणस्वरूपं निरुपमं तर्ह्य सुखं प्राप्नोति । एतेन यदुक्तम्—“ क्षीणपुण्य-पापत्वेन कारयामावाद् निःसुख-दुःखो मुक्तात्मा, व्योमवत् ” इत्येतदपि प्रत्युक्तं द्रष्टव्यम्, “ कारयामावात् ” इत्यस्य हेतोरसिद्धत्वात्, सकलकर्मक्षयलक्षण-कारणजन्यत्वेन सिद्धसुखस्य सकारणत्वादिति ॥ ४६२ ॥ (२०१०)

D O—Just as a *muktatma* attains *siddhatva* etc when it is free from the bondages of *Karma*, it attains celestial happiness also due to the same reason. So your argument that if the *ātma* is free from *papa-punya*, it has no *sukha*—like sky proves itself absolutely unfounded. ॥ 462 ॥ (2010)

Now in reply to the argument that *deha* is the only agent of perceiving *sukha-dukkha* the author states—

साया-ऽसाय दुक्खं तविरहंमि य सुहं जओ तेण ।
देहि-दिपसु दुक्खं सोक्खं देहिं दियाभावे ॥ ४६३ ॥ (२०११)

Sāya-sāyam dukkham tattiviraṃhami ya suhaṃ jao tenaṃ ।
Dehin-diesu dukkham sokkham dehin-diyaḥbhāve ॥ 463 ॥ (2011)

[साता-ऽसातं दुःखं तद्विरहे च सुखं यतस्तेन ।

देहे-न्द्रियेषु दुःखं सौख्यं देहे-न्द्रियाभावे ॥ ४६३ ॥ (२०११)

Sata-'satam duhkham tadviraho ca sukham yatastena ।
Dehe-ndriyesu duhkham saukhyam dehe-ndriyābhāve ॥463॥(2011)]

Trans—463 Results of sinful and virtuous deeds are only distressful And since happiness is (attained) in their absence, (there is) misery (in case of) body and sense-organs existing, (and) (there is) happiness in absence of body and sense-organs (2011)

टीका-ननु यत् पुण्यफलं सातं सुखतया लोकव्यवहारतो रूढं तत् सर्वं दुःखमेवेत्यनन्तरमेव समर्थितम्, असातं तु पापफलत्वाद् निर्विवादं दुःखमेव । एवं च सति सर्वं दुःखमेवास्ति संसारे, न सुखम् । तच्च दुःखं सिद्धस्य सर्वथा क्षीणम् । अतस्तद्विरहे यद् यस्मात् सिद्धस्य स्वाभाविकं निरुपमम्, अनन्तं च शुक्ति सिद्धमेव सुखम् तेन तस्मात् कारणात् पारिशेष्यन्यायात् संसारिणामेव जीवानां देहे-न्द्रियेष्वधारभूतेषु यथोक्तस्वरूपं दुःखम्, सुखं तु देहे-न्द्रियाभाव एव, सिद्धस्य क्षीणनिःशेषसुख-दुःखत्वेन तस्य तत्र शुक्तिसिद्धत्वादिति ॥ ४६३ ॥ (२०११)

D C—It has already been proved that even *punya-phalas* are *duhkhamaya* in this mundane world And *pāpa-phalas* are undoubtedly *duhkhamaya* This shows that everything in this world is full of misery This sort of *duhkha* can never affect *muktātmas*.

Muktātma being free from such *dukkhas*, enjoys perfect and infinite happiness showing there-by that *duhkha* exists only where *deha* and *indriyas* exist, and real *sukha* is always found in a *siddha* being who is free from *deha* and *indriyas* ॥463॥ (2011)

Or,

जो वा देहिं-दियजं सुहमिच्छइ तं पहुच्च दोसोऽयं ।

संसाराईयमिदं धम्मन्तरमेव सिद्धिसुहं ॥ ४६४ ॥ (२०१२)

Jaha vā kammakkhayao so siddhattāparināim labhāi |
Taha saṃsārāiyam pāvaḥ tatto cciya suham ti ॥ 462 ॥ (1020)

[यथा वा कर्मक्षयतः स सिद्धत्वादिपरिणतिं लभते ।

तथा संसारातीतं प्राप्नोति तत एव सुखमिति ॥ ४६२ ॥ (२०१०)

Yathā vā karmakṣayataḥ sa siddhatvādiपरिणतम् labhate |
Tatha saṃsārātītam prāpnōti tata eva sukhamiti ॥ 462 ॥ (2010)]

Trans.—462 Just as it attains the form of *siddhatva* etc, on account of the destruction of *Karma*, it attains the celestial happiness also due to the same reason (2010)

टीका—यथा वा सकलकर्मक्षयादसौ मुक्तात्मा सिद्धत्वादिपरिणतिं लभते, तत एव सकलकर्मक्षयात् संसारातीतं वैयर्थिकसुखाद् विलक्षणस्वरूपं निरुपमं तस्य सुखं प्राप्नोति । एतन् यदुक्तम्—“ क्षीणपुण्य-पापत्वेन कारणामावाद् निःसुख-दुःखो मुक्तात्मा, व्योमवत् ” इत्येतदपि प्रत्युक्तं द्रष्टव्यम्, “ कारणामावाद् ” इत्यस्य हतोरसिद्धत्वात्, सकलकर्मक्षयलक्षण-कारणवन्त्यत्वेन सिद्धसुखस्य सकारणत्वादिति ॥ ४६२ ॥ (२०१०)

D C—Just as a *muktatma* attains *siddhatva* etc when it is free from the bondages of *Karma*, it attains celestial happiness also due to the same reason. So your argument that the *dātma* is free from *papa-punya* it has no *sukha* like sky proves itself absolutely unfounded. ॥ 462 ॥ (2010)

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देहि-दिपसु दुक्ख सोक्ख देहिं दियाभावे ॥ ४६३ ॥ (२०११)

Sāyā-sāyam dukkham tavyirahanimi ya suham jao tenam |
Dehī-dīesu dukkham sokkham dehī-diyābhāve ॥ 463 ॥ (2011)

Kaha nanu meyam ti mai nanā-'nābāhau tti nanu bhanīyam ।
Tadamccam nānam pi ya ceyanadhammo tti rāgo vva ॥465॥ (2013)

[कथं ननु मेयमिति मतिर्ज्ञाना-ऽनाबाधत इति ननु भणितम् ।
तदानित्यं ज्ञानमपि च चेतनधर्म इति राग इव ॥ ४६५ ॥ (२०१३)

Katham nanu meyamiti matirjñānā-'nābādhata iti nanu bhanitam ।
Tadanityam jñanamapi ca cetanadharma iti rāga iva ॥ 465 ॥ (2013)]

Trans—465 (The question may be that) “ How could it really be taken like that ? (The reply is)—“ It has already been said that (it is so) on account of the uninterrupted cognizance ” Then, even cognizance being a quality of consciousness, it will be *a-rūpya* like affection (2013)

टीका-अत्रैवंभूता मतिः परस्य भवेत्-नन्विच्छन्ति भवन्तः सिद्धस्य यथोक्तं सुखम्, किन्तु नेच्छामात्रतो वस्तुसिद्धिः, अपि तु प्रमाणतः; ततो येन प्रमाणेन तत् सिध्यति तद् वक्तव्यम् । अनुमानेन तदनुमीयत इति चेत् । तर्हि केनानुमानेन तदनुमेयम्-अनुमीयत इत्यर्थः ? इत्याह-“ नाणा-ऽणा-बाहउ त्ति नणु भणियं ति ” ननु भणितमत्रार्थे प्रागनुमानम्-सिद्धस्य प्रकृष्टं सुखम्, ज्ञानत्वे सत्यनाबाधत्वात्, मुनिवदिति । पुनरपि परः प्राह-यद्येवम्, तर्हिनित्यं सुखं ज्ञानं च सिद्धस्य, चेतनधर्मत्वात्, रागवदिति ॥ ४६५ ॥ (२०१३)

D C—*Prabhāsa*—With what *pramāṇa* or *anumāṇa* do you establish the existence of the above-mentioned *mokṣasukha* ?

Bhagavān—The *anumāṇa* has already been stated that, like a sage, *muktātmā* enjoys perfect happiness by virtue of its uninterrupted cognizance

Prabhāsa—In that case, as happiness and cognizance on, the part of free soul are *cetana-dharmas*, they would be *a-rūpya* like *rāga* ॥ 465 ॥ (2013)

There is another inference also—

Jo vā dehin-diyajam suhamicchai tam paducca doso'yam ।
Samsārāyamidam dhammantarameva siddhisuham ॥ 464 ॥ (2012)

[यो वा देहे-न्द्रियञ्च सुखमिच्छति त प्रतीत्य दोषोऽयम् ।

संसारातीतमिदं धर्मान्तरमेव सिद्धिसुखम् ॥ ४६४ ॥ (२०१२)

Yo vā dehe-ndriyajam suhāmīcchati tam pratitya doso'yam ।
Samsārattamidaṁ dhammantarameva siddhisukham ॥ 464 ॥ (2012)]

Trans—464 Or according to one who believes in the happiness (afforded) by body and sense alone, this (may involve) a difficulty But this celestial happiness is far above the mundane world and has (perfectly) different characteristics (2012)

टीका-यो वा कश्चित् संसारामिनन्दी मोहमूढः परमार्थदर्शी विषया विषमाश्रयुद्धो देहे-न्द्रियञ्चमेव सुखं मन्यते, न तु सिद्धिसुखम्, तस्य तेन स्वप्नेऽप्यदृष्टनात्, तस्य वादिनः संसारविषये मोक्षे प्रमादतः साधिते सति “ निःसुख , मिदं , देहे-न्द्रियमाशात् ” इत्ययं दोषो भवेत् ; न त्वस्माकं संसारातीतं पुण्य-पापफलसुख-दुःखाभ्यां सर्वथा विलक्षणं धर्मान्तरमेवाऽनुपममध्य निरुपचरितं सिद्धिसुखमिच्छतामिति ॥ ४६४ ॥ (२०१२)

D C—According to one who is disillusioned by the situation of this mundane world and its sensuous pleasures (1) [*happiness of deha and endriya* would be the only happiness] could be nothing like *mokṣa sukha* in his view-point. He (1) therefore find fault with our belief by saying that (1) “ never experience *sukha* as it has no *deha* and *endriya* (1)

But those like us who recognize the existence of *mūlātma* and its uncomparable infinite happiness understand that *mokṣa-sukha* being *samparattita* has absolutely different characteristics and hence there is no *doxa*. ॥ 464 ॥ (2012)

Here again there is a question and its reply—

कह नणु मेयं ति मई नाणा-णावाहुटं चि नणु भणिय ।
तदणिच्च नाणं पि य चेयणधम्मो चि रागो व ॥ ४६५ ॥ (२०१३)

नित्यत्वं स्यात् । न हि घनपटलापगमे चन्द्रज्योत्स्नायाः सूर्यप्रभाया वा तिरोभावमात्रनिवृत्तौ कृतकत्वम्, अभूतप्रादुर्भावो वा वक्तुं युज्यत इति ।

अथ तेनाविर्भूतेन विशिष्टेन रूपेण कृतकत्वादन्त्ये सिद्धस्य ज्ञान-सुखे; प्रतिक्षणं च पर्यायरूपतया ज्ञेयविनाशे ज्ञानस्य विनाशात्, सुखस्यापि प्रतिसमयं परापररूपेण परिणामादेतयोरनित्यत्वंमुच्यते । तर्हि सिद्धसाध्यता, इति दर्शयति—“उप्पाय-द्विईत्यादि” इत्यमात्माऽऽकाश-घटादिरूपस्य सर्व-स्यापि वस्तुस्तोमस्य स्थित्यु-त्पाद-प्रलयस्वाभाव्याभ्युपगमात् सिद्धसुख-ज्ञानयोरपि कथञ्चिदनित्यत्वाद् नायं तदनित्यत्वापत्तिलक्षणो ऽस्माकं दोष इति ॥ ४६६ ॥ (२९१४)

D. C — Prabhāsa:—Jñāna and sukha of a siddha being, are a-nitya firstly because they are produced by means of the painful observance of penances etc, and secondly, because they are susceptible to production like ghata

Bhagavān —Your argument is absolutely unfounded O Prabhāsa ' Jñāna and sukha of a muktātmā would be a-nitya only if they vanished By means of jñānāvaranas, jñāna would be obscured and hence destroyed and with the rise of sinful deeds, sukha would vanish. Both these obstructions jñānāvaranas and pāpa-karmas are bound by the hetus of mithyātva etc, muktātmā being free from such hetus it is free from jñānāvaranas and pāpa-karmas also. Consequently, its jñāna and sukha do not meet destruction and hence they are never called a-nitya.

Secondly, all the qualities of *cetana* are not *a-nitya*. *Dravyatva* and *a-mūrtatva* are *nitya* Therefore, the argument that *jñāna* and *sukha* are *a-nitya* because they happen to be *cetana-dharmas*, is *anekāntika* Similarly, the *hetu* of *kṛitakatva* etc is also *anekāntika* Indestructibility of *ghata* is *a-siddha* in spite of its being *kṛitaka* This *hetu* is *a-siddha* also, because *jñāna* and *sukha* of a *siddha* being are natural Since there is no reason for the existence of *āvaranas* and *bādhās*, that which is in obscurity becomes manifest Thus, they are not factitious

कयगाइभावओ वा नावरणा—ऽऽबाहकारणाभावा ।

उप्पाय—ट्टिइ—मङ्गस्सहावओ वा न दोसोऽय ॥४६६॥ (२०१४)

Kayagāibhāvao vā nāvaranā'bhāhakarānābhāvā ।

Uppāya-tṭhi-bhaṅgassahāvao vā na doṣoyam ॥ 466 ॥ (2014)

[कृतकादिभावतो वा नावरणा—ऽऽबाहकारणाभावात् ।

उत्पाद—स्थिति—मङ्गस्वभावतो वा न दोषोऽयम् ॥ ४६६ ॥ (२०१४)

Kṛtakadibhāvato vā nāvaranā 'bhāhakarānābhavat ।

Utpāda-sthiti-bhaṅgassabhāvato vā na doṣo yam ॥ 466 ॥ (2014)]

Trans—466 “Or is it *a-nūya* because of (its) being factitious etc ?” It is not so as there is no cause for (the production of) obstacles and interruptions. Or this fault (of *a-nūyatā*) does not arise (at all) on account of its nature of being susceptible to production retention and destruction.” (2014)

टीका—अथवा, अनित्ये सिद्धस्य सुख-ज्ञाने, तयोः प्रसूतिकृष्टानुष्ठानेन क्रियमाणत्वात्, आदिशब्दादभूतप्रादुर्भावात्, षट्पदिति । अत्रोत्तरमाह—
“ नावरणेऽस्यादि ” न सिद्धस्यानित्ये ज्ञान-सुखे । कृतः ? । आवरणं चावा
वधावरणा—ऽऽबाधौ, तयोः कारणं हेतुस्तस्याऽभावात्, आकाशपदिति । इदं
मन् भवति—सिद्धस्य ज्ञानं सुखं च यद्यपगच्छेत् तदा स्यादनित्यम्, अपग
मः । तानस्यावरणोदयात्, सुखस्य त्वाभावे हेतुभूतादसाववेदनीयोदयादि
कारणाद् भवन आवरण-वेदनीयादीनि च मिथ्यत्वादिभिर्बन्धहेतुमिर्बन्धन्ते,
ते च सिद्धस्य न पश्यन्ते, तत्तदमावाद् नावरणा—ऽऽबाधकारणसमावाहः,
तदमावाच्च न सिद्धस्य ज्ञान-सुखापगमः, तदसत्त्वे च तयोः सदाऽवस्थित
त्वात् कथमनित्यत्वम् ? । न च वेतनधर्माः सर्वेऽप्यनित्या भवन्ति, जीवमत
द्रव्यत्वा—ऽमृतत्वादिमिथ्यमिचारात् । ततश्च “ वेतनधर्मत्वात् ” इत्यने
कान्तिको हेतुः । तथा, कृतकत्वादिरप्यनैकान्तिकः, षट्प्रश्नसामायेन व्यभि
चारात् । असिद्धभायम्, सिद्धस्य ज्ञानसुखयोः स्वाभाविकत्वेन कृतकत्वा
द्ययोगात्, आवरणा—ऽऽबाधकारणमावेन च तत्परोभावाप्रमेय निवर्तते, न
पुनस्ते क्रियेते, षटादिष्वत्; नाप्यभूते प्रादुर्भवता, विद्युदादिष्वत्, यन् तयोः

नित्यत्वं स्यात् । न हि घनपटलापगमे चन्द्रज्योत्स्नायाः सूर्यप्रभाया वा तिरोभावमात्रनिवृत्तौ कृतकत्वम्, अभूतप्रादुर्भावो वा वक्तुं युज्यत इति ।

अथ तेनाविर्भूतेन विशिष्टेन रूपेण कृतकत्वादन्त्ये सिद्धस्य ज्ञान-सुखे; प्रतिक्षणं च पर्यायरूपतया ज्ञेयविनाशे ज्ञानस्य विनाशात्, सुखस्यापि प्रतिसमयं परापररूपेण परिणामादेतयोरनित्यत्वंमुच्यते । तर्हि सिद्धसाध्यता, इति दर्शयति—“उप्पाय-द्विईत्यादि” इत्थमात्माऽऽकाश-घटादिरूपस्य सर्व-स्यापि वस्तुस्तोमस्य स्थित्यु-त्पाद-प्रलयस्वाभाव्याभ्युपगमात् सिद्धसुखज्ञानयोरपि कथञ्चिदनित्यत्वाद् नायं तदनित्यत्वापत्तिलक्षणो ऽस्माकं दोष इति ॥ ४६६ ॥ (२९१४)

D. C.—Prabhāsa:—Jñāna and sukha of a siddha being, are a-nitya firstly because they are produced by means of the painful observance of penances etc, and secondly, because they are susceptible to production like ghata

Bhagavān—Your argument is absolutely unfounded. O Prabhāsa ' Jñāna and sukha of a muktātmā would be a-nitya only if they vanished By means of jñānāvaranas, jñāna would be obscured and hence destroyed and with the rise of sinful deeds, sukha would vanish Both these obstructions jñānāvaranas and pāpa-karmas are bound by the hetus of mathyātva etc, muktātmā being free from such hetus it is free from jñānāvaranas and pāpa-karmas also. Consequently, its jñāna and sukha do not meet destruction and hence they are never called a-nitya.

Secondly, all the qualities of *cetana* are not *a-nitya* *Dravyatva* and *a-mūrtatva* are *nitya* Therefore, the argument that *jñāna* and *sukha* are *a-nitya* because they happen to be *cetana-dharmas*, is *anekāntika* Similarly, the *hetu* of *kṛtakatva* etc is also *anekāntika* Indestructibility of *ghata* is *a-siddha* in spite of its being *kṛtaka* This *hetu* is *a-siddha* also, because *jñāna* and *sukha* of a *siddha* being are natural Since there is no reason for the existence of *āvaranas* and *bādhās*, that which is in obscurity becomes manifest Thus, they are not factitious

like *ghaṭa* etc nor are they produced like lightning etc The moonlight and sun-shine obscured by clouds are not said to have been produced when the obstruction of the clouds has been removed. They are only said to have been manifested in a particular way

Still however *jñāna* and *sukha* of a *multatandā* could easily be considered as *a-nitya* by virtue of their being *ksatata*. Because at every time when *jñeya* vanishes *jñāna* is also vanishing and *sukha* also comes into existence in various forms at various times. So there is no difficulty in taking both of them to be *a-nitya* to a certain extent as all objects like soul sky *ghṛta* and *pata* etc are susceptible to *utpāda vyaya* and *dhrāvya* after all. # 466 n (2014)

Establishing the existence of *moksa* and *moksa-sukha* by the help of *Veda-vacanās* the author proceeds—

नह वइ ससररीरस्स प्पिय ऽप्पियावहतिरेवमादि व ज ।
तदमोक्खे नासम्मि व सोक्खाभावम्मि व न जुत्त ॥ ४६७ ॥ (२०१५)

Na ha vai sasarīrassa ppiya-ppiyāvahatirevamādi va jam ।
Tadamokkhe nāsammi va sokkhābhāvammi va na juttam #467#

[न ह वै ससररीरस्स प्रिया-ऽप्रियापहतिरेवमादि वा यत् ।
तदमोक्खे नास्ते वा सौख्याभावे वा न युक्तम् ॥ ४६७ ॥ (२०१५)

Na ha v i p p i y a p r i y a - p r i y ā p a h a t i r e v a m ā d i v ā y a t ।
Tadamokkhe n ā s a m m i v a s o k k h ā b h ā v a m m i v a n a y u k t a m #467# (2015)]

Trans—467 (The sentence of *Vedas* that) “ One having body has no likes and dislikes etc would become worthless in (case of) accepting the negation or destruction of *moksa* and absence of (absolute) happiness (2015)

टीका—“ न ह वै ससररीरस्स प्रिया-ऽप्रियापहतिरेवस्ति ” “ ससररीरं वा वसन्तं प्रिया-प्रिये न स्पृष्टवः ” इति च यद् वेदोक्तम्, तदप्यमोक्षे मोक्षभावे-जीव-कर्मणोर्वियोगेऽनभ्युपगम्यमान इत्यर्थः, तथा, “ मतिरपि न

प्रज्ञायते” इति वचनाद् मुक्तावस्थायां सर्वथा नाशे वा जीवस्याभ्युपगम्यमाने, सत्त्वेवामुक्तात्मनः सुखाभाव इष्यमाणे न युक्तं प्राप्नोति—अभ्युपगमविरोधस्त-वेत्यर्थः । अनेन हि वाक्येन किल यथोक्तो मोक्षः, मुक्तौ च निष्कर्मणो जीवस्य सत्त्वम्, निरुपमसुखं च तस्य, एतानि त्रीण्यप्यभ्युपगम्यन्ते । एतच्च पुरस्ताद् व्यक्तीकरिष्यते । ततोऽस्य त्रितयस्य निषेधं कुर्वतस्तवाभ्युपगम-विरोध इति भावः ॥ ४६७ ॥ (२०१५)

D C—The sentences of *Vedas* such as “*Na ha va sa-sarīrasya priyā' priyayo-rapahatnasti*” and “*Āsarīram vā vasantam priyā'priye na spris'atah*” etc would prove themselves futile if the existence of *moksa*, *jīva* and *moksa-sukha* were denied. Because, the existence of *moksa*—separating *jīva* and *Karma* from each other—existence of pure soul in the *mukta* state and the attainment of perfect and infinite happiness by a *mukta* being, have already been established by the *Veda-padas* ॥ 467 ॥ (2015)

The opponent then asks—

नटो असरीरो च्चिय सुह—दुक्खाइं पिय—ऽप्पियाइं च ।
ताइं न फुसंति नटं फुडमसरीरं ति को दोसो ? ॥ ४६८ ॥ (२०१६)

Nattho a-sarīro cciya suha-dukkhāim piya'-ppiyāim ca ।
Tāim na phusanti nattham phudamasarīram ti ko doso ? ॥ 468 ॥ (2016)

[नटोऽशरीर एव सुख-दुःखे प्रिया-ऽप्रिये च ।

ते न स्पृशतो नटं स्फुटमशरीरमिति को दोषः ? ॥ ४६८ ॥ (२०१६)

Nasto'sarīra eva sukha-dubkha priyā'priye ca ।
Te na sprisato nastam sphutamasarīramiti ko dosah ? ॥ 468 ॥ (2016)

Trans—468 One who is dead, is bodiless Happiness and misery, likes and dislikes do not touch him (Then) what harm is there in taking a bodiless person to have been distinctly destroyed ? (2016)

• टीका—“ न ह वै० ” इत्यादिवेदवाक्यस्य किल परोऽमुमर्थं मन्यते—
शरीरसर्वनाशेन नटः खरविषाणकल्प एवोच्यते, तमेवंभूतम शरीरं नट प्रिया—

like *ghata* etc nor are they produced like lightning etc. The moonlight and sun-shine obscured by clouds are not said to have been produced when the obstruction of the clouds has been removed. They are only said to have been manifested in a particular way.

Still however *jñāna* and *sukha* of a *multātma* could easily be considered as *a-nūya* by virtue of their being *kṛtata*. Because at every time when *jñeya* vanishes *jñāna* is also vanishing and *sukha* also comes into existence in various forms at various times. So there is no difficulty in taking both of them to be *a-nūya* to a certain extent as all objects like soul, sky, *ghata* and *pata* etc are susceptible to *utpāda vyaya* and *dhrauvya* after all. # 466 n (2014)

Establishing the existence of *mokṣa* and *mokṣa-sukha* by the help of *Veda-vacanas* the author proceeds—

न ह वै ससरीरस्त प्रिय ऽप्रियावहतिरेवमादि व ज ।
तदमोक्खे नासम्मि व सोक्खाभावम्मि व न जुत्त ॥ ४६७ ॥ (२०१५)

Na ha vai sasārīrassa ppiya—ppiyāvahatirevamādi va jaṃ ।
Tadamokkhe nāsammi va sokkhābhāvammi va na juttam #467n

[न ह वै ससरीरस्य प्रिया—ऽप्रियावहतिरेवमादि वा यत् ।
तदमा न नाश वा सौख्यमावे वा न युक्तम् ॥ ४६७ ॥ (२०१५)

Na ha v 1 va priya—priyāpahatirevamādi vā yat ।
Tadamokṣo ॥ ५८ ikhyābhāve va na yuktam #467|| (2015)||

Trans—467 (The sentence of *Vedas* that) “ One having body has no likes and dislikes etc would become worthless in (case of) accepting the negation or destruction of *mokṣa* and absence of (absolute) happiness. (2015)

टीका—“ न ह वै ससरीरस्य प्रिया—ऽप्रियायोरपहतिरस्ति ” “ ससरीरं वा वसन्त प्रिया—प्रिये न स्पृष्टतः ” इति च यद् वेदोक्तम्, तदप्यमोक्खे मोक्षमावे—जीव—कर्मणोर्वियोगेऽनम्युपभग्यमान इत्यर्था, तथा, “ मतिरपि न

Trans—469-470 You do not properly understand the (real) meaning of those sentences of *Vedas*. It is this. Hear please. Like '*a-dhana*,' the word '*a-sārīra*' is meant to denote the negation of an existent object. By (means of) negation due to '*na*', (its) existence would be found in another of the same type. In understanding the word '*a-sārīra*', it is better, therefore, to accept (the existence of) *jīva* and not (its non-existence like) *kharaśrnga*. (2017-2018)

टीका-आयुष्मन् ! प्रभास ! न केवलं युक्तिम्, वेदपदानाममीषामर्थं च त्वं सुष्ठु न जानासि, ततस्तं शृणु “ न ह वै० ” इत्यादि पूर्वार्धं सुगमत्वादत्र गाथाद्वये न व्याख्यातम्, तदपि सुखप्रतिपत्त्यर्थं व्याख्यायते—‘ न ’ इति निपातो निषेधार्थः । ‘ ह ’ ‘ वै ’ इत्येतदपि निपातद्वयं हिशब्दार्थत्वाद् यस्मादर्थे । सह शरीरेण वर्तत इति सशरीरो जीवस्तस्य सशरीरस्येत्यत्रैवकारो द्रष्टव्यः । ततश्चायमर्थः—यस्मात् सशरीरस्य जीवस्य प्रिया-ऽप्रिययोः सुख-दुःखयोरपहतिर्विधातोऽन्तरं नास्ति, न त्वशरीरस्य; तस्मादशरीरं शरीर-रहितं मुक्त्यवस्थायां वसन्तं लोकान्तस्थितं जीवं प्रिया-ऽप्रिये सुख-दुःखे न स्पृश्यतः । इदमुक्तं भवति—यावदयं जीवः मशरीरः, तावत् सुखेन दुःखेन वाऽन्यतरेण कदाचिदपि न मुच्यते; अशरीरस्त्वसौ क्षीणवेदनीयत्वात् सुख-दुःखाभ्यां कदाचिदपि न स्पृश्यत इति । एवंभूते चास्य वाक्यस्यार्थे सति योऽयमशरीरव्यपदेशः, असौ सत एव विद्यमानस्यैव जीवस्य मुक्त्यवस्थायां विधीयते, न तु सर्वथा नष्टस्य । कुतः ? इत्याह—निषेधात् । इह यो यस्य निषेधः स तस्य सत एव विधीयते, न त्वमतः, यथाऽधन इति, अत्र सत एव देवदत्तस्य धननिषेधो विधीयते, न त्वसतः खरविषाणस्य ।

आह—न विद्यते शरीर यस्येत्येवं निषेधादन्यपदार्थे जीव एव कथं प्रतीयते ? इत्याह—“ ननिसेहओ य इत्यादि ” व्याख्यातो विशेषप्रतिपत्तेः पर्युदास-वृत्तिना नञा निषेधो नञ्निषेधस्तस्माद् नञ्निषेधात् कारणात् सशरीरादन्य-स्मिस्तद्विध एव शरीरमदृशे कस्मिंश्चिदन्यपदार्थे संग्रत्ययो विज्ञेयः, यथा “ न ब्राह्मणोऽब्राह्मणः ” इत्युक्ते ब्राह्मणसदृशः क्षत्रियादिव गम्यते, न

अप्रिये सुख-दुःखे यद् न स्पृशत्, तत् स्फुटमेव बुध्यत एवेदम्, नष्टस्य सुख-दुःखस्पर्शयोगात्, अक्षरीरशब्देन च जीवनाशमिधानात् । एवंभूते चास्य वाक्यस्पर्शे सुमुमुक्षुजीवस्य निर्वाणप्रदीपस्येव सर्वनाशमभ्युपगच्छतां कोऽस्माकमभ्युपगमविरोधलक्षणो दोषः ?-न कश्चिदपीति परामिप्राय इति ॥ ४६८ ॥ (२०१६)

D C—Prabhāsa—Since a bodiless person is absolutely perished it is not-existent like *kharasringa*. It is therefore clear that such bodiless persons are not affected by happiness or misery and likes or dislikes. Consequently there would be no harm in accepting the absolute destruction of a soul which has attained *mokṣa*. # 468 # (2016)

In reply to this *Bhagavan* explains the real interpretation of the *Veda-padas* such as " *Na ka vaṣ* ' etc and proceeds.

वेयवयाण य अस्य न सुद्धु जाणसि इमाण त सुणसु ।
असरीरव्वपसो अभणो व सओ निसेहओ ॥ ४६९ ॥ (२०१७)
ननिसेहओ य अन्नम्मि तव्विहे चेव पच्चओ जेण ।
तेणासरीरग्गहणे जुत्तो जीवो न खरसिंग ॥ ४७० ॥ (२०१८)

Veyvavāṇa ya attham na suṭṭhu jānasi imāṇa tam suṇasu ।

A sa sarīravvapaso adhaṇo vva sa o nisehā o # 469 # (2017)

Nan nisehā o y annammi tavvihe ceva pacchā o jena ।

Tena asarīragrahaṇe jutto jīvo na kharasīṅgam # 470 # (2018)

[वेदपदानां चाऽनं सुद्धु जानाम्येषां तं शृणु ।

अक्षरीरव्यपदेषो धन इव सतो निषेधात् ॥ ४६९ ॥ (२०१७)

नाननिषेधतमान्यस्मिन्तद्विध एव प्रत्ययो येन ।

तेनाक्षरीरग्रहणे युक्तो जीवो न खरशृङ्गम् ॥ ४७० ॥ (२०१८)

Veda-padanām cartham na suṭṭhu jānasyeṣāṇi tam śṛṇu ।

Aśarīravvapadeśo dhana iva sato niseḍhaṭ # 469 # (2017)]

Nanniseḍhataśānyasminstadvīdha eva pratyayo yena ।

Tenaśarīragrahaṇe yukto jīvo na kharasīṅgam # 470 # (2018)]

Trans—469-470 You do not properly understand the (real) meaning of those sentences of *Vedas* It is this Hear please Like ‘*a-dhana*,’ the word *a-śarīra* is meant to denote the negation of an existent object By (means of) negation due to ‘*na*’, (its) existence would be found in another of the same type In understanding the word ‘*a-śarīra*’, it is better, therefore, to accept (the existence of) *jīva* and not (its non-existence like) *kharaśrnga*. (2017-2018)

टीका-आयुष्मन् ! प्रभास ! न केवलं युक्तिम्, वेदपदानाममीषामर्थं च त्वं सुष्ठु न जानामि, ततस्तं शृणु “ न ह वै० ” इत्यादि पूर्वार्धं सुगमत्वाद्वात्र गाथाद्वये न व्याख्यातम्, तदपि सुखप्रतिपत्त्यर्थं व्याख्यायते—‘ न ’ इति निपातो निषेधार्थः । ‘ ह ’ ‘ वै ’ इत्येतदपि निपातद्वयं हिशब्दार्थत्वाद् यस्मादर्थे । सह शरीरेण वर्तत इति सशरीरो जीवस्तस्य सशरीरस्येत्यत्रैवकारो द्रष्टव्यः । ततश्चायमर्थः—यस्मात् सशरीरस्य जीवस्य प्रिया-ऽप्रिययोः सुख-दुःखयोरपहतिर्विधातोऽन्तरं नास्ति, न त्वशरीरस्य; तस्मादशरीरं शरीर-रहितं मुक्त्यवस्थायां वसन्तं लोकान्तस्थितं जीवं प्रिया-ऽप्रिये सुख-दुःखे न स्पृशतः । इदमुक्तं भवति—यावदयं जीवः मशरीरः, तावत् सुखेन दुःखेन वाऽन्यतरेण कदाचिदपि न मुच्यते; अशरीरस्त्वसौ क्षीणवेदनीयत्वात् सुख-दुःखाभ्यां कदाचिदपि न स्पृश्यत इति । एवंभूते चास्य वाक्यस्यार्थे सति योऽयमशरीरव्यपदेशः, असौ सत एव विद्यमानस्यैव जीवस्य मुक्त्यवस्थायां विधीयते, न तु सर्वथा नष्टस्य । कुतः ? इत्याह—निषेधात् । इह यो यस्य निषेधः स तस्य सत एव विधीयते, न त्वमतः, यथाऽधन इति, अत्र सत एव देवदत्तस्य धननिषेधो विधीयते, न त्वसतः खरविषाणस्य ।

आह—न विद्यते शरीरं यस्येत्येवं निषेधादन्यपदार्थे जीव एव कथं प्रतीयते ? इत्याह—“ ननिसेहो य इत्यादि ” व्याख्यातो विशेषप्रतिपत्तेः पर्युदास-वृत्तिना नञा निषेधो नञ्निषेधस्तस्माद् नञ्निषेधात् कारणात् सशरीरादन्य-स्मिस्तद्विध एव शरीरमदृशे कस्मिंश्चिदन्यपदार्थे संप्रत्ययो विज्ञेयः, यथा “ न ब्राह्मणोऽब्राह्मणः ” इत्युक्ते ब्राह्मणसदृशः क्षत्रियादिरेव गम्यते, न

तु तुच्छरूपोऽभावः । उक्तं च—“नञिवयुक्तमन्यसदृशाधिकरणे लोके तथा
 सर्षगतिः ” इति । इह च क्षरीरसदृशोऽक्षरीरो जीव एव गम्यते, द्वयोरप्यु-
 पयोगरूपत्वेन सदृशत्वात् । न चेह क्षरीरं सादृश्यभाषकम्, तस्य जीवेन सह
 क्षीर-नीरन्यापतो लोलीभूतत्वेनैकत्वादिति । तदेव येन यस्मात् कारणात्
 नञिनेषादन्यस्मिस्तद्विष एषान्यपदार्थे संप्रत्ययो भवति, तेन यस्मात्
 कारणात् “अक्षरीरं वा वसन्त” इत्यत्राक्षरीरग्रहणे जीव एवाक्षरीरो युज्यते,
 न तु स्वरविषाणं तुच्छरूपोऽभाव इत्यर्थः । तदेवमक्षरीरमिति व्याख्यातम् ॥
 ४६९-४७० ॥ (२०१७-२०१८)

D C—Bhagavan.—O Prabhava! Really you do not understand the proper meaning of the sentences such as “*Na ha vaḥ*” etc. In this sentence the particle *na* denotes negation and the particles *ha* and *vaḥ* are used in the ablative sense “*Sa-sarīrasya* means to a soul having a body and *prīya-prīyayorapahatirasti*” denotes the destruction of happiness and misery. The whole sentence will be interpreted as follows—

Jīva being possessed of a body has no *abhāva* of *sukha-duḥkha*. In the same way *Jīva* existing in a bodiless state of
 never undergoes *sukha-duḥkha* : e. As long as soul is
 ed in a body it has to undergo *sukha-duḥkha* but
 || *multātmā* is free from *Karma*-good or bad-it
 || *sukha-duḥkha*

In the word “*sa-sarīra*” here there is a negation of the body and not of the soul. In the expression “*Adhamo Devadatta*” the riches are denied to the *vidyamāna Devadatta* and not to an *a vidyamāna kharasṅga*. Similarly here also the existence of soul is not denied but only that of body is denied. That which is denied must belong to an existent source and not to a non-existent source.

Prabhava.—How could it be believed that that which is denied at one place must be found at another ?

Bhagavān.—Just as by the word “*na-brāhmana*” a non-brahmin like a *ksatriya* or a *vaśīya* is understood, but the absolute *abhāva* of *brāhmana* as a whole, is not meant. So also, the expression “*a-s'arīra*” signifies a bodiless *mukta jīva* of the type of *mukta jīva* having body, but that does not absolutely deny the existence of soul. There is resemblance in both owing to the common property of *upacāra*.

Moreover, “*s'arīra*” does not come in the way of resemblance. As body is mixed with soul like milk and water, it is one and the same as soul. Thus, by the denial of the particle ‘*na*’, the same soul is apprehended at another place but the existence of soul is never denied thereby. So, the word ‘*a-s'arīra*’ denotes nothing but *jīva* which is *vidyamāna* like *Devadatta*, and not *a-vidyamāna* like *kharas'ringa* ॥ 469-470 ॥ (2017-2018)

The expression “*Vā vasantam*” is now explained —

जं व वसंतं संतं तमाह वासद्दओ सदेहं पि ।

न फुसेज्ज वीयरायं जोगिणमिट्ठे—यरविसेसा ॥ ४७१ ॥ (२०१९)

Jam va vasantam santam tamāha vāsddaō sadeham pi ।
Na phusejja viyarāyam joginamitthe—yaravisesā ॥ 471 ॥ (2019)

[यद् वा वसन्तं सन्तं तमाह वाशब्दतो सदेहमपि ।

न स्पृशेयुर्वीतरागं योगिनमिट्ठे—तरविशेषाः ॥ ४७१ ॥ (२०१९)

Yad vā vasantam santam tamāha vāśabdato sadehamapi ।
Na sprīseyur vitarāgam yoginamitthe—taraviśeśaḥ ॥ 471 ॥ (2019)]

Trans—471 Happiness and misery do not affect him who is existing in a free state and also by the word ‘*vā*’ (they do not affect) a dispassionate ascetic having a body. (2019)

टीका—यस्माच्चाशरीरम् । कथंभूतम् ? । वसन्त लोकाग्रे निवसन्तं तिष्ठन्तमिति यावत् । अनेन वसनविशेषणेन तमशरीरशब्दवाच्यमर्थं सन्तं

विद्यमानमाह, न त्वसञ्चलम्, वसनस्य सद्वर्त्मत्वात् । तस्मात् कथं जीवनाश
रूपं निर्वाणं स्यात् ? न कवलमञ्चरीरं मुक्तम्, किन्तु वाञ्छन्दात् सदेहमपि
सञ्चरीरमपि वीतराग-धीजोषश्चमोहयोगिनं परमसमाधिमन्तं भवस्यमपि न
स्पृशेयुः । क ? । इष्टे-तरविशेषाः सुख-दुःखमेवा इत्यर्थः ॥४७१॥ (२०१९)

D C—A bodiless *mukta* being is not affected by the
sukha-dukkha bheda. The word *va* includes dispassionate
ascetics having bodies ॥ 471 ॥ (2019)

Also

वाव चि वा निषाओ वासद्वरथो भवतमिह सत ।
बुज्झाज्व सि व सत नाणाइविसिट्टमववाह ॥४७२॥ (२०२०)

Vāva tti vā nivāō vāsaddattho bhavantamiha santam ।
Bujjāva va tti va santam nāṇāvisittamavavāha ॥ 472 ॥ (2020)

[वावेति वा निपातो वाञ्छन्दार्थो भवन्तमिह सन्तम् ।
बुध्यस्याज्वेति वा सन्तं ज्ञानादिविशिष्टमववाह्य ॥ ४७२ ॥ (२०२०)

Vaveti vā nipāto vāśabdārtho bhavantamiha santam ।
Budhyasya vōti vā santam jñānādiviśiṣṭamavavāha ॥ 472 ॥ (2020)]

Trans—472 Or “*vāva*” is a particle meaning “Or and
means a soul existing (In the *mukta* state) Or
tak a particle and *santam* meaning (a soul)
character (the qualities of) knowledge, etc. (2020)

टीका—‘ वा ’ इत्यथवा ‘ वाव ’ इत्यथ चञ्चो निपातः, स च
वाञ्छन्दार्थः । ततश्चाञ्चरीरं सन्तं भवन्तं मुक्तौ विद्यमानं जीवं त्रिधा—जग्नि-
न स्पृशतः, वाञ्छन्दात् सञ्चरीरमपि वीतरागं न तं स्पृशतः । यदिवा,
‘ वसन्तम् ’ इत्यन्यथा व्याख्यायते—“ बुज्झाज्व सि वेत्त्यादि ” “ वा ”
इत्यववाह्यमर्थः । “ वाव संतं ति ” रक्षण-गति-प्रीत्यादिविषेकोनविंशता-
वर्षेध्वववाहः पठ्यते । गत्यर्थाच्च घातयो ज्ञानार्था अपि भवन्ति । ततश्चाह-
विनेय ! स्वमेव बुध्यस्व । किं तत् ? इत्याह—अञ्चरीरं सन्तं बुध्यववाह्यं

विद्यमानं जीवम्; अथवा, ज्ञानादिभिर्गुणैर्विशिष्टं सन्तमित्याह ब्रूते, प्रिया-
ऽप्रिये न स्पृशतः; वाशब्दात् सशरीरमपि वीतरागमिति तथैवेति ॥ ४७२ ॥
(२०२०)

D C—The expression “*vā vasantam* could be dissolved as *vāva santam*, the particle *vāva* meaning “or” and *santam* meaning a bodiless *jīva* existing in the *moksa* state The word *vāva* here will signify that *sukha-dukkha* do not touch not only a bodiless *jīva* existing in a *moksa* state, but also the dispassionate ascetics having bodies.

Or, the expression could be dissolved as *vā ava santam* also. The prefix *ava* has nineteen different meanings such as to protect, to go, to love etc Since a root signifying motion signifies knowledge also, a bodiless soul existing in the *mukta* state and characterized by the qualities of cognizance etc, is not affected by *sukha-dukkha* Here also, the word ‘*vā*’ brings in the dispassionate *sa-dehi* ascetic ॥ 472 ॥ (2020)

The opponent asks—

न वसंतं अवसंतं ति वा मई नासरीरगहणाओ ।

फुसणाविसेसनं पि य जओ मयं संतविसयं ति ॥४७३॥ (२०२१)

Na vasantam a-vasantam ti vā mai nāsarīragahanāō ।

Phusanāvisesanam pi ya jaō mayam santavisayam ti ॥473॥ (2021)

[न वसन्तमवसन्तमिति वा मतिर्नाशरीरग्रहणात् ।

स्पर्शनाविशेषणमपि च यतो मतं सद्विषयमिति ॥ ४७३ ॥ (२०२१)

Na vasantamavasantamiti vā matirnāsarīragrahanāt ।

Sparsanāvisesanamapi ca yato matam sadvisayamiti ॥473॥(2021)]

Trans—473 Or, it may be dissolved as “*na vasantam iti avasantam*” meaning thereby ‘not existing (anywhere)’ (But) it is not proper (Since) *jīva* is understood from ‘*a-śarira*’ Moreover, the adjective ‘*sparsanā*’ is also accepted with regard to existent objects (only) (2021)

विद्यमानमाह, न त्वसञ्ज्ञम्, वसनस्य सद्वर्त्तत्वात् । तस्मात् कथं जीवनाद्य
रूपं निर्वाणं स्यात् ? न कवलमञ्जरीरं मुक्तम्, किन्तु वाञ्छन्दात् सदेहमपि
सञ्जरीरमपि वीतराग-क्षीणोपश्रममोहयोगिनं परमसमाधिमन्तं यवस्थमपि न
स्पृशेयुः । क ? । इष्टे-उरविशेषाः सुख-दुःखमेवा इत्यर्थः ॥४७१॥ (२०१९)

D O—A bodiless *mukta* being is not affected by the
sukha-dukkha bheda. The word *eva* includes dispassionate
ascetics having bodies ■ 471 ■ (2019)

Also

वाव त्ति वा निवाओ वासद्वस्थो भवतमिह सत्त ।
बुद्धाज्ज वत्ति व सत्त नाणादिविसिट्ठमहवाह ॥४७२॥ (२०२०)

Vāva tti vā nivāō vāsaddattho bhavantamiha santam ।
Bujjhāva vti va santam nānāvisittṭhamahavāha ■ 472 ■ (2020)

[वावेति वा निपातो वाञ्छन्दायो भवन्तमिह सन्तम् ।

बुध्यस्वाज्जेति वा सन्तं ज्ञानादिविशिष्टमववाह ॥ ४७२ ॥ (२०२०)

Vaveti va nipato vāśabdārtho bhavantamiha santam ।
Bodhyasvā vti va santam jñanādiviśiṣṭamathava tha ■ 472 ■ (2020)]

Trans—472 Or “*vāva*” is a particle meaning “Or and
means a soul existing (in the *mukta* state). Or
tik a particle and *santam* meaning (a soul)
chara t t (the qualities of) knowledge, etc. (2020)

टीका—‘ वा ’ अन्यथा ‘ वाव ’ इत्ययं छन्दो निपातः, स च
वाञ्छन्दायः । ततश्चाञ्जरीरं सन्तं भवन्तं मुक्तौ विद्यमानं जीव प्रिया-ऽप्रिये
न स्पृशतः, वाञ्छन्दात् सञ्जरीरमपि वीतरागं न तं स्पृशतः । यदिवा,
‘ वसन्तम् ’ इत्यन्यथा व्याख्यायते—“ बुद्धाज्ज वत्ति वेत्यादि ” “ वा ”
इत्यववाहस्यमर्थः । “ वाव सन्तं ति ” रक्षण-गति-प्रीत्यादिभ्येकोनविंशता-
पर्येष्वववाहः पठ्यते । गत्यर्थाच्च घातयो ज्ञानार्था अपि भवन्ति । ततश्चाह-
विनेय ! स्वमेवं बुध्यस्व । किं तत् ? इत्याह—अञ्जरीरं सन्तं बुध्यवस्थायां

would have lost its sense as found in the case of assertions like " *Sukha-duḥkha* do not affect the *vandhyāputra*.' The adjective, therefore, is befitting ' *as'arīra* ' only if it means " *mukta-jīva* ' Your interpreting the expression by dissolving it as, ' *vā a-rasantam* ' is thus useless, while our interpretation is perfectly proper This proves the existence of *mokṣa* which separates *jīva* and *kāmana s'arīra* and that of *mukta-jīva* also If the existence of *jīva* were denied, *Veda-vacanas* would prove worthless as shown above. || 473 || (2021)

The opponent said—

एवं पि होज्ज मुत्तो निस्सुह—दुक्खत्तणं तु तदवत्थं ।
तं नो पिय—ऽप्पियाइं जम्हा पुण्णे—यरकयाइं ॥४७४॥ (२०२२)
नाणाऽबाहत्तणओ न फुसंति वीयराय—दोसस्स ।
तस्स पियमप्पियं वा मुत्तसुहं को पसंगोऽत्थ ? ॥४७५॥ (२०२३)

Evam pi hojja mutto nissuha-dukkhattanam tu tadavattham ।
Tam no piya-'ppiyāim jamhā punne-yarakayāim ॥ 474 ॥ (2022)
Nānā'bāhattanaḍ na phusanti viyarāya-dosassa ।
Tasya ppiyamappiyam vā muttasuham ko pasango'ttha ? ॥475॥

[एवमपि भवेद् मुक्तो निःसुख—दुःखत्वं तु तदवस्थम् ।
तद् नो प्रिया—ऽप्रिये यस्मात् पुण्ये—तरकृते ॥ ४७४ ॥ (२०२२)
ज्ञानाऽनाबाधत्वतो न स्पृशतो वीतराग—द्वेषस्य ।
तस्य प्रियमप्रियं वा मुक्तसुखं कः प्रसङ्गोऽत्र ? ॥४७५॥ (२०२३)

Evamapi bhaved mukto nīhsukha-duhkhatvam tu tadavastham ।
Tad no priya-'priye yasmāt punye-tarakṛite ॥ 474 ॥ (2022)]
Jñāna'nābadhatvato na spṛśato vītarāga-dveśasya ।
Tasya priyamapriyam vā muktasukham kaḥ prasango'tra ? ॥475॥

Trans—474-475 Such being a *mukta* soul, it will have no ha ess and ery (But) it is not (so), as likes and

टीका—“अक्षरीरं वावसन्त” इत्यत्र लुप्तस्याकारस्य दशनाद् “न वसन्तमवसन्तं काप्यतिष्ठन्तम्” इति व्याख्यानतो नास्ति मुक्त्यवस्थायां जीवः, काप्यवसनात्, असत्त्वादेव च नामु प्रिया-ऽप्रिये स्पृशत इति परस्य मतिर्भवेत् । तदेतद् न । कुतः ? इत्याह—अक्षरीरग्रहणात् । एतदुक्तं भवति—“न विद्यते क्षरीरं यस्य” इत्यत्र पर्युदामनिषेधात् पूर्वोक्तयुक्त्या मुक्त्यवस्थायामक्षरीरो जीवो गम्यते, इत्यतोऽप्राकारप्ररूपव्याख्यानं कर्तुं न पार्यते, अक्षरीरग्रहणाद् मुक्तौ जीवसिद्धेः । किञ्च, ‘प्रिया-ऽप्रिये न स्पृशतः’ इति यदक्षरीरस्य स्पर्शनाविशेषणं तदपि यस्मात् सद्विषयमेव मतम्, तस्माद् न मुक्तौ जीवस्याभावः । यदि अक्षरीरशब्दस्य जीवाभावो वाच्यः स्यात् तदा तं प्रिया-ऽप्रिये न स्पृशत इति विशेषणमनर्थकं स्यात् । न हि “व-व्यापुत्र प्रिया-ऽप्रिये न स्पृशतः” इति विश्लेष्यमाणं विराजते । तस्माद् मुक्त्यवस्थो जीव एवाक्षरीरशब्दवाच्यः, न पुनस्तदभावः । ततो नाकारप्ररूपव्याख्यानं युज्यत इति । तदेव “अक्षरीरं वा वसन्तं” इत्यनेन जीवकार्मणक्षरीरवियोग लक्षणस्य मोक्षस्य मुक्तजीवसत्त्वस्य चामिषानात् तन्निषेधं कुर्वतस्तद्वाम्युप गमविरोध एवेति ॥ ४७३ ॥ (२०२१)

D C—Prabhāsa—If you can dissolve the expression as done above I can also dissolve the expression at my will and fill the meaning in my favour. This, in no way leads to the existence of *śakṣa*. For by dissolving “*a-s arīram*” it is *a-s arīram* or *a-s arīram* I can interpret it as (soul) not existing at any place and thus prove *jīva* is distant from *muktavasthā*, proving thereby the the negation of *jīva* as well as *jīva*.

Bhagavan.—Your interpretation does not fit in properly. By interpreting *a-s arīram* as one having no body *vidyamanatā* of *jīva* in the *muktavasthā* is clearly understood. It is not proper therefore to interpret it in another way by prefixing “*a*”

Secondly in the sentence “*Sukha-duḥkha na sruṣṭa atah*” *sruṣṭa* becomes the adjective of *as arīram*. If *as arīram* were meant to denote the negation of soul the adjective

would have lost its sense as found in the case of assertions like “*Sukha-duḥkha* do not affect the *vandhyāputra*.” The adjective, therefore, is befitting ‘*as’arīra*’ only if it means ‘*mukta-jīva*’ Your interpreting the expression by dissolving it as, ‘*vā a-vasantam*’ is thus useless, while our interpretation is perfectly proper This proves the existence of *mokṣa* which separates *jīva* and *kāmana s’arīra* and that of *mukta-jīva* also If the existence of *jīva* were denied, *Veda-vacanas* would prove worthless as shown above. || 473 || (2021)

The opponent said—

एवं पि होज्ज मुत्तो निस्सुह—दुक्खत्तणं तु तदवत्थं ।
तं नो पिय—ऽप्पियाइं जम्हा पुण्णे—यरकयाइं ॥४७४॥ (२०२२)
नाणाऽबाहत्तणओ न फुसंति वीयराय—दोसस्स ।
तस्स प्पियमप्पियं वा मुत्तसुहं को पसंगोऽत्थ ? ॥४७५॥ (२०२३)

Evam pi hojja mutto nissuha-dukkhattanam tu tadavattham ।
Tam no piya-’ppiyāim jamhā punne-yarakayāim || 474 || (2022)
Nānā’bāhattanaō na phusanti vīyarāya-dosassa ।
Tasya ppiyamappiyam vā muttasuham ko pasango’ttha ? ||475||

[एवमपि भवेद् मुत्तो निःसुख-दुःखत्वं तु तदवस्थम् ।
तद् नो प्रिया-ऽप्रिये यस्मात् पुण्ये—तरकृते ॥ ४७४ ॥ (२०२२)
ज्ञानाऽनाबाधत्वतो न स्पृशतो वीतराग-द्वेषस्य ।
तस्य प्रियमप्रियं वा मुक्तसुखं कः प्रसङ्गोऽत्र ? ॥४७५॥ (२०२३)

Evamapi bhaved mukto nīhsukha-duhkhātvaṃ tu tadavastham ।
Tad no priyā-’priye yasmāt punye-tarakṛite || 474 || (2022)]
Jñāna’nābādhatvato na spṛśato vītarāga-dveśasya ।
Tasya priyamapriyam vā muktasukham kaḥ prasango’tra ? ||475||

Trans—474-475 Such being a *mukta* soul, it will have no happiness and misery (But) it is not (so), as likes and

dislikes are produced from sinful or virtuous deeds. Moreover likes and dislikes cannot affect a dispassionate (person) owing to his (high) knowledge and irresistibility. He enjoys natural and perfect happiness. So, what is the sense in asserting the negation of happiness ? (2022-2023)

टीका-एवमुक्तप्रकारेण मुक्तो जीवो भवेदित्यकामैरप्यभ्युपगतं मस्मामि, तथा च सति जीवस्य कर्मविभोगलक्षणो मोक्षः, तत्र जीवस्य च सिद्धम् । यत्तु निःसुख-दुःस्वत्वं सिद्धस्य मया प्रेरितं तत् “ प्रिया-ऽप्रिये अक्षरीरं न स्पृशतः ” इति वचनात् तदवश्यमेव । अत्रोच्यते-तदेतद् न, यस्मात् पुण्य-पापकर्मजनिते एव जीवानां प्रिया-ऽप्रिये सांसारिकसुख-दुःखे भवतः । ते च त स्त्रीनिःश्रेयपुण्य-पापकर्माणि सकलसंसारार्णवपारप्राप्तं मुक्तात्मानं न स्पृशत इत्युच्यते-गायानां सवधः । न चैतावता तस्य निःसुखत्वमिति स्वयमेव द्रष्टव्यम् । कुतः ? इत्याह-“ नाप्येत्यादि ” ज्ञानत्वे सत्यं नापाधरूपत्वादित्यर्थः । यच्च तद् मुक्तस्य सुखं मुक्तसुखं स्वामाधिकं निष्प्रतीकारं निरुपमं च । “ मुक्तस्तं परं सोऽस्त्वं नापा-ऽनापाहो जहा मुषिणो ” इत्यादिना प्रागेव साधितम्, तत् तस्य वीतराग-द्वेषस्य मुक्तात्मनो न प्रियं न पुण्यजनितं सुखं भण्यते, न चाप्रियं न पापजनितं दुःखं भण्यते, किन्तु वेदाभ्यां सवध्या विलक्षणम्, अकर्मजनितत्वेन स्वामाधिकत्वात् निष्प्रतीकाररूपत्वात्, निरुपमत्वात्, अप्रतिपादितत्वाच्चेति ।

ननु को परमोऽयं सिद्धिः ? “ अक्षरीरं प्रिया-ऽप्रिये न स्पृशतः ” इत्युक्तं का त्र मन्तात्मनि मुक्तसुखाभासप्रसङ्गः ?-न कश्चिदित्यर्थः, पुण्य-पापजनितप्रिया- । यथास्मादेव तस्य सुखरामेष भावात् । तस्मात् “ न ह वै सक्षरीरस्य० ” इत्यादिष्वदप्यैवोक्तनीत्या जीव-कर्मण्यक्षरीरविरहलक्षणो मोक्षः, मुक्तावस्थस्य च जीवस्य सम्बन्धः, तथा, “ अक्षरीरं प्रिया-ऽप्रिये न स्पृशतः ” इत्येतोऽपि वचनात् पुण्य-पापक्षयसमुत्पत्त्या स्वामाधिकम्, अप्रतिपादितं सुखं चास्य, इत्येतद्विषयं सिद्धम् । अत एव तदनभ्युपगच्छतस्तवाभ्युपगमविरोध इति स्थितम् ।

यदपि “ अरामयं वैतत् सर्वं यदभिहोत्रम् ” इत्येतस्मात् वाक्यात् मोक्ष

हेतुक्रियारम्भयोग्यकालाभावाद् मोक्षाभावं शङ्कसे; तदप्ययुक्तम्, तदर्थपरिज्ञानात्। तस्य ह्ययमर्थः—यदेतदग्निहोत्रं तद् यावज्जीवं सर्वमपि कालं कर्तव्यम्, वाशब्दाद् मुमुक्षुभिर्मोक्षहेतुभूतमप्यनुष्ठानं विधेयमिति। इत्येवं वेदपदोक्तद्वारेण युक्तिभिश्च प्रसाधितो मोक्षः। छिन्नश्च प्रभासस्य तत्संशयः ॥ ४७४-४७५ ॥
(२०२२-२०२३)

D C—Prabhāsa—I grant the existence of *muktātmā*, *mokṣa*, and soul as such But according to the *Veda-vacanas* that *siddha* beings are free from happiness and misery, likes and dislikes will not affect the bodiless soul, consequently, a *muktātmā* will have no experience of happiness

Bhagavān—*Priya* and *a-priya* and hence *sukha* and *duḥkha* are produced by *punya-pāpas* from which *muktātmā* is free But this in no way, means that *muktātmā* has no scope for the experience of happiness Since *muktātmā* is, highly cognizant and perfectly irresistible owing to its being free from *rāga-dveṣa*, it enjoys the highest and most natural happiness which never vanishes

Or, it is no use discussing about the negation of happiness to a *mukta* being, by saying that likes and dislikes do not affect the bodiless *Muktātmā* will thus have no experience of the mundane *sukha-duḥkha*, because it is always free from likes and dislikes Thus, the sentences of *Vedas* such as *Na ha vaṁ sa-s'arīrasya* etc establish, O blessed *Prabhāsa* ' the existence of *mokṣa*, *jīva*, and the immutable happiness of *muktātmā* at the removal of *punya-pāpa*

Lastly, the sentence that “*Jarāmarīyam vartat sarvaṁ yadagnihotraṁ*” means that one should practise *agnihotra* etc, till the end of life

Your suspicion about the existence of *mokṣa* generated from this sentence (as the time of beginning the performance has not been mentioned in it) is out of place The sentence really means as follows —

One should perform sacrifice throughout the life at all times. The word *va* here signifies that he who aspires for *mokṣa* should also perform the sacrifice which acts as the *hetu* of their *mokṣa*. Thus the *Tīrthankara* removes the doubt of *Prabhāsa* ॥ 474-475 ॥ (2022-2023)

Then,

छिन्नमि ससयम्मी जिणेण जर-मरणविप्पमुक्केण ।
सो समणो पवइओ तिहि ओ सह खण्डियसएहिं ॥४७६॥ (२०२४)

Chinnammi samsayammi Jinena jara-marana-vippamukkenam ।
So samano pavvaï tihī o saha khandiyasāhim ॥ 476 ॥ (2024)

[छिन्ने संशये जिनेन जरा-मरणविप्रमुक्केन ।

स भ्रमणः प्रव्रजितस्त्रिभिस्तु सह खण्डिकस्यैः ॥ ४७६ ॥ (२०२४)

Chinne samāye Jinena jarā-marana-vipramukkena ।
Sa bramaṇah pravrajitastribhistu saha khaṇḍikasāyēḥ ॥476॥(2024)

Trans—476 When the doubt was thus removed by the *Tīrthankara* who was entirely free from old age and death that saint accepted *dīkṣā* along with his three hundred pupils (2024)

End of the Discussion with the Eleventh Gaṇadhara.



Corrections.

<i>Page</i>	<i>Line</i>	<i>Incorrect</i>	<i>Correct</i>
9-12	1-6	pramāna	pramāna
12	5	the soul cannot	the soul, it cannot
24	23	Nānadao	Nānadao
25	2	mūtra	mūrta
30	20	care	case
103	last line	is	in
125	23	mūtra	mūrta
128	23	jīvas	jīva
134	26	vastuviśesa	vastuviśesa
136	9	Knrman	Karman
144	15	naving	having
277	8	rasa	rasa
298		niskarānata	niskaranatā
384	16	tacca	taccattha
385	5-7-30	sinha	simha
389	7	āgacchi	āgacchanti
398	2	सर्वावरण क्षयादि	सर्वावरणक्षयादि
405	12	vayṇam	vayanam
430	23	कर्मकार्याणां	कर्मकार्याणां
438	16	a-śubhayoga	śubha yoga
440	20	is case of	in case of
445	1	Ganadharadavā	Ganadharavada
460	20	भवान्तर गमनलक्षणः	भवान्तरगमनलक्षणः
462	17	च शब्दो	चशब्दो

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